43 UST Faculty Union vs.
Bitonio disqualified from becoming union members, since they represented
G.R. No. 131235. November 16, 1999
FACTS:
Private respondent Marinio et al were duly elected officers of UST faculty. The union has
a 5-year CBA with its employer and is set to expire on May 31, 1998. On October 5, 1996
various UST club presidents requested a general faculty assembly thus union and non-
union faculty members convened. New set of officers were elected, violative of the CBL
and that the GA was held with non-union members present. Union officers were served
with a notice to vacate the union office, and CBA was ratified by an overwhelming
majority. Med-Arbiter declared the election violative of the CBL while BLR director
Bitonio upheld the decision with a ruling that the CBL which constituted the covenant
between the union and its members could not be suspended during the general assembly
of all faculty members, since it ha not been authorized by the union.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Collective Bargaining Unit of all the faculty members in that General
Faculty Assembly had the right in that General Faculty Assembly to suspend the
provisions of the CBL of the UNION regarding the elections of officers of the union?
NO
2. Whether the suspension of the provisions of the CBL of the UNION in that General
Faculty Assembly is valid pursuant to the constitutional right of the Collective
Bargaining Unit to engage in "peaceful concerted activities" for the purpose of
ousting the corrupt regime of the private respondent? NO
3. Whether the overwhelming ratification of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
executed by the petitioners in behalf of the UNION with the UST has rendered moot
and academic the issue as to the validity of the suspension of the CBL and the
elections of October 4, 1996 in the General Faculty Assembly? NO
HELD:
Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution and the Labor
Code. Corollary to this right is the prerogative not to join, affiliate with or assist a labor
union. Therefore, to become a union member, an employee must not only signify the
intent to become one, but also take some positive steps to realize that intent. The
procedure for union membership is usually embodied in the union’s CBL. An employee
who becomes a union member acquires the rights and he concomitant obligations that
go with the new status and becomes bound by the union’s rules and regulations.
1. NO. Petitioners contend that the October 4, 1996 assembly "suspended" the
union's CBL. They aver that the suspension and the election that followed were
in accordance with their "constituent and residual powers as members of the
collective bargaining unit to choose their representatives for purposes of
collective bargaining." Again they cite the numerous anomalies allegedly
committed by the respondents Marinoas UNION officers. This argument does
not persuade.
o First, the general faculty assembly was not the proper forum to
conduct the election of UNION officers. Not all who attended the
assembly were members of the union; some, apparently, were even
management.
o Second, the grievances of the petitioners could have been brought up
and resolved in accordance with the procedure laid down by the
union's CBL and by the Labor Code. They contend that their sense of
desperation and helplessness led to the October 4, 1996 election.
However, we cannot agree with the method they used to rectify years
of inaction on their part and thereby ease bottled-up frustrations, as
such method was in total disregard of the UNION's CBL and of due
process. The end never justifies the means. In both elections, there are
procedures to be followed. Thus, the October 4, 1996 election cannot
properly be called a union election, because the procedure laid down
in the USTFUs CBL for the election of officers was not followed. It
could not have been a certification election either, because
representation was not the issue, and the proper procedure for such
election was not followed. The participation of non-union members in
the election aggravated its irregularity.
2. NO. We agree with the finding of Director Bitonio and Med-Arbiter Falconitin
that the October 4, 1996 election was tainted with irregularities because of the
following reasons.
o First, the October 4, 1996 assembly was not called by the UNION. It
was merely a convocation of faculty clubs, as indicated in the
memorandum sent to all faculty members by Fr. Rodel Aligan, OP, the
secretary general of the University of Santo Tomas. It was not
convened in accordance with the provision on general membership
meetings as found in the UNION's CBL, which reads: "ARTICLE VIII-
MEETINGS OF THE UNION "Section 1. The Union shall hold regular
general membership meetings at least once every three (3) months.
Notices of the meeting shall be sent out by the Secretary-General at
least ten (10) days prior to such meetings by posting in conspicuous
places, preferably inside Company premises, said notices. The date,
time and place for the meetings shall be determined by the Board of
Officers."
o Unquestionably, the assembly was not a union meeting. It was in fact a
gathering that was called and participated in by management and
non-union members. By no legal fiat was such assembly transformed
into a union activity by the participation of some union members.
o Second, there was no commission on elections to oversee the election,
as mandated by Sections 1 and 2 of Article IX of the UNION's CBL.
o Third, the purported election was not done by secret balloting, in
violation of Section 6, Article IX of the UNION's CBL, as well as Article
241 (c) of the Labor Code.
o The foregoing infirmities considered, we cannot attribute grave abuse
of discretion to Director Bitonio's finding and conclusion. In
Rodriguez v. Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, we invalidated the
local union elections held at the wrong date without prior notice to
members and conducted without regard for duly prescribed ground
rules. We held that the proceedings were rendered void by the lack of
due process -- undue haste, lack of adequate safeguards to ensure
 integrity of the voting, and the absence of the notice of the dates of
balloting.
3. NO. The ratification of the new CBA executed between the petitioners and the
University of Santo Tomas management did not validate the void October 4,
1996 election. Ratified were the terms of the new CBA, not the issue of union
leadership -- a matter that should be decided only by union members in the
proper forum at the proper time and after observance of proper procedures.
There is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reasons,[1] and in
the present case, in the right forum by the right parties. While grievances against union
leaders constitute legitimate complaints deserving appropriate redress, action thereon
should be made in the proper forum at the proper time and after observance of proper
procedures. Similarly, the election of union officers should be conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the unions constitution and bylaws, as well as the Philippine
Constitution and the Labor Code. Specifically, while all legitimate faculty members of the
University of Santo Tomas (UST) belonging to a collective bargaining unit may take part
in a duly convened certification election, only bona fide members of the UST Faculty
Union (USTFU) may participate and vote in a legally called election for union officers.
Mob hysteria, however well-intentioned, is not a substitute for the rule of law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED.
Notes:
Union Election vs. Certification Election
 A union election is held pursuant to the unions constitution and bylaws, and the
right to vote in it is enjoyed only by union members. A union election should be
distinguished from a certification election, which is the process of determining,
through secret ballot, the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees
in the appropriate bargaining unit, for purposes of collective bargaining.
