MANUEL LARA ET AL. ,petitioner, vs.

PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, respondent

No. L-6339. April 20, 1954

Facts:
In 1950, defendant Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi cabs, or cars,
operated a taxi business under the name of “WAVAL TAXI.” He employed among others three
mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked forperiods ranging from 2 to 37
months. When the owner, Del rosario, Jr., sold all of his vehicles on September 4, 1950, to La
Mallorca (a transportation he failed to continue them in their employment. Because their
employer did not give them one month’s salary in lieu of the notice required in Article 302 of the
Code of Commerce, this action was instituted.

Issue:
Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to extra compensation for work performed in excess
of 8 hours a day. Sundays and holidays included.

Ruling:
The services of the plaintiffs ended September 4, 1950, when the new Civil Code was
already in force, it having becoming effective August 30, 1950 (one year after it ws released for
circulation). The New Civil Code on Article 2270 repealed the provisions of the Code of
Commerce, governing agency, one provision of which was Article 302 (particularly one
speaking of “salary corresponding to said month,” commonly known as “mesada”). Hence, the
plaintiffs are no longer entitled to their one month severance pay.

1
 LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ET. AL., petitioners, v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, ET. AL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915. April 24, 1985

Facts:
The petitioners, Lorenzo M. Taňada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys
for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), were seeking a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette. However, respondents through Solicitor General would have this case dismissed on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity date.
They pleaded likewise that the date of publication is material in determining the date of
effectivity, that is, the fifteenth day following the publication, as provided in Article 2 of the
New Civil Code, but not when the law itself provides its own date of effectivity. Otherwise, there
would be no room for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat,” for it
prejudices the right of due process since these presidential issuances are “of public nature” or “of
general applicability.”

Issue:
Whether or not the publication of presidential issuances in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity

Ruling:
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect. The enforcement of presidential decrees
prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an “operative fact which may have
consequence which cannot be justly ignored.” Wherefore, the Court hereby orders respondents to
publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application.

2
 LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ET. AL., petitioners, v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA. IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.

Facts:
After the decision of the Court on 24 April 1985 affirming the necessity for the
publication of some of the decrees, Taňada, et. al., are before the Court again to suggest that
there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that
publication should be complete; and the same should be made in the Official Gazette.

Issue:
Whether or not the publication should be completed prior to its enforcement in the
Official Gazette

Ruling:
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. For the phrase “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2
of the New Civil Code, it does not dispense the need of publication rather it refers to the date of
effectivity of the law. Such publication of laws could be available in a newspaper of general
circulation for it is easily available, has a wide readership, and comes out regularly. However,
there is no amendment in the said Code as to the publication of laws. And as far as the Supreme
Court is concerned, its function is limited to interpret laws and cannot prescribed other rule on
where the publication has to be made. Thus, it has no other choice but to pronounce that
publication shall be made in the Official Gazette.

*(Executive Order 200, dated June 18, 1987, has modified Article 2 of the Civil Code, which
provides for the publication of laws either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines as a requirement for effectivity.)

3
 PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
ANGELES, respondent
G.R. No. 108461. October 21, 1996

Facts:
On August 30, 1989, the administrative order no. SOCPEC 89-08-01 was issued by the
Philippine International Coporation (PITC). The relevant provision therein was that
organizations which wanted to trade with the People’s Republic of China (PROC) had to do so
under certain conditions: Imports must be made with a corresponding number or percentage or
exports. Desiring to make importations form PROC, private respondents Remington and
Firestone, both domestic corporations, individually applied for the deal and executed respective
undertaking to balance their imports and exports. After importation, both private respondents
failed to comply in submitting corresponding export credits. The PITC subsequently barred
private respondents from future importation from PROC.
Eventually, private respondents came together came together in a petition against PITC
(petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, with prater for issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order). The regional trial court rendered its decision on January 4, 1992. the court sided with
herein private respondents citing among a host of reasons that PITC’s authority to create laws
had already been repealed by E.O. No. 133, issued on February 27, 1987. Another considerable
point was that the administrative order was null and void since the same was not published as
was required by Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner then came to the Supreme Court on petition for review on certiorari. While the
Supreme Court was deliberating, President Fidel V. Ramos came to an agreement with PROC
and forged Executive Order No. 244. The executive order essentially abrogated the
administrative order. There however remained, the matter of outstanding obligations of the
respondents for the charges relating to the 0.5%. Counter Export Development Service in favor
of PITC, for the period when the questioned Administrative Order was still in effect.

Issues:
1. Are administrative orders subject to Article 2 of the Civil Code?
2. Has legal authority of PITC emanating from LOI No. 444 and P.D. No. 244 ben
repealed by E.O. No. 133?
3. Is the obligation still subsisting, or are the respondents freed from it?

Ruling:
LOI No. 444 and P.D. No. 244 were not repealed by E.O. No. 13 since the executive
order itself, as worded, was silent as to the abolition or limitation of the powers granted to the
:PITC. However, the Administrative Order is not exempt from Article 2 of regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
The administrative order issued by PITC dated on August 30, 1989 was not published in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Hence, the law was invalid when
obligations were supposed to take effect.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, to the effect that judgment
was hereby rendered in favor of the private respondents.

4
 PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-N.U.B.E and PERFECTO B.
FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE BENJAMIN VEGA, respondents.
G.R. No. 105364. June 28, 2001

Facts:
On January 24, 1992, President Cory Aquino signed into law “An Act to Rehabilitate The
Philippine Veterans Bank Created Under Act. No. 3518 Providing The Mechanisms Therefor,
And For Other Purposes (RA 7169),” which was published in the Official Gazette on February
24, 1992 and provides in part for the reopening of the Philippine Veterans Bank together with all
its branches within the period of three years from the date of the reopening of the head office.
On June 3, 1992, the liquidator filed A Motion for the Termination of the Liquidation
Proceeding s of the Philippine Veterans Bank with the respondent judge. And in a Resolution
dated June 8, 1992, the Court issued a temporary restraining order in the instant case restraining
respondent judge from further proceeding with the liquidation of PVB. On the other hand, on
June 22, 1992, VOP Security and Detective Agency and its 162 security guards filed a Motion
for Intervention with prayer that they be excluded from the operation of the Temporary
Restraining Order issued by the Court. They alleged that they had filed a motion before Branch
39 of the RTC Manila praying that the said court order PVB to pay backwages and salary
differentials by authority of RA No. 6727, Wage Orders; and that said court in an Order dated
June 5, 1992, approved therein movants’ case and directed the bank liquidator to pay backwages
and differentials in accordance with the computation incorporated in the order.
On August 3, 1992, the Philippine Veterans Bank reopened.

Issue:
May a liquidation court continue with liquidation proceedings of the Philippine Veterans
Bank when Congress had mandated its rehabilitation and reopening?

Ruling:
The concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or contrary to the concept of
rehabilitation, such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the liquidation
proceedings to continue would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank. The
enactment of the Republic Act No. 7169 has rendered the liquidation court functus de officio
which was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino and became effective on the date
indicated. Therefore, liquidation cannot go further proceedings.

5
 YAO KEE petitioner vs. SY-GONZALES respondent
L-55960 November 24, 1988

Facts:
Sy-Kiat, a Chinese national, died on Jan. 17, 1977 in Caloocan City leaving behind real
and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300, 000.00 more or less. Thereafter, Aida
Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the grant of
letters of administration in said petition, they alleged among others that a) they are the children
of the deceased with Asuncion Gillago; b) they do not acknowledge Sy-Kiat’s marriage to Yao-
Kee. The petition was opposed by Yao-Kee, Sze Sook Wan, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Kiat. After
the hearing, the probate court affirmed that Sy-Kiat was legally married to Yao-Kee. On appeal,
the CA held that respondents are the acknowledged natural children of Sy-Kiat and that Sy-
Kiat’s marriage with Yao-Kee had not been proven to be valid in the both the Philippine and
Chinese laws. As testified by Yao-Kee, she was married to Sy-Kiat on Jan. 19, 1931, in Fookien,
China; that she is not in possession of their marriage certificate; that their marriage was an
agreement of their parents who were as well the signatories of the certificate; that they were wed
by a village leader; that she cannot provide the said document containing the signatures of the
couple’s parents and that she cannot provide any legal document proving that their wedding was
indeed part of China’s custom or China’s laws.

Issue:
Whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven?

Ruling:
Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact. Accordingly,
in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same
as ours. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently the validity of the
marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao-Kee and Sy-Kiat
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Wherefore, the decision of the CA is hereby affirmed.

6
 MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE
AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents.
G.R. No. 114776. February 2, 2000.

Facts:
In 1978, plaintiff Menandro B. Laureano, then Director of Flight Operations and Chief
Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant company through its Area Manager
in Manila. Plaintiff’s appointment was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. On the said date, the
defendant also offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five (5) years effective
January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the contract
of employment, which the latter accepted.
Sometime in 1982, defendant initiated cost-cutting measures due to recession. Seventeen
(17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the defendant’s requirements.
Defendant informed its expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to
take advance leaves. It did not however immediately terminate A-300 pilots. It reviewed their
qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet. Among the 17 Airbus pilots reviewed,
12 were found qualified. Unfortunately, plaintiff was not one of the 12. On October 5, 1982,
defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1, 1982 and that he will be
paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice but defendant gave only two (2)
months notice and one (1) month salary.
Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter. Defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds since the plaintiff was employed in Singapore and all other aspects of his employment
contract were executed in Singapore, therefore, Singapore laws should apply.

Issue:
Whether or not Singapore laws should be applied in this case.

Ruling:
No.
The Philippines laws should be applied in this case because the defendant that claims the
applicability of the Singapore laws has the burden of proof but defendant failed to do so.
Therefore, the court decided to apply “processual presumption.”

7
 JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 112193. March 13, 1996

Facts:
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint for Compulsary Recognition and Enforcement of
Successional Rights was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, Antonia
F. Aruego and her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, born on October 5, 1962 and September 3,
1963, respectively, represented by their mother, Luz M. Fabian. The complaint prayed for an
order praying that Antonia and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of Jose Aruego, Sr.
who died on March 30, 1982; that the petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge
them as the compulsory heirs of the deceased; and that their share and participation in the estate
of their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them. The main basis of the
action for compulsory recognition is their alleged “open and continuous possession of the status
of illegitimate children.”
On June 15, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego,
declaring her as the illegitimate daughter of the deceased. Petitioners filed a motion for partial
reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the
complaint by virtue of the passage of E.O. No. 209 or the Family Code of the Philippines. Said
motion was denied. Another petition to the Court of Appeals was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Family Code of the Philippines or E.O. 209 be given retroactive
effect.

Ruling:
No. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is
concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of the respondent, Antonia Aruego, to
have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the
fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code.
The trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint,
never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209. The ruling reinforces
the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached
cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events. The Supreme Court denied the petition
and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

8
 ERNESTO BERNABE, plaintiff vs. CAROLINA ALEJO, defendant
G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002

Facts:
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-
three(23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18,
1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. On
May 16, 1994, Carolina on behalf of Adrian filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be
declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he be given his share in
Fiscal Bernabe’s estate, which is now being held by Ernestine as the sole surviving heir.

Issue:
I
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the legitimate
daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative
father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgement of paternity by the latter.
II
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents ha four years
from the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the
Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the provision of the Family Code and the
applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.
III
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner is fatally defective for failure to
implead the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents.

Ruling:
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, the Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the
civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition
within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take
Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its
enactment. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and
only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court. The
failure of the petitioner to implead the Court of Appeal as a party is not a reversible error; it is in
fact the correct procedure.

9
 GUY, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 163707. September 15, 2006

Facts:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent – minors Karen and Kamille Oanes Wei
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a pertition for letters of administration before
the Regional trial court of Makati.
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledge illegitimate children of
Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at 10,
000, 000. 00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are surviving spouse
Guy, children Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael all surnamed Guy. Petitioners argued
that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the
lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code, they further alleged that
private respondents’ claim had been paid, waived, abandoned, extinguished by reason of
Remedios’ June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial
and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge
the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.

Issue:
Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming
their hereditary rights?

Ruling:
Remedios’ Release and Waiver of claim does not bar private respondents from claiming
succession rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and equivocal
terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of her
children, such waiver does not bar the latter’s claim. Article 104 of the Civil Code requires
judicial authorization of the said waiver which it lacks. Since the affiliation of the private
respondents as co heirs to Sima Wei’s Estates, it would thus be inconsistent to rule that they
waived their hereditary rights when they do not have such right.

10
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff vs. BENJAMIN MORIAL, defendant
G.R. No. 129295. August 15, 2001

Facts:
On the 6th day of January 1996, the above named accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with intent to gain entered into the house of
Paula Bandipas and Benjamin Morial. Once inside did then and there willfully and feloniously
stab Paula Bandipas and Albert Bandipas with the use of a pointed weapon and stones which was
used by the accused in inflicting mortal wounds which caused their instantaneous death, said
accused took and stole P11, 000.00
The next day, the accused went with the police officers to the police station. There
Leonardo Morial was forced to confess about the death of Paula Bandipas and Albert Bandipas.
Leonardo’s statements were then reduced into writing. A policeman informed him that they were
going to contact the lawyer to assist him during the investigation but in truth, Leonardo was not
informed of his rights even before the investigation started.

Issue:
Whether or not the custodial investigation conducted to Leonardo Morial without a
counsel a valid waiver of constitutional right?

Ruling:
A person under custodial investigation enjoys the right to counsel from its inception so
does he enjoy such right until its termination. Even granting that accused consented to Atty.
Aguilar during the investigation and to answer questions during the lawyers’ absence, such
consent was an invalid waiver of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent. The right
cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and with the presence of a counsel.
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the extra judicial confession executed by Leonard
Morial, the conviction of accused is fully supported by other pieces of evidence. The accused is
truly guilty and nevertheless faces conviction.

11
 LORNA PESCA, petitioner vs. ZOSIMO PESCA, respondent
G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001

Facts:

Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and Zosimo A. Pesca got married on March 1975. And their
union begot four children. It started in 1988, the petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent
surprisingly showed signs of psychological incapacity. His true colors of emotionally immature
and irresponsible husband became apparent. The respondent allegedly would slap, beat and kick
her and one time with a loaded shotgun threatened to kill her in the presence of their children.
After some other beating, a case was filed against the respondent for slight physical injuries and
was sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment. On November 15, 1995, following hearings
conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part
of the respondent and ordered a liquidation of conjugal partnership. The respondent appealed the
above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred, and particularly in
holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between the petitioner and
respondent valid and subsisting.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage is null and void for the ground of psychological incapacity?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court thereby dismissing the
petition. The petitioner has utterly failed to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the
part of the respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a
declaration of marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity. The petitioner also failed to follow procedural guidelines in trying
cases for nullity of, that is the necessity for medical and clinical identified sufficiently proven by
experts for both parties to determine the presence of psychological incapacity.

12
 AYALA CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT  CORPORATION, respondent.
December 1, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Ayala Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Ayala) was the registered owner
of a parcel of land located in Alfaro Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City with an area of 840
square meters, more or less and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 233435 of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal. Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to Vilma Po and  Sy  Ka
Kieng married to Rosa Chan.  The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and the buyers
contained Special Conditions of Sale and Deed Restrictions which then sell the lot to respondent
Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation with Ayala’s approval.  Thereafter,  Rosa-
Diana submitted to the building official of Makati another set of building plans for “The Peak”
which were substantially different from those that it earlier submitted to Ayala for approval.
During the construction of Rosa-Diana’s condominium project, Ayala filed an action with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 139 for specific performance, with application for
a writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order against Rosa-Diana Realty seeking
to compel the latter to comply with the contractual obligations under the deed of restrictions. The
lower court denied Ayala’s prayer for injunctive relief, thus enabling Rosa-Diana to complete the
construction of the building. 
In the meantime, Ayala completed its presentation of evidence before the trial court. 
Rosa-Diana filed a Demurrer to Evidence averring that Ayala failed to establish its right to the
relief sought.
The Court of Appeals also cited C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 46488 entitled, “Ayala Corporation vs. Ray
Burton Development Corporation” which relied on  C.A. G.R. S.P.  No. 29157  in ruling that
Ayala is barred from enforcing the deed restrictions in dispute.  Upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by herein petitioner, the Court of Appeals clarified that “the citation of the
decision in Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation, C.A. G.R. C.V. No.
46488, February 27, 1996, was made not because said decision is res judicata to the case at bar
but rather because it is precedential under the doctrine of stare decisis.”
Petitioner reiterates  its  contention  that  the  trial  court’s  findings  that  Ayala  has
waived its right to enforce the deed of restrictions is not supported by law and evidence.
In its assailed decision of February 4, 1994, the trial court, ruled in favor of respondent Rosa-
Diana Realty on the ground that Ayala had not acted fairly when it did not institute an action
against the original vendees despite the latter’s violation of the Special Conditions of Sale but
chose instead to file an action against herein respondent Rosa-Diana. 
Respondent Rosa-Diana, however, misses the point inasmuch as it has freely consented to
be bound by the deed restrictions when it entered into a contract of sale with spouses Manuel Sy
and Sy Ka Kieng. 

Issue:
“An examination of the decision in the said Rosa-Diana case reveals that the sole issue
raised before the appellate court was the propriety of the lis pendens  annotation.  However, the
appellate court went beyond the sole issue and made factual findings bereft of any basis in the
record to inappropriately rule that AYALA is in estoppel and has waived its right to enforce the
subject restrictions.  Such ruling was immaterial to the resolution of the issue of the  propriety of
the annotation of the lis pendens.  The finding of estoppel was thus improper and made in excess
of jurisdiction.”

Ruling:
Exemplary damages in the sum of P2,500,000.00 as prayed for by petitioner are also in
order inasmuch as respondent Rosa-Diana was in evident bad faith when it submitted a set of
building plans in conformity with the deed restrictions to petitioner Ayala for the sole purpose of
obtaining title to the property. Petitioner Ayala is likewise entitled to an award of attorney’s fees
in the sum of P250,000.00.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 4, 1997 and its Resolution dated
June 19, 1998 , C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 4598, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

13
 FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA, JR., petitioner, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ROQUE VILLADORES, respondents.
March 19, 2002

Facts:
Petitioner Villanueva, Jr. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties,
among them, IBC 13. When the labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner Villanueva, Jr., IBC 13
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Thus, the two (2) complaints for falsification of public document were filed before the
Manila City Prosecutor's Office. The charges against respondent Villadores and Atty. Eulalio
Diaz III were dismissed by the City Prosecutor's Office which, however, found probable cause
against the other respondents.
On April 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered its now challenged decision which
reversed and set aside the two (2) Orders of the trial court dated August 27, 1998 and December
4, 1998. The appellate court directed that the name of petitioner Villanueva, Jr., appearing as the
offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-138744-45 be stricken out from the records.
What seems to be more crucial here is the fact that the crime charged in the two
information is falsification of public document committed by a private individual defined and
penalized under Article 172, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. Apropos, the crime of
falsification of public document does not require for its essential elements damage or intent to
cause damage. In the final analysis. the inclusion of the name of Francisco N. Villanueva. Jr.
would then be merely a superfluity in the information, a meaningless surplusage therein. In fact.
it is even highly doubted if civil damages may be awarded in such transgression of the law.
- Viewed from the above ratiocinations, We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
lower court in admitting the second amended informations albeit such amendment is totally
irrelevant and unnecessary to the crime charged.

Issue:
Whether or not the pronouncement of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 46103 to the
effect that petitioner Villanueva, Jr. is not an offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-138744-
45 is obiter dictum.

Ruling:
It is significant to mention that the intervention of petitioner Villanueva, Jr. in the
criminal cases as an offended party is apparently predicated on the reduction by the NLRC, in
IBC's appeal of the illegal dismissal case, of the monetary award to which he is entitled, despite
finding the appeal as not perfected due to the posting of the spurious appeal bond. However, such
alleged error should have been brought by petitioner Villanueva, Jr. to the appropriate forum,
and not raised in criminal cases before the trial court as a ground for his inclusion as a
"prejudiced party".
In view of all the foregoing, the instant petition, being devoid of merit, must fail.
The instant petition is hereby DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April
12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50235 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

14
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO
CORDERO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995

Facts:

On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the
necropsy report of the victim, Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address, and
Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288 Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo, Manila were later charged
with the crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region. Said Information, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 94-138071. After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and
the defense, the trial court rendered a decision on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry
Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all
the accessories provided for by law." Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City
Prosecutor of Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the
Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" against respondents Lagarto and
Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act on the merits of
the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge, on February 10, 1995, issued an Order
denying the same for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an
accused individual in a criminal case has, on the occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is the
judge allowed any discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death?

Ruling:

Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should
impose "the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused." This is not
a case of a magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the
appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing,
respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law
clearly imposes the penalty of Death. The instant petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private
respondents in consonance with respondent judge's finding that the private respondents in the
instant case had committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, subject to automatic review by
this Court of the decision imposing the death penalty.

15
 CESARIO URSUA petitioner v.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. No. 112170. April 10,1996.

Facts:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua, a Community Environment and Natural Resources Ofiicer
assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato, had a complaint against him for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of
authority and giving of unwarranted benefits.
On August 1 1987, Atty. Francis Palmores, counsel of the petitioner requested to the
Office of the Ombudsman in Manila that he be furnished a copy of the complaint against
petitioner. He then asked his client Ursua to take his letter request to the office of the
Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal
matters.
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote the name “Oscar
Perez” on the visitor’s logbook and upon receipt of the acknowledged by writing. Loida
Kahulugan, who handed the copy of complaint, learned that the person who introduced himself
as Oscar Perez was actually the petitioner, Cesario Ursua. She reported the matter to the Deputy
Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be charged.
The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
No. 6085. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on May 31, 1993. The petitioner asks for
review on his conviction in Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 otherwise
known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Alias.

