MONTAÑO v VERCELES G.R. No. 168583 July 26, 2010   Atty.

Atty. Montaño filed his Comment with Motion to Dismiss on the

grounds that the Regional Director of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) and not the BLR has jurisdiction over
FACTS:   the case.  

The Federation/Union's Constitution and By‐Laws govern the
relationship between and among its members. They are akin to
ordinary contracts in that their provisions have obligatory force
upon the federation/ union and its member. What has been
expressly stipulated therein shall be strictly binding on both.   action as president of an affiliate union of FFW, the BLR ruled
Atty. Montaño worked as legal assistant of FFW Legal Center on
October 1, 1994. Subsequently, he joined the union of rank‐and‐
file employees, the FFW Staff Association, and eventually
became the employees' union president in July 1997. In
November 1998, he was likewise designated officer‐in‐charge of
FFW Legal Center.   According to the CA, since Atty. Montaño, as legal assistant
During the 21st National Convention and Election of National
Officers of FFW, Atty. Montaño was nominated and elected for
the position of National Vice‐President despite the finding of FFW
COMELEC that Atty. Montaño is not qualified to run for the
position because Section 76 of Article XIX of the FFW
Constitution and By‐Laws prohibits federation employees from
sitting in its Governing Board and strong opposition and protest
of respondent Atty. Ernesto C. Verceles (Atty. Verceles), a
delegate to the convention and president of University of the
East Employees' Association (UEEA‐FFW) which is an affiliate
union of FFW.   Section 226 of the Labor Code28 clearly provides that the BLR
On May 28, 2001, through a letter to the Chairman of FFW
COMELEC, Atty. Verceles reiterated his protest over Atty.
Montaño's candidacy which he manifested during the plenary
session before the holding of the election in the Convention. On
June 18, 2001, Atty. Verceles sent a follow‐up letter to the
President of FFW requesting for immediate action on his protest.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: * FFW COMELEC: Montano not
qualified. * Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR): Montano qualified.
it upheld its jurisdiction over the intra‐union dispute case and
affirmed, as well, Atty. Verceles' legal personality to institute the
that there were no grounds to hold Atty. Montaño unqualified to
run for National Vice‐President of FFW. * BLR (motion for
reconsideration): denied * CA: reversed BLR, montano not
qualified. Atty. Montaño did not possess the qualification
requirement under paragraph (d) of Section 26 that candidates
must be an officer or member of a legitimate labor organization.
employed by FFW, is considered as confidential employee,
consequently, he is ineligible to join FFW Staff Association, the
rank‐and‐file union of FFW. * CA (motion for reconsideration):
denied.  
ISSUES & RULING: 1. WON the CA was correct in upholding the
jurisdiction of the BLR;  
YES. The BLR has jurisdiction over intra‐union disputes involving
a federation.  
and the Regional Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction
over inter‐union and intra‐union disputes. Such disputes include
the conduct or nullification of election of union and workers'
association officers. There is, thus, no doubt as to the BLR's
jurisdiction over the instant dispute involving member‐unions of
a federation arising from disagreement over the provisions of
the federation's constitution and by‐laws.  

On July 13, 2001, Atty. Verceles, as President of UEEA‐FFW and Rule XVI lays down the decentralized intra‐union dispute
officer of the Governing Board of FFW, filed before the BLR a settlement mechanism. Section 1 states that any complaint in
petition13 for the nullification of the election of Atty. Montaño as this regard ‘shall be filed in the Regional Office where the union
FFW National Vice‐ President.   is domiciled.' The concept of domicile in labor relations
regulation is equivalent to the place where the union seeks to
operate or has established a geographical presence for purposes
of collective bargaining or for dealing with employers concerning 4. WON the CA was correct in not dismissing the case for being
terms and conditions of employment.   moot in view of the appointment of Atty. Verceles as NLRC
Commissioner;  
The matter of venue becomes problematic when the intra‐union
dispute involves a federation, because the geographical The CA is correct. There is necessity to resolve the case despite
presence of a federation may encompass more than one the issues having become moot. As manifested by Atty.