Specifically, the purpose of a certification election is to ascertain whether or not
a majority of the employees wish to be represented by a labor organization and,
in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization.
 In a certification election, all employees belonging to the appropriate
bargaining unit can vote. Therefore, a union member who likewise belongs to
the appropriate bargaining unit is entitled to vote in said election. However, the
reverse is not always true; an employee belonging to the appropriate
bargaining unit but who is not a member of the union cannot vote in the union
election, unless otherwise authorized by the constitution and bylaws of the
union. Verily, union affairs and elections cannot be decided in a non-union
activity.
44 Salunga v CIR
FACTS:
1. Since 1948, Salunga had been an employee of San Miguel Brewery (SMB).
2. SMB entered into a CBA with the National Brewery & Allied Industries Labor
Union of the Philippines (PAFLU) that contained as a condition of employment
a provision that they shall not voluntary resign from PAFLU earlier than 30
days before expiry of the CBA.
3. Salunga was a member of PAFLU. He later tendered his resignation from
PAFLU, which was accepted and transmitted to SMB, with a request for the
immediate implementation of the above-quoted provision.
4. Having been informed by SMB that his resignation from PAFLU would result in
his termination from employment, Salunga wrote PAFLU and the company,
withdrawing and revoking his resignation. PAFLU however insisted on his
separation from service. He was thus dismissed by SMB.
5. PAFLU’s Executive Board: no ground to review union’s action; discharge of
Salunga was implemented.
6. Salunga filed for unfair labor practices (ULP).
CIR: guilty of ULP. PAFLU and SMB were directed to readmit Salunga.
CIR: on MR: reversed.
ISSUE: WON PAFLU’s refusal to readmit Salunga to the union is proper.
RULING: NO
1. PAFLU had acted arbitrarily in not allowing Salunga to continue his
membership.
2. The TC found said refusal of the PAFLU officers to be due to his critical attitude
towards certain measures taken or sanctioned by them, as he had been
criticizing and objecting to what he believed were illegal or irregular
disbursements of union funds:
a. Allowing a union official to receive 6 months advanced salaries when
he went to the United States;
b. Granting the union secretary 2 months advanced salaries when
preparing for the bar examinations;
c. PAFLU’s additional monthly expense for the salary of a counsel when
their mother union is well staffed with a number of lawyers who could
attend to and handle their cases and other legal matters; and
d. Giving salary to Charles Mitschek who was dismissed by the company
but denying the same privilege to other similarly situated member-
employees.
3. Salunga was later removed by PAFLU from his position as steward without his
knowledge. Also, the power of attorney executed in his favor by coworker
Miranda for the collection of Miranda's indebtedness to him was not honored
by PAFLU.
4. PAFLU officers tried to justify themselves by characterizing said criticisms by
Salunga as acts of disloyalty to the Union, which, of course, is not true, because
the criticism assailed are explicitly recognized not only by the constitution and
bylaws of the Union as a right of its members to give their views on all
transactions made by the union, but also as a part of the freedom of speech
granted by the Philippine Constitution.
a. The officers of PAFLU have, in effect, confirmed the fact that their
refusal to allow the withdrawal of Salunga’s resignation had been due
to his aforementioned criticisms.
5. Although, generally, a state may not compel ordinary voluntary associations to
admit thereto any given individual, because membership therein may be
accorded or withheld as a matter of privilege, the rule is qualified in respect of
labor unions holding a monopoly in the supply of labor, either in a given
 locality, or as regards a particular employer with which it has a closed shop
agreement. The reason is that the closed shop and the union shop cause the
admission requirements of trade union to become affected with the public
interest. Likewise, a closed shop, a union shop, or maintenance of
membership clauses cause the administration of discipline by unions to
be affected with the public interest.
a. Consequently, it is well settled that such unions are not entitled to
arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership, and a closed-
shop provision would not justify the employer in discharging, or a
union in insisting upon the discharge of, an employee whom the union
thus refuses to admit to membership, without any reasonable ground
therefor.
b. If said unions may be compelled to admit new members, who have the
requisite qualifications, with more reason may the law and the courts
exercise the coercive power when the employee involved is a long
standing union member, who, owing to provocations of union officers,
was impelled to tender his resignation, which he forthwith withdrew
or revoked. Surely, he may, at least, invoke the rights of those who
seek admission for the first time, and cannot arbitrarily he denied
readmission.
6. SMB is not guilty of ULP. On the contrary, it did not merely show a
commendable understanding of and sympathy for his plight. It even tried to
help him, although to such extent only as was consistent with its obligation to
refrain from interfering in purely internal affairs of the Union.
45 Villar v. Inciong
G.R. No. L-50283-84 April 20, 1983.
Facts:
Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, a duly registered
labor organization which, was the existing bargaining agent of the employees in private
respondent Amigo Manufacturing, Inc. (Company).
The Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU had a CBA governing their labor
relations, which agreement was then about to expire on February 28, 1977. Within the
last 60 days of the CBA, upon written authority of at least 30% of the employees in the
company, including the petitioners, the Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR) filed a
petition for certification election with MOLE. The petition was opposed by the PAFLU
with whom the Amigo Employees Union was at that time affiliated. The same employees
who had signed the petition filed by FUR signed a joint resolution disaffiliating from
PAFLU.
Dolores Villar, representing herself to be the authorized representative of the Amigo
Employees Union, filed a petition for certification election in the Company. The Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU intervened and moved for the dismissal of the petition for
certification election filed by Villar, on the ground, among others that Villar had no legal
personality to sign the petition since she was not an officer of the union nor is there
factual or legal basis for her claim that she was the authorized representative of the local
union.
Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition filed by Villar, which dismissal is still pending appeal
before BLR. Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU called a special meeting of its general
membership. A Resolution was thereby unanimously approved which called for the
investigation by the PAFLU national president, of all of the petitioners and one Felipe
Manlapao, for continuously maligning the union spreading false propaganda that the
union officers were merely appointees of the management; and for causing divisiveness
in the union. PAFLU formed a Trial Committee to investigate the local union's charges
against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty.