Ruling:
Cesario Ursua is acquitted of the crime charged. C.A No. 142, approved on November 7,
1936 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases”, was amended by R.A. No. 6085on
August 4 1969. C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to penalize the act of using an
alias name publicly and in business transactions in addition to his real name unless such alias
was duly authorized by proper judicial proceeding.
The fact that the petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as “Oscar
Perez” served only the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which the
petitioner was a respondent. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to
use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. Hence, the use of a fictitious name
or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or
indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that
day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
6085. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure and that a construction of which the statue is fairly susceptible is favored.

16
 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO,
petitioners,vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 162155. August 28,2007.

Facts:
On May 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group Inc.,
applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. He explained in his letter
to the petitioner Revenue District Officer Arturo Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati)
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that he suffered loses and caused industry to slow
down.
On May 13, 1999, Revenue Officer Elizabeth Santos required the respondent to submit
additional documents to support its claim. Respondents complied but its claim was not acted
upon. Thus on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeal (CTA) but
was dismissed because it was filed beyond two-year prescription period for filing a judicial claim
for tax refund based on Sec. 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and Art. 13 of
the Civil Code.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, it filed an appeal in the
Court of Appeal which reversed the decision of Court of Tax Appeal because Art. 13 of the Civil
Code did not distinguish between a leap year and a regular year.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied, thus, petitioners ask for review on
certiorari to Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within the two-year
prescriptive period provided in Sec. 229 of the NIRC.

Ruling:
The court affirms the decision of the CTA but the basis is however not correct. Article 13
of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to
365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. However, EO 292 or the
Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book 1 provides that “year”
shall be understood to be twelve calendar months. Both deal with the same subject matter- the
computation of legal periods. There obviously exists incompatibility in the manner of computing
legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold
that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book 1 of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent
law, governs the computation of legal periods.
Applying Section 31,Chapter VIII, Book 1 of Administrative Code of 1987, the
respondent’s petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24 th calendar
month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the
reglementary period.

17
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. LUDIVICO D. ARCIAGA,
TAURINO SINGSON AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
No. L-29701. March 16,1987.

Facts:
On August 24, 1960, Taurino Singson filed a complaint against Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines Inc. for sustaining multiple serious physical injuries when the bus crashed against an
acacia tree. The case was set for trial on December 25, 1965 but upon the motion of both
counsel, it was transferred to February 3 and 4 1966. No pre-trial has ever been conducted, until
when April 29, 1967, only the defendant Philippine Rabbit appeared and upon motion of its
counsel, the court dismissed the case for non-appearance of plaintiff.
The order of dismissal of April 29, 1976 alluded to was sent to Atty. Constante Pimentel,
counsel for plaintiff, by registered mail on May 3, 1967 and was received on May 6, 1967. On
July 6, 1967 (61 days from receipt of dismissal), counsel for plaintiff filed a Petition for Relief
accompanied by an affidavit alleging that Taurino Singson upon attending the trial of his case
had encountered engine trouble causing him to be late. On August 16, 1967, lower court granted
plaintiff’s petition for relief and denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner on November
28, 1967 on the ground that the petition for relief under Rule 38 is premised on equity. On July 9,
1968, petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with preliminary injunction in the Court of Appeals but it was denied on August 5, 1968.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied on October 1, 1968. Hence, the instant
petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Is the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petition for Relief under Rule 38 is premised
on equity?

Ruling:
The court found that the petition is impressed with merits. Sec 3. of Rule 38 of the Rules
of Court provides for a petition to be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment and in this case the Petition for Relief was filed 61 days after the receipt of the notice
of the dismissal. Furthermore, the counsel for private respondents did not move for
reconsideration of the Order for dismissal, nor for new trial. Neither did he appeal, thereby
allowing the decision to become final and executory.
The private respondent could have availed of the sixty day period provided for by Rule
38 to file Petition for relief of judgment but he allowed the opportunity to lapse, thus, the rule of
equity is not applicable in this case. Moreover, the petitioner did not satisfactory showed that he
has faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of the said Rule. He cannot invoke equity
as a ground for the reopening of the case. Indeed, to him is applicable, the well known maxim
that, “equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.” The court, thus, ruled that
the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside and said Civil Case is declared
terminated.

18
 MA. VILMA S. LABAD, plaintiff, v.
THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES, defendant.
G. R. No. 139665. August 9, 2001.

Facts:
Petitioner was a probationary faculty member of the University of Southeastern
Philippines (hereafter respondent) Laboratory (high school) and designated as the adviser for the
school’s yearbook “TRAIL 95,” the regular organ “INSIGHTS” and the school’s government
known as the school’s government known as the “LSOCSG.”
On February 1, 1996, the officers and members of respondent university’s Parents
Teachers Association filed a letter-complaint with the president of respondent university,
charging petitioner with “Dishonesty,” Grave Misconduct, and “Unfitness as a Teacher.”
The respondent’s university Board of Regents subsequently approved and adopted the
report of the Investigating Committee – that it rendered a report recommending the penalty of
dismissal from service through the non-renewal of petitioner’s probationary status on the ground
of dishonesty and misconduct – as its decision.
The petitioner appealed said decision to Civil Service Commission. However, the CSC,
issued a resolution on April 14, 1998 affirming the decision of respondent’s university Board of
Regents. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration to CSC but it was denied.
On December 28, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for extension
of period to file petition for Review asking for 15 days from December 28, 1998 until January
12, 1999 to do so. The petitioner filed her petition for Review with the Court of Appeals on the
latter date.
The counsel of the petitioner received a copy of resolution dated February 24, 1999 on
March 10, 1999, issued by the CA, former 4 th division, dismissing the petitioner for review. The
petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration on March 24, 1999. But it was denied on July
29, 1999 resolution issued by the CA dated July 27, 1999.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the review by petitioner before it
on the ground that the petition was filed late.

Ruling:
Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court and as applied in several cases, where
the last day for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
In this case, petitioner still had until December 28, 1998, a Monday and the next business day to
move for a 15-day extension considering that December 26, 1998, the last day for petitioner to
file her petition for review fell on a Saturday. The motion for extension filed on December 28,
1998 was thus filed on time since it was filed before the expiration of the time sought to be
extended.
As a rule, the extension should be attacked to the original period and commence
immediately after the expiration of such period. However, in Moskowsky vs. Court of Appeals
and Vda. De Capulong vs. Workmen’s Insurance Co., Inc., the SC allowed the extended period
to commence from the specific time prayed for in the motion for extension. In this case, the
petitioner specifically manifested that she be granted an extension of 15, days from December
28, 1998 or until January 12, 1999 for her petition for review. Hence, the period for reckoning
the commencement of the additional 15 days should have been from December 28, 1998, and not
December 26, 1998. thus, the petition filed petitioner with the Court of Appeals on January 12,
1998, exactly 15 days from December 28, 1998, was filed on time.

19
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner v. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY
GROUP, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 162155. August 28, 2007

Facts:
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group,
Inc. Apply for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. Because the
respondent suffered losses (amounting to Php 71, 879, 228), due to some factors that caused the
industry to slowdown, it was not liable for income taxes. Nevertheless, respondent paid its
quarterly corporate income tax and remitted credible withholding tax from real estate sales to the
BIR in the total amount of Php 26, 318, 398.32. Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund/
tax credit.
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit
additional documents to support. Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus,
on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals.
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-
year prescriptive period for filling a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. According to
CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under section 229 of the NIRC for filing of judicial claims
was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent’s petition which
was filed 731 days after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the
reglementary period.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, he filed an appeal in the
Court of Appeals. On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. It
ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year.
A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted not construed. Petitioners moved
for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus this appeal.

Issue:
Whether Article 13 of the Civil Code is valid basis to resolve the respondent’s petition
for refund/tax credit.

Ruling:
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA within
the two-year prescriptive period provided in section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code
is correct. Its basis however is not.
A repealing clause section 27, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 is not an
express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the laws to be abolished. Thus,
the provision above only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the Administrative Code
of 1987. Implied repeals, however, are not favoured. An implied repeal must have been clearly
and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law
encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or
reasonable reconciled.
The Supreme Court therefore hold that the respondent’s petition (filed on April 14, 2000)
was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final
adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.

20
 ILLUH ASAALI, HATIB ABDURASID, INGKOH BANTALA, BASOK INGKIN, and
MOHAMMAD BANTALA, petitioners, v. THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
respondent.
No. L-24170, December 16, 1968

Facts:
A customs patrol team on board Patrol Boat ST-23 intercepted the five sailing vessels in
the high seas, between British North Borneo and Sulu on September 10, 1950. These five
vessels, which were all of the Philippine registry, owned and manned by Filipino residents of
Sulu were heading towards Tawi-Tawi, Sulu carrying cigarettes and some pieces of rattan chairs
without the require import license, hence smuggled.

Issue:
Whether or not the seizure can be made although the vessel was on the high seas

Ruling:
Since the ship is registered in the Philippines, it is subjected to our Revised Penal Code,
even outside our territorial jurisdiction. Likewise, in international law, it was agreed upon that a
state has the right to protect itself as well as its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory
but extending to the high seas (Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch 187, 234).

21
 GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v. REDERICK A.
RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001

Facts:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to an Australian citizen, Editha Samson, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving
a marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. The respondent became an Australian
citizen on June 26, 1992 when the Australian government issued a Certificate of Australian
citizenship.
On January 12, 1994, the respondent, claiming that he is single, married the petitioner, a
Filipina, in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. On March 3, 1998,
petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy,
believing that the respondent’s prior marriage to Editha Samson still subsists. However, the
respondent contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved
by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989; thus, he is legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994. While the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending, respondent was able
to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia.

Issue:
Whether or not a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction

Ruling:
The Court decided that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in the
Philippine jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. Thus, the Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A.
Recio, a naturalized Australian citizen, solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as
dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties.

22
 LORENZO LLORENTE, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. NO. 124371. November 23, 2000

Facts:
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in
Nabua, Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States
citizenship and Certifiacte of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United
States District Court, Southern District of New York. In 1945, he discovered that his wife Paula
was pregnant and was “living in” and having an adulterous relationship with his brother,
Ceferino Llorente. On February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that
Llorente would not support Paula, the dissolution of their marital union, and that Lorenzo would
not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act. On November 27, 1951, Lorenzo obtained a divorce
in California. On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. On January 16, 1958,
Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila and begot three children in his later years.

Issue:
Can foreign laws be made applicable in the Philippines?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and recognized the
validity of the divorce granted in favor of Lorenzo. The Court also remanded the cases to the
court of origin for determination of successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.

23
 ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. AND
RICHARD UPTON, respondents.
No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.

Facts:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and
established residence in the Philippines afterwards. The parties were divorced in Nevada, United
States in 1982. Petitioner re-married also in Nevada with Theodore Van Dorn. Dated June 8,
1983, private respondents filed suit against petitioner claiming that the latter’s properties in
Manila were conjugal and that private respondent had a rightful claim to its management.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the suit claiming that the private respondent acknowledged that he
and petitioner had no “community property” in the divorce proceedings. The Regional Trial
Court denied the dismissal on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines
so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this
certiorari proceeding.

Issues:
a. When is a certiorari proceeding justifiable?
b. Can the Philippines recognize divorce?

Ruling:
a. The petition was granted, and respondent judge was hereby ordered to dismiss the
complaint filed where respondent judge denied her motion to dismiss said case, and her motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal order. When the lower court acts in a manner equivalent to a
lack of jurisdiction then it devolves upon the Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding to
exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed.
b. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippines nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces. Aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. A divorce decree granted by a U.S. Court between a Filipina and her
American husband is binding on the American husband. Since the couple had obtained a
divorced in Nevada, the husband is estopped from asserting his rights over supposed conjugal
property. The American husband in this instance who was granted absolute divorce with his
Filipina wife is cut off from marital and successional rights with the latter.

24
 IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,
DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, EXECUTOR AND LUCY CHRISTENSEN, HEIR
OF THE DECEASED, EXECUTOR AND HEIR-APPELLEES, vs. HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
No. L-16749. January 31, 1963.

Facts:
Edward E. Christensen, the deceased, who domiciled in the Philippines and/but a citizen
of California, made a will executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 stating that Maria Lucy
Christensen was his only child and that a certain Maria Helen Christensen, though baptized as
Christensen, was not in any way related nor adopted by him. With this, Maria Helen Christensen
was just granted with 3,000 pesos, Philippine currency to be deposited in trust with the Davao
Branch of the Philippine National Bank and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos,
Philippine currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have
accrued thereon, was exhausted while all that was left by the deceased be given to Maria Lucy
Christensen.
Since Maria Helen Christensen was declared by the Court in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward Christensen, opposition to the approval of
the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her legitime as an acknowledged
natural child.
However, the court ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States
and of the Sate of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity
of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California. Oppositor Helen
Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but were denied. Some
of which claimed that the lower court erred in ignoring the decision of the SC that Helen was
acknowledged as a natural child; recognizing the calling for the application of International Law;
recognizing that the validity of the testamentary disposition of the distribution of estate should be
governed by the Philippine laws; declaring the schedule of distribution was contrary to
Philippine laws.

Issue:
What law will determine and recognize the validity of testamentary provisions and the
disposition of the bequeathed of the deceased given that his domicile was the Philippines but his
citizenship is in California; the repercussion of which is the determining factor of whether Maria
Helen Christensen’s appeal for ½ share of the properties be granted or not.

Ruling:
Art. 16 of the Philippine Civil Code states that “…intestate and testamentary
successions…shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where
said property may be found. Since Edward Christensen was a California citizen, the Philippines
where he executed his testament referred back to the laws of which he was a citizen of –
California, USA. However, no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions was found, therefore it referred to no other than the private law of the state of which
the decedent was a citizen – State of California. Referring then to California Civil Code, Article
946 authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile.
Finding therefore that Philippines is the domicile of the deceased, the validity of the provisions
of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, pursuant to the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
Judgment is therefore reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions
that the partition be made as the Philippine Law on succession provides.

25
 TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE’S
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, executor. MARIA CRISTINA
BELLIS AND MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
No. L-23678. June 6, 1967.

Facts:
Amos G. Bellis was born in Texas and a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States. At the time of his death, he was a resident thereof. Before he died, he made two wills, one
disposing of his Texas properties, the other, disposing of his Philippine properties. In both wills,
his recognized illegitimate children were not given anything. Texas has no conflicts rule – rule of
Private International Law – governing successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas Law, there
are no compulsory heirs and therefore no legitimes. The illegitimate children opposed the wills
on the ground that they have been denied of their right to inherit to which they would be entitled
if Philippine law were to be applied.

Issue:
Are they entitled to their legitimes?

Ruling:
The said children are not entitled to their legitimes for under Texas Law which must be
applied – because it is the national law of the deceased – there are no legitimes.
The renvoi doctrine, applied in Testate Estate of Edward Christensen, Adolfo Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia cannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a
national of one country and a domiciliary of Texas at the time of his death. So that even
assuming that Texas has a conflicts of law rule providing that the law of the domicile should
govern, the same would not result in a renvoi to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law
because the deceased was both a citizen and a domiciliary of Texas.
The contention that the national law of the deceased should be disregarded because of
Article 17 which in effect states that our prohibitive laws should not be rendered nugatory by
foreign laws, is wrong. This is because Article 16 and Article 1039 are special provisions while
Article 17 is merely a general provision. Moreover, because Congress deleted the phrase
“notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article” when it incorporated
Article 11 of the old Civil Code as Article 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without
substantial change, the second paragraph of Article 10 of the old Civil Code as Article 16 of the
new.
Pointed out by the oppositor that the decedent, executing two wills intended Philippine
Law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent’s intention, a
provision in a foreigner’s will in accordance with the Philippine law and not with his national
law is illegal and void for his national law.

26
 PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, petitioner
vs. VENICIO ESCOLIN, ET AL., respondent
56 S 266

Facts:
On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will. On May 27,
1957, her widower- Hodges, had been appointed as SpecialAdministrator. Barely four months
before his death, he executed an affidavit wherein he ratified and confirmed all that he stated in
his estate tax returns as to his having renounced what was given him bu his wife’s will.
Thereafter, Atty. Leon Gellada, who had been previously acting as counsel for Hodges in his
capacity as special executor of his wife’s estate, and as such had filed the aforequoted motions
and manifestations; that the most trusted employee of both spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C.N
Hodges, who had been employed for around 30 years, in the person of Miss Avelina Magno,
should be appointed as administrator of the estate and at the same time, a special administrator of
the estate of Charles Newton Hodges.
On January 24, 1964, virtually al of the heirs of C.N Hodges, who claim to be the sole
beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal counsel representing the
aforementioned parties, entered into anamicablesettlement, wherein the partied thereto agreed
that certain sums of money were to be paid in settlement of different claims against the 2 estates
and that the asets of both estates would be administrered jointly by the PCIB as administrator of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, that PCIB’s claim to exclusive possession
and ownership of 100% of all assets owned by Charles Newton Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges
situated here in the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not Philippine law should govern the successional rights of the heris?

Ruling:
Applying the “renvoi doctrine,” asenunciated and applied by this honorable court in the
case of “In reChristensen,” there can be no question that Philippine law governs the testamentary
provisions in the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the
successional rights to her estate, both with respect to movables, as well as immovables in the
Philippines.

27
 AMERICAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. BERNARD L. SALAS and DEMOCRITO MENDOZA, respondents
G.R No. 116044-45. March 9, 2000

Facts:
It is undisputed that the private respondent purchased from Singapore Airlines in Manila
conjunction tickets for Manila-Singapore-Athens-Larnaca-Rome-Turin-Geneva-Copenhagen-
New York. American Airlines was not a participating airline in any of the segments. In Geneva,
private respondent decided to forego his trip to Copenhagen and to go straight to New York and
in the absence of a direct flight under his conjunction tickets from Geneva to New York; the
private respondent on June 7, 1989 exchanged the unused portion of the conjunction ticket for a
one-way ticket to New York from American Airlines. Am. Airlines issued its own ticket to the
private respondent in Geneva and claimed the value of the unused portion of the conjunction
ticket from the clearing house in Geneva. In Sept. 1989, private respondent filed an action for
damages before the RTC of Cebu for the alleged embarrassment and mental anguish he suffered
at the Geneva Airport when the Am. Airline’s security officers prevented him from boarding the
plane only after all the other passengers have boarded. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction of Philippine courts to entertain the said proceedings under Art. 28 of the
Warsaw Convention. The petitioner contends that since the Philippines is not the place where the
contract of carriage was made between the parties herein, Philippine courts do not have
jurisdiction over this action for damages. Petitioner lays stress on the fact that the plane ticket for
a direct flight from Geneva to New York was purchased by the private respondent from the
petitioner by “exchange and cash” which signifies that the contract of carriage with Singapore
Airlines was terminated and a second contract was perfected. Moreover, the second contract of
carriage cannot be deemed to have been an extension of the first as the petitioner airline is not a
participating airline in any of the destinations under the first contract. The RTC denied the
motion. The order of denial was elevated to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the ruling of
the RTC. Both RTC and CA held that the suit may be brought in the Philippines under the pool
partnership among the IATA (International Air Transport Association) members, which include
Singapore Airlines and American Airlines, wherein the members act as agents of each other in
the issuance of tickets to those who may need their services.

Issue:
Whether or not the Philippines has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for
damages filed by the private respondent against petitioner in view of Art 28 (1) of the Warsaw
Convention?

Ruling:
The Warsaw Convention to which the Philippines is a party and which has the force and
effect of law in this country applies to all international transportation of persons, baggage, or
goods performed by an aircraft gratuitously or for hire. The threshold issue of jurisdiction of
Philippine courts under Art. 28 must first be resolved before any pronouncements may be made
on the liability of the carrier thereunder. Art. 3 of the Warsaw Convention clearly states that a
contract of air transportation is taken as a single operation whether it is founded on a single
contract or a series of contracts. The number of tickets issued does not detract from the oneness
of the contract of carriage as long as the parties regard the contract as a single operation. The
third option of the plaintiff under Art. 28 of the Warsaw Convention e.g., to sue in the place of
business of the carrier wherein the contract was made, is therefore, Manila, and Philippine courts
are clothed with jurisdiction over this case. We note that while this case was filed in Cebu, the
issue of venue is no longer an issue.
Wherefore, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.

28
 PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. ROSARIO GANAC CHU respondent.
G.R. No. 14521. September 21, 2005

Facts:
A complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction and
temporary restraining order filed by respondent against petitioner and the National Housing
Authority (NHA).
Sometime in June 1993, without notice and due process, petitioner entered her property
and bulldozed the land destroying her black pepper plantation, causing damage to her operation
and depriving her of her means of livelihood. Respondent appeared claiming that petitioner had
encroached upon her property. Respondent failed to prove her ownership thereof.
The partial decision of the trial court favored the respondent. On the other hand, the
petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. the court sustained the factual findings of the trial court.

Issue:
Is the respondent entitled for the payment of damages?
Did the petitioner acted in bad faith?

Ruling:
It was held in the modified decision of the Supreme Court that in lieu of the actual
damages, temperate damages should have been awarded by the trial court considering that
respondent had suffered some pecuniary loss but its amount cannot be proved without certainty.
Respondent’s ownership of the property on which the pepper tree stand is immaterial to
the case. There is no dispute that respondent owned the pepper trees that were destroyed by the
petitioner. Even assuming that petitioner owns the property or that bulldozed the land with its
boundaries, still, there was no reason for the petitioner to disregard respondent’s right over her
trees. Thus the petitioner acted in bad faith in view of the destroyed trees.

