EMINENT DOMAIN; JUSTCOMPENSATION
Republic of the Philippines vs Leonor Macabagdal
G.R. No. 227215
January 10, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts:On January 23, 2008, petitioner, represented by the Department of Public Works
and Highways filed before the RTC a complaint against an unknown owner for the
expropriation of a 200-square meter lot located in Barangay Ugong, Valenzuela City for
the construction of the the NLEX Segment 8.1.
Petitioner thereafter applied for, and was granted by the RTC a writ of possession over
the subject property on May 5, 2008 and was required to deposit with the court the
amount of PhP550,000.00 representing the zonal value thereof as provisional deposit.
Respondent Leonor Macabagdal, represented by Eulogia Macabagdal Pascual, was
substituted as partydefendant upon sufficient proof that the subject lot is registered in
her name. Respondent did not oppose the expropriation, and received the provisional
deposit.
The RTC found the recommendation of the board commissioners who determined the
just compensation of the subject lot to be favorable and just. Accordingly, the just
compensation for the subject lot is fixed at PhP 9,000.00/sq.m. and the petitioner is
directed to pay the same, less the aforesaid provisional deposit (PhP550,000.00) and
the legal interest at the rate of 12% p.a. on the unpaid balance was imposed, computed
from the time of the taking of the subject lot until full payment.
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed before the CA questioning the abovementioned ruling
of the RTC, instead of six percent (6%) p.a. as provided under Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, but the same
affirmed the RTC Decision.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision dated September 13, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision, holding
that the commissioners, in their recommendation, observed the parameters set forth
under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974 and the findings of the RTC was amply
supported by the evidence on record.
Issue/s: Whether or not the applicable rate of interest in this case should be at 12%
p.a. from the filing of the complaint until June 30, 2013, and thereafter, at 6% p.a. until
full payment
Ruling: The purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property
taken, but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the
property is the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted. Indeed,
the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for appropriating the
latter's property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner,
with due consideration to the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken.
The value of the landholdings should be equivalent to the principal sum of the just
compensation due, and interest is due and should be paid to compensate for the
unpaid balance of this principal sum after taking has been completed. This shall
comprise the real, substantial, full, and ample value of the expropriated property, and
constitutes due compliance with the constitutional mandate of just compensation in
eminent domain.
As aptly pointed out by petitioner, the twelve percent (12%) p.a. rate of legal interest is
only applicable until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, legal interest shall be at six percent
(6%) p.a. in line with BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013. Thereafter, legal
interest shall be at six percent (6%) p.a. in line with BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of
2013.
Nonetheless, it bears to clarify that legal interest shall run not from the date of the filing
of the complaint but from the date of the issuance of the Writ of Possession on May 5,
2008, since it is from this date that the fact of the deprivation of property can be
established. As such, it is only proper that accrual of legal interest should begin from
this date. Accordingly, the Court deems it proper to correct the award of legal interest to
be imposed on the unpaid balance of the just compensation for the subject lot, which
shall be computed at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. from the date of the taking
on May 5, 2008 until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully
paid, the just compensation due respondent shall earn legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) p.a.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. SPOUSES CHIONG
FACTS: petitioner is a government owned and controlled corporation for the
development of hydroelectric power, pursuant to RA 6395. In order to carry out its
purpose, NPC is authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain. On Feb.19,
1998, NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain with the RTC of Iba, Zambales,
seeking the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way and certain portions of
agricultural lands owned by Igmedio and Liwayway Chiong and the Heirs of Agrifina
Angeles to be used in its Northwestern Luzon Transmission Line Project. Respondents
averred that the fair market value is P1,100 /m². On Mar.9, 2000, Atty. Castillo and
Ms.Ragadio submitted their report that the property have a fair market value of
P500/m². On May 5, 2000, Atty. Alog submitted his report recommending that NPC pay
an easement fee of P20,957.88 and P9,187.05 to heirs of Angeles and spouses
Chiong, respectively. Furthermore, Atty. Alog assessed the properties to have fair
market value of P22.50/m² for Angeles and P15.75/m² for Chiong.
