Madness in the Media / 125

Madness in the Media:

Political extremism and beliefs in historical
primacy as a feature of transition
Eric Beckett Weaver

In The Open Society and its Enemies1, Karl Popper argued that
historical determinism, the belief in the inevitability of historical
development has been one of the banes of our age. As Popper was
well aware, the belief that one state of being must assuredly lead to
another, in logical social procession, is a common thought pattern.
Nonetheless, as Popper has so eloquently argued, it is a pattern that
may lead to the establishment of closed, dictatorial regimes which
establish legitimacy through a belief in utopia “proven” by a pro-
jection onto the past of the progress of history. 2
Since ancient times monarchies have established divine descent
for royalty through myth and ceremony. 3 Traditional monarchies
have tried, from time immemorial and in many differing cultures
the world over, to establish their legitimacy through proof of de-
1
Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1973).
2
On nationalist dreams of past utopia, see Anthony Smith, 1997, "The
‘Golden Age’ and National Renewal", in Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin
(eds.), Myths and Nationhood (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), pp. 36-59.
3
For a description of ceremony related to the veneration of kings, see:
Sergio Bertelli, The King’s Body: Sacred rituals of power in Medieval and Early
Modern Europe, trans. by R. Burr Litchfield (University Park, PA: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001). For a theory of the social origins of
royal divinity, see chapter in Arthur Maurice Hocart, Kings and Councillors: An
Essay in the Comparative Anatomy of Human Society, ed. by Rodney Needham
([1936] Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 86-101.
Also see: Sir James G. Fraser, The Golden Bough, A study in magic and religion
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1941), esp. pp. 139-159.
126 / Challenges to new Democracies in the Balkans
scent from some illustrious ancestor. Such claims often include theo-
ries of divine descent,4 and in Western society this was not only the
case with the ancients, but was also popular among later dynas-
ties.5 Thus, at times the Hapsburgs were “found” to be descended
through the Roman emperors from Aeneas and the pagan Roman
gods Saturn and Jove, and simultaneously (through another ances-
tral line) from the priests and kings of the Old Testament, thus ulti-
mately establishing their kinship to Christ.6
While I would not like to overemphasize social continuity, (and
would rather wish here to stress the commonality of certain social
thought patterns), it should be pointed out that attempts have been
made to prove the divinity or divine blessedness of individual na-
tions in newer political arrangements, where legitimacy derives from
the nation and no longer the sovereign.7
Anthony Smith has said that: “the modern religious and even some
of the secular assertions of nationalism have been influenced by these
older, long-lived beliefs; and, more fundamentally, that modern na-
tionalism has taken from these older traditions a vital component of its
outlook, one that readily translates into collective tasks and visions:
what we call, the ‘national mission’, and the ‘national destiny’.”8
4
See, for instance: Arthur Maurice Hocart, Kingship, ([1927] reprint
London: Watts and Co., 1941). Hocart also suggests that the divinity of kings
may have given birth to gods. For a non-European example of such, see Clifford
Geertz, 1980, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-century Bali (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1980), esp. pp. 11-33.
5
On the dubiousness of ancient pedigrees in general, see: Lord Raglan,
The Hero: A study in tradition, myth and drama ([1936] reprint London: Watts
and Co., 1941), esp. pp. 16-29.
6
Marie Tanner, The Last Descendents of Aeneas: The Hapsburgs and the
mythic image of the emperor, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1993), esp. p. 97. See also: Leon Poliakov, The Aryan Myth, A History of Racist
and Nationalist Ideas in Europe, translated by Edmund Howard, (London: Chatto-
Heinemann for Sussex University Press, 1974), p. 18.
7
For a classic description of the process of transfer in legitimacy and power
from monarchy through crown to state and nation, see: Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The
King’s Two Bodies: A study in mediaeval political theology, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1997). On the end of royal divinity, see also Peter Burke, "The
Demise of Royal Mythologies", in Allan Ellenius (ed.), Iconography, Propaganda
and Legitimation, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 245-254.
8
Anthony D. Smith, "Ethnic election and national destiny: some religious
origins of nationalist ideals", in Nations and Nationalism, 5 (3), (1999), pp.
331-355, (349).
Madness in the Media / 127
Early patterns of belief may well provide a sort of template for
later extremist thought. However, it might also be argued that the
recurrence of such patterns indicates some deeper psychological
need. The fact that finding ancestral links with gods appears among
widely separate monarchies all over the world may instead indicate
that societies arranged on similar lines evoke similar psychological
needs.