29
 HERMINO C. PRINCIPIO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. OSCAR BARRIENTOS, BANKO
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, and HILARIO SORIANO, respondents
G.R. No. 167025. December 19, 2005

Facts:
On june 25, 2001, respondent Hilarion P. Soraino, president and stock holder of the Rural
Bank of San Miguel Inc., filed an affidavit-complaint against petitioner with the office of the
Ombudsman for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019. Respondent alleged that
petitioner, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross negligence, caused undue
injury to RBSMI by reporting that the bank incurred legal reserve deficiencies, and by
recommending the imposition of a fine which was adopted by the Monetary Board.
On September 26, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding
probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of the said Republic Act. On November 12, 2002,
and information was filed against the petitioner with the RTC Manila.
On November 26, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the information had been already filed in the
court.
The petitioner filed a motion with the trial court praying that the motion for
reconsideration filed with the Office of the Ombudsman be given due course and thereafter, to
rule that no probable cause exist.
On December 3, 2003, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion to give due course to his
motion for reconsideration and to defer proceedings until resolution of the pending issues. It also
suspended petitioner from office for a period of 60 days. His motion for reconsideration was
denied on January 27, 2004.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying for the
annulment of respondent judges Orders of December 3, 2003 and January 27, 2002 for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner acted in bad faith.

Ruling:
It was held that the Ombudsman cannot impute bad faith on the part of the petitioner on
the assumption that he, together with other BSP officials, was part of the cabal to apply pressure
on RBSMI to sell out by subjecting it to many impositions through the Monetary Board. Bad
faith is never presumed, while good faith is always presumed. The Ombudsman should have first
determined the facts indicating bad faith instead of relying on the tenuous assumption that there
was an orchestrated attempted to force RBSMI to sell out.

30
 WILLIAM GATCHALIAN, petitioner, vs. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
(COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), et al., respondents.
MAY 31, 1991 G.R. Nos. 95612-13

Facts:
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was
recognized by the Bureau of immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the
citizenship of his mother, Marciana Gatchalian.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve year old minor, arrived in Manila
from Hong Kong together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They
had with them Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Cosulate in Hong
kong and sought an admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco and daughter and son,
respectively, of Santiago; while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
After investigation, the board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6,
1961, admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens. As a consequence
thereof, William Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate by the immigration authorities
on August 16, 1961.
On January 24, 1962, Memorandum No. 9 was issued by the secretary of Justice setting
aside all decisions purporting rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or review motu
propio of the Board of special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of
commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a
Philippine citizen.
On July 6, 1962, the New Board of Commissioners after a review motu propio of the
proceedings in the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the
exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian. A warrant of exclusion also dated July 6,
1962 was issued alleging the decision of the Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 has
now become final and executory.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by July 6, 1962
warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of special Inquiry where the
deportation case against them was assigned.
On March 14, 1973, the board of Special Inquiry recommended to the then Acting
Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the
warrant of arrest issued against him.
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the national Bureau of Investigation wrote the
Justice Secretary recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with other applicants covered
by the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Com. Act No. 613, as
amended, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940.
On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to
the CI for investigation and immediate action.
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation issued a mission order commanding the arrest of William
Gatchalian.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with injuction before the RTC of Manila.
On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging that respondent
judge has no jurisdiction over the board of Commissioners. Nonetheless, respondent judge issued
the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to dismiss.
In a counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among others that: 1) assuming that the
evidence on record is not sufficient to declare him as Filipino citizen, petitioners have no
jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until the courts have resolved the question of his
citizenship; (2) petitioners can no longer judiciously and fairly resolve respondent’s citizenship
in the deportation case because of their bias, pre-judgment and prejudice against him; and (3) the
ground for which he sought to be deported has already prescribed.

31
Issues:
Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration valid?
Whether or not William Gatchalian a Filipino citizen?

Held:
It was held that the warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of immigration should
be for investigation purposes only. Thus, the warrant of arrest that was issued is null and void for
being unconstitutional. Based on the Immigration Act, it is clear that the Commissioner of
Immigration may issue warrant of arrest only after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In
other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of immigration, to be valid, must be
for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation.
As to the citizenship of William Gatchalian, it was held that William Gatchalian follows
the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in
turn, is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who is admittedly a
Filipino citizen whose Filipino citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an
order dated July 12, 1960. Thus, William gatchalian belongs to the Filipino class of citizens as
contemplated under Sec. 1 Article IV of the Constitution, which provides: “Section 1. the
following are citizens of the Philippines; (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution.

32
 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, vs. ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.
G.R. No. 132344. February 17, 2000.

Facts:
Plaintiff Romeo A. Jader was enrolled in the defendant’s College of Law from 1984 up to
1988. In the first semester of his last year (SY 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled fro the
second semester as fourth year law student and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for
the removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega which was approved
by Dean Celedonio Tiongson. He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988,
his grade of five (5) was submitted by Professor Ortega.
In the deliberations conducted by the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of
Law, the plaintiff’s name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the
Degree of Bachelor of Laws. Plaintiff’s name also appeared in the invitation for the 35 th
Investitures and Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws.
The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies on April 16, 1988. during the program
of which he went up the stage, his mother and brother placed his Hood, his Tassel turned from
left to right, and he was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper
symbolical of the Law Diploma.
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence from
his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far
Eastern University. Having learned of the deficiency, he dropped his review class and was not
able to take the bar examination.
Plaintiff-appellee sued defendant-appellant for damages alleging that he suffered moral
shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless
nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter’s
negligence.

Issue:
Whether or not plaintiff-appellee can claim for moral and exemplary damages for the
abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ordered that petitioner should pay respondent the sum of Thirty-five
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35, 470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum
computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid but not entitled to moral
damages. The court does not believe that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain because he
could not graduate and could not take the bar examinations. The court stated that it behooved on
respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be
eligible for the bar examinations. Respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure
that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order.

33
 VIOLA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
NORKIS DISTRIBUTORS, INC., JOSE RAMIRO A. CARPIO, JR., WESSIE
QUISUMBING, and ELIZALDE AMPALAYO, respondents.,
G.R. No. 116384, 2000 February 7, 2000.

Facts:
Respondent Norkis Distributor, Inc., a domestic corporation with principal office and
business address at A. S. Fortuna Street, Mandaue City, Cebu, is engaged in the business of
selling motorcycles and household appliances, with branches all over the country. One of the
branches is in Valencia, Bukidnon where petitioner Viola Cruz was employed as cashier/
bookkeeper. For her loyalty and dedication to the company, petitioner Cruz was given
compensating salary adjustment of One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos, effective July 1, 1990.
In October 14, 1990, while petitioner and her co-employees were busy packing up and
making inventory of the things to be moved because of a scheduled transfer of the Valencia
branch, the petitioner suddenly collapsed. She was rushed to the Monsanto General Hospital in
Valencia, Bukidnon and was later on transferred to the Capitol College General Hospital in
Cagayan de Oro City on October 17, 1990. She was diagnosed to be suffering from “CNS
Infection: TB Meningitis vs. Cryptococcal Meningitis.” She was later transferred to the Maria
Reyna Hospital, where she was confined from October 25 to December 5, 1990, and treated for “
Cryptococcal Meningitis, Pott’s Disease, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II.
Starting October 15, 1990, the petitioner stopped reporting for work. Two days after
petitioner’s collapse, respondent Norkis was able to recruit a replacement cashier/ bookkeeper in
the person of Hernando Juaman.
On December 28, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to respondent Norkis to verify the status of
her employment. As an answer, she received a termination latter dated November 2, 1990 citing
health reasons as the cause for her dismissal.
On March 18, 1991, petitioner lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal against private
respondents before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cagayan De Oro City. On May 28,
1993, Labor Arbiter Leon P. Murillo rendered a decision but both parties appealed to the NLRC.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed by private respondents on ground of
illness and so she was entitled to recover moral and exemplary damages.

Ruling:
Private respondents illegally dismissed the petitioner because they failed to comply with
the requirement that an employee to be dismissed should be given two written notices. The first
notice is to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions by reason of which her
dismissal has been decided upon; and the second is to inform the employee of the employer’s
decision to dismiss him. Having failed to do the requirement, respondents have not given the
petitioner due process which makes their act illegal and void. For this, petitioner is entitled to
recover moral and exemplary damages.

34
 GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE & RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner vs. GEORGE G.
BARRIOS AND OLGA THERESA CRUZ-BARRIOS, respondents
No. L-60859. December 27, 1982

Facts:
The petitioner cable company failed to deliver to respondent-spouses, both physicians, a
cablegram from Mercy Hospital, Buffalo, New York, admitting respondent-wife for a rotating
internship in said hospital. As a consequence of which, she was unable to signify her acceptance
and the position was given to someone else. The Trial Court and the Court of appeals found that
the petitioner was grossly negligent in having admittedly failed to deliver the cablegram which
caused respondents financial difficulties in New York, due to loss of earnings for approximately
six months, serious anxiety, and sleepless nights, for which the petitioner should be held liable,
and which should be corrected for the public good.

Issue:
Whether or not the award of damages is excessive.

Ruling:
Yes. A telegraph company is a public service corporation owing duties to the general
public ands is liable to any member of the public whom it owes a duty for damages proximately
flowing from a violation of that duty. However, the petitioner is a quasi-public corporation also
affected with public interest and the award of damages made by the Trial Court and affirmed by
the Court of Appeals was found by the Supreme Court to be excessive. The decision of the
Supreme Court modified that of the lower courts by reducing the award.

35
 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND LORETO DIONELA, respondents
No. L-44748. August 29, 1986

Facts:
The complaint against the defendant corporation is based on a telegram sent through its
Manila Office to the offended party, Loreto Dionela. Plaintiff-respondent Dionela alleged that
the defamatory words (“sa iyo walang pakinabang dumating-ka diyan-wala kang padala ditto-
kahit bulbul mo”) on the telegram sent to him not only wounded his feelings but also caused him
undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business as well because other people have
come to know of the said defamatory words. Defendant-corporation as a defense, alleged that the
additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between the sending and receiving operators and
that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not form part of the
telegram and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory.
The trial court ruled that the additional words in Tagalog are libelous and that they
clearly impute a vice or defect of the plaintiff. Whether or not they were intended for the
plaintiff, the effect on the plaintiff is the same. There is sufficient publication of the libelous
Tagalog words for they are open to view and inspection by third parties. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the Trial Court’s decision by reducing the award of damages. A
motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not award of moral damages based on documentary evidence without
supporting oral testimonies is proper.

Ruling:
Yes. In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover.
However, since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine
of RES IPSA LOQUITUR or “the thing speaks for itself,” by considering the presence of facts or
circumstances surrounding the injury.

36
 FRANCISCO HERMOSSISIMA, plaintiff vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, et.al., defendant
No.L-14628. September 30, 1960

Facts:
Since 1950, Soledad Cagigas was then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in
Cebu, and Francisco Hermosima, who was almost 10 years younger than she was her boyfriend.
They were regarded as engaged although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In
1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where
intimacy between them developed. One evening in 1953, after coming from the movie house,
they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V “Escana” to which he was then attached
as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to
marry her. Their child Chris Hermosima was born on June 17,1954, in a private maternity and
clinic. However on July24, 1954, Francisco married Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action
was commenced on or about October 4 1954.

Issue:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to
marry

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that under the Civil Code, there can be no recovery of moral
damages for a breach of promise to marry, as such the omission in the Civil Code of the
proposed Chapter on breach of Promise Suits is a clear manifestation of legislative intent not to
sanction as such, suits for breach of promise to marry, otherwise “many innocent man may
become the victims of designing and unscrupulous females.” However, if there be seduction,
moral damages may be recovered under Art. 2219, Par.3 of Civil Code of the Philippines.
Francisco was morally guilt of seduction in this case. Soledad, the complainant, who was 10
years older, surrendered herself to him because overwhelmed by her love for him; she wanted to
bind him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of the clergy. He
was, therefore, ordered to pay a monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the child; P4500.00
representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and
shortly after the birth of the child as actual compensatory damages; P5000.00 as moral damages;
and P500.00 as attorney’s fees.

37
 BEATRIZ GALANG, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
NO.L-17248.January 29, 1962

Facts:
Beatriz Galang and Rodrigo Quinit were both from the same town of Sison, Pangasinan,
and were engaged but Rodrigo’s parents were strongly opposed to their marriage. He wanted the
marriage to take place after his graduation while the appellee was impatient and wanted the
marriage to be held at an earlier date. On April 26, 1955, Rodrigo’s parents told him to leave the
parental home in view of his continued relations with Beatriz. On April 27, 1955, the couple
lived as husband and wife in the house of Adolfo Dagawan at Colorado Falls, Tuba, Mountain
Province until May 9 when Rodrigo left and never returned.

Issue:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to
marry

Held:
The Court of First Instance of Baguio, rendered a decision sentencing the defendants
jointly and severally to pay sums of P275.00 by way of actual damages; P5000.00 as moral
damages and P500.00 as attorney’s fees, apart fro the costs. On appeal taken by the defendants,
the Court of Appeals absolved Maximo Quinit, and accordingly reversed said decision insofar as
he is concerned, and modified it as regards Rodrigo Quinit by eliminating the awards for moral
damages and attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals.
Moral damages for breach of promise to marry are not collectible.

38
 GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents
G. R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993

Facts:
Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22 year old Filipina filed on Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan
in Lingayen for a complaint for damages against the petitioner, Gashem Shookat Baksh (an
Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments in Guilig, Dagupan City and is an exchnage
student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges), for the alleged violation
of their agreement to get married. Before August 20, 1987, the latter courted and proposed to
marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore
agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of thar year; the
petitioner visited to private respondent’s hometown in Banaga, Bugallion, Pangasinan to secure
their approval to the marriage; sometimes in August 20, 1987, the petitioner forced her to live
with him in his apartment. Because of the petitioner’s promise to marry the private respondent,
the latter surrendered her virginity. A week before the filing of the complaint, the petitioner’s
attitude towards her started to change; he matreated and threatened to kill her. He said that he
does not want to marry her because he was already married to someone living in Bacolod. The
private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages,
reimbursements for actual expenses, and attorney’s fees and costs. On the other hand, the
petitioner also filed a counter claim, of course, denying and reversing the allegations against him
by the private respodent.
On October 16, 1989, the Regional Trial Court applied the Article 21 of the Civil Code
favoring the private respondent. The petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals regarding
the decision of the trial court. On February 18, 1991, the CA affirmed in toto the trial courts
ruling. Thus, unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed instant petition on March 26, 1991.

Issue:
Whether or nor damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis
of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that, in the existing rule under our Civil Law, a breach of
promise to marry itself is not an actionable wrong.
The Supreme Court found out the true character and motive of the petitioner, that is, he
used deception and took advantage of the situation of the private respondent (a high school
graduate and financially unstable) by proposing to support and marry her, just so he can satisfy
his lust. Thus, he clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of morality and defied the traditional
respect was not going to marry her after all, she left him.
Therefore, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision the instant petition
hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner.

39
 BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appeallant
No. L-20089. December 26, 1964

Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz, follwing their promise to love, decided to get married. Two
days before their marriage Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her that their marriage had to be
postponed as his mother opposes it. A day before his marriage he sent a telegram informing her
“nothing changed rest assured returning soon.” Despite the fact that everything was already
prepared, from invitations to matrimonial bed and other accessories, and in fact bridal showers
were given and gifts already received, Francisco was never heard from again. Beatriz sued for
damages for breach of promise to marry.

Issue:
Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?

Ruling:
The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not
limitless for Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damages.
This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is
not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be
held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code,
moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages
may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant
clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.

40
 CAR COOL PHILIPPINES, INC., represented in this act by its President and General
Manager VIRGILIO DELA ROSA, petitioner, vs. USHIO REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent
G.R. No. 138088. January 23, 2006

Facts:
On December 19, 1995, Ushio Realty and Development Corporations (Ushio Realty)
filed an ejectment case against Car Cool Philippines, Inc. (CAR COOL) to recover possession of
a parcel of land (property) located at No. 72 (137) Quezon Avenue corner of Victory Avenue,
Quezon City.
USHIO Realty alleges that the former owners of the property, spouses Hector and Gloria
Hizon Lopez (“Spouses Lopez”), leased the property to CAR COOL since 1972. In 1990, the
Spouses Lopez and CAR COOL executed a written lease agreement over the property for two
years. On the expiration of the agreement, the Spouses Lopez allowed CAR COOL to continue
renting the property. Thus, the agreement went on by a verbal month-month agreement. Hector
Lopez wrote CAR COOL to inform of his intention to sell the property and te former gave the
latter the option to buy the property before offering it to other prospective buyers. CAR COOL
failed to respond to the offer. Thus, the property was bought by USHIO.
USHIO gave CAR COOL a specific time to which to vacate the property. But after three
notice and failing, however, to comply te demands of USHIO, filed a complaint for ejectment on
December 19, 1995. The Metropolitan Trial Court decided in favor of USHIO REALTY. CAR
COOL filed an appeal to the Regional Trial Court, but still the latter affirm the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages by way of rentals and
attorney’s fees in favor of USHIO.

Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
CAR COOL asserts that to award damages to USHIO Realty would constitute unjust
enrichment at the expense of CAR COOL. CAR COOL claims that it never benefited from its
occupation of the property after USHIO Realty’s agents enetered the property on October 1,
1995 and unlawfully destroyed CAR COOL’s office, equipment and spare parts. Because of the
destruction of the equipment and spare parts needed to operate its business, CAR COOL asserts
that it was no longer possible to continue its business operations. The Supreme Court, however,
was not convinced basing from the Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically under
Sections 17 and 19.

41
 GIL MIGUEL T. PUYAT, petitioner, v. RON ZABARTE, respondent.
G.R. No. 1411536. February 26, 2001

Facts:
On 24 January 1994, Ron Zabarte, the respondent, commenced an action to enforce the
money judgment rendered by the Superior Court for the State of California, County of Contra
Costa, U.S.A.
On 1 August 1994, the respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 34
of the Rules of Court alleging that the Answer filed by petitioner failed to tender any genuine
issue as to the material facts.
On 6 April 1995, the court a quo issued an Order granting respondent’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. Likewise, it granted the petitioner ten (10) days to submit opposing
affidavits. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-stated order and
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, the
lower dismissed these two motions. The RTC then rendered its decision ordering the petitioner to
pay the respondent the amount of U$ 241,991.33 with the legal interest; P30, 000.00 as
attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs suit. This later on, affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue
Whether or not the judgment’s conformity to Philippine laws, public policy, canons of
morality, and norms against unjust enrichment

Ruling
This is not a case of unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment or solutio indebiti
contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment
has no right to receive it. The petitioner merely argues that the other two defendants whom he
represented were liable together with him. Likewise, there is no foreign judgment that is contrary
to law, morals, public policy or the canons of morality obtaining in the contrary. The petition,
therefore, is hereby denied. Double costs against petitioner.

42
 SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE GUTIERREZ AND ANGELA
FORNILDA, respondents.
G.R. No. 140420. February 15, 2001

Facts:
Amonoy, the petitioner, was the counsel of Francisca Catolos, Agnes Catolos, Asuncion
Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda, for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Julio Cantolos.
Such estate involves six (6) parcels of land situated in Tanay, Rizal. The Project of Partition was
approved on 12 January 1965 and two of the said lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba
and Alfonso Formilda. With regard to the attorney’s fees, Amonoy charged P27, 600.00. To
secure the payment of such, on 20 January 1965, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda
executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two lots adjudicated to them.
Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda passed away on 24 February 1969 and on 2
July 1969, respectively. Among the heirs of Alfonso was his daughter, plaintiff-appellant Angela
Gutierrez.
On 21 January 1970, Amonoy filed for their foreclosure before in the CFI of Pasig, Rizal,
since his attorney’s fees secured by the two lots were not paid. The heirs opposed. However, on
28 September 1972 judgement, it was rendered in favour of Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay
the P27,600.00by the mortgage, P11,880.00 as a value of the harvests, and P9,654.00 as another
round of attorney’s fees within 90 days. Failing in that, the two (2) lots would be sold at public
auction.
On 25 July 1985, the CFI issued a Writ of Possession and a pursuant to which a notice to
vacate was made on 26 August 1985. The land, where the house of Gutierrez spouses was
situated, was part of the said parcel of land to be possessed by Amonoy.
On 27 September 1985 a petition was filed by the petitioners (including Angela
Gutierrez) before the Supreme Court. A Decision rendered setting aside the Writ of Possession
and the Temporary Restraining Order was made permanent, and ordering that the six (6) parcels
of land are returned to petitioners. However, the said dwelling had already been destroyed. Thus,
a Complaint for damages for such was filed before the RTC; but it was dismissed. On appeal the
CA set aside the lower court’s decision, rather ordered petitioner Amonoy to pay P250, 000 as
actual damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that the petitioner was liable
to the respondents for damages

Ruling:
The petition has no merit. The Latin phrase damnum absque injuria – that damage
resulting from the legitimate exercise of a person’s rights is a loss without injury finds no
application to this case. Though petitioner, under the Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC,
commenced the demolition, there was a continuation the same after the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order, enjoining the demolition of respondents’ house, was issued by the Supreme
Court. Thus, costs against petitioner.