administrative region. Pursuant to its authority under Article Verceles, Atty. Montaño ran and won as FFW National President
226, this Bureau exercises original jurisdiction over intra‐union after his challenged term as FFW National Vice‐President had
disputes involving federations. It is well‐settled that FFW, having expired. It must be stated at this juncture that the legitimacy of
local unions all over the country, operates in more than one Atty. Montaño's leadership as National President is beyond our
administrative region. Therefore, this Bureau maintains original jurisdiction and is not in issue in the instant case. The only issue
and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from any for our resolution is petitioner's qualification to run as FFW
violation of or disagreement over any provision of its National Vice‐President during the May 26‐ 27, 2001 elections.
constitution and by‐laws.  We find it necessary and imperative to resolve this issue not
only to prevent further repetition but also to clear any doubtful
2. WON the CA was correct in not declaring as premature the interpretation and application of the provisions of FFW
petition in view of the pending protest before FFW COMELEC;   Constitution & By‐laws in order to ensure credible future
elections in the interest and welfare of affiliate unions of FFW.  
YES. The petition to annul Atty. Montaño's election as VP was
not prematurely filed.   5. WON Montano is qualified to run as National Vice ‐ President  

It is true that under the Implementing Rules, redress must first NO, the decision of FFW COMELEC is final and should have been
be sought within the organization itself in accordance with its given credence.  
constitution and by‐laws. However, this requirement is not
absolute but yields to exception under varying circumstances. FFW COMELEC, undeniably, has sufficient authority to adopt its
the FFW COMELEC failed to timely act thereon. Thus, Atty. own interpretation of the explicit provisions of the federation's
Verceles had no other recourse but to take the next available constitution and by‐laws and unless it is shown to have
remedy to protect the interest of the union he represents as well committed grave abuse of discretion, its decision and ruling will
as the whole federation, especially so that Atty. Montaño, not be interfered with. The FFW Constitution and By‐laws are
immediately after being proclaimed, already assumed and clear that no member of the Governing Board shall at the same
started to perform the duties of the position. Consequently, time perform functions of the rank‐and‐file staff. The BLR erred
Atty. Verceles properly sought redress from the BLR so that the in disregarding this clear provision. The FFW COMELEC's ruling
right to due process will not be violated.   which considered Atty. Montaño's candidacy in violation of the
FFW Constitution is therefore correct.  
3. WON the CA was correct in not finding that the petition
violated the rule on non‐forum shopping;   6. WON the CA was correct in granting the petition to annul
Montano's election as FFW National Vice‐ President on the
Montano is estopped from raising this issue since he only raised ground that FFW Staff Association is not a legitimate labor
this during this motion for reconsideration with the CA. The organization.  
allegation regarding certification against forum shopping was
belatedly raised. It is settled that new issues cannot be raised NO. the CA's declaration of the illegitimate status of FFW Staff
for the first time on appeal or on motion for reconsideration.   Association is proscribed by law, owing to the preclusion of
collateral attack.  
ST MARY’S ACADEMY OF DIPOLOG CITY v. affirms the decision of the Labor Arbiters Decision, it held
TERESITA PALACIO, MARIGEN CALIBOD, that the grounds relied upon by petitioner to dismiss
LEVIE LAQUIO, ELAINE MARIE SANTANDER, respondents are not among those enumerated by the
ELIZA SAILE, AND MA. DOLORES Labor Code and that respondents are regular employees,
thus cannot be removed unless for cause.
MONTEDRAMOS
G.R. No. 164913, September 8, 2010
The CA agreed with the findings of both the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC. As regards Padilla, Marlynn Palacio,
Andalahao and Decipulo, the CA found them to be mere
FACTS:
probationary, and not regular, employees. Their
employment contracts merely expired and since the
Petitioner hired respondents Calibod, Laquio, Santander,
petitioner did not wish to renew their contracts, then
Saile and Montederamos, as classroom teachers, and
there is no illegal dismissal to speak of.
respondent Palacio, as guidance counselor. However,
petitioner informed them that their application for school
ISSUE: Is the dismissal of the respondents
year 2000-2001 could not be accepted because they failed
premature since it was effected prior to the deadline set
to pass the Licensure Examination for Teachers (LET) in
by the PRC to acquire their license?
accordance to DECS Memorandum No. 10, S. 1998
pursuant to RA 7836.