PAFLU and the Company concluded a new CBA which also reincorporated the same
provisions of the existing CBA, including the union security clause. PAFLU President
rendered a decision finding the petitioners guilty of the charges. PAFLU demanded the
Company to terminate the employment of the petitioners pursuant to the security clause
of the CBA. Acting on PAFLU's demand, the Company informed PAFLU that it will first
secure the necessary clearances to terminate petitioners. PAFLU requested the Company
to put petitioners under preventive suspension pending the application for said
clearances to terminate the petitioners. The Company filed the request for clearance to
terminate the petitioners before DOLE which was granted. DOLE Secretary Inciong
denied the appeal, hence, this petition for review.
Issue: W/N DOLE Secretary erred in affirming the grant of clearance of termination of
petitioners. NO
Ruling:
It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal objection. It is implicit
in the freedom of association ordained by the Constitution. But the Court has laid down
the ruling that a closed shop is a valid form of union security, and such provision in
a CBA is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the
Constitution.
In the case at bench, the Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU entered into a
CBA with a union security clause which is a reiteration of the old CBA. The quoted
stipulation for closed-shop is clear and unequivocal. Petitioners’ theory that their
expulsion was not valid upon the grounds is untenable. PAFLU had the authority to
investigate petitioners on the charges filed by their co-employees in the local union and
after finding them guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll of membership of the
Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU is clear under the constitution of the PAFLU to which
the local union was affiliated. And pursuant to the security clause of the new CBA,
reiterating the same clause in the old CBA, PAFLU was justified in applying said security
clause.
Recognized and salutary is the principle that when a labor union affiliates with a mother
union, it becomes bound by the laws and regulations of the parent organization. It is
undisputable that oppositors were members of the Amigo Employees Union at the time
that said union affiliated with PAFLU; hence, oppositors are bound by the laws and
regulations of PAFLU.
Inherent in every labor union, or any organization for that matter, is the right of self-
preservation. When members of a labor union seek the disintegration and destruction of
the very union to which they belong; they thereby forfeit their rights to remain as
members of the union which they seek to destroy. Prudence and equity, as well as the
dictates of law and justice, therefore, compelling mandate the adoption by the labor
union of such corrective and remedial measures, in keeping with its laws and
regulations, for its preservation and continued existence; lest by its folly and inaction, the
labor union crumble and fall.
46 Bugay vs. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company
No. L-13093. February 28, 1962.
TOPIC: Admission and Discipline of Members; Due Process
Author: Andre Mina
FACTS:
1. Paulino Bugay is a former auditor of the Kapisanan union. He was at the same time
payroll clerk of the Manila Railroad Company. Sometime in March, 1953, he was
requested by the secretary-treasurer of the company to deliver certain documents which
were in his possession belonging to the union and in compliance therewith he delivered
them without consulting the officers of the union. Making use of these documents, the
management of the company filed with the City Fiscal of Manila against Vicente Olazo,
president of the union, a charge for falsification of commercial document. The City fiscal,
after proper investigation, dismissed the charge.
2. Subsequently, charges for disloyalty and conduct unbecoming a union member were
filed against Bugay, and after investigation, he was expelled from the union. As a result,
he filed a charge for ULP against the union before the CIR which, after due hearing,
rendered decision holding his expulsion was illegal, not observing due process, it
appearing that the same has not been approved by the majority of the chapters of the
union as required by its constitution and by-laws. Hence, the court ordered the
reinstatement of appellant as union member and the restoration to him of all his rights
and privileges. This decision was affirmed by the SC.
3. The CIR found that Bugay was not given due process:
FIRST, Bugay was not present during the investigation. He was not given notice because
he was in Lucena, Quezon. The investigation continued without him. All these were
without explanation. He was not given a chance to defend himself before the
investigation committee;
SECOND, the claim that majority of the members of union voted in favor of Bugay’s
expulsion from the union is not supported by evidence. Record even shows that the votes
were not validly cast. Only 2 chapters acted within 10 days (the period stated in their
constitution and by-laws in which they have to cast their votes on WON a member will be
accepted or terminated after they received a resolution for such) after receiving a
resolution terminating Bugay.
4. In this case, using the previous case affirmed by the SC as basis, Bugay filed an action
for moral damages arising out of an unfair labor practice allegedly committed by said
union. He claims that he has suffered moral damages because of the mental anguish,
anxiety, social humiliation and besmirched reputation he has been subjected among the
thousands of employees of the Manila Railroad Company.
5. The union contends that the CIR and SC decisions do not contain any intimation nor
statement to the effect that the charges filed against him which resulted in his separation
from the union were "trumped up" or fabricated but were solely based on procedural
defects in the matter of his expulsion, he cannot ask moral damages inasmuch as there is
no showing that to effect his expulsion the officers of the union have acted in bad faith.
As a matter of fact, he did not lose his employment as payroll clerk in the company as a
result of his expulsion, nor did he suffer any change in his status as a consequence
thereof. In effect, he was not awarded any damages by the industrial court. Further, the
contention was that he should have filed his claim before the CIR.
ISSUE: WON he is entitled for moral damages, as a result of the violation of his right to
due process committed by the union
HELD: YES
RATIO:
His claim for moral damages finds support in the Civil Code. Thus, Article 2217 provides:
"ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission."
The fact remains that the two courts have found that his expulsion was illegal because of
the irregularities committed in his investigation. In effect, it was found that not only has
he not been given an opportunity to defend himself but his expulsion was not submitted
to the different chapters of the union as required by its constitution and by-laws. The
result was that because of his expulsion he was subjected to humiliation and mental
anguish with the consequent loss of his good name and reputation. This is especially so
considering that the members of the union from which he was expelled amounted to
around 20,000 more or less.
With regard to the contention that this claim for moral damages should have been
included in his charge for ULP filed against the union with the CIR, suffice it to state that
the same does not come within the jurisdiction of that court. This is a matter that has to
be looked into by the regular courts.
47 TANCINCO v. CALLEJA
G.R. No. 78131 January 20, 1988
Facts:
1. The private respondents in this case are the prime organizers of ITM-MEA (Imperial
Textile Mills, Inc. Monthly Employees Association).
2. While preparing for their petition for direct certification of the Union as the sole &
exclusive bargaining agent of ITM, the union’s Vice President, Carlos Dalmacio was
promoted as a Department Head, thereby disqualifying him from union
membership.