43
 RODRIGO CONCEPCION, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR
NICOLAS and ALLEM NICOLAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 120706. January 31, 2000

Facts:
The spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas, the respondents, were residing in an
apartment leased to them by the owner Florence “Bing” Concepcion at Pasig City. Nestor
Nicolas was engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and private entities with
office equipment, appliances and other fixtures. Florence Concepcion joined after contributing
capital with the condition that she will receive half of the profit earned.
Rodrigo Concepcion, the petitioner and brother of the deceased husband of Florence,
went to Nestor’s apartment and accused him of committing adulterous relationship with
Florence.
Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame. Florence even ceased to do business with
the spouses. The spouses started to quarrel as Allem became doubtful of her husband’s fidelity.
Nestor forced then Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages. The latter
ignored that triggered the spouses to file civil suit against Rodrigo for damages. He reasoned out
that he did such to protect the name and reputation of the Concepcion family.

Issue:
Whether there is basis in law for the award of damages to private respondents, spouses
Nicolas

Ruling:
The petitioner's posture that there is no legal provision that supports such award of
damages has been rejected. Article 26 of the new Civil Code stressed the sacredness of human
personality, which is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The
rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person’s
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. Thus, the petitioner is liable to the spouses for
P50, 000 as moral damages, P25, 000 for exemplary damages, P10, 000 for attorney’s fees, plus
costs of suit.

44
 PEOPLE OF TH E PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 102207. September 2, 1994

Facts:
Rogelio Bayotas was charged with rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19,
1991. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992. Consequently, the
Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor
General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas’ civil liability arising from his commission of
the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of
accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the
offense charged. The counsel of Bayotas, however, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.

Issue:
Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?

Ruling:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished?
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary
penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard,
"the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability
ex delicto in senso strictiore."
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if
the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the
Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise
as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) Quasi-delicts.
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action
and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during
the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, the Supreme Court held that the death of
appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed without qualification.

45
 MANSION BICUIT CORPORATION, represented by its president, ANG CHO HONG,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, TY SECK SUAN, substituted by his heirs,
ROSENDA TY, ELIZABETH TY KOH, EDWARD TY, EDMUND TY, EDGAR TY,
EVELYN T. LIM, EDWIN TY and EDISON TY, and SY GUI, respondents
G.R. No. 94713. November 23, 1995

Facts:
On or about and during the month of January, 1982, in the municipality of Valenzuela,
Philippines, Ty Teck Suan, knowing fully well that he has no sufficient funds with the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
prepare, issue and make out, for value check with the total amount of P300,000.00 in payment of
catrons of Nutri-Wafer biscuits purchased from the Mansion Biscuit Corporation, represented by
Ang Cho Hong, president thereof, by the Edward Ty Brothers Corporation thru Ty Teck Suan,
but the said checks upon presentation with the said bank for deposit and verification of
sufficiency of funds was dishonored and refused payment on the ground of ‘insufficient funds,’
and despite repeated demands to make food said checks or redeem the same within five banking
days from demands, said accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the
said Mansion Biscuit Corporation.
On January 10, 1989, while the appeal of the Mansion Biscuit Corporation assailing the
trial courts ruling absolving Ty Teck Suan and Sy Gui from civil liability was pending with the
Court of Appeals, Ty Teck Suan died.

Issue::
Whether or not the petitioner can enforce civil liability for non-payment of the nutria-
wafer biscuits in question against private respondents notwithstanding the fact that the latter
contracted the agreement in behalf of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation.

Ruling:
The civil liability for non-payment of the nutria-wafer biscuits delivered by petitioner to
the Edward Ty Brothers Corporation cannot be enforced against the private respondents because
the said civil liability was not the personal liability of Ty Teck Suan to Mansion Biscuit
Corporation, rather, it was the contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, of which
Ty Teck Suan was president. This is borne out by the records of the case. Moreover, petitioner
itself admitted that the contract was executed by and between Edward Ty Brothers Corporation
and Mansion Biscuit Corporation.
With respect to the issue of tortious liability, the respondent court state that any claim for
tortious liability must be ventilated in a separate action against the proper party.
In the case at bench, the acquittal of Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui extinguished both their
criminal and civil liability as it is clear from the order acquitting them that the issuance of the
checks in question did not constitute a violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

46
 EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE
and FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 119398. July 2, 1999

Facts:
Eduardo M Cojuangco, a known busenessman-sportsman, won a total of P1,020,700.00
on various horse-racing. He then sent a letter demanding to the defendants the collection of the
prizes due to him. However, the demanded prizes were being withheld on advice of
Commissioner Ramon Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Governance heeding to
then President Corazon Aquino’s Executive Order No. 2 freezing all properties of former
Presidet Marcos, his immediate families, close associates and cronies, in which Cojuangco is a
friend of the former President Marcos. Finally, February 7, 1991, the PCGG advised defendants
that it poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize winnings. Immediately, this was
communicated to Atty. Mendoza by Carrascoso, Jr.
As culled from the pleadings of the parties, Atty. Mendoza, petitioner’s counsel, refused
to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought to court.

Issue:
a) Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office;
b) Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should have been dismissed for his
failure to file an appeal brief;
c) Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review and reverse the judgment on a
cause of action which was not appealed from by the respondents;
d) Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by
evidence and the law

Ruling:
The appellate court committed no error in dismissing the appeal since the representation
of the OGCC on behalf of the PCSO and Mr. Carrascoso is pursuant to its basic function to act as
principal law office of all government-owned or controlled corporations.
With regards the alleged failure of Mr. Carrascoso to file an appeal brief, his filing is not
an absolute requirement for the perfection of an appeal. What is important is that respondent
Carrascoso filed his notice of appeal on time and that his counsel before the lower court had filed
an appeal brief on his behalf.
As to the third issue, respondent court could not reverse and set aside the RTC decision in
its entirety and dismiss the original complaint without trampling upon the rights that the accused
accrued to the petitioner from the unappealed portion of the decision. It is well-settled that only
the errors assigned and properly argued in the brief, and those necessarily related thereto, may be
considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case.
The controlling article regarding the fourth issue is Article 32 of the Civil Code which
states that: Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates, impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of
another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: xxx xxx xxx (6) The deprivationof
property without due process of law. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the
constitutional rights of petitioner, even of the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of one’s duties. The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a
properly issued seaquestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without
due process of law. Mr. Carrascoso is thereby ordered to pay petitioner nominal damages.

47
 CATALINO P. ARAFILES, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC., ROMY
MORALES, MAX BUAN, JR., and MANUEL C. VILLAREAL JR., respondents
G.R No. 150256. March 25, 2004

Facts:
About 2am on April 14, 1987, respondent Morales, a reporter of People’s Journal
Tonight, was at the Western Police District Headquarters where Emelita Despuig, and employee
of the National Institute at Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a complaint against petitioner,
a NIAS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape. In
the presence of Morales, Despuig executed a sworn statement narrating the events surrounding
the reported offenses. She stated that the first incident was on March 14, 1987 where she was
abducted and raped by the petitioner at Flamingo Hotel. The second incident was an attempted
rape on the night of April 14, 1987. Morales thereupon personally interviewed Despuig. After
the interview, Morales tried to contact Arafiled at the NIAS office to verify Despuig’s story but
failed, the office having already closed. That same day, April 14, 1987, Morales’ report appeared
as headline on People’s Journal Tonight reading: “GOV’T EXEC RAPES COED GIRL by
Romy Morales”.
On April 13, 1988, petitioner instituted a complaint before the RTC of Quezon City.
Petitioner alleged that on account of the “grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting
in the news item” prepared by respondent Morales, edited by respondent Buan Jr., allowed for
publication by respondent Villareal Jr., as president of the Philippine Journalists Inc., aspersions
were cat on his character; his reputation as a director of the NIAS at the PAGASA was injured;
he became the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker
and serial rapist. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint alleging that the news
item, having been sourced out of the Police Blotter which is an official public document and
bolstered by a personal interview is therefore privileged and falls within the protective
constitutional freedom of the press. RTC decided in favor of the petitioner. The CA however
found that petitioner was not able to prove by that respondents were motivated to cause harm or
injury.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news item was not
attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages?

Ruling:
Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely
unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel under this article shall
be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved preponderance of evidence separately
from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal action
because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal
Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom.
The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a
sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. Respondents could of course have been more
circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first 7 paragraphs of the news item give
the impression that a certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained by
Despuig. The succeeding paragraphs sufficiently conveyed to the readers, however, that the
narration of events was only an account of what Despuig had reported at the police headquarters.
In determining the manner in which a given event should be presented as a news item and the
importance to be attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion.
In fine, this court finds that case against respondents has not been sufficiently established
by preponderance of evidence.

48
 SOPHIA ALCUAZ, ET AL., petitioners vs. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION Quezon City Branch ET AL, respondents
No. L-76353. May 2, 1988

Facts:
Petitioners are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration,
Quezon City, while respondents are: Philippine Scholl of Business Administration Quezon City
Branch, a non-stock institution of higher learning organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, Juan D. Lim, President and Chairman of the Board of PSBA; Benjamin P. Paulino,
Vice-president for admission and registration of PSBA; Ruben Estrella, Officer-in-charge; and
Ramon Agapay, director of the Office of Student Affairs and Romeo Rafer, chief security of
PSBA.
As early as March 22, 1986, the students of the respondent school and the respondent
PSBA had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the
school. In spite of the agreement, petitioners felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they
demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the school,
resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances. During the regular enrollment
period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied
admission for the school year 1986-1987. On Oct. 28, 1986, the president of the student council
filed a complaint against PSBA. Meanwhile, a motion for intervention was filed on Nov. 10,
1986, by the PSBA Faculty Union representing the faculty members hereinafter referred to as
intervenors on the ground of similarity of issues and cause with that of the petitioners.
Thereafter, an investigating committee was established. The committee submits the following
recommendation: that Renato Palma, Bernadette Ang, Rogelio Taganas are to be exonerated of
all charges; that Sophia Alcuaz be honorable dismissed; that Florante Bagsic and Atenogenes
Bondoc, both faculty-intervenors, be reprimanded with a warning; that Severinon Cortes, also a
faculty-intervenor, be granted non-renewal of his semester appointment and that Asser Tamayo
and Rene Encarnacion, also faculty-intervenors, be terminated. Respondents adopted the
afrestated recommendations and prayed that the case be dismissed.

Issue:
Whether or not there has been deprivation of due process for petitioners-students who
have been barred from enrollment and for intervenors-faculty whose services have been
terminated?

Ruling:
It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for
one semester. It is provided in Par 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a
college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester.
Likewise, it is provided in the manual that the “written contracts” required for college teachers
are for “one semester”. It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC
no longer has any existing contract either with the student or with thee intervening teachers. Such
being the case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is a time-honored principle
that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties. This court moreover
stressed that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in court. Furthermore, the court
found out that petitioners were academically deficient while the intervening teachers apart from
participating in acts of illegality against the school committed various acts of misconduct. The
right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of
disciplinary regulation has always been recognized by this court.
Premises considered, the petition is hereby dismissed.

49
 ARIEL NON ET.AL., petitioners. vs. HON. SANCHO DAMES II, in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge of the 5th Regional Trail Court, Br. 38, and
MABINI COLLEGES, INC., respondents
G.R. No. 89317. May 20, 1990

Facts:
Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges Inc., in Daet were not allowed
to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student
mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. Petitioners filed a petition in the court
seeking their re-admission to the school, but the trail court dismissed the petition using the ruling
in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA as the basis. Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari.
The case was assigned to the 3rd division of the court, which then transferred it to the Court en
banc on Aug. 21, 1989 considering that the issues raised are jurisdictional.
Respondent school justified their action of non-readmission due to the fact that the
petitioners incurred academic deficiency. Petitioners used the following as defense: that 3 of
them were graduating; that their academic deficiencies do not warrant re-admission; that their
breach of discipline was not serious; that the improper conduct attributed to them was during the
exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly; that there was no due
investigation; that respondent school is their choice institution near their places of residence
which they can afford to pay for tertiary education, of which they have already lost one-and-a-
half school-years-in itself punishment enough.

Issue:
Whether or not the ruling in the Alcuaz vs. PSBA be binding in this case?

Ruling:
The court in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the “termination of contract” theory. But it
must be repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an
ordinary contract. Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Par. 137 of the
manual of Regulations for Private Schools. On the other hand, the manual recognizes the right of
the student to be enrolled in his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it.
It is not denied that what incurred the ire of the school authorities were the student mass
actions conducted in Feb. 1988 and which led and/or participated by the petitioners. Certainly,
excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them
undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also
constitutes a violation of the basis tenets of fair play.
Petitioners, who have been refused readmission and who have been effectively excluded
from respondent school for 4 semesters, have already been more than sufficiently penalized for
any breach of discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass
actions that, according to respondents, resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them
to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the
strained relations between petitioners and the officials of the respondent school.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The orders of respondent judge are herby annulled.
Respondent Mabini College is ordered to re-admit and to allow the re-enrollment of petitioners.

50
 G. JESUS B. RUIZ, petitioner, vs. ENCARNACION UCOL and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
No. L-45404. August 7, 1987
Facts:
Agustina Tagaca, laundry woman for petitioner Atty. Jesus Ruiz filed an administrative
charge against respondent Encarnacion Ucol. In the answer of the respondent to the charge filed
against her, she alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Ruiz who wanted to get back at
the Ucol’s because of a case filed by Encarnacion Ucols’ husband against Ruiz. She also alleged
to have made remarkds that Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charge.
The administrative case was dismissed. Ruiz decided to file his own criminal complaint
for libel against Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
No pronouncement was made by the trial court as to the civil liability of the accused.
Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages based on the same facts upon which the libel
case was founded.
Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribe and that the case of
action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel.

Issue:
Whether the civil case was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel.

Ruling:
It was held that the trial court dismissed the case filed by Atty. Ruiz against Ucol because
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not established. And in the review of the findings by the
court, the disputed answer of Ucol in the administrative case contains no libel. The court found
the charges against Ucol, if not malicious, at least reckless in the face of proven facts and
circumstances. The court dismissed the case filed by Atty. Ruiz.

51
 INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL) INC., petitioner, vs.
MERLIN J. ARGOS and JAJA C. PINEDA, respondents
G.R. No. 130362. September 10, 2001
Facts:
IFFI is a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. Argos and Pineda
(respondents) are the general manager and commercial director respectively of the Fragrance
Division of IFFI.
In 1992, the office of Managing Director was created to head the corporation’s operations
in the Philippines. Costa was appointed as the Managing Director. Argos and Pineda as general
managers have to report directly to Costa.
Because of serious differences between the Managing Director and the General Manager,
the latter agreed to terminate their services. They signed a “Release Waiver and Quit Claim” on
December 10, 1993. On the same date, Costa issued a “Personnel Announcement” which
described respondents as ‘persona non grata’ and urged employees not to have further dealings
with them.
The respondents filed a libel case in Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig, Metro Manila.
On March 31, 1995, respondents filed a civil case for damages at Regional Trial Court of Pasig
against Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as employer. IFFI moved to dismiss the
complaint.
On October 1995, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss for the respondents failure to
reserve right to institute a separate civil case.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondents and was granted the same
court. IFFI on the other hand filed a motion to reconsider the said order but was denied by the
court. The case was elevated by the IFFI to the Court of Appeals reiterating the same ground for
dismissal. However, the Ca dismissed the case.
Issue:
Whether the private respondents can sue IFFI for civil case for damages in its subsidiary
capacity as employer.
Ruling:
It was held by the court, based on the case of Joaquin vs. Aniceto, Article 33 of the New
Civil Code contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It does not
apply against the employer to enforce its subsidiary liability, because such liability arises only
after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty of
the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of
his duties. Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before
conviction of its employee is premature.
Having established that respondents did not based their civil action on IFFI’s primary
liability under Article 33 but claimed damages from IFFI based on its subsidiary liability as
employer of Costa is premature.
The court granted the petition and the decisions of the RTC and Ca were reversed and set
aside.

52
 MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP, DAMIANA MARCIA, EDGAR
MARCIA, and RENATO YAP, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPREALS, FELARDO PAJE
and VICTORY LINER, INC., respondents.
No. L-34529. January 27, 1983
Facts:
On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao Pampanga, a bus operated by
Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia,
resulting in the latter’s death and in physical injuries to petitioner Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap.
Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence
was filed against Paje in RTC Pampanga.
On January 23, 1957 an action for damages was filed in the RTC of Rizal by the
petitioner against Victory and Paje, alleging that the mishap due to the reckless imprudence and
negligence of the latter in driving.
While the civil case was in progress in Rizal, RTC Pampanga rendered its decision and
convicted the respondent. However, in their appeal to the Ca they were acquitted.
As conducted by the CA, criminal negligence is wanting in the case, and that Paje was
not even guilty of Civil Negligence because it was a case of mere accident.
Respondent Paje in the Civil Case in Rizal moved for dismissal of the complaint invoking
the decision of the CA for his acquittal. However, the Rizal RTC dismissed the motion and
thereafter continued the trial. The RTC Rizal dismissed the complaint against Victory and Paje
based on the decision of the CA.
The petitioner appealed to the CA invoking Article 33 of the New Civil Code and Sec. 2
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and not Sec. 3.
The CA held that private respondent cannot be held civilly liable after it had ruled in the
criminal action that negligence was wanting and that the collision was pure accident.

Issue:
Whether the civil case filed separately be dismissed.

Ruling:
It was held by the court that Article 33 speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries. The injuries suffered by the petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal
negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages
maybe instituted in connection therewith. Furthermore, Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court states that “extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from which the civil might arise did not exist.” Otherwise stated,
unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be non-existent in the final
judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability.

53
 FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEO ALMARIO,
respondents
No. 48006. July 8, 1942

Facts:
On May 3, 1936, about half past one in the morning on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by
Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned, and
one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two
days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two
years of prision coreccional but the court granted the petition that the right to bring civil action
be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence given by the lower court in the criminal
case.
On the other hand, there arose two liabilities of Fausto Barredo: (1) the subsidiary one
because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from his criminal liability; and (2)
Barredo’s primary liability as an employer under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take and they preferred the second. On
March 7, 1939, Severino Garcia and Timoteo Almario, parents of the deceased, brought an
action to the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo, as the employer of Pedro
Fontanilla.
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto
Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro
Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.

Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs may bring a separate civil action based on cuasi delito or
culpa aquiliana against Fausto Barredo for the death of Faustino Garcia.

Ruling:
Yes.
The plaintiffs may bring a separate civil action against Fausto Barredo because of the
separate individuality of cuasi delito or culpa aquiliana. The court held that this will make for
the better safeguarding of private rights and is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress.
The court also found out that defendant-petitioner is Fontanilla’s employer. There is no
proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. It is
shown that he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for
violation of the Automobile Law and speeding – violations which appeared in the Records of the
Bureau of Public Works available to the public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify
plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed wherein the plaintiffs should be
awarded for damages by defendant-petitioner P1, 000 with legal interest from the time the action
was instituted.

54
 ARMANDO JOSE y PAZ and MANILA CENTRAL BUS LINES (MCL), represented by
its General Manager MR. DANILO T. DE DIOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ROMMEL ABRAHAM, represented by his father FELIXBERTO ABRAHAM, JOSE
MACARUBO and MERCEDES MACARUBO, respondents.
G. R. Nos. 118441-42. January 18, 2000.

Facts:
On February 22, 1985, at around six o’clock in the morning, Bus 203, being operated and
leased by petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL), collided with a red Ford
Escort. The bus is driven by Armando Jose while the Ford Escort by John Macarubo. As a result
of the collision, the left side of the Ford Escort’s hood was severely damaged while its driver,
John Macarubo, and its lone passenger, private respondent Rommel Abraham, were seriously
injured. The driver and conductress of Bus 203 rushed Macarubo and Abraham to the nearby
hospital but after 5 days, Macarubo eventually died. Abraham survived but he became blind and
he also suffered multiple lacerations on the face and a fracture on the forehead.
Rommel Abraham, represented by his father, Felixberto, instituted a civil case against
MCL and Armando Jose while spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of the deceased,
filed their own suit for damages against MCL alone. On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party
case complaint against Juanita Macarubo, registered owner of the Ford Escort. The latter, in turn,
filed a counterclaim for damages against MCL for the damage in her car.
The trial court dismissed the two civil cases against MCL and ruling favorably on its
third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court, ordering petitioners to pay damages for injuries to persons and damage to property
as a result of a vehicular accident, thus, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue/s:
(a) Whether it was the driver of Bus 203 who was at fault for the collision of the two
vehicles under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
(b) Whether private respondent Juanita Macarubo, the registered owner of the Ford
Escort, is liable to petitioners based on John Macarubo’s negligence.

Ruling:
(a) No. Private respondents failed to prove their allegation of negligence against the
driver of Bus 203, neither are the allegations of negligence against employer-employee relations,
so the two civil cases against Manila Central Bus Lines and driver Armando Jose, are hereby
dismissed. Article 2176 provides that “whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this chapter.”
(b) No. The third-party complaint filed against Juanita Macarubo was also dismissed on
the ground that MCL only alleged that John Macarubo is the “authorized driver” which is not
equivalent to an allegation that he was an employee of Juanita Macarubo. Nor did MCL present
any evidence to prove that Juanita Macarubo was the employer of John Macarubo.