HELD:
YES. The dismissal of the respondents was
Respondents filed a complaint contesting their
premature since it was effected prior to the deadline
termination as highly irregular and premature. They
set by the PRC to acquire their license.
argued that their security of tenure could not simple be
trampled upon for their failure to register with the
Pursuant to RA 7836, the PRC formulated certain rules
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) or to pass the
and regulations relative to the registration of teachers
LET. Further, they opined that their outright dismissal
and their continued practice of the teaching profession.
was illegal because some of them possess civil service
The law has provided a specific timeframe within which
eligibilities and special permits to teach.
respondents could comply, petitioner has no right to deny
them of this privilege accorded to them by law. The
While the DECS Memorandum fixed the deadline for
Memorandum further stated that a Memorandum of
teachers to register on September 19, 2000, petitioner
Agreement (MOA) was subsequently entered into by the
claimed that it decided to terminate their services as early
PRC, Civil Service Commission (CSC) and DECS to further
as March 31, 2000 because it would be prejudicial to the
allow those teachers who failed to register by September
school if their service will be terminated in the middle of
19, 1997 to continue their service and register. In so far
school year.
as Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander and Montederamos
are concerned, being dismissed on March 2000 was
The Labor Arbiter adjudged petitioner guilty of illegal
premature.  However, Saile is not qualified to take the
dismissal. Thus, petitioner was ordered to reinstate them
LET, therefore, no prematurity is to speak of on her end.
separation pay at the rate of ½ month wage for every year
of service, plus limited backwages covering the period
Petitioner's intention and desire not to put the students'
from March 31, 2000 to September 30, 2000. The NLRC
education and school operation in jeopardy is neither a
decisive consideration for respondents' termination prior
to the deadline set by law. Again, by setting a deadline for
registration as professional teachers, the law has allowed
incumbent teachers to practice their teaching profession
until September 19, 2000, despite being unregistered and
unlicensed.
It is incumbent upon this Court to afford full protection to
labor. Thus, while the Court take cognizance of the
employer's right to protect its interest, the same should
be exercised in a manner which does not infringe on the
workers' right to security of tenure.
The Court will not hesitate to defend the workers'
constitutional right to security of tenure. After all, the
interest of the workers is paramount as they are regarded
with compassion under the policy of social justice.
Lolita Lopez et.,al v. Quezon City Sports Club, Inc. (QCSC)
G.R. No. 164032, January 19, 2009
FACTS :
The Kasapiang Manggatgawa sa Quezon City Sports Club
(Union) filed a compliant for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP)
against QCSC. On July 1997, the union wrote to the
management for the release of the members’ salaries and for
the implementation of wage increase mandated by CBA.
When the letter was unanswered, the union filed a notice of
strike. QCSC placed some of its employees under lay-off
status due to redundancy and likewise filed a petition for
cancellation of registration against union. QCSC contended
that the union was not a legitimate labor union as it had a
pending complaint for cancellation of certificate of
registration, that there was no valid CBA and staged an illegal
strike. The Labor Arbiter (LA) decides finding QCSC guilty of
ULP. In turn, the union filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal
for non-perfection due to failure to post the appeal bond. The
QCSC filed a Supplement to its appeal. The NLRC in its
decision, granted the appeal and reversed the LA decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the simultaneous filing of the matter to reduce the
appeal bond and posting of the reduced amount of bond
within the reglementary period for appeal constitute
substantial compliance with Article 223 of the Labor Code.
HELD:
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is not a natural
right or a part of due process, it is merely a statue of privilege
and may be exercise only if in manner and in accordance with
the provisions of law. The party when seeks to avail himself of
the same must comply with the requirements of the rules.
Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
In case a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond raised by a reputable bonding company
and admitted by the Commission in the amount equivalent to
the monetary award in the judgment applied for.
Appeals involving monetary awards are perfected only upon
compliance with the following mandatory requisites, namely:
(1) payment of the appeal fees; (2) filing of the memorandum
of appeal ;and (3) payment of the required cash or surety
bond. Thus, the posting of the bond is indispensable to the
perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards
from the decision of the labor arbiter.
