163 Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates Inc vs.
NLRC
G.R. No. 105090. September 16, 1993.
Topic: Basis of Right to Engage in Concerted Activities; Constitution
Author: Andre Mina
FACTS:
1. On April 6, 1992, Bisig staged a wild-cat strike, without valid notice of strike, nor observing
cooling-off period, and made even during the pendency of a preventive mediation
proceedings. On April 8, 1992, Concrete Aggregates (CA) filed with the NLRC a petition for
injunction.
2. CA alleged that during the strike, Bisig setup makeshifts, tents, banners and streamers and
other man-made obstructions at the main plant and offices, impeding the ingress and egress
of everyone.
3. The hearing was set on April 13, 1992, but Bisig was not furnished a copy of the petition on
the ground of wrong address. The hearing was conducted ex parte, and the Ocular Inspection
Report (Report) was presented as evidence. The Report stated that “The passage was
obstructed with pieces of rock, an old ladder, pieces of wood and other hard objects that
gave rise to a strong indication that the passage to and from the premises was not free. The
barricades and obstruction were put up 50 meters or less away from the main gate.” and that
“Ingress to and egress from the company is presumed to be not free.” ON THE SAME DATE, a
TRO was issued.
4. No copy of the TRO was issued to Bisig; the union only learned about the issuance of such
order when it was posted in the company premises. Upon learning of its issuance, Bisig filed
an opposition against the petition for injunction and denied the allegations made by CA.
5. On April 30, CA filed a petition for the Immediate Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction due
to the continued alleged illegal strike of the union and due to the economic losses the
company suffers. Further, CA alleges that there were threats of bodily harm made to its
employees and other personnel who attempted to report for work. The allegation further
stated that the president of the union said “SISIMENTUHIN NAMING ANG GATES NG
CONCRETE AGGREGATES NA KAHIT IPIS AY HINDI MAKAKAPASOK O MAKAKALABAS.”
6. The union got a hold of the motion only on May 4, 1992. The next day, if filed its
opposition, claiming that they were not served with the copy of the original petition for
injunction; that it was deliberate in order for the union not to be able to immediately oppose
the petition praying for a temporary restraining order and so petitioner was scot-free when it
presented ex parte evidence; the allegation of damages if no injunction is secured is
therefore premature and irrelevant in this proceedings because there is no proof that the
strike is illegal. For if the strike is legal then both sides must bear their own losses in an
economic contest: the company—loss of income; the workers—loss of wages; and that the
SOLE has not acted upon the letter sent by CA, thus showing that the loss is not that serious.
On the same day, NLRC issued an injunction.
ISSUE: WON the writ of injunction was properly issued – NO
RATIO:
In the case at bar, the records will show that the respondent NLRC failed to comply with the
letter and spirit of Article 218 (e), (4) and (5) of the Labor Code in issuing its Order of May 5,
1992. Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code provides both the procedural and substantive
requirements which must strictly be complied with before a temporary or permanent
injunction can issue in a labor dispute, which states that:
“(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
“(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainants’ property are
unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
To support the claim of threats, intimidation, unlawful and prohibited acts, etc. allegedly
committed by the union against the non-striking employees, the company even submitted a
joint affidavit signed by Joselito Concepcion, Renato Trambulo and Armando Arcos but when
presented before the Labor Arbiter, the affiants themselves controverted the allegations in
said joint-affidavit. They innocently divulged having signed the prepared affidavit without
first reading the same. Likewise, they admitted that they did not see or hear the union
members threatened the group of “non-strikers” including themselves of bodily harm.
Moreover, no less than Mr. Ronnie Mercado, the Assistant Manager for Operations of the
Company, testified that after the issuance of the ex parte temporary restraining order, the
barricade blocking the gates were removed and people were allowed free ingress and egress.
Furthermore, Atty. Elmer Jolo, the Personnel Manager joined by Mr. Mercado, disclosed that
the public authorities charged to protect the company’s properties were neither unwilling
nor unable to furnish adequate protection. As a matter of fact, the police regularly patrolling
the area, was never requested assistance.
Verily, the factual circumstances proven by the evidence show that there was no concurrence
of the five (5) prerequisites mandated by Art. 218(e) of the Labor Code. Thus there is no
justification for the issuance of the questioned Order of preliminary injunction.
Moreover, the records reveal the continuing misuse of unfair strategies to secure ex
parte temporary restraining orders against striking employees.
To be sure, the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order in a labor dispute is
not per se prohibited. Its issuance, however, should be characterized by care and caution for
the law requires that it be clearly justified by considerations of extreme necessity, i.e., when
the commission of unlawful acts is causing substantial and irreparable injury to company
properties and the company is, for the moment, bereft of an adequate remedy at law. This is
as it ought to be, for imprudently issued temporary restraining orders can break the back of
employees engaged in a legal strike. Often times, they unduly tilt the balance of a labor
warfare in favor of capital. When that happens, the deleterious effects of a wrongfully issued,
ex parte temporary restraining order on the rights of striking employees can no longer be
repaired for they defy simple monetization. Moreover, experience shows that ex
parte applications for restraining orders are often based on fabricated facts and concealed
truths. A more becoming sense of fairness, therefore, demands that such ex
parte applications should be more minutely examined by hearing officers, lest, our
constitutional policy of protecting labor becomes nothing but a synthetic shibboleth. The
immediate need to hear and resolve these ex parte applications does not provide any excuse
to lower our vigilance in protecting labor against the issuance of indiscriminate injunctions.
Stated otherwise, it behooves hearing officers receiving evidence in support of ex
parte injunctions against employees in strike to take a more active stance in seeing to it that
their right to social justice is in no way violated despite their absence. This equalizing stance
was not taken in the case at bar by the public respondents.
Nor do we find baseless the allegation by petitioner that the public respondents have
neglected to resolve with reasonable dispatch its own Petition for Injunction with prayer for a
temporary restraining order dated April 25, 1992. The petition invoked Article 264(d) of the
Labor Code16 to enjoin the private respondent from using the military and police authorities
to escort scabs at the struck establishment. Sadly contrasting is the haste with which public
respondents heard and acted on a similar petition for injunction filed by the private
respondent. In the case of the private respondent, its prayer for an ex parte temporary
restraining order was heard on April 13, 1992 and it was granted on the same day. Its petition
for preliminary injunction was filed on April 30, 1992, and was granted on May 5, 1992. In the
case of petitioner, its petition for injunction was filed on April 24, 1992, and to date, the
records do not reveal whether the public respondent has granted or denied the same. The
disparate treatment is inexplicable considering that the subject matters of their petition are
of similar importance to the parties and to the public.
entitled Social Justice and Human Rights. For the first time in our constitutional history, the
fundamental law of our land mandated the State to “. . . guarantee the rights of all workers
to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.” This constitutional imprimatur
given to the right to strike constitutes signal victory for labor. Our Constitutions of 1935 and
1973 did not accord constitutional status to the right to strike. Even the liberal US Federal
Constitution did not elevate the right to strike to a constitutional level. With a constitutional
matrix, enactment of a law implementing the right to strike was an inevitability. RA 6715
came into being on March 21, 1989, an intentional replication of RA 875. In light of the
genesis of the right to strike, it ought to be obvious that the right should be read with a
libertarian latitude in favor of labor. In the wise words of Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a
distinguished commissioner of the 1987 Constitutional Commission “x x x the constitutional
recognition of the right to strike does serve as a reminder that injunctions, should be reduced
to the barest minimum.”

CONSTITUTIONLAITY OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE DISCUSSED

Strike has been considered the most effective weapon of labor in protecting the rights of
employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. It may be that in highly
developed countries, the significance of strike as a coercive weapon has shrunk in view of the
preference for more peaceful modes of settling labor disputes. In underdeveloped countries,
however, where the economic crunch continues to enfeeble the already marginalized
working class, the importance of the right to strike remains undiminished as indeed it has
proved many a time as the only coercive weapon that can correct abuses against labor. It
remains as the great equalizer.

