Jurisdiction

Q: Give examples of civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

Answer: IRR CARDS

Injunction
Rescission or annulment of contract Reformation of contract
Citizen Suit
Action for abatement of nuisance Action for revival of judgment
Declaratory Relief
Specific Performance

Q: Can a suit for injunction be aptly filed with the Supreme Court to stop the
President of the Philippines from entering into a peace agreement with the National Democratic
Front? (03 Bar Q11)

A: No. An action for injunction is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, the

Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the same, exclusive original jurisdiction being vested
in the RTC.

Ultimate Objective Test

Q: Andre filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila an action for specific
performance against Brent, a resident of Quezon City, to compel the latter to execute a deed of
conveyance covering a parcel of land situated in Quezon City having an assessed value of
P19,000.00. Brent received the summons and a copy of the Complaint on January 2, 2003. On
Jan. 10, 2003, Brent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction contending that the subject matter of the suit was incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The court issued an Order denying the motion. In due time, Brent filed with the
Regional Trial Court a Petition for Certiorari praying that the said Order be set aside because
the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case.

On February 13, 2003, Andre filed with the MeTC a motion to declare Brent in default.
The motion was opposed by Brent on the ground that his Petition for Certiorari was still
pending.

a) Was the denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint correct?

b) Resolve the Motion to Declare the Defendant in Default.

Answers:

a) The denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was correct.

The Supreme Court has held that even if the action is one for specific performance but the
ultimate objective of the plaintiff is to obtain title to real property, the action is a real action
and not one incapable of pecuniary estimation. (Ruby Shelters Builders vs. Formaran, G.R.
No. 175914, February 10, 2009; Gochan vs. Gochan, 423 Phil. 491 [2001]).
Here, the ultimate objective of Andre was to obtain title to the land. Hence the action is a
real one and since the assessed value does not exceed P20,000, the MeTC has jurisdiction.
 b) The Motion to Declare Defendant in Default should be granted.

The Supreme Court has held that the pendency of certiorari proceedings does not excuse
the defendant from filing an answer unless he has obtained a restraining order or injunction
suspending proceedings in the case. (China Bank vs. Oliver, 390 SCRA 263 [2002])

Here, the RTC did not issue any injunction or restraining order nor did Brent file an answer
within the reglementary period. Hence, it is proper for Brent to be declared in default.

Q: Olivia entrusted the owner’s duplicate certificate of title No. 105602 over her lot to his
broker Xander so as to subdivide the lot. Xander subdivided the lot into several titles. Xander
forged the signature of Olivia in a deed of sale and sold one of the lots covered by a title to
Bea. Bea then sold the lot to Chad. A new certificate of title No. 137466 was issued in the name
of Chad.

Olivia filed with the RTC an action for cancellation of the title of Chad. The complaint
alleged that the land was bought by Chad for P15,000.00.

Judgment was rendered in favor of Olivia. On appeal Chad moved to set aside the
judgment on the ground that the same was a real action and since the value of the land was
only P15,000.00, then the RTC did not have jurisdiction. May the RTC’s judgment be set aside
for lack of jurisdiction?

Suggested answer:

Yes. An action for cancellation of TCT is a real action where the court has to determine
which of two titles over the same lot is valid. In such a case, jurisdiction depends upon assessed
value. Since the complaint did not allege the assessed value, the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage even on appeal. (Padlan vs.
Dinglasan, March 20, 2013)
Q: Plaintiff filed with the MTC a case for unlawful detainer against the Defendant. The
Plaintiff averred that he had bought the property from the seller but had found that the
Defendant staying thereon, that he allowed Defendant to stay provided that Defendant will
immediately vacate the land upon Plaintiff’s prior notice that he will be needing the land, and
that Defendant refused to vacate despite notice to do so. The MTC rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the proof showed that the issue of
possession cannot be properly determined without setting the issue of ownership.

On appeal by the Plaintiff, the RTC agreed with the MTC that jurisdiction lies with the
RTC. The RTC then took cognizance of the case and rendered a decision in favor of the Plaintiff
ordering the Defendant to vacate the premises. On appeal by Defendant, the CA reversed and
set aside the RTC Decision. The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case for Plaintiff’s failure to allege the assessed value of the subject property and, as a
consequence, the assailed RTC Decision is null and void. Was the CA decision correct?
Suggested answer:

No. In real actions there is a need to allege the assessed value of the real property subject
of the action, or the interest therein, for purposes of determining which court (MTC or RTC)
has jurisdiction over the action. However, it must be clarified that this requirement applies only
if these courts are in the exercise of their original jurisdiction.

Here, the RTC was exercising its appellate, not original, jurisdiction when it took
cognizance of Plaintiff’s appeal and Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129 does not provide any amount
or value of the subject property which would limit the RTC’s exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction over cases decided by first level court. Clearly then, in the instant case, contrary to
the ruling of the CA, the assessed value of the disputed lot is immaterial for purposes of the
RTC’s appellate jurisdiction. Indeed, all cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable to
the RTC irrespective of the amount involved. Hence, the CA erred in nullifying the RTC
decision for lack of jurisdiction. (Arrienda vs. Kalaw, April 6, 2016)
 Rule 1 - General Provisions

Q: The Respondent offered to buy a parcel of land from the National Tobacco
Administration. The deed of sale was signed by Respondent and he paid the 20% down
payment but the Petitioners, officers of the NTA, refused to implement the sale. Respondent
thus filed against Petitioners a Petition for Mandamus with Damages. In the body of the
petition, the amount of the moral and exemplary damages and the attorney’s fees were
mentioned but they were not mentioned at all in the prayer. The Petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to pay the docket fees on the moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees. The Respondent then filed an amended petition specifying the amount of the damages and
fees in the prayer and also asking that the deed of sale executed by NTA in favor of Stanford
East Realty Corporation be declared void and a TCT in favor of Petitioner be issued. The trial
court, over the Petitioners’ objections, admitted the amended petition stating that the
Respondent had already paid the docket fee. Did the trial court act properly in admitting the
amended petition?

Suggested answer:

No. The trial court should have dismissed the petition pursuant to the ruling in
Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA, 149 SCRA 562, which had been rendered as far
back as 1987 and which states that the amount of damages claimed should be specified in the
body and in the prayer. It is unfortunate that up to this date, this ruling had been ignored. The
trial court had no power to admit the amended petition since it had no jurisdiction over the
original petition. What is more the amended petition seeks to recover interest over real property
at bottom and hence the Respondent should have specified the assessed value, or if none, the
estimated value thereof, to serve as a basis for the computation of the docket fee. Evidently,
there was an intent to evade payment of the correct docket fees. The amended petition should
be expunged and the civil case dismissed. (Siapno vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 132260, August 30,
2005)

Rule 2 - Cause of Action

Q: What is a cause of action?

Suggested answer:

It is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. (S2 R2). The facts
which give rise to a right of action.
Q: Reviera Golf Club Inc. (RGC) and CCA Holdings (CCA) entered into a 5-year
Management and Royalty Agreement whereby RGC agreed to pay CCA monthly management
and royalty fees for operating and managing the Riviera Golf Club. Just three years into the
contract, RGC preterminated the same on the ground of financial difficulties and alleged
violations by CCA of the agreement. CCA filed with the RTC of Makati City, a complaint for
collection of the unpaid management and royalty fees for services rendered against RGC. The
parties entered into a compromise agreement which became the basis of a compromise
judgment by the court. The compromise agreement contained a “non-waiver” clause wherein
the compromise agreement shall not be considered as a waiver of and is without prejudice to
CCA’s cause of action arising from the pre-termination of the Management and Royalty
Agreement.

Subsequently, CCA filed a second complaint against RGC for the expected business
profits it should have derived from the unexpired two-year term of the agreement but did not
because of the pretermination of the agreement. RGC filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of res judicata. CCA opposed the motion on the grounds that: (a) the two cases involve different
causes of action, and (b) the parties had stipulated in the “non-waiver” clause that the
compromise agreement was without prejudice to CCA’s cause of action arising from the
pretermination of the Management and Royalty Agreement. Should the motion to dismiss be
granted?

Suggested answer:

Yes.

a) Both the first and the second cases involve the same cause of action, that is, the breach
by RGC of the Management and Royalty Agreement. CCA confuses the reliefs sought
(collection of the unpaid management and royalty fees, and the claim for the expected
profits for the unexpired two-year term) with the cause of action. A cause of action may
give rise to several reliefs, but only one action can be filed. A single cause of action or
entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided into two or more different actions.
Here the single cause of action gave rise to two reliefs which should have been sought
by CCA in the first complaint. Hence, CCA was splitting its cause of action when it
brought the second complaint.

b) The stipulation is void for it in effect allows the plaintiff CCA to split its cause of action.
The provision on res judicata and against splitting of cause of action are based on public
policy. Hence the stipulation is repugnant to public policy and is thus void and
unenforceable. (Reviera Golf Club, Inc. vs. CCA Holdings, B.V., June 17, 2015)
Q: Define the following terms:
1) Right of action,
2) Relief,
3) Remedy, and
4) Subject matter.

1) Right of action. The remedial right or right to relief granted by law to a party to institute an
action against a person who has violated his right; the legal right to sue.
2) Relief. The redress or other measure which a plaintiff prays the court to order or adjudicate
in his favor.
3) Remedy. The form or type of action which the plaintiff may avail of in order to obtain relief
from the court.
4) Subject matter. The thing, act, contract, or property which is directly involved in the action,
concerning which the wrong has been done.

Joinder of causes of action

Q: Petitioner’s bus sideswiped a car owned by G. The cost of repair was P450,000.00. The
insurer paid G P60,000 and so the balance of P390,000 was shouldered by G. The insurer and
G filed a single complaint before the RTC of Las Pinas City against Petitioner wherein the
insurer claimed for P60,000 and G claimed for P390,000. The Petitioner filed an answer
wherein he contends that the RTC of Las Pinas does not have jurisdiction since the separate
claims of the insurer and G fall below the jurisdictional amount and joinder of the causes of
action was not proper. Does the Las Pinas RTC have jurisdiction?

Suggested answer:

Yes. The joinder of causes of action by the Plaintiffs was proper since the two cases
arose from a single transaction, that is, Petitioner’s bus hitting the rear side of the car and there
is also a common question of fact: whether or not the bus driver was negligent. Hence, we
apply the totality rule and thus the Las Pinas RTC would have jurisdiction since the aggregate
amount is Php450,000.00 (Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Standard Insurance, G.R. No.
140746, March 16, 2005)
 Rule 3 - Parties to Civil Action

Q: Respondents filed a complaint for nullification of sale and damages against the
Petitioner. The Respondents alleged that they are the grandchildren and successors-in-interest
of Udiaan and that an impostor sold Udiaan’s land to the Petitioner. The RTC rendered
summary judgment dismissing the complaint since the Respondents being the grandchildren
are not the real-parties-in-interest as they have no successional rights. On appeal, the CA
upheld the RTC’s findings that the Respondents are not real parties-in-interest but it also
nullified the deed of sale to Petitioner on the ground that Udiaan’s signature was forged.

a) Are the Respondent’s real parties-in-interest?

b) Was it proper for the CA to render judgment nullifying the deed of sale?

Answers

a) No, the respondents are not real parties-in-interest. As grandchildren, they have no
successional rights to the estate of Udiaan unless by virtue of the right of representation.
Since the repsondents did not show that their mother predeceased Udiaan, they have no
successional rights.

b) No. Having established that respondents are not the real parties in interest to the instant
suit, the proper course of action was for the CA to merely affirm the RTC’s dismissal of
their complaint. It therefore erred in proceeding to resolve the other substantive issues
of the case and granting one of the principal reliefs sought by respondents, which is the
declaration of the nullity of the questioned deed of absolute sale. (Ang vs. Pacunio, July
8, 2015)

Rule 4 - Venue

Q: Amando brings an action in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila against Bernardo for
the annulment of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale of real property with an assessed value of
P50,000 located in Laguna. The complaint alleged prematurity of the sale for the reason that
the mortgage was not yet due. Bernardo timely moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the action should have been brought in the RTC of Laguna. Decide with reasons. (2000 Bar
Q18a)
Suggested answer:
Insofar as the motion to dismiss is based on improper venue- since it argued that the
action should have been brought in Laguna – the same should be granted.
The action for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of property is a real action
since there has been a foreclosure sale and thus the action affects title to the real property
mortgaged. (Chua vs. Total Office Products & Services, September 30, 2005). Hence, the
venue lies in Laguna, the place where the real property is situated. [It should be filed with the
RTC of Laguna, since the assessed value exceeds P20,000.00].
DISCUSS pp 191-192
What is the venue of real actions?
What is the venue of personal actions?
Q: BPI Family Bank filed with the RTC of Makati an action to recover deficiency against
the real estate mortgagors after the extrajudicial foreclosure sale had resulted in a deficiency.
The realty mortgaged was located in Manila while BPI FB has its main office in Makati. The
mortgagors filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action, res
judicata, and waiver. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The mortgagors filed a motion
for reconsideration wherein they reiterated the previous grounds and added the ground of
improper venue, contending that the action for deficiency was a real action which should have
been brought in Manila. The motion for reconsideration was denied. The mortgagors went up
to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari. The CA granted the petition and ordered
the dismissal of the action on the ground of improper venue, holding it was a real action which
should have been filed in Manila. Was the CA’s decision correct?

Suggested answer:

No, the CA’s decision was not correct.

First, an action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage is a personal action since it does not affect title to or possession of real property or
any interest therein. Hence, the action was properly brought in Makati where the mortgagee
has its main office.

