CASE DIGEST 51_QUESTIN

People v. Balute Case Digest No. 52_REONICO

G.R. No. 212932 January 21, 2015
PEOPLE VS. OROSCO, G.R. NO. 209227, MARCH 25, 2015
Facts: At around 8’clock in the evening, SPO1 Manaois was on board his owner-type
jeepney with his wife and daughter, and was traversing Road 10, Tondo, Manila. While the FACTS
vehicle was on a stop at a lighted area due to heavy traffic, two persons, later on identified
as Balute and a certain Blaster, suddenly appeared on either side of the vehicle, with Balute PROSECUTION (Based on eyewitness account of Albert Arca)
poking a gun at the side of SPO1 Manaois and saying ―Putang ina, ilabas mo!‖ Thereafter, Witness Arca went to the store of Lourdes Yap at Barangay Rawis, Legazpi City. He was
Balute grabbed SPO1 Manaois’ mobile phone from the latter’s chest pocket and shot him buying ice but it was not yet hardened so he went home. After an hour, he went back to
at the left side of his torso. SPO1 Manaois was taken to the hospital where he died despite buy ice at the same store. After purchasing the ice, he noticed there was a verbal tussle
undergoing surgical operation and medical intervention. between Yap and two male customers. The men were arguing that they were given
insufficient change and insisting they gave a P500 bill and not P100. When Yap opened the
Charge: Robbery with Homicide door, the two men entered the store. From outside the store and thru its open window
grills, Arca saw one of the men placed his left arm around the neck of Yap and covered her
RTC: Robbery with Homicide; penalty: reclusion perpetua mouth with his right hand while the other man was at her back restraining her hands. He
without eligibility for parole -AC: treachery recognized the man who was holding the hands of Yap as appellant Charlie Orosco, while
he described the man who covered her mouth as thin, with less hair and dark complexion.
CA: affirmed RTC The latter stabbed Yap at the center of her chest. When they released her, she fell down
-no AC of treachery because the prosecution failed to allege it in the information on the floor. Appellant then took a thick wad of bills from the base of the ―santo‖ at the
altar infront of the store’s window, after which he and the man who stabbed Yap fled
Issue: WON the CA correctly upheld Balute’s conviction for Robbery with Homicide together with two other men outside who acted as lookouts. Arca went near the bloodied
victim but also left and went home afraid because he was seen by one of the lookouts.
Ruling: Yap was brought to the hospital but she was declared dead on arrival. Dr. Belgira
explained that the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock secondary to a stab wound of the
SC: affirmed CA trunk. He explained that it was possible that the lone stab wound caused by a sharp object,
such as a knife, was inflicted while the victim was standing, and found no other injuries
such astakes
In People v. Ibañez, the Court explained that ―a special complex crime of robbery with homicide defense wounds.
place when a
At the NBI Legazpi City District office, Arca gave descriptions of the faces of
homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. A conviction requires certitude that the
appellant Orosco and the dark thin man who stabbed Yap (―John Doe‖). From a
robbery is the main purpose, and the objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The
surveillance digital photo and video clip shown to him, Arca positively identified Abner
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.‖
Astor as one of the two men sitting beside the store as lookouts. Consequently, warrants
of arrest were issued against appellant Orosco and Astor. But only appellant Orosco was
arrested as Astor, John Doe and Peter Doe remained at large.
The elements are:
DEFENSE
1. The taking of personal property belonging to another; Appellant Orosco testified that on the date and time of the incident, he was at his
-Balute took SPO1 Manaois’ mobile phone house in Bigaa taking care of his three-year-old child while his wife was washing clothes.
He stayed in the house until his wife finished the laundry at past 3:00 p.m. He denied
2. With intent to gain; knowing Yap and his co-accused Astor. While he admitted that he was a resident of Purok
4, Bgy. Rawis, his family transferred to their other house at Bigaa. He denied knowing Arca
3. With the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and -Balute poked his and
gun he does not
at SPO1 knowand
Manaois of any motive for Arca to testify against him. He worked in a copra
shot
him company in Lidong but stopped reporting for work as he was selling fish. He was arrested
by the police at the rotunda in Legazpi when he was buying medicine for his sick child.
4. On the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in itsAppellant’s wife,was
generic sense, Teresa Magdaong-Orosco also testified to confirm that at the time of the
committed.
incident he was at their house while she was doing the laundry just adjacent to their house.
-The shot resulted in SPO1 Manaois’ death despite surgical and medical intervention

1
On cross-examination, she was asked the distance between their place and Bgy. Rawis and
she replied that it will take less than one hour from Bigaa to Rawis.
CRIME CHARGED: Robbery with homicide
RTC: Orosco is guilty of Robbery with homicide; insofar as the other accused is
concerned, the case is hereby sent to the archives, pending their eventual arrest. CA:
Affirmed RTC decision, dismissed appeal.
In this petition to the Supreme Court, appellant Orosco contends that the crime imputed
to him should only be robbery and not the complex crime of robbery with homicide
considering the fact that it was not him who stabbed Yap.
ISSUE
Whether or not appellant Orosco is guilty of robbery with homicide.
RULING
The Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the CA and RTC convicting
appellant Orosco of the crime of robbery with homicide.
The crime of robbery with homicide is defined under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides in part:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. –
Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of
the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson;
The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi (the
intention to make a gain or profit); and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof,
homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed.
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery
if it is committed:
(a) to facilitate the robbery
or the escape of the
culprit;
(b) to preserve the
possession by the
culprit of the loot; (c)
to prevent discovery of
the commission of the
robbery; or (d) to
eliminate witnesses to
the commission of the
crime.
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to
commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.
The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may
take place before, during or after the robbery.
In the case at bar, the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion
of the robbery as appellant Orosco and John Doe had to kill Yap to accomplish their main
objective of stealing her money. The earlier verbal tussle where the two pretended to have
paid a greater amount and asked for the correct change was just a ploy to get inside the
store where the victim kept her earnings. Moreover, as pointed out by the trial court, it
was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the crime considering the
presence of many public conveyances which would drastically cut the one hour walk from
Bigaa to Rawis to only a ―couple of minutes.‖
The Court did not appreciate the contention of appellant Orosco that the crime
imputable to him was only robbery since Arca testified that it was John Doe, whom he
described as a thin man, who stabbed the victim. The Court explained that the evidence
presented by the prosecution clearly showed that appellant acted in conspiracy with his
co-accused in the perpetration of robbery and killing of the victim. It must be stressed that
appellant played a crucial role in the killing of the victim to facilitate the robbery. He was
behind the victim holding her hands while John Doe grabbed her at the neck. His act
contributed in rendering the victim without any means of defending herself when John
Doe stabbed her frontally in the chest. Having acted in conspiracy with his coaccused,
appellant is equally liable for the killing of Yap.
In the case of People v. Baron, when a homicide takes place by reason of or on the
occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there is
proof that there was an endeavor to prevent the killing. There was no evidence adduced
in this case that the appellant attempted to prevent the killing. Thus, regardless of the acts
individually performed by the appellant and his co-accused, and applying the basic
principle in conspiracy that the ―act of one is the act of all,‖ the appellant is guilty as a co-
conspirator. As a result, the criminal liabilities of the appellant and his co-accused are one
and the same.
Hence, the CA did not err in affirming the conviction of appellant for robbery with
homicide. Appellant was positively identified by prosecution eyewitness Arca as among
those who perpetrated the robbery and killing of Yap. This positive identification prevails
over accused’s defense of alibi.
2
Case Digest No. 53_SANTOS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
JUAN CABBAB, JR. G.R. No. 173479
July 12, 2007
FACTS: Appellant was charged along with his cousin-in-law Segundino Calpito, with the
crimes of Double Murder and Attempted Murder with Robbery committed with treachery,
evident premeditation, with intent to kill and intent to gain. The prosecution alleges that
father and son Vidal Agbulos and Winner Agbulos, together with Eddie Quindasan, Felipe
Abad and Police Officer (PO) William Belmes, attended a "fiesta" celebration, but it was
already over when they got there. On their way home, they were met by accused-appellant
Juan Cabbab, Jr. and Calpito who invited them to play "pepito," a local version of the game
of "russian poker." Winner Agbulos won the game. While walking on their way home, PO
William Belmes, who was behind Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan picking-up guava
fruits from a tree, saw accused-appellant, accused Calpito and a companion running up a
hill. Suddenly, he heard gunshots and saw Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan, who
were then walking ahead of the group, hit by the gunfire. By instant, PO William Belmes
dove into a canal to save himself from the continuous gunfire of accused-appellant. PO
William Belmes ran towards Vidal Agbulos and Felipe Abad, who were walking behind the
group, and informed the two that Winner Agbulos and Eddie Quindasan were ambushed
by accused-appellant and Calpito.
The three (3) proceeded to the crime scene where they saw the dead body of
Winner Agbulos together with Eddie Quindasan whom they mistook for dead. The three
sought help from the police authorities of Pilar, Abra and returned to the scene of the crime
where they found Eddie Quindasan who was still alive and who narrated that it was Juan
Cabbab, Jr. and Calpito who ambushed them and took the money, estimated at P12,000.00,
of Winner Agbulos which he won in the card game. Eddie Quindasan was brought to the
Abra Provincial Hospital but died the following day.
The Trial Court acquitted Calpito but found appellant Juan Cabbab, Jr. guilty of two crimes,
i.e. (1) robbery with double homicide and (2) attempted murder. The CA modified the trial
court's decision and found appellant guilty of the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA also affirmed
appellant's conviction, as well as the penalty imposed, for the separate crime of attempted
murder.
ISSUE: What crime did appellant commit?
HELD: Robbery with Homicide. To warrant conviction for the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following elements:
(a)the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons; (b)the property taken belongs to another; (c)the taking is characterized by intent
to gain or animo lucrandi; and (d)by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof,
homicide is committed.
In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the
killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. It is immaterial that death would
supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of
robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a homicide is committed by reason
or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is the special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide. In pursuit of his plan to rob Agbulos of his winnings, appellant
shot and killed him as well as his companion, Eddie Quindasan.
However, that the two courts below erred in convicting appellant of the separate
crime of attempted murder for the shooting of PO William Belmes. Attempted homicide or
attempted murder committed during or on the occasion of the robbery, as in this case, is
absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a special complex crime that
remains fundamentally the same regardless of the number of homicides or injuries
committed in connection with the robbery.
Case Digest No. 54_TERRE
People v. Suyu
FACTS: On the night of January 13, 1996, Clarissa Angeles, a third year student of St. Paul
University, and her boyfriend William Ferrer were eating snacks near the COA and DepEd
building in Tuguegarao when a tricycle arrived. Thereafter everal men–Rodolfo Suyu,
Willy Suyu, Rommel Maracubbo, and Francis Cainglet–approached the truck. One of them
went in front of the truck, pointed a gun at them, and declared a holdup. They took the
belongings of Clarissa and William. They opened William’s side of the door and dragged
and clubbed him, but he was able to escape. He went to the police to report the incident.
Meanwhile, they also let Clarissa out of the truck and then kissed, embraced, and fondled
her breasts. After a lot of struggle, they brought her to the hill on top of the Capitol where
Rodolfo was able to remove Clarissa’s pants and undergarments, and forced his penis into
her. Cainglet came next. Willy and Rommel did not help Clarissa even as she cried for help.
The men decided to give her back her pants but not her underwear, threatening to place it
at the gate of St. Paul University. Hearing vehicles arriving with headlights illuminating
them, they agreed to let Clarissa go on the promise that she will not report to the police.
She then went to a nearby house where she was able to call the police. She was brought to
a hospital to be examined, and when asked if she was raped, she denied it due to
embarrassment. The doctor found lacerations on her hymen. The accused used the
defense of denial and alibi, claiming they were in different places, and that they did not
know the other co-accused prior to their detention. They also said Clarissa failed to
identify them the first time they were brought to the police station, and that she issued
five inconsistent sworn statements before the MTC which puts her credibility in question.
The RTC and CA convicted the accused of robbery with rape.
3
ISSUE: Whether or not Clarissa’s testimony is enough to convict accused of robbery with
rape.
HELD: YES. The trial court and CA found Clarissa’s statements consistent, believable, and
credible. The credibility of complainant's testimony is a primordial consideration in rape
cases for the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided it
is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things. When the testimony of a rape victim is simple and straightforward, unshaken by
rigorous cross-examination and unflawed by any serious inconsistency or contradiction,
the same must be given full faith and credit.
While it is true that the victim initially did not reveal to the authorities the fact that she
was raped after the robbery, this does not cast doubt on her testimony for it is not
uncommon for a rape victim right after her ordeal to remain mum about what really
transpired. Jurisprudence has established that delay in revealing the commission of rape
is not an indication of a fabricated charge, and the same is rendered doubtful only if the
delay was unreasonable and unexplained. Besides, Clarissa sufficiently explained her
initial reluctance on crossexamination. Indeed, the fear of social humiliation prevented
Clarissa from revealing, at the time, the details of her defilement.
That Clarissa was unable to identify the accused bears no credence, because she certainly
knew the physical features of her offenders but not their names, and such is enough to
establish their identity. The hospital’s examination of Clarissa is also sufficient despite the
findings that the examination of her cervix did not reveal forcible assault, as slight
penetration on the lips of the vagina is enough to consummate the crime of rape.
The alibi of the accused cannot stand. There exists a conspiracy on the part of the accused.
Thus, they are equally liable for the rape committed by any of them in the event of the
robbery.
The accused are rightfully convicted of the crime of robbery with rape under Art. 294 par.
1 of the Revised Penal Code. Here, the intent to rob preceded the rape. Furthermore,
despite the sexual assault committed by Suyu and the rape committed by Cainglet as well,
these crimes are absorbed in the single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape.
Case Digest 55_FABON
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOSEPH BARRA, Accused-
Appellant
G.R. No. 198020 July 10, 2013
FACTS: The accused, Joseph Barra, while armed with a firearm, after gaining entrance into
the residence of
Elmer Lagdaan, with intent to gain, by means of force and intimidation, took and stole
money from Elmer
Lagdaan. On the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling him to take
and steal the money, Barra, with intent to kill, shot Elmer Lagdaan, thereby inflicting upon
him a gunshot wound which caused his death. Barra pleaded not guilty.
Ricardo de la Peña testified that he saw appellant enter the house of Lagdaan and poke a
gun to the victim’s right forehead and demanded money. De la Peña hid behind a tree ten
meters away. When the victim stated that the money was not in his possession, appellant
shot him. He went home and reported the incident the following morning.
Ely Asor testified that he saw Barra in the yard of Lagdaan’s house. He asked Barra if the
Lagdaan was around, because he wanted to collect his daily wage from Lagdaan. Barra
responded that the victim was not around. Asor went home. It was while Asor was in his
house that he heard a gunshot. It was the following morning that he learned that the victim
died. Asor then proceeded to report the incident.
RTC Decision
RTC found Barra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide as
defined and penalized under Article 294 of the RPC.
CA Decision
CA stated that Barra should have been declared guilty only of attempted robbery with
homicide. The only evidence introduced to establish robbery is the statement of De la Peña
that when Barra reached the victim’s place, the Barra barged in, poked a gun at the victim’s
forehead, demanded money and when the victim refused to accede to his demand, fired a
gun and shot the victim. No evidence was presented to establish that Barra took away the
victim’s money or any property.
ISSUE: WON Barra is guilty of robbery with homicide, or only of attempted robbery with
homicide.
HELD: SC affirmed CA decision that Barra is guilty only of attempted robbery with
homicide. To be convicted of robbery with homicide, the element of taking must be
complete. In the case at bar, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the
victim refused to give his money to appellant and no personal property was shown to have
been taken. It was for this reason that the victim was shot, making the crime one of
attempted robbery with homicide. Appellant is, therefore, liable under Article 297 of the
RPC. The elements of Robbery with Homicide as defined in Art. 297 are: (1) There is an
attempted or frustrated robbery. (2) A homicide is committed.
4