In the Philippine milieu where social justice remains more as a rhetoric than a reality, labor
has vigilantly fought to safeguard the sanctity of the right to strike. Its struggle to gain the
right to strike has not been easy and effortless. Labor’s early exercise of the right to strike
collided with the laws on rebellion and sedition and sent its leaders languishing in prisons.
The spectre of incarceration did not spur its leaders to sloth; on the contrary it spiked labor
to work for its legitimization. This effort was enhanced by the flowering of liberal ideas in the
United States which inevitably crossed our shores. It was enormously boosted by the
American occupation of our country. Hence, on July 17, 1953, Congress gave statutory
recognition to the right to strike when it enacted RA 875, otherwise known as the Industrial
Peace Act. For nearly two (2) decades, labor enjoyed the right to strike until it was prohibited
on September 12, 1972 upon the declaration of martial law in the country. The 14-year battle
to end martial rule produced many martyrs and foremost among them were the radicals of
the labor movement. It was not a mere happenstance, therefore, that after the final battle
against martial rule was fought at EDSA in 1986, the new government treated labor with a
favored eye. Among those chosen by then President Corazon C. Aquino to draft the 1987
Constitution were recognized labor leaders like Eulogio Lerum, Jose D. Calderon, Blas D. Ople
and Jaime S.L. Tadeo. These delegates helped craft into the 1987 Constitution its Article XIII
164 ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA v. NLRC
Basis of right to engage in concerted activities
FACTS:
1. With RA 6727 or the Wage Rationalization Act, IBM (represents 4500 employees of SMC)
presented to the company a “demand” for correction of the “significant distortion in
(the workers’) wages.”
2. In that “demand,” the Union explicitly invoked Section 4 (d) of RA 6727: “Where the
application of the increases in the wage rates under this Section results in distortions as
defined under existing laws in the wage structure within an establishment and gives rise
to a dispute therein, such dispute shall first be settled voluntarily between the parties
and in the event of a deadlock, the same shall be finally resolved through compulsory
arbitration by the regional branches of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
having jurisdiction over the workplace.”
3. But the Union claims that demand is ignored. It alleged that SMC offered a measly
across-the-board increase of 7php per day per employee as against the proposal of
25php (later reduced to 15php)
4. Hence, the workers involved issued a joint notice. The Union’s position was that the
workers’ refusal “to work beyond eight (8) hours everyday starting October 16, 1989” is
a legitimate means of compelling SMC to correct “the distortion in their wages brought
about by the implementation of the said laws to newly-hired employees.
5. There ensued thereby a change in the work schedule which had been observed by daily-
paid workers at the Polo Plant of SMC for the past (5) years, i.e., “ten (10) hours for the
first shift and ten (10) to fourteen (14) hours for the second shift, from Mondays to
Fridays
6. This abandonment of the long-standing schedule of work and the reversion to the eight-
hour shift apparently caused substantial losses to SMC. Resulted to work disruption and
lower efficiency which resulted to loss of production.
7. SMC filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a complaint against the Union and its
members “to declare the strike or slowdown illegal” and to terminate the employment
of the union officers and shop stewards.
8. SMC filed another complaint against the Union and members thereof, this time directly
with the NLRC, “to enjoin and restrain illegal slowdown and for damages, with prayer for
the issuance of a cease-and-desist and temporary restraining order.”
9. LA scheduled the incident for hearing.
10. In 1990, Union filed the petition which commenced the special civil action of certiorari
and prohibition. It prayed for annulment of the resolution and ordering the removal of
210 files of employees and all disciplinary action imposed to the latter by reason of their
refusal to work overtime.
11. SMC submits that the act of Union members is an illegal and unprotected activity; that it
is contrary to law and the CBA between them
ISSUE: WON Union members’ act is legal.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
1. Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code is that of engaging in
concerted activities in order to attain their legitimate objectives.
2. Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, declares that in line with “the policy of the
State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining, x x (w)orkers
shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective
bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection.” A similar right to engage in
concerted activities for mutual benefit and protection is tacitly and traditionally
recognized in respect of employers.
3. The more common of these concerted activities as far as employees are concerned
are:
a. strikes––the temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute;
b. picketing––the marching to and fro at the employer’s premises, usually
accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the
facts involved in a labor dispute; and
c. boycotts––the concerted refusal to patronize an employer’s goods or
services and to persuade others to a like refusal.
4. The counterpart activity that management may licitly undertake is the lockout––the
temporary refusal to furnish work on account of a labor dispute.
5. The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the legality of the purposes
sought to be attained and the means employed therefor.
6. In the particular instance of “distortions of wage structure within an establishment”
resulting from “the application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law or
wage order,” Sec. 3 of RA No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and comprehensive
procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or
other concerted activities as mode of settlement.
a. The legislative intent that solution of the problem of wage distortions shall
be sought by voluntary negotiation or arbitration, and not by strikes,
lockouts, or other concerted activities of the employees or management, is
made clear in the rules implementing RA 6727 issued by SOLE
b. Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement between the SMC and the
Union also prescribes a similar eschewal of strikes or other similar or related
concerted activities as a mode of resolving disputes or controversies
7. The Union was thus prohibited to declare and hold a strike or otherwise engage in non-
peaceful concerted activities for the settlement of its controversy with SMC in respect of
wage distortions, or for that matter; any other issue “involving or relating to wages,
hours of work, conditions of employment and/ or employer-employee relations.”
a. In the first place, that it was indeed the wage distortion issue that principally
motivated the Union’s partial or limited strike is clear from the facts. Hence, it
could not be considered a matter of such great prejudice to the workers as to
give rise to a controversy between them and management
b. In the second place, even if there were no such legal prohibition, and even
assuming the controversy really did not involve the wage distortions caused by
RA 6727, the concerted activity in question would still be illicit because\
contrary to the workers’ explicit contractual commitment “that there shall be
no strikes, walkouts, stoppage or slowdown of work, boycotts, secondary
boycotts, refusal to handle any merchandise, picketing, sit down strikes of any
kind, sympathetic or general strikes, or any other interference with any of the
operations of the COMPANY during the term of xx their CBA”
Disposition: Petition denied. Counter-petition granted and case remanded to the
Commission (First Division)
165 BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO. v. NLRC, TINIG AT LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA
SA BLTBCO-NAFLU, et al.
FACTS:
1. TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU (TLM), filed a Notice of Strike against the BLTBCo on the grounds of
ULP and violation of CBA.
2. BLTBCo asked the SOLE to assume jurisdiction over the dispute or to certify it to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration. BLTBCO also moved to dismiss the notice of strike.
3. Efforts at amicable settlement having failed, Acting SOLE certified the dispute to the
NLRC.
4. A copy of the certification order was served upon NAFLU and TLM. However, union
secretary Jerry Soriano refused to receive it.
5. The officers and members of TLM went on strike and maintained picket lines blocking
the premises of BLTBCo's terminals.
6. NLRC: Ordered the striking EEs to lift their picket and to remove all obstructions and
barricades. All striking EEs on payroll were required to return to work. BLTBCo directed
to accept them back to work within 5 days.
7. BLTBCo caused the publication of the resolution and called on all striking workers to
return to work not later than 5 days (extended to 6).
8. Only 1,116 out of 1,730 striking EEs reported back for work. 17 others were later re-
admitted. Subsequently, about 614 EEs filed complaints for illegal dismissal, w/ the
common ground was that they were refused admission when reported back for work.
9. NLRC: Dismissed the charge of ULP and union busting. Ordered reinstatement of 190
striking EEs, and reinstatement of all striking EEs who have not committed illegal acts.
10. MR denied for lack of merit. Prayer for TRO is likewise denied.
11. BLTBCo then filed this certiorari, claiming that NLRC committed GAD. On motion of
BLTBCo and upon its posting of a P500k cash bond, the SC issued a TRO, against the
enforcement of the NLRC resolutions.
ISSUE: W/N the NLRC erred in ordering the reinstatement of the EEs.
RULING: NO.
BLTBCo: That the 190 union members who participated in the illegal strike should not have
been reinstated because they defied the return-to-work order.
A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the SOLE of an assumption or
certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the 2nd
paragraph of Art. 264 of the LC. The Union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to
have lost their employment status for knowingly participating in an illegal act.
 However, the NLRC was "not inclined to declare a wholesale forfeiture of employment
status of all those who participated in the strike" because there was inadequate service
of the certification order on the union as of the date the strike was declared and there
was no showing that the striking members had been apprised of such order by the
NAFLU.
Applying the principle of vicarious liability, only the officers of the union deserved to be
penalized with the loss of their employment status. The leaders of the union are the moving
force in the declaration of the strike and the rank-and-file employees merely followed.
Likewise, viewed in the light of Article 264, paragraph (e), those who participated in the
commission of illegal acts who stood charged criminally thereof in court must be penalized.
 While the general membership of TLM may have joined the strike at its inception, they
returned to work, although beyond the period required by the NLRC.
 The circumstances of time and place of employment, residences of the EEs, and the lack
of individual notice to them are reasons enough to justify their failure to beat the
deadline.
The mere fact that the majority of the strikers were able to return to work does not
necessarily mean that the rest deliberately defied the return-to-work order or that they had
been sufficiently notified thereof. Some of them may have left Metro Manila and did not
have enough time to return during the period given by BLTBCo.
BLTBCo: That the striking EEs abandoned their position
NO. An employee who takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by any logic be said to have
abandoned his work.
For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination, there must be a deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the EE to resume his employment. Mere absence is not sufficient. It
must be accompanied by overt acts showing that the EE simply does not want to work
anymore.
A worker who joins a strike does so precisely to assert or improve the terms and conditions
of his employment. If his purpose is to abandon his work, he would not go to the trouble of
joining a strike.
Mere filing of charges against an EE for alleged illegal acts during a strike does not by itself
justify his dismissal. The charges must be proved at an investigation duly called where the EE
shall be given an opportunity to defend himself. This is true even if the alleged ground
constitutes a criminal offense.
BLTBCo: That the NLRC should not have issued the blanket directive for the "reinstatement of
all striking employees of BLTBCo who have not committed illegal acts."
 The key clause here is "who have not committed illegal acts." The directive was not
really "blanket," but SELECTIVE.
The loss of employment status of striking union members is limited to those "who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts." (Article 264, Labor Code) Evidence must be
presented to substantiate the commission thereof. It is on the basis of substantiated
evidence that the NLRC declares the loss of employment status of specific union members
who have committed illegal acts.
The assailed Resolution does not prevent BLTBCo from continuing with its investigation and
come up with evidence against these workers. But they have to be admitted back to their
work first. This is clearly a situation where the social justice provisions of our laws and
jurisprudence come in aid of labor.
 166
Since such investigations might be extended, intentionally or otherwise, the workers are in
danger of losing their livelihood. As compared to the management that is in a position to
wage an extended legal struggle against labor, the latter cannot do so. This is where the State
intervenes to equalize matters between labor and management.

Right to strike
The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an
instrument of labor for its protection against exploitation by management. By virtue of this
right, the workers are able to press their demands for better terms of employment with more
energy and persuasiveness, poising the threat to strike as their reaction to the employer's
intransigence.

The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working class. But precisely because of this,
it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in the workers' own
hands. Thus, it must be declared only after the most thoughtful consultation among them,
conducted in the only way allowed, that is, peacefully, and in every case conformably to
reasonable regulation.

Any violation of the legal requirements and strictures, such as a defiance of a return-to-
work order in industries affected with public interest, will render the strike illegal, to the
detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect. Even war must be lawfully waged. A
labor dispute demands no less observance of the rules, for the benefit of all concerned.
167 BMC-Super et al v. CA, NLRC and Clothman Knitting Corporation
The members and the supporters of the petitioner union, headed by petitioner Tomaroy,
Facts: thru concerted action, caused a temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial
1. Respondent Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC) is a domestic corporation dispute. 
engaged in knitting/textiles. The petitioner union is a legitimate labor organization
of rank-and-file employees therein. The petitioners were rank-and-file employees It is, thus, apparent that the concerted effort of the members of the petitioner union and its
of the respondent and were also members and officers of the petitioner union. supporters caused a temporary work stoppage. The allegation that there can be no work
2. When the union was formed in 2001, the CKC gathered the employees and advised stoppage because the operation in the Dyeing and Finishing Division had been shutdown is of
them not to listen to outsiders. no consequence. It bears stressing that the other divisions were fully operational. There is
3. another group of rank-and-file employees banded together and formed the nothing on record showing that the union members and the supporters who formed a picket
Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Clothman Corporation Katipunan (NLM- line in front of the respondents compound were assigned to the finishing department. As can
Katipunan). The NLM-Katipunan was issued a certificate of registration. be clearly inferred from the spot reports, employees from the knitting department also
4. A petition for certification election was later filed by the petitioner union. joined in picket. The blockade of the delivery of trucks and the attendance of employees from
5. Pending the resolution of the PCE, the CKC issued a Memorandum, informing the the other departments of the respondent meant work stoppage. The placards that the
employees of the change in the schedule brought about by the decrease in the picketers caused to be displayed arose from matters concerning terms or conditions of
orders from the customers. employment as well as the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
6. Another Memo as issued by the respondent informing its employees at the Dyeing maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment.
and Finishing Division that a temporary shutdown of the operations therein would
be effected for one week. The employees were advised to go on vacation leave. In order for a strike to be valid, the following requirements laid down in paragraphs (c) and (f)
7. Unable to solve its financial problems, the respondent decided to temporarily of Article 263 of the Labor Code must be complied with: (a) a notice of strike must be filed;
shutdown its operations at the Dyeing and Finishing Division effective the next day, (b) a strike-vote must be taken; and (c) the results of the strike-vote must be reported to the
scheduled to resume until further notice, It notified DOLE. DOLE. It bears stressing that these requirements are mandatory, meaning, non-compliance
8. For its reduced dyeing and finishing needs, the respondent brought the textiles to therewith makes the strike illegal. The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike
Crayons, Inc., a sister company. while the respondents service truck was to deliver notice and strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to
fabrics in Bulacan the group of petitioner Raymond Tomaroy and some companions the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law.
approached the truck as it made its way towards Don Pedro Street and blocked its
way. As a result, the driver of the service truck decided to return to the
respondents compound. Later that day, petitioner Tomaroy, with sixteen (16)
members of the petitioner union, staged a picket in front of the respondents
compound, carrying placards with slogans.
9. For 4 more days, the members as well as the supporters of the union gathered in
front of the companys compound carrying placards.
10. CKC filed a petition to declare the strike illegal before the NLRC.
11. LA: strike illegal hence, the union officers who knowingly participated in an illegal
strike, already lost their employment status
12. NLRC and CA affirmed. Hence this petition. The petitioners argue that they did not
stage a strike, much more an illegal strike. They explain that a strike means work
stoppage. Considering that the Dyeing and Finishing Division of the respondent was
shutdown, it could not have caused a work stoppage.

Issue: WON THE STRIKE IS ILLEGAL - YES

Ratio:

A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result
of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter
concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee.
168 Diwa ng Pagkakaisa-PAFLU v. Filtex
GR L-23960-61 February 12, 1972

Facts:
 The Feb. 19 work stoppage: On Feb. 19, 1961, two dismissed Filtex employees put up a
picket line on company premises to compel Filtex to reinstate them. They were
eventually joined by the midnight shift and morning shift employees of Filtex.
 Jose Abejero, a morning shift worker and Union secretary, informed PAFLU of the
incident. PAFLU President then convinced the employees to lift the picket line so that
everyone could go back to work.
 Filtex then allowed back the workers, except the Union officers.
 According to Filtex, the February 19 work stoppage was a “strike”; hence it violated the
CBA’s no-strike provision; and the since the strike was illegal, the Union officers should
suffer the consequences.
 On Feb. 26: The Union actually calls for a real strike.
 A month after, the Union offers to return to work for the sake of industrial peace. Again,
Filtex allowed workers back, except the Union officers.
 CIR cases were filed between the parties and tried jointy:
o Union sued Filtex for ULP for interference with worker’s rights and
discrimination meant to discourage union membership
o Filtex sued Union for ULP for violating the CBA
 CIR ruled for Filtex, and declares that the Feb. 19 “strike” was illegal

 Issue: Was the Feb. 19 work stoppage a “strike”? NO.

 There were no union demands refused.
 There were no deliberations by the union officers
 There was no order for the union members to strike
 In fact, the Union immediately convinced the workers to return to work
 Since there was no strike, then there was no violation of the CBA’s “no strike”
provision, and thus no need to first resort to the CBA’s grievance procedure.
 No responsibility therefore on the part of the Union officers. In fact, the case shows
that the Union took immediate steps to get the situation back to normal as soon as it
found out about the picket.
 If the other workers were readily admitted back to work there is no reason why the
officers, through whose efforts the incident was settled, should deserve a different
treatment.