ISSUE: whether or not NPC should be required to pay full market value as just
compensation despite the fact that the petitioner was only acquiring an easement of
right-of-way
HELD: in eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just
compensation to which the owner is entitled to is the market value, which is “the sum of
money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner wiling but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor.” When
only a part of a property is expropriated, the owner is also entitled to recover for the
consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property, from which value of
consequential benefits must be deducted. In fixing the valuation at P500/m², the CA
noted that the trial court had considered the reports of the commissioners and proofs
submitted by the parties. The trial court found that the land sought to be expropriated
are agricultural land with minimal improvements. It is the nature and character of the
EMINENT DOMAIN; JUSTCOMPENSATION
land at the time of the taking that is the principal criterion to determine just of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just compensation for
compensation to the landowner. Without any showing that the valuation is exorbitant or
the properties.
otherwise unjustified, factual finding of the CA is binding on the parties. The petition is
denied for lack of merit. CA’s decision is affirmed.
EPZA filed an Objection to Commissioner's Report on the grounds that P.D.
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner
No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court on the
vs.
ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the compensation
HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Court of First
must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533.
Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT
The trial court denied the motion, as a result of which, the petitioner flied this
CORPORATION, respondents
present petition enjoining the trial court from enforcing the order and from further
G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987
proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

ISSUE: Whether or not the there is still a need to appoint commissioners even after the
FACTS: On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation
effectivity of P.D. No. 1533 which already provided for a mode in determining just
No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of
compensation.
Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu for the establishment of an export processing zone
by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
HELD: Yes.
Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation
The Court declares the provision of the P.D. 1533 on just compensation
included, among others, four (4) parcels of owned and registered in the name of the
unconstitutional and void as the method of ascertaining just compensation under the
San Antponio Development COrporation. EPZA, therefore, offered to purchase the
said decree constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to
parcels of land in acccordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential
render the Court inutile on a matter which, under the Constitution, is reserved to it for
Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement
final determination.
regarding the sale of the property.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding, the court technically would still
EPZA then filed with Court of First Instance a complaint for expropriation,
have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the
through which, a writ of possession authorizing the petitioner to take immediate
applicable decree, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the
possession of the premises was issued.
property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. The strict application of the
At the pre-trial conference, parties have agreed that the only issue to be
decree during proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as
resolved is the just compensation for the properties. Hearing on the merits was then
the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the
set.
assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot
Thereafter, the court issued an orders, declaring EPZA as having the lawful
exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair.
right to take the properties sought to be condemned upon the payment of just
The trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may only serve
compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint and appointing
as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
not substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how
properties sought to be expropriated.
to arrive at such amount. A return to the earlier well-established doctrine is more in
The consolidated report of the three commissioners recommended the amount
keeping with the principle that the judiciary should live up to its mission "by vitalizing
EMINENT DOMAIN; JUSTCOMPENSATION
and not denigrating constitutional rights."
The basic unfairness of the decree is readily apparent.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It
means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained.
In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by EPZA as basis for
just compensation were made by the city assessor long before martial law, when land
was not only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were stated in
figures constituting only a fraction of their true market value. The private respondent
was not even the owner of the properties at the time. To peg the value of the lots on the
basis of documents which are out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of
present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by
assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass
of land owners accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared
by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less
analyze, the statements.
It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that
the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong.
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial
function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights
that private property may not be taken for pubhc use without just compensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shag prevail
over the court's findings.
In view of the foregoing, P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion
to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, was therefore held
unconstitutional and void.