Second, even assuming that there was improper venue, the ground was waived by the
mortgagors since they did not timely raise it in their motion to dismiss. Here, the ground for
improper venue was raised belatedly in the motion for reconsideration, not in the motion
dismiss. Hence the objection was waived pursuant to S2, R9. (BPI Family Bank vs. Yujuico,
July 22, 2015)

Rule 5- Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts

Q: In an ejectment case, the court dismissed the complaint for failure of the plaintiff to
appear during the preliminary conference. The Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of
the dismissal order. The Defendant contends that the dismissal had become final and executory
since the motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and hence does not suspend the
reglementary period to appeal. Is the Defendant’s contention correct?

Suggested answer:

No. The motion for reconsideration prohibited under Section 19(C) of the Rule on
Summary Procedure is that which seeks reconsideration of a judgment rendered by the Court
after trial on the merits. The dismissal order is not a judgment on the merits after trial of the
case. (Lucas vs. Fabros, 324 SCRA 1).
 Rule 6 - Pleadings

Q: Plaintiff filed suit for nullification of a promissory note against the Defendant on the
ground of usurious and unconscionable interest rates. The Defendant counterclaimed for the
payment of the P1,000,000 loan with interest. He however did not pay the docket fees. Should
the counterclaim be dismissed for failure to pay docket fees?

Suggested answer:

No. The counterclaim for the payment of the loan with interest is compulsory since it
arises out of or is connected to the loan transaction subject of the complaint. The grant of the
counterclaim would necessarily negate or defeat the suit for nullification. Being compulsory,
there is no need to pay the filing fees thereon. (Tan vs. Kaakbay Finance Corp., G.R. No.
146595, June 20, 2003); Alba vs. Malapajo, January 13, 2016)

Q: Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) filed a petition for extrajudicial

foreclosure against the Petitioners who are the mortgagors. After the foreclosure sale, Shell
filed an action for the deficiency against the Petitioners with the RTC of Manila. Petitioners in
the meantime commenced an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure sale with the RTC of
Makati City. The Manila RTC ruled in favor of Shell. This judgment became final and
executory. Subsequently, the Makati RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioners and annulled the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The Makati RTC ruled that no auction sale was actually
conducted. Shell filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the Makati case should have
been dismissed on the ground of res judicata. The motion was denied and Shell appealed to the
CA. Should the Makati case have been dismissed?

Suggested answer:

Yes. The Makati case should have been earlier disallowed to proceed on the ground of
litis pendentia, or, once the decision in the Manila case became final, should have been
dismissed on the ground of being barred by res judicata. Petitioner’s claim for annulment of
the extrajudicial foreclosure case should have been set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the
Manila case. (Mendiola vs. Court of Appeals, July 18, 2012)
Q: Jim filed a complaint in the RTC of Quezon City for the collection of P300,000.00. The
defendant, Jim, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the action since the claimed amount of P300,000.00 is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. Before the court could resolve the
motion, Bong, without leave of court, amended his complaint to allege a new cause of action
consisting in the inclusion of an additional amount of P300,000.00, thereby increasing his total
claim to P600,000.000. Bong thereafter filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss claiming
that the RTC had jurisdiction over his action. Is Jim’s opposition to the motion to dismiss
sustainable?

ANSWER: Yes, Jim’s opposition to the motion to dismiss is sustainable. The motion to
dismiss should be denied. Basic is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading.
Under the Rules, a pleader may amend his pleading as a matter of right before the other party
has served his responsive pleading. (Sec. 2, Rule 10, Rules of Court) The court, in allowing the
amendment, would not be acting without jurisdiction because allowing an amendment as a
matter of right does not require the exercise of discretion. The court therefore would not be
"acting" and thus, could not have acted without jurisdiction. It would have been different had
the amendments been made after a responsive pleading had been served. The court then would
have been exercising its discretion in allowing or disallowing the amendment. It cannot do so
however, because it would be then acting on an amendment of a complaint over which it has
no jurisdiction. (Soledad v. Mamangun, G.R. No. L-17983, May 30, 1963; Gumabay v.
Baralin, G.R. No. L-30683, May 31, 1977; Prudence Realty v. CA, G.R. No. 110274, March
21, 1994)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER

The motion to dismiss should be granted. Jurisdiction must be conferred by the contents
of the original complaint. Amendments are not proper and should be denied where the court
has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer
jurisdiction on the court. (Rosario v. Carandang, G.R. No. L-7076, April 28, 1955) While a
plaintiff is entitled to amend the complaint before a responsive pleading is served (Sec. 2, Rule
10, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; Remington Industrial Sales Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 133657, May 29, 2002), still, a complaint cannot be amended to confer
jurisdiction on a court where there was none to begin with.
Q: Describe briefly at least four (4) modes of discovery under the Rules of Court.

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Five modes of discovery under the Rules of Court are:

1. DEPOSITION. By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or
over property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been
served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of
any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. (Sec. 1, Rule 23,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.)

2. INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES. Under the same conditions specified in section 1 of

Rule 23, any party shall file and serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories regarding
material and relevant facts to be answered by the party served. (Sec. 1, Rule 25, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.)

3. ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY. At any time after issues have been joined, a party
may file and serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the latter of the
genuineness of any material and relevant document or of the truth of any material and relevant
matter of fact. (Sec. 1, Rule 26, RoC)

4. PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS OR THINGS. Upon motion of any

party showing good cause therefore, a court may order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing of any designated documents, etc. or order any party
to permit entry upon designated land or property for inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. (Sec. 1,
Rule 27, 1997 Rule 27 Rules of Civil Procedure.)

5.PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION OF PERSONS. Rule 28

Q: In an admiralty case filed by Andrea against Y Shipping Lines (whose principal offices are
in Manila) in the RTC of Davao City, the court issued a subpoena duces tecum directing Jason,
the president of the shipping company, to appear and testify at the trial and to bring with him
several documents. Jason refused to comply with the subpoena duces tecum on the ground that
he resides more than 100 kilometers from Davao City, which the Court found justifiable. How
can Andrea take the testimony of Jason and present the documents as exhibits other than
through the subpoena from the RTC?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Andrea can take the testimony of Jason and present the documents as exhibits by taking
his deposition through oral examination or written interrogatories. (Rule 24; new Rule 23) He
may also file a motion for the production or inspection of documents. (Rule 27).

Jason can refuse to comply with the subpoena duces tecum on the ground that he resides
more than 50 (now 100) kilometers from the place where he is to testify, (Sec. 9 of former Rule
23; Sec. 10 of new Rule 21).
 The witness can also refuse to comply with the subpoena duces tecum on the ground that
the documents are not relevant and there was no tender of fees for one day's attendance and the
kilometrage allowed by the rules.

Q: The plaintiff sued the defendant in the RTC to collect on a promissory note, the terms of
which were stated in the complaint and a photocopy attached to the complaint as an annex.
Before answering, the defendant filed a motion for an order directing the plaintiff to produce
the original of the note so that the defendant could inspect it and verify his signature and the
handwritten entries of the dates and amounts. The judge granted the defendant’s motion for
production and inspection of the original of the promissory note, but the plaintiff failed to
comply with the court’s order. How should the defendant plead to the alleged execution of the
note?

ANSWER:

The defendant is not required to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of
the promissory note, because of the non-compliance by the plaintiff with the order for
production and inspection of the original thereof. (Rule 8, sec. 8).

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The defendant may file a motion to dismiss the complaint
because of the refusal of the plaintiff to obey the order of the court for the production and
inspection of the promissory note. [Rule 29 Sec. 3(c)].

Q: What is the "most important witness" rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of Pretrial
and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures?

Answer:

The “most important witness” rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of Pretrial and Use
of Deposition-Discovery Measures provides that the judge shall, during the pretrial conference,
determine the most important witnesses to be heard and limit the number of witnesses.
Q: What is the "one-day examination of witness" rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of
Pretrial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures?

ANSWER:

The “one-day examination of a witness” rule pursuant to the 2004 Guidelines of Pretrial
and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures provides that a witness has to be fully examined
in one day only, subject to the court’s discretion to extend the direct and/or cross-examination
for justifiable reasons.

Q: Linda, as mother and in her capacity as legal guardian of her legitimate minor son,
Habeas, brought action for support against Albert, as father of Habeas and Linda’s lawfully
wedded husband. Albert filed his answer denying his paternity with counterclaim for damages.
Subsequently, Linda filed a manifestation in court that in view of the denial made by Albert, it
would be futile to pursue the case against Albert. Linda agreed to move for the dismissal of the
complaint, subject to the condition that Albert will withdraw his counterclaim for damages.
Linda and Albert filed a joint motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the case with prejudice.
Later on, minor son Habeas, represented by Linda, filed another complaint for support against
Albert. Albert filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata.

(A) Is res judicata a valid ground for dismissal of the second complaint?
(B) What are the essential requisite of res judicata?

ANSWER: (A) No, res judicata is not a defense in an action for support even if the first case
was dismissed with prejudice on a joint motion to dismiss. The plaintiff’s mother agreed to the
dismissal of the complaint for support in view of the defendant’s answer denying his paternity
with a counterclaim for damages. This was in the nature of a compromise of the right of support
which is prohibited by law. (Art, 2035, Civil Code; De Asis v. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA
176 [1999]).

(b) The Essential Requisites of Res Judicata are: 1 the judgment or order rendered must be
final; 2 the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the
parties; 3 it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and 4. there must be between the two
cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. (San Diego
v. Cardona, 70 Phil, 281 [1940]
Q: Continental Chemical Corporation (CCC) filed a complaint for a sum of money against
Barstow Trading Corporation (BTC) for the latter’s failure to pay for its purchases of industrial
chemicals. In its answer, BTC contended that it refused to pay because CCC misrepresented
that the products it sold belonged to a new line, when in fact they were identical with CCC’s
existing products. To substantiate its defense, BTC filed a motion to compel CCC to give a
detailed list of the products’ ingredients and chemical components, relying on the right to avail
of the modes of discovery allowed under Rule 27. CCC objected, invoking confidentiality of
the information sought by BTC. Resolve BTC’s motion with reasons.

ANSWER:

I will deny the motion. The ingredients and chemical components of CCC‟s products
are trade secrets within the contemplation of the law. Trade secrets may not be the subject of
compulsory disclosure by reason of their confidential and privileged character. Otherwise,
CCC would eventually be exposed to unwarranted business competition with others who may
imitate and market the same kinds of products in violation of CCC‟s proprietary rights. Being
privileged, the detailed list of ingredients and chemical components may not be the subject of
mode of discovery under Rule 27, Section 1 which expressly makes privileged information an
exception from its coverage (Air Philippines Corporation vs. Pennswell, Inc., 540 SCRA 215
[2007]).

Q: What are the instances of dismissal due to the fault of the plaintiff?

Suggested Answer:

1)The plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the
complaint,
2) To prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or
3) To comply with these Rules or any order of the court.
Q: On March 4, 2007, Liza filed a complaint against Nyoy in the RTC of Quezon City.
Nyoy received the summons on March 10, 2007. For some reason, Liza had a change of heart
and filed a motion to dismiss the action on March 14, 2007. On the same day, and without
being served with a copy of Liza’s motion to dismiss, Nyoy filed and served to Liza his verified
answer to the complaint with counterclaim. The Court granted Liza’s motion. On April 3, 2007,
Nyoy filed a motion to declare Liza in default for her failure to file an answer on his
counterclaim. Liza argued that she was justified in not filing an answer because the case was
already dismissed by the court, including the counterclaim. Was Nyoy’s counterclaim
dismissed when Liza’s complaint was dismissed upon her own motion?

Answer: No. Nyoy’s counterclaim was not dismissed. The dismissal of the action on her motion
shall be limited to the complaint (Section 2, Rule 17). The counterclaim is not dismissed,
whether it is compulsory or a permissive counterclaim.

If a counterclaim has already been pleaded by the defendant prior to the service upon
him of the plaintiff‘s motion to dismiss, and the court grants said motion to dismiss, the
dismissal ― shall be limited to the complaint‖ (Sec. 2, Rule 17) . The phraseology of the
provision is clear: the counterclaim is not dismissed, whether it is a compulsory or a permissive
counterclaim because the rule makes no distinction. The defendant if he so desires may
prosecute his counterclaim either in a separate action or in the same action. Should he choose
to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action, he must notify the court of his preference
within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the plaintiff‘s motion to dismiss. Should he opt to
prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action, the court should render the corresponding order
granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint.

Q: Agatha filed a complaint against Yana in the RTC in Iligan City to collect
Php350,000.00, an amount representing the unpaid balance on the price of the car Yana had
bought from Agatha. A couple of weeks later and before she was served with the answer of
Yana, Agatha filed a notice of dismissal. The RTC issued an order confirming the dismissal.

Three months later, Agatha filed another complaint against Yana based on the same
cause of action in the same court. Again, for reasons personal to her, Agatha decided to have
the complaint dismissed without prejudice by filing a notice of dismissal prior to the service of
the answer of Yana. Hence, the case was dismissed. A month later, Agatha refiled the complaint
against Yana in the same RTC. May Yana successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar
Agatha’s third complaint? Explain your answer.

Answer: Yes. Yana may successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third
complaint. Under the Two-Dismissal Rule, the notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits provided it is filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court
an action based on or including the same claim. (S1, Rule 17)
Here, the first dismissal by the plaintiff was in a competent court as the RTC in Iligan
City has jurisdiction over the action. Hence, Agathat’s third complaint is barred by the Two-
Dismissal Rule.
The two-dismissal rule applies when the plaintiff has (a) twice dismissed actions, (b) based
on or including the same claim, (c) in a court of competent jurisdiction. The second notice of
dismissal will bar the refiling of the action because it will operate as an adjudication of the
claim upon the merits. In other words, the claim may only be filed twice, the first being the
claim embodied in the original complaint. Since as a rule, the dismissal is without prejudice,
the same claim may be filed. If the refiled claim or complaint is dismissed again through a
second notice of dismissal, that second notice triggers the application of the two-dismissal rule
and the dismissal is to be deemed one with prejudice because it is considered as an adjudication
upon the merits.