Theories on national primacy in historical terms are com-
mon. To examine them in our time there is no need to attempt to
trace continuity with thought patterns under previous forms of
government (such as monarchy). Some have argued that the at-
tempt to prove that one’s own nation is first is almost univer-
sally inherent to nationalism and seems to create histories of
primacy in all things and places possible. 9 As Lord Raglan put
it: “We thus see arrayed in defence of false genealogy the pow-
erful forces of religion and patriotism; of custom and tradition;
[...] not to mention the popular love of the marvelous and the
romantic.”10
This common belief in the primacy of one’s nation may indi-
cate a psychological state common to nationalism, or a cultural
logic, rather than a continuing cultural pattern. Thus, on the need
for genetic-moral superiority, preceding his discussion of conti-
nuity in Aryan theories, Leon Poliakov says: “[...] it is the simple
expression of an urge which is universal among human groups or
cultures; namely that of claiming distinctive origin, an ancestry
which is both high-born and glorious.”11 Apparently in national-
ist logic being first is best, even if those who are first are only a
“we” in the distant past. Amongst numerous other such claims,
contemporary Greek claims to Hellenic heritage, Italian “memo-
ries” of Roman greatness, and claims of Daco-Romanian12 , Irano-
9
For example, see: David Lowenthal, The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils
of History (Cambridge: CUP, 1998).
10
Lord Raglan, op. cit., p. 29.
11
Leon Poliakov, op. cit., p. 2.
12
See: Walter Kolarz, Myths and Realities in Eastern Europe (London:
Lindsay Drummond Ltd., 1946), pp. 171-188. For short outlines of the political
use of Daco-Romanian continuity theories see, Katherine Verdery, National
Identity Under Socialism, Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu’s Romania,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 31-33; and Andrew Ludanyi,
"Ideology and Political Culture in Romania: The Daco-Roman Theory and the
128 / Challenges to new Democracies in the Balkans
Croatian13 , or Illyro-Albanian14 continuity fit within this general
framework.
Less widespread theories of national historical primacy can gain
support among certain splinter-nationalist groups, or may gain a de-
gree of social respectability for a time. Anthony Smith has said: “We
sometimes find examples of a symbiosis and even fusion between
the earlier religious myths and the nationalist ideal. Here the old
religious myths, particularly where they are associated with the idea
of a ‘covenant’ between a people and its god, have survived intact.”15
Smith concludes: “My argument, then, is that modern concepts
of national mission and national destiny are lineal descendants of
the ancient beliefs in ethnic election.”16
However, in many cases it would be extremely difficult to es-
tablish a direct link between new theories of national divinity, and
ancient folk beliefs or customs. At most we can say that such theo-
ries evoke a sort of social resonance with established religious be-
liefs or historical tradition. For example, at times theories of de-
scent from the lost tribes of Israel have enjoyed some popularity
among a great variety of social groups. One such theory, that the
English were descended from the lost tribes, held a surprising de-
‘Place’ of Minorities", in John F. Cadzow, Andrew Ludanyi, and Louis J. Elteto,
(eds.), Transylvania: The Roots of Ethnic Conflict (Kent, OH: The Kent State
University Press, 1983), pp. 229-244. For a specific example of the theory see,
Ion Pachia Tatomirescu, Dacoromani lui Regalian [Regalianus’ Dacoromania],
(Timisoara: Editura Aethicus, 1998). On theories of Romanian as the source of
all languages, see chapter in Andrei Oisteanu, Cosmos vs. Chaos, Myth and
magic in Romanian traditional culture. A comparative approach, translated by
Merela Adascalitei, revised by Alexander Drace-Francis (Bucharest: The
Romanian Cultural Foundation Publishing House, 1999), pp. 232-247.
13
For example: Dr. Josip Lucic et al., Hrvatski povijesni zemljovidi (Zagreb:
Hrvatska skolska kartografija, 2000), esp. maps on p. 6 and text on p. 56.
14
As elaborated by (among others) Shyqri Nimani, Albanian Lands in
Maps and Emblems through Centuries from Strabo and Ptolemy to Our Time
(Prishtina: Institute of Text-Books of Kosova, 1997); and Asllan Pushka, Kosova
and its Ethnic Albanian Continuity (Prishtina: Kosova Information Centre, 1997).
On the establishment of such myths see Noel Malcolm, "Myths of Albanian
National Identity: Some key elements, as expressed in the works of Albanian
writers in America in the early Twentieth Century", in Stephanie Schwandner-
Sievers and Bernd J. Fischer, (eds.), Albanian Identities, Myth and History,
(London: Hurst and Company, 2002).
15
Anthony D. Smith, "Ethnic election and national destiny", p. 332.
16
Ibid., p. 350.
Madness in the Media / 129
gree of support among a portion of the elite in Victorian Britain.
“Indeed, belief in the descent of the English from the Jews gained
such wide currency in the nineteenth century that a movement called
the British-Israelites claimed hundreds of thousands of followers,
even counting Queen Victoria and King Edward VII among its pa-
trons.”17
Not surprisingly, then, Oxford’s Bodleian Library catalogue in-
cludes some 95 entries under the subject-heading Anglo-Israelism.
Although now almost dead in its homeland, the British-Israelite
theory spread to Canada and the United States where it has proven
to be very resilient, and has given birth to a number of extremist
movements.18
Some have suggested that messianic beliefs in national superi-
ority and holiness (such as belief in descent from the lost tribes) are
more prevalent in nationalist thought in Eastern Europe. Hence Peter
Duncan has written: “Neither suffering nor messianism are unique
to the Russians. Among the East European nations the age of em-
pire offered fertile ground for messianic dreams.”19
In my view a belief in divine election is only part of a general
search for national grace. Such theories of ancient greatness, holi-
ness, or divine selection often rest on similar proofs. For instance,
one of the techniques employed by such theorists as the British-
Israelites is “to look for words in different languages that sounded
the same, assuming, usually erroneously, that if the sounds were
similar, then the languages and their speakers had to be connected.