Eslaban v. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001
Fact: Respondent is the owner of a lot in South Cotabato. Santiago Eslaban, Jr.,
Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the main irrigation canal of
the NIA on the said lot. Respondent’s husband agreed to the construction of the NIA
canal provided that they be paid by the government for the area taken after the
processing of documents by the Commission on Audit. a Right-of-Way agreement was
executed between respondent and the NIA who paid respondent for the Right-of-Way
damages. Respondent subsequently executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and
Fees whereby she waived any compensation for damages to crops and improvements
which she suffered as a result of the construction of a right-of-way on her property. The
same year, petitioner offered respondent the sum of P35,000.00 by way of amicable
settlement. Respondent demanded payment for the taking of her property, but
petitioner refused to pay. Accordingly, respondent filed on December 10, 1990 a
complaint against petitioner before the RTC, praying that petitioner be ordered to pay
as compensation for the portion of her property used in the construction of the canal
constructed by the NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs. Petitioner, an Answer, in
which he admitted that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the property of the
plaintiff and that NIA paid a certain landowner whose property had been taken for
irrigation purposes. The trial court rendered a decision ordering National Irrigation
Administration, to pay to plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Seven Thousand Five
Hundred Seventeen Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P107,517.60) as just compensation for
the questioned area of 24,660 square meters of land owned by plaintiff and taken
bysaid defendant NIA which used it for its main canal plus costs.
On November 15, 1993, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on October
31, 2000, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the value of just compensation shall be determined from the time of the
taking or from the time of the finality of the decision?
Held:   Yes, With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned
property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is the market value which
should be paid or “that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to
buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be
given and received therefor.”8 Further, just compensation means not only the correct
amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered “just” for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of
being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.9 Nevertheless,
there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the
expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time
of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain.
CITY OF CEBU vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA DEDAMO
[G.R. No. 142971, May 7, 2002]
FACTS:
On 17 September 1993, Petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent
domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner
alleged that they needed the parcels of land owned by the respondents for public
purpose because they are planning to construct a public road which will serve as an
access or relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and
the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City.
EMINENT DOMAIN; JUSTCOMPENSATION
However, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the
purpose of expropriation was not for public purpose but for the benefit of the Cebu
Holdings, Inc. They alleged that the petitioner could simply buy directly the property
from them at its fair market value just like what they did with the neighboring lots and
the price offered was very low. They also alleged that they have no other land in Cebu
City.
From this, a pre-trial was conducted. On 23 August 1994, the petitioner filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No.
7160. The motion was granted by the trial court on 21 September 1994.  The parties
executed an agreement and submitted to the trial wherein they declared that they have
partially settled the case in consideration of the stipulations in the agreement.
Pursuant to the said agreement, the trial court appointed Palermo M. Lugo,
Alfredo Cisneros and Herbert E. Buot to be the commissioners to determine the just
compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated. The commissioner’s report
contained that the plaintiff is directed to pay a just compensation costs P24,865.930.00
to the respondents.
But the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
commissioner’s report was inaccurate since it included an area which was not subject
to expropriation. Then the commissioners submit an amendment which made the just
compensation costs P20,826,339.50 which was later approved by the trial court.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals alleging that the lower
court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. They also
alleged that just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the
property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. However, the Court of
Appeals was not convinced and affirmed the lower court’s decision.
The petitioner filed with a petition for review to the SC. They asserted that just
compensation should be determined on September 17, 1993, as of the date of the filing
of the complaint and not at the time the property was actually taken in 1994.
ISSUE:
whether just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.
HELD:
No. Just compensation should not be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.
Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is
the Governments right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use or purpose. [9] However, the Government must pay the
owner thereof just compensation as consideration therefor.
In this case, the applicable law as to the point of determining the just compensation is
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of actual taking. The SC justifies that although the general
rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as
of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule admits of an exception: where this
Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. 
Moreover, both of the parties agreed to be bound by the report of the commission so
they need to comply on the agreement in good faith. Also, the petitioner was too late to
question the valuation without violating the principle of equitable estoppel. And lastly,
Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, which is a
substantive law.
Therefore, the petition was denied.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Honorable Secretary of
Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 78742
July 14, 1989
Ponente: CRUZ, J.