Q: Lilio filed a complaint in the Municipal Trial Court of Lanuza for the recovery of a sum
of money against Juan. The latter filed his answer to the complaint serving a copy thereof on
Lilio. After the filing of the answer of Juan, whose duty is to have the case set for pre-trial?
Why?

Suggested Answer: After the filing of the answer of Juan, the plaintiff has the duty to promptly
move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial. The reason is that it is the plaintiff who knows
when the last pleading has been filed and it is the plaintiff who has the duty to prosecute (Rule
18, Section 1)

Q: Warren, the defendant in a case, failed to attend the pre-trial conference despite
proper notice. The plaintiff’s counsel moved in open court that Warren be declared in default
due to his failure to attend the pre-trial, which the court granted. Was the Court correct is
declaring Warren in default?

Suggested Answer:
On the procedural aspect, the Court reiterates the rule that the failure to attend the pretrial
conference does not result in the default of an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, a defendant is only declared in default if he fails to file his Answer within the
reglementary period. On the other hand, if a defendant fails to attend the pretrial conference,
the plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte. There is no dispute that Spouses Salvador and
their counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference set on February 4, 2005 despite proper
notice. Spouses Salvador aver that their nonattendance was due to the fault of their counsel as
he forgot to update his calendar. This excuse smacks of carelessness, and indifference to the
pre-trial stage. It simply cannot be considered as a justifiable excuse by the Court. As a result
of their inattentiveness, Spouses Salvador could no longer present any evidence in their favor.
(Sps. Salvador v. S ps. Rabaja, GR No. 199990, 02/04/2015)
Q: Rolly filed a petition for declaration of the nullity of his marriage to Carmina because of
the alleged psychological incapacity of the latter. After trial, the court rendered judgment
dismissing the petition on the ground that Rolly failed to prove the psychological incapacity of
his wife. The judgment having become final, Rolly filed another petition for declaration of the
nullity of his marriage to Carmina, this time on the ground that his marriage to the latter had
been celebrated without a license. Carmina moved to dismiss the second petition on the ground
that the same is barred by the judgment in the first? Resolve the motion.

Suggested Answer: No, the second action is not barred by the judgment in the first because
they are different causes of action. The first is for annulment of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, while the second is for
declaration of nullity of marriage in view of the absence of a basic requirement, which is a
marriage license. They are different causes of action because the evidence required to prove
them,are not the same (Pagsisihan vs. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 540[1980])

Q: What are the grounds upon which a motion to dismiss may be filed?

Under Sec. 1, Rule 16, a motion to dismiss may be filed on any of the following grounds:
a. The court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
b. The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
c. The venue is improperly laid;
d. The plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
e. There is another action pending between the same parties and for the same cause ( litis
pendentia );
f. The cause of action is barred by a prior judgment ( res judicata ) or by the statute of limitations
(prescription);
g. The pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
h. The claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff‘s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned,
or otherwise extinguished;
i. The claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute
of frauds; and
j. A condition precedent for filing the action has not been complied with. 1. Exhaustion of
administrative remedies 2. Compliance with earnest efforts between or among members of
the family 3. Barangay conciliation

Q: Within the period for filing a responsive pleading, the defendant filed a motion for bill of
particulars that he set for hearing on a certain date. The judge granted the motion and ordered
the plaintiff to file and serve the bill of particulars, which the plaintiff failed to comply. On this
ground, the judge dismissed the case. Was the dismissal of the case in order?

Answer: Yes, the judge may dismiss the case for failure of the plaintiff to comply with its
order (Rule 17, Section 3) or order the striking out of the pleading and may issue any other
order at its discretion (Rule 12, Section 4).
Q: What is demurrer to evidence?

Suggested Answer:

Demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant after the plaintiff had
rested his case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It may be filed after the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his evidence. It is an aid or instrument for the expeditious
termination of an action similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either
grant or deny.

Q: Distinguish motion to dismiss from demurrer to evidence.

Distinctions:

(a) A motion to dismiss is usually filed before the service and filing of the answer; a demurrer
to evidence is made after the plaintiff rests his case;

(b) A motion to dismiss is anchored on many grounds; a demurrer is anchored on one ground—
plaintiff has no right to relief; and

(c) If a motion to dismiss is denied, the defendant may file his responsive pleading; in a
demurrer, the defendant may present his evidence.

Q: Kristina, the wife, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC
of Pasig City. James, the husband, filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Pasay
City praying for custody over their minor child. Kristina filed a motion to dismiss the James’
petition on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
which she filed before the RTC of Pasig City. If you were the judge of RTC of Pasay City, how
will you resolve the motion?

Answer:

The husband‘s motion to dismiss his wife‘s petition for habeas corpus should be granted
because the case for nullity of marriage constitutes litis pendencia. The custody over the minor
child and the action for nullity of the marriage are not separate causes of action. Judgment on
the issue of custody in the nullity of marriage case before the RTC of Pasig City, regardless of
which party would prevail, would constitute res judicata on the habeas corpus case before the
RTC of Pasay City since the former has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.
The evidence to support the petition for nullity necessarily involves evidence of fitness to take
custody of the child, as the court in the nullity of proceedings has a duty under the Family Code
to protect the best interest of the child (Yu vs. Yu, GR No. 164915, 03/102006; Sec. 1[e], Rule
16) and Sec. 2, Rule 102).
Q: Summons was issued by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Iligan City and
actually received on time by the defendant from his wife at their residence. The sheriff’s return
of proof of service filed with the court, in sum, states that the summons, with attached copy of
the complaints, was served on defendant at his residence thru his wife, a person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the court
had no jurisdiction over his person as there was no valid service of summons on him because
the sheriff‘s return on proof of service did not show that the sheriff first made a genuine attempt
to serve the summons on defendant personally before serving it thru his wife. Was there a
valid service of summons? What is the purpose of summons? Explain.

Answer: The motion to dismiss is not meritorious because the defendant actually received
the summons on time from his wife. Service on the wife was sufficient. It is the duty of the
court to look in the sufficiency of the service. The sheriff‘s negligence is not stating in his
return that he first made a genuine effort to serve the summons on the defendant, should not
prejudice the plaintiff (Mapa v. CA, 214 SCRA 417 [1992]). The purpose of the summons is
to inform the defendant on the complaint filed against him and to enable the court to acquire
jurisdiction over his person. It may be served by the sheriff or his deputy or any person
authorized by the court.

Q: Gina Guerrero filed with the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, a complaint
for sum of money amounting to P1 million against Carla Corro. The complaint alleges, among
others, that Carla borrowed from Gina the said amount as evidenced by a promissory note
signed by Carla and her husband, jointly and severally. Carla was served with summons which
was received by Linda, her secretary. However, Carla failed to file an answer to the complaint
within the 15-day reglementary period. Hence, Gina filed with the court a motion to declare
Carla in default and to allow her to present evidence ex parte. Five days thereafter, Carla filed
her verified answer to the complaint, denying under oath the genuineness and due execution of
the promissory note and contending that she has fully paid her loan with interest at 12% per
annum.

a) Was the summons validly served on Carla?

b) If you were the judge, would you grant Gina‘s motion to declare Carla in default?

SUGGESTED Answers:

a) The summons was not validly served on Carla because it was served on her secretary and
the requirements for substituted service have not been followed, such as a showing that efforts
have been exerted to serve the same on Carla and such attempt has failed despite due diligence
(Manotoc v. CA , GR No. 130974, 08/16/2006).

b) If I were the judge, I would not grant Gina‘s motion to declare Carla in default because
summons was not properly served and, anyway, a verified answer to the complaint had already
been filed. Moreover, it is better to decide a case on the merits rather than on technicality.
Q: Yani filed an action for partition and accounting in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
against her sister Mary Rose, who is a resident of Singapore and is not found in the Philippines.
Upon motion, the court ordered the publication of the summons for three weeks in a local
tabloid, Bandera. Linda, an OFW vacationing in the Philippines, saw the summons in Bandera
and brought a copy of the tabloid when she returned to Singapore. Linda showed the tabloid
and the page containing the summons to Mary Rose, who said, “Yes, I know, my kumare Anita
scanned and e-mailed that page of Bandera to me!” Was there a valid service of summons? Did
the court acquire jurisdiction over Mary Rose?

Answer: Yes. Partition is an action quasi in rem. Summons by publication is proper when the
defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, provided that a copy of the
summons and order of the court are sent by registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant (Sec. 15, Rule 14). Publication of the notice in Bulgar, a newspaper of general
circulation, satisfies the requirements of summons by publication.

Q: The Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment against ST, copy of which was received
by his counsel on February 28, 2000. On March 10, 2000, ST, through counsel, filed for a
motion for reconsideration of the decision with notice to the Clerk of Court submitting the
Motion for Reconsideration of the court. On March 18, 2000, realizing that the motion
lacked a notice of hearing, ST‘s counsel filed a supplemental pleading. Was the Motion for
Reconsideration filed within the reglementary period?

Answer: No, because the last day for filing a motion for reconsideration was March 15 if
February had 28 days or March 16 if February had 29 days.

Although the original Motion for Reconsideration was defective because it lacked a
notice of hearing, the defect was cured on time by its filing on March 15 of a supplemental
pleading, provided the motion was set for hearing and served the adverse party at least three
(3) days before the date of hearing (Rule 15, Section 4)
Q: The plaintiff sued the defendant in the RTC for damages allegedly caused by the latter‘s
encroachment on the plaintiff‘s lot. In his answer, the defendant denied the plaintiff‘s claim
and alleged that it was the plaintiff who in fact had encroached on his (defendant‘s) land.
Accordingly, the defendant counterclaimed against the plaintiff for damages resulting from the
alleged encroachment on his lot. The plaintiff filed an ex parte motion for extension of time to
answer the defendant‘s counterclaim, but the court denied the motion on the ground that it
should have been set for hearing. On the defendant‘s motion, therefore, the court declared the
plaintiff in default on the counterclaim. Was the plaintiff validly declared in default? Why?

Answer: No, the plaintiff was not validly declared in default. A motion for extension of time
to file an answer may be filed ex parte and need not be set for hearing. (Amante v. Suñga, 64
SCRA 192 [1975]).
Q: The defendant was declared in default in the RTC for his failure to file an answer to a
complaint for a sum of money. On the basis of the plaintiff’s ex parte presentation of evidence,
judgment by default was rendered against the defendant. The default judgment was served on
the defendant on October 1, 2001. On October 10, 2001, he filed a verified motion to lift the
order of default and to set aside the judgment. In his motion, the defendant alleged that,
immediately upon receipt of the summons, he saw the plaintiff and confronted him with his
receipt evidencing his payment and that the plaintiff assured him that he would instruct his
lawyer to withdraw the complaint. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion because it was
not accompanied by an affidavit of merit. The defendant filed a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 challenging the denial order.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion or act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
denying the defendant’s motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the default judgment?

Abraham filed a complaint for damages in the amount of P750,000.00 against Salvador
in the RTC in Quezon City for the latter's alleged breach of their contract of services. Salvador
promptly filed his answer, and included a counterclaim for P250,000.00 arising from the
allegedly baseless and malicious claims of Abraham that compelled him to litigate and to
engage the services of counsel, and thus caused him to suffer mental anguish.

Noting that the amount of the counterclaim was below the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the RTC, Abraham filed a motion to dismiss vis-a-vis the counterclaim on that ground.

Should the counterclaim of Salvador be dismissed? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the counterclaim of Salvador should not be dismissed on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

In an original action before the RTC, the RTC has jurisdiction over a compulsory
counterclaim regardless of its amount. [See S7 R6]

Here Salvador’s counterclaim for damages arising from the alleged malicious and
baseless claims of Abraham is a compulsory counterclaim as it arises from Abraham’s
complaint. Hence the RTC has jurisdiction over Salvador’s counterclaim even if it did not
exceed the jurisdictional amount of P400,000.
 XII

On the basis of an alleged promissory note executed by Harold in favor of Ramon, the
latter filed a complaint for P950,000.00 against the former in the RTC of Davao City. In an
unverified answer, Harold specifically denied the genuineness of the promissory note.

During the trial, Harold sought to offer the testimonies of the following: (1) the
testimony of an NBI handwriting expert to prove the forgery of his signature; and (2) the
testimony of a credible witness to prove that if ever Harold had executed the note in favor of
Ramon, the same was not supported by a consideration.

May Ramon validly object to the proposed testimonies? Give a brief explanation of
your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1) Ramon may validly object to the proposed testimony of an NBI handwriting expert
to prove forgery.

Under S8 R8, the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document is

deemed admitted by the adverse party if he fails to specifically deny such genuineness and
due execution.

Here the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note, which is an
actionable document, was impliedly admitted by Harold when he failed to deny the same
under oath, his answer being unverified. Hence Harold is precluded from setting up the
defense of forgery and thus Ramon may object to the proposed testimony seeking to prove
forgery.

2) Ramon may not validly object to the proposed testimony showing that the note
was not supported by a consideration.