55
 ARTURO ALANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
ENRICO A. LANZANAS, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Manila, Branch 37, and ROBERTO CARLOS, respondents.
G. R. No. 111244. December 15, 1997

Facts:
On June 10, 1986, petitioner Arturo Alano, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Roberto S. Carlos whom he sold a parcel of land for P30, 000.00. Alano sold
the aforesaid property the second time to one Erlinda B. Dandoy for P87, 900.00, thereby
depriving the said Roberto S. Carlos of his rightful ownership/possession of the said land, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Roberto S. Carlos in the aforesaid amount of P30, 000.00.
Alano was now charged of estafa in a criminal case.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that there was a
prejudicial question pending resolution in another case being tried against him by Roberto Carlos
and Trinidad Carlos in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, which concerns the
nullity of the sale and recovery of possession and damages. In the aforementioned civil case,
private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner seeking the annulment of the second
sale of said parcel of land made by the petitioner to a certain Erlinda Dandoy on the premise that
the said land was previously sold to them. In his answer, petitioner contends that he never sold
the property to the private respondents and that his signature appearing in the deed of absolute
sale in favor of the latter was a forgery, hence, the alleged sale was fictitious and inexistent. The
civil case was filed on March 1, 1985, five years before June 19, 1990 when the criminal case for
estafa was instituted. If the Court in the said Civil Case rules that the first sale to herein private
respondent was null and void, due to the forgery of petitioner’s signature in the first deed of sale,
it follows that the criminal case for estafa would not prosper.
On October 3, 1991, the trial court denied the petitioner’s motion for the suspension of
the proceeding of the criminal case as well as his motion for reconsideration. The decision was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of the Civil Case filed against petitioner is a prejudicial
question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in the Criminal Case filed against him.

Ruling:
The findings of the Court of Appeals are affirmed. The pendency of the civil case against
petitioner is not a prejudicial question that would suspend the criminal proceedings.
Accordingly, petitioner’s admission in the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial of the
criminal amounts to a waiver of his defense of forgery in the civil case. Hence, the courts have
no reason to nullify such waiver, it being not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. Furthermore, it
must be emphasized that the pre-trial order was signed by the petitioner himself. As such, the
rule that no proof need be offered as to any facts admitted at a pre-trial hearing applies.

56
 MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON.
JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR. being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati City,
respondents
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine Felix were married on June 16, 1973.
after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner’s wife answered by alleging that
it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named
Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against
petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor’s office in Makati, who found probable
cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them on September 16, 1997.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance
of the warrant of Arrest in the criminal case issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court. Petitioner
argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a
prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Such motion and the motion for
reconsideration were denied.

Issue:
Is the petitioner’s contention tenable?

Ruling:
No. The Court averred that petitioner’s contention is untenable. The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The pendency of the case
for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage
case because the facts in the latter case are not based on the former for the guilt of the petitioner-
accused to be determined.

57
 CITY OF PASIG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents
G.R. No. 125646. September 10, 1999

MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS, CITY OF PASIG, respondent
G.R. No. 128663. September 10, 1999

Facts:
These are two petitions which question the propriety of the suspension of plebiscite
proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the Municipality
of Cainta and the City of Pasig. The main problem is that, two barangays namely Karangalan and
Napico are claimed by both.

Issue:
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangay Karangalan and
Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the
two local governments.

Ruling:
The COMELEC declared that the plebiscite held to ratify the creation of the Barangays
were null and void until after the courts settle with finality the boundary dispute between the City
of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta.

58
 ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner, vs. HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ. ETC. ET AL.,
respondents
No. L-15315. August 26, 1960

Facts:
Abundio Merced was married to Eufriciana Tan and without such marriage having been
legally dissolved; he contracted a second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar. Facing bigamy charges
by the latter, petitioner alleged force and intimidation by the relatives Elizabeth force him into
marriage and filed for annulment. He also raised the issue of prejudicial question.

Issue:
Whether or not the action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question to the
prosecution for bigamy.

Ruling:
The civil action must be decided first before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed
(before the new Family Code took effect).

59
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO,
respondents.
No. L-16439. July 20, 1961

Facts:
Nita Villanueva came to know Antonio Geluz for the first time in 1948 through her aunt
Paula Yambot. In 1950, Nita became pregnant by her present husband before they legally
married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt,
she had herself aborted by the again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the
Commission on elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted
again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant.
On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister and the latter’s daughter, she again repaired to
the defendant’s clinic. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the
sum of P50.00. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his
election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. It is
the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff’s basis in filing this action and award of
damages. The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages upon the
provision of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Issue:
Whether or not fixing a minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case
of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that both the lower court and Court of Appeals erred in giving
minimum award of damages to the respondent. The two said courts have not found any basis for
an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee’s indifference to the previous
abortion of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. Despite the suspicious
repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate and secure the
punishment of the practitioner. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from
the doctor a large money payment. It is unquestionable that the appellant’s act in provoking the
abortion of appellee’s wife, without medical necessary to warrant it, was a criminal and morally
reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of woman or that of
her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an
award of damage that under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

60
 FELICIANO CATALAN, petitioners, vs. JESUS BASA, respondents
G. R. No. 159567. July 31, 2007.

Facts:
On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service. The
Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render
military service due to his mental disorder (schizophrenia). On September 28, 1949, Feliciano
married Corazon Cerezo. On June 16, 1951, Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister Mercedes
one-half of the real property through the execution of a document, titled, “Absolute deed of
Donation”. On December 11, 1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings
to declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order of
Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of
Feliciano. Thus, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), which is formerly the People’s Bank and
Trust Company, was appointed to be his guardian by the trial court. On March 26, 1979,
Mercedes sold the property donated by Feliciano to her in issue in her children Delia and Jesus
Basa. On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed a case for Declaration of
Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, as well as damages against
herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation of Mercedes was void ab
initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if
Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he
was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. On August 14, 1997,
Feliciano passed away. Both the lower court and Court of Appeals dismissed the case because of
insufficient evidence presented by the complainants to overcome the presumption that Feliciano
was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes
Catalan.

Issue:
Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation
Whether or not the property donated to Mercedes and later on sold to her children is
legally in possession of the latter
Are laches and prescription should be considered in the case?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals
and denied the petition. A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously
a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the
parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be
intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it
should be spontaneous. The parties’ intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of
consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable. A person suffering from schizophrenia
does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely
alleging the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date
of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental facilities.
Thus, the lower court correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and this
condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. Since the donation was
valid. Mercedes has the right to sell the property to whomever she chose. Not a shred of
evidence has been presented to prove the claim that Mercedes’ sale of property to her children
was tainted with fraud or falsehood. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus
Basa. The Supreme Court notes the issue of prescription and laches for the first time on appeal
before the court. It is sufficient for the Supreme Court to note that even if it prospered, the deed
of donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it was not
annulled in a proper action in court within four years.

61
 LEONILO DONATO, petitioner, vs. HON ARTEMON LUNA and
PAZ ABAYAN, respondents.
April 15, 1988

Facts:
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner’s arraignment, private respondent filed with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that private
respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato’s second one, since she
had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978.
Petitioner’s answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void
since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation, and undue
influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner’s consent to the marriage. Prior to the
solemnization of the subsequent marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and
deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years
as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite
marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages
of exceptional character. Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case, petitioner filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings of said case contending Civil Case seeking the annulment of his
second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined
or decided before the criminal case can proceed.

Issue:
Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Instance should be
suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question

Ruling:
The respondent judge ruled in the negative and the Supreme Court sustains him. A prejudicial
question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of question is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It
is based on a fact distinct or separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only in
the said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined. The issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court
is not determinative of petitioner’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. It was petitioner’s second
wife, who filed the complainant for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was
obtained through deceit. Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner cannot
apply the rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner’s
consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence, and intimidation in order to
establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be
the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in case at bar. Another event which militates
against petitioner’s contentions is the fact that it was only when the civil case was filed on September 28,
1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner
came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence,
intimidation, and undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent until
November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already
previously married.

62
 EUGENIO DOMINGO, plaintiff vs. COURT OFAPPEALS, defendant
October 17, 2001

Facts:

Paulina Rigonan, in her old age, owned 3 parcels of land located at Batac and Espiritu,
Ilocos Norte. She allegedly sold them to private respondents, the spouses Felipe and Concepcion
Rigonan through a Deed of Sale executed by Paulina Rigonan on January 28 1965. Respondents
filed a reinvindication of said parcels of land against petitioners Eugenio Domingo, Crispin
Mabagat and Samuel Capulungan, the closest living relatives of Paulina Rigonan who aleegedly
entered the properties illegally and refuse to leave the same. Petitioners contested respondent’s
claim of the properties and alleged that the deed of sale of the properties of Paulina Rigonan as
null and void for lacking of considerations. The Regional Trial court on March 23, 1994 decided
in favor of the Petitioners declaring the Deed of Sale as null and void. On appeal by the
respondents, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Deed of Sale executed on January 28, 1965 by Paulina Rigonan valid?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court.
At the time of the execution of the 0alleged Deed of Sale, Paulina Rigonan was already
of advanced age and senile. She died on March 20, 1966, barely over a year when the deed was
allegedly executed on January 28, 1965. The General Rule is that, a person is not incompetent to
contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. However, when
such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from
properly, intelligently, and firmly protecting her property rights, then she is undeniably
incapacitated. According to testimony of Eugenio’s wife Zosima, at the time of the alleged
execution of deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. Given these
circumstances, there is sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to the sale of her
parcels of land. Thus, the Deed of Sale executed by Paulina Rigonan on January 28, 1965
rendered null and void ab initio.

63
 JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T.
ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES
and AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA
ARUEGO, respondents.

G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996

Facts:

In essence, the complaint (Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional

Rights) avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with
Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship
were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963,
respectively. The complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein private respondent and
Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr.; that herein
petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs of the
deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their deceased father
be determined and ordered delivered to them.

The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged "open and
continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children."

Issue:

Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As a corollary
will the application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or impair any vested right of the
private respondent such that it should not be given retroactive effect in this particular case?

Ruling:

The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition
and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code,
must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is
concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case
decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she filed
her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought
to be that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the
putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was
filed, an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the
trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost
jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code
of the Philippines.

Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in
criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events,
although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 31, 1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.

64
 PRIMA G. CARRILLO and LORENZO LICUP, plaintiffs and appellants, vs.
FRANCISCA SALAK DE PAZ and ERNESTO BAUTISTA, defendants and appellees.

G.R. No. L-22601. October 28, 1966

Facts:

Severino Salak and Petra Garcia were the owners of Lot No. 221 of the Cadastral
Survey of Tarlac, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 41543, with an area of 1,334
square meters. Petra Garcia died on September 21, 1941. On August 16, 1943, Severino Salak
sold to Honoria Salak for P812.00 his portion of said lot. A year later, on December 5, 1944,
Severino Salak died. Honoria Salak and other members of her family died ? massacred by the
Japanese.

On September 4, 1946, a Project of Partition was submitted in Special Proceeding No. 3,

which the court approved on November 19, 1946. Said project adjudicated inter alia Lot No.
221, which was given thereunder to Francisca Salak de Paz (1/4 of it in her capacity as heir, and
the other 3/4 by purchase and/or exchange with her co-heirs, Rita Sahagun, Aurea Sahagun and
Ernesto Bautista). From 1946 up to the present Francisca Salak has possessed all of Lot No. 221.
On November 9, 1948, Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac (docketed therein as Case No. 351) against the heirs in Special Proceeding No.
3 to recover Lot No. 221. On December 20, 1960, the lower court dismissed Civil Case No. 351.

Plaintiffs Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup thereupon appealed to CA upon questions of
law. At any rate, this Court can resolve this appeal on the issue of prescription.

And the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the existence of reserva troncal,
promulgated on June 8, 1950, rendered it all the more doubtless that such right had accrued in
their favor from the time Agustina died. It is clear, therefore, that the right or cause of action
accrued in favor of the plaintiffs-reservatarios herein on April 24, 1950.

Issues:

Whether or not the cause of action is barred by prior judgment and by the statute of
limitations. Although the action was dismissed by the lower court expressly upon the ground of
res judicata, it did not totally disregard the defense of prescription.

Ruling:

Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure fixes 10 years as the period of prescription for
actions to recover real property, counted from the time the cause of action accrued. This is the
applicable law because Article 1116 of the New Civil Code provides that "Prescription already
running before the effectivity of this Code [August 30, 1950] shall be governed by laws
previously in force." Plaintiffs-appellants' suit herein, having been filed only on April 22, 1963,
or more than ten (10) years from April 24, 1950, has prescribed. And having reached such
conclusion, We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the question of whether the suit is also barred
on the ground of res judicata.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed on the ground of
prescription, with costs against appellants.

65
 IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, plaintiff vs.
COMMISSION OF ELECTIONS, defendant
248 SCRA 300

Facts:

On 8 March 1995, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, indicating that she was a resident of said
constituency for seven months. Faced with petition for cancellation and disqualification by the
incumbent representative Cirilo Roy Montejo, Marcos filed an amended certificate changing the
entry “seven months” to “since childhood.” The Commission on Elections, on 24 April, ordered
the disqualification of Marcos from running for the congressional seat of the First District of
Leyte. It appears however, that Marcos garnered the most votes in the 8 May election. The
Commission on Elections, thus, suspended her proclamation.

Issue:

Whether the statement in the certificate of candidacy (“seven”) determines whether an

individual satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement, to warrant Marcos’
disqualification.

Ruling:

It is the fact of residence, not a statement-in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be

decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency
qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to
be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly
make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification. A
close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for
residence is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a
candidate seeks election. Marcos merely committed an honest mistake in jotting down the word
“seven,” obviously resulting from the confusion which prompted Marcos to write down the
period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district,
which was “since childhood” in the space provided. It must be noted again that “residence” is
used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, while “domicile” denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. Residence
for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

66
 ERNESTINA BERNABE v. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor,
petitioner vs. ADRIAN BERNABE, rspondent
G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002

Facts:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-
three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18,
1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina, as the sole surviving heir, who
filed the complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabe’s estate, which is now
being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the
interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the
legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the
putative father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.

Ruling:
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code
took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek
recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining
majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family
Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could
not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent aptly
points out in his Memorandum, [24] the State as parens patriae should protect a minor’s right.
Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only
twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED.

67
 ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v.SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent
A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Facts:
Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of
Branch 253, Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors
that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her
husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally
related either to Escritor or her partner and is a resident not of Las Piñas City but of Bacoor,
Cavite. Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an
immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain
employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Lock stressed that although Escritor had become
capacitated to marry by the time she joined the judiciary as her husband had died a year before, it
is due to her relationship with a married man, voluntarily carried on, that respondent may still be
subject to disciplinary action.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross
and immoral conduct.”

Ruling:
The Court has repeatedly declared that religious freedom means government neutrality in
religious matters and the Court has also repeatedly interpreted this policy of neutrality to prohibit
government from acting except for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular
effects.
Second, the court asks: "(i)s there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this
infringement of religious liberty?" This step involves balancing, i.e., weighing the interest of the
state against religious liberty to determine which is more compelling under the particular set of
facts. The greater the state's interests, the more central the religious belief would have to be to
overcome it.
Third, the court asks: "(h)as the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state?" The analysis requires the state to show that the means in
which it is achieving its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means, i.e., it has chosen a
way to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties.
In any event, even if the Court deems sufficient respondent's evidence on the sincerity of
her religious belief and its centrality in her faith, the case at bar cannot still be decided using the
"compelling state interest" test. The case at bar is one of first impression, thus the parties were
not aware of the burdens of proof they should discharge in the Court's use of the "compelling
state interest" test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court
Administrator.

68
 MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner v. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent
G.R. No. 145370. March 4, 2004

Facts:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had eight children during their coverture. The respondent left
the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their children. Petitioner Marietta Ancheta
filed a petition with the RTC against the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea for support and support pendente lite.
The parties executed a Compromise Agreement where some of the conjugal properties
were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children. The respondent intended to marry again
and filed a petition with the RTC for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner
on the ground of psychological incapacity and subsequently granted by the court. The Court of
Appeals granted the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of trial court.

Ruling:
The original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in light of the
material averments therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff
to serve on her the summons and a copy of the complaint. She claimed that the summons and
complaint were served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however, failed to
give her the said summons and complaint.
The Supreme Court, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing
the original petition of the petitioner and the amended petition for annulment of the assailed
order grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of
the Court of Appeals dated July 13, 2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are
hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 be remanded to
the Court of Appeals for further proceedings conformably with the Decision of this Court and
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

69
 TEODORO GUARING, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 108395. March 7, 1997

Facts:
This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happened on November 7,
1987, along the North Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the accident
were a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who died as a result of the mishap,
Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota Cressida car, driven by
Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer was heading north, at the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers
per hour. Following it was the Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, with Plate No. CVD-584. On the
other hand, the Toyota Cressida was cruising on the opposite lane, bound for Manila.
Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought this action for damages, based on quasi
delict, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Their evidence tended to show that the Rabbit bus
tried to overtake Guaring’s car by passing on the right shoulder of the road and that in so doing it
hit the right rear portion of Guaring’s Mitsubishi Lancer. The impact caused the Lancer to
swerve to the south-bound lane, as a result of which it collided with the Toyota Cressida car
coming from the opposite direction.
The Regional Trial Court awarded the heirs with moral and exemplary damages. The
Court of Appeals reversed this decision upon review. The appellate court held that since the basis
of petitioners’ action was the alleged negligence of the bus driver, the latter’s acquittal in the
criminal case rendered the civil case based on quasi delict untenable.

Issue:
Does judgment in the criminal case extinguished the liability of private respondent
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, for damages for the death of
Teodoro Guaring, Jr?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case
back to the Court of Appeals for a decision in accordance with law. The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the
facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished
by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as
only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code
provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not
guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.

70
 GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001

Facts:
On or about the 25th day of September 1982, the said accused, being then the driver and
person-in-charge of an automobile, drove and operated the same while along the Daang
Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent
manner, without due regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the
necessary precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing by such
negligence, carelessness and imprudence said automobile driven and operated by him to
sideswipe a passenger jeepdriven by Charles Codamon, thereby causing the said automobile to
turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a passenger of said automobile.
Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless
imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the
judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable
and ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas
P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and moral damages of
P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas. The petitioner
then proceeded to the Supreme Court and held that he would be subject to double jeopardy if he
trial on his civil libility would ensue.

Issues:
a. Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as
to his negligence or reckless imprudence?
b. Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner’s acquittal did not extinguish his civil
liability?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It should be noted that what
was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal
Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second
criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no second criminal
offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower court’s judgment, the
appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second
criminal case against petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second
jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner’s claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of
the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability. The second instance is
an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. Scrutiny of the lower court’s
decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate court that the
acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner’s civil liability was not extinguished
by his discharge.

71
 FLORENCIO BONITA, plaintiff vs Zosa, defendant
G.R. No. L-33772 June 20, 1988

Facts:
At about 2:00 P.M. of 24 September 1968, while Florencio Bonite was working as
"caminero" of the Bureau of Public Highways in Barrio Vicente Alto (Dagatan), Oroquieta City,
he was hit by a truck driven by private respondent, as a result of which, Bonite died on that same
day. Consequently, a criminal complaint for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed
by the surviving heirs of the deceased (now petitioners) against the respondent Abamonga, with
the City Court of Oroquieta City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 9328. Petitioners through their
counsel Atty. Alberto Dulalas, as private prosecutor, actively participated in the prosecution of
the criminal case against the accused. After trial on the merits, a decision was rendered by the
court in the criminal case, acquitting the accused Abamonga for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On 28 December 1970, petitioners filed an action for recovery of damages against the
same accused on account of the death of Florencio Bonite, with the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental, 16th Judicial District, Branch III, docketed as Civil Case No. 2806. In an
order dated 25 February 1971, the court a quo dismissed the complaint for damages. THe
petitioners then moved for reconsideration of the said order.

Issue:
Is an independent civil action for damages, under Article 29 of the Civil Code deemed
barred by petitioners' failure in the criminal action to make a reservation to file a separate civil
action and by their active participation in the prosecution of such criminal action?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the rulings of the lower courts. It allowed the
reinstatement of the case for retrial. When the accused in a criminal case is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for
the same act or omission may still be instituted against him, and only a preponderance of
evidence is required to hold the accused liable. The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal
of the accused, where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the criminal
complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence was dismissed on the ground that the guilt
of the accused (herein private respondent) was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly,
herein petitioners have the right to file an independent civil action for damages, the acquittal of
the accused in the criminal case notwithstanding.
Lastly, that petitioners actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case does
not bar them from filing an independent and separate civil action for damages under Article 29 of
the Civil Code. The civil action based on criminal liability and a civil action under Article 29 are
two separate and independent actions

72
 RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996

Facts:
Rodolfo Navarro, Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, filed an administrative
complaint against respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy, Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judge.
One of the two acts complained of was the fact that respondent Judge performed a
marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside his court's
jurisdiction.
The judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte.
The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the Municipality of
Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area
Respondent judge points out to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his
having solemnized the marriage.

Issue:
Is a marriage solemnized outside of a court's jurisdiction valid?

Held:
Article 8 of the Family Code provides that, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's
chamber or courtroom only in the following instances: 1) at the point of death, 2) in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 or 3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn
statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point
of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of
the solemnizing officer. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the
"authority of the solemnizing officer". Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among
others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which
is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or
qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-
compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriage, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law
are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
wedding only within said areas and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the Municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of
his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the
basic principles of civil law.

73
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

Facts:
Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by a City Court Judge of Pasig City and was celebrated without the knowledge of
Castro's parents.
Defendant Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was
unknown to Castro's parents. They decided to live together when Castro discovered she was
pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways.
Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted to put in order he marital status before
leaving for the U.S. She then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas
prior to the celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro
Manila.
Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City seeking for the judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to them
prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
The trial court denied the petition holding that the certification was inadequate to
establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage
between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage
license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued. On appeal, the
decision of the trial court was reversed.