Case Digest No. 56_DE LA ROSA-REID
G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007
ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. COURT OF APPEALS NACHURA,
respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a
supermarket within the SM complex. Lorenzo Lago, a security guard, was manning his post
when he noticed the petitioner hauling a push cart of Tide detergent. He unloaded these
to where Calderon was waiting. He then came back to the supermarket and obtained more
cartons of Tide Ultramatic. Upon seeing that the accused have boarded a taxi and is about
to get away, he stopped the taxi and asked for receipts. Upon failure to show receipts, the
accused ran to which Lago fired a warning shot and with the help of other security guards,
apprehended the suspects. They were then charged with theft by the Assistant City
Prosecutor.
RTC’S RULING: Valenzuela and Calderon are convicted of the crime of consummated theft.
CA’S RULING: Valenzuela and Calderon appealed but the latter abandoned his appeal.
Valenzuela argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft because he was
never placed in a position to freely dispose the articles stolen. But still, the CA affirmed the
petitioner’s conviction.
ISSUE: Whether, under the given facts, the theft should be deemed as consummated or
merely frustrated
HELD: The elements of theft as provided in Article 308 of the RPC are as follows: 1) there
be a taking of personal property, 2) said property belongs to another, 3) the taking be done
with intent to gain, 4) the taking be done without the consent of the owner and 5) the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things. There is only one operative act of execution and that is the taking of the
personal property of another.
There is a frustrated crime if the acts committed by the accused are ordinarily sufficient to
produce the crime as a consequence but do not produce such by reasons of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator. Theft is generally produced upon the taking of
personal property of another without the latter’s consent. The Court of Appeals has
rendered two decisions wherein the crime of frustrated theft was upheld. Such is the case
of People vs. Dino and People vs. Flores which the herein accused is maintaining. They also
find support in cases decided by American and Spanish courts such as US vs. Adiao, People
vs. Sobrevilla, People vs. Espiritu and Empelis vs. IAC.
The Philippine courts, to refrain from a broad interpretation of penal laws, follow a narrow
interpretation. The court must take heed of the language of the law in order to strictly
determine the conduct that the law forbids. Again, the court reiterated that theft is the
taking, with intent to gain, of personal property of another without the latter’s consent. It
is deemed produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by
one without intent to gain. The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property
stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft. The ―unlawful taking‖ is the
element which produces the felony in consummated stage. There is then no crime of
frustrated theft.
The court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was
completed. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of
detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in
the parking lot, and long enough to load these into a taxi cab.
Case Digest No. 57_MENDOZA
G.R. No. 200308, February 23, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MERA “JOY” ELEUTERIO
NIELLES, @ MERA NIELLES DELOS REYES, Accused-
Appellant
FACTS:
Appellant Mera Joy Eleuterio Nielles was charged with the crime of Qualified Theft.
On July 2014, Nielles being then the cashier of complainant Juanita J. Flores and as such
enjoying the trust and confidence reposed upon her by the said complainant feloniously
take, steal, and carry away collected money in the total amount of P640,353.86.
In an Order dated January 18, 2005, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 132, ordered appellant’s release from confinement after having posted a bond in
the amount P100,000.00 undertaken by Far Eastern Surety & Insurance Company, Inc.
under Bond No. 8385. Appellant was thereafter arraigned where she pleaded not guilty to
the charges.3 Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that private complainant Juanita Flores (Flores) was
engaged in the business of guaranteeing purchase orders and gift checks of Shoemart and
Landmark and disposing, selling or transferring them for consideration. Appellant initially
worked as Flores’ househelp but was eventually hired to work at Flores’ office performing
clerical jobs like sorting invoices. When Flores’ business grew, appellant was assigned to
5
bill and collect from sub-guarantors, and to encash and deposit checks. On July 15, 2004,
appellant collected P640,353.86 from the sub-guarantors. However, appellant did not
remit the amount to Flores or deposit it in her (Flores’) account. Instead, she issued 15
personal checks totaling P640,353.86 and deposited them to Flores’ account. All the
checks were dishonored upon presentment due to ―account closed.‖ Appellant thereafter
absconded.
For her part, appellant denied having stolen the amount of P640,353.86.
RTC Ruling: Found appellant guilty of the crime of qualified
CA Ruling: Affirmed with modification the ruling of the trial court
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused id guilty of the crime of qualified theft
HELD: YES, the SC concur with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
the prosecution satisfactorily established all the elements of qualified theft, to wit: 1)
taking of personal property; 2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the said
taking was done with intent to gain; 4) that it was done without the owner’s consent; 5)
that it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, or of
force upon things; and 6) that it was done with grave abuse of confidence.
Private complainant testified that Accused-appellant took the amount of
P640,353.86 from her without her consent by failing to turn over the amount she collected
from the former’s sub-guarantors. Instead, she issued fifteen (15) personal checks and
deposited the same to Private Complainant’s account which however, all bounced for the
reason ―account closed‖. The taking of the amount collected by Accused-appellant was
obviously done with intent to gain as she failed to remit the same to Private Complainant.
Intent to gain is presumed from the act of unlawful taking. Further, the unlawful act was
accomplished by Accused-appellant without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, [or] of force upon things as the payment to her of the said amount was voluntarily
handed to her by the sub-guarantors as she was known to be entrusted with the collection
of payments.
The circumstance of grave abuse of confidence that made the same as qualified
theft was also proven. Accused-appellant herself testified that as a cashier, her functions
and responsibilities include billings and collections from their agents and making of
deposits and withdrawals in behalf of Private Complainant. Moreover, when the payment
for the purchase orders or gift checks becomes due, she would fill up the four (4) blank
checks given by the sub-guarantor with the knowledge and consent of Private
Complainant. It is beyond doubt that an employee like a cashier who comes into
possession of the monies she collected enjoys the confidence reposed in her by her
employer, as in the instant case.
Notably, when Flores testified during her cross-examination that she talked to
the sub-guarantors who admitted having made payments to appellant, the latter’s counsel
no longer made further clarifications or followup questions. Thus, Flores’ testimony on
this fact remains on record unrebutted. Clearly, it is futile on the part of the appellant to
belatedly claim in her Brief before the appellate court that the prosecution should have
presented these sub-guarantors so they could be cross-examined. Significantly, when
appellant was placed on the witness stand, she did not even make any attempt to explain
her issuance of the 15 checks. In fact, during her entire testimony, she never made any
mention about the personal checks that she issued and deposited in Flores’ account. the
prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that the amount of P640,353.86 actually
belonged to Flores; that appellant stole the amount with intent to gain and without Flores’
consent; that the taking was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, or of force upon things; and that it was committed with grave abuse of
confidence.
Case Digest No. 58_CORPUZ
ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 170863 March 20, 2013
FACTS: Petitioner Engr. Anthony V. Zapanta along with Concordio O. Loyao, was charged
with the crime of theft filed by private complainant Engr. Lorna Marigodon. Arraigned on
November 12, 2002, the petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." Loyao remains at-large.
In the ensuing trial, the prosecution offered in evidence the oral testimonies of
Danilo Bernardo, Edgardo Cano, Roberto Buen, Efren Marcelo, private complainant Engr.
Lorna Marigondon, and Apolinaria de Jesus, as well as documentary evidence consisting
of a security logbook entry, delivery receipts, photographs, letters, and sworn affidavits.
The prosecution’s pieces of evidence, taken together, established the facts recited below.
In 2001, A. Mojica Construction and General Services (AMCGS) undertook the
Porta Vaga building construction in Session Road, Baguio City. AMCGS subcontracted the
fabrication and erection of the building’s structural and steel framing to ANMAR, Inc.,
owned by the Marigondon family. ANMAR assigned petitioner Engr. Zapanta as project
manager with general managerial duties, including the receiving, custody, and checking of
all building construction materials.
On two occasions in October 2001, the petitioner instructed Bernardo, Junio
Trucking’s truck driver, and about 10 ANMAR welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload
about 10 to 15 pieces of 20 feet long wide flange steel beams at ANMAR’S alleged new
contract project along Marcos Highway, Baguio City. Sometime in November 2001, the
petitioner again instructed Bernardo and several welders, including Cano and Buen, to
unload about 5 to 16 pieces of 5 meters and 40 feet long wide flange steel beams along
Marcos Highway, as well as on Mabini Street, Baguio City.
6
 In January 2002, Engr. Nella Aquino, AMCGS’ project manager, informed Engr.
Marigondon that several wide flange steel beams had been returned to ANMAR’S
warehouse on October 12, 19, and 26, 2001, as reflected in the security guard’s logbook.
Engr. Marigondon contacted the petitioner to explain the return, but the latter simply
denied that the reported return took place. An inventory of the construction materials at
the project site was conducted. There, Marcelo, a warehouseman found and took pictures
of some of the missing steel beams. He reported the matter to the Baguio City police
headquarters and contacted ANMAR to send a truck to retrieve the steel beams, but the
truck came weeks later and, by then, the steel beams could no longer be found. The stolen
steel beams amounted to P2,269,731.69.
RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified theft and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment from 10 years and 3 months, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum, to
indemnify Anmar P2,269,731.69, with legal interest from November 2001 until full
payment, and to pay Engr. Marigondon P100,000.00 as moral damages.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC. However, deleted the award of moral damages to Engr.
Marigondon for lack of justification.
The Petition:
The petitioner submits that, while the information charged him for acts committed
"sometime in the month of October, 2001," he was convicted for acts not covered by the
information, i.e., November 2001, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He further argues that
the prosecution failed to establish the fact of the loss of the steel beams since the
corpus delicti was never identified and offered in evidence.
The Case for the Respondent:
The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
counters that the issues raised by the petitioner in the petition pertain to the correctness
of the calibration of the evidence by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, which are issues of
fact, not of law, and beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition. In any case, the respondent
contends that the evidence on record indubitably shows the petitioner’s liability for
qualified theft.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC’s decision
convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
The crime of qualified theft was committed with grave abuse of discretion of
discretion
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308
and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the
said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be
done without the owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution’s evidence proved, through the
prosecution’s eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioner’s instruction, several pieces of wide
flange steel beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in November 2001,
along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust
and confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took construction
materials from the project site, without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon,
the owner of the construction materials.
Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime of rape
The petitioner argues that his conviction was improper because the alleged stolen beams
or corpus delicti had not been established. He asserts that the failure to present the alleged
stolen beams in court was fatal to the prosecution’s cause.
The petitioner’s argument fails to persuade us.
"Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or
substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime
of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered" or, in this case, to the
stolen steel beams. "Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this
Court has ruled that even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may
suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be
established by circumstantial evidence." "In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely:
(1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking."
In this case, the testimonial and documentary evidence on record fully established the
corpus delicti. The positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly
Bernardo, Cano and Buen, stating that the petitioner directed them to unload the steel
beams along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street on the pretext of a new Anmar project,
were crucial to the petitioner’s conviction. The security logbook entry, delivery receipts
and photographs proved the existence and the unloading of the steel beams to a different
location other than the project site.
Proper Penalty
We reiterate the rule that it is necessary for the courts to employ the proper legal
terminology in the imposition of penalties because of the substantial difference in their
corresponding legal effects and accessory penalties. The appropriate name of the penalty
must be specified as under the scheme of penalties in the RPC, the principal penalty for a
7
felony has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties. 21 Thus, the
courts must employ the proper nomenclature specified in the RPC, such as "reclusion
perpetua" not "life imprisonment," or "ten days of arresto menor" not "ten days of
imprisonment." In qualified theft, the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua based on
Article 310 of the RPC which provides that "the crime of qualified theft shall be punished
by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in Article
309."
To compute the penalty, we begin with the value of the stolen steel beams, which is
P2,269,731.69. Based on Article 309 of the RPC, since the value of the items exceeds
P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, to be
imposed in the maximum period, which is eight years, eight months and one day to 10
years of prision mayor.
To determine the additional years of imprisonment, we deduct P22,000.00 from
P2,269,731.69, which gives usP2,247,731.69. This resulting figure should then be divided
by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less thanP10,000.00. We now have 224 years that
should be added to the basic penalty. However, the imposable penalty for simple theft
should not exceed a total of 20 years. Therefore, had petitioner committed simple theft,
the penalty would be 20 years of reclusion temporal. As the penalty for qualified theft is
two degrees higher, the correct imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
The petitioner should thus be convicted of qualified theft with the corresponding
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
CASE DIGEST_59 ACOSTA
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG, Appellant.
FACTS: Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (WPESLAI). She was tasked with handling, managing, receiving, and
disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI. It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July
2001, Cahilig made withdrawals from the funds of WPESLAI and appropriated the same
for her personal benefit. Cahilig would prepare disbursement vouchers, to be approved by
the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order to withdraw funds from one of
WPESLAI’s bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other bank account. The
withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as WPESLAI
cashier. This procedure for transferringfunds from one bank account to another was said
to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds.
Instead, she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made into
her account and then she would fill out a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said
amount from her capital contribution. RTC-guilty 30 counts of qualified theft
CA-affirmed RTC's ruling
ISSUE: Whether or not Cahilig was guilty of qualified theft.
HELD: YES. The elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence,
are as follows:
Taking of personal property;
That the said property belongs to another;
That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
That it be done without the owner’s consent;
That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor
of force upon things;
That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
All the elements are present in this case.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her position.
Her intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately executed
scheme to commit the theft. Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft,
must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance,
between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of
confidence between them which the appellant abused. Applying this, Cahilig’s act of
deliberately misleading the board of directors into authorizing disbursements for money
that eventually ended up in her personal account makes him guilty of the crime of qualified
theft considering that his position was one reposed with trust and confidence as it involves
―handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing‖ money from complainant-depositors
and other funds.
(As to the proper penalty)
The trial court, however, erred in the penalty imposed in Criminal Case Nos. 03-2186, 03-
2191, 03-2194, 03-2197, 03-2204, and 03-2206.To recall, the amounts involved in the
aforesaid cases are P20,000.00, P46,300.00, P25,000.00, P30,000.00, P40,000.00, and
P35,000.00, respectively.
Article 310 provides that Qualified Theft "shall be punished by the penalties next higher
by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article." Article 309,
in turn, states:
8
Art. 309. Penalties. -Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value
of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of
the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos,
but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed pr is ion mayor
or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
In the aforementioned six cases, none of the amounts are below P12,000.00. Hence, if the
crime charged had been simple theft, the penalty in any of these six cases would have been,
at least, prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since it was established that
the crime was qualified by grave abuse of confidence, Article 310 provides that the penalty
to be imposed shall be the one "next higher by two degrees," which in this case is reclusion
perpetua. Accordingly, the penalty in these six cases should be reclusion perpetua.
Case Digest No. 60_BARRIETA
PEOPLE v. LAGAT
G.R. No. 187044
September 14, 2011
FACTS: Biag was a farmer, a barangay tanod, and a tricycle driver. On April 12, 2005, at
around two o’clock in the morning, he left their house to operate his tricycle for public use.
Biag and his tricycle however went missing on that very day. Respondents Lagat and
Palalay were found in unauthorized possession of Biag’s tricycle on April 13, 2005.
According to Police Officer 2 (PO2) Arthur Salvador, a member of the PNP in Alicia who