The Supreme Court has held that an implied admission under S8 R8 does not preclude
the adverse party from introducing evidence that the actionable document was not supported
by a consideration. The reason is that such evidence is not inconsistent with the implied
admission of genuineness and due execution. [Acabal v. Acabal, 31 March 2005]

The fact that the defense of lack of consideration is inconsistent with Harold’s defense
of forgery is also not objectionable.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may set forth two or more statements of
defense alternatively or hypothetically. [S2 R8]
 XIII

Circe filed with the RTC a complaint for the foreclosure of real estate mortgage against
siblings Scylla and Charybdis, co-owners of the property and cosignatories to the mortgage
deed. The siblings permanently reside in Athens, Greece. Circe tipped off Sheriff Pluto that
Scylla is on a balikbayan trip and is billeted at the Century Plaza Hotel in Pasay City. Sheriff
Pluto went to the hotel and personally served Scylla the summons, but the latter refused to
receive summons for Charybdis as she was not authorized to do so. Sheriff Pluto requested
Scylla for the email address and fax number of Charybdis which the latter readily gave. Sheriff
Pluto, in his return of the summons, stated that Summons for Scylla was served personally as
shown by her signature on the receiving copy of the summons. Summons on Charybdis was
served pursuant to the amendment of Rule 14 by facsimile transmittal of the summons and
complaint on defendant's fax number as evidenced by transmission verification report
automatically generated by the fax machine indicating that it was received by the fax number
to which it was sent on the date and time indicated therein."

Circe, sixty (60) days after her receipt of Sheriff Pluto's return, filed a Motion to
Declare Charybdis in default as Charybdis did not file any responsive pleading. Accordingly,
Charybdis was declared in default. What is the effect of Scylla's answer to the complaint?

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

a) No, the court should not declare Charybdis in default.

Under the Rules of Court, the amendment of Rule 14 allowing service of summons by
facsimile transmittal refers only to service of summons upon a foreign private juridical entity
under Section 12 of Rule 14, not to a non-resident defendant under Section 15 of Rule
14. Service of summons by facsimile cannot be effected under Section 15 unless leave of court
was obtained specifically permitting service by facsimile transmittal.
Here the defendant is not a foreign private juridical entity but a non-resident defendant
and no leave of court was obtained to serve summons by facsimile.
Hence there was no valid service of summons and thus the court could not declare
Charybdis in default.

b) The effect of Scylla’s answer to the complaint is that the court shall try the case
against both Scylla and Charybdis upon the answer filed by Scylla.
Under Section 3(c) of Rule 9, when a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause
of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so,
the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon
the evidence presented.
Here there was a common cause of action against Scylla and Charybdis since both were
co-signatories to the mortgage deed.
Hence the court should not render judgment by default against Charybdis but should
proceed to try the case upon the answer filed and the evidence presented by Scylla.
 XIV

Aldrin entered into a contract to sell with Neil over a parcel of land. The contract
stipulated a P500,000.00 down payment upon signing and the balance payable in twelve (12)
monthly installments of P100,000.00. Aldrin paid the down payment and had paid three (3)
monthly installments when he found out that Neil had sold the same property to Yuri for P1.5
million paid in cash. Aldrin sued Neil for specific performance with damages with the RTC.
Yuri, with leave of court, filed an answer-in-intervention as he had already obtained a TCT in
his name. After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering Aldrin to pay all the installments
due, the cancellation of Yuri's title, and Neil to execute a deed of sale in favor of Aldrin. When
the judgment became final and executory, Aldrin paid Neil all the installments but the latter
refused to execute the deed of sale in favor of the former. Aldrin filed a "Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Execution" with proper notice of hearing. The petition alleged, among
others, that the decision had become final and executory and he is entitled to the issuance of
the writ of execution as a matter of right. Neil filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the
ground that it lacked the required certification against forum shopping.

(A) Should the court grant Neil's Motion to Dismiss?

Despite the issuance of the writ of execution directing Neil to execute the deed
of sale in favor of Aldrin, the former obstinately refused to execute the deed.

(B) What is Aldrin's remedy? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

a) No, the court should not grant Neil’s Motion to Dismiss.

Under Section 5 of Rule 7, a certification against forum shopping is required only for
initiatory pleadings or petitions.
Here the “Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution,” although erroneously
denominated as a petition is actually a motion for issuance of a writ of execution under Rule
39.
Hence the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of a certification against forum
shopping should be denied.

b) Aldrin’s remedy is to file a motion for judgment for specific act under Section 10(a)
of Rule 39.
Under Section 10(a) of Rule 39, if a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance
of land and the party fails to comply, the court may direct the act to be done at the disobedient
party’s cost by some other person appointed by the court or the court may by an order divest
the title of the party and vest it in the movant or other person.
 What are the provisional remedies under the rules?

Suggested answer: The provisional remedies under the Rules are preliminary attachment,
preliminary injunction, receivership, replevin, and support pendente lite.

XIX

JK’s real property is being attached by the sheriff in a civil action for damages against
LM. JK claims that he is not involved in said case; and that he is the sole registered owner of
said property. Under the Rules of Court, what must JK do to prevent the sheriff from attaching
his property?

Suggested answer: If the real property has been attached, the remedy is to file a third party
claim. The third-party claimant should make an affidavit of his title to the property
attached, stating the grounds of his title thereto, and serve such affidavit upon the sheriff while
the latter has possession of the attached property, and a copy thereof upon the attaching party
(Rule 57, Section 1). The third-party claimant may also intervene or file a separate civil action
to vindicate his claim to the property involved and secure the necessary reliefs, such as
preliminary injunction, which will not be considered as interference with a court of coordinate
jurisdiction (Ong v. Tating, 149 SCRA 265).

XX

Distinguish attachment rom garnishment. (2%)

Suggested answer: Attachment and garnishment are distinguished from each other as follows:
Attachment is a provisional remedy that effects a levy on property of a party as security for the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered, while garnishment is a levy on debts due
to the judgment obligor or defendant and other credits, including bank deposits, royalties, and
other personal property not capable of manual delivery under a writ of execution or a writ of
attachment.

XXI

In a case, the property of an incompetent under guardianship was in custodia legis. Can
it be attached? Explain.

Suggested answer: Although the property of an incompetent under guardianship is in custodia

legis, it may be attached as in fact it is provided that in such case, a copy of the writ of
attachment shall be filed with the proper court and notice of the attachment served upon the
custodian of such property (Rule 57, Section 7).
 XXII

May damages be claimed by a party prejudiced by a wrongful attachment even if the

judgment was adverse to him? Explain.

Suggested answer: Yes, damages may be claimed by a party prejudiced by a wrongful

attachment even if the judgment is adverse to him. This is authorized by the Rules. A claim
for damages may be made on account of improper, irregular, excessive attachment, which shall
be heard with notice to the adverse party and his surety or sureties (Rule 57, Section 20;
Javellana v. D.O. Plaza Enterprises, Inc., 32 SCRA 281).

XXIII

(A) May a preliminary attachment be issued ex parte? Briefly state the reason(s) for
your answer.
(B) May a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte?

Suggested answer:

(A) Yes, an order of attachment may be issued ex parte or upon motion with notice
and hearing (Section 2). The reason why the order may be issued ex parte is that requiring
notice to the adverse party and hearing would defeat the purpose of the provisional
remedy and enable the adverse party to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ
of attachment or dispose of his property before a writ of attachment issues (Mindanao
Savings and Loan Assn. v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 480).
(B) No, a writ of preliminary injunction may not be issued ex parte. As provided in
the Rules, no preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to
the party or person sought be enjoined (Rule 58, Section 5). The reason is that a
preliminary injunction may cause grave and irreparable injury to the party enjoined.

XXIV

The plaintiff obtained a writ of preliminary attachment upon a bond of P1 million. The
writ was levied on the defendant‘s property, but it was discharged upon the posting by the
defendant of a counter bond in the same amount of P1 million. After trial, the court rendered
judgment finding that the plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendant and that he had
sued out the writ of attachment maliciously. Accordingly, the court dismissed the complaint
and ordered the plaintiff and its surety to pay jointly to the defendant P1.5 million as actual
damages, P0.5 million as moral damages and P0.5 million as exemplary damages. Evaluate the
soundness of the judgment from the point of view of procedure.

Suggested answer: The judgment against the surety is not sound if due notice was not given
to him of the application for damages (Rule 57, Section 20). Moreover, the judgment against
the surety cannot exceed the amount of its counterbond of P1 million.
 XXV

A default judgment was rendered by the RTC ordering D to pay P a sum of money. The
judgment became final, but D filed a petition for relief and obtained a writ of preliminary
injunction staying the enforcement of the judgment. After hearing, the RTC dismissed D’s
petition, whereupon P immediately moved for the execution of the judgment in his favor.
Should P’s motion be granted? Why?

Suggested answer: P’s immediate motion for execution of the judgment in his favor should be
granted because the dismissal of D’s petition for relief also dissolves the writ of preliminary
injunction staying the enforcement of the judgment, even if the dismissal is not yet final (Golez
v. Leonidas, 107 SCRA 187 [1981]).

XXVI

Katy filed an action against Tyrone for collection of the sum of P1 million in the
Regional Trial Court, with an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Upon
posting of an attachment bond, the court granted the application and issued a writ of
preliminary attachment. Apprehensive that Tyron might withdraw his savings deposit with the
bank, the sheriff immediately served a notice of garnishment on the bank to implement the writ
of preliminary attachment. The following day, the sheriff proceeded to Tyrone‘s house and
served him the summons, with copies of the complaint containing the application for writ of
preliminary containing the application for writ of preliminary attachment, Katy‘s affidavit,
order of attachment, writ of preliminary attachment and attachment bond. Within fifteen (15)
days from service of the summons, Tyrone filed a motion to dismiss and to dissolve the writ of
preliminary attachment on the following grounds: (i) the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
his person because the writ was served ahead of the summons; (ii) the writ was improperly
implemented; and (iii) said writ was improvidently issued because the obligation in question
was already fully paid. Resolve the motion with reasons. (4%)

Suggested answer: The fact that the writ of attachment was served ahead of the summons did
not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the defendant. The effect is that the writ is not
enforceable (Rule 57, Sec. 5). But, as pointed out by jurisprudence, all that is needed to be done
is to re-serve the writ (Onate v. Abrogar, 241 SCRA 659 [1985]). The writ was improperly
implemented. Serving a notice of garnishment, particularly before summons is served, is not
proper. What should be served on the defendant are a copy of the writ of attachment and notice
that the bank deposits are attached pursuant to the writ (Rule 57, Section 7[d]). The proper
remedy where there is a payment is a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, Section 1[h]. A motion
to discharge on the ground that the writ was improvidently issued will not lie, since such a
motion would be tantamount to trial on the merits of the action which cannot be ventilated at a
mere hearing of the motion instead of a regular trial. The writ is only ancillary to the main case
(Rule 57, Section 3; Mindanao Savings and Loans Assn. v. v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA
480 [1989]; Davao Light & Power Co. v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 343 [1991])
 XXVII

After his properties were attached, defendant Porfirio filed a sufficient counterbond. The
trial court discharged the attachment. Nonetheless, Porfirio suffered substantial prejudice due
to the unwarranted attachment. In the end, the trial court rendered a judgment in Porfirio‘s
favor by ordering the plaintiff to pay damages because the plaintiff was not entitled to the
attachment. Profirio moved to charge the plaintiff‘s attachment bond. The plaintiff and his
sureties opposed the motion, claiming that the filing of the counterbond had relieved the
plaintiff‘s attachment bond from all liability for the damages. Rule on Porfirio‘s motion. (4%)

Suggested answer: Porfirio‘s motion to charge the plaintiff‘s attachment bond is proper. The
filing of the counterbond by the defendant does not mean that he has waived his right to proceed
against the attachment bond for damages. The attachment bond is posted to answer for any
damage that a party may suffer if the attachment is wrongful or improper (DM Wenceslao &
Associates, Inc. v . Readycon Trading & Construction Corp., GR No. 154106, 29 June 2004).

XXVIII

The writ of execution was returned unsatisfied. The judgment obligee subsequently
received information that a bank holds a substantial deposit belonging to the judgment obligor.
If you were the counsel of the judgment obligee, what steps would you take to reach the deposit
to satisfy the judgment? (3%)

Suggested answer: I would ask for a writ of garnishment against the deposit in the bank (Rule
57, Section 9[c]).

XXIX

What is a TRO?

Suggested answer:

A TRO is an order to maintain the status quo between and among the parties until the
determination of the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. A writ of preliminary
injunction cannot be granted without notice and hearing. A TRO may be granted ex parte if it
shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the
court in which the application for preliminary injunction was made may issue a TRO ex parte
for a period not exceeding 20 days from service to the party sought to be enjoined.
 XXX

An application for a writ of preliminary injunction with a prayer for a temporary

restraining order is included in a complaint and filed in a multi-sala Regional Trial Cout (RTC)
consisting of Branches 1, 2, 3, and 4. Being urgent in nature, the Executive Judge, who was
sitting in Branch 1, upon the filing of the aforesaid application, immediately raffled the case in
the presence of the judges of Branches 2, 3, and 4. The case was raffled to Branch 4 and the
judge thereof immediately issued a temporary restraining order. Is the temporary restraining
order valid? Why?

Suggested answer: No. It is only the Executive Judge who can issue immediately a temporary
restraining order effective only for seventy-two (72) hours from issuance. No other judge has
the right or power to issue a temporary restraining order ex parte. The judge whom the case is
assigned will then conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining
order shall be extended. But in no case beyond 20 days, including the original 72 hour period
(Rule 58, Section 5).

XXXI

May a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte? Why?

Suggested answer: No, a writ of preliminary injunction may not be issued ex parte. As
provided in the Rules, no preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior
notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined (Rule 58, Section 5). The reason is that a
preliminary injunction may cause grave and irreparable injury to the party enjoined.

XXXII

Can a suit for injunction be aptly filed with the Supreme Court to stop the President of
the Philippines from entering into a peace agreement with the National Democratic Front?

Suggested answer: No, a suit for injunction cannot be aptly filed with the Supreme Court to
stop the President of the Philippines from entering into a peace agreement with the National
Democratic Front, which is purely political question. The President of the Philippines is
immune from suit during his term (Madarang v. Santamaria, 37 Phil. 304 [1917]).

XXXIII

What are the requisites for the issuance of (a) a writ of preliminary injunction; and (b) a
final writ of injunction?

