EMINENT DOMAIN; for public use
[G.R. No. 106440; January 29, 1996]
ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, et al. petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et
al., respondents
FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, the Court is asked to resolve whether or not the
“public use” requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by
the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National
Historical Institute (“NHI”) as a national historical landmark.
Petitioners inherited a 492 sq.m. land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig,
Metro Manila. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site
of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of
1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a
national historical landmark.  It was approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports, while the Secretary of Justice, in his opinion on the legality of the measure, said
in part that “the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo,
who, admittedly, had made contributions to Philippine history and culture has been
declared as a national landmark.  It has been held that places invested with unusual
historical interest is a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be
authorized x x x. it is believed that the NHI… may initiate the institution of
condemnation proceedings for the purpose of acquiring the lot in question in
accordance with the procedure provided for in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court.”
In May 1989, the Republic, through the OSG, instituted a complaint for
expropriation before RTC Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, it filed
an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession
of the property.  The motion was opposed by petitioners. The trial court ruled in favor of
the Republic.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would
constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or
support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2),
Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. Motion was dismissed. Petitioners then lodged a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.  
ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation of the land in the case at bar is for public use.
HELD: YES. Petitioners ask about the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation
of (Felix Manalo’s) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain” when only members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo would benefit.  This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case
deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of,
not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power.  The
purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution
of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate
his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo.  The practical reality that greater
benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could
well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and
secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the
expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of
public use.
All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law and
jurisprudence. The petition is DENIED. 
[G.R. No. 139495.  November 27, 2000]
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA), petitioner, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and VIRGINIA CHIONGBIAN, respondents.
Facts:
 On April 16, 1952, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the CAA,
filed an expropriation proceeding, Civil Case No. R-1881 (Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Third Branch), on several parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu
City,  which included Lot 941, for the expansion and improvement of Lahug
Airport
 In June 1953, appellee Virginia Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original
owner, AntoninaFaborada, the original defendant in the expropriation case,
for P8,000.00. Subsequently, TCT No. 9919 was issued in her name
 December 29, 1961, judgment was rendered in the expropriation case in favor
of the Republic of the Philippines which was made to pay Virginia Chiongbian
the amount of P34,415.00 for Lot 941, with legal interest computed from
November 16, 1947, the date when the government begun using it.  Virginia
Chiongbian did not appeal therefrom.
 1990, Republic Act No. 6958 was passed by Congress creating the Mactan-
Cebu International Airport Authority to which the assets of the Lahug Airport
wastransferred.  Lot 941 was then transferred in the name of MCIAA under
TCT No. 120366 on May 8, 1992
 July 24, 1995, Virginia Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot
941 with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 9, docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-17650
 June 3, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Virginia
Chiongbian
 MCIAA contends that the Republic of the Philippines appropriated Lot No. 941
through expropriation proceedings in Civil Case No. R-1881.   The judgment
rendered therein was unconditional and did not contain a stipulation that
ownership thereof would revert to CHIONGBIAN nor did it give CHIONGBIAN
the right to repurchase the same in the event the lot was no longer used for
the purpose it was expropriated.  
ISSUE:
DOES CHONGBIAN HAD A RIGHT TO REPURCHASE THE EXPROPRAITED
LOT 941.
RULING:
The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title acquired by
the expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, a municipality, or a
corporation which has the right to acquire property under the power of eminent
domain.
If, for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that
when that purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former
owner, then, of course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former
owner reacquires the property so expropriated. If, for example, land is
EMINENT DOMAIN; for public use
expropriated for a public street and the expropriation is granted upon condition that
the city can only use it for a public street, then, of course, when the city abandons
its use as a public street, it returns to the former owner, unless there is some
statutory provision to the contrary.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either
by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no
rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be
devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or
any reversion to the former owner
The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941
in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines.  There was no condition imposed