took the witness stand, on April 13, 2005, they received a report from Esteban that the
cavans of palay stolen from him were seen at Alice Palay Buying Station in Alicia, Isabela,
in a tricycle commandeered by two unidentified male persons. Upon receipt of this report,
the Chief of Police composed a team, which included him, PO2 Bernard Ignacio, and PO2
Nathan Abuan, to verify the veracity of the report. At Alice Palay Buying Station, they saw
the tricycle described to them by their chief, with the cavans of palay, and the two accused,
Lagat and Palalay. PO2 Salvador and his team were about to approach the tricycle when
the two accused "scampered‖ to different directions. After "collaring" the two accused,
they brought them to the Alicia PNP Station together with the tricycle and its contents.
When they reached the station, they asked the two accused if they had any papers to show
for both the tricycle and the palay, to which the two accused did not answer. When police
officers unloaded the tricycle, they discovered bloodstains inside and outside the sidecar.
A wallet containing the tricycle’s Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt issued by
the Land Transportation Office in the name of Jose Biag was also found. When they asked
the two accused about their discoveries, Lagat and Palalay voluntarily answered that the
name in the papers is that of the owner of the tricycle, whom they killed and dumped along
Angadanan and San Guillermo Road, when they carnapped his tricyle. Thereafter, they
coordinated with the PNP of Angadanan Police Station, and together with the two accused,
they proceeded to Angadanan-San Guillermo Road, where they found Biag’s body in a
ravine just after the bridge near the road. Accused-appellants Lagat and Palalay were
charged with the crime of Carnapping as defined under Section 2 and penalized under
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539. RTC finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified carnapping and hereby sentences each of them to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The CA AFFIRMED RTC’s ruling with the MODIFICATION as to the
amount of actual damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are guilty of the Crime of Qualified Carnapping.
RULING OF SC:
Lagat and Palalay have been charged and convicted of the crime of qualified
carnapping under Republic Act. No. 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. Section 2 of
the Act defines "carnapping" and "motor vehicle" as follows:
"Carnapping" is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to
another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things.
"Motor vehicle" is any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular
power using the public highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-
sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts, amphibian trucks, and
cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles, which run only on rails or tracks, and
tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural
purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be
propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified as separate motor vehicle
with no power rating. The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under
the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 are the following:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the
taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things; and
4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.
The records of this case show that all the elements of carnapping are
present and were proven during trial.
9
 The tricycle, which was definitively ascertained to belong to Biag, as evidenced
by the registration papers, was found in Lagat and Palalay’s possession. Aside from this,
the prosecution was also able to establish that Lagat and Palalay fled the scene when the
Alicia PNP tried to approach them at the palay buying station. To top it all, Lagat and
Palalay failed to give any reason why they had Biag’s tricycle. Their unexplained
possession raises the presumption that they were responsible for the unlawful taking of
the tricycle. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states that:
[A] person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a
person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.
For such presumption to arise, it must be proven that: (a) the property was
stolen; (b) it was committed recently; (c) that the stolen property was found in the
possession of the accused; and (d) the accused is unable to explain his possession
satisfactorily. As mentioned above, all these were proven by the prosecution during trial.
Thus, it is presumed that Lagat and Palalay had unlawfully taken Biag’s tricycle. In People
v. Bustinera, this Court defined "unlawful taking," as follows:
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the
consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Lagat and
Palalay’s intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle was also proven as they were caught
in a palay buying station, on board the stolen tricycle, which they obviously used to
transport the cavans of palay they had stolen and were going to sell at the station. In
Bustinera, we elucidated on the concept of "intent to gain" and said: Intent to gain or
animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.
Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term
"gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any
other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere
use of the thing which was taken without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.
Moreover, when a person is killed or raped in the course of or on the occasion
of the carnapping, the crime of carnapping is qualified and the penalty is increased
pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended:
Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this
term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle
taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months
and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed
without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment
for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when
the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person,
or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when
the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (As amended by
R.A. No. 7659.)
WHEREFORE, as Biag was killed by the accused in furtherance of Carnapping, RTC and
CA are AFFIRMED with modification as to the fines. Accused-appellants Renato Lagat y
Gawan and James Palalay y Villarosa are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of QUALIFIED CARNAPPING and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Case Digest No.61_CANAPE
PEOPLE VS. JOEL AQUINO, G.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014
FACTS: On September 5, 2005, at around 8:30 in the evening, the victim Jesus Lita,
accompanied by his ten-year old son, Jefferson, went out aboard the former’s black
Kawasaki tricycle. Upon reaching San Jose del Monte Elementary School, appellant Joel
Aquino together with Noynoy Almoguera a.k.a. Negro, Rodnal, Bing, John Doe and Peter
Doe boarded the tricycle. Noynoy Almoguera instructed the victim to proceed to the nipa
hut owned by appellant.
Upon reaching the said nipa hut, Jesus Lita, appellant and his companions had a shabu
session while Jefferson was watching TV. After using shabu, Noynoy Almoguera demanded
from the victim to pay Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00), but the victim said that he had no
money. Appellant shouted at the victim demanding him to pay. Bing suggested to her
companions that they leave the nipa hut. Thus, the victim mounted his tricycle and started
the engine. Noynoy Almoguera and John Doe rode in the tricycle behind the victim while
appellant and Rodnal rode in the sidecar with Jefferson [sitting] at the toolbox of the
tricycle. Inside the tricycle, appellant pointed a knife at Jefferson while Noynoy Almoguera
stabbed the victim’s side. After the victim was stabbed, he was transferred inside the
tricycle while appellant drove the tricycle to his friend’s house where they again stabbed
the victim using the latter’s own knife. Then they loaded the victim to the tricycle and
drove to a grassy area where appellant and his companions dumped the body of the victim.
Thereafter, they returned to appellant’s residence. Jefferson told the sister of appellant
about the death of his father but the sister of appellant only told him to sleep.
The next day, Jefferson was brought to the jeepney terminal where he rode a jeepney to
get home. Jefferson told his mother, Ma. Theresa Calitisan-Lita, about the death of his
father.
In the meantime, SPO3 Servillano Lactao Cabading received a call from Barangay Captain
Danilo Rogelio of Barangay San Rafael IV, San Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan thru the two
(2) way radio, that the body of a male person with several stab wounds was found dead
10
on a grassy area beside the road of the said barangay. Immediately, SPO3 Cabading
together with a police aide proceeded to the area. Thereat, they found the dead body whom
they identified thru his Driver’s License in his wallet as Jesus Lita, the victim. Also
recovered were a big stainless ice pick about 18 inches long including the handle and a
tricycle key. The police officers brought the body of the victim to the Sapang Palay District
Hospital. Thereafter, they proceeded to the address of the victim.
Ma. Theresa Calitisan-Lita and Jefferson were about to leave for the morgue when they met
SPO3 Cabading outside their residence. SPO3 Cabading informed Ma. Theresa that the
body of the victim was found in Barangay San Rafael IV. Jefferson told SPO3 Cabading that
he was with his father at the time of his death and he brought the police officers to the
place where his father was stabbed and to the hut owned by appellant. Thereat, the police
officers recovered a maroon colored knife case and the sandals of the victim. Appellant
was invited to the police station for questioning but he refused alleging that he does not
know anything about the incident. The police officers were able to obtain a picture of
appellant which was shown to Jefferson and he positively identified the same as "Akong"
one of those who stabbed his father. Likewise, a video footage of Noynoy Almoguera alias
"Negro" was shown to Jefferson and he likewise identified the person in the video footage
as the same "Negro" who also stabbed his father.
Dr. Richard Ivan Viray, medico-legal, who conducted an autopsy on the victim, concluded
that cause of death is Hemorrhagic Shock due to multiple stab wounds.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder and for violation of RA 6539 or the
Anti-Carnapping Law.
HELD:
RTC: Convicted the accused of murder and violation of RA 6539.
CA: Upheld the conviction of the accused.
The Supreme Court said that According to jurisprudence, to be convicted of murder, the
following must be established: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; the
killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.
Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the qualifying circumstance of treachery did attend the
killing of Jesus. We have consistently held that treachery is present when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an
unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even when the
victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated
since what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim
to defend himself or to retaliate. Records disclose that Jesus was stabbed by the group on
the lateral part of his body while he was under the impression that they were simply
leaving the place where they had [a] shabu session. Judicial notice can be taken that when
the tricycle driver is seated on the motorcycle, his head is usually higher or at the level of
the roof of the side car which leaves his torso exposed to the passengers who are seated
in the side car. Hence, there was no way for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended
stabbing of his body both from the people seated in the side car and those seated behind
him. Thus, the trial court’s finding of treachery should be affirmed. There is treachery
when the means, methods, and forms of execution gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and such means, methods, and forms of
execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his
person. What is decisive in an appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the attack
made it impossible for the victim to defend himself.
However, in contrast to the pronouncements of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, we cannot consider abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance in
this case. As per jurisprudence, when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength
concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. Since there is no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance present, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, in
accordance with Article 63 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, it being the lesser
penalty between the two indivisible penalties for the felony of murder which is reclusion
perpetua to death.
The Court concurs with the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the
penalty of life imprisonment for carnapping originally imposed by the trial court.
Life imprisonment has long been replaced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659. Furthermore, the said penalty is applicable
only to the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide which is not obtaining
in this case. Jurisprudence tells us that to prove the special complex crime of
carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of
carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the
killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof. The appellate court correctly observed that the killing of Jesus cannot
qualify the carnapping into a special complex crime because the carnapping was
merely an afterthought when the victim’s death was already fait accompli. Thus,
appellant is guilty only of simple carnapping.
Case Digest No. 62_CARILLO
JAIME ONG y ONG, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
April 10, 2013
Private complainant Azajar was the owner of 44 Firestone truck tires. He acquired the
same from a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of
Firestone tires evidenced by Sales Invoice No. 4565 and an Inventory List of serial
11
numbers. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them
inside the warehouse owned by his relative Guano. Jose Cabal, Guano's caretaker of the
warehouse, was in charge of the tires. After appellant sold 6 tires, 38 tires remained inside
the warehouse.
Cabal then informed private complainant that all 38 truck tires were stolen from the
warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly opened. Pending the police investigation,
private complainant canvassed from numerous business establishments in an attempt to
locate the stolen tires. Private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing owned and
operated by appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was selling Firestone
tires with same model as the one he lost, to which the latter replied in the affirmative.
Appellant brought out a tire fitting the description, which private complainant recognized
as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial
number thereon. A buy-bust operation on appellant's store in Paco was conducted. Pseur-
buyer Atienza asked appellant if he had any T494 1100 by 20 by 14 Firestone truck tires
available. Appellant then instructed his helpers to bring out 12 more tires from his
warehouse, which was located beside his store. It was found out that they were the same
tires which were stolen, based on their serial numbers.
For his part, accused Ong denied that he had any knowledge that he was selling stolen
tires in Jong Marketing. He averred that a certain Ramon Go offered to sell 13 Firestone
truck tires allegedly from Caloocan City. Charge: violation of PD 1612 (Anti Fencing
Law)
RTC: Guilty
CA: Affirmed
SC: affirmed.
Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent
to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or
anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or
theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.
First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Azajar whose testimony was
corroborated by Jose Cabal - the caretaker of the warehouse where the 38 tires were stolen
testified that the crime of robbery had been committed on 1995. Azajar was able to prove
ownership of the tires through Sales Invoice No. 456511 dated 10 November 1994 and an
Inventory List.
Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he
never denied the fact that 13 tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not
establish that Ong was neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but
13 out of 38 missing tires were found in his possession. This Court finds that the serial
numbers of stolen tires corresponds to those found in Ong's possession.
Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The
words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and
intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would
govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Ong, who was in the business of
buy and sell of tires for the past 24 years, ought to have known the ordinary course of
business in purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and
offered to sell the 13 tires and he did not even ask for proof of ownership of the tires. The
entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the delivery of tires happened in just one
day. His experience from the business should have given him doubt as to the legitimate
ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time to transact with Go and the
manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the 13 tires in the streets.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust
operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing
from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything
of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty
based on the value of the property.
12
Case Digest No. 63_CASTRO
People v. Dimat
G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012
FACTS: Delgado’s wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing
plate number WAH-569 for P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicles engine
number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. On March 7, 2001
PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group spotted the Nissan Safari
on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping
and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-
119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found the particular Nissan
Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there
further learned that it had been stolen from its registered owner, Mantequilla. Mantequilla
affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM-818. The
vehicle was carnapped at Robinsons Gallerias parking area.
Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in
good faith and
for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine number
as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle
to Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one
which the police officers took into custody, had the same plate number, they were not
actually the same vehicle. Hence, Dimat was charged with violation of Anti-Fencing Law
before the RTC. The RTC found the latter guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law which
decision was affirmed by the CA.
chassis. Second, Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential
Decree 1612 is a special law and its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring
no proof of criminal intent. Of course, the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or
should have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was
derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.
Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the
Nissan Safari to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old
certificate of registration and official receipt of the vehicle and even promised to give him
a new certificate of registration and official receipt already in his name. But Tolentino
reneged on this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentino’s failure to deliver the documents
should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado himself could not produce any certificate of
registration or official receipt.
Evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly
documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and
official receipt. But this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been
carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good
on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the
Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who
apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase. That she might
herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand accused in the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dimat knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was
earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.