Suggested answer: Requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are a verified
complaint showing the existence of a right in esse, violation or threat of violation of such right,
damages or injuries sustained or that will be sustained by reason of such violation, notice to all
parties of raffle and of hearing, hearing on the application, and filing of an appropriate bond
and service thereof. On the other hand, a final writ of injunction may be rendered by judgment
after trial, showing applicant to be entitled to the writ (Rule 58, Section 9).
 XXXIV

May the Regional Trial Court issue injunction without bond?

Suggested answer: Yes, if the injunction that is issued is a final injunction. Generally, however,
preliminary injunction cannot issue without bond unless exempted by the trial court (Rule 58,
Section 4[b]).

XXXV

(A) What is the duration of a TRO issued by the Executive Judge of a Regional Trial
Court?
(B) Differentiate a TRO from a status quo order.

Suggested answer:

(A) In cases of extreme urgency, when the applicant will suffer grave injustice and
irreparable injury, the duration of a TRO issued ex parte by and Executive Judge of a
Regional Trial Court (RTC) is 72 hours (Rule 58, Section 5). In the exercise of his
regular functions over cases assigned to his sala, an Executive Judge may issue a TRO
for a duration not exceeding a total of 20 days.
(B) A status quo order (SQO) is more in the nature of a cease and desist order, since
it does not direct the doing or undoing of acts, as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory
injunctive relief. A TRO is only good for 20 days if issued by the RTC; 60 days if issued
by the CA; until further notice if issued by the Supreme Court. The SQO is without any
prescriptive period and may be issued without a bond. A TRO dies a natural death after
the allowable period; the SQO does not. A TRO is provisional. SQO lasts until revoked.
A TRO is not extendible, but the SQO may be subject to agreement of the parties.

-end –
 I

(A) Explain the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment.

(B) What are the exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of judgment?

Answer: FGU Insurance Corporation vs. RTC of Makati City, et al., G.R. No. 161282,
February 23, 2011

(A) Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision

that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and
law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.
Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.

(B) But like any other rule, it has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction of clerical
errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void
judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering
its execution unjust and inequitable.[13] The exception to the doctrine of immutability of
judgment has been applied in several cases in order to serve substantial justice. The early case
of City of Butuan vs. Ortiz[14] is one where the Court held as follows:

Shortly after Obviously a prevailing party in a civil action is entitled

to a writ of execution of the final judgment obtained by him within five
years from its entry (Section 443, Code of Civil Procedure). But it has been
repeatedly held, and it is now well-settled in this jurisdiction, that when
after judgment has been rendered and the latter has become final, facts
and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or
unjust, the interested party may ask the court to modify or alter the
judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the facts (Molina vs. De
la Riva, 8 Phil. 569; Behn, Meyer & Co. vs. McMicking, 11 Phil. 276;
Warner, Barnes & Co. vs. Jaucian, 13 Phil. 4; Espiritu vs. Crossfield and
Guash, 14 Phil. 588; Flor Mata vs. Lichauco and Salinas, 36 Phil. 809). In
the instant case the respondent Cleofas alleged that subsequent to the
judgment obtained by Sto. Domingo, they entered into an agreement
which showed that he was no longer indebted in the amount claimed of
P995, but in a lesser amount. Sto. Domingo had no right to an execution
for the amount claimed by him. (De la Costa vs. Cleofas, 67 Phil. 686-693).

City of Butuan v. Ortiz, the case of Candelario v. Caizares was promulgated, where it
was written that:

After a judgment has become final, if there is evidence of an event or

circumstance which would affect or change the rights of the parties
thereto, the court should be allowed to admit evidence of such new facts
and circumstances, and thereafter suspend execution thereof and grant
relief as the new facts and circumstances warrant. We, therefore, find that
the ruling of the court declaring that the order for the payment
of P40,000.00 is final and may not be reversed, is erroneous as above
explained.
 These rulings were reiterated in the cases of Abellana vs. Dosdos,[16] The City
of Cebu vs. Mendoza[17] and PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v Antonio Milan.[18] In these cases,
there were compelling circumstances which clearly warranted the exercise of the Courts equity
jurisdiction.

In the case at bench, the Court agrees with the RTC that there is indeed a need to find
out the whereabouts of the subject refrigerators. For this purpose, a hearing is necessary to
determine the issue of whether or not there was an actual turnover of the subject refrigerators
to FGU by the assured CII. If there was an actual turnover, it is very important to find out
whether FGU sold the subject refrigerators to third parties and profited from such sale. These
questions were brought about by the contention of GPS in its Opposition to Motion for
Execution[19] that after the assured, CII, was fully compensated for its claim on the damaged
refrigerators, it delivered the possession of the subject refrigerators to FGU as shown in the
certification of the Accounting/Administrative Manager of CII. Thereafter, the subject
refrigerators were sold by FGU to third parties and FGU received and appropriated the
consideration and proceeds of the sale. GPS claims that it verified the whereabouts of the
subject refrigerators from the CII because it wanted to repair and sell them to compensate FGU.

If, indeed, there was an actual delivery of the refrigerators and FGU profited from the
sale after the delivery, there would be an unjust enrichment if the realized profit would not be
deducted from the judgment amount. The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of
judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments
would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.[20]

II

In a complaint for recovery of real property, the plaintiff averred, among others, that he
is the owner of the said property by virtue of a deed of sale executed by the defendant in his
favor. Copy of the deed of sale was appended to the complaint as Annex ―A‖ thereof. In his
unverified answer, the defendant denied the allegation concerning the sale of the property in
question, as well as the appended deed of sale, for lack of knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth thereof. Is it proper for the court to render judgment without
trial? Explain?

Suggested Answer: Defendant cannot deny the sale of the property for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof. The answer, being defective
amounts to an admission (Rule 8, Section 10) . Moreover, the genuineness and due execution
of the deed of sale can only be denied by the defendant under oath and failure to do so is also
an admission of the deed. Hence, a judgment on the pleadings can be rendered by the court
without need of a trial (Phil. Advertising Counselors, Inc. v. Revilla, G.R. No. L-31869, August
8, 1973; Sec. 10, Rule 8) 52 SCRA 246 [1973]; Gutierrez v. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 127
[1976])
 III

After defendant has served and filed his answer to plaintiff’s complaint for damages
before the proper Regional Trial Court, plaintiff served and filed a motion (with supporting
affidavits) for a summary judgment in his opposition (with supporting affidavits) to the motion.
After due hearing, the court issued an order (1) stating that the court has found no genuine issue
as to many material fact and thus concluded that plaintiff is entitled to judgment in his favor as
a matter of law except as to the amount of damages recoverable, and (2) accordingly ordering
that the plaintiff shall have judgment summarily against defendant for such amount as may be
found due plaintiff for damages to b ascertained by trial on October 7, 2004, at 8:30 o‘clock in
the morning. May defendant properly take an appeal from said order? Or may defendant
properly challenge sad order thru a special civil action for certiorari? Reason.

Suggested Answer: No, plaintiff may not properly take an appeal from said order because it is
an interlocutory order and not a final and appealable order (Sec. 4, Rule 35) . It does not
dispose of the action or proceeding. Partial summary judgments are interlocutory. There is still
something to be done, which is the trial for the adjudication of damages (but the defendant may
properly challenge said order thru a special civil action for certiorari (Section 1(c), Rule 41;
Province of Pangasinan vs. CA, 220 SCRA 726 [1993]).

IV

Distinguish between a judgment on the pleadings and a summary judgment.

Suggested answer:
 V

After Plaintiff in an ordinary civil action before the ZZ Regional Trial Court has
completed presentation on his evidence, defendant without prior leave of court moved for
dismissal of plaintiff‘s complaint for insufficiency of plaintiff‘s evidence. After due hearing
of the motion and the opposition thereto, the court issued an order, reading as follows: ―The
Court hereby grants defendant‘s motion to dismiss and accordingly orders the dismissal of
plaintiff‘s complaint, with the cost taxed against him. It is so ordered.‖ Is the order of dismissal
valid? May plaintiff properly take an appeal? Reason.

Suggested Answer: The order or decisions is void because it does not state findings of fact
and of law, as required by Sec. 14, Article VII of the Constitution and Section 1, Rule 36 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure. Being void, appeal is not available. The proper remedy is
certiorari un

Pedro filed a complaint against Carlos in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamis City
for the recovery of the ownership of a car. Pedro filed his answer within the reglementary
period. After the pre-trial and actual trial, and after Pedro has completed with the presentation
of his evidence, Carlos filed a demurrer to evidence, which the RTC granted. Pedro appealed
and the appellate court reversed the order of the trial court. Thereafter, Carlos filed a motion
with the RTC asking the latter to allow him to present his evidence. Resolve the motion.

Suggested Answer: The motion should be denied. Carlos can no longer present evidence. The
Rules provide that the motion for dismissal is granted by the trial court but on appeal the order
of dismissal is reversed, he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
(Section 1, Rule 33)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: No, because when the appellate court reversed the order of the
trial court it should have rendered judgment in favor of Carlos. (Quebral v. Court of Appeals,
252 SCRA 353, 1996)
 II

Sonny Ty filed in the RTC of Iligan City an action against Jerome Uy for collection of
sum of money. For his failure to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, Uy was
declared in default, Ty was allowed to present his evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk
of Court, and judgment was rendered by the RTC for Ty. Uy appealed on the ground that the
presentation of Ty’s evidence was void because it should have been done before the judge and
not the Branch Clerk of Court. Rule on the appeal.

Suggested answer:

Dy, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 97130, July 19, 1991

With regard to the validity of the proceedings before the Branch Clerk of Court, we
agree with the observations of the Court of Appeals that:

Appellant is now estopped from questioning the retention of the proceedings

held on August 19, 1983 before the Branch Clerk of Court since her husband
agreed to the same during the pre-trial conference held on November 12,
1987. Agreements reached at the pre-trial conference and embodied in the
pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the trial and should not be
disturbed unless there could be manifest injustice.

The agreement is not unjust to appellant. Aside from appellant having the right
to adduce evidence on her behalf, the parties agreed that the evidence
presented by appellee before the Branch Clerk of Court would be retained, with
appellant having the right to cross-examine appellee's witnesses.

xxx xxx xxx

The agreement of the parties as contained in the pre-trial order is not invalid.
The parties are authorized by the Rules of Court to consider "[s]uch other
matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action." An authority
believes this includes "agreement on certain matters so that witnesses need
not and will not be called." Undoubtedly, the procedure agreed upon by the
parties in this case would have greatly accelerated the trial and the decision
therein, which, at the, time of the pre-trial conference, had been pending for
three years and had already gone up on appeal to this Court. (pp. 27-
28, Rollo.)

The presentation of the plaintiff's evidence before the Branch Clerk of Court was not
void. The Supreme Court, in the case of Continental Bank vs. Tiangco, et al. (94
SCRA 715) departing from its contrary statement in the Lim Tan Hu case (66 SCRA
425), declared that a decision based on evidence heard by a deputy clerk of court as
commissioner is valid and enforceable because it was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, was not impaired by extrinsic fraud, nor by lack of due
process, and there was no showing that the private respondents were prejudiced by
such a procedure, or that the commissioner committed any mistake or abuse of
discretion, or that the proceedings were vitiated by collusion and collateral fraud.
That ruling applies four square to this case.
The practice of designating the clerk of court as a commissioner to receive evidence
in the event of the non-appearance of the defendant and its counsel, is not irregular
and is sanctioned by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court on trial by commissioner (J.M.
Tuazon, Inc. vs. Dela Rosa, 18 SCRA 591; Wassmer vs. Velez, 12 SCRA 648).

The petitioner was not denied due process. As pointed out by the appellate court:

. . . Appellant retained her right to present evidence on her behalf and the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses already presented by appellee. At
any rate, if appellant believes that her right to procedural due process had
been curtailed, the same was due to a voluntary waiver by her husband. (p.
28, Rollo)

III

Juana filed with the RTC of Iligan City an action to quiet title against Jose. Answer was
in due course filed by Jose. The case was set for pre-trial on January 25, 2010. Jose’s counsel
moved for cancellation of this setting. The court reset the pre-trial to February 27, 2010, but
again Jose’s counsel, pleading illness, sought to have this second pre-trial setting cancelled by
motion. The motion contained no notice of hearing, hence denied by the court. At the scheduled
pre-trial on February 27, 2010, neither Jose nor his counsel appeared. The court consequently
authorized Juana to present evidence ex parte. On certiorari, Jose questions the orders of the
court contending that (1) while his counsel’s motion for postponement was defective in that it
had not been set for hearing, the flaw was but a formal one caused by its having been hastily
drawn up when counsel was suffering from headache; and (2) the pre-trial setting was void
since notice thereof had not been given to Jose personally, only his counsel has been notified.
Are Jose’s contentions tenable?