Issue:
a. Is the marriage valid?
b. Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"?

Held:
a. At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law
governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage license
shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by the local civil registrar. Being one
of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage
void ab initio.

b. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a
judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret
marriage" - a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage
celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the
contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas as initially
unknown to the parents of the former.

74
 LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners, vs. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988

Facts:
Paz Abayan filed an information for Bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato. She also
filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court a civil action for declaration of nullity of
marriage to petitioner because of a prior marriage of petitioner. In his answer petitioner claimed
that his 2nd marriage was void because is was solemnized without a valid marriage license and
that violence, intimation and undue influence were employed by Paz to obtain his consent.
Prior to the date set for the trial of the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend
the proceedings of the case because the civil action raises a prejudicial question which must first
be determined before the criminal case can proceed.

Issue:
Does a criminal case for bigamy suspend the civil case of annulment of marriage on the
ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question?

Held:
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. I must be noted
that the issue before the JDRC touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not
determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it
was petitioner's 2nd wife, the herein private respondent Paz Abayan who filed the complaint for
annulment of the 2nd marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.
He who contracts a 2nd marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

75
 SUSAN NICDAO CARINO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARINO, respondent.
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages.
The first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao, with whom he had two offsprings;
and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee, with whom he had no
children in their almost 10 year cohabitation starting way back 1982.
In 1988, Santiago became ill and bed ridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for
his medical and burial expenses.
Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able
to collect a total of P 146, 000 from MBAI, PCCUI, NAPOLCOM, and Pag-Ibig; while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P 21,000.00 from “GSIS life, Burial (GSIS) and burial
(SSS.)”
Respondent filed a case for collection of sum of money against petitioner praying, inter
alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least ½ of the P 146, 000.00 “death benefits.”
Petitioner failed to file her answer prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral, where she met petitioner
who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of
money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio
because the same was solemnized with the required marriage license.
The court ruled in favor or respondent. On appeal, the decision of the Regional trial court
was affirmed in toto. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Who is entitled to half the death benefits?

Held:
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab
initio.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
does not fall within the marriage exempt from the license requirement. . A marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number
and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license.
It is beyond cavil, therefore that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of
the marriage exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the “death benefits” would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee.
*** Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the
property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two
marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or

76
conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Article 147 and
148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”

77
 MARILOU NAMA MORENO, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-94-963 July 14, 1995

Facts:
Marilou Nama Moreno and Marcelo Moreno were married before the respondent Judge
Jose Bernabe on October 4, 1993 but did not process the papers for the marriage contract. The
complainant at that time was pregnant and begged to the judge to have her and her husband to be
married by him. The complainant then filed a complaint allegedly for deceiving her that the
marriage is valid.

Issue:
Whether or not that a Judge who held a wedding without issuing a marriage contract
should be held liable even if the complaint had “expressly” withdrawn by the complainant.

Held:
Even with the withdrawal of the complainant against the respondent the Supreme Court
insisted that it should still be dealt with accordingly as the accused was a member of the
judiciary and a conduct of a higher level were expected. The judge displayed ignorance of the
law which is unacceptable for his position and is therefore fined with 10, 000.00 pesos and is
sternly warned that a repetition of a similar act should be punished severely.

78
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984

Facts:
At high noon of July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Elias and Susana Borromeo
reported to Matilde Taborada, mother of Susanna, that Susana was shouting frantically for help
because Elias was killing her. Matilde, upon reaching to her the information, told the child to
report the same to Geronimo Taborada, Susana’s brither who was then working at their mango
plantation. The latter, upon hearing the information, went to inform his father. The two went to
Susana’s hut but the door was closed. Geronimo could only peep through the bamboo slats at the
wall and saw her sister lying down, and motionless. Susana’s father called for the Mabolo police.
Thereafter, police officer Fernando C. Abella and three policemen arrived. They shouted and
ordered Elias to open the door. The latter opened the door after he consumed one stick of
cigarette. When questioned, he could only mumble incoherent words.
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu held Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of parricide. Thus, this appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed by Elias is not parricide but homicide because he
and the deceased, Susana were not legally married

Held:
There is no better of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of such
marriage. Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. And, the mere fact that
no record of the marriage exist in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as
long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present.
Thus, the decision of the trial court was affirmed, with modification that the indemnity of
PHP 12,000 was increased to PHP 30,000.

79
 JOSE RIVERA petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990

Facts:
On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of Mabalacat, Pampanga named
Venancio Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving
legitimate son of the deceased filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over
Venancio’s state. This was, apparently, opposed by one Adelaido Rivera who denied Jose was
the son of the decedent. He avers that the decedent left 2 holographic wills. The latter then filed
for the probation of the said 2 holographic wills. The two cases were then consolidated. Judge
Eliodoro B. Guinto found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent but of a different
Venancio Rivera who was married to Maria Vital. The Venancio Rivera whose estate was in
question was married to Maria Jocson, by whom he had seven children, including Adelaido.
Therefore, Jose had no right to claim to this estate because the decedent was not his father. The
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed this decision of the trial court. Hence, Jose Rivera
appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Jose Rivera was the only surviving legitimate son of Venancio Rivera,
whose estate was in question in this case

Held:
It is true that Adelaido could not present his parents’ marriage certificate because, as he
explained it, the marriage records for 1942 in the Mabalacat Civil Registry were burned during
the war. Even so, he could still rely on the presumption of marriage, since it is not denied that
Venancio Rivera and Maria Jocson lived together as husband and wife and for many years,
begetting seven children in all during that time.
Jose Rivera, on the other hand, although presented necessary documents, his father’s
parents were different of that Venancio Rivera’s whose estate is in question. Moreover, if it was
true, the court said that Jose and her mother did not file any appropriate proceedings to prosecute
Venancio Rivera as they were abandoned and neglected, considering also that they lived in the
same town.
When the authenticity of a will is not being questioned, there is no necessity of presenting
the three witnesses required under Article 811; an opposition by a mere stranger did not have the
legal effect of requiring the three witnesses.
Thus, the petition was denied by the Supreme Court.

80
 MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant, vs.
JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR.,respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995

Facts:
Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a clerk of Court assigned to the sala of the respondent, Judge Jose
C. Tabiliran, Jr. of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Manukan, Zamboanga Del Norte.
Respondent stands charged with gross immorality for contracting a second marriage to certain
Priscilla Q. Baybayan as his legitimate child; and corruption unbecoming of a judge for
notarizing documents, collected fees thereof, and used it for personal purposes.
The respondent judge denied all the allegations against him. In the case of gross
immorality, respondent claimed that his marriage to Priscilla Q. Baybayan was valid because his
first wife Teresita Banzuela abandoned the conjugal home for seven years, citing Article 310 of
the Civil Code; on deceitful conduct, he claimed that since there were only three words to choose
from, Single, Widow, or Divorced, he chose the word single as the most appropriate since he
had no knowledge of his first wife whereabouts; on corruption, he claimed that there was no
Notary Public in Manukan, as attested by the Mayor of the place, and as such, he may be allowed
to notarize documents as ex-officio notary. The fees collected were for the used to subsidize
office expenses since the funds he had been receiving from the municipal government were not
enough to cover expenses in maintaining his office.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither
bigamous nor immoral because, as his contention, he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only
after his first wife had already left and abandoned the family home in 1966 and until the present
her whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive

Held:
The Supreme Court held that the respondent’s actuation of cohabiting with another when
his marriage was valid and subsisting – his wife having been allegedly absent for four years only
– constitutes grossly immoral conduct.
Children born prior to marriage can not be legitimated nor in any way considered
legitimate if at the time they were born there was an existing valid marriage between the father
and his first wife.
The respondent’s failure to properly account and turn over the fees collected by him as
ex-officio notary to the municipal government as required by law raises the presumption that he
had put such fund to his personal use.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the respondent, Judge C. Tabiliran, guilty of the three
charges against him and was dismissed from service, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement
benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in the government service, all without
prejudice to criminal or civil liability.

81
 ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000

Facts:
Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside
of his jurisdiction and not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil
Registrar. On the other hand, the respondent claimed that he solemnized their marriage (Zenaida
S. Beso and Bernardito Yman) due to the urgency of the situation, that Beso, on August 28,
1997, the day of the marriage, said that he will be leaving the country for job purposes and
considering her to be an Overseas Filipino Worker and that if not solemnized that day, their
marriage license would lapse because she will be working abroad for a long period. Thus, this
would necessitate spouses for a new marriage license. The necessary documents that was
supposedly to be forwarded by him to the Local Civil Registrar was missing and claimed to be
taken by someone.
The Office of the Court administration held that the respondent Judge committed non-
feasance in office and was fined PHP 5,000 with stern warning.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Daguman really committed non-feasance in office

Held:
The Supreme Court finds evaluation of the Office of the Court Administration will taken.
Marriage may only be solemnized in a public place except in marriage in articulo mortis, remote
place, or upon request by both parties in writing a sworn statement.
The Supreme Court also held that judges who are appointed to specific jurisdiction may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Moreover, a judge is charged with
exercising extra care in ensuing that the records of the cases and official documents in his
custody are intact.

82
 LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

Facts:
Lupo Almodiel Atienza filed an administrative case against Judge Brillantes for Gross
Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety. Complainant alleges that he has two children with
Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at a subdivision in Makati, which he purchased in
1987. One day, he caught the respondent asleep in his bedroom. He asked the houseboy about
him and the latter said that the judge had been cohabiting with De Castro. Atienza did not bother
to wake up the respondent instead asked the houseboy to take care of his two children.
After that, the respondent prevented him from visiting his child and has alienated the
affection of his children. The Complainant also claims that the respondent is married to Zenaida
Ongkiko.
The judge denies having been married to Ongkiko because their marriage was celebrated
twice without marriage license, therefore, his marriage to De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California was because he believed in good faith and for all legal purposes, that his first marriage
was solemnized without marriage license.
He further argues that Article 40 of the Family Code is not applicable in his case because
his first marriage in 1965 was governed by the Civil Code and the 2nd relationship was 1991
under the Family Code. No retroactive Effect.

Issue:
Whether or not the absence of marriage license of his previous marriage justifi3es his act
to cohabit with De Castro

Held:
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law
in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already
a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a
marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity
to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time.
His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and
bad faith.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of
the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is
particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any
vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.

83
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004.

Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of one Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Bohol for four years. Their communication was broken after school year 1977-
1978. In 1984, Lucio received a letter from Lucia from Singapore. After an exchange of letters,
the two became sweethearts. Lucia later returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to
work there. Nonetheless, the sweethearts maintained a constant communication. Lucia, later
came back to the Philippines. The two agreed to get married, thus, they were married at Iglesia
de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada
leaving Lucio behind. Barely a year, August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with Ontario Court a petition
for divorce which was granted and took effect in February of 1992. On October that year Lucia
married Maria Lumbago also in Tagbilaran City. September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint
for nullity of marriage in Regional Trial Court of Bohol on the ground that there was no marriage
ceremony actually took place. He was later charge with Bigamy filed by City Prosecutor of the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
The petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case invoking prejudicial
question. The civil case is a prejudicial question to bigamy. The Court granted unfortunately
denied by the motion for reconsideration of the prosecution.
The Regional Trial Court of Bohol held Lucio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
He filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in Court of
Appeals, the trial court granted the petition for nullty of marriage since no marriage ceremony
took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, thus, became final and executory. But the
Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of merit. Hence, the petition was elevated to the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith
is valid

Held:
The first element of Bigamy as laid down in Bobis v. Bobis was not present.
No marriage ceremony. What transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by
the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The mere signing of the same bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.
The Supreme Court need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith
or lack of criminal intent, which is moot and academic.

84
 LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY
and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

Facts:
Karl Heinz Wiegel filed a petition for the declaration of his marriage to the petitioner
Lilia Oliva Wiegel before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City. Their
marriage was celebrated in June 1978. The basis for such petition was that Lilia’s previous
marriage to Eduardo A. Maxion was still existing. Lilia admitted the existence of her previous
marriage, but as a defense, he avers that it was initiated by force, therefore, the previous marriage
was null and void. So, a pre-trial ensued. respondent judge ruled against Lilia.

Issue:
Whether or not the Lilia’s previous marriage was void or merely voidable

Held:
There is no need to prove that Lilia’s previous marriage was vitiated by force, because
assuming that indeed it is vitiated by force, it is not void but merely voidable (Aticle 85, Civil
Code). Therefore, since there is no annulment made, her marriage to the respondent is void
because the previous marriage is not yet dissolved.

85
 FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 127263 April 12, 2000

Facts:
Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy were married on November 15, 1973 at the church of Our
Lady of Lourdes, Quezon City. Both were 22 years old. the union was blessed with two children,
Frederick and Farrah Sheryl. They first resided at Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga,
and later I Sto. Tomas, Pampanga were they operated their business, lumber and hardware.
Later, Fernando left their Conjugal dwelling. Their two children were under the custody
of Filipina. But later, Frederick transferred to his father in Tondo.
As a result, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation in Regional Trial Court San
Fernando, Pampanga. The case later upgraded to separation of property on the ground that her
husband left her without cause for more than one year. Moreover, they have entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement. The trial court granted the petition. She also sued her husband for
attempted parricide. One afternoon, she went to a dental clinic owned by her husband and
operated by her mistress. She went there to fetch her son Frederick and to take him to San
Fernando, Pampanga. But the boy ignored her and continued playing the family computer. So
she spanked her, unfortunately Fernando pulled her and started beating her like hell.
Unfortunately, the Regional Trial Court of Manila held Fernando liable only for slight physical
injuries and sentenced to 20 days of imprisonment.
She filed another legal separation on that ground and the Regional trial Court of
Pampanga granted the petition and giving Sheryll in her custody, Frederick to the respondent.
She filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage to Fernando. But the
Regional Trial Court denied for lack of merit. She appealed to the Court of Appeals but denied
the same. It fell short of quantum of evidence. Thus, the petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void ab initio because of the absence of marriage license
at the time of the celebration of marriage

Held:
The findings of the Supreme Court were:
a. The marriage was celebrated on November 15, 1973, but the marriage license was issued
on September 17, 1974. Almost one year after the celebration of the marriage (120 days
from the date of issue).
b. The marriage license was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet neither the wife nor the husband
ever resided the place.
Thus, the petition was granted.

86
 ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998

Facts:
During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent
Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. The union begot two illegitimate children, namely,
Roberto Rafson Alonso and Rudyard Pride Alonzo.
When Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Cotabato City a petition for Guardianship and Administration. The trial court issued an
order setting the hearing and directed the notice thereof be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province of Maguindanao and Cotabato City and or Davao City.
Sometime in July 1992, Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving
spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground of improper venue. She alleged
that the decedent’s death was in Davao City, thus, the Regional Trial Court of Davo City is the
proper forum.
Vallejo filed a motion to dismiss mainly on the ground that Antonietta de Chua has no
personality to intervene in the petition for guardianship and administration of Robert Chua; a
pretender because the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he died.
The trial court, indeed, dismissed the petition of de Chua for lack of merit. She was able
only to present a Xerox copy of the alleged marriage certificate. She was unable to produce the
original copy or authenticated copy. The alleged marriage was not even registered to local civil
registration. Moreover, the alleged judge who solemnized the marriage denied that he
solemnized such marriage (Judge Augusto Banzali). The trial court issued an order appointing
Romulo Lim Uy, first cousin of the deceased, and Florita Vallejo as guardian to the estate of
Roberto and Rudyard Alonzo.
Antonietta filed a motion to recall the letters of administration of Vallejo and she also
filed a petition to declare the proceedings as mistrial but was denied.
She filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals alleging the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion but it was denied, hence, the petition was elevated to
the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Antonietta has a personality to file a motion to dismiss the petition for
guardianship and administration of Robert and Rudyard Alonzo, filed by Vallejo

Held:
Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving spouse of the decedent. The
best proof of marriage between man and wife is marriage contract which Antonietta failed to
produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate
which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other
worthless pieces of evidence.

87
 MERCEDITA MATA ARANES, petitioner, vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002.

Facts:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charges respondent Judge, the presiding judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, with Gross Ignorance of the law for
solemnizing her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia (a retired Commodore of the
Philippine Navy) on February 17, 2000, without the requisite of marriage license and at Navua,
Camarines Sur which outside the respondent’s territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her
husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the
“vast properties” left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving
pensions from her late husband’s job.
On the respondent judge’s comment dated July 5, 2001, he solemnized the marriage
because he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo; Orobia had a difficulty walking because he
had a physical condition that if aggravated could lead to a fatal end; due to influx of visitors, he
proceeded to solemnize the marriage; assuming that all marriage requirements were present;
petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the
afternoon on that same day, February 12, 2000.
However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own
shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing from the records of the case, it appears that petitioner filed application for
marriage license on January 5, 2000. It was issued on January 17, 2000 but neither petitioner nor
Orobia claimed it.
On September 12, 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of desistance dated August 28 2001
with the Office of the Court of a marriage license.
The Office of the Court Administrator rendered a decision penalizing respondent judge of
a fine of PHP 5,000 in November 15, 2000.

Issue:
Whether or not the affidavit of desistance shall excuse the judge from being penalized

Held:
No, because the Supreme Court has the authority to discipline its members.
The act of the judge in solemnizing the marriage at Nabua, outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the respondent judge is contrary to the law of marriage. The marriage may still be
considered valid but the respondent judge in administratively liable. However, this is not a gross
ignorance of law (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129).
The grounds that make the act grossly ignorance of the law is the solemnization of the
marriage without the marriage license, which makes the marriage void under paragraph 2 Article
3 of the Family Code, and the late issuance of such license did not prove the validity of the
marriage. Thus, the Supreme Court rendered a decision requiring the respondent judge to pay the
fine of PHP 5,000.

88
 FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

Facts:
Quita and Padlan were married in the Philippines, but Quita filed for divorce in
California which was granted. She remarried twice after the divorce. Upon Padlan’s death, Quita
made claims upon his estate as the surviving spouse and heir of Padlan, alleging that since
Padlan was a Filipino citizen, he remained married to her in spite of the divorce decree.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that
she had secured a divorced in the USA and in fact had twice remarried

Held:
Quita’s right to inherit from Padlan depends on her citizenship at the time the divorce
was decreed. If she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, the divorce
would be valid as to her and will be recognized in the Philippines, and she would lose her right to
inherit.
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may, be reorganized in the Philippines,
provided tahy are valid according to their national law; once proved that a wife was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from her husband, then she could very well lose her
right to inherit from the latter.

89
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, respondent.
G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005.

Facts:
On May 24, 1981 Crpriano Orbecido III married Lady Milagros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. The marriage was blessed
with two children, Kristoffer Simbortiz V, Orbecido and Lady Kimberly B. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cpriano’s wife left for the United States bringing his son, Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano was informed by his son that his wife had been naturalized as Amrican
citizen and that she married certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court (Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga
Del Sur, Branch 73) a petition to marry because of the situation. It was granted. However, the
Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General sought reconsideration
but it was denied. Thus, this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code

Held:
The Supreme Court is unanimous in holding that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried,
also to remarry. However before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts,
the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. In the case, it was not submitted as evidence.
Thus, the petition of the Republic of the Philippines was granted.

90
 JAIME O. SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.

Facts:
Jaime O. Sevilla, herein petitioner, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Carmelita N. Cardenas, herein respondent, for their marriage was vitiated by
machination, duress, and intimidation employed by the respondents Carmelita and her father. He
was forced to sign a marriage contract with Carmelita Cardenas before a minister of the Gospel,
Rev. Cirilo D Gonzales. Moreover, he alleged that there was no marriage license presented
before the solemnizing officer as certified by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Manila. Actually, it was certified 3 times on the following dates: March 11, September 20, 1994
and July 25, 2000 that marriage license no. 2770792 was nowhere to be found.
On the other hand, the respondent, Carmelita N. Cardenas refuted these allegations of
Jaime and claims that they were first civilly married on May 19, 1969 and thereafter married at a
church on May 31, 1969 at Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both were alleged to be
recorded in Local Civil Registrar and NSO. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage
license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City declared the nullity of marriage of the parties
based on the petitioner’s allegations that no marriage license was presented before a solemnizing
officer. And that without the said marriage license, being one of the formal requisites of
marriage, the marriage is void from the beginning. This was based on the 3 certifications issued
by the Local Civil Registrar Manila that marriage license number 220792 was fictitious.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of
the trail court in favor of the marriage, because the Local Civil Registrar failed to locate the said
license with due effort as testified by certain Perlita Mercader because the former Local Civil
registrar had already retired. The petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by the Court of Appeals. thus, this case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the certification made by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan that
Marriage License No. 2770792, as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties, sufficient to
declare the marriage void from the beginning

Held:
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The absence of logbook is not conclusive proof of non-
issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to
search for the said logbook, we can not easily accept that absence of the same also means non-
existence or falsity of entries therein.
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for
several years producing two offsprings, now adult themselves. Thus, the instant petition was
denied.

91
 GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001.

Facts:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On
May 18, 1989, decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. he then married the petitioner on
January 12, 1992.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in
the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at
the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's
marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner
his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;
thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it
stated no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The
court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. The trial court held the marriage
dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines.

Issue:
a. Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven
b. Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner

Held:
a. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
b. The Supreme Court cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. The Supreme
Court agree to the petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce
decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the
very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Thus, the case was remanded.