FACTS
 Cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions.
They will be subject to one common discussion and resolution.
G.R. No. 79777:
 The petitioners are Nicolas Manaay and his wife who own a 9-hectare riceland
worked by four tenants and Augustin Hermano, Jr. who owns a 5-hectare
riceland worked by four tenants. They question the constitutionality of P.D. No.
27, E.O. Nos. 228 & 229, and R.A. No. 6657 since their tenants were declared
full owners of the mentioned lands.
G.R. No. 79310
 Landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros
Occidental and Planters’ Committee Inc., with 1400 planter-members,
submitted a petition seeking to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131
and E.O. No. 229.
 Aug. 27, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by the National Federation
of Sugarcane Planters, which claim 20 000 members). It was granted by the
court.
 Sept. 10, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by Manuel Barcelona, et
al., representing coconut and riceland owners. It was granted by the court.
G.R. No. 79744
 Sept. 3 1986 – The petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small
landholding under Operation Land Transfer accusing the then Secretary of
EMINENT DOMAIN; JUSTCOMPENSATION
DAR of violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation.
Certificates of Land Transfer were issued to the private respondents who then
refused to pay lease rentals. The petitioner is asking for the recall and
cancellation of these certificates.
 Dec. 24, 1986 – Petitioner claims his petition was denied without hearing.
 Feb. 17, 1987 – A motion for reconsideration was filed which had not been
acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 & 229 were issued which rendered his motion
moot.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the President had the power to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. Nos. 228 & 229
2. Whether or not the President had the legislative power for issuing the
measures
3. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 conforms to the requirements of a valid
appropriation as specified in the Constitution
4. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because
they do not provide for retention limits required by Article 13, Section 4 of the
Constitution
5. Whether or not E.O. No. 229 violates constitutional requirement that a bill
should only have one subject, to be expressed in its title
6. Whether or not the writ of mandamus can issue to compel the performance of
a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government.
7. Whether this statute is an exercise of police power or the power of eminent
domain
8. Whether or not the statutes are valid exercises of police power
9. Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated
10. Whether or not the content and manner of the just compensation provided for
in the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution
11. Whether or not there is contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent
domain by divesting the landowner of his property even before actual payment
to him in full of just compensation
RULING
1. YES. P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos during Martial Law has been sustained
in Gonzales v. Estrella. President Aquino is authorized under Section 6 of the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate Proc. No. 131
and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229.
2. YES. The said measures were issued before July 27, 1987, when the
Congress was formally convened and took over legislative power.
3. NO. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure for that is not its principal
purpose and therefore is not required to conform to the requirements.
4. NO. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law.
5. NO. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its
contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to
each other and may be inferred from the title.
6. NO. The rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the
discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In
other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific
action.
7. It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain because there is payment of
just compensation unlike in the exercise of police power wherein confiscation
of property is not compensable.
8. YES. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a
concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. As the subject and
purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we
may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be
examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional
goal.
9. NO. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and
entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but
also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction
between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those
who will not see.
10. NO. It is declared that although money is the traditional mode of payment,
other modes of payment shall be permitted as compensation. The court
accepts the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always
required to be made fully in money, they find further that the proportion of cash
payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as
determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly
oppressive upon the landowner. The other modes, which are likewise
available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because
payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets,
tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just
compensation.
(Court: We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has
influenced our decision on this issue. The Court is as acutely anxious as the
rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the
frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these
disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will
result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even
as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and
dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the
Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.)
11. NO. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of
the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds
with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.
DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
EMINENT DOMAIN; JUSTCOMPENSATION
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full
payment of compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained
and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27
shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein
prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
MERALCO VS PINEDA (1992)
FACTS
 Petitioner is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine Laws of the Philippines
 For the purpose of constructing a transmission line from Barrio Malaya to
Pililia, Rizal, petitioner needed portions of land of the private respondents
with an aggregate area of 237, 321 sqm; parties failed to reach an agreement
despite negotiations and offers to pay compensation
 Petitioner then filed a complaint for eminent domain with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal
 Court authorized petitioner to take and enter property sought to be
expropriated
 Respondents filed for Motion for Withdrawal of deposit claiming they are
entitled but were subsequently denied
 Petitioner then sold to NAPOCOR its power plants and transmission lines
including the one in questions pursuant to a government policy
 The court then appointed commissioners for the appraisal of the land
 Commissioners’ work was suspended when petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss because of their said sale to NAPOCOR
 Respondents filed another motion for payment and courts granted and
another sum thereafter
 Petitioner then filed for a Motion for Reconsideration and alleged that “at this
stage” the respondents are not yet entitled to payment of just compensation
as there is no appraisal yet and that court, upon awarding a fraction of sum,
based it only on a witness of a credible real estate broker instead of
employing the assistance of three commissioners to determine just
compensation
ISSUE
 Whether the court can dispense the employment of three commissioners in
the ascertainment of just compensation
HELD
 No
 Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: the court shall appoint 3
commissioners to ascertain just compensation and render judgment based on
their reports
 2 stages of expropriation:
1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise power of eminent
domain
2. Determination of the court of just compensation for the property sought
done with the assistance of 3 commissioners
 A trial before commissioners in a mandatory and substantive right,
indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just
compensation
 Reasons for court to disregard findings of commissioners:
1. Where the commissioners applied illegal principles to the evidence
submitted to them
2. Where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence
3. Where the amount is either grossly inadequate and excessive
NPC VS HENSON
Facts:
On March  21, 1990, the National Power Corporation initiated with the Regional Trial
Court, Pampanga, a complaint for eminent domain  for the taking for public use of five
(5) parcels of land, owned or claimed by respondents, with a total aggregate area of
58,311 square meters, for the expansion of the NPC Mexico Sub-Station. The
respondents, 5 couples, were the owners.
The petitioner tried to fix the value of the land but was met of a price of 180 to 250
pesos due to the respondents. The respondents also filed a motion to dismiss.
In the trial court, the motion to dismiss was quashed. However, the court fixed the
provisional value of the land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of 63,220
sqm.  The petitioner deposited the amount.  The trial court allowed respondents a
motion to withdraw P5,831,100.00, with a balance of P690,900.00 as the purchase
value.
3 commissioners were then authorized by the trial court to determine the provisional
value of the land for just compensation. The values were in 350, 375, and 170 per sqm
from Tiglao, Atienza and Orocio.
In May 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment fixing the amount of just
compensation to be paid by petitioner for the taking of the entire area of 63,220 square
meters at P400.00 per square meter, with  legal  interest  from September 11, 1990,
when petitioner was placed in possession of the land, plus attorney’s fees of
P20,000.00, and costs of the proceedings.
The CA merely deleted the attorney’s fees.
Issue: What  is  the  just compensation for the taking of respondents’ property for the
EMINENT DOMAIN; JUSTCOMPENSATION
expansion of the NPC’s Mexico Sub-station?
Held: P375.00 per sqm. CA decision modified.
Ratio:
The parcels of land sought to be expropriated  are undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw
agricultural land, bereft of any improvement.   Except for the Henson family, all the
other respondents were admittedly farmer beneficiaries under operation land transfer of
the Department of Agrarian Reform.  However, the land has been re-classified as
residential.  The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal
criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner.
CA fixed 400.00 due to the similarity with the price in the adjacent Sto. Domingo
Village. The land in question, however, was an undeveloped, idle land, principally
agricultural in character, though re-classified as residential. There was no evidence for
the value. It was even higher than that of the commissioners’ valuation.
On the other hand, Commissioner Atienza recommended a fair market value at
P375.00 per square meter.  This appears to be the closest valuation to the market
value of lots in the adjoining fully developed subdivision.  Considering that the subject
parcels of land are undeveloped raw land, the price of P375.00 per square meter would
appear to the Court as the just compensation for the taking of such raw land.