RULING:

Yes. The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused,
who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object
taken during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the
thing is derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself
or for another.

Here, someone carnapped Mantequillas Nissan Safari. Two years later, Dimat sold it to
Delgado. Dimat’s defense is that the Nissan Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold
to Delgado had different engine and chassis numbers from that stolen from Mantequilla.
But Dimat’s defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him turned out
to have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This
means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct numbers of the vehicles engine and
13
Case Digest No. 64_DEL ROSARIO
Carganillo vs People
GR No. 182424 September 22, 2014
Facts:
An Information for the crime of estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph l (b) of the
Revised Penal Code, was filed against Nenita Carganillo. Herein accused-petitioner alleged
to have entered a ―Kasunduan‖ with Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Nueva Ecija. Teresita
gave the accused—an agent of buy-andsell of palay, 132,000 pesos for the purpose of
buying palay to be delivered on or before Nov. 28, 1998 to Lazaro Palay Buying Station. In
their Kasunduan, the parties agreed that for every kilo of palay bought the petitioner shall
earn a commission of twenty centavos (P0.20). But if no palay is purchased and delivered
on November 28, the petitioner must return the P132, 000 to Teresita within one (1) week
after November 28. However, no palay was received on the prescribe day and the 132,000
was never returned. Then Teresita made oral and written demands to the petitioner for
the return of the P132, 000.00 but her demands were simply ignored. This prompted
Teresita to file a case of estafa against petitioner before the RTC.
On her defense, Carganillo denied that she entered into a "principal-agent" agreement
with, and received the P132, 000 from, Teresita. She alleged that she owed Teresita a
balance of P13,704.32 for the fertilizers and rice that she purchased from the latter in 1995
and 1996, and that, in November 1996, she was made to sign a blank "Kasunduan" that
reflected no written date and amount. She likewise denied personally receiving any
written demand letter from Teresita. And that the "Kasunduan" between her and Teresita
does not contain their real agreement of a simple money loan. She argues that the
prosecution failed to establish all the elements of estafa because she never received the
P132, 000 from Teresita; that an element of the crime is that "the offender receives the
money, or goods or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligations involving the duty to deliver, or to return,
the same.
RTC convicted petitioner of the crime of estafa and CA affirmed petitioner’s conviction.
Hence, the petition on SC.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of
the crime of estafa Decision: Yes, petitioner
is guilty of the crime estafa.
Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the offense of
estafa committed with abuse of confidence requires the following elements:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the
same
The petitioner received in trust the amount of 132,000 from Terisita
for the purpose of buying palay
(b) That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt
There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to conform in their
Kasunduan, not delivering the agreed palay nor returning the 132,000
for such failure of delivery of palay
(c) That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of another; and The acts of petitioner was to the prejudice of Terisita
(d) There is demand by the offended party to the offender.
Teresita demanded for the return of the 132,000 and this was shown
in her oral and written demands to the petitioner
Hence, all the elements of estafa are present in this case. The Court find worthy
of credit and belief the "Kasunduan" presented in evidence by the prosecution that was
admittedly signed by the petitioner and which contained the terms of agreement between
her and Teresita as contrary to what petitioner claims.
In this case, the petitioner alleges that the subject "Kasunduan" failed to express
the real agreement between her and Teresita; that theirs was a plain and simple loan
agreement and not that of a principal-agent relationship in the buy-and-sell of palay. The
documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the petitioner, however, fail to
support her claims. Also, we cannot sustain the petitioner’s claim that she had been the
victim of a fraud because Teresita deceived her into signing a blank document; that she
signed the "Kasunduan," even if it had no date and amount written on it, because Teresita
led her to believe that the document would be used merely for show purposes with the
bank.
For fraud to vitiate consent, the deception employed must be the causal (dolo
causante) inducement to the making of the contract, and must be serious in character. It
must be sufficient to impress or lead an ordinarily prudent person into error, taking into
account the circumstances of each case.
In this case, we find no vitiated consent on the part of the petitioner. In her
Memorandum to this Court, she narrated that after she signed the "Kasunduan," Teresita
subsequently made her execute a deed of sale over her property, which deed she refused
to sign. This statement negates the petitioner’s self-serving allegation that she was tricked
by Teresita into signing a blank "Kasunduan," as she was fully aware of the possible
implications of the act of signing a document.
14
Case Digest No. 65_DIZON
L of] jewelry should be returned, if unsold, or the money to be remitted, if sold;
ITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE GR No. 180016
April 29, 2014 FACTS:
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale
Casino in Olongapo City. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending
money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for
sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the
said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a
consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for
men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an
aggregate value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed
that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same
items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the
proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able
to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said
items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Information was filed against petitioner that he committed the crime of estafa
―on or about July 5, 1991‖ where the latter entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution,
to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the
other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be
summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia,
who is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every
collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any
business with private complainant. However, he admitted obtaining a loan from
Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed
that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for
the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
RTC= The court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa
CA=The court affirmed the decision of the RTC
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this
Court the present petition stating the ff. arguments:
A. The CA erred in confirming the admission and appreciation by the lower court of
prosecution evidence, including its exhibits, which are mere machine copies, as this
violates the best evidence rule;
b. The CA erred in affirming the lower court's finding that the criminal information
for estafa was not fatally defective although the same did not charge the offense under
article 315 (1) (b) of the revised penal code in that -
1. The information did not fix a period within which the subject [pieces
2. The date of the occurrence of the crime alleged in the information as of
05 july 1991 was materially different from the one testified to by the private
complainant which was 02 may 1991;
c. The CA erred in affirming the lower court's finding that demand to return the
subject [pieces of] jewelry, if unsold, or remit the proceeds, if sold – an element of the
offense – was proved;
ISSUE:
a.) W/N the CA erred in affirming the admission of evidence dated May 2, 1991 although
the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule.
b.) W/N the CA erred in finding the information filed against the petitioner complete
c.) W/N the demand to return the subject jewelry was proved.
RULING:
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit. The SC affirmed with
modification the decision of the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Estafa.
A.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting
in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings,
although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However,
the records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at
the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The
CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his
Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed
the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely
objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be
considered as waived. B.
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective
Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the
period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when
the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private complainant. This
argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the Information was substantially
complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the
Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the
crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner
and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the
exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in
the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
15
x xxAn information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation
of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused;
1.) the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; 2.) the name of the offended party;
3) the approximate time of the
commission of the offense,
4)and the place wherein the
offense was committed.
In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the
foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about
the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering
that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the
same is a material ingredient of the offense.The gravamen of the crime of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside
from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of the
crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not
render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due
date within which accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the
said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient
compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim
that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred against him.
C.
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
x xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any
other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x xx
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there
is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended
party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private
complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months
from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items
with the latter promising to pay them.
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not
even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word "demand" need not even be used to
show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as
to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a
demand.
Case Digest No.66_ DOÑA
SULIMAN v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 190970 November 24, 2014
FACTS:
In six (6) Informations, Vilma Suliman, herein petitioner and one Luz P. Garcia were
charged before the RTC with two (2) counts of illegal recruitment under Section 6,
paragraphs (a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as well as four (4) counts of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Only petitioner was brought to trial
as her coaccused, Garcia, eluded arrest and remained at-large despite the issuance of a
warrant for her arrest.
The RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two (2) counts of illegal recruitment and three (3) counts of estafa. Petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration was denied. On appeal, CA affirmed RTC’s judgment.
ISSUE Whether or not Suliman is guilty of estafa.
HELD: Yes. The lower courts did not commit any error in convicting petitioner of the
crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa. As to the charge of estafa, the act complained of
in the instant case is penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, wherein
16
estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud another by false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. It
is committed by using fictitious name, or by pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means
of other similar deceits.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following, viz.: (a) that there
must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such
false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the
false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money
or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
In the instant case, all the foregoing elements are present. It was proven beyond
reasonable doubt, as found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and her co-
accused misrepresented and falsely pretended that they had the capacity to deploy the
private complainants for employment either in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Canada. The
misrepresentation was made prior to private complainants' payment of placement fees. It
was the misrepresentation and false pretenses made by petitioner and her co-accused that
induced the private complainants to part with their money. As a result of such false
pretenses and misrepresentations, the private complainants suffered damages as the
promised employment abroad never materialized and the various amounts of money they
paid were never recovered.
Petitioner argues that she could not be held liable because she was not privy nor
was she aware of the recruitment activities done by her co-accused. Petitioner avers that
when her co-accused received several amounts of money from the private complainants,
she acted in her personal capacity and for her own benefit without the knowledge and
consent of petitioner. The Court is not persuaded. As owner and general manager,
petitioner was at the forefront of the recruitment activities of Suliman International.
Undoubtedly, she has control, manage mentor direction of the business of the said
company. In any case, petitioner cannot deny participation in the recruitment of the
private complainants because the prosecution has established that petitioner was the one
who offered the private complainants an alleged alternative employment in Ireland when
their original deployment did not materialize.
1 The RTC convicted accused-appellants of simple Estafa only, as the
prosecution failed to allege in the Informations those accused-appellants and
Case Digest No. 67_DUQUILLA
PEOPLE V. TIBAYAN AND PUERTO
G.R. Nos. 209655-60
FACTS: Tibayan Group Investment Company Inc. (TGICI), an open-end investment
company registered with the SEC, was subjected to an investigation which led to the
discovery that TGICI was selling securities to the public without a registration statement
and that it submitted a fraudulent Treasurer’s Affidavit. The SEC revoked TGICI’s
corporate registration for being fraudulently procured. This led to the filing of multiple
criminal cases for Syndicated Estafa against the incorporators and directors of
TGICI, herein accused-
appellants and five others who are still at large. Private complainants were enticed to
invest in TGICI due to the offer of high interest rates, as well as the assurance that they will
recover the investments. They were given a Certificate of Share and post-dated checks
representing the amount of the principal investment and the monthly interest earnings.
Upon encashment, the checks were dishonoured as the account was already closed. The
TGICI office closed down without private complainants having been paid. In their defense,
accused-appellants denied having conspired with the other TGICI incorporators to
defraud private complainants. The RTC issued six separate decisions convicting
Tibayan of 13 counts and Puerto of 11 counts of Simple Estafa 1. The CA modified
accused-appellants’ conviction to that of Syndicated Estafa.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellants are guilty of the crime of Syndicated Estafa defined
and penalized under Item 2(a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD
1689.
HELD: Yes, the Court sustains the convictions of accused-appellants. Under the
lucrative promise of a very high monthly interest rate, the investing public are enticed to
infuse funds into TGICI. However, TGICI is operating without any paid-up capital and has
no clear trade by which it can pay the assured profits; thus, they cannot comply with their
guarantee and had to simply abscond with their investors’ money. The elements of Estafa
by means of deceit under Item 2(a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC are: (a) that there
must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such
false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the
false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money
or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. Under
Section 1 of PD 1869, Syndicated Estafa has the following elements: (a) Estafa or other
forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the
the other directors/ incorporators formed a syndicate with the intention of
defrauding the public.
17
Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and (c)
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or
members of rural banks, cooperative, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers’ associations, or of
funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. All the elements of
Syndicated Estafa, committed through a Ponzi scheme 1 , are present in this case,
considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI comprising more than five (5)
people, including herein accusedappellants, made false pretenses and representations to
the investing public - in this case, the private complainants - regarding a supposed
lucrative investment opportunity with TGICI in order to solicit money from them; (b) the
said false pretenses and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the
commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private complainants invested their hard
earned money into TGICI; and (d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running
away with the private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice.
Case Digest No. 68_EISMA
MA. GRACIA HAO and DANNY HAO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 183345 September 17, 2014
RTC-syndicated estafa
CA-simple estafa
SC-simple estafa
Facts:
On July 11, 2003 private complainant Manuel Dy filed a criminal complaint
against the petitioners and Victor Ngo for syndicated estafa penalized under Article
315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch
where Ngo was the manager. Ngo then introduced him to Ma. Gracia Hao, who presented
herself as an officer of various reputable companies and an incorporator of State
Resources Development Corporation, the recommended company that can give Dy his
higher investment return. Because of their good business relationship, Dy took Ngo’s
advice to and thereafter, Dy initially invested the approximate amount of P10,000,000.00
to State Resources.
This first investment earned profits. Thus, Dy was enticed by Gracia to invest
more so that he eventually advanced almostP100,000,000.00 with the same company.
1A Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of
purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new
investors. In many Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators focus on attracting new
Gracia’s succeeding checks representing the earnings of his investments (P114,286,086.14
in total sum), however, were all dishonored upon deposit. He subsequently learned that
the petitioners used his money for Gracia’s husband, Danny’s construction and realty
business. Despite repeated demands and the petitioners’ constant assurances to pay, they
never returned Dy’s invested money and its supposed earnings.
RTC
Information filed--- syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six co-accused
Judge Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners and the other
accused. Consequently, petitioners immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment and
motion to lift warrant of arrest. In their twin motions, they invoked the absence of
probable cause against them and the pendency of their petition for review with the
Department of Justice. The trial court denied the petitioners’ twin motions. Petitioners
moved for reconsideration but the trial court also denied this. Consequently, the
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.
CA
The CA affirmed the denial of the petitioners’ motion to defer arraignment and
motion to lift warrant of arrest.
In determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, a judge is mandated
to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. The
CA noted that Judge Marquez committed no grave abuse of discretion because he only
issued the warrants of arrest after his personal examination of the facts and circumstances
of the case.
The offense charged should only be for simple estafa, not syndicated estafa. Since
there was no evidence that State Resources was formed to defraud the public in general
or that it was used to solicit money from other persons aside from Dy. Under PD No. 1689,
in order for syndicated estafa to exist, the swindling must have been committed by five or
more persons, and the fraud must be against the general public or at least a group of
persons.
Issue:
Whether or not the inconsistencies in Dy’s affidavits negate the existence of probable
cause against them for the crime charged.
Held:
We resolve to DENY the petition.
money to make promised payments to earlier-stage investors to create the
false appearance that investors are profiting from a legitimate business.
18
Probable Cause for the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest
Under the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judge is
mandated to personally determine the existence of probable cause after his personal
evaluation of the prosecutor’s resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime
charged. He may: a)dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or c) order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt on
the existence of probable cause.
The trial court chose to issue warrants of arrest to the petitioners and their co-
accused. The records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal determination of the
existence of probable cause to support the issuance of the warrants. Hence, the warrants
of arrest were not arbitrarily issued.
Distinction between Executive and Judicial Determination
of Probable Cause In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is
determined at two stages.
1. Executive level- where determination is made by the prosecutor during the
preliminary investigation, before the filing of the criminal information.
2. Judicial level- undertaken by the judge before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In the case at bar, it relates to the judicial determination of probable cause. In order to
properly resolve if the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s issuance of the warrants of
arrest against the petitioners, it is necessary to scrutinize the crime of estafa, whether
committed as a simple offense or through a syndicate.
The crime of swindling or estafa is covered by Articles 315-316 of the RPC. One of these
modes is estafa by means of deceit as clearly defined in Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior toor
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means
of other similar deceits.
Under this provision, ESTAFA has the following elements:
1) the existence of a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means;
2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
3) the reliance by the offended party on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means, which induced him to part with his money or property;
4) as a result, the offended party suffered damage.
The elements of estafa by means of deceit are present in this case. Had it not been for the
petitioners’ false representations and promises, Dy would not have placed his money in
State Resources, to his damage. Dy was induced to invest with the promise of higher
returns. Unknown to him, petitioners employed deception to secure his money to be used
in Danny’s construction and realty business. The petitioners’ deceit became more blatant
when they admitted in their petition that as early as August 1995, State Resources had
already been dissolved. Petitioners misrepresented facts regarding themselves and State
Resources in order to persuade Dy to part with his money for investment with an
inexistent corporation. These circumstances all serve as indicators of the petitioners’
deceit.
"Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false
or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed,
which deceives or is intended to deceive another, so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury."
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689, there is syndicated estafa if the following elements are
present:
1) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC was
committed;
2) the estafa or swindling was committed by a syndicate of five or more persons;
3) the fraud resulted in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or
members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon," or farmers associations or
of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
The factual circumstances of the present case show that the first and second elements of
syndicated estafa are present; there is probable cause for violation of Article 315(2)(a) of
the RPC against the petitioners. Moreover, in Dy’s supplemental complaint-affidavit, he
alleged that the fraud perpetrated against him was committed, not only by Ngo and the
petitioners, but also by the other officers and directors of State Resources. The number of
the accused who allegedly participated in defrauding Dy exceeded five, thus satisfying the
requirement for the existence of a syndicate.
However, the third element of the crime is patently lacking. The funds fraudulently
solicited by the corporation must come from the general public. In the present case, no
evidence was presented to show that aside from Dy, the petitioners, through State
Resources, also sought investments from other people. Dy had no co-complainants
alleging that they were also deceived to entrust their money to State Resources. The
general public element was not complied with.
Thus, no syndicated estafa allegedly took place, only simple estafa by means of
deceit. CA did not err in affirming the trial court’s denial of the petitioners’ motion to lift
warrant of arrest.
19
Case Digest No. 69_FAJARDO
People of
the Philippines v Wagas Topic: ESTAFA Article 315
paragraph 2(d)
Facts:
Prosecution: Private complainant, Alberto Ligaray alleged that Wagas placed an order of
200 bags of rice over the telephone to be paid by a postdated check. The goods were
released to Robert Cañada, brother-in-law of Wagas, who at the same time give to Ligaray
the BPI check in issue. Said check is payable to cash. When he later deposited the check it
was dishonoured due to insufficiency of funds. He called Wagas about the matter and
despite repeated demands; the latter did not pay him.
Ligaray even presented a letter signed by Wagas addressed to his counsel. The letter
contains acknowledgement and explanation of the matter and a promise by Wagas to pay
his debt.
Defense: Wagas denied of having a telephone conversation with Ligaray. Although he
admitted issuing the check in question; according to him it was issued by him to his
brother-in-law, Cañada, as payment for portion of the latter’s property that he wanted to
buy. The sale did not push through so he did not fund the check anymore. With regards
to the letter purportedly signed by him, he admitted it but insisted that it was Cañada who
transacted with Ligaray and that he signed the letter only because his sister and her
husband has begged him to assume responsibility in order to avoid jeopardizing Cañada’s
application for overseas employment.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling:
RTC The trial court convicted Wagas of estafa holding that all its elements have been
proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. First, Wagas issued a postdated
check as payment for an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued. Second, he
failed to deposit an amount sufficient to cover the check despite having been informed that
the check was dishonour. Third, Ligaray released the goods upon receipt of the postdated
checks and upon Wagas’ assurance that it was funded.
SC The Supreme Court gave merit to Wagas’ appeal. The crime charged to Wagas is Article
315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
―Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned herein below shall be punished by: x x x x
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud: x x x x
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the
check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days
from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check
has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.‖
In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating
or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the
defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to obtain money or property from
the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In
other words, the prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered
would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check
by the offender.
The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is postdated
or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b)
lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof.
It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the
non-payment of a debt. Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the
drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three
days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.
The prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Cañada
because of the postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the check was
dishonored when presented for payment because of the insufficiency of funds. However it
failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the offender. As can be gleaned
from the facts Ligaray did not personally meet the person whom he transacted over the
phone. The prosecution did not even presented evidence as to how Ligaray knew and
identified that the one he’s talking over the phone is indeed Wagas. In fact, check was
delivered and the goods were received by Cañada. And there is no evidence pointing to the
fact that Cañada was acting in behalf of Wagas despite their in-law relationship. Also, the
check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. A check payable to cash according
to Negotiable Instruments Law is payable to bearer and could be negotiated by mere
delivery without need of an endorsement, hence it may be said that Wagas indeed did not
issue the check in favour of Ligaray but to somebody else.
It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have
used the check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud
or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty
of estafa simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt
must still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray
by means of the check.
Hence, the prosecution did not prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Wagas is
acquitted of the crime charged.
20
Case Digest No. 70_FERRER checks were dishonored upon presentment due to insufficiency of funds or because the
account was already closed. The third element was also proved by the showing that
People of the Philippines v. Julie Grace K. Villanueva Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure to collect from Villanueva the balance of
(G.R. No. 163662; February 25, 2015) P995,000.00.