 RE: Did the Feb. 26 strike continue the Feb. 19 “strike”? NO.
 As already noted, the Feb. 19 stoppage ended when PAFLU convinced the workers to go
back to work.
 Hence, the Feb. 19 incident was already closed, and could not have been “continued” by
the Feb. 26 strike.
 if a strike was called on February 26 it was because the readmission of the said officers
was refused.
 Since such refusal appears to be groundless, the fact that a strike was called on February
26, 1961 would not affect the resolution of this case, the only issue here being the
legality or illegality of the alleged strike of February 19.
170 Lapanday Workers Union vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 248 SCRA 95, G.R.
Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995
Facts:
Union has a collective bargaining agreement with private respondents, Lapanday Agricultural
and Development Corporation (LADECO) and CADECO Agro Development Phil. Inc 1, covering
the period from Dec 1985 – Nov 1988. A few months before the expiration of their CBA,
private respondents initiated certain management policies which disrupted the relationship
of the parties.
These Management Policies, are:
1. On the Security Services for the Business Premises
a. Contractor is Philippine Eagle Protectors and Security Agency, Inc.,. The
contract also called for the protection of the lives and limbs of the officers,
employees and guests within company premises.
b. The Union branded the security guards posted within the company premises
as private respondents’ “goons” and “special forces.”
c. It also accused the guards of intimidating and harassing their members.
2. On the seminars on Human Development and Industrial Relations (HDIR) for
their managerial, supervisory employees and the rank-and-filers, to promote
their social education and economic growth.
a. The Union claimed that the module on the Philippine political spectrum
lumped the ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor
Organization), with other outlawed labor organizations such as the
National Democratic Front or other leftist groups.
These issues were discussed during a labor-management meeting.
After private respondents explained the issues, the Union agreed to allow its members to
attend the HDIR seminar for the rank-and-filers.
Nevertheless, days after the Union directed its members not to attend the seminars
scheduled on said dates. Earlier on, the Union, picketed the premises of the Philippine Eagle
Protectors to show their displeasure on the hiring of the guards.
Worse still, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB. It accused the company of
unfair labor practices consisting of coercion of employees, intimidation of union members
and union-busting.
The NCMB called a conciliation conference. The Union officials did attend the September 5,
1988 seminar. While they no longer objected to the continuation of the seminar, they
reiterated their demand for the deletion of the discussion pertaining to the KMU-ANGLO.
With the apparent settlement of their differences, private respondents notified the NCMB
that there were no more bases for the notice of strike.
An unfortunate event broke the peace of the parties. In 1988, Danilo Martinez, a member of
the Board of Directors of the Union, was gunned down in his house in the presence of his
1
Sister companies engaged in Banana production
wife and children. The gunman was later identified as Eledio Samson, an alleged member of
the new security forces of private respondents.
The day after the killing, most of the members of the Union refused to report for work. They
returned to work the following day but did not comply with the “quota system” adopted by
the management to bolster production output. Allegedly, the Union instructed the workers
to reduce their production to thirty per cent (30%). Private respondents charged the Union
with economic sabotage through slowdown.
Thus, private respondents filed separate charges against the Union and its members for
illegal strike, unfair labor practice and damages, with prayer for injunction.
Petitioners skipped work to pay their last respect to the slain Danilo Martinez who was laid to
rest. Again, they did not report for work. Instead, they proceeded to private respondents’
office at Lanang, carrying placards and posters which called for the removal of the security
guards, the ouster of certain management officials, and the approval of their mass leave
application. Their mass action did not succeed.
In a last ditch effort to settle the deteriorating dispute between the parties, City Mayor
Rodrigo Duterte intervened. Dialogues were held on at the City Mayor’s Office. Again, the
dialogues proved fruitless as private respondents refused to withdraw the cases they earlier
filed with public respondent.
Thereafter, a strike vote was conducted among the members of the Union and those in favor
of the strike won overwhelming support from the workers. The result of the strike vote was
then submitted to the NCMB. Two days later, the Union struck.
LABOR ARBITER (herein referred as “Villanueva Decision”)-
 There is an Illegal Strike
Before the NLRC could resolve the appeal taken on the Villanueva decision, Labor Arbiter
Sancho rendered a decision in the two (2) cases filed by the Union against private
respondents
LABOR ARBITER (herein referred as “Sanchez Decision”)-
 Private respondents guilty of ULP and illegal dismissal and ordered the
reinstatement of the dismissed employees of private respondents, with backwages
and other benefits.
NLRC-
 Upheld Villanueva Decision
ISSUE:
Whether or not the strike held within the 7 day waiting period provided by Art 263 (f) of the
LC is illegal?
HELD:
YES. The strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is plainly illegal as it was held
within the seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor
Code, as amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor and
Employment from verifying whether it carried the approval of the majority of the union
members. It set to naught an important policy consideration of our law on strike. Considering
this finding, we need not exhaustively rule on the legality of the work stoppage conducted by
the union and some of their members on September 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the
ruling of the public respondent on the matter is supported by substantial evidence.
We also affirm the decision of the public respondent limiting the penalty of dismissal only to
the leaders of the illegal strike, especially the officers of the union who served as its major
players. They cannot claim good faith to exculpate themselves. They admitted knowledge of
the law on strike, including its procedure. They cannot violate the law which ironically was
cast to promote their interest.
We, likewise, agree with the public respondent that the union members who were merely
instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently from their leaders.
Part of our benign consideration for labor is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers
who were merely misled in supporting illegal strikes. Nonetheless, these reinstated workers
shall not be entitled to backwages as they should not be compensated for services skipped
during the illegal strike.
RATIO:
A strike is “any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result
of an industrial or labor dispute.” It is the most preeminent of the economic weapons of
workers which they unsheathe to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the
joint product of labor and capital.
Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, provide for the
MANDATORY procedural steps to be followed before staging a strike—
(1) filing of notice of strike,
(2) taking of strike vote, and
(3) reporting of the strike vote result to the DOLE.
“(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may
file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30
days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the notice shall be 15
days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike
may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case
of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union
constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the
union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take
action immediately.
x x x      x x x      x x x
“(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or
referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a
majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the partners in a
partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall
be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered
when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the
request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of secret balloting. In every case, the
union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven (7)
days before the intended str ike or lockout subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.

The seven (7) day waiting period is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify
whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union
members.

The need for assurance that majority of the union members support the strike cannot be
gainsaid. Strike is usually the last weapon of labor to compel capital to concede to its
bargaining demands or to defend itself against unfair labor practices of management. It is a
weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and its members in their struggle
with management for a more equitable due of their labors. The decision to wield the weapon
of strike must, therefore, rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the
tempers and tantrums of a few hotheads, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest of the
union which should not, however, be antithetical to the public welfare. Thus, our laws
require the decision to strike to be the consensus of the majority for while the majority is not
infallible, still, it is the best hedge against haste and error. In addition, a majority vote assures
the union it will go to war against management with the strength derived from unity and
hence, with better chance to succeed.

LAW:
Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111, provides:
STA ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EE UNION v COCA COL BOTTLERS PHILS INC 21, 1999 were disapproved, opted not to report for work on said date, and
gathered in front of the company premises to hold a mass protest action.
FACTS: Petitioners deliberately absented themselves and instead wore red ribbons, carried
1. Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union)entered into 3yr CBA with placards with slogans such as: YES KAMI SA STRIKE, PROTESTA KAMI, SAHOD,
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant.  KARAPATAN NG MANGGAGAWA IPAGLABAN, CBA-WAG BABOYIN, STOP UNION
2. Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to BUSTING. They marched to and fro in front of the companys premises during
renegotiate its terms. working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity which already
3. The Union insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca- affected the companys operations. The mass concerted activity constituted a strike.
Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings.   A strike is the most powerful of the economic weapons of workers which they
4. Company was of the view that the members of the Alyansa  were not members of unsheathe to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint
the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of the product of labor and capital. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or
Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization.  destroy the Union and its members in their struggle with management for a more
5. Union filed a notice of strike w NCMB on two grounds: deadlock and ULP from equitable due to their labors. The decision to declare a strike must therefore rest
refusal to bargain. on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, envisaged by the tempers and
6. Company filed MD alleging that the reasons cited by Union were not valid grounds tantrums of a few hot heads, and finally focused on the legitimate interests of
for strike. the Union which should not, however, be antithetical to the public welfare, and,
7. Union filed amended notice of strike stating the following grounds: ULP for refusal to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a
to bargain in good faith and interference w exercise of their right to self- means of attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the
organization. employer.
8. Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by Alaynsa in front of  Since strikes cause disparity effects not only on the relationship between labor
company’s premises. and management but also on the general peace and progress of society, the law
9. 106 union members filed for leave of absence, company disapproved it. has provided limitations on the right to strike. For a strike to be valid, the
10. A day before the mass action, some Union members wore gears, red tag cloths following procedural requisites provided by Art. 263 of the Labor Code must be
stating YES KAMI SA STRIKE as headgears and on the different parts of their observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended
uniform, shoulders and chests. date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved
11. Office of Mayor allowed the conduct of mass protest action. by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned
12. Union officers and members held a picket along the front perimeter of the plant - obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to
14 personnel of the Engineering Section of the Company did not report for work, the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended
and 71 production personnel were also absent. strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply
13. The volume of production for the day was short by 60,000 physical case[s] versus therewith renders the strike illegal.
budget.
14. Company filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal
15. Union argued that it is a valid exercise of their right to picket, which is part of the
right of free expression as guaranteed by the Constitution
16. LA: illegal strike since there was no showing that the union conducted strike vote.
17. NLRC: affirmed. CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE: WON it was a strike or picket?
HELD: It was a strike. (Illegal)
RATIO:
 The term strike encompasses not only concerted work stoppages, but also
slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage
plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities.
 Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer,
usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the
facts involved in a labor dispute. As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the
stationing of one or more persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose
of pickets is said to be a means of peaceable persuasion.
 The basic elements of a strike are present in this case : 106 members of
petitioner Union, whose respective applications for leave of absence on September
172
172 ESCARIO ET AL v. NLRC, PINAKAMASARAP CORP., TIN, and TAN
Strike – Effect on Work Relationship
1. The petitioners were among the regular employees of Pinakamasarap Coroporation
(PINA), engaged in manufacturing food seasoning.
2. They were members of Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Balanced Foods
(Union).
3. All the officers and 200 members of the Union walked out of Pina’s premises andwent to
the barangay office to show support for Cañete, an officer of the Union charged with
oral defamation by Manor, Pina’s manager, and Fabella, Manor’s secretary.
a. After settlement, the officers and members returned to work thereafter.
4. Pina preventively suspended all officer because of the walkout. After a month, it
terminated their employment.
5. Pina filed a complaint for ULP and damages.
6. LA: Incident was an illegal walkout constituting ULP, and that all the Union’s officers,
except Cañete, had thereby lost their employment.
7. Union filed a notice of strike, claiming that Pina was guilty of Union busting through
constructive dismissal.
8. After a strike vote, a strike was staged.
9. Pina retaliated by charging the strikers (petitioners) with ULP and abandonment of work
stating that they violated the provisions on strike of the CBA such as:
a. Sabotage by inserting foreign matter in the bottling of the products
b. Decreased production output by slowdown
c. Serious misconduct and willful disobedience and insubordination
d. Disruption of the work place by invading the premises and perpetrating
commotion
e. Abandonment of work despite notices
f. Picketing within the premises barring the in/egress of Pina’s officials and
employees.
10. NLRC: Issued a TRO enjoining the Union to cease and desist from barricading.
11. LA: Declared the strike illegal and that there was abandonment.
12. NLRC sustained as regards strike but reversed ruling on abandonment.
13. CA: Affirmed NLRC. Denied petitioners’ claim for full backwages.
a. CA applied the third paragraph of Article 264(a) instead of Article 279 of the
Labor Code, explaining that the only instance under Article 264 when a
dismissed employee would be reinstated with full backwages was when he
was dismissed by reason of an illegal lockout;
b. That Article 264 was silent on the award of backwages to employees
participating in a lawful strike; and
c. That a reinstatement with full backwages would be granted only when the
dismissal of the petitioners was not done in accordance with Article 282
(dismissals with just causes) and Article 283 (dismissals with authorized
causes) of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are entitled to full backwages from the date of dismissal until
actual reinstatement. NO.
 The petitioners’ participation in the illegal strike was precisely what prompted PINA to
file a complaint to declare them, as striking employees, to have lost their employment
status.
 However, the NLRC ultimately ordered their reinstatement after finding that they had
not abandoned their work by joining the illegal strike.
 They were thus entitled only to reinstatement, regardless of whether or not the strike
was the consequence of the employer’s ULP, considering that a strike was not a
renunciation of the employment relation.
 As a general rule, backwages are granted to indemnify a dismissed employee for his loss
of earnings during the whole period that he is out of his job.
o Considering that an illegally dismissed employee is not deemed to have left his
employment, he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him
from the employment.
 Their reinstatement sans backwages is in order, to conform to the policy of a fair day’s
wage for a fair day’s labor.
o The petitioners were not entitled to the wages during the period of the
strike (even if the strike might be legal), because they performed no work
during the strike. Verily, it was neither fair nor just that the dismissed
employees should litigate against their employer on the latter’s time.
 The third paragraph of Article 264(a) authorizes the award of full backwages only when
the termination of employment is a consequence of an unlawful lockout.
 On the consequences of an illegal strike, the provision distinguishes between a union
officer and a union member participating in an illegal strike.
o A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike is deemed to
have lost his employment status, but a union member who is merely
instigated or induced to participate in the illegal strike is more benignly
treated.
 The petitioners were terminated for joining a strike that was later declared to be illegal.
 They were not unjustly dismissed from work.
o Based on the text and intent of the two aforequoted provisions of the Labor
Code, therefore, it is plain that Article 264(a) is the applicable one.
173
Master Iron Labor Union v NLRC and Master Iron Corp.
[G.R. No. 92009. February 17, 1993]
Types and conversion/ Unfair labor practice
Facts: Master Iron Labor Union (MILU) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
with the Company for the three-year period. It States that there shall be no strike and no
lockout, stoppage or shutdown of work, or any other interference with any of the operation
of the COMPANY during the term of this AGREEMENT, unless allowed and permitted by law.
Right after the signing of the CBA, the Corporation subcontracted outside workers to do the
usual jobs done by its regular workers including those done outside of the company plant. As
a result, the regular workers were scheduled by the management to work on a rotation basis
allegedly to prevent financial losses thereby allowing the workers only ten (10) working days
a month. Thus, MILU requested implementation of the grievance procedure which had also
been agreed upon in the CBA, but the Corporation ignored the request.
Consequently, on April 8, 1987, MILU filed a notice of strike. Upon the intervention of the
DOLE the Corporation and MILU reached an agreement whereby the Corporation acceded to
give back the usual work to its regular employees who are members of MILU.
Notwithstanding said agreement, the Corporation continued the practice of hiring outside
workers.
MILU filed a notice of strike on the following grounds: (a) violation of CBA; (b) discrimination;
(c) unreasonable suspension of union officials; and (d) unreasonable refusal to entertain
grievance.
Ruling: No. As this Court has held, a no-strike clause in a CBA is applicable only to economic
strikes. Corollarily, if the strike is founded on an unfair labor practice of the employer, a strike
declared by the union cannot be considered a violation of the no-strike clause.
An economic strike is defined as one which is to force wage or other concessions from the
employer which he is not required by law to grant.
In this case, MILU enumerated in their notice of strike the following grounds: violation of
CBA or the Corporation's practice of subcontracting workers; discrimination; coercion of
employees; unreasonable suspension of union officials, and unreasonable refusal to entertain
grievance.
Professor Perfecto Fernandez, in his book Law on Strikes, Picketing and Lockouts (1981
edition, pp. 144-145), states that an economic strike involves issues relating to demands for
higher wages, higher pension or overtime rates, pensions, profit sharing, shorter working
hours, fewer work days for the same pay, elimination of night work, lower retirement age,
more healthful working conditions, better health services, better sanitation and more safety
appliances. The demands of the petitioners, being covered by the CBA, are definitely within
the power of the Corporation to grant and therefore the strike was not an economic strike
The strike staged by MILU was a legal one even though it may have been called to offset what
the strikers believed in good faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of the employer.
Verily, such presumption of legality prevails even if the allegations of unfair labor practices
are subsequently found out to be untrue.
Ruling of LA and NLRC reversed. The strike was legal.