The court agreed with petitioner that the area of the communal irrigation canal
consisting of 4,809 square meters must be excluded from the land to be expropriated. 
To begin with, it is excluded in the amended complaint. Hence, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals erred in including the same in the area to be taken.
The trial court erroneously ordered double payment for 3,611 square meters of lot 5
(portion) in the dispositive part of its decision, and, hence, this must be deleted.
The decision for legal interest was correct. Napocor was exempted from costs of
proceedings.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and
DISTRICT ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS, Petitioners -versus-SPOUSES
HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON, Respondents
G.R. No. 179334 July 01, 2013
Facts:Respondent spouses Heracleo and Ramona Tecson are co-owners of a parcel
of land with an area of 7,268 square meters located in San Pablo, Malolos, Bulacan
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-43006 of the Register of Deeds
of Bulacan. Said parcel of land was among the properties taken by the government
sometime in 1940 without the owners’ consent and without the necessary expropriation
proceedings and used for the construction of the MacArthur Highway.
In a letter dated December 15, 1994, respondents demanded the payment of the fair
market value of the subject parcel of land. Petitioner Celestino R. Contreras, then
District Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering District of DPWH, offered to pay the
subject land at the rate of P0.70 per square meter per Resolution of the Provincial
Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan. Unsatisfied with the offer, respondents
demanded for the return of their property or the payment of compensation at the current
fair market value.
As their demand remained unheeded, respondents filed a Complaint for recovery of
possession with damages against petitioners, praying that they be restored to the
possession of the subject parcel of land and that they be paid attorney’s fees.
Instead of filing their Answer, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
the following grounds: (1) that the suit is against the State which may not be sued
without its consent; (2) that the case has already prescribed; (3) that respondents have
no cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (4) if respondents
are entitled to compensation, they should be paid only the value of the property in 1940
or 1941.
On June 28, 1995, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion to dismiss based on
the doctrine of state immunity from suit.
The CA reversed and set aside the dismissal of the complaint and consequently
remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of determining the just
compensation because the doctrine of state immunity from suit is not applicable and
the recovery of compensation is the only relief available. To deny such relief would
undeniably cause injustice to the landowner.
The trial proceeded in the RTC with the Branch Clerk of Court appointed as the
Commissioner and designated as the Chairman of the Committee that would determine
just compensation.
Later the case was referred to the PAC for the submission of a recommendation report
on the value of the subject property. The PAC recommended the amount of P1,500.00
per square meter as the just compensation for the subject property per PAC Resolution
No. 99- 007 dated December 19, 2001.
On March 22, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision directing DPWH to pay the amount
of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) per square meter for the subject lot
in accordance with PAC Resolution.
The CA affirmed the above decision with the modification that the just compensation
stated above should earn interest of six percent (6%) per annum computed from the
filing of the action on March 17, 1995 until full payment. Hence, this petition.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting just
EMINENT DOMAIN; JUSTCOMPENSATION
compensation to respondents considering the highly dubious and questionable
circumstances of their alleged ownership of the subject property.
2. Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred in awarding just compensation to
respondents because their complaint for recovery of possession and damages is
already barred by prescription and laches.
3. Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred in affirming the trial court’s
decision ordering the payment of just compensation based on the current market value
of the alleged property of respondents.
Held: It is undisputed that the subject property was taken by petitioners without the
benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur Highway.
After the lapse of more than fifty years, the property owners sought recovery of the
possession of their property.
Both equity and the law direct that a property owner should be compensated if his
property is taken for public use. There is a long-standing rule that where private
property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto
either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land
or the value thereof does not prescribe.
For failure of respondents to question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a long
period of time, they are deemed to have waived and are estopped from assailing the
power of the government to expropriate or the public use for which the power was
exercised. What is left to respondents is the right of compensation.