3. This incident led to two strikes which were eventually settled through an agreement
between the management, Lacanilao group and the Tancinco group.
a. The first strike was headed by the Lacanilao group, who are also the
respondents in the case at bar. Their strike was staged outside company
premises.
b. A second strike was led by the petitioners and happened inside the
company premises.
4. The Agreement stated that: (1) That all monthly union employees shall be under
ITM-MEA, to be affiliated with ANGLO; (2) That the management recognizes ANGLO
as sole & exclusive bargaining agent of monthly-paid employees; (3) That the
schedule of election of union officers (date of election, last day of filing of candidacy,
& final pre-election conference to finalize list of voters)
5. Pursuant to the Agreement, a pre-election conference was held but the parties failed
to agree on the list of voters.
6. Also during a pre-election conference, Cornelio Sy made a unilateral ruling
excluding 56 employees. Such employees were grouped and the following are the
reasons for their exclusion:
a. The Manila Employees – they are personal employees of Mr. Lee
b. Iglesia Ni Kristo – that allowing them to vote will be anomalous since it is
their policy not to participate in any form of union activities;
c. The non-time card employees – that they are managerial employees;
d. Employees of the cooperative – they are non-ITM employees
7. Such ruling was protested to the MOLE, but no action was taken.
8. When the election of officers was conducted, the 56 employees participated but
their votes were segregated and not counted. Lacanilao’s group was then
proclaimed the winner.
9. Petitioners then filed a formal protest with the Ministry of Labor claiming that the
determination of the qualification of the 56 votes is beyond the competence of
ANGLO.
10. Respondents counter-argued that the definition of union’s membership is solely
within their jurisdiction.
11. Med-Arbiter issued an order directing the counting of the 56 votes.
12. On appeal to BLR:
a. ruled that the exclusion of 56 employees is arbitrary.
b. set aside the Med-Arbiter Order and held that 51 of 56 challenged voters
were not yet union members at the time of the election.
c. directed the proclamation of Lacanilao group as the duly elected officers
and for ITM-MEA to absorb in the bargaining unit the challenged voters
unless proven to be managerial employees.
Issue: WON the order of segregation/exclusion of 56 votes of the petitioner’s union is
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion
HELD: Yes. BLR decision set aside, petition granted.
Ratio:
1. Submission of the employees names with the BLR as qualified members of the union
is not a condition sine qua non to enable said members to vote in the election of
union’s officers.
2. Art. 242 (c) provides that only members of the union can participate in the election of
union officers. However, the question of eligibility to vote may be determined
through the use of the applicable payroll period and employee’s status during the
applicable payroll period.
3. In the case at bar, since the use of payroll was never insisted, it may be concluded
that the fact that the employees joined the election by casting their votes is a clear
manifestation of their intention to join the union. Therefore, they must be
considered ipso facto members.
4. SC does not agree with the contention of the respondents that since the CBA has
been concluded already, the determination of the issue in this case at bar may not
serve the purpose of the union and may destroy the cordial relations existing
between the management & the union.
5. The existence of a CBA and cordial relations should not be used to justify the
frustration of the union members’ rights.
6. Neither may the inclusion and counting of the 56 segregated votes serve to disturb
the existing relationship with management as feared by herein private respondents.
7. Respondents themselves pointed out that petitioners joined the negotiating panel in
the recently concluded CBA.
8. This fact alone is conclusive against herein petitioners and hence will estop them
later if ever, from questioning the CBA which petitioners concurred with.
48 Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa (KMP) vs Trajano
1. Silvestre and 13 other member-employees filed a request for the examination of the
financial status of KMP Union
2. It was found by the Ministry of Labor Union Account Examiner Vicedo that the union
did not submit accounts for 1977-1979
a. The union had disallowed expenditures worth P1,278, not supported by
receipts
b. they also forgot to maintain segregated disbursement receipts for all their 5
accounts
c. the union’s constitution and by-laws were not ratified by the general
membership, thus, illegal
3. thus, silvestre et al filed with the Ministry of Labor a petition to expel the union
officers
4. the union officers argued that the disallowed expenditures were made in good faith,
for the benefit of the members, and they are willing to reimburse the same
a. also, they were not the officers for the years 1977-79
b. the non-ratification and non-segregation was before they became officers
5. Med-Arbiter called a referendum to decide the issue. BLR affirmed.
WON the referendum is the proper remedy NO
1. The proper action should have been to decide on the issue – either dismiss the
petition or expel the officers, as prayed for and not call for a referendum
2. Mere disbursement without being supported by receipts is not falsification and
misrepresentation; the expenditures appeared to have been made in good faith
3. Moreover, the referendum issue is moot (it seems like they re-elected the same
officers)
a. the repudiation of both private respondents to the highly sensitive position of
auditor at the October 4, 1982 election, is a convincing manifestation and
demonstration of the union membership's faith in the herein officers'
leadership on one hand and a clear condonation of an act they had allegedly
committed.
b. The SC said that The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done
prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the
people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man
to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.
49 Gabriel v. Secretary of Labor GR No.115949 March 16, 2000
Topic: Union Funds- Payment of atty.’s fees and special assessments
DOCTRINE: Attorneys fees may not be deducted or checked off from any amount due to
an employee without his written consent.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Gabriel et al. comprise the Executive Board of the SolidBank Union,
the duly recognized collective bargaining agent for the rank and file employees
of Solid Bank Corporation. Private respondents are members of said union.
2. The union’s Executive Board decided to retain anew the service of Atty. Ignacio
P. Lacsina (now deceased) as union counsel in connection with the negotiations
for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA); majority of all union
members approved and signed a resolution confirming the decision of the
executive board to engage the services of Atty. Lacsina as union counsel.
3. As approved, the resolution provided that ten percent (10%) of the total
economic benefits that may be secured through the negotiations be given to
Atty. Lacsina as attorney’s fees. It also contained an authorization for SolidBank
Corporation to check-off said attorney’s fees from the first lump sum payment
of benefits to the employees under the new CBA and to turn over said amount
to Atty. Lacsina and/or his duly authorized representative.