On July 24, 1987, MILU staged the strike, maintaining picket lines on the road leading to the
Corporation's plant entrance and premises.

The picketers were dispersed and arrested by the CAPCOM.

The Corporation filed with the NLRC National Capital Region arbitration branch a petition to
declare the strike illegal. However, MILU re-staged the strike. Consequently, the Corporation
filed a petition for injunction before the NLRC which issued an order directing the workers to
remove the barricades and other obstructions which prevented ingress to and egress from
the company premises.

LA ruled that the strike is illegal. On appeal to NLRC, the NLRC affirmed the decision of LA.
NLRC relied on no strike no lock out provision in the CBA.

On appeal before the SC, MILU contend that notwithstanding the non-strike provision in the
CBA, the strike they staged was legal because the reasons therefor are non-economic in
nature.

Issue: WON the strike was illegal.

174 SHELL OIL WORKERS UNION V. SHELL CO. OF THE PHILS. LTD., and CIR
Shell wanted to dissolve its security guard section stationed at its Pandacan Installation, even
though its existence was assured by the CBA.
1. Union filed a petition alleging that the 18 security guards affected are part of the
bargaining unit and covered by the CBA, as such, their transfers and eventual dismissals
are illegal being done in violation of the existing contract
2. Shell prayed for the dismissal of petition and the said strike be declared illegal
3. Shell reasoned out that if an outside agency is hired to perform security services, they
would save 96k annually
4. There was a consultation with the Union and that the latter did not oppose such move
provided it be done gradually
5. However, a CBA was executed, it included the security guards in the CBA
6. Union tried to talk to Shell to just keep the security guards – unheeded
7. Union told shell that they would hold a strike
8. CIR – no ULP since its within Shell’s MP, hence, strike was illegal there being no
compliance with statutory requisites before a strike could be staged
ISSUE: Whether or not dissolution of the security guard section is a MP. YES but barred by
the CBA.
RATIO:
 It is to be admitted that the stand of Shell Company as to the scope of management
prerogative is not devoid of plausibility if it were not bound by what was stipulated
 What was stipulated in an existing collective bargaining contract certainly precluded
Shell Company from carrying out what otherwise would have been within its prerogative
if to do so would be violative thereof
ISSUE: Whether or not the strike was illegal. NO.
RATIO:
 The ULP strike called by the Union did have the impress of validity. Labor is justified in
making use of such a weapon in its arsenal to counteract what is clearly outlawed by the
Industrial Peace Act. That would be one way to assure that the objectives of
unionization and collective bargaining would not be thwarted. It could, of course, file an
unfair labor practice case before the Court of Industrial Relations. It is not precluded,
however, from relying on its own resources to frustrate such an effort on the part of
employer
 laborer is inhibited from striking or walking out of his employment only when so
enjoined by the Court of Industrial Relations and after a dispute has been submitted
thereto and pending award or decision by the court of such dispute
 The employees or laborers may strike before being ordered not to do so and before an
industrial dispute is submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations, subject to the power
of the latter, after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot,
in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled, to order them to return, with the
consequence that if the strikers fail to return to work, when so ordered, the court may
authorize the employer to accept other employees or laborers
There being a valid unfair labor practice strike, the loss of employment decreed by
respondent Court on all the Union officers cannot stand. The premise on which such penalty
was decreed was the illegality of the strike. Hence, its imposition is unwarranted. It is to be
made clear, however, that because of the commission of specific serious acts of violence, the
Union's President as well as its Assistant Auditor did incur such a penalty