to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a
right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated is ended
or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug airport.
CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan Cebu International Airport vs.
Court of Appeals[14]  wherein the presentation of parol evidence was allowed to
prove the existence of a written agreement containing the right to repurchase. Said
case did not involve expropriation proceedings but a contract of sale.  This Court
consequently allowed the presentation of parol evidence to prove the existence of
an agreement allowing the right of repurchase based on the following ratiocination:
“Under the parol evidence rule, when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and
there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.  However, a party
may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading, the failure of the written agreement to
express the true intent of the parties thereto.
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. BERNARDO L.
LOZADA, GR No. 176625, 2010-02-25
Facts:
Subject of this case is Lot No. 88-SWO-25042 (Lot No. 88), with an area of 1,017
square meters, more or less, located in Lahug, Cebu City.
Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation
proceedings, initiated by the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic), represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA),
for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport. The case was filed with the
then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, and docketed as Civil Case No. R-
1881.
During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada,
Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine.
On December 29, 1961, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Republic and
ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of Lot No. 88, adjudged at P3.00
per square meter, with consequential damages by way of legal interest computed from
November 16, 1947--the... time when the lot was first occupied by the airport.
Lozada, with the other landowners, contacted then CAA Director Vicente Rivera, Jr.,
requesting to repurchase the lots, as per previous agreement.
On November 29, 1989, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued a Memorandum to
the Department of Transportation, directing the transfer of general aviation operations
of the Lahug Airport to the Mactan International Airport before the end of 1990 and,
upon such transfer, the... closure of the Lahug Airport.
From the date of the institution of the expropriation proceedings up to the present, the
public purpose of the said expropriation (expansion of the airport) was never actually
initiated, realized, or implemented.
Thus, on June 4, 1996, petitioners initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession
and reconveyance of ownership of Lot No. 88.
On October 22, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision, disposing as follows... he Court
hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr.,... Aggrieved,
petitioners interposed an appeal to the CA.
fter the filing of the necessary appellate briefs, the CA rendered its assailed Decision
dated February 28, 2006, denying petitioners' appeal and affirming in toto the Decision
of the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu City.
Issues:
(1) the respondents utterly failed to prove that there was a repurchase agreement or
compromise settlement between them and the Government; (2) the judgment in Civil
Case No. R-1881 was absolute and unconditional, giving title in fee simple to... the
Republic;
Ruling:
The petition should be denied.
Indeed, the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 should be read in its entirety, wherein it
is apparent that the acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots was subject to
the condition that the Lahug Airport would continue its operation. The condition not
having... materialized because the airport had been abandoned, the former owner
should then be allowed to reacquire the expropriated property.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property,
consequent to the Government's exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always
subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for
which it was taken.
EMINENT DOMAIN; for public use
Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is
peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the
reversion of the property, subject to the return of the amount of just compensation
received. In such... a case, the exercise of the power of eminent domain has become
improper for lack of the required factual justification.

It bears stressing that both the RTC, Branch 57, Cebu and the CA have passed upon
this factual issue and have declared, in no uncertain terms, that a compromise
agreement was, in fact, entered into between the Government and respondents, with
the former undertaking to resell Lot

No. 88 to the latter if the improvement and expansion of the Lahug Airport would not be
pursued.

the testimony of Lozada was based on... personal knowledge as the assurance from
the government was personally made to him.

As regards the position of petitioners that respondents' testimonial evidence violates

the Statute of Frauds, suffice it to state that the Statute of Frauds operates only with
respect to executory contracts, and does not apply to contracts which have been
completely or partially... performed,... The right of respondents to repurchase Lot No.
88 may be enforced based on a constructive trust constituted on the property held by
the government in favor of the former.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Principles:

If x x x land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that
purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of
course, when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires
the... property so expropriated. If x x x land is expropriated for a public street and the
expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public street,
then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the
former... owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary. x x x. If, upon
the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title,
then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it
be the State, a... province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have
the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings. x x x.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no right in the
land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different
use, without... any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the
former owner. x x x.