Since similar sounds often crop up in otherwise unrelated languages
17
John M. Efron, Defenders of the Race: Jewish Doctors and Race Science in
Fin-de-Siecle Europe (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 39;
see, for example, Rev. Bourchier Wrey Savile, Anglo-Israelism and the Great
Pyramid: an examination of the alleged claims of H.M. Queen Victoria to the throne
of David and of fixing the end of the age in 1882 (London: Longmans, 1880).
18
Michael Barkun, Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the
Christian Identity Movement (Chapel Hill and London: University of North
Carolina Press, 1994); see also David S. Katz and Richard H. Popkin, Messianic
Revolution: Radical religious politics to the end of the second millenium (London:
Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1999), pp. 170-204.
19
Peter J.S. Duncan, Russian Messianism, Third Rome, Revolution,
Communism and After (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 1; see also
George Schöpflin, "The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths", in
Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin (eds.), Myths and Nationhood (London:
Hurst and Company, 1997), pp. 19-35.
130 / Challenges to new Democracies in the Balkans
they allowed [one such scholar] to claim, and to believe, that he
had proved that ‘many of our most common [English] words and
names of familiar objects are almost pure Hebrew.’”20
Although always present, such theories generally only gain sup-
port among a tiny minority in any given society. If it is best to be
first in historical terms, then it would logically seem best to prove a
link with the Sumerians, with whom history allegedly begins,21 as
well as to establish proof of national genius throughout the history
of civilization.
Such theories as Sumerian-Hungarian22, or Celtic-Hungarian23
continuity theories, and such works as Serbs, The Oldest Nation24,
Hungarian as the most ancient language25, The Hungarian Origins
of Easter26, and The Ancient Hungarian Origins of the Wheel27, are
supported, created, or disseminated by individuals from the Hun-
garian or Serbian diaspora. The diaspora has played an enormous
role in the attempt to find ancient roots in Eastern Europe. Their
role amongst extremist movements is also deserving of more com-
plete analysis than can be provided here. Thus, we have the follow-
20
Michael Barkun, op. cit., p. 7.
21
Samuel Noah Kramer, History Begins at Sumer (London: Thames and
Hudson, 1958, reprint 1961).
22
For example, in order by publishing date: Dr. Kalman Gosztony,
Osszehasonlito szumer nyelvtan (Fahrwangen, Switzerland: Duna Konyvkiado
Vallalat, 1977); Dr. Ida Bobula (copyright Prof. Francisco J. Jos Badiny), Sumer-
magyar rokonsag (Buenos Aires: Esda, 1982); Ferenc Jos Badiny, Kaldeatol
Ister-Gamig (3 volumes; Budapest: Orient Press, 1997); Veronika Marton, A
sumir kultura tortenete (2nd ed., self-published, 2000); Attila Foldes, Nyelvi es
genetikai oseink a sumerek (2nd ed., Budapest: Anahita-Ninti, 2002); note the
differing spellings of Sumerian in the various titles.
23
Sandor Timaru Kast, Kelta Magyarok, Magyar Keltak (Budapest: Magyar
Haz, 1999).
24
The work of a Sorbonne graduate, Olga Lukovic Pjanovic, Srbi…narod
najstariji (3 volumes; Belgrade: "Miroslav" [Kosmos], 1993).
25
For example: Tibor Barath, A magyar nepek ostortenete, Tatarlaki
agyagtabla 3,600 eves magyar rovasirassal [The ancient history of the Hungarian
peoples, A clay tablet from Tatarlak with 3,600 year-old Hungarian runes], (New
York: Somogyi Zoltan, 1997); or Janos Madarasi, Paleo-Hipotezisek [Paleo-
Hypotheses], (Budapest: Quark Bt., 1997).
26
Piroska Baranyai Gyimesi, A Husvet magyar eredete (Philadelphia:
Regös Nyomda, 1986).
27
Tamas Zoltan Forray, A kerek osmagyar eredete (Toronto: Huankara,
1997).
Madness in the Media / 131
ing quote on an individual in Serbia: “The clinical psychologist Dr.
Ratibor M. Djurdjevic [...] lived in the West, mostly in America,
and returned to Serbia in 1992. God Himself sent him back, he
says, to help the almost extinguished ancestral Orthodox faith flare
up again among the Serbs, who had been de-Christianised and
paganised under communism and lived like wild creatures.”28
Whatever the diaspora’s role, domestic researchers have also
been productive. Theories such as Serbs as the lost tribes of Israel,
Hungarian-Etruscan continuity theories 29, Serbian as The Oldest
Language of the Bible30, or Olympic Gods from Serbia31, may be
generated by extremely original domestic scholarship. Such theo-
ries aim to prove the highly cultured and ancient nature of the na-
tion. At times this goal becomes exceedingly evident. One such
Hungarian theorist, a professor of anthropology Istvan Kiszely, has
said of the Hungarians: “Our ancient history goes back 3,000
years.”32 Kiszely also controversially claimed to have found the
Hungarian hero Petofi’s skeleton in a grave in Siberia (under DNA
testing the skeleton proved to be that of a girl).33 He has been a
great proponent of Hungarian identity for many years. Kiszely ex-
plains to his Hungarian interviewer:
“We came [to Europe] with a unique food-culture that gave
Europe the fork and spoon. We came with our own clothing.