In her defense, Villanueva adverts to an agreement with Madarang whereby the latter
would deposit or encash the
FACTS:Accused-appellant Villanueva was charged with the crime of Estafa under Article checks only after being informed of the sufficiency of funds in Villanueva's account. This
315, paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC and the CA found her guilty defense, however, crumbles because she did not present proof of the supposed agreement.
beyond reasonable of the crime charged.
The prosecution has proved the existence of all elements of estafa under Article 315
Records show that, complainant Madarang went to Villanueva's residence and was able to paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, hence, accused-appellant’s conviction is
sell to Villanueva five sets of jewelry worth P 1,010,000.00. Villanueva made out nine affirmed.
checks drawn against Philippine National Bank
(PNB), eight of which were postdated for the
payment of such jewelries.

Madarang received the checks because of Villanueva's assurance that they would all be
honored upon presentment. However, the draweee bank paid only one of the eight
postdated checks since the remaining checks were dishonored by reason of Account Closed
or Drawn Against Insufficient Funds. Case Digest No. 71_GABA

Villanueva denies the crime and insists on the absence of fraud when she drew the
postdated checks. She avers that (a) the checks were issued as replacement; (b) the checks
could only be deposited or encashed after Madarang was notified of the sufficiency of
funds; and (c) the receipt presented by the Prosecution failed to embody the real intention
of the parties. She further argues that the checks were not executed prior to or
simultaneous with the alleged fraud and that Madarang had instigated her to issue the
checks, hence, she cannot be held liable for estafa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Villanueva commited Estafa under
Article 315 paragraph 2(d)
HELD:
YES. The estafa charged under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) may be committed when: (1)
the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the
time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check,
the offender has no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover
the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded.The deceit should be the
efficient cause of the defraudation, and should either be prior to, or simultaneous with, the
act of the fraud. In the present case, all the elements of estafa were present.
The first element was admitted by Villanueva, who confirmed that she had issued the
checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had purchased. There is no question
that Madarang accepted the checks upon the assurance of Villanueva that they would be
funded upon presentment. The second element was likewise established because the
DE CASTRO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015
FACTS: Matuguina and Cornejo left their savings account passbooks with the accused
within the space of a week in October – November 1993 when they went to the bank’s
Malibay branch to transact on their accounts. The branch manager Cynthia Zialcita learned
that Matuguina wanted the passbooked returned so Zialcita told the accused to return the
passbook. However, the accused said she had already returned the passbook. Skeptical,
Zialcita reviewed Matuguina’s account and found three withdrawal slips dated October 19,
29 and November 4, 1993 containing signatures radically different from the specimen
signatures of the depositor and covering a total of P65,000. It was apparent that the
accused had intervened in the posting and verification of the slips because her initials
were affixed thereto.
Zialcita also summoned Juanita Ebora, the teller who posted and released the November 4
withdrawal. When she was asked why she processed the transaction, Ebora readily
pointed to the accused as the person who gave to her the slip. Since she saw the accused’s
initials on it attesting to having verified the signature of the depositor, she presumed that
the withdrawal was genuine.
The same incident happened to Milagrosa Cornejo’s bank account. Zialcita reported her
findings to her superiors. The accused initially denied the claims against her but when she
was asked to write her statement down, she confessed to her guilt. She started crying and
locked herself inside the bathroom. She came out only when another superior Fed Cortez
arrived to ask her some questions. Since then, she executed three more statements in
21
response to the investigation conducted by the bank’s internal auditors. She also gave a
list of the depositors’ accounts from which she drew cash and which were listed
methodically in her diary.
The employment of the accused was ultimately terminated. The bank paid Matuguina
P65,000, while Cornejo got her refund directly from the accused. In the course of her
testimony on the witness stand, the accused made these further admissions:
(a) She signed the withdrawal slips Exhibits B, C, D and H which contained the fake
signatures of Matuguina and Cornejo;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(b) She wrote and signed the confession letter
Exhibit K;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(c) She wrote the answers to the questions of the branch cluster head Fred Cortez
Exhibit L, and to the auditors’ questions in Exhibit M, N and
O;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(d) Despite demand, she did not pay the bank.2cralawlawlibrary
RTC RULING: Convicted for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial
document committed on separate occasions in October and November 1993 by forging the
signatures of bank depositors Amparo Matuguina and Milagrosa Cornejo in withdrawal
slips, thereby enabling herself to withdraw a total of P65,000.00 and P2,000.00 from the
respective savings accounts of Matuguina and Cornejo.
CA RULING: RTC decision affirmed with the modification that the award of P2,000 to the
complainant be deleted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction was invalid because her constitutional rights against
self-incrimination, to due process and to counsel were denied.
HELD: The appeal lacks merit.
The guilt of the petitioner for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial
document was established beyond reasonable doubt. As a bank teller, she took advantage
of the bank depositors who had trusted in her enough to leave their passbooks with her
upon her instruction. Without their knowledge, however, she filled out withdrawal slips
that she signed, and misrepresented to her fellow bank employees that the signatures had
been verified in due course. Her misrepresentation to her co-employees enabled her to
receive the amounts stated in the withdrawal slips. She thereby committed two crimes,
namely: estafa, by defrauding BPI Family Savings, her employer, in the various sums
withdrawn from the bank accounts of Matuguina and Cornejo; and falsification of a
commercial document, by forging the signatures of Matuguina and Cornejo in the
withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor concerned had signed the respective
slips in order to enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were complex crimes,
because theestafa would not have been consummated without the falsification of the
withdrawal slips.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on
August 18, 2005, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 94-5524, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty
of three years of <I>prison correccional</I>, as minimum, to six years, eight months
and 21 days of <I>prision mayor</I>, as maximum;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 94-5525, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty
of two years of <I>prision correccional</I>, as minimum, to four years, nine months
and 11 days of <I>prision correccional</I> plus fine of P5,000.00, as maximum;
(3) In Criminal Case No. 94-5526, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty
of two years and four months of <I>prision correccional,</I> as the minimum, to
five years of <I>prision correccional</I> plus fine of P5,000.00, as the maximum;
and
(4) In Criminal Case No. 94-5527, the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty
of four years of <I>prision correccional,</I> as minimum, to seven years, eight
months and 21 days of <I>prision mayor,</I> as maximum.
The Court orders the petitioner to pay to BPI Family Saving Bank interest of 6% per annum
on the aggregate amount of P65,000.00 to be reckoned from the finality of this judgment
until full payment.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

Petitioner has accepted the findings of fact about the transactions that gave rise to the
accusations in court against her for four counts of estafa through falsification of a
SO ORDERED.
commercial document. CA correctly stressed that the rights against self-incrimination and
to counsel guaranteed under the Constitution applied only during the custodial
interrogation of a suspect. In her case, she was not subjected to any investigation by the
police or other law enforcement agents. Instead, she underwent an administrative
investigation as an employee of the BPI Family Savings Bank, the investigation being
conducted by her superiors. She was not coerced to give evidence against herself, or to
admit to any crime, but she simply broke down bank when depositors Matuguina and
Cornejo confronted her about her crimes.