Suggested answer:

(a) The omission in defendants' motion for cancellation of the pre-trial scheduled on
February 27, 1978 of a notice of hearing was not a mere formal defect, as
defendants seem to imagine. The motion for cancellation or postponement was not
one that could be granted by the Court as a matter of course, and thus be acted
on ex parte. No party has a right to a postponement of a trial or hearing, or pre-trial;
and his adversary has the right to oppose any move towards this end. A party or
counsel desiring a postponement of a pre-trial or trial must comply with the
requisites of motions in general set out in Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, i.e., the
motion shall be made in writing, shall state the grounds upon which it is based and
if necessary be accompanied by supporting affidavits and other papers and notice
thereof — specifying the date of hearing which is supposed to be specified by the
movant himself — shall be served by the applicant on all parties concerned at least
three (3) days before said hearing, together with a copy of the motion and of any
affidavits and other relevant papers. Such notice of hearing, it must be added, is
essential. Its importance is underscored by the prohibition of action by the court on
any motion which is not accompanied by proof of service thereof, except when the
court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected. And
if the motion be grounded on illness of a party or counsel, the Rules further require
an "affidavit that the presence of such party or counsel at the trial (or pre-trial) is
 indispensable and that the character of his illness is such as to render his non-
attendance excusable." 8

The defendants' counsel, Atty. Pacamarra, attributes his omission to include a

notice of hearing in his motion in question to his headache at the tune. But neither
his motion nor its supporting medical certificate showed "that the character of his
illness is such as to render his non-attendance excusable," i.e., that the headache
was so severe and expected to last for such a period of time as to make it
impossible or extremely difficult for him to attend the pre-trial, still a month away.
Indeed, since rest was apparently all that was needed to relieve him of his
indisposition at the time, January 27, 1978 (the date of his motion), he had enough
time therefor, as the Trial Court tartly observed, "from that date to the date of the
next hearing of the case" (February 27, 1978). There was, too, a not unreasonable
hesitancy on the part of the Trial Court to give full credence to the medical certificate
attached to the motion, since it was not verified and was only a xerox copy.

Furthermore, as shown by the record, notice of the denial of his motion for
postponement had been served on Atty. Pacamarra on February 24, 1978, three
(3) days before the pre-trial set on February 27, 1978. There is nothing in the record
to excuse his failure to exert any effort to himself appear at the pre-trial, or cause
his client, or any other representative, to present himself before the Court to advise
it of his predicament.

(b) The objection that notice of pre-trial was not served personally on the defendants
as well as on their attorney is, in the premises, utterly without merit. Atty. Pacamarra
did not protest against this defect in relation to the pre-trial settings on January 25
and again on February 27, 1978. If he believed that failure of notice to be a grave
defect, he should have brought it to the Court's attention forthwith, and the matter
would have immediately been set aright. He did not do so. Moreover, this Court has
already ruled that service of the notice of pre-trial on a party through his counsel is
not only proper but is the preferred mode. 9
 Explain briefly your answer.

I. (A) Distinguish action from cause of action.

(B) What is the rule on joinder of causes of action?

II. After working for 25 years in the Middle East, Arlene returned to the Philippines to retire
in Manila, the place of her birth and childhood. Ten years before her retirement, she bought for
cash in her name a house and lot in Malate, Manila. Six months after her return, she learned
that her house and lot were the subject of foreclosure proceedings commenced by ABC Bank
on the basis of a promissory note and a deed of real estate mortgage she had allegedly executed
in favor of ABC Bank five years earlier. Knowing that she was not in the country at the time
the promissory note and deed of mortgage were supposedly executed, Arlene forthwith
initiated a complaint in the RTC of Manila praying that the subject documents be declared null
and void.

ABC Bank filed.a motion to dismiss Arlene's complaint on the ground of improper
venue on the basis of a stipulation in both documents designating Quezon City as the exclusive
venue in the event of litigation between the parties arising out of the loan and mortgage. Should
the motion to dismiss of ABC Bank be granted?

III. Give the effects of the following:

(A) Splitting a single cause of action, and
(B) Non-joinder of a necessary party.

IV. A filed a complaint against B for cancellation of title. B filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint because C, to whom he mortgaged the property as duly annotated in the
TCT, was not impleaded as defendant. Resolve the motion.

V. Elise obtained a loan of P3 Million from Merchant Bank. Aside from executing a
promissory note in favor of Merchant Bank, she executed a deed of real estate mortgage over
her house and lot as security for her obligation. The loan fell due but remained unpaid; hence,
Merchant Bank filed an action against Elise to foreclose the real estate mortgage. A month
after, and while the foreclosure suit was pending, Merchant Bank also filed an action to recover
the principal sum of P3 Million against Elise based on the same promissory note previously
executed by the latter.

In opposing the motion of Elise to dismiss the second action on the ground of splitting
of a single cause of action, Merchant Bank argued that the ground relied upon by Elise was
devoid of any legal basis considering that the two actions were based on separate contracts,
namely, the contract of loan evidenced by the promissory note, and the deed of real estate
mortgage. Is there a splitting of a single cause of action? Explain your answer.

VI. Perry is a resident of Manila, while Ricky and Marvin are residents of Batangas City.
They are the co-owners of a parcel of residential land located in Pasay City with an assessed
value of P100,000.00. Perry borrowed P100,000.00 from Ricky which he promised to pay on
or before December 1, 2004. However, Perry failed to pay his loan. Perry also rejected Ricky
and Marvin’s proposal to partition the property. Ricky filed a complaint against Perry and
Marvin in the RTC of Pasay City for the partition of the property. He also incorporated in his
complaint his action against Perry for the collection of the latter’s P100,000.00 loan, plus
interests and attorney’s fees.
 State with reasons whether it was proper for Ricky to join his causes of action in his
complaint for partition against Perry and Marvin in the RTC of Pasay City.

VII. A purchased a lot from B for P1,500,000.00. He gave a down payment of P500,000,
signed a promissory note payable thirty days after date, and as a security for the settlement of
the obligation, mortgaged the same lot to B. When the note fell due and A failed to pay, B
commenced suit to recover from A the balance of P1,000,000.00. After securing a favorable
judgment on his claim, B brought another action against A before the same court to foreclose
the mortgage. A now files a motion to dismiss the second action on the ground of bar by prior
judgment. Rule on the motion.

-end-

Answer key:
I

After working for 25 years in the Middle East,

Evan returned to the Philippines to retire in Manila, the place of his birth and childhood. Ten
years before his retirement, he bought for cash in his name a house and lot in Malate, Manila.
Six months after his return, he learned that his house and lot were the subject of foreclosure
proceedings commenced by ABC Bank on the basis of a promissory note and a deed of real
estate mortgage he had allegedly executed in favor of ABC Bank five years earlier.

Knowing that he was not in the country at the time the promissory note and deed of
mortgage were supposedly executed, Evan forthwith initiated a complaint in the RTC of Manila
praying that the subject documents be declared null and void.

ABC Bank filed a motion to dismiss Evan's complaint on the ground of improper venue
on the basis of a stipulation in both documents designating Quezon City as the exclusive venue
in the event of litigation between the parties arising out of the loan and mortgage.

Should the motion to dismiss of ABC Bank be granted? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the motion to dismiss of ABC Bank should not be granted.

In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that a party is not bound by a
venue stipulation where he directly assails on the ground of forgery the validity of the contracts
containing the venue stipulation. The reason is that such a party cannot be expected to comply
with the venue stipulation since his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition
of the validity of the contracts he assails. [Briones v. Cash Asia Credit Corp., 14 January 2015]

II

Hanna, a resident of Manila, filed a complaint for the partition of a large tract of land
located in Oriental Mindoro. She impleaded her two brothers John and Adrian as defendants
but did not implead Leica and Agatha, her two sisters who were permanent residents of
Australia.

Arguing that there could be no final determination of the case without impleading all
indispensable parties, John and Adrian moved to dismiss the complaint.

Does the trial court have a reason to deny the motion? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the trial court has a reason to deny the motion to dismiss.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, non-joinder of parties, even indispensable ones, is
not a ground of a motion to dismiss. [S11 R3; Vesagas v. CA, 371 SCRA 508 (2001)]

III

Elise obtained a loan of P3 Million from Merchant Bank. Aside from executing a
promissory note in favor of Merchant Bank, she executed a deed of real estate mortgage over
her house and lot as security for her obligation. The loan fell due but remained unpaid; hence,
Merchant Bank filed an action against Elise to foreclose the real estate mortgage. A month
after, and while the foreclosure suit was pending, Merchant Bank also filed an action to recover
the principal sum of P3 Million against Elise based on the same promissory note previously
executed by the latter.

In opposing the motion of Elise to dismiss the second action on the ground of splitting
of a single cause of action, Merchant Bank argued that the ground relied upon by Elise was
devoid of any legal basis considering that the two actions were based on separate contracts,
namely, the contract of loan evidenced by the promissory note, and the deed of real estate
mortgage.

Is there a splitting of a single cause of action? Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, there is a splitting of a single cause of action.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, there is a splitting of a single cause of action if two
or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action. [S4 R2]. A cause of action
is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. [S2 R2].

Here, both suits, the foreclosure and the collection suit, arose from the same cause of
action, that is, the non-payment by Elise of her P3 million loan from Merchant Bank. The fact
that the two actions were based on separate contracts is irrelevant, what matters is that both
actions arose from the same cause of action.

IV
 Eduardo, a resident of the City of Manila, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila a complaint for the annulment of a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage he signed in favor
of Galaxy Bank (Galaxy), and the consequent· foreclosure and auction sale of his mortgaged
Makati property. Galaxy filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue alleging
that the complaint should be filed with the RTC of Makati since the complaint involves the
ownership and possession of Eduardo's lot. Resolve the motion with reasons. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue should be granted.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the venue of real actions shall be with the proper
court having jurisdiction over the area where the real property involved is situated. An action
for annulment of mortgage is a real action if there has already been a foreclosure
sale. (See Chua v. Total Office Products and Services, 30 September 2005).

Here there was already a foreclosure sale. Hence, the action for annulment of
mortgage is a real action which should have been filed in Makati where the real property is
situated.

V
Lender extended to Borrower a P100,000.00 loan covered by a promissory note. Later,
Borrower obtained another P100,000.00 loan again covered by a promissory note. Still later,
Borrower obtained a P300,000.00 loan secured by a real estate mortgage on his land valued at
P500,000.00. Borrower defaulted on his payments when the loans matured. Despite demand to
pay the P500,000.00 loan, Borrower refused to pay. Lender, applying the totality rule, filed
against Borrower with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a collection suit for
P500,000.00.
(A) Did Lender correctly apply the totality rule and the rule on joinder of causes of
action?

At the trial, Borrower's lawyer, while cross-examining Lender, successfully elicited an

admission from the latter that the two promissory notes have been paid. Thereafter, Borrower's
lawyer filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that as proven only P300,000.00 was
the amount due to Lender and which claim is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court. He further argued that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can
be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

(B) Should the court dismiss the case? (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(A) No. Lender did not correctly apply the totality rule and the rule on joinder of
causes of action. None of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. All
causes of action are governed by a special rule, i.e. Rules on Small Claims.

Alternative answer: Yes. Lender correctly applied the totality rule and the rule on joinder of
causes of action.
 Under the rule on joinder of causes of action, a party may in one pleading assert as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party. Under the totality rule, where the
claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.

Here, the causes of action by Lender are all against borrower and all the claims are
principally for recovery of money. Hence, the aggregate amount claimed, which is P500,000
shall be the test of jurisdiction and thus it is the RTC of Manila which has jurisdiction.

Although the rules on joinder of causes of action state that the joinder shall not include
special civil actions, the remedy resorted to with respect to the third loan was not foreclosure
but collection. Hence joinder of causes of action would still be proper.

b) Yes, the court should dismiss the case. RTC has no jurisdiction.

Alternative answer: No, the court should not dismiss the case.

The Supreme Court has held that subject-matter jurisdiction is determined by the amount
of the claim alleged in the complaint and not the amount substantiated during the trial.
(Dionisio v Sioson Puerto, 31 October 1974).

Here, the amount claimed was P500,000. Even if the claim substantiated during the trial
was only P300,000 that is not determinative of subject-matter jurisdiction. Hence, the argument
that lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time is misplaced since in the first
place the RTC has jurisdiction.

VI

Juliet invoking the provisions of the Rule on Violence Against Women and their
Children filed with the RTC designated as a Family Court a petition for issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Romeo. The Family Court issued a
30-day TPO against Romeo. A day before the expiration of the TPO, Juliet filed a motion for
extension. Romeo in his opposition raised, among others, the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262
(The VAWC Law) arguing that the law authorizing the issuance of a TPO violates the equal
protection and due process clauses of the 1987 Constitution. The Family Court judge, in
granting the motion for extension of the TPO, declined to rule on the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 9262. The Family Court judge reasoned that Family Courts are without jurisdiction to pass
upon constitutional issues, being a special court of limited jurisdiction and R.A. No. 8369, the
law creating the Family Courts, does not provide for such jurisdiction. Is the Family Court
judge correct when he declined to resolve the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the Family Court judge was not correct when he declined to resolve the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9262.

The Supreme Court has held that despite its designation as a Family Court, a Regional
Trial Court remains possessed of authority as a court of general jurisdiction to resolve the
constitutionality of a statute. (Garcia v. Drilon, 25 June 2013)
 VII

Strauss filed a complaint against Wagner for cancellation of title. Wagner moved to
dismiss the complaint because Grieg, to whom he mortgaged the property as duly annotated in
the TCT, was not impleaded as defendant.
(A) Should the complaint be dismissed?
(B) If the case should proceed to trial without Grieg being impleaded as a party to the
case, what is his remedy to protect his interest?

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(A) No, the complaint should not be dismissed.

The Supreme Court has held that non-joinder of an indispensable party is not a ground
of a motion to dismiss. (Vesagas v. CA, 371 SCRA 508).
Here, although Grieg, the registered mortgagee, is an indispensable party (Metrobank
v. Alejo, 364 SCRA 813 [2001]), his non-joinder does not warrant the dismissal of the
complaint.

(B) The remedy of Grieg is to file a motion for leave to intervene. Under Rule 19, a
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation may intervene in the action.
Here, Grieg is a mortgagee and such fact was annotated in the title. Hence, he has a
legal interest in the title subject-matter of the litigation and may thus intervene in the case.

VIII

A law was passed declaring Mt. Karbungko as a protected area since it was a major
watershed. The protected area covered a portion located in Municipality A of the Province I
and a portion located in the City of Z of Province II. Maingat is the leader of Samahan ng
Tagapag-ingat ng Karbungko (STK), a people's organization. He learned that a portion of the
mountain located in the City of Z of Province II was extremely damaged when it was bulldozed
and leveled to the ground, and several trees and plants were cut down and burned by workers
of World Pleasure Resorts, Inc. (WPRI) for the construction of a hotel and golf course. Upon
inquiry with the project site engineer if they had a permit for the project, Maingat was shown
a copy of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the DENR-EMB,
Regional Director (RD-DENR-EMB).