People don’t really consider the fact that Bill Clinton doesn’t
come to Europe, to Hungary, in dress adopted from the Romans
or in the clothing of furs originating from the Germans: he has
28
Ivan Colovic, The Politics of Symbol in Serbia: Essays in political
anthropology, translated by Celia Hawkesworth (London: Hurst & Company,
2002), p. 203.
29
Dr. Karoly Szabo, Etruszkok es Magyarok [Etruscans and Hungarians],
(Budapest: Design and Quality, 1997); Gyorgy Zaszlos-Zsoka, Az Etruszkok, A
toscaniai harangok [Etruscans: The bells of Tuscany], (Budapest: Anahita-Ninti
Bt., 2001).
30
Andjelija Stancic Spajiceva, Najstariji jezik Biblije (Belgrade: "Miroslav"
[Kosmos], 1994).
31
Antonije Skokljev and Ivan Skokljev, Bogovi Olimpa iz Srbije (Belgrade:
Nauka, 1998).
32
Istvan Kiszely, interviewed by Lajos Arany, in Hajdu-Bihari Naplo, 12
November 1999.
33
See: Istvan Rev, "Parallel Autopsies", Representations, 49 (Winter 1995),
pp. 15-39.
132 / Challenges to new Democracies in the Balkans
‘adopted’ the Hungarians’ three-quarter length jacket and fine
trousers of linen. And the world inherited the coat [...], the hat
[...], and three-quarter length moccasins from us. Byzantine and
Arab writers all mention the unbelievable elegance of even our
common people.”34
In Kiszely’s account Europe owes much of its high culture to the
Hungarians, and should be duly grateful. Sadly, Kiszely admits that
even the Hungarians do not know this history because the foreign
and domestic works proving this glorious past were “intentionally
not published.” 35
Such theories, while shocking, are not surprising, and exist in
so-called older democracies, and in transition countries alike - coun-
tries that some have argued have a totalitarian legacy36 that, as Juan
J. Linz put it “shaped the entire social life and culture. It is that
legacy - difficult to define, conceptualize or describe - that cannot
be ignored.”37
Whatever the case, in my view the totalitarian legacy is not dem-
onstrated by the mere existence of theories of cultural preeminence.
To provide such demonstrations, one would have to show that these
theories are absent from countries that lack a totalitarian past. And
this, obviously, is far from being the case. One encounters them
often enough in Western countries with a supposedly entrenched
democratic tradition. What is surprising, however, is the degree of
penetration such works achieve in some post-communist societies,
or rather: the common availability of such works in a broad variety
of bookstores; their serious discussion in a wide range of media
outlets (television, radio, print); and their availability in otherwise
seemingly highly prestigious venues.
For example, the work, Serbs, The Oldest Nation was featured
for years in the shop-window of the Serbian Academy of Sciences
and Arts’ outlet, Naucno Delo, in the heart of Belgrade, and was
still being sold inside the shop when I visited in September 2002.
34
Istvan Kiszely, op. cit.
35
Ibid.
36
Perhaps most convincingly, Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, Problems
of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America,
and post-communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
37
Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder and
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p. 35.
Madness in the Media / 133
In Hungary the works mentioned above are available in a number
of shops throughout the country, and are seriously discussed in a
range of right-wing media.
Sometimes such theories are featured side-by-side in the same
venue. Thus, when I purchased books elaborating Sumerian-Hun-
garian continuity theories with a work proving Etruscan-Hungar-
ian continuity, the cashier at the bookshop (Feherlofia in Budapest)
suggested that I narrow my selection and “start slowly as the theo-
ries might be confusing if taken all at once”. Yet, surprisingly, over
time attempts have been made to consolidate and combine such
seemingly inherently incompatible theories into meta-theory. 38
Furthermore, in Hungary evidence of the penetration of such
theories into ordinary life was provided by college entrance exams
for the Hungarian language that have included a question asking
students to explain the false linguistic premises on which Hungar-
ian-Sumerian continuity theories are based. The theory has appar-
ently been so widely disseminated by its believers that, in a recent
book on Hungarian culture published in English by the Hungarian
Academy’s press, the editors felt compelled to include the follow-
ing text explaining the false basis of the theory:
“Another view holds that the Hungarian language is re-
lated to Sumerian. This relationship is based on the similar
sounding and apparently similar words. As such, it is con-
vincing for those interested in, but unfamiliar with the issue
of linguistic relationships. However, the relationship of lan-
guages is not proved by accidental coincidences - even if they
are numerous -, but by regular similarities and differences (the
so-called regular observations).”39
In his description of Serbian national myths the political-anthro-
pologist Ivan Colovic writes that extremist Serbian nationalists hold
that:
38
For example: Istvan Foyta, Honnan szarmazunk, Mit adtunk a vilagnak,
Kik a rokonaink [Where we originate from, What we have given to the world,
Who our relatives are], (Buenos Aires: Batori Testverek, 1961).