4. The bank, on request of the union, made payroll deductions for attorney’s fees
from the CBA benefits paid to the union members in accordance with the
abovementioned resolution.
5. Private respondents instituted a complaint against the petitioners and the
union counsel before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for
illegal deduction of attorney’s fees as well as for quantification of the benefits in
the 1992 CBA.
6. Med-arbiter granted the complaint; Secretary partially granted and the Order of
the Med-Arbiter dated 22 April 1993 is hereby modified as follows: (1) that the
ordered refund shall be limited to those union members who have not signified
their conformity to the check-off of attorney’s fees; and (2) the directive on the
payment of 5% attorney’s fees should be deleted for lack of basis. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the deductions made by petioner-company is valid (NO)
HELD:
 Private respondent’s contention: claim that the check-off provision in question
is illegal because it was never submitted for approval at a general membership
meeting called for the purpose and that it failed to meet the formalities
mandated by the Labor Code.
 In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on prior
authorization from employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the
latter’s wages and remits them directly to the union. It assures continuous
funding; for the labor organization. As this Court has acknowledged, the system
of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the union and only indirectly for the
individual employees.
 The pertinent legal provisions on check-offs are found in Article 222 (b) and
Article 241 (o) of the LC.
 Art. 222 (b) states:
o No attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind
arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusions of
the collective agreement shall be imposed on any individual member
of the contracting union: Provided, however, that attorney’s fees may
be charged against unions funds in an amount to be agreed upon by
the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the
contrary shall be null and void.
 Art. 241 (o) provides:
o Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special
assessment, attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or any other
extraordinary fees may be checked off from any amount due to an
employee without an individual written authorization duly signed by
the employee. The authorization should specifically state the amount,
purpose and beneficiary of the deduction.
 Art. 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special assessment for
union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s fees and representation expenses. These
are:
o 1) authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the
members at the general membership meeting called for the purpose;
o (2) secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting; and
o (3) individual written authorization for check off duly signed by the
employees concerned. Clearly, attorney’s fees may not be deducted or
checked off from any amount due to an employee without his written
consent.
 After a thorough review of the records, we find that the General Membership
Resolution of October 19, 1991 of the SolidBank Union did not satisfy the
requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence for the validity of the ten
percent (10%) special assessment for union’s incidental expenses, attorney’s
fees and representation expenses. There were no individual written check off
authorizations by the employees concerned and so the assessment cannot be
legally deducted by their employer.
 public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the
workers through their union should be made to shoulder the expenses incurred
for the services of a lawyer. And accordingly the reimbursement should be
charged to the union’s general fund or account. No deduction can be made from
the salaries of the concerned employees other than those mandated by law.
50 Galvadores et al v. Trajano (Dir. Of BLR), Manggagawa ng Komunikasyong sa
Pilipinas (FIWU), PLDT and Espinas
Mandatory Activity
Facts:
1. Atty. Espinas has been the legal counsel of the Union since 1964. He was hired
on a case to case contingent basis. He was hired as counsel in the on going labor
dispute at PLDT and was offered 10% of any improvement of PLDT’s last offer.
2. The Ministry of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. So they went
under compulsory arbitration.
3. The Executive Board of the Union passed a resolution requesting PLDT to
deduct P115 per EE for legal services extended to the Union by Atty. Espinans.
4. Petitioner contends that the attorney’s fees of Atty Espinas were not only
unreasonable but also violative of Art. 242(o) of LC and that the deduction
cannot be given legal effect by mere Board Resolution but needs the ratification
by the general membership of the Union.
5. Respondent Union and Atty. Espinans argues that the attorney’s fees,
pertaining to his services during compulsory arbitration proceedings, cannot
be considered as negotiation fees or attorney’s within the context of Art 242(o).
6. Petitioners proposed a solution to pay P10/EE, but Espinas refused.
7. The case was referred to the BLR for being intra-union. The Union filed a
Manifestation to the effect the about 6,607 members of the Union ratified the
resolution of the legislative council in a plebiscite called for that purpose. So,
Espinas moved for the payment of his legal fees.
8. Petitioners question the plebiscite on the ground that the QUESTION NO. 2 1 was
misleading and deceptive as it assumed that there was no dispute regarding the
deduction of the attorney’s fees from the monetary benefits awarded to PLDT
EEs.
9. BLR dismissed the complaint. Hence this petition, assailing that individual
written authorization of all the EEs must be first obtained before any
assessment can be made against the monetary benefits awarded to them
pursuant to Art. 242(o) of LC.
10. In their comment, Union and Espinas argue that compulsory arbitration is a
“mandatory activity” and an exception to Art. 242(o), and the Union members
approved the deduction in the plebiscite.
Issue: WON the compulsory arbitration is a “mandatory activity” which dispenses with
the individual written authorizations for check-offs
Held: No, there was no individual written authorizations duly signed by the EES. BLR
Decision was set aside. The attorney’s fees may be charged against the Union funds
pursuant to Art. 222(b) LC, as may be agreed upon between them.
Ratio:
“Article 222. Appearance and Fees. x x x x x x
1
“Question No. 2. Do you approve of the use of P1 million (P500,000.00 to be withdrawn from PECCI
and another P500,000.00 from IBAA) from our CBA negotiation fund together with the attorney’s fees
(P1 million) that was collected and to be loaned to the MKP/FTWU, as our counterpart of the seed
money to start the housing program as agreed by the PLDT management and our union panel and
included in the award of the MOLE?”
“(b) No attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any
collective bargaining negotiations or conclusion of the collective bargaining agreement
shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting union;
Provided, however, that attorney’s fees may be charged against union funds in an
amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of
any sort to the contrary shall be null and void.”
“Art. 242. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization.—The following
are the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization:
“x x x x x x “(o) than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessment,
attorney’s fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked off
“from any amount due an employee without individual written authorization duly signed
by the employee. The authorization should specifically state the amount, purpose and
beneficiary of the deduction.”
The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code also provide that deductions from
wages of the employees may only be made by the employer in cases authorized by law ,
including deductions for insurance premiums advanced by the employer on behalf of the
employees as well as union dues where the right to check-off is authorized in writing by
the individual employee himself.