ISSUE: Whether or not the CBA constituted a bar to such decision reached by the
management. YES.
RATIO:
 There was specific coverage concerning the security guard section in the collective
bargaining contract. It is found not only in the body thereof but in the two appendices
concerning the wage schedules as well as the premium pay and the night compensation
to which the personnel in such section were entitled
 What is involved is the integrity of the agreement reached, the terms of which should be
binding of both parties
 Shell Company, in failing to manifest fealty to what was stipulated in an existing
collective bargaining contract, was thus guilty of an unfair labor practice
 In Security Bank Employees Union v. Security Bank and Trust Company
o "It being expressly provided in the industrial Peace Act that [an] unfair labor
practice is committed by a labor union or its agent by its refusal 'to bargain
collectively with the employer' and this Court having decided in the Republic
Savings Bank case that collective bargaining does not end with the execution
of an agreement, being a continuous process, the duty to bargain necessarily
imposing on the parties the obligation to live up to the terms of such a
collective bargaining agreement if entered into, it is undeniable that non-
compliance therewith constitutes an unfair labor practice."
175 CONSOLIDATED LABOR ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILS v. MARSMAN & CO. and CIR (1964)
FACTS:
1. MARCELA-FFW (the Union) submitted to Marsman & Co (the Company) a set of
proposals for CB.
2. They failed to reach an agreement so the Union filed a notice of strike. Mediation by the
Conciliation Service of DOLE proved fruitless.
3. The Union declared a strike and placed a "round-the-clock" picket line around the
Company's premises in Intramuros. Policemen came to preserve peace. Meanwhile, the
Conciliation Service continued to mediate between the reps of the parties.
4. Subsequently, in a conference called by the SOLE, the Company VP offered (1) to take
back ALL the strikers if they would only stop the strike and (2) to discuss the Union's
demands when the strikers were already working. The SOLE convinced the Union to
accept this proposal, w/c the Union did.
5. Hence, the Company re-admitted majority of the strikers. However, herein complainants
were refused admittance and were informed by Company officials that they would not
be reinstated unless they ceased to be active Union members.
6. Hence, the strike and the picketing resumed.
7. During the strike, some of the picketers and some non-strikers were arrested within the
strike zone for having committed unlawful acts, and were criminally charged.
8. A petition for writ of injunction was filed by the Company against the Union and its
president on the ground that the strike and picket were being maintained illegally.
9. CFI: DENIED. The proper criminal complaints should have been filed against the
individual strikers in the corresponding courts.
10. Because of the Company's consistent refusal to reinstate the 69 complainants even after
repeated requests, CLAP, to which the Union had affiliated after disaffiliating from FFW,
initiated the present charge for ULP.
11. CIR: Company is guilty of ULP. Ordered it to reinstate 60 of the 69 complainants w/o
backwages. MR denied.
12. Both the Union and the Company appealed.
a. Union: The 60 reinstated EEs should be granted backpay
b. Company questions the CIR’s finding of ULP
ISSUES & RULING: (Honestly, hindi ako sure alin ba yung pertinent issue huhuhu but the topic
in the syllabus is “Types and Conversion: Bargaining Deadlock – Economic/ULP” – na parang
hindi naman issue??)
TOPIC IN THE SYLLABUS (naka-bold)
Initially the strike staged by the Union was meant to compel the Company to grant it
certain economic benefits in its proposal for CB. The strike was an economic one, and the
striking EEs would have a right to be reinstated if, in the interim, the ER did not hire other
permanent workers to replace them.
For it is recognized that during the pendency of an ECONOMIC STRIKE an employer may
take steps to continue and protect his business by supplying places left vacant by the
strikers, and is not bound to discharge those hired for that purpose upon election of the
strikers to resume their employment.
 But the strike changed its character from the time the Company refused to reinstate
complainants because of their union activities after it had offered to admit all the
strikers and in fact did readmit the others. It was then converted into an UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE STRIKE.
1. W/N the Company is guilty of ULP. YES.
Company: That the complainants applied for readmission only more than a year after the
offer, when CLAP wrote the Company asking for their reinstatement.
 Prior to said letter, however, complainants had, by various means, sought readmission.
 After accepting the VP’s offer, 81 of the strikers were allowed to come back. But the
Company's security guards barred entry when herein complainants attempted to enter,
and told them to write individual letters of application. Complainants complied but their
applications were scrutinized by a committee. None of the 69 applications was granted.
 Some complainants called & others personally approached their respective chiefs of
department in the Company.
 Some also went to see the chairman of the screening committee, and expressed their
desire to work. However, upon learning that the strikers were still active union
members, the chairman informed them that they should first disaffiliate from the union
in order to be reinstated.
Company: That it was its policy of retrenchment, not labor discrimination, which prevented it
from rehiring complainants.
 Disproved by the fact that it hired new EEs and even increased the salaries of its
personnel by almost 50%.
 It was not business exigency but a desire to discourage union activities which prompted
the Company to deny readmittance to complainants. This is an indubitable case of ULP.
2. W/N the strike was illegal. NO, it was legal.
Company: That the strike was illegal because (1) it was staged for a trifling reason and (2)
the union demands were already covered by the CIR judgment – w/c, in order to be modified,
necessitates that a certain procedure be followed.
 The Union began the strike because it believed in good faith that settlement of their
demands was at an impasse and that further negotiations would only come to naught. It
stopped the strike upon the belief they could go back to work. Then it renewed the
strike as a protest against the discrimination practiced by the Company. Both are valid
grounds for going on a strike.
 While the CIR already promulgated a decision, however, except for the demand for
general salary increases, the demands in the CIR case were different from the demands
which the Union made before it went on strike. Hence, no modification of this judgment
is needed. It had only to give the proper strike notice, w/c it did.
Company: That since the methods used by the strikers were illegal, it had the right to refuse
them readmission.
 9 out of the 69 complainants were convicted of various crimes like coercion, malicious
mischief, physical injuries, breach of the peace, light threats, and damage to property,
 committed during the period of strike. Nevertheless, it does not appear that these
individual acts were authorized or impliedly sanctioned by the Union.
 Hence, the other strikers who did not participate in the illegal acts should not be
deprived of their right of reinstatement. Only those who are guilty should be penalized.
3. W/N the EEs were entitled to backpay. NO.
In an economic strike, the strikers are NOT entitled to backpay, since the ER should get the
equivalent day's work for what he pays his EEs.
 During the time that the strike was an economic one, complainants had no right to back
pay. CIR could not have made a finding of ULP with respect to such time, as none had so
far been committed.
 This being a ULP case, it cannot, therefore, order reinstatement much less back pay for
that period.
On the other hand, even after the court has made a finding of ULP, it still has the discretion
to determine W/N to grant back pay.
 Such discretion was not abused when it denied back wages to complainants, considering
the climate of violence which attended the strike and picket.
 While the complainants ordered reinstated did not actively take part in the acts of
violence, their threatening attitude towards the Company is shown by the fact that from
the first day of the strike, policemen had to patrol the strike zone in order to preserve
peace.
176 Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) v. NLRC (1991)
FACTS:
1. Upon effectivity of the Wage Rationalization Act (RA 6727), the union Ilaw at Buklod ng
Manggagawa (IBM), presented to San Miguel Corp (SMC) a demand for correction of the
significant distortion in the workers’ wages.
2. In said demand, IBM explicitly invoked § 4 (d) of RA 6727 which reads: “Where the
application of the increases in the wage rates results in distortions in the wage structure
within an establishment and gives rise to a dispute therein, such dispute shall first be
settled voluntarily between the parties and in the event of a deadlock, the same shall be
finally resolved through compulsory arbitration by the regional branches of the NLRC
having jurisdiction over the workplace. It shall be mandatory for the NLRC to conduct
continuous hearings and decide any dispute arising under this Section within 20
calendar days from the time said dispute is formally submitted to it for arbitration. The
pendency of a dispute arising from a wage distortion shall not in any way delay the
applicability of the increase in wage rates.”
3. As such, SMC offered an across-the-board wage increase of P7/day per employee as
against IBM’s proposal of P25/day per employee. However, this did not satisfy IMB.
Consequently, the workers refused to work beyond 8 hours every day to compel SMC to
correct the said distortion. Basically, they went on strike by not working beyond 8-hours
which was already been implemented by SMC for 5 years. This caused substantial losses
to SMC.
4. Thereafter, SMC filed a complaint against IBM to declare its strike as illegal and to
terminate employment of the members thereof. NLRC issued a resolution in favor of
SMC and ordered IBM to cease and desist. IBM appealed.
5. In its defense, SMC submits that the strike staged by IBM in order to compel SMC to
yield to its demand for the correction of wage distortions is illegal and an unprotected
activity. SMC argues that it is contrary to law and to their CBA.
ISSUE: Whether IBM can compel SMC to correct wage distortions by means of a strike. NO
HELD/RATIO:
 NO. Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code is that of engaging in
concerted activities (ie. Strike, picketing, boycott) in order to attain their legitimate
objectives.
 It goes without saying that these joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or
restricted by law or contract. In the particular instance of “distortions of the wage
structure within an establishment” resulting from “the application of any prescribed
wage increase by virtue of a law or wage order,” prescribes a specific, detailed and
comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding
strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of settlement of the issue.
 The legislative intent of RA 6727 is that the solution of the problem of wage distortions
shall be sought by voluntary negotiation or arbitration, and NOT by strikes, lockouts,
 or other concerted activities of the employees or management, is made clear in the
rules implementing RA 6727. Section 16, Chapter I of these implementing rules, after
reiterating the policy that wage distortions be first settled voluntarily by the parties and
eventually by compulsory arbitration, declares that, “any issue involving wage
distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout.”
 Moreover, the CBA between SMC and IBM also prescribes a similar means for the
avoidance of strikes or other concerted activities as a mode of resolving disputes.
 IBM was thus prohibited to declare and hold a strike or otherwise engage in non-
peaceful concerted activities for the settlement of its controversy with SMC in respect
of wage distortions, or for that matter; any other issue “involving or relating to wages,
hours of work, conditions of employment and/ or employer-employee relations.”
 The partial strike or concerted refusal by the IBM members to follow the work
schedule which they had therefore been observing, resorted to as a means of coercing
correction of “wage distortions,” was therefore forbidden by law and contract and, on
this account, illegal.
177 PHILCOM EMPLOYEES UNION VS PHILIPPINE GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS and
PHILCOM CORPORATION
G.R. No. 144315             July 17, 2006
Facts:
 The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner Philcom Employees
Union and the respondent Philcom Corporation expired.
o the parties started negotiations for the renewal of their CBA in July 1997
o While negotiations were ongoing, PEU filed a Notice of Strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) – National Capital
Region
 Ground: perceived unfair labor practice committed by the
company
(a) PABX transfer and contractualization of PABX service and
position;
(b) Massive contractualization;
(c) Flexible labor and additional work/function;
(d) Disallowance of union leave intended for union seminar;
(e) Misimplementation and/or non-implementation of
employees' benefits like shoe allowance, rainboots, raincoats,
OIC shift allowance, P450.00 monthly allowance, driving
allowance, motorcycle award and full-time physician;
(f) Non-payment, discrimination and/or deprivation of
overtime, restday work, waiting/stand by time and staff
meetings;
(g) Economic inducement by promotion during CBA negotiation;
(h) Disinformation scheme, surveillance and interference with
union affairs;
(i) Issuance of memorandum/notice to employees without
giving copy to union, change in work schedule at Traffic Records
Section and ITTO policies; and
(j) Inadequate transportation allowance, water and facilities."
o The company, then, suspended the ongoing CBA negotiation
 Ground: bargaining deadlock
o The union went for another strike
 At a conciliation conference held at the NCMB-NCR office, the parties agreed to
consolidate the two (2) Notices of Strike filed by the union and to maintain the
status quo during the pendency of the proceedings
o While the union and the company officers and representatives were
meeting, the remaining union officers and members staged a strike at the
company premises.
 The company immediately filed a petition for the Secretary of Labor and
Employment to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
o Acting Labor Secretary Trajano: enjoining any strike or lockout, whether
threatened or actual, directing the parties to cease and desist from
committing any act that may exacerbate the situation/
 Secretary of Labor: The Union's Manifestation/Motion to Strike Out Portions of and
Attachments in Philcom's Position Paper is hereby denied for lack of merit. The
 Union's charges of unfair labor practice against the Company are hereby attend a seminar notwithstanding that its request to be given more
dismissed. details about the affair was left unheeded by the union. Those who were
 CA: Violations of CBAs, except those gross in character, are mere grievances denied leave were urgently needed for the operation of the company.
resolvable through the appropriate grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration as
provided in the CBAs
Issue/s: 1.) Was there an illegal strike? The Strike was illegal having found that PEU's officers
and members have committed illegal acts during the strike.
Ratio:
 Philcom is engaged in a vital industry (in this case, Philcom is engaged with the
communication industry) protected by Presidential Decree No. 823 (PD 823), as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 849, from strikes and lockouts.
o the striking employees violated the no-strike policy of the State in regard
to vital industries
 The Secretary had already assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Despite the
issuance of the return-to-work orders dated 19 November and 28 November
1997, the striking employees failed to return to work and continued with their
strike.
o A return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory despite
the filing of a motion for reconsideration. It must be strictly complied
with even during the pendency of any petition questioning its validity.
 PEU staged the strike in utter disregard of the grievance procedure established in
the CBA.
o A strike declared on the basis of grievances which have not been
submitted to the grievance committee as stipulated in the CBA of the
parties is premature and illegal.
On ULP:
 Unfair labor practices of the employer are enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor
Code (check your codal, please)
 In this case, do not fall under any of the prohibited acts defined and
enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code.
 The issues of misimplementation or non-implementation of employee
benefits, non-payment of overtime and other monetary claims,
inadequate transportation allowance, water, and other facilities, are all a
matter of implementation or interpretation of the economic provisions of
the CBA between Philcom and PEU subject to the grievance procedure.
o The Union failed to convincingly show that there is flagrant and/or malicious
refusal by the Company to comply with the economic provisions stipulated in the
CBA.
 Guys, here inexplain kung bakit hindi ULP yung acts nun employer. Medyo
madami sya kung i-enumerate. Examples na lang, hehe:
 On contractualization and economic inducement: the acts of said
company qualify as a valid exercise of management prerogative. It is not
unfair labor practice to contract out work for reason of reduction of labor
cost through the acquisition of automatic machines.
 On the union's charge that management disallowed leave of union
officers and members to attend union seminar: this is belied by the
evidence submitted by the union itself. In a letter to PEU's President, the
company granted the leave of several union officers and members to
178 Biflex Phils., Inc. Labor Union (NAFLU) v. Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing redress of grievances, the exercise of such rights is not absolute.For the protection of other
Corporation and Biflex (Phils.) significant state interests such as the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
G.R. No. 155679 investments, and to expansion and growth enshrined in the 1987 Constitution must also be
December 19, 2006 considered, otherwise, oppression or self-destruction of capital in order to promote the
interests of labor would be sanctioned. And it would give imprimatur to workers joining
Topic: Strike; Grounds; Prohibited Strikes demonstrations/rallies even before affording the employer an opportunity to make the
necessary arrangements to counteract the implications of the work stoppage on the
FACTS: business, and ignore the novel principle of shared responsibility between workers and
Petitioners are officers of Biflex (Phils.) Inc. Labor Union and Filflex Industrial and employers aimed at fostering industrial peace.
Manufacturing Labor Union. The two petitioner-unions, which are affiliated with National There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention, or that they
Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), are the respective collective bargaining agents of the were allowed by respondents, to join the welga ng bayan on October 24, 1990, their work
employees of corporations. stoppage is beyond legal protection.
Respondents Biflex (Phils.) Inc. and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation DOCTRINE: Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they
(respondents) are sister companies engaged in the garment business.Situated in one big are scheduled to work, refuse to work and instead join a welga ng bayan commit an illegal
compound along with another sister company, General Garments Corporation (GGC), they work stoppage.
have a common entrance.
On October 24, 1990, the labor sector staged a welga ng bayan to protest the accelerating
prices of oil. On even date, petitioner-unions, led by their officers, herein petitioners, staged
a work stoppage which lasted for several days, prompting respondents to file on October 31,
1990 a petition to declare the work stoppage illegal for failure to comply with procedural
requirements.
On November 13, 1990, respondents resumed their operations. Petitioners, claiming that
they were illegally locked out by respondents, assert that aside from the fact that the welga
ng bayan rendered it difficult to get a ride and the apprehension that violence would erupt
between those participating in thewelga and the authorities, respondents workers were
prevented from reporting for work.
Petitioners further assert that respondents were slighted by the workers no-show, and as a
punishment, the workers as well as petitioners were barred from entering the company
premises.
On their putting up of tents, tables and chairs in front of the main gate of respondents
premises, petitioners, who claim that they filed a notice of strike on October 31, 1990,
explain that those were for the convenience of union members who reported every morning
to check if the management would allow them to report for work.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the work stoppage was illegal since the
following requirements for the staging of a valid strike were not complied with: (1) filing of
notice of strike; (2) securing a strike vote, and (3) submission of a report of the strike vote to
the Department of Labor and Employment.
LA - Strike was illegal
NLRC - Reversed. It accordingly ordered respondents to reinstate petitioners to their former
positions, without loss of seniority rights, and with full backwages from the date of their
termination.
CA - Reversed. Reinstated the decision of LA
ISSUE: WON the strike was illegal?
RULING: YES!
Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they are
scheduled to work, refuse to work and instead join a welga ng bayan commit an illegal work
stoppage.
Even if petitioners joining the welga ng bayan were considered merely as an exercise of their
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly or freedom to petition the government for
179
179 Malayang Samahan ng Manggawa sa M. Greenfield (MSMG) v Ramos (Topic: No Strike
Clause)
Facts:
1. Petitioner MSMG is an affiliate of the federation United Lumber and General Workers of
the Philippines (ULGWP). MSMG and M. Greenfield entered into a CBA with the ff.
provisions: Membership as condition precedent for continued employment; Program fund –
the company shall provide the amount of P10K/month for a continuing labor education
program which shall be remitted to the federation
2. The local union held a general membership meeting and several members failed to attend
prompting the EB to investigate the non-attendance of the members. Union wrote
respondent company a letter requesting it to deduct the union fines from the
wages/salaries of those union members who failed to attend the general membership
meeting. Secretary General of the federation disapproved the resolution imposing the fine.
The union officers protested.
4. The imposition of P50.00 fine became the subject of bitter disagreement between the
Federation and the local union culminating in the latter’s declaration of general autonomy
from the former through Resolution No. 10. In retaliation, the national federation asked
respondent company to stop the remittance of the local union’s share in the education funds.
5. Complaint for interpleader: Med-Arbiter: the company should remit the fund
6. The officials of ULGWP called a Special National Executive Board Meeting where a
Resolution was passed placing the MSMG under trusteeship and appointing respondent
Cesar Clarete as administrator.
7. The said administrator wrote the respondent company informing the latter of its
designation of a certain Alfredo Kalingking as local union president and "disauthorizing" the
incumbent union officers from representing the employees.
8. The federation advised respondent company of the expulsion of the 30 union officers
and demanded their separation from employment pursuant to the Union Security Clause in
their collective bargaining agreement. Thereafter, the Federation filed a Notice of Strike
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to compel the company to effect the
immediate termination of the expelled union officers. Under the pressure of a threatened
strike, respondent company terminated the 30 union officers from employment. The
Federation, having achieved its objective, withdrew the Notice of Strike filed with the
NCMB.
11. The petitioners filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB alleging the following grounds for
the strike:(a) Discrimination (b) Interference in union activities (c) Mass dismissal of union
officers and shop stewards (d) Threats, coercion and intimidation (e) Union busting
14. The following day, a strike vote referendum was conducted and out of 2, 103 union
members who cast their votes, 2,086 members voted to declare a strike.
15. The petition was dismissed by then Secretary Franklin Drilon: it is clear that the dispute at
M. Greenfield is purely an intra-union matter. No mass lay-off is evident as the terminations
have been limited to those allegedly leading the secessionist group leaving MSMG-ULGWP to
form a union under the KMU.
16. A total of 78 union shop stewards were placed under preventive suspension by
respondent company. This prompted the union members to again stage a walk-out and
resulted in the official declaration of strike at around 3:30 in the afternoon of March 14,
1989. The strike was attended with violence, force and intimidation on both sides resulting
to physical injuries to several employees, both striking and non-striking, and damage to
company properties.
17. Petitioners filed a verified complaint with the Arbitration Branch, charging private
respondents of unfair labor practice. LA: Termination is valid; in compliance with the union
security clause
Issue: W/N the strike is illegal - NO
Ruling:
Labor Arbiter: the strike was illegal for the following reasons: (1) it was based on an intra-
union dispute which cannot properly be the subject of a strike(2) it was made in violation of
the "no strike, no lock-out" clause in the CBA, and (3) it was attended with violence, force
and intimidation upon the persons of the company officials
SC: On the submission that the strike was illegal for being grounded on a non-strikeable issue,
that is, the intra-union conflict between the federation and the local union, it bears
reiterating that when respondent company dismissed the union officers, the issue was
transformed into a termination dispute and brought respondent company into the picture.
Petitioners believed in good faith that in dismissing them upon request by the federation,
respondent company was guilty of unfair labor pratice in that it violated the petitioner’s
right to self-organization. The strike was staged to protest respondent company’s act of
dismissing the union officers. Even if the allegations of unfair labor practice are
subsequently found out to be untrue, the presumption of legality of the strike prevails.
Another reason why the Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal is due to the existence of a
no strike no lockout provision in the CBA. Again, such a ruling is erroneous. A no strike, no
lock out provision can only be invoked when the strike is economic in nature, i.e. to force
wage or other concessions from the employer which he is not required by law to grant.
Such a provision cannot be used to assail the legality of a strike which is grounded on unfair
labor practice, as was the honest belief of herein petitioners. Again, whether or not there
was indeed unfair labor practice does not affect the strike.
On the allegation of violence committed in the course of the strike, it must be remembered
that the Labor Arbiter and the Commission found that "the parties are agreed that there
were violent incidents x x x resulting to injuries to both sides, the union and
management."The evidence on record show that the violence cannot be attributed to the
striking employees alone for the company itself employed hired men to pacify the strikers.
With violence committed on both sides, the management and the employees, such violence
cannot be a ground for declaring the strike as illegal.
180 Pilipino Telephone Corp. v. PILIEA
FACTS:
 The CBA between the Union and Pilipino Telephone Corporation (the Company)
was due to expire. The Union submitted to the Company its proposals for the
renegotiation of the non-representation aspects of their CBA. As there was a
standstill on several issues, the parties submitted their dispute to the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for preventive mediation. The
conciliation proceedings failed.
 On July 13, 1998, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB for unfair labor
practice due to the alleged acts of “restraint and coercion of union members and
interference with their right to self-organization” committed by the Company to
wit:
o Requiring employees to execute undated resignation letters prior to
regularization as a condition for continued employment.
o Preventing employees from displaying Union flags and CBA’s slogans.
o Prohibiting employees from conducting and preventing employees from
participating in Union activities.
o Requiring employees to render forced overtime to prevent them from
attending Union meetings and activities after office hours.
o Using vulgar and insulting language such as “Kahit sa puwet n’yo isaksak
ang mga banderang yan!”
o Threatening employees who join concerted Union activities with
disciplinary action.
o Discouraging employees from participating in Union activities by branding
the activities illegal and prohibited by law.
o Abuse of Company Rules and Regulations to prevent the free exercise by
the Union and its members of their right to self organization and free
expression (e.g. issuing show cause memos for refusal to render overtime
and vandalism).
o Utilizing security guards to harass employees who participate in Union
activities by requiring the guards to take down the names of employees
who participate in the Union activities.
 The Union filed a second Notice of Strike with the NCMB on the grounds of: a)
union busting, for the alleged refusal of the Company to turn over union funds; and
b) the mass promotion of union members during the CBA negotiation, allegedly
aimed at excluding them from the bargaining unit during the CBA negotiation. On
the same day, the Union went on strike.
 SOLE directed the striking Union officers and members to return to work within
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the Order and for the Company to accept all
strikers under the same terms and conditions of employment prior to the strike.
The Union and its members complied.
 Company filed with the NLRC a petition to declare the Union’s strike illegal.
 LA: strike is illegal. Suspended employees.
 NLRC: Affirmed NLRC
 CA via Rule 65: the union contend that this finding of unfair labor practice
precludes the CA from ruling that the strike was illegal and that the Union was in
bad faith in conducting the strike.
ISSUE: Whether the Union’s strike is illegal taking into consideration that SOLE assumed
jurisdiction?
HELD: Yes. Article 263 of the Labor Code, outline the following procedural requirements for a
valid strike:
1) A notice of strike, with the required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically
the Regional Branch of the NCMB, copy furnished the employer of the union;
2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of notice and the actual
execution of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen (15) days in
case of unfair labor practice. However, in the case of union busting where the union’s
existence is threatened, the cooling-off period need not be observed. XXX
4) Before a strike is actually commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting,
with a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB. The decision to declare a strike requires the secret-
ballot approval of majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned.
5) The result of the strike vote should be reported to the NCMB at least seven (7) days before
the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period.
It is settled that these requirements are mandatory in nature and failure to comply
therewith renders the strike illegal. In the case at bar, the Union staged the strike on the
same day that it filed its second notice of strike. The Union violated the seven-day strike
ban. This requirement should be observed to give the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the approval of the
majority of the union members.
181/186 SUKHOTHAI CUISINE v. CA
Strike Vote; Effects of Illegality of Strike
1. The majority of the employees of Sukhothai organized themselves into Union whoch
affiliated with the Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC), and was designated as PLAC
Local 460 Sukhothai Restaurant Chapter.
2. The Union filed a notice of strike with NCMB on the ground of ULP (acts of harassment,
fault-finding, union busting through coercion and interference with union affairs).
3. In the conference, the representative of Sukhothai guaranteed that there will be no
termination of the services of the Union members during the pendency of the case, with
the reservation of the MP to issue memos to erring employees, for violation of company
policies
4. A strike vote was conducted and supervised by NCMB.
5. Sukhothai and the Union entered into a Submission Agreement, agreeing to submit the
issue of ULP for voluntary arbitration to prevent the strike.
6. During the pendency of the voluntary arbitration, Garcia (Sukhothai’s President)
dismissed Lucente (Union member) due to an alleged petty quarrel with a co-employee.
a. The Union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC.
7. Lanorias, another Union member, was relieved from his post as cook.
a. Bacus, union VP, conferred with Garcia and protested his dismissal.
8. Shortly after, the Union staged a wildcat strike.
9. A notice of strike was re-filed by the Union and the protest was converted into a sit-
down strike. Next day, it was transformed into an actual strke.
10. Sukhothai filed a complaint for illegal strike with the NLRC seeking to declare the strike
illegal.
11. LA: Illegal strike. Employment of the union officers are deemed validly terminated.
Union directed to remove picket lines and obstructions.
a. The Notice of Strike and Strike Cote referred to a prior dispute submitted for
voluntary arbitration and hence, they cannot apply to the strike staged about
6 months later.
b. The union failed to comply with the mandatory requisites for a lawful strike.
c. Issuance of memos was a management prerogative and is not ULP.
12. NLRC: Reversed. Sukhothai was guilty of union busting.
a. Notice of strike and Strike Vote was applicable to the strike staged 6 months
later since the same issues of unfair labor practices are continuing offenses.
b. Even if the Notice of Strike and Strike Vote were not applicable, the Union may
take action immediately since Sukhothai is guilty of union busting
c. Refiling of a Notice of Strike cired the defect of noncompliance with the
mandatory requirements.
d. CA: Affirmed NLRC.
 UNION: Insists that the filing of the Notice of Strike on December 3, 1998, the Strike
Vote of December 11, 1998, the submission of the results of the vote to the NCMB on
December 21, 1998, and their observation of the 15-day cooling-off period in case of
unfair labor practice as well as the seven-day reporting period of the results of the strike
vote, all satisfy the mandatory requirements under Article 263 of the Labor Code and
are applicable to the June 1999 strike.
o Invoked Article 263(f) in that the decision to strike is valid for the duration of
the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the
strike vote was taken, thus, there is no need to repeat the process.
  Individual respondents engaged in illegal acts during the strike, such as the intimidation
ISSUE: Whether the strike staged was illegal. YES. and harassment of a considerable number of customers to turn them away and
discourage them from patronizing the business of Sukhothai.
 The undisputed fact, however, is that at the time the strike was staged in June 1999,
voluntary arbitration between the parties was ongoing by virtue of the January 21, 1999
Submission Agreement.
o The issue to be resolved under those proceedings pertained to the very same
issues stated in the Notice of Strike of December 3, 1998: the commission of
unfair labor practices, such as acts of harassment, fault-finding, and union
busting through coercion and interference with union affairs.
 This Court has held that strikes staged in violation of agreements providing for
arbitration are illegal, since these agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected
if their ends are to be achieved.
 The rationale of the prohibition under Article 264 is that once jurisdiction over the labor
dispute has been properly acquired by competent authority, that jurisdiction should not
be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike
 The Union should have availed themselves of any of these alternative remedies instead
of resorting to a drastic and unlawful measure, specifically, the holding a wildcat strike.
And because of the fact that the Union was fully aware that the arbitration proceedings
were pending, good faith cannot be invoked as a defense.
 For failing to exhaust all steps in the arbitration proceedings by virtue of the Submission
Agreement, in view of the proscription under Article 264 of the Labor Code, and the
prevailing state policy as well as its underlying rationale, this Court declares that the
strike staged by the Union is illegal.