Article 223 of the Labor Code partly provides that:
Art. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten
(10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such
appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
A. If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the
Labor Arbiter;
b. If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion,
including graft and corruption;
c. If made purely on questions of law; andcralawlibrary
d. If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave
or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
Likewise, Sections 4(a) and 6 of Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, as amended, provide:
SECTION 4. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal.—(a) The Appeal shall be filed
within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be
verified by appellant himself in accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court, with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a
cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied
by a memorandum of appeal in three (3) legibly typewritten copies which shall
state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief
prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received the
appealed decision, resolution or order and a certificate of non-forum shopping
with proof of service on the other party of such appeal. A mere notice of appeal
without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the
running of the period of perfecting an appeal.
SECTION 6. Bond.—In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional
Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The appeal bond shall
either be in cash or surety in an amount equivalent to the monetary award,
exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees.
xxx
No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds
and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the
monetary award.
The filing of the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in
the preceding paragraph shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an
appeal.
The NLRC’s favorable ruling on QCSC’s motion to reduce the appeal bond should
be accorded due weight and respect absent any indication of grave error.
The second legal question deals with the validity of the NLRC decision, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We rule in favor of petitioners.
The assailed Dinopol decision involves a complaint for illegal strike filed by QCSC
on the ground of a "no-strike no lockout" provision in the CBA. The challenged
decision was rendered in accordance with law and is supported by factual
evidence on record. Indeed, the grounds for declaring the strike, as alleged by
the Union, were not substantially proven. In the notice of strike, the union did
not state in particular the acts which allegedly constitute unfair labor practice.
Moreover, by virtue of the "no-strike no lockout" provision in the CBA, the union
was prohibited from staging an economic strike, i.e., to force wage or other
concessions from the employer which he is not required by law to grant.
However, it should be noted that while the strike declared by the union was held
illegal, only the union officers were declared as having lost their employment
status. In effect, there was a ruling only with respect to some union members
while the status of all others had remained disputed.
Applying the totality of the conduct doctrine, Labor Arbiter Lustria held that
QCSC had committed unfair labor practices.
There is no conflict between the Dinopol and the Lustria decisions. While both
rulings involve the same parties and same issues, there is a distinction between
the remedies sought by the parties in these two cases. In the Dinopol decision, it
was QCSC which filed a petition to declare the illegality of the 12 August 1997
strike by the union. The consequence of the declaration of an illegal strike is
termination from employment, which the Labor Arbiter did so rule in said case.
However, not all union members were terminated. In fact, only a few union
officers were validly dismissed in accordance with Article 264 of the Labor Code.
Corollarily, the other union members who had merely participated in the strike
but had not committed any illegal acts were not dismissed from employment.
Hence, the NLRC erred in declaring the employment status of all employees as
having been lost or forfeited by virtue of the Dinopol decision.
On the other hand, the Lustria decision involved the unfair labor practices
alleged by the union with particularity. In said case, Labor Arbiter Lustria sided
with the Union and found QCSC guilty of such practices. As a consequence, the
affected employees were granted backwages and separation pay. The grant of
backwages and separation pay however was not premised on the declaration of
the illegality of the strike but on the finding that these affected employees were
constructively dismissed from work, as evidenced by the layoffs effected by the
company. As explained in the Lustria decision:
Considering that the temporary lay-off of listed employees effected by the
respondents on 16 August 1997 was without documentary evidence to
determine its validity, it is our considered view and we so hold that said
employees were constructively dismissed without just or authorized cause and
observance of due process. This opinion finds support from the hard and cold
fact of absence of prior notice, report with the regional office of the Department
of Labor and Employment having jurisdiction over the area and they remain
under lay-off status of employment. In conclusion, they are entitled to
backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement as prayed.33
Clearly, there are two separate decisions issued by two different labor arbiters
involving the same parties and interests. Considering that the remedies sought
by the parties in each case differ, these two rulings may co-exist.
Therefore, with respect to petitioners and union officers Alex J. Santiago, Ma.
Cecilia Pangan, Ronilo E. Lee, and Genaro Bando, who apparently had been
substituted by present petitioner Teresita Bando, the Dinopol decision declaring
them as having lost their employment status still stands.
To recapitulate, the NLRC erred in setting aside the Lustria decision, as well as in
deleting the award of backwages and separation pay, despite the finding that the
affected employees had been constructively dismissed.