The provisions are clear. No check-offs from any amounts due employees may be
effected without individual written authorizations duly signed by the employees
specifically stating the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction. The required
individual authorizations in this case are wanting. In fact, petitioner employees are
vigorously objecting. The question asked in the plebiscite, besides not being explicit,
assumed that there was no dispute relative to attorney’s fees.
Contrary to respondent Union’s and Counsel’s stand, the benefits awarded to PLDT
employees still formed part of the collective bargaining negotiations although placed
already under compulsory arbitration. This is not the “mandatory activity” under the
Code which dispenses with individual written authorizations for check-offs,
notwithstanding its “compulsory” nature. It is a judicial process of settling disputes laid
down by law. Besides, Article 222(b) does not except a CBA, later placed under
compulsory arbitration, from the ambit of its prohibition. The cardinal principle should
be borne in mind that employees are protected by law from unwarranted practices that
diminish their compensation without their knowledge and consent
51 Diokno v. Cacdac  There was no need for the support of 30% of the FLAMES members. Book 5, Rule 14,
GR 168475, July 4, 2007 Sec. 1 of the IRR states that the 30% requirement only applies in cases where the
issue involves the entire membership of the union, which is clearly not the case
Facts: here, since the issue is limited to the disqualification from participation in the
* Union involved: FLAMES (First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees) elections by particular union members.
1. FLAMES created a comelec for the conduction of union elections, to be held on May
7, 2003. Issue: Should there have been an exhaustion of administrative remedies? NO.
2. Petitioners Diokno et al go to the FLAMES comelec and sought the disqualification of  Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where the facts show that
candidate Edgardo Daya et al, for allowing themselves to be assisted by nonunion there was a violation of due process. In this case there was such a deprivation when
members, and for committing acts of disloyalty to FLAMES. Petitioners claim that the FLAMES comelec refused to act on Daya’s motion for reconsideration and failed
Daya et al colluded with officers of the Meralco Savings & Loan Association to receive Daya’s written protest. It became incumbent upon them to seek the aid of
(MESALA) and the Meralco Mutual Aid and Benefits Association (MEMABA), and the BLR. To insist otherwise would render their exhaustion of remedies within the
that Daya et al exerted undue influence of the FLAMES emembers. union as illusory and vain.
3. Hence, the FLAMES comelec disqualified Daya et al. According to the FLAMES Issue: Did the FLAMES comelec invoke the proper ground to disqualify Daya? NO.
comelec, Daya et al violated the FLAMES constitution and bylaws (CBL) by allowing  The ground used by the FLAMES comelec was Art. 4, Sec. 4a6 of the FLAMES CBL.
non-members to help them during the campaign, by soliciting support from them. The provision states that, after investigation and 2/3 vote of the executive board,
According to the FLAMES comelec, these acts of solicitation are deemed “inimical to any member may be dismissed/expelled for acting in a manner harmful to the
the interest of FLAMES.” interest and welfare of FLAMES and its members.
4. The FLAMES election was held, and the Petitioners Diokno et al were elected as  However, this provision only applies to expulsion or dismissal of members from the
FLAMES officers. union. It does not refer to disqualification of candidates.
5. Daya et al go to the Med-Arbiter to appeal their disqualification and to nullify the  Furthermore, there was no investigation on Daya’s activities nor was there any
election proceedings and results. showing of the voting requirement of the Executive Board.
6. Regarding Daya’s appeal to the Med-Arbiter, the Med-Arbiter ruled for Daya. The  Hence, there was a violation of due process since the requirements for expulsion
Med-Arbiter held that the FLAMES Comelec’s previous disqualification of Daya was were not observed.
not done with due process. As found by the Med-Arbiter, the grounds used by the
FLAMES comelec to disqualify Daya were wrong, because the grounds used were for
the expulsion of union members, not for the disqualification of candidates. As found
by the Med-Arbiter, the FLAMES constitution and bylaws provide that the executive
board, not the FLAMEs comelec, has the power to disqualify candidates.
7. The Med-Arbiter also took the opportunity to defend his jurisdiction over the case.
The Med-Arbiter held that the election of union officers is an internal affair of the
union, and his office may look into the conduct of such elections when its
jurisdiction is sought. BLR director affirmed the Med-Arbiter.
8. Petitioners Diokno et al go to the CA. Petitioners say that Respondents Daya et al did
not have the required 30% member support in filing the petition to nullify the
FLAMES comelec’s decision to disqualify Daya.
9. CA affirms. The CA held that the 30% requirement was not applicable in this case,
since it did not involve the entire membership of FLAMES.
*Note: Meanwhile, after the CA decision, another election was conducted. This time Daya et
al won. Hence, Petitioners Diokno (who won the previous election) assail the results of this
subsequent election with the DOLE, which upheld the validity of the election. The CA also
upheld this subsequent election. Daya et al were then proclaimed winners of the union
election.
Issue: did the BLR have jurisdiction over the case? YES.
 The Labor Code expressly provides that the BLR shall have original/exclusive
authority over inter-union and intra-union conflicts. This case involves the
propriety of the disqualification of Daya by the FLAMES comelec. Hence, it is an
intra-union dispute, as it is one involving a dispute within FLAMES.
Issue: was the 30% requirement applicable? NO.
52 53 RODRIGUEZ v DIRECTOR
Topic: Enforcement and Remedies
FACTS: [FTWU is a union and they are ee of PLDT; consolidated petitions]
1. The FTWU’s (Union) by-laws provide for the election of officers every three (3)
years, in the month of July. 
2. Legislative Council set the provincial elections for its officers on July 14 to 18,
1986, and those for Metro Manila on July 25, 1986.
3. Council also quite drastically raised the fees for the filing of certificates of
candidates which had therefore ranged from P75.00 to P100.00.
a. For President: P3,000
b. VP, Sec-Gen, Treas and Auditor: P2,000
c. Asst Sec, Asst Treas and Asst Aud: P1,000
4. Although the increased fees were paid in due course by the candidates,
complaints were filed separately by two presidential candidates against
Chairman of COMELEC of Union (Rodriguez) and its officers with the BLR for
their invalidation as excessive, prohibitive and arbitrary.
5. Notwithstanding the cases, elections for Visayas and Mindanao and areas of
Luzon were held, but it was different from the original date set by the council.