Immediately, Maingat and STK filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing
mandamus against RD-DENR-EMB and WPRI with the RTC of Province I, a designated
environmental court, as the RD-DENR-EMB negligently issued the ECC to WPRI.

On scrutiny of the petition, the court determined that the area where the alleged
actionable neglect or omission subject of the petition took place in the City of Z of Province II,
and therefore cognizable by the RTC of Province II. Thus, the court dismissed outright the
petition for lack of jurisdiction.

(A) Was the court correct in motu proprio dismissing the petition?

Assuming that the court did not dismiss the petition, the RD-DENR-EMB in his
Comment moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners failed to appeal the
issuance of the ECC and to exhaust administrative remedies provided in the DENR Rules and
Regulations.

(B) Should the court dismiss the petition?

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(A) No, the court was not correct in motu proprio dismissing the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.
In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that the requirement that the
petition be filed in the area where the actionable neglect or omission took place relates to venue
and not to subject-matter jurisdiction. Since what is involved is improper venue and not
subject-matter jurisdiction, it was wrong for the court to dismiss outright the petition since
venue may be waived. (Dolot v. Paje, 27 August 2013).

(B) No, the court should not dismiss the petition.

The Supreme Court has held that in environmental cases, the defense of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies by appealing the ECC issuance would apply only if the defect
in the issuance of the ECC does not have any causal relation to the environmental damage.
Here the issuance of the ECC has a direct causal relation to the environmental damage
since it permitted the bulldozing of a portion of the mountain and the cutting down and buring
of several trees and plants. (See Paje v. Casiño, 3 February 2015).

IX

Landlord, a resident of Quezon City, entered into a lease contract with Tenant, a resident
of Marikina City, over a residential house in Las Piñas City. The lease contract provided,
among others, for a monthly rental of P25,000.00, plus ten percent (10%) interest rate in case
of non-payment on its due date. Subsequently, Landlord migrated to the United States of
America (USA) but granted in favor of his sister Maria, a special power of attorney to manage
the property and file and defend suits over the property rented out to Tenant. Tenant failed to
pay the rentals due for five (5) months. Maria asks your legal advice on how she can
expeditiously collect from Tenant the unpaid rentals plus interests due.

(A) What judicial remedy would you recommend to Maria?

(B) Where is the proper venue of the judicial remedy which you recommended?
(C) If Maria insists on filing an ejectment suit against Tenant, when do you reckon the
one (1)-year period within which to file the action?

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
(A) The judicial remedy that I would recommend to Maria is to file a collection suit for the
P125,000 rentals in arrears and the P12,500 interest due. The remedy would be expeditious
since it would be governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure as the amount of the
demand, excluding interest, does not exceed P200,000.

(B) The proper venue of the collection suit would be in Marikina City, where Tenant
resides.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, venue in personal actions is with the residence of
either the plaintiff or the defendant, at the plaintiff’s election.
Since the Plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, venue may be laid only in
Marikina City where the defendant Tenant resides.

(C) If Maria insists on filing an ejectment suit against Tenant, the one-year period within
which to file the action shall be reckoned from the expiration of 5-days from notice of the last
demand to pay and vacate. (Cruz v. Atencio, 28 February 1959; Sy Oh v. Garcia, 30 June
1969).

Prince Chong entered into a lease contract with King Kong over a commercial building
where the former conducted his hardware business. The lease contract stipulated, among
others, a monthly rental of P50,000.00 for a four (4)-year period commencing on January 1,
2010. On January 1, 2013, Prince Chong died. Kin Il Chong was appointed administrator of
the estate of Prince Chong, but the former failed to pay the rentals for the months of January
to June 2013 despite King Kong’s written demands.

Thus, on July 1, 2013, King Kong filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) an action
for rescission of contract with damages and payment of accrued rentals as of June 30, 2013.

(A) Can Kin Il Chong move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC is
without jurisdiction since the amount claimed is only P300,000.00?
(B) If the rentals accrued during the lifetime of Prince Chong, and King Kong also filed
the complaint for sum of money during that time, will the action be dismissible upon Prince
Chong’s death during the pendency of the case?

SUGGESTED ANSWERS:

(A) No, Kin II Chong cannot move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC is
without jurisdiction since the amount claimed is only P300,000.
Under B.P. Blg. 129, the RTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Here, the action is for rescission which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The
P300,000 accrued rentals is only incidental to the main purpose of the action which is to rescind
the lease contract.

(B) No, the action will not be dismissible upon Prince Chong’s death during the
pendency of the case.
 Under S20 R3, when the action is on a contractual money claim and the defendant dies
before entry of final judgment, the action shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to
continue until entry of final judgment.
Here, the action is on a contractual money claim, that is, a claim for rentals based on a
lease contract. Hence it shall be allowed to continue until final judgment. (S20 R3, S5 R86).

XI

While leisurely walking along the street near her house in Marikina, Patty unknowingly
stepped on a garden tool left behind by CCC, a construction company based in Makati. She
lost her balance as a consequence and fell into an open manhole. Fortunately, Patty suffered no
major injuries except for contusions, bruises and scratches that did not require any
hospitalization. However, she lost self-esteem, suffered embarrassment and ridicule, and had
bouts of anxiety and bad dreams about the accident. She wants vindication for her uncalled for
experience and hires you to act as counsel for her and to do whatever is necessary to recover at
least Php100,000.00 for what she suffered.

What action or actions may Patty pursue, against who, where (court and venue), and
under what legal basis?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Patty may avail any of the following remedies:

a) She may file a complaint for damages arising from fault or negligence under the Rules
on Small Claims against CCC Company before the MTC of Marikina City where she resides
or Makati City where the defendant corporation is holding office, at her option (A.M. No. 8-8-
7-SC in relation to Section 2, Rule 4, Rules of Court).

b) She may also file an action to recover moral damages based on quasi delict under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code. The law states that, whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi delict.
Since moral damages are incapable of pecuniary estimation, Patty should file the action
before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City where she resides or Makati City, where the
defendant corporation is holding office, at her option (Section 19[1], B.P. 129).

c)Patty can also file a civil action for damages against the City of Marikina for
maintaining an open manhole where she unfortunately fell. Under Article 2189 of the Civil
Code, provinces, cities, and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. The proper court
having jurisdiction over the case is at least Php100,000 for as long as the aggregate of the
claims for damages does not exceed Php400,000.00
XII

A bought a Volvo Sedan from ABC Cars for P5.0M. ABC Cars, before delivering to A,
had the car rust proofed and tinted by XYZ Detailing. When delivered to A, the car’s upholstery
was found to be damaged. ABC Cars and XYZ Detailing both deny any liability. Who can A
sue and on what cause(s) of action? Explain.
 SUGGESTED ANSWER:

XIII

Distinguish action from cause of action.

XIV

Give the effects of the following:

(A) Splitting a single cause of action; and
(B) Non-joinder of a necessary party.

XV

(A) What is the rule on joinder of causes of action?

(B) A secured two loans from B, one for P500,000.00 and the other for P1,000,000.00,
payable on different dates. Both have fallen due. Is B obliged to file only one complaint against
A for the recovery of both loans? Explain.

XVI

Perry is a resident of Manila, while Ricky and Marvin are residents of Batangas City. They are
the co-owners of a parcel of residential land located in Pasay City with an assessed value of
P100,000.00. Perry borrowed P100,000.00 from Ricky which he promised to pay on or before
December 1, 2004. However, Perry failed to pay his loan. Perry also rejected Ricky and
Marvin’s proposal to partition the property. Ricky filed a complaint against Perry and Marvin
in the RTC of Pasay City for the partition of the property. He also incorporated in his complaint
his action against Perry for the collection of the latter’s P100,000.00 loan, plus interests and
attorney’s fees.

State with reasons whether it was proper for Ricky to join his causes of action in his complaint
for partition against Perry and Marvin in the RTC of Pasay City.

XVII

(A) What is the rule against splitting a cause of action and its effect on the respective rights
of the parties for failure to comply with the same?
(B) A purchased a lot from B for P1,500,000.00. He gave a down payment of P500,000,
signed a promissory note payable thirty days after date, and as a security for the settlement of
the obligation, mortgaged the same lot to B. When the note fell due and A failed to pay, B
commenced suit to recover from A the balance of P1,000,000.00. After securing a favorable
judgment on his claim, B brought another action against A before the same court to foreclose
the mortgage. A now files a motion to dismiss the second action on the ground of bar by prior
judgment. Rule on the motion.

XVIII
 Raphael, a warehouseman, filed a complaint against V Corporation, X Corporation and Y
Corporation to compel them to interplead. He alleged therein that the three corporations
claimed title and right of possession over the goods deposited in his warehouse and that he was
uncertain which of them was entitled to the goods. After due proceedings, judgment was
rendered by the court declaring that X Corporation was entitled to the goods. The decision
became final and executory

Raphael filed a complaint against X Corporation for the payment of P100,000.00 for storage
charges and other advances for the goods. X Corporation filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of res judicata. X Corporation alleged that Raphael should have
incorporated in his complaint for interpleader his claim for storage of fees and advances and
that for his failure he was barred from interposing his claim. Raphael replied that he could not
have claimed storage fees and other advances in his complaint for interpleader because he was
not yet certain as to who was liable therefor. Resolve the motion with reasons.

XIX

Rolando filed a petition for declaration of the nullity of his marriage to Carmela because of the
alleged psychological incapacity of the latter.

After trial, the court rendered judgment dismissing the petition on the ground that Rolando
failed to prove the psychological incapacity of his wife. The judgment having become final,
Rolando filed another petition, this time on the ground that his marriage to Carmela had been
celebrated without a license. Is the second action barred by the judgment in the first? Why?

XX

In an action for unlawful detainer in the MTC, defendant X raised in his answer the defense
that plaintiff A is not the real owner of the house subject of the suit. X filed a counterclaim
against A for the collection of a debt of P80,000.00 plus accrued interest of P15,000.00 and
attorney’s fees of P20,000.00. Does the MTC have jurisdiction over the counterclaim?

Answer: The counterclaim is within the jurisdiction of the MTC which does not exceed
P100,000.00, because the principal demand is P80,000 exclusive of interest and attorney’s fees
(Sec. 33, BP 129, as amended). However, inasmuch as all actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer are subject to summary procedure and since the counterclaim is only per

Part III. 5-point Questions

1. Santa filed against Era in the RTC of Quezon City an action for specific performance praying
for the delivery of a parcel of land subject of their contract of sale. Unknown to the parties, the
 case was inadvertently raffled to an RTC designated as a special commercial court. Later, the
RTC rendered judgment adverse to Era, who, upon realizing that the trial court was not a
regular RTC, approaches you and wants you to file a petition to have the judgment annulled
for lack of jurisdiction. What advice would you give to Era? Explain your answer.

Answer: The advice I would give to Era is that the petition for annulment of judgment on lack
of jurisdiction will not prosper.
The Supreme Court has held that a special commercial court is still a court of general
jurisdiction and can hear and try a non-commercial case. (Concorde Condominium Inc. vs.
Baculi, 17 Feb 2016)

2. An amicable settlement was signed before a Lupon Tagapamayapa on January 3, 2001. On

July 6, 2001, the prevailing party asked the Lupon to execute the amicable settlement because
of the non-compliance by the other party of the terms of the agreement. The Lupon concerned
refused to execute the settlement/ agreement. Is the Lupon correct in refusing to execute the
settlement/agreement?

Answer: Yes. The Lupon is correct in refusing to execute the settlement/ agreement because
the execution sought is already beyond the period of six months from the date of the settlement
within which the Lupon is authorized to execute. (Sec. 417, Local Government Code of 1991)
After the six-month period, the prevailing party should move to execute the
settlement/agreement in the appropriate city or municipal trial court.

3. A brings an action in the MTC of Manila against B for the annulment of an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale of real property with an assessed value of P50,000.00 located in Laguna. The
complaint alleged prematurity of the sale for the reason that the mortgage was not yet due. B
timely moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the action should have been brought in the
RTC of Laguna. Decide with reason.

Answer: The motion should be granted. The MTC of Manila has no jurisdiction because the
action for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure is not capable of pecuniary estimation
and is therefore under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. (Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738 [1999])

However, the action for annulment is a personal action and the venue depends on the residence
of either A or B. Hence, it should be brought in the RTC of the place where either of the parties
resides.

4. A files an action in the Municipal Trial Court against B, the natural son of A’s father, for the
partition of a parcel of land located in Taytay, Rizal with an assessed value of Php20,000.00.
B moves to dismiss the action the ground that the case should have been brought in the RTC
because the action is one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation as it involves primarily a
determination of hereditary rights and not merely the bare right to real property. Resolve the
motion.

Answer: The motion should be granted. The action for partition depends on a determination of
the hereditary rights of A and B, which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, even
 though the assessed value of the land is P20,000, the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction.
(Russel vs. Vestil)

5. P sued A in the RTC Manila to recover the following sums: (1) 200,000.00 on an overdue
promissory note, (2) P80,000.00 on the purchase price of a computer, (3) P150,000.00 for
damages to his car and (4) P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Can A move
to dismiss the case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter?
Explain.

Answer: No. Because the RTC-Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter. P may sue A in
one complaint asserting as many causes of action as he may have and since all the claims are
principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of
jurisdiction. (Rule 2, Sec. 5[d]). The aggregate amount claimed is P450,000.00, exclusive of
the amount of P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees and expenses for litigation. Hence, the RTC-
Manila has jurisdiction.