RE: Strike Vote

 The cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban after the strike-vote report were
intended to be mandatory, and in case of union busting where the existence of the
union is threatened, it is only the 15-day cooling-off period that may be dispensed with.
 In case of unfair labor practice involving the dismissal from employment of any union
officer duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws which may
constitute union-busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the fifteen-day
cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately after the
strike vote is conducted and the results thereof submitted to the appropriate regional
branch of the Board.
 The implementing rules clarify Article 263(c) in that the union may strike “immediately”
provided that the strike vote is conducted, the results thereof submitted “in every case”
at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout.
 In case of alleged union busting, the three remaining requirements, notice, strike vote,
and seven-day report period, cannot be dispensed with.

NOTE:
 Even if the strike were to be declared valid because its objective or purpose is lawful,
the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal.
 Permissible activities of the picketing workers do not include obstruction of access of
customers.
182 183 Master Iron Labor Union vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 92009. February 17, 1993.
Author: Andre Mina

FACTS:

1. Master Iron Labor Union (Union) entered into a CBA with Master Iron Works Construction
Corporation (Master) for the 3-year period between December 1, 1986 and November 30,
1989. The CBA contained a provision which states that “That there shall be no strike and no
lockout, stoppage or shutdown of work, or any other interference with any of the operation
of the COMPANY during the term of this AGREEMENT, unless allowed and permitted by law.”
and a grant of service allowance, which states that “The COMPANY agrees to continue the
granting of service allowance of workers assigned to work outside the company plant, in
addition to his daily salary, as follows: (a) For those assigned to work outside the plant but
within Metro Manila, the service allowance shall be P12.00; (b) For those assigned to work
outside Metro Manila, the service allowance shall be P25.00/day;
(c) The present practice of conveying to and from the jobsites of workers assigned to work
outside of the company plant shall be maintained.”

2. Right after the signing of the CBA, the Corporation subcontracted outside workers to do
the usual jobs done by its regular workers including those done outside of the company
plant. As a result, the regular workers were scheduled by the management to work on a
rotation basis allegedly to prevent financial losses thereby allowing the workers only ten (10)
working days a month. The Union requested implementation of the grievance procedure
which had also been agreed upon in the CBA, but the Master ignored the request.

3. When the Union president, Wilfredo Abulencia, insisted in doing his regular work of cutting
steel bars which was being done by casual workers, a supervisor reprimanded him, charged
him with insubordination and suspended him for 3 days. Upon the request of the Union,
Francisco Jose of the DOLE called for conciliation conferences. Master insisted that the hiring
of casual workers was a management prerogative. It ignored subsequent scheduled
conciliation conferences. Subsequently, the Union filed a notice of strike on the grounds of:
(a) violation of CBA; (b) discrimination; (c) unreasonable suspension of union officials; and (d)
unreasonable refusal to entertain grievance. The Union then staged the strike, maintaining
picket lines on the road leading to the Corporation's plant entrance and premises.