6. The validity of the elections was very shortly challenged on the ground of lack
of (1) due notice and (2) adequate ground rules
7. The cases were praying for the promulgation of rules as well as seeking to
restrain holding of elections until ground rules have been set and until the issue
on the fees has finally been decided.
8. TRO prohibiting election was issued.
9. But the Union COMELEC still proceeded with the general elections in all PLDT
branches in Metro Manila.
10. The no. of qualified voters was 9,429 of which 6,903 actually voted, the
percentage of turn-out being 73%
11. A case was filed to declare the Union COMELEC guilty for defying the TRO and
nullification of election
12. MedArbiter denied the petitions to nullify the elections as well as the motion
for contempt, but invalidated the increase in rates of filing fees; MedArbiter
said the TRO was belatedly received and that 73% ov veters’ turnout was
higher in prior elections
13. OIC of Labor Relations overturned the decision on the ground of lack of notice
to candidates and voters and failure to disseminate rules and disregard of TRO.
14. Thus this petition arguing that BLR OIC rendered his decision with grave abuse
of discretion
15. In GR 80504: Legislative Union again passed a resolution which generated
another controversy increasing the union dues from P21-P50 a month.
16. In BLR case, a petition challenging the increase in union dues was filed
contending that since terms of council who approved it has expired, they ahd
no authprity to act as members of council and could not be said that resolution
for increase had been approved by 2/3 vote of council.
17. MedArbiter denied on the ground of lack of support of at least 30% of all
members union pursuant to Art 242 of LC.
18. Director reversed and ceased the increase saying that the petition was
supported by more than 30% of total membership and assuming that it was not
complied with, BLR has jurisdiction because it is a clear violation of rights and
conditions of union membership – expressly conferring the authority to act on
all intra-union and inter-union conflicts.
 19. BUT THEN, director reversed herself. The Manggagawa sa Komunikasyon sa  the resolution of the union’s Legislative Council to this effect 6 does not
Pilipinas (MKP) — with which the FTWU, is affiliated — intervened in the case bear the signature of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the members of the
and moved for reconsideration of her decision – granted. Council, contrary to the requirement of the union constitution and by-
20. Hence, this petition. laws; and that proof is wanting of proper ratification of the resolution by a
ISSUES/HELD: majority of the general union membership at a plebiscite called and
A. WON 30% membership support is indispensable? Yes. Petition is intra- conducted for that purpose, again in violation of the constitution and by-
union conflict. [MAIN] laws.
B. WON the general elections of 1986 was valid? No, there was no due process.  All amounts already collected must be credited accordingly in favor of the
C. WON the increase in Union dues was valid? No, it was not properly ratified. respective members either for their future legal dues or other assessments
RATIO: or even delinquencies, if any.
A. ON 30% MEMBERSHIP SUPPORT
 a report of a violation of rights and conditions of membership in a labor
organization may be made by" (a)t least thirty percent (30%) of all the
members of a union or any member or members specially concerned." The
use of the permissive "may" in the provision at once negates the notion
that the assent of 30% of all the members is mandatory. More decisive is
the fact that the provision expressly declares that the report may be made,
alternatively by "any member or members specially concerned."
 confirmation that the assent of 30% of the union members is not a factor in
the acquisition of jurisdiction by the Bureau of Labor Relations is furnished
by Article 226 of the same Labor Code, which grants original and exclusive
jurisdiction to the Bureau, and the Labor Relations Division in the Regional
Offices of the Department of Labor, over "all inter-union and intra-union
conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting
labor management relations," making no reference whatsoever to any such
30%-support requirement. Indeed, the officials mentioned are given the
power to act "on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts (1) "upon request
of either or both parties" as well as (2) "at their own initiative." 
 In the cases at bar, the petition to nullify the 1986 union elections could
not be deemed defective because it did not have the assent of 30% of the
union membership. The petition clearly involved an intra-union conflict -
one directly affecting the right of suffrage of more than 800 union
members and the integrity of the union elections - over which, as the law
explicitly provides, jurisdiction could be assumed by the Labor Relations
Director or the Med-Arbiters "at their own initiative" or "upon request of
either or both parties."
B. ON ELECTION:
 The dates for provincial elections were set for July 14 to 18, 1986. But they
were in fact held on July 21 to 22, 1986, without prior notice to all voting
members, and without ground rules duly prescribed therefor.
 Moreover, it was in disregard and in defiance of the temporary restraining
order properly issued by the Med-Arbiter, notice of which restraining
order had been regularly served on the same date, as the proofs
adequately show
 there were no ground rules or guidelines set for the Metro Manila
elections. Undue haste, lack of adequate safeguards to ensure integrity of
the voting, and absence of notice of the dates of balloting, thus attended
the elections in the provinces and in Metro Manila. They cannot but render
the proceedings void.
C. ON INREASE OF UNION DUES
55 PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CO. (PDC) V. SEC. OF LABOR
FACTS:
1. Kilusan (mother union) filed with DOLE a petition for certification election
among rank and file employees of PDC
a. That it is a legitimate federation and its local chapter PDC Union was
issued a charter certificate
b. That there was no existing CBA
c. That there was no other legitimate labor organization that existed
2. PDC filed MtoD
a. PDC Union (local union) failed to comply with Rule II Section 3 Book V
of LC; submission of
i. Constitution and by-laws;
ii. Names, addressed and list of officers and/or members; and
iii. Books of accounts
3. Kilusan submitted a rejoinder claiming that it submitted the required
documents. That no books of account could be submitted as the local union was
only recently organized
4. PDC insisted verification with BLR. It found out that:
a. Minutes of the organizational meeting was unauthenticated
b. No signatures
c. Constitution and by-laws were not duly subscribed
5. Med-Arb held that there was substantial compliance. Mere issuance of the
charter certificate by the federation was sufficient compliance. Considering
that establishment was unorganized, Med-Arb maintained that certification
election should be conducted to resolve question of representation
6. PDC appealed with the Office of the secretary. Denied. Hence this appeal.
7. PDC contends that
a. A labor organization such as Kilusan may not validly invest the status
of legitimacy upon a local or chapter through mere expedient of
issuing charter certificate and submitting such to the BLR
b. That such local or chapter must also comply with the requirement
(under fact no. 2 (a))
c. Mere filing of the documents is insufficient, there must be due
recognition or acknowledgement by BLR
8. OSG avers that
a. There was substantial compliance with the requirements for the
formation of a chapter
b. Art. 257 LC mandates automatic holding by Med-Arb of a certification
election where there’s no CBA
ISSUE: Whether or not petition for certification election should be allowed. NO.