What about the rule that it must not be governed by a special rules. Joinder of action.

6. A filed with the MTC of Manila an action for specific performance against B, a resident of
Quezon City, to compel the latter to execute a deed of conveyance covering a parcel of land
situated in Quezon City having an assessed value of P19,000.00. B received the summons and
a copy of the Complaint on 02 January 2003. On 10 January 2003, B filed a Motion to Dismiss
the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction contending that the subject matter of the
suit was incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court denied the motion. Was the denial of the
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint correct?

Answer: The denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was not correct. Although the
assessed value of the parcel of land involved was P19,000.00, within the jurisdiction of the
MTC of Manila, the action filed by A for Specific Performance against B to compel the latter
to execute a Deed of Conveyance of said parcel of land was not capable of pecuniary
estimation, and therefore the action was within the jurisdiction of RTC. (Russel vs. Vestil;
Copioso vs. Copioso, G.R. No. 149243, October 28, 2002; Cabutihan vs. Land Center
Construction, 383 SCRA 353[2002]).

Alternative answer: If the action affects title to or possession of real property then it is a real
action and jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the property. It is within the
jurisdiction therefore of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

7. P sued A and B in one complaint in the RTC Manila, the cause of action against A being on an
overdue promissory note for P300,000.00 and that against B being on an alleged balance of
P300,000.00 on the purchase price of good sold on credit. Does the RTC-Manila have
jurisdiction over the case? Explain.

Answer: No. The RTC-Manila has no jurisdiction over the case. A and B could not be joined
as defendants in one complaint because the right to relief against both defendants do not arise
out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there is no common question of law or
 fact common to both. (Rule 3, Sec. 6). Hence, separate complaints will have to be filed and
they would fall under the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

8. Amorsolo, a Filipino citizen permanently residing in New York City, filed with the RTC of
Lipa City a complaint for Rescission of Contract of Sale of Land against Brigido, a resident of
Barangay San Miguel, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The subject property, located in Barangay
Talisay, Lipa City has an assessed value of 19,700. Appended to the complaint is Amorsolo’s
verification and certification of non-forum shopping executed in New York City, duly
notarized by Mr. Joseph Brown, Esq., a notary public in the State of New York. Brigod filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
(a) The court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of Amorsolo because he is not a resident
of the Philippine.
(b) The RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action involving the real
property with an assessed value of P19,700; exclusive and original jurisdiction is with the
Municipal Trial Court.
Assume you’re the judge, resolve the motion.

Answer: The first ground raised lacks merit because jurisdiction over the person of a plaintiff
is acquired by the court upon the filing of plaintiff’s complaint therewith. Residency or
citizenship is not a requirement for filing a complaint, because plaintiff thereby submits to the
jurisdiction of the court.

The second ground raised is also without merit because the subject of the litigation, Rescission
of Contract, is incapable of pecuniary estimation the exclusive original jurisdiction to which is
vested by law in the Regional Trial Courts. The nature of the action renders the assessed value
of the land involved irrelevant.

9. Josefa filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Alicia and Mabili, a petition for the probate
of the will of her husband, Martin, who died in the Municipality of Alicia, the residence of the
spouses. The probable value of the estate which consisted mainly of a house and lot was placed
at P195,000.00 and in the petition for the allowance of the will, attorney’s fees in the amount
of P10,000.00, litigation expenses in the amount of P5,000.00 and costs were included. Pedro,
the next of kin of Martin, filed an opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that the
total amount included in the relief of the petition is more than P200,000.00, the maximum
jurisdiction amount for municipal circuit trial courts. The court overruled the opposition and
proceeded to hear the case. Was the municipal circuit trial court correct in its ruling?

Answer: Yes. The MCTC was correct in proceeding to hear the case. It has exclusive
jurisdiction in all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the value of the estate
does not exceed P100,000.00 (now P200,000.00). The value in this case is P195,000.00 is
within its jurisdiction. In determining the jurisdictional amount, excluded are attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and costs; these are considered only for determining the filing fees.

10.Agatha filed a complaint against Yana in the RTC in Makati City to collect Php350,000.00, an
amount representing the unpaid balance on the price of the car Yana had bought from Agatha.
Realizing a jurisdictional error in filing the complaint in the RTC, Agatha filed a notice of
dismissal before she was served with the answer of Yana. The RTC issued an order confirming
the dismissal.
 Three months later, Agatha filed another complaint against Yana based on the same cause of
action this time in the MeTC of Makati City. However, for reasons personal to her, Agatha
decided to have the complaint dismissed without prejudice by filing a notice of dismissal prior
to the service of the answer of Yana. Hence, the case was dismissed by the MeTC.

A month later, Agatha refiled the complaint against Yana in the same MeTC.

May Yana successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third complaint?
Explain your answer.

Answer: No, Yana may not successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third
complaint.
Under the Two-Dismissal Rule, the notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon
the merits provided it is filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an
action based on or including the same claim. (S1, R17)
Here the first dismissal by the plaintiff was not in a competent court as the RTC in Makati
City did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over an action seeking to recover P350,000. Hence
Agatha’s third complaint is not barred by the Two-Dismissal Rule.

Part III. 5-point Questions

11.Santa filed against Era in the RTC of Quezon City an action for specific performance praying
for the delivery of a parcel of land subject of their contract of sale. Unknown to the parties, the
case was inadvertently raffled to an RTC designated as a special commercial court. Later, the
RTC rendered judgment adverse to Era, who, upon realizing that the trial court was not a
regular RTC, approaches you and wants you to file a petition to have the judgment annulled
for lack of jurisdiction. What advice would you give to Era? Explain your answer.

Answer: The advice I would give to Era is that the petition for annulment of judgment on lack
of jurisdiction will not prosper.
The Supreme Court has held that a special commercial court is still a court of general
jurisdiction and can hear and try a non-commercial case. (Concorde Condominium Inc. vs.
Baculi, 17 Feb 2016)

12.An amicable settlement was signed before a Lupon Tagapamayapa on January 3, 2001. On
July 6, 2001, the prevailing party asked the Lupon to execute the amicable settlement because
of the non-compliance by the other party of the terms of the agreement. The Lupon concerned
refused to execute the settlement/ agreement. Is the Lupon correct in refusing to execute the
settlement/agreement?

Answer: Yes. The Lupon is correct in refusing to execute the settlement/ agreement because
the execution sought is already beyond the period of six months from the date of the settlement
within which the Lupon is authorized to execute. (Sec. 417, Local Government Code of 1991)
After the six-month period, the prevailing party should move to execute the
settlement/agreement in the appropriate city or municipal trial court.
13.A brings an action in the MTC of Manila against B for the annulment of an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale of real property with an assessed value of P50,000.00 located in Laguna. The
complaint alleged prematurity of the sale for the reason that the mortgage was not yet due. B
timely moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the action should have been brought in the
RTC of Laguna. Decide with reason.

Answer: The motion should be granted. The MTC of Manila has no jurisdiction because the
action for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure is not capable of pecuniary estimation
and is therefore under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. (Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738 [1999])

However, the action for annulment is a personal action and the venue depends on the residence
of either A or B. Hence, it should be brought in the RTC of the place where either of the parties
resides.

14.A files an action in the Municipal Trial Court against B, the natural son of A’s father, for the
partition of a parcel of land located in Taytay, Rizal with an assessed value of Php20,000.00.
B moves to dismiss the action the ground that the case should have been brought in the RTC
because the action is one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation as it involves primarily a
determination of hereditary rights and not merely the bare right to real property. Resolve the
motion.

Answer: The motion should be granted. The action for partition depends on a determination of
the hereditary rights of A and B, which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, even
though the assessed value of the land is P20,000, the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction.
(Russel vs. Vestil)

15.P sued A in the RTC Manila to recover the following sums: (1) 200,000.00 on an overdue
promissory note, (2) P80,000.00 on the purchase price of a computer, (3) P150,000.00 for
damages to his car and (4) P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Can A move
to dismiss the case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter?
Explain.

Answer: Yes, A can move to dismiss the case on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Under Section 5(c), Rule 2, the joinder shall not include actions
governed by special rules. Here, the action for collection of P200,000.00 is governed by a
special rule, i.e. the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases. Hence, the joinder of causes of
action is not proper and consequently the totality rule cannot come into play. The RTC Manila
would not have jurisdiction since the claim in each cause of action falls below the jurisdictional
amount of P400,000.00.

Previous answer, before small claims. No. Because the RTC-Manila has jurisdiction over the
subject matter. P may sue A in one complaint asserting as many causes of action as he may
have and since all the claims are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction. (Rule 2, Sec. 5[d]). The aggregate amount claimed is
P450,000.00, exclusive of the amount of P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees and expenses for
litigation. Hence, the RTC- Manila has jurisdiction.

16.A filed with the MTC of Manila an action for specific performance against B, a resident of
Quezon City, to compel the latter to execute a deed of conveyance covering a parcel of land
 situated in Quezon City having an assessed value of P19,000.00. B received the summons and
a copy of the Complaint on 02 January 2003. On 10 January 2003, B filed a Motion to Dismiss
the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction contending that the subject matter of the
suit was incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court denied the motion. Was the denial of the
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint correct?

Answer: The denial of the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint was not correct. Although the
assessed value of the parcel of land involved was P19,000.00, within the jurisdiction of the
MTC of Manila, the action filed by A for Specific Performance against B to compel the latter
to execute a Deed of Conveyance of said parcel of land was not capable of pecuniary
estimation, and therefore the action was within the jurisdiction of RTC. (Russel vs. Vestil;
Copioso vs. Copioso, G.R. No. 149243, October 28, 2002; Cabutihan vs. Land Center
Construction, 383 SCRA 353[2002]).

Alternative answer: If the action affects title to or possession of real property then it is a real
action and jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the property. It is within the
jurisdiction therefore of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

17.P sued A and B in one complaint in the RTC Manila, the cause of action against A being on an
overdue promissory note for P300,000.00 and that against B being on an alleged balance of
P300,000.00 on the purchase price of good sold on credit. Does the RTC-Manila have
jurisdiction over the case? Explain.

Answer: No. The RTC-Manila has no jurisdiction over the case. A and B could not be joined
as defendants in one complaint because the right to relief against both defendants do not arise
out of the same transaction or series of transactions and there is no common question of law or
fact common to both. (Rule 3, Sec. 6). Hence, separate complaints will have to be filed and
they would fall under the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

18.Amorsolo, a Filipino citizen permanently residing in New York City, filed with the RTC of
Lipa City a complaint for Rescission of Contract of Sale of Land against Brigido, a resident of
Barangay San Miguel, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The subject property, located in Barangay
Talisay, Lipa City has an assessed value of 19,700. Appended to the complaint is Amorsolo’s
verification and certification of non-forum shopping executed in New York City, duly
notarized by Mr. Joseph Brown, Esq., a notary public in the State of New York. Brigod filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
(c) The court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the person of Amorsolo because he is not a resident
of the Philippine.
(d) The RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action involving the real
property with an assessed value of P19,700; exclusive and original jurisdiction is with the
Municipal Trial Court.
Assume you’re the judge, resolve the motion.

Answer: The first ground raised lacks merit because jurisdiction over the person of a plaintiff
is acquired by the court upon the filing of plaintiff’s complaint therewith. Residency or
citizenship is not a requirement for filing a complaint, because plaintiff thereby submits to the
jurisdiction of the court.
 The second ground raised is also without merit because the subject of the litigation, Rescission
of Contract, is incapable of pecuniary estimation the exclusive original jurisdiction to which is
vested by law in the Regional Trial Courts. The nature of the action renders the assessed value
of the land involved irrelevant.

19.Josefa filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Alicia and Mabili, a petition for the probate
of the will of her husband, Martin, who died in the Municipality of Alicia, the residence of the
spouses. The probable value of the estate which consisted mainly of a house and lot was placed
at P195,000.00 and in the petition for the allowance of the will, attorney’s fees in the amount
of P10,000.00, litigation expenses in the amount of P5,000.00 and costs were included. Pedro,
the next of kin of Martin, filed an opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that the
total amount included in the relief of the petition is more than P200,000.00, the maximum
jurisdiction amount for municipal circuit trial courts. The court overruled the opposition and
proceeded to hear the case. Was the municipal circuit trial court correct in its ruling?

Answer: Yes. The MCTC was correct in proceeding to hear the case. It has exclusive
jurisdiction in all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the value of the estate
does not exceed P100,000.00 (now P200,000.00). The value in this case is P195,000.00 is
within its jurisdiction. In determining the jurisdictional amount, excluded are attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and costs; these are considered only for determining the filing fees.

20.Agatha filed a complaint against Yana in the RTC in Makati City to collect Php350,000.00, an
amount representing the unpaid balance on the price of the car Yana had bought from Agatha.
Realizing a jurisdictional error in filing the complaint in the RTC, Agatha filed a notice of
dismissal before she was served with the answer of Yana. The RTC issued an order confirming
the dismissal.

Three months later, Agatha filed another complaint against Yana based on the same cause of
action this time in the MeTC of Makati City. However, for reasons personal to her, Agatha
decided to have the complaint dismissed without prejudice by filing a notice of dismissal prior
to the service of the answer of Yana. Hence, the case was dismissed by the MeTC.

A month later, Agatha refiled the complaint against Yana in the same MeTC.

May Yana successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third complaint?
Explain your answer.

Answer: No, Yana may not successfully invoke the Two-Dismissal Rule to bar Agatha’s third
complaint.
Under the Two-Dismissal Rule, the notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon
the merits provided it is filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an
action based on or including the same claim. (S1, R17)
Here the first dismissal by the plaintiff was not in a competent court as the RTC in Makati
City did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over an action seeking to recover P350,000. Hence
Agatha’s third complaint is not barred by the Two-Dismissal Rule.