Based on the foregoing, the Lustria decision should be upheld and therefore
reinstated except as regards the four petitioners.
G.R. No. 181516               August 19, 2009
CESARIO L. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
The instant petition stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner, Cesario L. del
Rosario, against herein respondent, Philippine Journalists, Inc. (PJI), for illegal
dismissal with money claims.
Petitioner claims that he was hired by PJI as a libel scanner in March 1997 and
was receiving the benefits and privileges of a regular managerial employee of
the newspaper and magazine company. On April 6, 1999, petitioner received a
notice of termination of employment from respondent. According to petitioner,
the termination of his services was illegal for want of just or authorized cause
and for non-compliance with procedural requirements prior to his dismissal. 1
Respondent, on the other hand, averred that petitioner was hired only as a
consultant whose term of employment was deemed renewed on a month-to-
month basis, unless either party opted for its termination by a written notice of
at least five (5) days before the end of any month, based on the contract of
employment issued by the company on April 15, 2007.2
On November 5, 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision 3 in favor of
petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
respondent [PJI] of (sic) illegally dismissing complainant [del Rosario] from his
employment. As above-discussed, respondent Philippine Journalist, Inc., is
ordered to pay complainant Cesario del Rosario the following:
a) Unpaid salaries from Oct. 1998 to May 9, 1999 -- ₱300,000.00
b) Unpaid quarterly bonuses & 13th month pay 98-99
-- ₱260,000.00
c) Unused vacation and sick leave[s] for two years -- ₱40,000.00
d) Unpaid ₱10,000 monthly allowance from May 1998
up to May 9, 1999 equals 12 months x 10,000 -- ₱120,000.00
e) Unpaid 250 liters gasoline per month from May 9,
[1998]
up to May 9, 1999 equals 3,000 liters for 12
months
Computed at the price of gasoline in 1998 & 1999.
f) Salary from 9 May 1999 to 31 October 2002
for non-compliance of Procedural due process.
₱40,000 x 29 mos. = ₱1,160,000.00
g) Moral and Exemplary damages = ₱100,000.00
h) 10% for and (sic) attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.4
Respondent elevated its case to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). On January 6, 2003, it filed its memorandum of appeal together with
the appeal bond issued by Philippine Pryce Assurance Corporation (PPAC). 5
On December 15, 2003, the NLRC issued a resolution 6 dismissing the appeal for
failure to perfect the same due to the posting of the appeal bond from a bonding
company not duly accredited by the Court. The NLRC stated that PPAC was not
authorized by the Supreme Court to transact business with courts anywhere in
the Philippines since December 2, 2002, per Certification of the Office of the
Court Administrator.7
On January 23, 2004, respondent duly filed a motion for reconsideration and a
supplemental motion for reconsideration, alleging that it had no knowledge that
PPAC was no longer authorized to transact business with the courts.1avvphi1
Acting on the motion and in a bid of liberality, the NLRC issued a resolution 8 on
February 23, 2004, directing respondent to post a new bond, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents [PJI] are now directed to post a
new bond accompanied by all requisites as provided in Sec. 6, Rule VI of the
New Rules of Procedure of the Commission in lieu of bond posted herein within
an unextendible period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Otherwise the
appeal shall be dismissed.
No further motions of this nature shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.9
Respondent failed to comply. Thus, on March 31, 2005, the NLRC issued a
resolution10 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court before the Court of Appeals (CA). On November 29, 2007, the CA
rendered the assailed decision,11 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Resolutions of the public
respondent are SET ASIDE.
Public Respondent NLRC is directed to admit the appeal and decide the same on
the merits. Petitioner [PJI] is directed to replace the surety bond it posted with a
new one to be obtained from a bonding company duly accredited by the
Supreme Court within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.12
The CA held that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
PJI’s appeal based on an erroneous finding that the surety bond respondent
posted was void. The CA ratiocinated that at the time the subject bond was
issued, PPAC was still authorized to issue the same. The CA found that the
Supreme Court placed PPAC on a blacklist only on October 9, 2003, while the
Chairperson of the NLRC cancelled PPAC’s accreditation on November 3, 2003.