RATIO:
 While Art. 257 mandates automatic conduct of certification election, it also requires
that petition must be filed by a legitimate labor organization
 Question that now arises is: when does a branch, local or affiliate of a federation
become a legitimate labor organization?
 It acquires legitimacy only upon registration with BLR and Art. 234 has been
complied with
 Kilusan questions the requirements as too stringent
 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Secretary of Labor
o The registration is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association-
may be exercised with or without said registration. Registration is for the
acquisition of legal personality
o Registration is required to protect both labor and the public against
abuses, fraud or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly
accredited agents of the union they purport to represent. Such
requirement is a valid exercise of the police power, because the activities
in which labor organizations, associations and unions of workers are
engaged affect public interest, which should be protected
o Obligation to submit financial statements because they solicit funds or
membership, as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge
amounts of money due to them or to the organization
 When an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter of a federation,
some of the requirements for registration are no longer required
 Undoubtedly, the intent of the law in imposing lesser requirements in the case of the
branch or local of a registered federation or national union is to encourage the
affiliation of a local union with the federation or national union in order to increase
the local union's bargaining powers respecting terms and conditions of labor
 The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures against the
commission of fraud. They likewise afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting
employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions
whose sole purpose is to control union funds or to use the union for dubious ends
 The “procedure governing the reporting of independently registered union” also
refers to Art. 235 par. 2
o constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts submitted
by the local and chapter must likewise comply with these requirements
 Moreover, there is greater reason to exact compliance with the certification and
attestation requirements because, as previously mentioned, several requirements
applicable to independent union registration are no longer required in the case of
formation of a local or chapter
 The policy of the law in conferring greater bargaining power upon labor unions
must be balanced with the policy of providing preventive measures against the
commission of fraud
 A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon
submission of the following to the BLR:
o A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor
federation or national union, and
o The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the
books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or
treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by
its president
o Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or
chapter does not become a legitimate labor organization
 In the case at bar, Kilusan failed to certify the documents under oath; fatal to its
acquisition of a legitimate status
 RELATION: It may also be argues that Kilusan (mother union) and not the local
union which filed the petition, being a legitimate organization, Kilusan has the
personality to file such petition
 It is important to clarify relationship between mother and local union
o Mother union had the status of an agent while the local union remained the
basic union of association
o As in this case, the petition was filed by the federation which is merely an
agent, the petition is deemed filed by the chapter, the principal, which
must be a legitimate labor organization
o The chapter cannot merely rely on the legitimate status of the mother
union
 Big federations and national unions of workers should take the lead in requiring
their locals and chapters to faithfully comply with the law and the rules instead of
merely snapping union after union into their folds in a furious bid with rival
federations to get the most number of members.
56 Filipino Pipe & Foundry Corp. v. NLRC
G.R. No. 115180 November 16, 1999
Purpose, nature of relation
Facts: On February 1986, National Labor Union-Trade Congress of the Philippines (NLU-
TUCP) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment, in behalf of its local
chapter, the Filipino Pipe Workers Union-National Labor Union (FPWU-NLU), a notice of
strike signed by its national president against the Filipino Pipe and Foundry (FPFC),
alleging of union busting and non-implementation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. In the early morning of March 3, 1986, without waiting for the outcome of
the conciliation conference scheduled on said date, the local union FPWU-NLU staged a
strike which lasted until June 13, 1986, when a return to work agreement was reached
by the union and FPFC. Subsequently, FPFC filed before the Ministry of Labor and
Employment a petition to declare the strike illegal with prayer for damages against the
local union FPWU-NLU, NLU-TUCP and its national president. FPFC, however,
subsequently moved for the partial dismissal of the complaint against the local union
FPWU-NLU, but maintained the action against the other parties. Thereafter, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of FPFC ruling that the strike staged by Union was
illegal and liable for damages.. The Labor Arbiter directed Union to pay damages to FPFC.
Both parties appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC, however, reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter and dismissed FPFC's complaint.
Issue: WON the local union is liable for the damages suffered by FPFC. No. WON the
strike is legal. No.
Ruling: No. It is important to clarify the relationship between the mother union and the
local union.
The Court held that the mother union, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, had the
status of an agent while the local union remained the basic unit of the association, free to
serve the common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints imposed by
the constitution and by-laws of the association." The same is true even if the local union
is not a legitimate labor organization. The Court ruled that the mother federation was a
mere agent and the local chapter/union was the principal, notwithstanding the failure of
the local union to comply with the procedural requirements that would make it a
legitimate labor organization.
Direct and primary responsibility for the damages allegedly caused by the illegal strike
sued upon fell on the local union FPWU-NLU, being the principal, and not on NLU-TUCP,
a mere agent of FPWU-NLU which assisted the latter in filing the notice of strike. Being
just an agent, the notice of strike filed by the national president of NLU-TUCP, was
deemed to have been filed by its principal, the FPWU-NLU. Having thus dismissed the
claim for damages against the principal, the action for damages against its agent,
respondent NLU-TUCP, and its national president, had no more leg to stand on and
should also be dismissed.
WON the strike is illegal.

The Supreme Court held that the strike staged by the local union FPWU-NLU was illegal
for want of any legal basis. The alleged union busting was not substantiated and the
supposed non-implementation of the CBA was groundless because the demands of the
local union FPWU-NLU at the time it actually struck were the subject of a pending writ of
execution filed by the union. Moreover, the failure of the union to serve FPFC a copy of
the notice of strike was a clear violation of Section 3, Rule XXII, Book V, of the Rules
Implementing the Labor Code. The same strike blatantly disregarded the prohibition on
the doing of any act which may impede or disrupt the conciliation proceedings.

The SC affirmed the decision of the NLRC. The Union is not liable for damages.