22
Case Digest No. 72_HADLOC
CAMPOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FIRST WOMEN’S CREDIT
CORPORATION
FACTS: Campos obtained a loan, payable on installments, from respondent First Women’s
Credit Corporation (FWCC) in the amount of P50,000.00. She issued several postdated
checks in favor of FWCC to cover the agreed installment payments. Fourteen of these
checks drawn against her Current Account with BPI Family Bank-Head Office, however,
were dishonored when presented for payment as the same were declared by the drawee
bank to be drawn against a ―closed account.‖
After Campos failed to satisfy her outstanding obligation with FWCC despite demand, she
was charged before the MeTC with violations of B.P. 22. Campos was tried in absentia, as
she failed to attend court proceedings after being arraigned. Therein, she was convicted of
the crime for which she was charged. Campos then appealed to the RTC. The latter upheld
her conviction. A motion for reconsideration filed by Campos was denied for lack of merit.
Wlawlibrary
Campos argues that the crime’s element requiring her knowledge at the time of the check’s
issuance that she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank for the payment of
the check in full upon presentment was not established by the prosecution. She denies
having received a notice of dishonor from FWCC. Insisting on an acquittal, Campos
discredits the MeTC’s reliance on a supposed notice of dishonor that was sent to her by
FWCC through registered mail. She also invokes good faith as she allegedly made
arrangements with FWCC for the payment of her obligation after the subject checks were
dishonored.
ISSUES: (1) W/N a demand letter that was sent thru registered mail is sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of B.P. 22 as to knowledge of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks.
(2) W/N Campos’ want of information of the fact of the check’s dishonor and her
subsequent arrangements for their payment are tantamount to good faith so as to warrant
her acquittal.
RULING: The petition lacks merit; hence,
conviction, sustained.
To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1)
the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.cralawlawlibrary
The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. An issue being advanced by
Campos through the present petition concerns her alleged failure to receive a written
demand letter from FWCC. In a line of cases, the Court has emphasized the importance of
proof of receipt of such notice of dishonor, although not as an element of the offense, but
as a means to establish that the issuer of a check was aware of insufficiency of funds when
he issued the check and the bank dishonored it, in relation to the second element.
Considering that the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish,
Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, as it
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing, and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety days
from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee
of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has
not been paid by the drawee.
The Court holds that the mere presentation of registry return receipts that cover
registered mail was not sufficient to establish that written notices of dishonor had been
sent to or served on issuers of checks. The authentication by affidavit of the mailers was
necessary in order for service by registered mail to be regarded as clear proof of the giving
of notices of dishonor and to predicate the existence of the second element of the offense.
In still finding no merit in the present petition, the Court, however, considers Campos’
defense that she exerted efforts to reach an amicable settlement with her creditor after
the checks which she issued were dishonored by the drawee bank, BPI Family Bank.
Campos categorically declared in her petition that, ―[she] has in her favor evidence to
show that she was in good faith and indeed made arrangements for the payment of her
obligations
subsequently after the dishonor of the checks.‖ Clearly, this statement was a
confirmation that she actually received the required notice of dishonor from FWCC.
Campos could have avoided prosecution by paying the amounts due on the checks or
making arrangements for payment in full within five (5) days after receiving notice.
Unfortunately for Campos, these circumstances were not established in the instant case.
She failed to sufficiently disclose the terms of her alleged arrangement with FWCC, and to
establish that the same had been fully complied with so as to completely satisfy the
amounts covered by the subject checks.
23
Case Digest No. 73_LEANO
ARIEL T. LIM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 190834 November 26, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner issued Bank of Commerce Check Nos. 0013813 and 0013814, dated June
30, 1998 and July 15, 1998, respectively, payable to CASH, in the amount P100K for each
check. He gave the checks to Mr. Willie Casto as his campaign donation to the latter's
candidacy in the elections of 1998. Claiming that the printing materials were delivered too
late, Castor instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment" order for the two checks. Thus,
the checks were dishonored by the bank because of said order and during trial, when the
bank officer was presented on the witness stand, he admitted that said checks were drawn
against insufficient funds. Private complainant Badiee sent two demand letters to
petitioner and filed a complaint against petitioner before the Office of the Prosecutor. After
the lapse of more than one month from receipt of the demand letters, and after receiving
the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner issued a replacement check
(P200k) and Badiee was able to encash said replacement check.Nevertheless, 6 months
after petitioner had paid the amount of the bounced checks, two Informations were filed
against him before the MTC Manila for violating BP Blg. 22 on the ground that despite
receipt of notice regarding the dishonor checks, he failed to pay Badiee the amount of the
said check or to make arrangement for payment in full of the same within five banking
days after receiving said notice.
MeTC- guilty of 2 counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
RTC-affirmed the decision regarding the 2nd criminal case but ordered the decision on
criminal case no. 1 as vacated and set aside for the lack of jurisdiction of the the lower
court of Manila to try and decide cases where the essential ingredients of the crime
charged happened in Quezon City
CA- affirmed in toto the judgement of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON he is still guilty despite the fact that he has fully paid the amount of the
dishonored checks even before the Informations were filed in court
HELD:NO. The Court holds that herein petitioner must be exonerated from the imposition
of penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as he had already paid the amount of the
dishonored checks six (6) months before the filing of Informations with the court. Such a
course of action is more in keeping with justice and equity.
In Griffith, the Court ruled that albeit made beyond the grace period but two years prior to
the institution of the criminal case, the payment collected from the proceeds of the
foreclosure and auction sale of the petitioner's impounded properties, with more than a
million pesos to spare, justified the acquittal of the petitioner.
In the present case, CA erred in holding that the factual circumstances in Griffith are
dissimilar from those in the present case, because the checks subject of this case are
personal checks, while the check involved in Griffith was a corporate check and, hence,
some confusion or miscommunication could easily occur between the signatories of the
check and the corporate treasurer. However, it should be noted that the same kind of
confusion giving rise to petitioner's mistake very well existed in the present case. CA also
took it against petitioner that he paid the amount only after receiving the subpoena from
the Office of the Prosecutor, which s shows that petitioner was motivated to pay not
because he wanted to settle his obligation but because he wanted to avoid prosecution.
This reasoning is tenuous because in Griffith, the accused therein did not even voluntarily
pay the value of the dishonored checks; rather, the complainant was paid from the
proceeds of the invalid foreclosure of the accused's property.
While the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are
dishonored upon their presentment for payment, penal laws should not be applied
mechanically. In the more recent case of Tan v. Philippine Commercial International Bank,
the foregoing principle articulated in Griffith was the precedent cited to justify the
acquittal of the accused in said case.
Therein, the Court enumerated the elements for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 being (1) The
accused makes, draws or issues a check to apply to account or for value; (2) The accused
knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3)
The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
To facilitate proving the second element, the law created a prima facie presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds or credit, which is established when it is shown that
the drawer of the check was notified of its dishonor and, within five banking days
thereafter, failed to fully pay the amount of the check or make arrangements for its full
payment.
Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check during the five-day
grace period would exculpate the accused from criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 but the
aforementioned cases show that the Court acknowledges the existence of extraordinary
cases where, even if all the elements of the crime or offense are present, the conviction of
the accused would prove to be abhorrent to society's sense of justice.
In the present case, the fact that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the
dishonored check after having received the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor
should have forestalled the filing of the Information in court. The spirit of the law which,
for B.P. Blg. 22, is the protection of the credibility and stability of the banking system,
would not be served by penalizing people who have evidently made amends for their
mistakes and made restitution for damages even before charges have been filed against
24
them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the informations has already
attained the purpose of the law.
It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced check after the
information has been filed in court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the
accused from possible conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Since from the
commencement of the criminal proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever
to show that the accused had every intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects
of his issuance of the unfunded check, then there is no equitable and compelling reason to
preclude his prosecution. In such a case, the letter of the law should be applied to its full
extent.
Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should be well
differentiated from cases where the accused is charged with estafa under Article 315, par.
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, where the fraud is perpetuated by postdating a check, or
issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank,
or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In said
case of estafa, damage and deceit are the essential elements of the offense, and the check
is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value of the
dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the
civil liability of the crime but not the criminal liability.
Case Digest No.74_LELAY
Crimes against Property and P.D. 1613 (The Anti-Arson Law)
Buebos and Buebos v. People (2008)
FACTS: On January 1, 1994 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, Adelina Borbe was in
her house at Hacienda San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay, watching over her sick child. She was
lying down when she heard some noise around the house. She got up and looked through
the window and saw the four accused, Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos
and Antonio Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her hut. When she went out, she saw the
roof of her nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help. Instead of coming to her
immediate succor, the four fled.
At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help.
Olipiano was then drinking with Pepito Borbe to celebrate New Year’s Eve. Olipiano
immediately ran to the place and saw a number of people jumping over the fence. When
he focused his flashlight on them, he was able to identify Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos
and Antonio Cornel, Jr. He also saw Rolando Buela running away.
On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos, together with
Rolando Buela and Antonio Cornel, Jr., were indicted for arson.
On the other hand, the defense contended that the accused were at different
places at the time of the incident.
RTC found all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson.
CA disposed the subsequent appeal and affirmed the RTC’s decision, with
modifications, downgrading the penalty. It opined that the accused could only be convicted
of simple arson, punishable by prision mayor, and not for burning of an inhabited house,
which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua, because the information failed to allege with specificity the actual crime
committed.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are liable for simple arson or arson of an inhabited house which
merits a penalty of
up to reclusion perpetua.
RULING:
Petitioners are only liable of simple arson.
Previously, arson was defined and penalized under nine different articles of the Revised
Penal Code: Article 320 (destructive arson), Article 321 (other forms of arson), Article 322
(cases of arson not included in the preceding articles), Article 323 (arson of property of
small value), Article 324 (crimes involving destruction), Article 325 (burning ones own
property to commit arson), Article 326 (setting fire to property exclusively owned by the
offender, Article 326-a (in cases where death resulted as a consequence of arson), and
Article 326-b (prima facie evidence of arson).
25
 On March 7, 1979, citing certain inadequacies that impede the successful
enforcement and prosecution of arsonists, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree (P.D) No. 1613. P.D. 1613 supplanted the penal code provisions on
arson.
On November 11, 1980, the law on arson was again revisited via P.D. No. 1744.
The new law expanded the definition of destructive arson by way of reinstating Article 320
of the Revised Penal Code. The amendatory legislation also paved the way for the re-
imposition of the capital punishment on destructive arsonists.
When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 (An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on
Certain Heinous Crimes) was passed on December 13, 1993, Article 320 again underwent
a revision.
Under the new rules, the information or complaint must state the
designation of the offense given by the statute and specify its qualifying and generic
aggravating circumstances. Otherwise stated, the accused will not be convicted of
the offense proved during the trial if it was not properly alleged in the information.
Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the house intentionally
burned by petitioners and their cohorts was inhabited. Rather, the information merely
recited that accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to
cause damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on
fire the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter’s damage and prejudice.
Although the rule took effect only on December 1, 2000, while the petitioners
were convicted by the RTC on April 7, 1998, it may be applied retroactively. It is
elementary that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application insofar as
they benefit the accused.
In fine, petitioners can only be convicted only of simple arson, under Section 1,
paragraph 1 of P.D. No. 1613, punishable by prision mayor.
Case Digest No. 75_Leonardo
People of the Philippines v. Alamada Macabando
G.R. No. 188708 July 31, 2013
Facts: The prosecution’s evidence showed that at around 4:00 pm on December 21, 2001,
the appellant broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he
wanted to get even (―manabla ko‖). Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house.
At 6:35 pm of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there was a
fire. When Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from the
appellant’s house. He got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire. Eric
Quilantang, a neighbor whose house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran to
the barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning
house, the appellant, who was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere;
the appellant then fired three shots in the air. The appellant also told the people around
that whoever would put out the fire would be killed. Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio
hurriedly went home to save his nephews and nieces. Eric also returned to his house to
save his belongings. Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naïve and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted
a spot investigation of the incident, and concluded, among others, that the fire started in
the appellant’s house; and that it had been intentional. Barangay Chairman Modesto Ligtas
stated that the fire gutted many houses in his barangay.
On the other hand, the defense’s version argued that the appellant lived in the two-storey
house in Barangay 35, Limketkai Drive, which was owned by his sister, Madji Muslima
Edemal. He admitted that he felt angry at around 2:00 pm on December 21, 2001 because
one of his radio cassettes for sale had been stolen. The appellant claimed that he went to
sleep after looking for his missing radio cassette, and that the fire had already started
when he woke up. He denied making a threat to burn his house, and maintained that he
did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots heard by his neighbors came from the
explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the New Year celebration.
Lomantong Panandigan, the appellant’s cousin, stated, among others, that he did not see
the appellant carry a revolver or fire a shot. Dimas Kasubidan, the appellant’s brother-in-
law, stated that he and the appellant lived in the same house, and that the latter was asleep
in his room before the fire broke out.
Crime Charged: Crime of Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the RPC before the RTC
RTC Ruling: Appellant was guilty of the crime charged
CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC ruling that appellant was guilty
Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of destructive arson or simple arson under PD
1613 as amended
Supreme Court Ruling:
Appellant is guilty of simple arson under PD 1613 as amended
ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
At the outset no one saw the appellant set fire to his house. The trial and the
appellate courts thus resorted to circumstantial evidence since there was no direct
evidence to prove the appellant’s culpability to the crime charged. It is settled that in the
absence of the direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to sustain a
conviction that ―(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances
results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who
has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence,
the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
In the present case, the following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain that leads
to an unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his
house: first, the appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe, acted violently and broke
bottles near his house at around 4:00 pm of December 21, 2001; second, while he was still
26
in a fit of rage, the appellant stated he would get even, and then threatened to burn his
own house; third, Judith Quilantang saw a fire in the appellant’s room approximately two
house after the appellant returned to his house; fourth, the appellant prevented Cornelio,
Eric, and several other people from putting out the fire in his house; fifth, the appellant
fired shots in the air, and then threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out the fire;
and finally, the investigation conducted by the fire marshals of the Bureau of Fire
Protection revealed that the fire started in the appellant’s house, and that it had been
intentional.
The combination of the circumstances leads to no other conclusion than that the appellant
set fire to his house. The Court finds it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to
prevent his neighbors from putting out the fire in his house, and threaten to kill them if
they did, if he had nothing to do with the crime. The first impulse of an individual whose
house is on fire is to save his loved ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to human nature,
reason and natural order of things for a person to thwart and prevent any effort to put out
the fire in his burning property. By carrying (and firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant
showed his determination to repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important to note, too, is
the fact that the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire which, to the Court’s mind,
showed deliberate planning and preparedness on his part to flee the raging fire; it likewise
contradicted his statement that he was asleep inside his house when the fire broke out,
and that the fire was already big when he woke up. Clearly, the appellant’s indifferent
attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the people who tried to put out the
fire, coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim of innocence.
Notably, the appellant failed to impute any improper motive against the prosecution
witnesses to falsely testify against him; in fact, he admitted that he had no
misunderstanding with them prior to the incident.
RELEVANT PART ON SIMPLE ARSON UNDER PD 1613 AS AMENDED
The CA convicted the appellant of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC. ―Article
320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels,
buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.‖
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1613, on the other hand, currently governs simple
arson. Section 3 of the law provides:
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua
shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or
forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private
structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659. This law punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the
acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and national security
implications than destructive arson.
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are:
(a) There is intentional burning; and
(b) What is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Both these elements have been proven in the present case. The Information
alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and that the fire spread to other
inhabited houses. These allegations were established during trial through the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found credible and
convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which stated that
damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been intentional. Moreover, the
certification from the City Social Welfare and Development Department likewise indicated
that the burned houses were used as dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his
burnt two-story house was used as a residence. That the appellant’s act affected many
families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the appellant’s act does not
appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when
compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established evidence
only showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration
spread to the neighboring houses. The Proper Penalty under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D.
No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson is reclusion temporal, which has a range
of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, to reclusion perpetua.
Case Digest No. 76_MAGABILLIN
Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. de
Carungcong v. People and Sato G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010
FACTS:
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of petitioner
intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a
complaint-affidavit for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese
national. That her my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato, aged 27 and 24,
was able to learn that prior to the death their mother Manolita Carungcong, their father
William Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure the signature and
thumbmark of their mother on a Special Power of Attorney where Wendy Mitsuko Sato,
who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her attorney-in-fact, to sell and
27
dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Said Special Power of Attorney,
was signed and thumbmarked by Manolita Carungcong because William Sato told her that
the documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes. At that time, she was
completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years. The aforesaid Special Power of
Attorney was signed by in the presence of Wendy, Wendy’s other niece Belinda Kiku Sato,
their maid Mana Tingzon, and Governor Josephine Ramirez.
On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found
buyers for the property and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3)
deeds of absolute sale. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were
falsified as Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato has actual knowledge of the true amounts
paid by the buyers, as stated in her Affidavit, since she was the signatory thereto
as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzales. Wendy was only 20
years old at the time and was not in any position to oppose or to refuse her
father’s orders. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold
under the power of attorney fraudulently secured from their mother, William
Sato failed to account for the same and never delivered the proceeds to Manolita
Carungcong until the latter died. Demands have been made for William Sato to
make an accounting and to deliver the proceeds of the sales to me as Mediatrix
Carungcong Administratrix to their mothers estate, but he refused and failed,
and continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the
estate of the deceased and of the heirs.
In a resolution, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint. On appeal,
however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution and directed the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for violation of Article
315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased
Manolita who was his mother-in-law, was an exempting circumstance.
The trial court granted Satos motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case
the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a petition for certiorari in
the Court of
Appeals which, however, in a decision, dismissed it by sustaining the finding of [the trial
court] that the death of Zenaida did not extinguish the relationship by affinity between
her husband, private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does not bar the
application of the exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal
Code in favor of private respondent Sato.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Satos is entitled for an absolutory cause provided under Article 332.
HELD:
Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause in the crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling)
and malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender to civil liability and frees
him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that
included in the exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children.[ By
virtue thereof, no criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather who commits malicious
mischief against his
stepson;http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/181409.htm -
_ftn18 by the stepmother who commits theft against her stepson; by the stepfather who
steals something from his stepson; by the grandson who steals from his
grandfather;http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/181409.htm
-
_ftn21 by the accused who swindles his sister-in-law
living with
him;http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/181409.htm - _ftn22
and by the son who steals a ring from his mother.
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other
spouse. It is a relationship by
marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage.
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates
with the dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the
relationship of affinity between the parties. Under this view, the relationship by affinity is
simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is
indispensably and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists
only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends
the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouses blood relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the
death of one spouse when there is a surviving issue. The rationale is that the relationship
is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both
parties is commingled.
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity
between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after
the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children
or not.Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of
the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said
marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent to benefit step-
relatives or in-laws, the tie of affinity between these people and their relatives-by-
marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married
parties.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/181409.htm -
_ftn30
28
After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, the court
hold that the second view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1)
of the Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification and