39
Jeno Kis, "The Relatives of the Hungarian Language", in Laszlo Kosa,
(ed.), A Companion to Hungarian Studies (Budapest: Akademiai kiado, 1999),
pp. 35-37, (36).
134 / Challenges to new Democracies in the Balkans
“The Serbian nation is the oldest nation in the world, all
other nations originated from it, just as all other languages
originated in the Serbian language. But it is at the same time
the youngest and freshest nation, it offers the germ of univer-
sal, or at least European renewal. This is possible because
this nation stands to one side of historical time, of the irre-
trievable loss of history. It lives in an eternal present, simulta-
neously old and young, in an eternal union of the dead, the
living and the yet unborn.”40
Regarding such theories, and Hungary’s relatively high levels
of xenophobia41, and racism42, and Serbia’s unfortunate recent his-
tory, some might suggest that belief in group-superiority is a symp-
tom of a deeper social pathology, and not just market distortions.
The historian Anthony Smith points out that: “profound belief
in inward superiority underpins the capacity for endurance and
self-renewal found among so many ethnies in history. [...] Closely
allied to this belief is the idea that the community’s special des-
tiny will see a radical reversal of its hitherto lowly or marginal
status in the world.”43
40
Ivan Colovic, op. cit., p. 7.
41
On levels of xenophobia in Hungary, see: Zoltan Fabian, Endre Sik,
Judit Toth, "Uniora varva: eloitelet, xenofobia es europai integracio", in E. Lukács
and M. Király, (eds.), Migracio es Europai Unio (Budapest: AduPrint, 2001),
pp. 395-412; Endre Sik, "The level and social basis of xenophobia in
contemporary Hungary", in Zsolt Enyedi and Ferenc Eros, (eds.), Authoritarianism
and Prejudice, Central European Perspectives (Budapest: Osiris, 1999), pp. 193-
213; György Csepeli and Antal Orkeny, "The Changing Facets of Hungarian
Nationalism", Social Research, vol. 63, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 247-286, (268-
282); and György Csepeli and Endre Sik, "Changing Content of Political
Xenophobia in Hungary – Is the growth of xenophobia inevitable?", in Maryellen
Fullerton, Endre Sik and Judit Toth, (eds.), Refugees and Migrants: Hungary at
a Crossroads (Budapest: Institute for Political Science of the Hungarian Academy
of Sciences, 1995).
42
On anti-Roma racism and anti-Semitism in Hungary see: Maria
Vasarhelyi, "Tani-tani, de hogyan?: Kirekeszto es demokratikus attitudok a leendo
tortenelem tanarok koreben", Elet es irodalom, vol. 48, no. 7 (13 February 2004);
and Zoltan Fabian and Zoltan Fleck, "Authoritarianism, socio-demographic
variables and socialization in the explanation of prejudiced attitudes:
Antisemitism and Anti-Gypsy attitudes in Hungary", in Enyedi, and Eros, (eds.),
op, cit., F. (eds.), Authoritarianism and Prejudice, pp. 231-254.
43
Anthony D. Smith, "Ethnic election and national destiny", p. 336.
Madness in the Media / 135
However, one would be hard-pressed to argue that Victorian
British-Israelites suffered from a feeling that their community was
suffering a “lowly or marginal status in the world”. It would seem
that, no matter what the nation’s current status, nationalists simply
find it best to be first. The widespread dissemination of theories of
primacy in countries in transition is not necessarily evidence of a
higher degree of social pathology, but rather a sign of the relative
weakness of the market, the overarching power of certain extremist
elite groups, and a low degree of media autonomy. After all, such
literature is published in both newer and long-established democ-
racies. The difference here is in the availability of such “research”.
In post-communist countries the poverty of many publishers, and
the small, impoverished local market burdened by a surfeit of com-
petition means that many publishers are compelled to print virtually
everything, regardless of quality, if the author can subsidize publica-
tion (as may be the case with many diaspora authors). Furthermore,
the continued party-centered clientelism in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope44 means that most parties, from the extreme right to the left,
have established publishing houses or gained control of newspapers,
radio stations and other media outlets from whence they may dis-
seminate their views regardless of popularity or market demand.
This attenuates the democratic crisis also common to Western
democracies, summarized by a British analyst: “the voting system
is distorted by the power of single-issue pressure groups. ‘One man
one vote’ conceals the reality of tightly organised interest groups
exerting disproportionate influence over all the political parties.”45
Research on the media in countries in transition from communist
rule paints a particularly gloomy picture. As Colin Sparks has put
it: “The press market remains highly competitive, although there is
a high casualty rate amongst the new foundations of 1989. The
press, too, remains highly politicised and partisan.”46
Addressing the more specific problem of the weakness of local
media in transition, Barbara Trionfi has written:
44
On clientelism see Andras Sajo, "Clientelism and Extortion: Corruption
in Transition", in Andras Sajo and Stephen Kotkin, (eds.), Political Corruption
in Transition: A Sceptics Handbook (Budapest: CEU Press, 2002), pp. 1-21.