When PJI obtained the surety bond on January 2, 2003, PPAC was still existing
and duly accredited by the Court. Thus, there was no legal basis to dismiss PJI’s
appeal because it had actually posted a valid bond.13
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 24, 2008, the CA issued
a Resolution14 denying the same for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presented the following issues for resolution of the Court:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW AND
WENT AGAINST APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE:
(A) IN SETTING ASIDE THE NLRC RESOLUTIONS DISMISSING RESPONDENT
PJI’S DEFECTIVE APPEAL FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH, AMONG OTHERS, THE
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD TO APPEAL AND THE REQUISITE OF POSTING AN
APPEAL BOND;
(B) IN ORDERING THE NLRC TO ADMIT RESPONDENT PJI’S DEFECTIVE APPEAL
AND TO DECIDE THE APPEAL ON THE MERITS;
(C) IN DIRECTING RESPONDENT PJI TO REPLACE WITHIN FIVE (5) DAYS FROM
NOTICE THE DEFECTIVE SURETY BOND IT POSTED AS ITS APPEAL BOND WITH
A NEW BOND TO BE OBTAINED FROM A BONDING COMPANY DULY ACCREDITED
BY THE SUPREME COURT; AND
(D) IN REMANDING THE CASE TO THE NLRC FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS,
INSTEAD OF AFFIRMING THE NLRC RESOLUTIONS DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF
RESPONDENT PJI ON LEGAL AND JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS.15
The issues need not be belabored. We find no reversible error committed by the
CA in issuing the assailed decision and resolution. Based on substantial evidence
on record, the CA found that at the time the bond was issued by PPAC, it was
still authorized to issue bonds.16
Article 223 of the Labor Code mandates that in cases of judgment involving a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in
the judgment appealed from. Appurtenant thereto, Section 6, Rule VI of the New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC17 provides:
SECTION 6. BOND. - In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional
Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The appeal bond shall
either be in cash or surety in an amount equivalent to the monetary award,
exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees.
In case of surety bond, the same shall be issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court, and shall be
accompanied by:
(a) a joint declaration under oath by the employer, his counsel, and the bonding
company, attesting that the bond posted is genuine, and shall be in effect until
final disposition of the case.
(b) a copy of the indemnity agreement between the employer-appellant and
bonding company; and
(c) a copy of security deposit or collateral securing the bond.
A certified true copy of the bond shall be furnished by the appellant to the
appellee who shall verify the regularity and genuineness thereof and
immediately report to the Commission any irregularity.
Upon verification by the Commission that the bond is irregular or not genuine,
the Commission shall cause the immediate dismissal of the appeal.
No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds
and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the
monetary award.
The filing of the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in
the preceding paragraph shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an
appeal.
The filing of a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal is mandatory
and jurisdictional.18 The requirement that employers post a cash or surety bond
to perfect their appeal is apparently intended to assure workers that if they
prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the
dismissal of the former’s appeal. It was intended to discourage employers from
using an appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligations to satisfy their
employees' just and lawful claims.19
At the time of the filing of the surety bond by PJI on January 2, 2003, PPAC was
still an accredited bonding company. Thus, it was but proper to honor the appeal
bond issued by a bonding company duly accredited by this Court at the time of
its issuance. The subsequent revocation of the authority of a bonding company
should not prejudice parties who relied on its authority. The revocation of
authority of a bonding company is prospective in application.
Still, the Court takes due notice of the opportunity given to PJI to post a new
bond issued by an accredited bonding company in the NLRC resolution dated
February 23, 2004. Yet, PJI insisted on the validity of the bond it had filed
despite the fact the PPAC was no longer accredited to act as a surety. This
notwithstanding, guided by the principle that technical rules of procedure should
not hamper the quest for justice and truth, this Court deems it prudent that the
case be reviewed and decided on the merits, in view of the question on the
employer-employee relationship of the parties and its resultant legal
consequences. But, so as not to prejudice the rights of petitioner in this case,
the Court reiterates the CA directive for PJI to post a new bond issued by an
accredited bonding company.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
November 29, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 24, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89513 are hereby AFFIRMED.
The National Labor Relations Commission is DIRECTED to GIVE DUE COURSE to
the appeal and decide the case on the merits with dispatch, upon the filing by
respondent, within ten (10) days from finality of this decision, of a bond issued
by an accredited bonding company.
SO ORDERED.