incest.On the other hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the
interpretation of laws that intend to benefit steprelatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of
the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to be beneficial to relatives by affinity
within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing affinity view is more
appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of relatives by affinity in the same line
is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction between the
spouse of ones living child and the surviving spouse of ones deceased child (in case of a
son-in-law or daughter-in-law with respect to his or her parents-inlaw) can be drawn from
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a
basic autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the
State to strengthen the solidarity of the
family.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/181409.htm - thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that she believed and adopted the
_ftn33In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and
obviate scandal. The view that relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of one
of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and
harmony.
Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws
is to resolve all doubts in
favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.The rule
applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one
that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the
adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court hold
that the relationship by affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood
relatives of the deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which
created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the justifying circumstance of defense
of ones relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense committed against ones relatives
under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of
accessories under Article 20 also of the same Code.)
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies
to the felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the
State condones the criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender
for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party with the option to hold the
offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned
therein. The plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it
applies exclusively to the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does
not apply where any of the crimes mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another
crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being
charged not with simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public documents. In particular, the Information states that Sato, by means of deceit,
intentionally defrauded Manolita.
In the Information show that the estafa was committed by attributing to
Manolita. Manolitas acts of signing the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that document
were the very expression of her specific intention that something be done about her taxes.
Her signature and thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such intention as
she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not have read)
because of Satos representation that the document pertained to her taxes. In signing and
representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e., that it involved her
taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to Satos proposal
that she execute a document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita
granted his daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of selling,
assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing of Manolitas Tagaytay properties when the
fact was that Manolita signed and thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the
belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the SPA, and everything
that it contained were falsely attributed to Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other
pertinent documents, [Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three
(3) Deeds of Absolute Sale and; (2) once in possession of the proceeds
of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and
benefit
raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and the one
who benefited therefrom, was the author thereof.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was
not simple estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the
special power of attorney and the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa.
Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail
29
himself of the absolutory cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in
his favor.
The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the
Revised Penal Code are as
follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.
While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not
require that the document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that
the falsification of the document cannot be considered as a necessary means to commit the
estafa under that provision.
The phrase necessary means does not connote indispensable means for if it did,
then the offense as a necessary means to commit another would be an indispensable
element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. In People v. Salvilla, the phrase
necessary means merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the
commission of the other. In this case, the crime of falsification of public document, the SPA,
was such a necessary means as it was resorted to by Sato to facilitate and carry out more
effectively his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he used the SPA to
sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft
or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same
Code.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/181409.htm - _ftn58
The falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of
committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to
defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage
or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of a public,
official or commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification was committed
prior to the consummation of the crime of
estafa.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/february2010/181409.htm - BBB, AAA’s mother corroborated her daughter’s testimony that on March 26. 1998, AAA
_ftn60 Actually utilizing the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud
another is estafa. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the
falsification of the document.
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information
show that the falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented a
ready-made SPA to Manolita who signed the same as a statement of her intention in
connection with her taxes. While the falsification was consummated upon the execution of
the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred only when Sato later utilized the SPA.
He did so particularly when he had the properties sold and thereafter pocketed the
proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the falsification
of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the time she
was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That is
why the falsification of the public document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a
necessary means for) the commission of the estafa.
The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had
made Manolita sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third
parties. In that case, the damage would have been caused by, and at exactly the same time
as, the execution of the document, not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed
would only have been the simple crime of estafa. On the other hand, absent any
inducement, the crime would have only been the simple crime of falsification.
Case Digest No. 77_MALLARI
PEOPLE VS AMARO
G.R NO. 199100 July 18, 2014
FACTS: Version of the Prosecution:
AAA who was then seven years old, testified that she was walking on her way
home from school when she passed by Boots & Maya store. She met a man, the appellant,
who asked her to buy cigarettes. After that, the latter gave her bread and banana cue. After
eating them, she suddenly became dizzy and passed out. AAA was rought to appellant’s
house. When she regained consciousnes, she saw appelant naked. She was undressed by
the appellant, kissed her on the lips and neck, and raped her. AAA was detained for six
days and was raped 5 times by appellant. AAA clarified that appellant’s penis touched the
outer portion of her vagina.
On the last day of her detention, while on their way to San Jose, Aunt Ruthie saw AAA
walking and immediately picked her up and brought her to the police station.
came home at noon time to eat. Then, AAA told her that she had to go back to school. AAA
was not at home at around 5pm so BBB went to the school to look for her, however, the
teacher told BBB that they already sent home the children. She proceeded to the police
station to report her missing daughter. Upon receiving a call from the police, BBB
immediately went to the police station and saw her daughter who was still in shock and
could not walk properly learning that AAA was raped.
30
Version of the Defense:
Appelant denied abducting and raping AAA but admitted that he brought the
latter to his house when AAA approached him asking for bread first, before begging him to
take her with him because she was always being scolded by her parents. Upon reaching
his house, appellant entrusted AAA to the care of Florante Magay’s sister. Appellant then
went back to town to attend to his work as a mason. He only decided to go back home when
he heard his name on the radio in connection with the disappearance of a girl. He picked
up the child in Barangay Tagburos and brought her to her house in Buncag. AAA walked
alone towards her house.
RTC- accused is GUILTY of the crime of FORCIBLE ABDUCTION with RAPE.
CA- AFFIRMED the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish from the testimony of the
complainant the guilt of the accused for the crime of forcible abduction with rape beyond
reasonable doubt.
HELD:
SC- AFFIRMED; complex crime of FORCIBLE ABDUCTION with RAPE.
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised
Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil
status, or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is
with lewd designs. On the other hand, rape under Article 266-A is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman by: (1) force or intimidation, or(2) when the woman is
deprived of reason or is unconscious, or (3) when she is under twelve years of age.
The prosecution was able to prove all these elements in this case. The victim, AAA was a
seven (7) year-old girl who was taken against her will by appellant who told her that he
knew her mother and that he would bring her home. At her tender age, AAA could have
easily been deceived by appellant. The employment of deception suffices to constitute the
forcible taking, especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. It is the taking
advantage of their innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. The
presence of lewd designs in forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the
victim.
The presence of lewd intentions is established by the conduct of the accused during the
abduction. When the girl is defiled, the forcible abduction becomes the means to commit
the rape, and since rape is the more serious offense, under Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape is committed and penalized by
reclusion perpetua, the penalty proper to rape.
Case Digest No.78_CORPUZ
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
MARVIN CAYANAN G.R. No.
200080 September 18, 2013
FACTS:
Cayanan is AAA’s brother-in-law, being married to AAA’s older sister, and the
couple lived in a nearby house. On February 1, 2001, Cayanan took advantage of 15-year
old AAA while the victim was alone inside her house. AAA was asleep when she felt
someone caressing her. It turned out to be Cayanan. He then started kissing her and told
her to remove her shorts. When she refused, Cayanan forcibly took it off and after the latter
took off his own under garment, he inserted his organ into her genitalia. Cayanan, who had
a knife with him, threatened to kill AAA if she resisted and informed anybody of the
incident.
On February 26, 2001, AAA was about to enter the school campus with her friend
Armina Adriano (Adriano) when Cayanan arrived on a tricycle. Cayanan then pulled AAA
towards the tricycle. She tried shouting but he covered her mouth. They alighted
somewhere and boarded a jeep. He brought her to a dress shop where he asked someone
to give her a change of clothes as she was in her school uniform and later to a Jollibee
outlet. He then brought her to his sister’s house where he raped her inside a bedroom.
Afterwards, a certain couple Putay and Tessie talked to Cayanan and she was brought to
the barangay office where she was asked to execute a document stating that she
voluntarily went with Cayanan. It was the latter’s mother and sister-in-law who brought
her home later that evening. She told her mother and brother of the incidents only after
her classmate Adriano informed her family of what happened in school and of the rape
incidents. AAA testified that she did not immediately tell her family because she was still
in a state of shock.
2 CRIMINAL CASES WERE FILED
In Criminal Case No. 1499-M-200 1, Marvin Cayanan was charged with the crime
of Qualified Rape. In
Criminal Case No. 1498-M-200 I, Cayanan was charged with the crime of Forcible
Abduction with Qualified Rape.
Adriano and the victim’s mother corroborated her testimony. A resident
psychiatrist at the National Center for Mental Health also testified that AAA was suffering
from mental depressive symptoms/chronic symptoms and presence of sexual abuse.
Cayanan interposed the sweetheart defense. The RTC, however, did not give
credit to his defense, ruling that it is a weak defense and does not rule out the use of force
given the prosecution’s evidence. He also failed to establish the genuineness and
authenticity of the love letters allegedly written by AAA.
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC.
31
ISSUE: Whether or not Cayanan is guilty of the crime of Qualified Rape in Criminal Case
No. 1499-M-200 1? Whether or not Cayanan is guilty of the crime of Forcible Abduction
with Qualified Rape in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-200 1?
HELD:
Cayanan is guilty of the crime of Qualified Rape in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-200 1.
A review of the CA decision shows that it did not commit any reversible error in
affirming Cayanan’s conviction. Record shows that Cayanan forced AAA to have sex with
him on February 1, 2001 and threatened her and her family with physical harm. The
testimony of Adriano, meanwhile, corroborated AAA’s testimony that Cayanan forcibly
took her by the school campus gate on February 26, 2001 and thereafter raped her. The
defense failed to show any reason why the prosecution’s evidence should not be given
weight or credit.
Moreover, the claim that they were sweethearts does not justify the commission
of the crimes. For the Court to even consider giving credence to the sweetheart defense, it
must be proven by compelling evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial
evidence in support of the theory. Independent proof is required ― such as tokens,
mementos, and photographs. And while Cayanan produced two love letters allegedly
written by AAA, the CA correctly sustained the finding of the RTC that these letters were
unauthenticated and therefore, bereft of any probative value.
Cayanan is not guilty of the crime of Forcible Abduction with Qualified Rape. But he
is guilty of the of Qualified Rape only in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-200 1
The Court, however, finds that Cayanan should be convicted only of Qualified
Rape in Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2001. Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of
rape if the real objective of the accused is to rape the victim. In this case, circumstances
show that the victim’s abduction was with the purpose of raping her. Thus, after Cayanan
dragged her into the tricycle, he took her to several places until they reached his sister’s
house where he raped her inside the bedroom. Under these circumstances, the rape
absorbed the forcible abduction.
Case Digest No. 79_PANGANIBAN
Capili v People of the Philippines (and Shirley Tismo-Capili)
GR No. 183805
July 03, 2013
Facts: Petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before RTC Pasig City. He
contracted second marriage with Shirley Tismo- Capili while still being lawfully married
to Karla Medina- Capili. Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend the Proceedings alleging that
there is a pending case for declaration of nullity of his second marriage filed by Karla Capili
before RTC Antipolo City, that if such marriage is declared null and void then he is not
guilty of bigamy, and that there is prejudicial question.
RTC Pasig City suspended the arraignment and pre- trial. Meanwhile, RTC Antipolo City
declared the second marriage with Shirley Capili null and void on the griund that a
subsequent marriage contracted by husband during lifetime of legal wife is void from
beginning. In line with the declaration of nullity of his second marriage, petitioner prayed
for the dismissal of his criminal case of bigamy before RTC Pasig City.
RTC: granted Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner
CA: reversed the decision of RTC
Issue: Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a
ground for dismissal of the criminal case of bigamy
Held: The Court ruled in the negative. The elements of bigamy are: 1) offender has been
legally married; 2) marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse is absent,
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to Civil Code; 3) that he contracts
second or subsequent marriage: and 4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. In the present case, all the elements were present at the
time the information was filed. It is undisputed that the second marriage with Shirley
Capili was contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s marriage with Karla Capili. For
that very fact of contracting second marriage while the first was validly subsisting, the
second marriage is void. However, judicial declaration of nullity of second marriage does
not bar the prosecution of petitioner for bigamy.
In Jarillo v People, the Court already ruled that crime of bigamy is consummated on the
celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous having been judicially
declared null and void. The subsequent declaration that the second marriage was void is
immaterial because prior to the declaration, the crime had already been consummated.
32
The court held that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he
contracted second marriage during subsistence of valid first marriage. In the present case,
petitioner contracted second marriage with Shirley Capili during subsistence of valid first
marriage with Karla Capili. Therefore, the petition is denied.
Case Digest No.80_QUESTIN
PEOPLE v. ODTUHAN
G.R. No. 191566 July 17, 2013
FACTS:
• In 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).
• In 1993, respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon).
• In August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina.
• In 1999, the RTC of Pasig City granted respondent’s petition and declared his
marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.
• In June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent’s
previous marriage with Modina. She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging
respondent with Bigamy.
• In November 2003, Alagon died.
• In April 2005, respondent was indicted in an information for Bigamy.
• In February 2008, respondent filed a motion to quash the information.
RTC of Manila
The RTC denied respondent’s motion and held that the facts alleged in the
information – that there was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and
without such marriage having been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage
with Alagon – constitute the crime of bigamy.
Respondent then instituted a special civil action on certiorari before the CA assailing the
denial of the motion to quash the information.
CA
The CA ordered the RTC to give due course to and receive evidence on the motion to quash
and resolve the case with dispatch. The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in
Morigo v. People, and held that there is cogent basis in looking into the motion to quash
filed by respondent, for if the evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed
void ab initio, one essential element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking.
ISSUES:
1. WON the information sufficiently alleges all the elements constituting bigamy.
2. WON the judgment declaring respondent’s first marriage void ab initio
extinguish respondent’s criminal liability.
HELD:
1. Yes.
The information contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent’s evidence showing the court’s declaration that
his marriage to Modina is void ab initio is only an evidence that seeks to establish a fact
contrary to that alleged in the information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the
time he contracted the second marriage.
2. No.
It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before
a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous
marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted
to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption
is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The Court remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
Case Digest No. 81_REONICO
SANTOS V. SANTOS, G.R. NO. 187061,
OCTOBER 8, 2014 FACTS
On June 15, 2007, Ricarco filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death
for the purpose of remarriage. On July 27, 2007, the RTC of Tarlac City declared petitioner
Celerina presumptively dead. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.
Ricardo Santos alleged that he and Celerina rented an apartment after they got
married in 1980. After a year, they moved to Tarlac City and were engaged in the buy and
sell business. The business did not prosper so Ricardo, because of Celerina’s insistence,
allowed her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. Celerina left for work and was
never heard from again. Furthermore, he alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina
by going to her parents who also did not know about her whereabouts, and by inquiring
about her from other relatives and friends but no one gave him any information. He
33
claimed that he believed that Celerina already passed away because it was almost 12 years
from the date of his RTC petition since she left.
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment
before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only in October 2008 when she
could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other
remedies. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his
knowledge of her
true residence which is their conjugal dwelling (since 1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008),
misrepresented that she was a resident of Tarlac City.
As a result, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition
declaring her presumptively dead.
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac, never worked as a domestic
helper, and that she was never absent for 12 years. Furthermore that it was Ricardo who
left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman as supported by a
joint affidavit executed by their children to support all her contentions and that Ricardo
made false allegations. She also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
Ricardo’s petition because it had never been published in a newspaper (that the OSG and
the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office were never furnished of copies of said petition).
The CA dismissed Celerina’s petition for being a wrong mode of remedy; that the
proper remedy was filing a sworn statement before the civil registry declaring her
reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code. The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
RTC: Declared Celerina presumptively dead.
CA: Dismissed Celerina’s petition for annulment of judgment.
In this petition before the Court, Celerina contends that it would be inappropriate
to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first place. Ricardo argued
that a petition for annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy because it cannot be
availed when there are other remedies available.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for
being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.
RULING
Yes. The CA erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition on the ground that it was a wrong
remedy. The Court ruled that annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional
Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.‖ The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The Court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of
Legaspi:
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or
actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the
original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been
litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the
trial which prevents a party from having a real contest, or from presenting all of
his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy.
The allegations of Celerina (that Ricardo made false allegations and the facts
supporting these were also false, that there was no publication of said petition in a
newspaper, that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the OSG and Prosecutor’s
Office were not given copies thereof) are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction which are sufficient grounds for annulment of judgment.
Furthermore, Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment on November
17, 2008 which is less than two years from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her
presumptively dead and about a month from her discovery of the decision in October
2008. Therefore, the petition of Celerina was filed within the four-year period allowed by
law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by laches, which is the period
allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.
In addition, there was no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time
of her discovery of fraud perpetrated on her. The choice of remedy is important because
remedies carry with them certain admissions, presumptions and conditions. It is also
important for purposes of determining the status of the second marriage and the liabilities
of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous
subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are present:
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2)The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead;
3)There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absent spouse; and
4)There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.55
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a
court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that
the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as. validly terminated.
Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally
considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is
protected by law.
34
 Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also
not immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for being bigamous.
The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still applies.
Celerina is correct in contending that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy
because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the
declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage. Since an undisturbed
subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the
"children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the
spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages." If it is terminated by
mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the
termination shall still be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring
presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent
marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in relation to the
status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy. However, "a
Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or wife." This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to
be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage, this
remedy is not available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but
also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent
marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to
file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
Case Digest No. 83_TERRE
RONULO v. PEOPLE
The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled
to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest,
Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed
to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,
and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests,
proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan
Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan
priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by
the couple that they had no marriage certificate.
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended,
was filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos
Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5
The petitioner entered the plea of ―not guilty‖ to the
crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the
ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the
wedding. Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare
during the ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife. 8 Days after the
wedding, she went to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with
Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was
issued to the couple.9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of
blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated
by law.10
MTC: Guilty - the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as
he made an official church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and
wife.11 It further ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s
marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty
provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law.
RTC: Guilty - the circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in ―blessing‖ the
couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It further ruled that
the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than the
petitioner’s negative statements
CA: Guilty - although there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of
marriage, the law provides minimum standards in determining whether a marriage
ceremony has been conducted. It added that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a
requirement in a marriage ceremony.
Contention of petitioner: (1) That Art. 352 of the RPC is vague and does not define what
constitutes an illegal marriage ceremony, (2) that under the principle of separation of
church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the
administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the ―blessing‖ into a
―marriage ceremony,‖ (3) that there was no criminal intent, (4) that because no case was
filed against the couple under Art. 350, there should also be no case filed against him, and
(5) Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is
not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law.
ISSUE:
35
 1. Whether or not petitioner performed a mere blessing and not a marriage
ceremony
2. Whether or not petitioner’s act is illegal
3. Whether or not penalty under the Marriage Law is proper
HELD:
1. NO. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize
a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged ―blessing‖ by the
petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an ―illegal marriage ceremony‖ which is
punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was
clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements
constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the
contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the
presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him
and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that,
contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution
has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally
declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and
State precludes the State from qualifying the church ―blessing‖ into a marriage ceremony.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an
inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is
not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The
State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the
preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws
and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the
commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.
While the petitioner may view this merely as a ―blessing,‖ the presence of the
requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this ―blessing‖ into
a ―marriage ceremony‖ as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the
Family Code and Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended.
2. YES. Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage
is the presence of a valid
marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the
couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the ―blessing‖ of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that
the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The
marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal.
The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of
good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his
criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony
has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided
by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal
liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an
element of the crime.
3. YES. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, clearly provides that it shall be imposed in
accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. We find merit in the ruling of the
CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered under
Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.
The petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352
of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this
provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely
under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any
violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.
Case Digest No. 84_FABON
ROBERTO BRILLANTE vs. CA
Petitioner Brillante was convicted for libel for writing and causing to be published an open
letter discussing the alleged participation of Jejomar Binay, then a candidate for the
position of Mayor in Makati, and Dr. Prudente, then President of the Polytechnic University
36
of the Philippines (PUP), in an assassination plot against Augusto Syjuco, another
candidate for Mayor of Makati.
FACTS:
- Brillante was a candidate for the position of Councilor in Makati - He held a press
conference attended by journalists - In the press conference, Brillante:
o Accused Binay of plotting the assassination of Syjuco
o Accused Binay of terrorism, intimidation, harassment of the Makati electorate
o Circulated among the journalists copies of an open letter addressed to President
Cory Aquino, which discussed in detail his charges against Binay
- Journalists in attendance wrote news articles about the press con
- The open letter was published in various newspapers
Portions of Brillante’s open letter read:
- Binay and his group (which includes Dr. Prudente and Commander Francis Baloloy) are
plotting the assassination of Bobby Syjuco, now frontrunner in the Makati mayoralty race
- The group discussed an operation involving terrorism, the use of public school teachers,
hitmen, and marshals who will be used to shelter the hitmen after performing their
missions
As a result, Binay, Prudente and Baloloy filed the ff. charges:
- Four (4) complaints for libel against Brillante, as the author of the letter;
- Against writers and publishers of news articles regarding the topic of Brillante’s
accusations;
- Against writers and publishers of the newspapers that published the open letter;
- Against Arcadio A. Sison (Sison) as President of A. Sison and Associates, an advertising
agency
Charges against all of Brillante’s co-accused were dismissed because their guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RTC:
- Acquitted Sison, his guilt not having been established beyond reasonable doubt
- Co-accused editors and publishers could not be held liable for libel because the news
reports regarding the press conference sufficiently informed the readers that the
reference to Binay’s involvement in the assassination plot were allegations made by
Brillante during the press conference, and that said allegations were reported for the
sole purpose of informing the public of the news.
- Brillante guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as author/writer, of LIBEL
In the Court of Appeals, Brillante contends:
(1) When the Informations were filed, the offense had already prescribed because more
than one year had elapsed since the publication of the open letter
(2) The open letter was not defamatory and was without malice
(3) The publication is considered privileged communication
(4) His conviction for libel on four counts gave rise to double jeopardy
CA affirmed the RTC decision. CA held:
(1) Brillante had committed libel against Prudente, because the open letter gives the
impression that Prudente is part of a purported criminal conspiracy to kill Syjuco
(2) The open letter is a malicious defamation which produced in the minds of the
readers Brillante’s intent and purpose to injure the reputation of Prudente
(3) The open letter is NOT privileged communication, because evidence does not show
that Brillante wrote and published it out of a legal, moral or social duty. It contains
libelous matter and was circulated to the public. While it is the right and duty of a
citizen to file a complaint regarding misconduct on the part of a public official, such
complaint must be addressed solely to officials having jurisdiction to inquire into
the charges.
(4) No double jeopardy. Each and every publication of the same libel constitutes a
separate distinct offense. The charge for one instance of publication shall not bar a
charge for subsequent and separate publications.
SC:
According to Brillante:
- His statements and utterances were privileged communication because he made them
public out of a legal, moral and social duty to safeguard the sanctity of the elections, and
to avoid the unnecessary loss of life.
- Since his statements were privileged communication, malice cannot be presumed from
them.
- He contends that where there is an honest belief in the truth of the charges made, and
the publication is in good faith, one is not responsible even for publishing an untruth.
ISSUE:
WON Brillante is guilty of libel
HELD:
CA is correct in sustaining Brillante’s conviction for libel.
Article 353 of the RPC defines libel as as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or
of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead."
Elements of libel:
(a) Allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another;
(b) Publication of the charge;
(c) Identity of the person defamed; and
(d) Existence of malice
There is no dispute as to the existence of the first three elements of libel in this case.
37
An allegation made by a person against another is considered defamatory if it ascribes to
the latter the commission of a crime; the possession of a vice or defect, whether real or
imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor
or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.64 Brillante’s statements during the press conference and in the open letter explicitly
referred to reprehensible acts allegedly committed by Binay, Prudente and their
associates, such as the use of goons to threaten Binay’s opponents in the election and the
plotting of Syjuco’s assassination.
The element of publication was likewise established. There is publication if the defamatory
material is communicated to a third person, other than the person to whom the
defamatory statement refers. Brillante uttered defamatory statements during the press
conference attended by journalists and caused the open letter to be published in
newspapers.
Brillante himself admitted that he named Binay, Prudente and their associates as the
persons who participated in the planning of the election-related terrorism and the
assassination of Syjuco not only in his open letter but also during the press conference.
Thus, the determination of Brillante’s culpability for libel hinges on the question of
whether his statements were made with malice.
Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will
or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the
person defamed; it implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present
when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.
Article 354 of the RPC states this general rule:
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive is shown.
Exception to the rule:
When the defamatory imputation qualifies as privileged communication.
Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those mentioned in Article 354
of the RPC:
1. A private communication made by a person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not
of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.
Requisites of qualifiedly privileged communication:
(1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make
the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either
be his own or of the one to whom it is made;
(2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some
interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought;
and
(3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice.74
Brillante’s statements, which according to him were made in order to protect himself and
Syjuco as Binay’s rivals in the elections, as well as to protect the electorate from possible
acts of terrorism by Binay, Prudente and their associates and from casting their votes for
undeserving candidates, satisfy the first requisite.
However, Brillante’s statements were based merely on unconfirmed intelligence reports.
As a journalist and candidate for public office, Brillante should have known that it is
necessary to further verify the truth or at least the reliability of the intelligence reports
before making them public. His hasty publication thereof negates the existence of good
faith and justifiable motives.
The absence of the second element of a privileged communication negates the
characterization of Brillante’s statements as privileged communication. The law requires
that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be privileged,
such statement must be communicated only to the person or persons who have some
interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection
sought by the author of the statement.
Although the open letter was primarily addressed to then President Aquino, the
communication was not limited to her alone. It was also published in newspapers and
made known to the public. Even if the interest sought to be protected belongs not just to
Brillante but to the public in general, certainly, the general public does not have the power
to remedy the alleged dangers sought to be prevented by Brillante His lack of selectivity is
indicative of malice.
The goodness of the intention is not a sufficient motive to warrant the employment of illicit
means to obtain
The statements during the press conference and in the open letter do not qualify as
privileged communication.
Since the open letter and the statements uttered by Brillante during the press conference
are defamatory and do not qualify as conditionally privileged communication, malice is
presumed and need not be proven separately from the existence of the defamatory
statement.
All the elements of libel are present in the case against Brillante.
38
A single defamatory statement, if published several times, gives rise to as many
offenses as there are publications. This is the "multiple publication rule" which is
followed in our jurisdiction. Each and every publication of the same libel constitutes a
distinct offense.
Case Digest No. 85_DE LA ROSA-REID
Jose Alemania Buatis Jr vs. People of the Philippines and Atty. Jose Pieraz
Facts: On 18 August 1995, the wife of Respondent Atty. Jose J. Pieraz retrieved a letter, not
contained in an envelope, from their mailbox addressed to her husband. The letter
contained malicious and insulting words. The letter was signed by herein Petitioner Jose
Buatis, Jr., attorney-in-fact of one Mrs. Teresita Quingco. Not personally knowing who the
sender was, nonetheless, Respondent replied to the letter. Reacting to the insulting words
used by Petitioner, Respondent filed a complaint for libel against Buatis, Jr. On the other
hand, Petitioner’s defense was denial.Petitioner invokes that such letter was for his client’s
cause, Mrs. Quingco, president of an association subjected to demolition, and as the latter’s
counsel, it is his responsibility to defend his client. After trial on the merits, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) found Petitioner guilty of the crime of libel invoking that calling the
lawyer with words ―inutil”, stupid and capable only of using English carabao was
prejudicial to the good name of Respondent and an affront to his good standing as a lawyer.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) but the latter affirmed the RTC’s decision
in its entirety. The CA found Petitioner’s words used in the letter to be defamatory as they
impeached the good reputation of Respondent as a lawyer. The CA denied Petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration as well. Hence, this present case.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the letter is libelous?
2. Whether or not the appellate court erred in not finding the alleged libelous letter
as one of those falling under the purview of privilege communication?
RULING: The Court held YES. For an imputation to be libelous, the imputation must be: (1)
defamatory; (2) malicious; (3) be given publicity; and, (4) victim must be identified. All
requisites are present since the letter was not contained in an envelope and furnished not
only to Respondent, hence, there was a publication. Second, the victim was identifiable
since it is addressed specifically to Respondent.
The issue is more on whether the letter was defamatory and malicious as to
comply with all the requisites of libel. The court held that it was because the
words used in the said letter casted aspersion on the character, integrity and
reputation of Respondent as a lawyer. No evidence need not be adduced to prove
it. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, there is no need to prove if it is
malicious for the law presumes that it is with malice. The letter of Petitioner
showed that he malevolently castigated Respondent for writing such a demand
letter to his client. There was nothing in the letter that showed the good intention
and justifiable motive of Respondent for the benefit of his client.
Qualified privileged communication
The Court held No. the court said that in order for a statement to fall within the
purview of a qualified privileged communication, the following requisites must concur:
1. The person made such communication had a legal, moral or social duty to
make the same or had an interest to protect;
2. The communication is addressed to an officer or superior having some
interest and have the power to protect such; and,
3. Statements therein are made in good faith and without malice.
The letter does not contain any explanation concerning the status of petitioner’s
client but only mere insulting words which are totally irrelevant to his defense.
The letter was crafted in an injurious way than what is necessary in answering a
demand letter which exposed Respondent to public ridicule hence negating good
faith and showing malicious intent on the part of Petitioner. Since the letter is
not a privileged communication, malice is presumed, thus a libelous one under
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.
Case Digest No. 86_MENDOZA
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary
release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict
39
and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner
moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal,
finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. The petitioner elevated the matter to the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from
the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his
arraignment as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC
proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail
and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s
motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his
arrest.Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion
remained unresolved.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's conviction in the first offense charged, bars his
prosecution in the second offense charged.
HELD:
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi offense. Reckless imprudence is a Single Crime, its
consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the penalty. The
two charges against the petitioner, arising from the same facts were prosecuted under the
same provision of the RPC, as amended, namely Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi
offenses. The proposition (inferred from Art 3 of the RPC) that "reckless imprudence" is
not a crime in itself but simple a way of committing it. The Court thru Justice JB Reyes:
Reason and precedent both coincide in that ones convicted or acquitted to a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determined the penalty, it does
not qualify the substance of an offense.
Tests to determine double jeopardy:
1. Whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
2.Whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say
whether the facts alleged in the first if proven, would have been sufficient to support the
second charge and vice versa; or whether the crime is an ingredient of the other
Case Digest No.87_CORPUZ
REYNALDO S. MARIANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 178145 July 7, 2014
FACTS:
Prosecution’s Version
At about 6:30pm of September 12, 1999, the Toyota pick-up, driven by accused
Reynaldo Mariano overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon (with his family as passengers)
and almost bumped it. Ferdinand got mad, overtook the pick-up and blocked its path.
Reynaldo Mariano stopped the pick-up behind the jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his jeep,
approached Reynaldo and claimed that he and Reynaldo had an altercation. Luis de Leon,
uncle of Ferdinand intervened and told Ferdinand and Reynaldo "magpasensiyahan na
lamang kayo at pagpasensiyahan mo si Ferdinand." Ferdinand and Reynaldo heeded the
advice of Luis and they went their separate ways.
Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray, Ferdinand decided to drop by
his mother’s house in San Roque, Angat to pick up some items. He parked his jeep in front
of the house of his mother and alighted therefrom. However, he was bumped by a moving
vehicle, thrown four (4) meters away and lost consciousness. Urbanita, wife of Ferdinand
identified the fast moving vehicle that bumped Ferdinand as the same red Toyota pick-up
driven by Reynaldo.
Ferdinand was brought to the Sto. Niño Hospital in Bustos, Bulacan, where he
stayed for two and a half days and was transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center in Quezon
City. Ferdinand suffered multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the inferior part of the right
orbital wall and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma, as evidenced by
the certification issued by Dr. Hernando L. Cruz, Jr. of St. Luke’s Medical Center. Urbanita,
received the amount of P50,000.00 from Reynaldo Mariano by way of financial assistance,
as evidenced by a receipt dated September 15, 1999.
Defense’s Version
On the other hand, Reynaldo and his wife, Rebecca, tried to show that the jeep of
Ferdinand stopped on the road in front of the house of the latter’s mother about five (5) to
six (6) meters away from their pick-up. Reynaldo stopped the pick-up as he saw an
oncoming vehicle, which he allowed to pass. Thereafter, Reynaldo made a signal and
overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand suddenly alighted from his jeep, lost
his balance and was sideswiped by the overtaking pick-up. Reynaldo did not stop his pick-
up and he proceeded on his way for fear that the bystanders might harm him and his
companions. After bringing his companions to their house in Marungko, Angat, Bulacan,
Reynaldo proceeded to Camp Alejo S. Santos in Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and report
the incident.
40
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan charged the petitioner with frustrated
murder for hitting and bumping Ferdinand de Leon while overtaking the latter's jeep in
the information filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), viz:
That on or about the 12th day of September, 1999, in the municipality of Angat, Province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of the
motor vehicle he was then driving, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of
superior strength, hit, bump and run over with the said motor vehicle one Ferdinand de
Leon, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which ordinarily would have
caused the death of the said Ferdinand de Leon, thus performing all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said Ferdinand de Leon. Contrary to law.
RTC convicted the petitioner of frustrated homicide.
CA modied the felony committed by the petitioner from frustrated homicide to reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.
In this appeal, the petitioner argues that his guilt for any crime was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt, and claims that Ferdinand’s injuries were the result of a mere
accident. He insists that he lacked criminal intent; that he was not negligent in driving his
pick-up truck; and that the CA should have appreciated voluntary surrender as a
mitigating circumstance in his favor
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries.
HELD: YES. Petitioner is guilty of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries.
The following findings by the CA compel us to affirm, to wit:
Reynaldo tried to show that he stopped his pick-up five (5) to six (6) meters behind the
jeep of Ferdinand, as he allowed an oncoming vehicle to pass. Thereafter, he overtook the
jeep of Ferdinand. However, the fact that Ferdinand’s body was thrown four (4) meters
away from his jeep showed that Reynaldo was driving his pick-up at a fast speed when he
overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. It is worthy to note that Reynaldo admitted that he has
known Ferdinand and the latter’s family since 1980 because they have a store where he
used to buy things. As aptly observed by the OSG, Reynaldo should have foreseen the
possibilitythat Ferdinand would alight from his jeep and go inside the house of his mother
where the store is also located.
xxxx
As aptly observed by the court a quo, only a vehicle that is moving beyond the normal rate
of speed and within the control of the driver’s hands could have caused Ferdinand’s
injuries. The very fact of speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a motorist must
exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the
conditions encountered, which will enable him or her to keep the vehicle under control
and avoid injury to others using the highway. As held in People v. Garcia:
"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to
be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring
punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which
no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own
person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all
manner of danger and injury."
Thus, had Reynaldo not driven his pick-up at a fast speed in overtaking the jeep of
Ferdinand, he could have easily stopped his pick-up or swerved farther to the left side of
the road, as there was no oncoming vehicle, when he saw that Ferdinand alighted from his
jeep and lost his balance, in order to avoid hitting the latter or, at least, minimizing his
injuries.
The findings by the CA are controlling on the Court. Indeed, the findings of both lower
courts on the circumstances that had led to the injuries of Ferdinand fully converged
except for the RTC’s conclusion that malicious intent had attended the commission of the
offense. Such findings cannot be disturbed by the Court in this appellate review, for it is a
well-settled rule that the findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
binding and conclusive upon the Court.
"Reckless imprudence consists involuntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place." To constitute the offense of reckless
driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of the
motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. The
Prosecution must further show the direct causal connection between the negligence and
the injuries or damages complained of. In Manzanares v. People, the petitioner was found
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and serious physical injuries
because of the finding that he had driven the Isuzu truck very fast before it smashed into
a jeepney. In Pangonorom v. People, a public utility driver driving his vehicle very fast was
held criminally negligent because he had not slowed down to avoid hitting a swerving car.
In the absence of any cogent reasons, therefore, the Court bows to the CA’s observations
that the petitioner had driven his pick-up truck at a fast speed in order to overtake the jeep
of Ferdinand, and in so attempting to overtake unavoidably hit Ferdinand, causing the
latter’s injuries.
Contrary to the petitioner’s insistence, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal Code,
41
expressly states that in the imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code.
CRIMCASE 88_ACOSTA
G.R. No. 195671, January 21, 2015
ROGELIO J. GONZAGA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts: Dionesio Sr. and his children were ascending the curving road going to Bocboc,
Bukindnon on their proper lane on the right side of the road when a Toyota Land Cruiser
driven by Rogelio was swiftly descending the same lane from the opposite direction.
Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his motorcycle to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its
proper lane but the Land Cruiser remained. In order to avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr.tried
to swerve to the left, but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards the same direction
and collided head-on with the motorcycle causing Dionesio’s death and his children’s
injury.
knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would
disclose the danger to any reasonable person.
Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the
consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of
mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law, without
regard to whether the private offended party may himself be considered likewise at
fault. Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of the road was the proximate
cause of the collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and serious physical injuries
to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry. Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a curve
sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the Inguitos were bound and descending
towards the opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed, the very fact of speeding,
under such circumstances, is indicative of imprudent behavior.
Consequently, the Court finds that Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at
a fast speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching the curve where the incident
happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, as well as civilly accountable for the
material damages resulting therefrom.

The RTC found Rogelio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property punishable under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC.

The CA reinstated the RTC’s July 31, 2006 Decision, thereby imposing on Rogelio the
original indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as
maximum, and the same civil liabilities, 39 hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Rogelio is guilty of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property.

Ruling:

YES. Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason
of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must
be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the
injuries or damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act
must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle – a
willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. Willful, wanton or reckless
disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been
held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which injures another, either with
42