4. After 4 days, CAPCOM soldiers came and arrested some of the picketers. They were then
brought to Camp Karingal, and were charged with illegal possession of firearms and
dangerous weapons. The strike was temporarily lifted because of this.

5. Master then filed with the NLRC a petition to declare the strike illegal. Subsequently, the
Union, together with Alyansa ng Manggagawa sa Valenzuela, re-staged another strike. A
petition for injunction was filed by the Master. An order was issued to remove the barricades
and other obstacles that prevented ingress and egress, which the union complied with.

6. On October 22, 1987, the union sent a letter with an offer of unconditional return. On
October 30, the union filed a position paper with a counter-complaint which alleges that:
unfair labor practice for subcontracting work that was normally done by its regular workers
thereby causing the reduction of the latter's workdays; illegal suspension of Abulencia
without any investigation discrimination for hiring casual workers in violation of the CBA, and necessary to maintain peace and order, protect life and property, and/or enforce the law and
illegal dispersal of the picket lines by CAPCOM agents. legal order."

7. LA – declared the strike as illegal. NLRC – affirmed LA. In holding that the strike was illegal, All told, the strike staged by the petitioners was a legal one even though it may have been
the NLRC relied solely on the no-strike no-lockout provision of the CBA called to offset what the strikers believed in good faith to be unfair labor practices on the
part of the employer. Verily, such presumption of legality prevails even if the allegations of
ISSUE: WON Master committed an ULP – YES unfair labor practices are subsequently found out to be untrue. Consonant with these
jurisprudential pronouncements, is Article 263 of the Labor Code which clearly states "the
RATIO: policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining".
Paragraph (b) of the same article guarantees the workers' "right to engage in concerted
A no-strike clause in a CBA is applicable only to economic strikes. Corollarily, if the strike is activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection" and
founded on an unfair labor practice of the employer, a strike declared by the union cannot be recognizes the "right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers
considered a violation of the no-strike clause. to lockout" so long as these actions are "consistent with the national interest" and the
grounds therefor do not involve inter-union and intraunion disputes.
An economic strike is defined as one which is to force wage or other concessions from the
employer which he is not required by law to grant. Professor Perfecto Fernandez, in his book
Law on Strikes, Picketing and Lockouts, defined economic strike as “involves issues relating to
demands for higher wages, higher pension or overtime rates, pensions, profit sharing, shorter
working hours, fewer work days for the same pay, elimination of night work, lower
retirement age, more healthful working conditions, better health services, better sanitation
and more safety appliances. The demands of the petitioners, being covered by the CBA, are
definitely within the power of Master to grant and therefore the strike was not an economic
strike.”

In this case, petitioners enumerated in their notice of strike the following grounds: violation
of CBA or Master’s practice of subcontracting workers; discrimination; coercion of
employees; unreasonable suspension of union officials, and unreasonable refusal to entertain
grievance. Petitioners are not asking for an economic benefit not already agreed upon, but
are merely asking for the implementation of the same, thus, one is not considered as an
economic strike.

Moreover, petitioners staged the strike only after Master had failed to abide by the
agreement forged between the parties upon the intervention of no less than the DOLE after
the union had complained of Master’s unabated subcontracting of workers who performed
the usual work of the regular workers. Master’s insistence that the hiring of casual
employees is a management prerogative betrays its attempt to coat with legality the illicit
curtailment of its employees' rights to work under the terms of the contract of employment
and to a fair implementation of the CBA.

The bringing in of CAPCOM soldiers to the peaceful picket lines without any reported
outbreak of violence, was clearly in violation of the following prohibited activity under Article
264 of the Labor Code:

"(d) No public official or employee, including officers and personnel of the New Armed Forces
of the Philippines or the Integrated National Police, or armed person, shall bring in, introduce
or escort in any manner any individual who seeks to replace strikers in entering or leaving the
premises of a strike area, or work in place of the strikers. The police force shall keep out of
the picket lines unless actual violence or other criminal acts occur therein: Provided, That
nothing herein shall be interpreted to prevent any public officer from taking any measure
184 NUWHRAIN v. NLRC
Legal strikes: defenses – good faith
FACTS:
1. In 1991, the rank & file union (of around 800 employees) of the hotel entered into a
CBA with the union.
2. Petitioners claim that the signing of the CBA was tainted with irregularities prompting
the union to file a notice of strike due to deadlock. It was further alleged that instead of
striking, the union offiers “mysteriously” signed the CBA without consulting the general
membership of the local chapter.
3. In 1993, some of the members submitted a letter demanding the resignation of the
officers of the union for being abusive and neglectful. This was unheeded. They
conducted an impeachment proceeding which caused the removal of some members
headed by Genato. They proclaimed themselves as the junta (petitioners here).
4. The junta conducted an election but this was not recognized by the national office.
5. Later, a notice of strike was filed by the junta before the NCMB citing ULP on the part of
the hotel (discrimination, undue interference, and bias in favor of the impeached
officers).
6. NCMB dismissed the case for being intra-union disputes because these were conflicts
between two-sets of union officers.
7. Genato filed a petition for injunction with the DOLE to enjoin the junta from usurping
functions. Hotel filed an interpleader and declaratory relief.
8. Despite the dismissal of the notice of strike, junta file another citing suspension of a
junta officer (Coronel) which they say is a ULP. NCMB dismissed the case.
9. Coronel was eventually dismissed from employment. Junta staged a wildcat strike
despite the prohibition.
10. SOLE certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Meanwhile,
Med-arbiter in the interpleader and injunction cases declared the formation of the
junta as illegal.
11. Hotel filed in the NLRC a petition to declare the wildcat strike illegal and to dismiss the
employees.
12. Later, they were dismissed due to acts of disloyalty. They filed a case for illegal
dismissal.
13. NLRC held that: (a) the termination of Coronel is not a ULP; (b) dismissal of junta officers
are valid; (c) remand to LA the proceedings regarding the other 153 members as to the
strike. MR was denied.
d. It is, therefore, not enough that the union believed that the employer
committed acts of ULP when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima
facie showing to sustain such belief.
2. The dismissal of Coronel which allegedly triggered the wildcat strike was not a sufficient
ground to justify that radical recourse on the part of the Junta members. However, the
dismissal was legal and was not a case of ULP but a mere exercise of management
prerogative on discipline. Remedies were available to the striking employees and they
had the option to either directly file a case for illegal dismissal in the LA or, by
agreement of the parties, to submit the case to the grievance machinery of the CBA so
that it may be subjected to voluntary arbitration proceedings.
3. With respect to the claim of petitioners that additional acts of discrimination by the
Hotel generated their belief in good faith that ULP acts existed as to justify a strike,
the NLRC has already held that the alleged acts of discrimination are not “strikeable”
grounds as found and explained by the NCMB when it dismissed the two notices of
strike filed by the Junta. Not every claim of good faith is justifiable, and herein
petitioners’ claim of good faith shall not be countenanced by this Court since their
decision to go on strike was clearly unwarranted.
4. Besides, petitioners should have complied with the prohibition to strike ordered by
the NCMB when the latter dismissed the notices of strike after finding that the alleged
acts of discrimination of the Hotel were not ULP, hence not “strikeable.” The refusal of
petitioners to heed said proscription of the NCMB is reflective of bad faith.
5. SC upheld the dismissal from employment of the 15 officers of the Junta who knowingly
participated in the strike.
Disposition: Affirmed.

ISSUE: WON the strike was legal

HELD: No.
RATIO:
1. A strike based on a non-strikeable ground is an illegal strike.
a. Generally: a strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no such acts actually exist.
b. Exception: even if no ULP acts are committed by the employer, if the
employees believe in good faith that ULP acts exist so as to constitute a valid
ground to strike, then the strike held pursuant to such belief may be legal.
c. Caveat: mere claim of good faith would not justify the holding of a strike
under the aforesaid exception as, in addition thereto, the circumstances
must have warranted such belief.
185 187 ARELLANO UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION v. CA, NLRC, and ARELLANO
UNIVERSITY

1. The Union filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike charging Arellano with ULP as ff:
a. Interfering in union activities
b. Union Busting (violation of CBA’s Article IV, Sec. 2)
c. Union Busting (Disregarding the Union’s request to deduct penalties from its
members who were absent and without justifiable reasons during union
meetings
d. Contracting Workout (management contracted out services being performed
by Union members)
2. A majority of the Union members filed a petition for audit of union funds before the
DOLE against the officers of the Union.
a. DOLE ordered officers to render an accounting of union funds amounting to
P480k which were remitted per check-off statement.
3. DOLE Sec certified the Notice of Strike for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC.
4. No settlement was reached.
5. University moved for the consolidation of the ff. cases:
a. The ULP Charge
b. The Interpleader it filed against the Union and some of its members
c. Complaint of the Union filed for underpayment of wages arising from the
change in the manner of computation of salary of employees and non-
payment of Sunday pay.
6. Before the NLRC could act of the motion for consolidation, DOLE Sec. Laguesma certified
for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC a 2 nd Notice of Strike filed by the Union charging
the University with:
a. Violation of CBA (Withholding of union and death benefits)
b. Violation of CBA (Non-granting of 10% salary increase to some union members
c. Illegal deductions in the payroll
d. Union interference (circulating letters against Union)
e. Non-implementation of the retirement plan as approved by BIR
7. A strike was then staged.
8. DOLE ordered them to return to work within 24 hours. The ff day, the Union lifted its
strike.
9. University filed a petition to declare the strike illegal.
10. NLRC:
a. 2 notices of strike: Without merit
b. University is absolved from the ULP charges
c. All the officers who participated in the illegal strike lost their employment
status.
d. There is no diminution of benefits because the University is correct in using
314 days as divisor.
ISSUE: Whether the University violated the CBA.

 To constitute ULP, however, violations of the CBA must be gross.

 Gross violation of the CBA, under Article 261 of the Labor Code, means flagrant and/or
malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions thereof.
 o Evidently, the University cannot be faulted for ULP as it in good faith merely o The NLRC also ruled that the resolution calling for such deduction was not
heeded the above-said request of Union members. valid as it was not even signed by the majority of Union officers and circulated
 On the NLRC’s declaration of loss of employment status of the strikers, an ordinary to the members.
striking worker may not be declared to have lost his employment status by mere
participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he knowingly participated in
the commission of illegal acts during the strike.
o While the University adduced photographs showing strikers picketing outside
the university premises, it failed to identify who they were.
o It thus failed to meet the substantiality of evidence test applicable in dismissal
cases.
o Petitioner-union members must thus be reinstated to their former position,
without backwages. If reinstatement is no longer possible, they should receive
separation pay of One (1) Month for every year of service.
 With respect to the union officers, as already discussed, their mere participation in the
illegal strike warrants their dismissal.

NOTE (NLRC DECISION, WHICH WAS AFFIRMED BY THE SC):

 NLRC found that what triggered the strike was the Union’s suspicion that the petition for
audit of union fund was initiated by the University.
o However, it was some Union members who initiated such, therefore, there
was no actual basis to hold the University guilty of interference.
 Re: Union busting
o NLRC: The refusal of the University to deduct penalties from the salaries of
members of the Union who failed to attend the meetings was based on the
CBA which required as condition for valid check-off prior submission to the
management of individual authorization. (This was not met by the Union).
 Re: Contracting Out
o Not raised during the conciliation meetings at the NCMB level.
 Re: 2nd Notice of Strike
o Only the charges of violation of the CBA for withholding union dues and death
benefits, and the non-implementation of the retirement plan, as approved by
the BIR, were left for resolution as the Union dropped the other issues raised
therein after the NCMB hearings.
o Crediting the explanation of the University that its withholding of union dues
and death aid benefits was upon the written request of several union
members themselves, the NLRC held that no ULP was committed.
 Re: Non-implementation of the retirement plan
o The same was baseless and it was in fact not ventilated before the NCMB.
 In the Interpleader case filed by the University against the Union and the members:
o NLRC ruled that the University may not be held guilty of ULP for refusal to
heed the demand of the Union that salaries of its members be deducted for
their failure to attend union meetings:
 firstly, because the Union itself failed to meet the requirements
provided for in Sections 1 and 2, Article IV of the CBA; and
 secondly, an interpleader had been filed by the University for the
parties to litigate their claims before the NLRC.
188 189 Yolito Fadriquelan et al v. Monterey Foods Corporation

Facts:
1. On April 30, 2002, a 3-yr CBA between the Union Bukluran ng Manggagawa sa
Monterey-Ilaw at Buklod ng Mangagawa and the company expired.
2. On March 28, 2003 after the negotiation for a new CBA reached a deadlock, the
union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB.
3. The company filed with DOLE a petition for assumption of jurisdiction over the
dispute over the dispute in view of its dire effects on the meat industry.
4. The DOLE Sec assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and enjoined the union and the
company to desist from taking any action that may aggravate the situation.
5. The union filed a second notice of strike before the NCMB on alleged ground that
the company committed ULP.
6. The company sent notice to the union officers, charging them with intentional acts
of slowdown. Six days later, the company sent new notice to the union officers
informing them of their termination from work for defying the DOLE Sec’s
assumption order.
7. on the same day, the union filed a third notice of strike based on allegations that
the company had engaged in union busting and illegal dismissal of union officers.
8. The company filed a petition for certification of the labor dispute to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration but the DOLE Sec denied the motion. He, however,
subsumed the third notice of strike under the first and second notices.
9. DOLE upheld the termination of the 17 union officers.
10. CA:10 valid. 7 illegal termination.