92
 RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, petitioner, v.
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007

Facts:
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that he and respondent celebrated their marriage twice without securing the
required marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing
on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never
went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14
October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted
ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued
declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding
marriage contract and its entry on file.
Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity
of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a
certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She had actually gave
birth to two children, one as stated by the petitioner and the other was Rachel Ann Alcantara on
October 27, 1992. Moreover, petitioner filed the said case in order to evade prosecution for
concubinage for he had a mistress with whom he had three children. The case for concubinage
was actually filed and that petitioner prays that the annulment case be dismissed for lack of
merit.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The
Court of Appeals dismissed also the petitioner’s appeal. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on
record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the
marriage

Held:
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite
enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the
marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in
case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of
its lawfulness. Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage
license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the
validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the
marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

93
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner v. CRASUS L. IYOY, respondent.
G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005

Facts:
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. The respondent avers
that Fely “hot-tempered, nagger, and extravagant,” she abandoned him for 13 years, and Fely’s
acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological
incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and
continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in
relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
On the other hand, Fely counterclaims that respondent was an American citizen, thus, she
is not subject to Philippine laws. She avers she left that respondent because of the latter’s
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the
maintenance of their household.  She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly
had enough money for basic needs. Moreover, she avers that respondent misused the amount of
P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On
the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent
Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she
advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
litigation expenses.
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu City promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage
of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initioon the gound of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner Republic believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and
evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.  The appellate court, though, in its Decision,
dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error
therein. Hence the case to the Supreme Court. 

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not applying Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code

Held:
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the
couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated.  By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case
of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was
still a Filipino citizen.  Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her
Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after
she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985.  In
the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988.  At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine
laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad.  Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses.  Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
Thus, the Petition was granted and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City,
Branch 22, in Civil Case No.  CEB-20077,  dated  30 October 1998, was reversed and set aside. 

94
 EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.
G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.

Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17,
1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
with whom he had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of
their marriage up to his death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement
of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper
venue and failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two
motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and
a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and,
hence, the case before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration

Held:
Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners.
If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove
that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be
acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
Morover, the Supreme Court found that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo
or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its
October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is affirmed. It
was also REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

95
 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA
DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA
ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, petitioners, v. HEIRS OF MARCIANA
RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006.
Facts:
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two
groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews
and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces. Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado
were never married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not
even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. (2) the alleged heirs of
Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, 9 and the de facto
adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents. Respondents aver that like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo
Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia
Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia
Miranda. Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never
duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement
prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the
documents she presented were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.
The decision of the trial court states “petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late
Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as
the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8,
1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to
in this Decision. Oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal was
not filed on time. They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, which was dismissed by the
Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors’
appeal in the interest of substantial justice. Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals partially set aside
the trial court’s decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals amended its earlier
decision. The decision was reconsidered and vacated. Consequently, the decision of the trial court was
reversed and set-aside. Hence, the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Held:
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed
between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be
doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was
such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in
1975 referred to them as "spouses." Every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual
order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be
living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
Thus, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch
55) was denied. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed with
modifications.

96
 TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990.

Facts:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas, Vitaliana for brevity), her
full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27
September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20,
Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in
1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal
authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age,
single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988)
to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus
proceedings and that he alleged that he had already a burial permit from the Undersecretary of
the Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine
Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he
(petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
The court a quo denied the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner on the ground that there
was no surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over
petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to
another woman. Hence, the appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not Tomas Eugenio is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body as his
common-law husband

Held:
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to
the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines. While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships
are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is
governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership
requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal
impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. The provisions of the
Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a
"spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a
lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her
lifetime.
Hence, the decision appealed from was affirmed. Both petitions were dismissed.

97
 ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 118904 April 20, 1998

Facts:
On August 10, 1978, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo,
Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was
the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the
original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels
of land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from
the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3)
individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused and alleged in their answer filed on
September 07, 1978 that plaintiff was not the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants
contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941 , before plaintiff's birth. Defendants
also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in
the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they
had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
The trial court rendered in favor of the petitioner. However, Respondent Court reversed
the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his
parents were legally married to each other and that acquisitive prescription against him had set
in. Respondent Court denied reconsideration, thus, the appeal.

Issue:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and
filiation be proven?

Held:
According to Respondent Court, petitioner failed to accomplish to prove that Inocentes
and his mother (Felicidad) were validly married, and that he was born during the subsistence of
their marriage. The Supreme Court disagrees citing the case of Pugeda v. Trias when the
question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute
competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couple's public and open
cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal
certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents.
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed
during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to
petitioner's case. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the
marital union, petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other
forms of relevant evidence may take its place. In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses
were presented by petitioner, Isabel Meren, who testified that she was present during the nuptial
of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who
testified that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo,
the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-
teachers' association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidad's house twice or thrice a week, as she
lived only thirty meters away.
Private respondents' thesis is that Inocentes died unwed and without issue in March 1941.
Private respondents' witness, Pedro Briones, testified that Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried
in the estate of the Trinidads, because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery in
Kalibo, which was then occupied by the Japanese forces. Taking judicial notice that World War
II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial
court was not convinced that Inocentes dies in March 1941. 35 The Japanese forces occupied
Manila only on January 2, 1942; thus, it stands to reason that Aklan was not occupied until then.
It was only then that local residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery In Kalibo,
because of the Japanese soldiers who were roaming around the area. Furthermore, petitioner

98
consistently used Inocentes' surname (Trinidad) without objection from private respondents a
presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes' legitimate child.
The petition was granted and the assailed Decision and Resolution were seversed and set
aside. The trial court's decision dated July 4, 1989 was reinstated.

99
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of the Deceased ALFREDO E.
JACOB, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 88602 April 6, 1990.

Facts:
Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob was the registered owner of a parcel of land described under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1433 of the Register of Deeds of Naga City. Because of the problem of paying
realty taxes, internal revenue taxes and unpaid wages of farm laborers of the hacienda, Dr. Jacob asked
Centenera to negotiate for a loan. For this purpose, a special power of attorney was executed and
acknowledged by Dr. Jacob before notary public Lorenzo Rosales.
The mortgage was annotated on the title and when the loan was twice re-structured, the proceeds
of the same were not actually given by the bank to Centera since the transaction was actually nothing but
a renewal of the first or original loan and the supposed proceeds were applied as payment for the loan.
The accrued interest for sixty (60) days was, however, paid by Centenera.
On November 15, 1982 a definite deed of sale of the property was executed in favor of the
respondent bank as the sole and highest bidder.
Tomasa Vda. de Jacob who was subsequently named administratrix of the estate of Dr. Jacob and
who claimed to be an heir of the latter, conducted her own investigation and therefore she filed a
complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur alleging that the special power of attorney and
the documents therein indicated are forged and therefore the loan and/or real estate mortgages and
promissory notes are null and void. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of a cause
of action and/or her failure to prove the causes of action alleged in the complaint; and judgment was
rendered against the Estate of the late Dr. Alfredo Jacob in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff appealed
to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court and dismissing the
appeal for lack of merit. Thus, the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not an extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage may proceed even after the death of the
mortgagor

Held:
A mortgagee has three remedies that may be alternately availed of in case the mortgagor dies
under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court:
a. to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
b. to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and;
c. to rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same at anytime, before it is
barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any deficiency.
From this rule, it is clear that the mortgagee does not lose its light to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgage even after the death of the mortgagor as a third alternative under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court. The power to foreclose a mortgage is not an ordinary agency that contemplated exclusively the
representation of the principal by the agent but is primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for
the latter's own protection. That power survives the death of the mortgagor. The right of the mortgagee
bank to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage after the death of the mortgagor, acting through his
attorney-in-fact, did not depend on the authority in the deed of mortgage executed by the latter. That right
existed independently of said stipulation and is clearly recognized in Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court aforecited. Other issues were questions of facts and can not be reviewed at the Supreme Court as
only questions of law are reviewed in the latter.
Thus, the case was dismissed for lack of merit.

100
 TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the
Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, defendants-appellee.
G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978

Facts:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years.
His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Yangco
had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis
R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose
A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4)
Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October,
1944 at Palauig, Zambales.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26, 1945
was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. The Probate court in its
order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition. From that order, Pedro Martinez,
Juliana de Castro, Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangco aped to this Court.
Appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus.
The estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar compromise a ment A the resolution
dismissing the appeal became, final and executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries
of judgment were made on those dates. On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of
Juanita corpus, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed
share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos
will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil
Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be
distributed according to the rules on intestacy.
The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res
judicata and laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its
order dated December 26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of
partition for the testator's estate. The Court of Appeals, however, certified the appeal to this
Court because it involves real property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos.

Issue:
Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in
Yangco's estate?

Held:
Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or
legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or
mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged
it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants,
natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in
accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R.
Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his
estate under the rules of intestacy. Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was
held that the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. The lower
court's judgment was affirmed.

101
 ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. AND
RICHARD UPTON, respondents.
No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.

Facts:
Alice Reyes Van-Dorn, petitioner, was a citizen of the Philippines while Richard Upton,
respondent, was a U.S. citizen. The two got married in Hong Kong in 1972. They lived in the
Philippines and begot two children. They obtained divorce in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn.
The private respondent filed suit against petitioner stating the business of the latter in
Ermita, Manila is their conjugal property. Thus, he claimed that he has the right to manage such
conjugal property.
Petitioner then filed a Motion to Dismiss since it was already agreed upon in the divorce
judgment that there is no community property between her and the respondent.
The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved is
located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.

Issue:
Is the effect of the foreign divorce binding in the Philippines on the matter of conjugal
property?

Ruling:
The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. Aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided that they are valid
according to their national law. Likewise, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorce. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of
petitioner. Furthermore, he cannot be entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.

102
 IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, v. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA,
HON LUIS C. VICTOR AND ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.

Facts:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino citizen) and
respondent and respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, German national, were married at Federal
Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child, Isabella Pilapil
Geiling.
The private respondent initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. The
local court in Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouse.
On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in
Manila.
After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed the complaint for
adultery before the prosecutor of Manila alleging that the petitioner had an affair William Chia
and Jesus Chua while they were still married.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside the cases filed
against her and be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for
the dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.

Issue:
Is the action tenable?

Ruling:
Yes. The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be
prosecuted except upon sworn written filed by the offended spouse. Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is logical consequence since the raison d’etre
of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the
spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. It is indispensable
that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be definitely established
and, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. Thus, the
divorce decree is valid not only in his country, may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
private respondent is concerned – in view of the nationality principle under the Civil Code on the
matter of civil status of persons. Private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and
has no legal standing to commence the adultery case. The criminal case filed against petitioner is
dismissed.

103
 PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, v. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET. AL.,
defendants-appellees.
No. L-19671. November 29, 1965.

Facts:
Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age and came from a prominent family, exchanged marriage
vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, before Lt. Moises Lavares (a Catholic Chaplain).
She did not inform her parents about the marriage rather she and Tenchavez decided to elope. It
did not however materialize rather she was forced to admit such “secret marriage” to her parents.
To avoid scandal, her parents decided to let their daughter remarry Tenchavez for the first
marriage was solemnized by a priest who had lack of authority. However, it did not happen.
Subsequently, the couple did not live together.
Vicenta went to Mizamis Occidental to escape and filed a petition therein to annul her
marriage but it was dismissed for she abandoned the same. She rather went to the United States
of America, without the knowledge of Tenchavez and indicating in her passport that she is
single, to study. She filed a divorce against her husband on the ground of “extreme cruelty, and
entirely mental in character,” in Nevada. Such petition was approved by the foreign court. She
met an American citizen, Russell Moran, and later on, they got married and had a child.
Tenchavez filed then a complaint against Vicenta’s parents whom he charged with having
dissuaded and discouraged her from joining her husband and alienating her affection and asked
for legal separation.
The judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his
wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife.

Issue:
Whether or not the action of Vicenta - filing a divorce decree is proper

Ruling:
No. The marriage of Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta is valid. The foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code, is not entitled
to recognition as valid. Thus, neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced entitled to validity in the country. The remarriage of the “divorced wife” and her
cohabitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal
separation.

104
 MARILOU NAMA MORENO, complainant, v. JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-94-963. July 14, 1995.

Facts:
Marilou Nama Moreno filed this complainant against Judge C. Bernabe for grave
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law.
On October 4, 1993, complainant alleges that she and Marcelo Moreno were married
before respondent Judge Bernabe. She visited the office of the Respondent Judge on October 15,
1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage contract because the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She claims that respondent Judge connived
with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her.
Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to solemnize
the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant.
Judge Villarama, Jr. recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent for
failure of complainant to appear on any of the scheduled hearings. He, however, also
recommended that the respondent be issued a stern warning for the latter solemnized a marriage
without the requisites marriage license.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void due to the lack of marriage license

Ruling:
Respondent Judge displayed his ignorance of the law when he solemnized the marriage
without a marriage license. As a judge, he is presumed to be aware of the existence of Article
3(2) of the Family Code of the Philippines, which provides of a marriage is a valid marriage
license. Absence of said requisite will make the marriage void from the beginning. Family Code
declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the
marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable. Thus, respondent be held liable for misconduct for
solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and that the appropriate administrative
sanctions be imposed against him.

105
 RODOLFO G., complainant, v.
JUDGE HERNANDO DOMAGTOY, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.

Facts:
On September 27, 1994, Judge Hernando Domagtoy solemnized the wedding between
Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn Borga despite the fact that the groom is merely separated from his
first wife.
Respondent judge, likewise, performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside his jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Thus he faced an
administrative for gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law
filed by Rodolfo Navarro, the complainant.
Respondent seeks exculpation from his act by stating that he merely relied on the
affidavit issued by the municipal trial court confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first
wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. The certified true copy of the marriage
contract between Tagadan and Borga states that the former’s civil status is “separated.” Tagadan
was civilly married to Ida Peñaranda; that after 13 years of cohabitation and having borne five
children, she left the conjugal dwelling and did not return for almost seven years thereby giving
rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In the marriage of Sumaylo and del Rosario, he maintained that he did not violate Article
7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge erred in solemnizing the marriages

Ruling:
Yes. Should Tagadan institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first
wife’s presumptive death otherwise he remains married to Peñaranda. Such negligence or
ignorance of the law has resulted is a bigamous, and therefore, void marriage. The marriage
between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a
subsisting marriage between him and Ida Peñaranda.
A marriage can be held outside of the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in the
following instances: (1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29;
(3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no
pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote area. The
written request was made by only one party. Under Article 3 of the Family Code, one of the
formal requisite is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within his or her court’s
jurisdiction. Article 8 of the same Code refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and
does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer. Non compliance of such will
not invalidate the marriage. Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
weddings only within said areas otherwise there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite
and may subject the solemnizing officer to administrative liability.

106
 RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, petitioner, v. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA AND
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007.

Facts:
Petitioner Restituto Alcantara filed a patition for annulment of marriage against
respondent Rosita Alcantara on the ground that there was no marriage license secured before
they get married before Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a minister of the Gospel of the CDCC on
December 8, 1982. They got married again on March 26, 1983 in San Jose de Manuguit Church
in Tondo, Manila without securing marriage license. It appeared in their marriage contract that
they obtained their alleged marriage license in Carmona, Cavite when in fact neither party was a
resident of Carmona nor they never went to the same to apply for a license. After the respondent
gave birth to Rose Ann, the couple parted ways.
In her defense, she contended that petitioner has a mistress that is why he filed the
annulment of marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Respondent then filed a case for
concubinage against petitioner and prayed that the annulment of marriage be denied for lack of
merit.
The regional trial court rendered its decision that the petition of petitioner is dismissed for
lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals, likewise, dismissed the appeal of petitioner for the marriage
license is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to
overcome the presumption.

Issue:
Is the decision of the Court of Appeals tenable?

Ruling:
Yes. Seper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the
validity of the marriage. Such certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct.
Under Article 53 of the new Civil Code, which was in effect at the time of its celebration, “no
marriage shall be solemnized unless all requisites are complied with.” In the contention that
neither spouse is a resident of Carmona, Cavite, it is not a sufficient basis or the Court to annul
their marriage because it is just a mere irregularity that does not affect the validity of marriage.
Thus, decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby
affirmed.

107
 JAIME O. SEVILLA, petitioner, v. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.

Facts:
Petitioner Jaime Sevilla filed a complaint to declare the nullity of his marriage to
Carmelita Cardenas on the ground that there was no marriage license applied. He claimed that
they got married on May 19, 1969 through machinations, duress and intimidations employed
upon him by respondent and the latter’s father who was a retired colonel of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.
In her defense, Carmelita refuted these allegations and claimed that she and Jaime were
married civilly on the said date in a church ceremony thereafter. Both marriages were registered
with the local civil registrar of Manila and the National Statistics Office. Likewise, the couple
have been married for 25 years and had begotten children.
The trial court rendered its decision that the absence of a license, as one of the formal
requisites, renders the marriage void ab initio and that there was no marriage license no.
2770792 issued by the local civil registrar of the San Juan, Manila. This was certified by the
same that such marriage license number is inexistent and fictitious. The marriage of Sevilla and
Cardenas solemnized at the Manila City Hall by Rev. Gonzales and under religious rites by Rev.
Velasco is null and void for the lack of requisite marriage license.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s decision for the presumption
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

Issue:
Whether or not the allegation of the local civil registrar of San Juan, that there was no
license number 2770762 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, is
sufficient to declare the marriage as null and void ab initio

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ decision that the marriage is
not null and void ab initio because of the absence of marriage license. The presumption of
regularity of performance of official function by the local civil registrar is satisfactory if
uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Eventhough the
logbook cannot be found, it is not conclusive proof by non-issuance of marriage license number
2770792. The Court likewise protects the sanctity of marriage for it is the foundation of family
and conjugal life. Thus, petition is denied, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

108
 OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, v. EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.
G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006.

Facts:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial court seeking
a declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court of Appeals.
After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
with the regional trial court alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to
the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and
forum shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.

Issue:
Is the action of the husband tenable?

Ruling:
No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as “bar by prior judgment” or
“estoppels by verdict,” which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the second
action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same rule, it
pertains to res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or the rule of auter action
pendant which ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be
raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action.
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed the validity of their marriage celebration,
petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. The Court finds then that the
present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is
barred. The petition is denied for lack of merit.

109
 EDUARDO M. COJUANCO, JR., complainant, v. ATTY. LEO J. PALMA, respondent.
Adm. Case No. 2474. September 15, 2004.

Facts:
Complainant Eduardo Conjuanco, Jr. and Atty. Leo Palma, respondent, met when the
latter was assigned to handle the case of the former. In other words, the respondent was hired by
the complainant has his personal counsel. Consequently, the respondent got acquainted with the
complainant’s family, most especially with the latter’s daughter, Maria Luisa Cojuanco.
Later on, she, 22 years of age, and respondent got married in Hong Kong without the
former’s family knowledge. It was only after the marriage that respondent informed the
complainant of the said marriage and assured him that it is all legal. Complainant knew that
respondent is married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has two children; the former then sent his
two sons to Hong Kong to convince Luisa to go home to Manila. She was persuaded.
Thus, the complainant filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage between the respondent and Luisa. The lower court declared the same null
and void ab initio.
Thereafter, complainant filed the instant complaint for disbarment of the respondent.
It was found out that the first marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima was subsisting at the
time the respondent contracted second marriage.

Issue:
Is the second marriage null and void ab initio?

Ruling:
As to the validity of the second marriage, it has not yet been determined by the Court
with finality for the same poses a prejudicial question to the present disbarment proceeding. If
the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case
against him or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course, then
the judgment of annulment of respondent’s marriage does not also exonerate him from a
wrongdoing actually committed. Definitely, the second marriage is null and void ab initio since
respondent is married to Elizabeth. First marriage is not yet annulled, thus second marriage
bigamous.

110
 SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, v. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
G.R. No. 132529.  February 2, 2001.

Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the
first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño with whom he had two
offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with
respondent Susan Yee Cariño with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation
starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated
by pulmonary tuberculosis.  He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan
Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses.  Both petitioner and respondent filed claims
for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various
government agencies. 
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum
of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at
least one-half of the money collectively denominated as “death benefits” which she received.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased.  She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she
met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased.  To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage
license. 
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent.
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court. 

Issue:
a. Whether or not the marriage of the deceased and petitioner is null and void ab
initio because it was solemnized without marriage license
b. Whether or not the second marriage is valid

Ruling:
a. Yes. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage
void ab initio. There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall
within the marriages exempt from the license requirement.  A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage.  The marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being
one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab
initio.
b. No. The declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with
respondent Susan Yee.  The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void.  Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
Hence, the petition is granted, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. 

111
 ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD
(DECEASED) AND LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.
G.R. No. 118904.  April 20, 1998

Facts:
On August 10, 1978, petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed with the Court of First Instance of
Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four parcels of land, described therein, claiming
that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three children of Patricio Trinidad, who
was the original owner of the parcels of land.  Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four
parcels of land to his three children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. 
In 1970, petitoner demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three equal
shares and to give him the one-third individual share of his late father, but the defendants
refused.
Defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.  They
contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiff’s birth. 
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late
Inocentes Trinidad. Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three. 
The trial court rendered decision in favor of the petitioner that he is entitled to inherit the
property left by his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of land subject matter of this
case. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each other and that
acquisitive prescription against him had set in. 

Issue:
Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents’ marriage and of his filiation?

Ruling:
Petitioner’s first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were validly
married, and that he was born during the subsistence of their marriage. Petitioner secured a
certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and
marriages were lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. 
This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioner’s case.  Although the marriage contract is considered
the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner’s failure to present it is not proof that no
marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. In place of a
marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who
testified that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in
New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves
as husband and wife after the marriage.  It is undisputed then, that, prior to the action for
partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner, was receiving from private respondents his
share of the produce of the land in dispute.  Further, the titles of these pieces of land were still in
their father’s name.  The petition is granted and the assailed decision and resolution are reversed
and set aside.  The trial court’s decision dated July 4, 1989 is reinstated. 