45
Ralph Harris, "Democracy does not merit even two cheers now", The
Times, 10 October 2002.
46
Colin Sparks, Communism, Capitalism and the Mass Media, (London:
Sage, 1998), p. 175.
136 / Challenges to new Democracies in the Balkans
“[...] this, in most cases, has been within very weak eco-
nomic environments. [...] Not being able to rely on revenue from
advertising has forced media outlets to seek financing from po-
litical parties or private financiers who, in return, have sought
to influence the content of the news reported. [...] All this not
only puts at risk the economic survival of independent media
organisations, but also significantly lowers the quality of jour-
nalism making it dependent on external factors other than truth
and accuracy.” 47
In Hungary, a recent survey of the press and press freedom showed
that: “half of all journalists have been menaced in one way or an-
other, and only a third of journalists are able to resist attempts of
political influencing.”48
The same could have been written of the book publishing mar-
ket. As an example of the access to media gained by even the least
popular politicians, one can again look at Hungary. It would be
wrong to assume that electoral outcomes and hence party popular-
ity are more-or-less mirrored in the market-availability of publica-
tions reflecting the views of parties. In the elections of 1998 the
extremist Hungarian Truth and Life Party (MIEP) was barely able
to gain the 5% minimum of votes required to enter Parliament, and
in the 2002 elections was unable to garner even that minimum.
Nevertheless the party’s weekly Magyar Forum49 continues to be
readily available at newsstands throughout Hungary. Furthermore,
the party is also able to express its views through a variety of other
associated print and electronic media, and not least through sym-
pathetic publishing houses such as Magyar Haz (Hungarian House)
and Gede Testverek (Gede Brothers).
The former Member of the Hungarian Parliament Izabella B.
Kiraly, is also a proponent of Hungarians’ cultural gifts to Europe.
“Hungarian ancient culture has a past of several thousand years,”
47
Barbara Trionfi, "Freedom of the Media in Central and Eastern Europe",
in Peter Bajomi-Lazar and Istvan Hegedus, (eds.), Media and Politics (Budapest:
Uj Mandatum, 2001), pp. 93-99 (95).
48
Laszlo Seres, "The Freedom of the Public Media in Hungary: A
Libertarian Approach", in Bajomi-Lazar and Hegedus (eds.), Media and Politics,
pp. 147-157 (155); for the original study see Maria Vasarhelyi, "Ujsagiro-kutatas
2000", Jel-kep, 2001, no. 4, pp. 53-71.
49
Magyar Forum can be found online at: http://www.miep.hu .
Madness in the Media / 137
she once said, going on to explain that on their arrival to Europe
“Hungarian women wore silk panties.”50 Unfortunately, instead of
only expounding on history in her lecture, Kiraly spoke of how
unfortunate it is that Jews in Hungary cannot be properly counted,
and said of the skinheads in her audience that they are “unusually
sympathetic bald boys”, with “national spirit”. She also assured
her audience that “the Hungarian nation is not mixed… and this is
of great political significance”52. In short, Kiraly mixes a theory of
racial purity to her beliefs about ancient Hungarian high-culture
Other Hungarian works that show a direct link between theories
of primacy and extremism might also be cited. One, The Hungar-
ian Jesus and the Lost Tribes of Israel53 expounds on a theory that
would be familiar to the British Israelites. Another, Was Christ a
Jew?, recycles the argument favored by some in Nazi Germany as
well that Jesus could not have been a Jew as no Jew could have
been so noble and generous.55 The author “proves” that Jesus in
fact must have been a child of Scythians enslaved by Jews, and
furthermore shows that Scythians must clearly be the ancestors of
modern-day Hungarians. Here the link between primacy, superior-
ity and anti-Semitism is unmistakably evident.
There are even alternative versions of the theory. One of the
foremost promulgators of the Sumerian-Hungarian continuity theory
from the Hungarian diaspora, Professor Ferenc Badiny-Jos, ex-
pounded upon his ideas on television on Hungarian television (Z
T.V.) until 12:15 p.m. on the night of 30 September - 1 October,
2003. Professor Badiny-Jos claims that the Hungarians are related
to the Sumerians through the Parthians. Furthermore, according to
50
Izabella B. Kiraly, quoted by Ferenc Hajba, in Nepszabadsag, 22 March
1993. Among her other sponsors, Kiraly was also invited to speak on this occasion
by the youth wing of the then governing MDF party.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid.
53
Lajos Biro, A magyar Jezus es Izrael elveszett torzsei (Budapest: Magyar
Haz, 1999).
54
Ferenc Zajti, Zsido volt-e Krisztus? [Was Christ a Jew?], (reprint;
Budapest: Gede Testverek, Bt., 1999); also Gyula Rock, Zsido volt-e Jezus [Was
Jesus a Jew?], ([1943] reprint; Budapest: Anahita-Ninti, 2001).
55
On the aryanization of Christ under Nazism, see: Peter Viereck,
Metapolitics: The Roots of the Nazi Mind ([1941] eighth impression, New York:
Capricorn Books, 1965), pp. 282-287.