Issue: WON the CA erred in holding that slowdowns actually transpired at the company’s
farms
WON the CA erred in holding that the union officers committed illegal acts that warranted
their dismissal from work

Ratio:

The law is explicit: no strike shall be declared after the Secretary of Labor has assumed
jurisdiction over a labor dispute. A strike conducted after such assumption is illegal and any
union officer who knowingly participates in the same may be declared as having lost his
employment.1 Here, what is involved is a slowdown strike. Unlike other forms of strike, the
employees involved in a slowdown do not walk out of their jobs to hurt the company. They
need only to stop work or reduce the rate of their work while generally remaining in their
assigned post.
The Court finds that the union officers and members in this case held a slowdown strike at
the company’s farms despite the fact that the DOLE Secretary had already assumed
jurisdiction over their labor dispute. The evidence sufficiently shows that union officers and
members simultaneously stopped work at the company’s Batangas and Cavite farms at 7:00
a.m. on May 26, 2003.

And if they did not intend a slowdown, why did they not hold their meetings after work.
There is no allegation that the company prevented the union from holding meetings after
working hours.
A distinction exists, however, between the ordinary workers’ liability for illegal strike and that
of the union officers who participated in it. The ordinary worker cannot be terminated for
merely participating in the strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during
its conduct. On the other hand, a union officer can be terminated upon mere proof that he
knowingly participated in the illegal strike.
In termination cases, the dismissed employee is not required to prove his innocence of the
charges against him. The burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the
employee’s dismissal was for just cause. The employer’s failure to do so means that the
dismissal was not justified.16 Here, the company failed to show that all 17 union officers
deserved to be dismissed.
190 Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle
GR 158930-31, August 22, 2006
Facts:
 The CBA between Nestle and the Union was about to end, and the Union sent a “letter
of intent” to Nestle to begin CBA negotiations
 Nestle sent a counter proposal to the Union, and also sent proposed ground rules that
would govern the CBA negotiations.
 An impasse resulted from the discussions, so Nestle sought assistance from the NCMB
to conduct preventive mediation proceedings. However, despite 15 meetings, the
parties failed to reach an agreement on the proposed CBA.
 Thus, the Union filed 2 notices of strike: the first based on a bargaining deadlock (re:
economic issues), and the second based on bargaining in bad faith (re: Nestle allegedly
refusing to negotiate until the retirement plan provisions are excluded from
negotiations)
 Because of the looming strike, Nestle filed a petition for assumption of jurisdiction
with the SOLE
 SOLE assumed jurisdiction; and ruled that retirement benefits are not proper subjects
of CBA negotiations
 CA set aside SOLE decision: CA said the SOLE’s assumption of jurisdiction should only
have been limited to the ground rules in CBA discussions.
 This was because the CA found that on the minutes of CBA meetings, Nestle stated that
“we are still discussing ground rules, and not yet on the CBA negotiations proper, a
deadlock cannot be declared”
Issue: Was the SOLE correct in ruling on substantive issues, such as the exclusion of
retirement benefits from CBA negotiations? YES.
 The CA was incorrect in saying that the SOLE was limited only to issues regarding ground
rules.
 The Labor Code authorizes the SOLE to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute, causing
or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to national interest, and
to decide the same
 In this case, there were 2 notices of strike filed by the Union, and the SOLE based its
assumption of jurisdiction on the contents of those 2 notices of strike
 Both notices contained matters regarding bargaining deadlocks and ULP; this means
that prior to filing of such notices, the parties were already discussing the substantive
issues of the CBA
 Hence, the SOLE rightly decided on matters of substance.
 More importantly, even assuming that the parties were only discussing ground rules,
the SOLE still had power to decide on substantive issues, because the power of the SOLE
to assume jurisdiction over an issue includes issues incidental to the subject labor
dispute.
 The query as to whether or not the Retirement Plan is to be included in the CBA
negotiations between the parties ineluctably dictates upon the Secretary of the DOLE to
go into the substantive matter of the CBA negotiations.
 The authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend
to all questions and controversies arising therefrom
 Even if not exactly on the ground upon which a notice of strike is based, the fact that the
issue is incidental to the resolution of the subject labor dispute, empowers the SOLE to
take cognizance of the issue and resolve the same.
191 Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel Corporation, 517 SCRA 349, G.R.
No. 154591 March 5, 2007
Facts:
In 1999, the MHEA filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB in its NCR office against Manila
Hotel on the grounds of ULP. Upon the petition of Manila Hotel, the SOLE certified the labor
dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.
Specifically, the Order enjoined any strike or lockout and the parties were ordered to cease
and desist from committing any acts that may exacerbate the situation. The parties and their
counsels were served copies of the said Order. MHEA filed a MR assailing the validity of said
Order.
The case was set for mandatory conference before Presiding Commissioner. During the
conference, the parties were advised of the certification order, which prohibited them from
taking any action that would exacerbate the situation. In spite of this, the MHEA conducted a
strike.
NLRC - directing the striking workers to return to work immediately and the hotel to accept
them back under the same terms and conditions of employment. The NLRC further instructed
the parties to submit proof of compliance with the instant order immediately after the lapse
of twenty-four hours
a copy of the Compliance filed by Manila Hotel o, manifesting that only six striking employees
complied with the return-to-work Order and were reinstated.
In response to the NLRC’s return-to-work order, the MHEA filed an Urgent Manifestation and
Motion to Set Aside NLRC Order. It alleged that the MR, questioning the validity of the Order
of the SOLE, which certified the case to the NLCR, was still pending with the SOLE.
NLRC (Decided by Veloso)- - MHEA to refrain from putting up a blockade or barricade or any
mode of preventing the free ingress to and egress from the hotel. Parenthetically, it also
ordered Manila Hotel to respect the right of the striking workers to peacefully picket in a
designated area outside the hotel.
NLRC (Reraffled to a another)- strike held by MHEA was illegal for its defiance of the return-
to-work order. However, it determined that only the union officers were deemed to have lost
their employment. It ruled that there was no evidence showing who among the striking
employees were actually notified of the return-to-work order, and therefore, such employees
have not forfeited their employment.
CA- modified NLRC decision. Indeed there is Illegal Strike and said that the incumbent officers
and members of the Union involved in the illegal strike should be declared to have lost their
employment status.
Issue:
Whether or not the strike conducted is illegal because it was in countenance of the
certification order?
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:
The allegation that the strikers relied on their honest belief that the filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order, issued by the SOLE on 24 November 1999, entitled them to
participate in a strike, cannot be sustained. . A return-to-work order is immediately
executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration—to say that a return-to-
work order’s effectivity must await affirmance on a motion for reconsideration is not only to
emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed for the return to
work would, in the ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be
affirmed insofar as the time element is concerned.
MHEA claims that the Court should consider as a mitigating circumstance the fact that they 192 STEEL CORP v SCP EE UNION-NFLU
held the strike three months after filing their notice of strike. Such detail is irrelevant. What is Effect of Certification Order
crucial is that they were apprised of the assumption order of the SOLE wherein they were
enjoined from carrying out a strike. They were again reminded to refrain from conducting a FACTS
strike during the mandatory conference on 8 February 2000. Pending the proceedings for 1. Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP) is engaged in manufacturing construction
compulsory arbitration and for no apparent reason, they staged the strike two days later materials, supplying approximately 50% of the domestic needs for roofing
and refused to obey. It is noteworthy to remember that the Court cautioned against the materials.
unreasonable and indiscriminate exercise of the right to strike: “[T]he decision to wield the 2. SCP-Federated Union of the Energy Leaders General and Allied Services (FUEL-GAS)
weapon of strike must therefore rest on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed filed a petition for Certification Election in its bid to represent the rank-and-file
by the tempers and tantrums of a few hotheads, and firmly focused on the legitimate interest employees of the petitioner.
of the union which should not however be antithetical to the public welfare. In every strike 3. SCP Employees Union (SCPEU) National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU)
staged by a union, the general peace and progress of society and public welfare are involved. intervened, seeking to participate and be voted for in such election but the same
x x x.” was denied for having been filed out of time.
4. consent election was conducted, with FUEL-GAS and NO UNION as choices. Said
election was however declared a failure because less than a majority of the rank-
and-file employees cast their votes. FUEL-GAS filed an Election Protest claiming
that the certification election was characterized by and replete with irregularities.
5. NAFLU, the mother federation of respondent, filed a petition for Certification
Election for and on behalf of its affiliate, seeking to represent the rank-and-file
employees of petitioner.
6. MA denied the election protest of FUEL-GAS and granted the petition for
certification election filed by NAFLU
7. DOLE USEC rendered an order of conduct of certification election.
8. SCPEU emerged as winner; hence, the second election protest filed by FUEL-GAS.
9. CA further directed the holding of a certification election with FUEL-GAS and NO
UNION as choices, to the exclusion of respondent.
10. MA: dismissed FUEL-GAS election protest but deferred the request of respondent
to be declared winner in the certification election until final resolution of the
pending petitions with the CA.
11. CA dismissed the appeal of resp SCPEU.
12. As a consequence of its certification as the exclusive bargaining agent, respondent
sent to petitioner CBA proposals.Petitioner, however, held in abeyance any action
on the proposals in view of its pending motion for reconsideration.
13. Resp filed notice of strike for refusal to bargain and ULP.
14. FUEL-GAS moved for the conduct of a certification election pursuant to the CA
decision.
15. Another Notice of strike was filed for non-recognition as certified union, refusal to
bargain, discrimination against union officers and members.
16. MA: recommended the holding of another certification election but with
respondent and FUEL-GAS as contenders.
17. NLRC: declaring petitioner as having no obligation to recognize respondent as the
certified bargaining agent; dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice; declaring
as illegal the strike held by the union; and declaring the loss of employment of the
officers of the union.
18. Another notice of strike was filed.
19. NLRC:  ordering petitioner to bargain collectively with respondent as the duly
certified bargaining agent.

ISSUE: WON the strike participated by officers of resp union was valid?
HELD: No. 193
RATIO:
 In the instant case, the strike undertaken by the officers of respondent union is
patently illegal for the following reasons: (1) it is a union-recognition-strike which is
not sanctioned by labor laws; (2) it was undertaken after the dispute had been
certified for compulsory arbitration; and (3) it was in violation of the Secretarys
return-to-work order.
 Respondents notices of strike were founded on petitioners continued refusal to
bargain with it. It thus staged the strike to compel petitioner to recognize it as the
collective bargaining agent, making it a union-recognition-strike. As its legal
designation implies, this kind of strike is calculated to compel the employer to
recognize ones union and not other contending groups, as the employees
bargaining representative to work out a collective bargaining agreement despite
the striking unions doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack
of formal certification as the exclusive representative in the bargaining unit.
 The certification election that was conducted where respondent emerged as
winner, not having been recognized as valid, it has no authority to represent the
rank and file employees of petitioner. Thus, it could not ask  petitioner to bargain
with it. As the issue of its identity had been the subject of a separate case which
had been settled by the court with finality, petitioner cannot, therefore, be
faulted in refusing to bargain. Neither could this Court sustain respondents
imputation of unfair labor practice and union busting against petitioner. With
more reason, this Court cannot sustain the validity of the strike staged on such
basis.
 Even if this Court were to uphold the validity of respondents purpose or objective
in staging a strike, still, the strike would be declared illegal for having been
conducted in utter defiance of the Secretarys return-to-work order and after the
dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration. Although ostensibly there
were several notices of strike successively filed by respondent, these notices were
founded on substantially the same grounds petitioners continued refusal to
recognize it as the collective bargaining representative.
 Respondent, in the instant case, after the assumption of jurisdiction and
certification of the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, filed notices of
strike and staged the strike obviously contrary to the provisions of labor
laws. Worse, it filed not one but several notices of strike which resulted in two
certified cases which were earlier consolidated. These disputes could have been
averted had respondent respected the CAs decision. That way, the collective
bargaining agent would have been determined and petitioner could have been
compelled to bargain. Respondent, through its officers, instead opted to use the
weapon of strike to force petitioner to recognize it as the bargaining agent. The
strike, having been staged after the dispute had been certified for arbitration and
contrary to the return-to-work order, became a prohibited activity, and was thus
illegal.