Just compensation is the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and
one who desires to sell fixed as of the date when it was taken and not the date of the
filing of the proceedings. The owner of private property should be compensated only for
what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his
loss or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is
taken. The fair market value of the subject property in 1940 was P0.70/square meter.
Hence, it should therefore be used in determining the amount due respondents instead
of the higher value which is P1,500.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is partially granted. The decision of
the Court of Appeals is modified. The valuation of the subject property owned by
respondents shall be P0.70 instead of Pl,500.00 per square meter, with interest at six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of taking in 1940 instead of March 17, 1995,
until full payment.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LIM
G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005
Gist: 57 years have lapsed from the time the decision in the subject expropriation
proceedings became final, but still the Republic has not compensated the owner of the
property. Just compensation is not only the correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable
time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just.
FACTS:
In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for expropriation of Lots 932 and
939 for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lots
were registered in the names of Gervasia and Eulalia Denzon. CFI ordered the
Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. The Denzons
appealed to the CA but it was dismissed.
In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a
claim for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the matter." In 1961, Lt.
Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the
lots within a reasonable time. For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, the
Denzons’ successors-in-interest (Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-
Panerio) filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages
against the Republic and AFP officers in possession of the property.
CFI ruled in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio but titles of the said lots came with the
annotation "subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said
parcels of land… ". Valdehueza and Panerio were ordered to execute a deed of sale in
favor of the Republic.
On appeal, SC held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots
932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic, but
they are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the
payment of their fair market value.
In 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to respondent Lim as security for
their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, the latter had the mortgage
foreclosed and the lot was issued in his name. On 1992, Lim filed a complaint for
quieting of title with the RTC against Republic. RTC rendered a decision in favor of Lim,
declaring that Lim is the absolute and exclusive owner of the lot with all the rights of an
absolute owner. CA affirmed. OSG then filed petition for review with the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation pursuant to the judgment
of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940.
HELD:
No.
Under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution: “Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.” The Republic disregarded the foregoing
provision when it failed and refused to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the
just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. Obviously, defendant-appellant Republic
evaded its duty of paying what was due to the landowners. The expropriation
proceedings had already become final in the late 1940s and yet, up to now, or more
EMINENT DOMAIN; JUSTCOMPENSATION
than 50 years after, the Republic had not yet paid the compensation fixed by the court
while continuously reaping benefits from the expropriated property to the prejudice of
the landowner.
The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner
to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Clearly, without full
payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to
the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the Republic’s acquisition of ownership is
conditioned upon the full payment of just compensation within a reasonable time.
The expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought
to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination
by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done
by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.
When Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to respondent in 1964, they were
still the owners and their title had not yet passed to the petitioner Republic. In fact, it
never did.
arising from such easement prescribed in five years.
ISSUE: WON the respondents are entitled to just compensation because of the legal
easement (underground tunnel) traversed their land.
HELD: RTC – Yes; CA – Yes; SC – YES
 We rule that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic
Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend
to an action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC
cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just
compensation for their land. The two actions are radically different in nature
and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based on the
Constitution[30] while the action for damages is predicated on statutory
enactments. Indeed, the former arises from the exercise by the State of its
power of eminent domain against private property for public use, but the latter
emanates from the transgression of a right.
 There was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners
were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of
private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual
physical taking or appropriation. Compensable taking includes destruction,
restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the
common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner,
lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be
wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the property is
removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands.
 The reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint and
not at the time either when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel

435_3 Napocor v Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, GR 165828, August 25, 2010

Topic: Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
(Section 9, Article III, 1987 Constitution)

FACTS:
 NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to
generate electricity for Mindanao (RA 6395 An Act Revising the Charter of the
National Power Corporation). The project included the construction of several
underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to
the hydroelectric plants.
 In 1997, respondents alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of the
underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River
traversed their land for the operation of the said project. Because of this, several
potential buyers and lenders would not buy or accept as mortgage collateral their
lands.
 NPC argued that respondents had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of
Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was
established; that their cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation,
already prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and that by
reason of the tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement, any action