138 / Challenges to new Democracies in the Balkans
the professor, Our Lord Jesus was not the child of a Jewess. Instead
Mary was the daughter of a Parthian prince, and thus the Immacu-
late Conception happened through the body of a Parthian princess.
As proof, Badiny-Jos claims that the Shroud of Turin is identical to
the shrouds used to bury noble Parthians.56 As the professor also
claims that the Parthians are the ancestors of the Hungarians, Jesus
is clearly related through his mother to Hungarians (his father, of
course, is divine). The professor admits that there has been contro-
versy about the shroud’s authenticity, but claims that one of the
two groups of scientists who examined it, those who did all they
could to prove the shroud was false, were the descendants of those
who had crucified Jesus. Professor Badiny-Jos also proudly an-
nounced that the Sumerian theory is now being taught at the Hu-
manities Faculty of the University of Miskolc.
Unfortunately such theories have been adopted by some of the
high and mighty, such as Laszlo Grespik, who unsuccessfully ran
as candidate for Parliament for MIEP in 2002. Grespik had been
commended by Hungary’s former Prime Minister, Viktor Orban
(1998-2002), for his outstanding service as head of Budapest’s
Administrative Office. In addition to his beliefs about Jesus’ de-
scent, Grespik has said that Hungarians were the “first people in
the world to have a written culture, the first to create a state.”57
Grespik also believes in Hungarians’ genetic superiority, for he has
come to the conclusion that Hungarian and Japanese DNA is unique
to humankind in that it has nine spirals.58
The spread of such ideas has recently evoked denunciation from
the Catholic Bishop of Gyor, Lajos Papai, who said of those who
disseminate the theory of Jesus’ Parthian ancestry: “We cannot share
space with movements or press that support, provide room for, or
accept such anti-Christian attacks.” 59
The Bishop was not exaggerating. Such “Jesus was Hungarian”
theories have given rise to neo-pagan sects. Of the several such
56
Also see Laszlo Tabori, Gilgamestol Jezusig [From Gilgamesh to Jesus],
(Budapest: Melkizedek, 1999).
57
Cited in: A. Gero, L. Varga and M. Vince (eds.), Anti-Semitic Discourse
in Hungary in 2000 (Budapest: B’nai B’rith, 2001), p. 150.
58
Ibid., p. 150.
59
Lajos Papai as cited in Janos Dobszay, "Mi van a rovasukon?", Heti
Vilaggazdasag, 27 September 2003; also see Szilard Szonyi, "Arpad nepe, hej!",
Heti Valasz, 26 September 2003.
Madness in the Media / 139
churches now registered in Hungary, two of them were founded in
the country prior to the Second World War. The Community of
Hungarian Faith (Magyar Vallas Kozossege) and the Ancient Hun-
garian Church (Osmagyar Egyhaz), were kept alive in the West,
and have recently returned to Hungary.
Yet such sects have extremely small congregations, even though
their supporters are able to purchase television time. And before leap-
ing to conclusions about extremism in Hungary, we should recall the
repeated publication in the United States of: Henry Ford’s Interna-
tional Jew60; the infamous Tsarist policy forgery61 The Protocols of
the Learned Elders of Zion62; and The Turner Diaries63, the book
found with Oklahoma bomber Timothy McVeigh at the time of his
arrest.64 Sadly, all of these books with the exception of The Turner
Diaries, are also available in Hungarian. Indeed, despite a law explic-
itly banning the publication of The Protocols in Hungary, I was able to
purchase the book at a metro stop in Budapest in December 2001.
The difference here is not in content, but rather the share of the
market such works enjoy, and the prominent place they are given in
the market. As is the case of pornography, there is a mutually rein-
forcing reaction between the dissemination of such views and their
adoption by certain sectors of the public. Thus, the widespread and
party-driven (as opposed to market-limited) dissemination of ha-
tred may have a long-term effect on society, and the widespread
distribution of such theories can evoke resonance among those who
may never otherwise have been exposed to them.
60
Henry Ford, Sr. (publisher), The International Jew, The World’s Foremost
Problem (reprint: Boring, Oregon: CPA Book Publishers, 1995).
61
The Protocols was first shown to be a forgery in English by Philip Graves
in a series of articles in The Times of London from 16-18 August 1921. For an
expose of the forgery in Hungarian (translated from the Russian original of 1938),
see Vlagyimir Burcev, A Cion bolcseinek jegyzokonyvei kozonseges hamisitvany
(Racskovskij fabrikalta, es Hitler tette vilaghiruve A Cion bolcseinek
jegyzokonyveit), (Budapest: Mult es Jovo); also see Norman Cohn, Warrant for
Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World Conspiracies and the Protocols of the
Elders of Zion ([1967] reprint, London: Serif, 1996).
62
Nilus, Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, translated by Viktor E.
Marsden ([1934] reprint, Boring, Oregon: CPA Books).
63
Andrew Macdonald (William L. Pierce), The Turner Diaries (Hillsboro,
West Virginia: national Vanguard Books, multiple editions, 1978, ’80, ’85, ’87,
‘90-).
64
David S. Katz and Richard H. Popkin, op. cit., p. 200.
140 / Challenges to new Democracies in the Balkans
This is why racist theories from the West, disseminated by the
wealthy Western diaspora, present a threat to the fledgling democ-
racies of transition countries. This is why theories such as those
spread by the same ethnic-Serbian American mentioned above, Dr.
Ratibor M. Djurdjevic, are significant. Dr. Djurdjevic has “pub-
lished some thirty books in Serbian [...]. The same story recurs,
with variations, in all of them: Western Europe and America are
today governed by ‘Judeo-bankers’ or ‘Judeo-masons’, descendants
of the Pharisees who over three centuries (the 18th to the 20th),
have succeeded in dividing the West from Christianity.”65
In such an environment, then, the results of a non-representa-
tive survey of secondary school students carried out in Budapest
and Belgrade in 2000 are hardly surprising. In that survey some
13% of Hungarian youth and some 30% of Serbian youth believed
that over the centuries their own nations had given birth to the great-
est number of saints. Some 33.8% of Hungarians and some 48% of
Serbs felt their own nations had the most geniuses per capita. And
some 22% of Hungarians and 21% of Serbs felt their own country
had the most Olympic gold medals per capita. Interestingly, by the
2002 survey only 5% of Hungarians felt their country had pro-
duced the most saints, while the number of those who felt Hungary
had the most geniuses per capita had risen significantly, to 37%.
The dramatic fall in the percentage of young Hungarians who feel
the country has produced the most saints may be the result of reli-
gious education, which is an optional subject in Hungarian schools
now. Sadly, the author was unable to gain funding to carry out the
survey in a Western country as well, which would have highly im-
proved the chances of discovering whether the Hungarian and
Serbian samples were to any extent deviant, or merely fit within a
general international norm.
The editor-in-chief of one of Hungary’s outstanding weeklies
bitterly commented on the situation in Hungary after a decade of
democracy: “contrary to the widespread misconception, in Hun-
gary no proper press market has been established. By ‘proper’ press
market I mean that eventually a newspaper should be maintained
by its readers, both directly, by paying money for the copies, and
indirectly, as data on the audience and reading are determinative in
65
Ivan Colovic, op. cit., p. 204.
Madness in the Media / 141
regard to advertising. Hardly any part of this scenario has been
realized [...] Advertising receipts [...] are still, or even more than
before, the result of political affiliations and subsequently the pub-
lisher is a key figure [...] who is more committed to his own eco-
nomic and political interests than to authentic information.”66
Indeed, in his survey of journalism throughout the region Peter
Gross has noted that: “Worse yet, journalists in the region believed,
with their Hungarian colleagues, that freedom of the press meant
‘freedom to write anything without attention to truth and privacy.’”67
In her comment on the situation since the changes in Serbia,
Miljenko Dereta recently remarked “Unfortunately, there wasn't
[the] expected professionalization of the media. On the contrary,
there are more and more links between individual media and cen-
ters of power, followed by manipulation of the public.”68
The Hungarian editor previously cited went on to finish his bleak
picture of the press in Hungary: “even though, as we know, there
are no Russians [in Hungary] any more, there is no Brezhnev, no
Warsaw Pact. There is something else now. With the exception of a
few fanatics, there is sinecure and acquaintanceship.”69 In short,
while the country is no longer under Soviet occupation, market
reforms have not yet led to a fully autonomous press. Instead of the
old single-party-line the press (with some outstanding exceptions)
now serves party and corporate interests.
To close, Popper identified a pattern of thought that can pose a
threat to democracy and liberty. But theories of linear descent from
ancient peoples appear to arise from the logic of the nation state itself,
and as such are likely to remain with us for some time to come. Patho-
66
Zoltan Kovacs, "Press, Ownership and Politics in Hungary", in Bajomi-
Lazar and Hegedus (eds.), Media and Politics, pp. 135-146 (139-140).
67
Peter Gross, Entangled Evolution:, Media and Democratization in
Eastern Europe (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002), p.
105.
68
Interview by Stojan Obradovic, "Long Road of Changes", in The Network
of Independent Journalists for Central and Eastern Europe - Weekly service, no.
299, (December, 2002), http://www.stina.hr.
69
Zoltan Kovacs, op. cit., p. 146; for a similarly dark overview of the
press in post-communist countries see Colin Sparks, "Media and Democratic
Society: A Survey of Post-communist Experience", in Margaret Blunden and
Patrick Burke, (eds.), Democratic Reconstruction in the Balkans (London: Centre
for the Study of Democracy, 2001), pp. 147-163.
142 / Challenges to new Democracies in the Balkans

logical theories arising from this logic are bound to arise. But to pub-
lish and widely disseminate pathological theories arising from this logic
in countries with relatively weak markets and media there is no need
for popular support or a market. All one needs is a little cash or a little
influence. Herein may rest one of the differences between established
democracies, and countries still struggling with transition.

(A shorter version of this chapter appeared in RFE/RL East Euro-

pean Perspectives on 13 November 2002. Thanks to Slobodan G.
Markovich, Michael Shafir and Irena Sumi for their helpful remarks.)