112
 LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, v.
JUDGE FRANCISCO BRILLANTES, JR., respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706. March 29, 1995.

Facts:
Petitioner Lupo Atienza alleged that he was living Yolanda De Castro and that they had
two children.
In December 1991, he saw Judge Franciso Brillantes, Jr., the respondent, sleeping on his
bed. He was informed by the houseboy that he cohabited with De Castro. He did not bother on
what he saw; he simply left the house and told the houseboy to take good care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him to visit his children. The former likewise alienated
the affection of his children for him.
While cohabiting with De Castro, the respondent was actually married to Zenaida
Ongkiko with whom he has five children. He alleged that while he and Ongkiko went through a
marriage ceremony before the mayor of a town in Nueva Ecija on April 25, 1965, it was not
valid for there was no marriage license. Even when they had their second marriage ceremony,
neither party applied for marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent leaving their children
to his care and custody.
Respondent then claimed that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California, he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was single
because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Judge Brillantes and Zenaida Ongkiko is valid

Ruling:
No. However, there should be judicial declaration of the nullity of the previous marriage
before a party can enter into a second marriage as provided in Article 40 of the Family Code.
The fact that he is already a lawyer, he then knew marriage license is necessary or a formal
requisite before one can get married. He was given an opportunity to correct the flaw when he
married Ongkiko for the second time but he failed to secure motives and bad faith.

113
 HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, v.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001

Facts:
Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late
David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish,
Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March
1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know
that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What
he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already
without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had he
known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again;
otherwise, Manzano could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
The Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
Respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Is the reason of the respondent Judge in solemnizing the marriage valid?

Ruling:
No. In Article 34 of the Family Code provides “No license shall be necessary for the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. Respondent Judge cannot take
refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had
been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting
previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who
are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

114
 ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000

Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by
Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action
since they are not among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under
Article 47 of the Family Code.

Issues:
(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least
five years exempts them from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code
of the Philippines.
(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for
the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her
specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is
already dead

Ruling:
(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on
the basis of cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special
contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period should
be the years immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five
years, and continuity—that is, unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who
lived faithfully with their spouse.
(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

115
 FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000.

Facts:
On November 15, 1973 Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married at the Church of Our
Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. After some time, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Two
children were born out of the marriage. Frederick, their son went to his father’s residence.
Filipina filed for legal separation.
The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of
their children to her.
Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked by
him when she started spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was talking to
him.
The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal
separation was granted by repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then filed
for the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological incapacity.
The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court,
she assailed for the first time that there was no marriage license during their marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the parties is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license at the time of the ceremony?

Ruling:
Their marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974. However, the celebration of
their marriage was on Nov. 15, 1973. It is obvious from the dates that the marriage was
contracted by the partners without a marriage license. They were not among the exceptions that
could avail of a valid marriage without marriage license, thus, their marriage is void from the
beginning for an absence of a formal requisite of a marriage. Thus, the marriage celebrated on
November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is
hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration.

116
 JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.
VILLAMORA, complainants, v. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge,
and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, respondents.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721. September 30, 1994.

Facts:
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the
requisite marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by the simple
expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage
license. In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate
the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license
to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably,
the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo,
who prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage
licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the
celebration of said marriages.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven marriages in
the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and
void.
In view of the findings that the evidence presented by the complainants sufficiently show
that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriages the respondent Judge solemnized were valid

Ruling:
It declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally
render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not
affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting
parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains
to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal
responsibility.

117
FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, the Minors JURIS ALEXIS T. MACARRUBO and
GABRIEL ENRICO T. MACARRUBO as represented by their Mother/Guardian,
FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO, complainant, v. ATTY. EDMUNDO L.
MACARRUBO, respondent.
A.C. No. 6148. February 27, 2004.

Facts:
Florence Teves Macarrubo, complainant, filed on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo,respondent, with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines alleging that respondent deceived her into marrying him despite his prior subsisting
marriage with a certain Helen Esparza. The complainant averred that he started courting her in
April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage
which was celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on
December 18, 1991 in the latter’s Manila office, and the second on December 28, 1991 at the
Asian Institute of Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that although respondent admitted that he
was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her
family and friends that his previous marriage was void.
Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one
Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children without
providing them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living
conditions.
Respondent denied employing deception in his marriage to complainant, insisting instead
that complainant was fully aware of his prior subsisting marriage to Helen Esparza, but that she
dragged him against his will to a “sham wedding” to protect her and her family’s reputation since
she was then three-months pregnant. He submitted in evidence that in the civil case “Edmundo
L. Macarubbo v. Florence J. Teves,” it declared his marriage to complainant void ab initio. He
drew attention to the trial court’s findings on the basis of his evidence which was not
controverted, that the marriage was indeed “a sham and make believe” one, “vitiated by fraud,
deceit, force and intimidation, and further exacerbated by the existence of a legal impediment”
and want of a valid marriage license. Respondent raised the additional defenses that the judicial
decree of annulment of his marriage to complainant is res judicata upon the present
administrative case; that complainant is in estoppel for admitting her status as mere live-in
partner to respondent in her letter to Josephine T. Constantino. Stressing that he had always been
the victim in his marital relations, respondent invoked the final and executory August 21, 1998 in
the case “Edmundo L. Macarubbo v. Helen C. Esparza,” declaring his first marriage void on the
ground of his wife’s psychological incapacity.
It is recommended that respondent Atty. Edmundo L. Macarrubo be suspended for three
months for gross misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession. The
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent should be suspended for gross misconduct

Ruling:
While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by final
judgment, this does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and complainant
started living as husband and wife in December 1991 when his first marriage was still subsisting,
as it was only on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was annulled, rendering him liable for
concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is required for the
continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. Even assuming that respondent
was coerced by complainant to marry her, the duress, by his own admission as the following
transcript of his testimony reflects, ceased after their wedding day, respondent having freely
cohabited with her and even begot a second child by her. Thus, respondent Edmundo L.
Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and is hereby disbarred from the practice of law.

118
 VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004.

Facts:
Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia
Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial
Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter
was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner,
Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of bigamy. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy despite
clear proof that the marriage between the accused and private complainant had been declared
null and void ab initio and without legal force and effect

Ruling:
As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s
valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during
the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites
for validity. In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were
satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily
contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the
City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses. The decision of the
Court of Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy is
AFFIRMED.

119
 FE D. QUITA, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and
BLANDINA DANDAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998.

Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
May 1941. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private
writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a
settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of
divorce. Three weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their
relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a
certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, opposed the
petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved
in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later
replaced by Higino Castillon.
The trial court disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it
expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, it declared null and void the decision and order of
the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Arturo and Fe still subsists

Ruling:
The Court noted that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in
spite of the divorce they obtained. However, petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the
time of her divorce from Arturo. Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was
obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to
erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring
hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err
in ordering the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court emphasizes
however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right
of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947
while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous
marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding
petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is affirmed. The order of the
appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half of the net hereditary estate
to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the
exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise
affirmed. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should
be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

120
 PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant, v.
JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (RETIRED), respondent.
Adm. Case No. 4431. June 19, 1997.

Facts:
Complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. De Mijares is the presiding judge in Pasay City
while respondent Onofre A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, is a consult at the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission.
Judge Mijares is actually widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares.
She obtained a decree declaring her husband presumptively dead, after an absence of 16 years.
Thus, she got married to respondent in a civil wedding on January 7, 1994 before Judge Myrna
Lim Verano.
They (complainant and respondent) knew each other when the latter, who was at that
time the Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, was trying a murder case
involving the death of the son of Mijares.
During their marriage, complainant judge discovered that respondent was having an illicit
affair with another woman. Respondent denied such rather he uttered harsh words to the
complainant judge. As a result, they lived separately and did not get in touch with one another
and the respondent did not bother to apologize for what happened.
Through Judge Ramon Makasiar, complainant knew that respondent married Lydia
Geraldez. Complainant then filed a complaint against respondent for disbarment for the latter
immorally and bigamously entered into a second marriage while having a subsisting marriage
and distorted the truth by stating his civil status as single.
In his defense, he contended that his marriage to the complainant judge was a “sham
marriage”; that he voluntarily signed the marriage contract to help her in the administrative case
for immorality filed against her by her legal researcher. Likewise, he maintained that when he
contracted his marriage with complainant, he had a subsisting marriage with his first wife
because the decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not yet become final and
executory or published.
Judge Purisima the found respondent guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct and
later on affirmed by the Court.

Issue:
a. Whether or not marriage of complainant and respondent valid
b. Whether or not the marriage of complainant and respondent was a sham marriage

Ruling:
a. Yes. It was a valid marriage. All the essential and formal requisites of a valid
marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code were satisfied and complied. Given the
circumstance that he was facing criminal case for bigamy and assuming for the sake of argument
that the judgment in civil case declaring the annulment of marriage between respondent and the
first wife had not attained complete finality, the marriage between complainant and respondent is
not void but only voidable.
b. As to the issue that it was a “sham” marriage is too incredible to deserve serious
consideration. Thus, former Justice Onofre Villaluz is found guilty of immoral conduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility; he is hereby suspended from practice of law
for two years with the specific warning.

121
 LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO- DIY
AND KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
No. L-53703. August 19, 1986.

Facts:
Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of nullity of his marriage, celebrated on July
1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church in Makati, with Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the
ground that she had a previous existing marriage to Eduardo Maxion solemnized on June 25,
1972, at Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City.
Lilia admitted she had prior subsisting marriage but it was null and void that she and
Eduardo have been allegedly forced to enter said marital union and that he, at the time of the
marriage in 1972, was already married to someone else.
The trial court ruled against Lilia because the existence of force exerted in both parties of
the first marriage had already been agreed upon

Issue:
Was said prior marriage void or merely voidable?

Ruling:
The prior marriage was voidable. A marriage vitiated by force on both parties is not
void but merely voidable and therefore valid until annulled. Since there is no annulment yet, it is
clear that when she married respondent, she was validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent is void.

122
 LEONCIA BALOGBOG AND GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, petitioners, v.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No.  83598.  March 7, 1997

Facts:
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and
Genoveva Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively.  They had an older brother,
Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents.
In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for
partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of
Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in
the estate of their grandparents.
Petitioners denied knowing private respondents.  They alleged that their brother Gavino
died single and without issue in their parents’ residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu.  In the
beginning they claimed that the properties of the estate had been sold to them by their mother
when she was still alive, but they later withdrew this allegation.
Witnesses then testified that they attended the wedding of Gavino and Catalina sometime
in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated in the Catholic Church of Asturias,
Cebu and and Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of the witnesses.
Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. She testified that after the
wedding, she was handed a “receipt,” presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it
was burned during the war.  She said that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot
three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso.  Petronilo died after an illness at the
age of six. She stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a
man for a year and then they separated.
On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified that Gavino
died single at the family residence in Asturias.  She denied that her brother had any legitimate
children and stated that she did not know private respondents before this case was filed. 
The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents
ordering petitioners to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the
estate of Basilio and Genoveva.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.  It held that private respondents failed to
overcome the legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that things happen
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Issue:
Was the decision of the Court of Appeals tenable?

Ruling:
Yes. The Court finds no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals. Since this
case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in
accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code,
except as they related to vested rights, and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the
presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally
married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. Neither is there
merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because there was
no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses,
declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife. An exchange of vows can be
presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took
place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. 
It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural
for people not to notice its absence. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

123
 ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner, v. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998.

Facts:
On May 31, 1958, Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano married Haja Putri Zorayda A.
Tamano, respondent, in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his
death on May 18, 1994. Prior to the death, he married petitioner Estrelita Tamano on June 2, 1993 in civil
rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
Upon knowing of such second marriage, Zorayda filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage of his husband and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. The entries in the marriage
contract of the second marriage were false and fraudulent for Mamintal and Estrellita misrepresented
themselves as divorced and single, respectively.
Zorayda alleged that she and her husband never divorced and that Estrellita was still married to
Romeo Llave because the decision on the annulment of their marriage never became final and executor
for the noncompliance with publication requirement.
Estrellita then filed a motion to dismiss for she alleged that only a party to the marriage could file
an action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse. She even contented that since Mamintal and
Zorayda were Muslims and married in Muslim rites, the jurisdiction to hear and try the case was vested in
the sharia courts pursuant to Article 155 of the Code of mUslim Personal Laws
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss. This is because Mamintal and Estrellita were
married in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with P.D. No. 1083 or the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
The Court of Appeals ruled that it would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts.

Issue:
Whether or not the sharia court has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action

Ruling:
No. Article 13 of P.D. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both
in civil and Muslim rites. The sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it
comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.

124
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 159614. December 9, 2005.

Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Courtbfor the declaration
of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia “Lea” A. Julaton.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in
Catbalogan, Samar. He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and he
berated her for being always out of their house. He told her that if she enjoyed the life of a single person,
it would be better for her to go back to her parents. Lea did not reply. Alan narrated that, when he
reported for work the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day,
Lea was nowhere to be found. Alan thought that Lea merely went to her parents’ house in Bliss, Sto.
Niño, Catbalogan, Samar. However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.
Alan further testified that, he inquired Lea’s whereabouts but to no avail.
Sometime in June 1995, he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to
leave after the town fiesta of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. Alan agreed.
However, Lea did not show up. Alan then left for Manila on August 27, 1995. He went to a house in
Navotas where Janeth, Lea’s friend, was staying. When asked where Lea was, Janeth told him that she
had not seen her. He failed to find out Lea’s whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan
decided to work as a part-time taxi driver. On his free time, he would look for Lea in the malls but still to
no avail. He returned to Catbalogan in 1997 and again looked for his wife but failed.
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station. The police
authorities issued an Alarm Notice on July 4, 2001. Alan also reported Lea’s disappearance to the
National Bureau of Investigation on July 9, 2001.
On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment granting the petition.
The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment on August 4,
2003, affirming the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of presumptive death of the wife is valid

Ruling:
No. In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by the Court in locating
the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with. It is the policy of the State to protect
and strengthen the family as a basic social institution. Marriage is the foundation of the family. Since
marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution seeks to protect from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. For respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his wife is
already dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing wife, the
petition for declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and the Honorable
Court of Appeals. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse present is, thus,
burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not
define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia
sea firme se funde en motivos racionales.” The Court finds and so holds that the respondent failed to
prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the trial court, that his spouse
Rosalia “Lea” Julaton was already dead. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.

125
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v.
GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO, respondent.
G.R. No. 160258.  January 19, 2005

Facts:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino, and her husband were married on June 12, 1987.  
Out of this marriage, she begot three children, namely: Francis Jeno, Fria Lou and Fatima.
Before they got married in 1987, Gloria was unaware that her husband was a habitual drinker,
possessed with violent character/attitude, and had the propensity to go out with friends to the
extent of being unable to engage in any gainful work.
Because of her husband’s violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind and
decided to go back to her parents together with her three children.   In order to support the
children, Gloria was compelled to work abroad. From the time of her physical separation from
her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all.  She had absolutely no communications
with him, or with any of his relatives.
On August 14, 2000, nine years after she left her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition
with the Regional Trial Court. The same issued an order directing, the publication of the petition
in a newspaper of general circulation, on August 28, 2000; that after nine years, there was
absolutely no news about him and she believes that he is already dead and is now seeking
through this petition for a Court declaration that her husband is judicially presumed dead for the
purpose of remarriage.

Issue:
Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code were duly established in this case

Ruling:
The Court rules against petitioner Republic. The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave
error on the part of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.  To stress, the Court of Appeals
should have dismissed the appeal on ground of lack of jurisdiction, and reiterated the fact that the
trial court decision was immediately final and executory.  As it were, the Court of Appeals
committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic
on ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision of law, the judgment was not
appealable. Thus, the instant petition is hereby denied for lack of merit.

126
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.

Facts:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition
for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, involving Article 41 of the
Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of
Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued,
first, that Nolasco did not possess a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead; and
second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a cunning attempt to
circumvent the law on marriage.
Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker,
a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting
onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six months until they
returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his seaman's
contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San Jose, Antique, in
Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
He obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San
Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his
mother informing him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that
Janet Monica had left Antique.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in
England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38
Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met,
were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no news
of Janet Monica.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition hereby declaring the presumptively death of Janet
Monica Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance.
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring
Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there
existed a well founded belief for such declaration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent
spouse had already died.

Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

Ruling:
No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead. Pursuant to Article 41 of the Family
Code, a marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his
absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet Monica
Parker presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision
declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby reversed and both Decisions are hereby
nullified and set aside.

127
 NENITA BIENVENIDO, petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 111717. October 24, 1994.

Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February 6,
1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another
marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho with whom he had been living since 1953 and by whom he
begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis “Chito” Faustino C. Camacho, born on May 22, 1961. The
marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had been living since 1958.
Because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her
case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband,
Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her and apparently won her heart because from June 1968 until Aurelio's
death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last time in a duplex apartment in Quezon City. Petitioner's
daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito, who lived with them for about a year in
1976.
On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner, using her Loyola Life Plan and Aurelio's account in
the PCI Bank, took care of the funeral arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in the United States
with respondent Chito, having gone there, according to her, at the instance of Aurelio in order to look for
a house in San Francisco so that Aurelio could follow and rejoin them. Upon learning of the death of
Aurelio she and her son Chito came home on May 31, 1988.
Respondent Luisita was granted death benefits by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as the
surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on Scout Delgado
Street in which Nenita had been living.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the payment to them of
damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event it was executed in fraud
of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.
On August 29,1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property to
petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of petitioner to be
genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the property until 1988
despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented himself to be single.
On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
of the trial court and declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in dispute.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in presuming the validity of the marriage between Aurelio and
Luisita

Ruling:
On the question of validity of Luisita's marriage to Aurelio, there is no dispute on the fact of
appellant Luisita's marriage in 1962 to Aurelio. The Court finds that the presumption of the validity of the
marriage Aurelio and Luisita has not been successfully assailed by appellee. The Court of Appeals thus
presumed the validity of Aurelio's second marriage from the failure of petitioner to prove that at the time
of such marriage Aurelio's first wife, Consejo, had not been absent for at least seven years and that
Aurelio did not have news that his first wife we still alive.
It was the burden of herein respondents to prove that, at the time of his second marriage to respondent
Luisita, Aurelio's first wife, Consejo Velasco, had been absent for at least seven years and that Aurelio
had no news that she was alive. To assume these facts because petitioner has not disproved them would
be to stand the principle on its head. Since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velasco,
his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous.

128
 NOEL BUENAVENTURA, plaintiff vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 127358. March 31, 2005

Facts:
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, declared the marriage between Noel A. Buenaventura
and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura (on July 4, 1979) null and void ab initio. Noel was
revealed to have been psychologically incapacitated; that he had married out of parental pressure and not
out of love; that he had abandoned his family; that this caused defendant to suffer moral damanges. The
Regional Trial Court awarded the defendant with damages based on Art. 2217 and Art. 21 of the New
Civil Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling. The plaintiff-appelle therefore filed for a petition
of certiorari alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages.

Issue:
Can award for damages be provided when the alleged offender is psychologically incapacitated?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court deleted the award for moral and exemplary damages. It is contradictory to
characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity and hence beyond the control of the party
because of an innate inability while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful.
Psychological incapacity therefore removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely
deceived the private respondent. Therefore, the award of moral damages damages was without basis in
law and in fact. Since the award of moral and exemplary damages was no longer justified, the award of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.

129
 EDUARDO MANUEL, plaintiff vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants
G.R. No. 165842. November 29, 2005

Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo Manuel was married to Rubylus Gaña on July 28, 1975. Rubylus was charged
with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her
again. On or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, Eduardo contracted a second marriage with Tina
Gandalera-Manuel. He assured her that he was single and was able to marry. THey had lived together
fruitfully for three years until Eduardo became distant and came home only twice a year. One day he
packed up his things and left her. Aggrieved and curious, Tina learned from the NSO that Eduardo was
previously married, she then filed a bigamy case against Eduardo. The Regional Trial Court found him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Eduardo then filed a motion to the Supreme Court claiming that he had contracted the second marriage in
good faith since he had not been able to see his first wife for over twenty years. He alleged that under the
Civil Code, no judicial decree of presumptive death is necesssary for remarriage.

Issue:
What constitutes a valid bigamous marriage?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals. Under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally
be considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting
party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under
the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old
rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can
institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in
consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in
Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
It should be noted that petitioner got married on 1996, way past the time when the Family Code
came into effect. The second marriage is therefore governed by the provisions of the family code.

130
 SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO, defendant
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the
first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second
was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan
Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in
1982.
Upon his death, Susan Nicdao inherited petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a
total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, while
respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial
(SSS). On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum
of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return
to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as “death benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to
file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Susan Nicdao's marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage license while the
marriage of Susan Carino was celebrated without having obtained the necessary judicial
declaration of nullity of the first void marriage. Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals favored granting the peitition thus leaving Susan Nicdao to file a motion to the Supreme
Court.

Issue:
a. How essential is the judicial decree of nullity of a void marriage?
b. How must presumptive legitimes be delivered in this instance?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and the initial decision of the Regional Trial
Court was dismissed. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not
be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
The Court of Appeals relied on the decision of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service
Insurance System, which is unfortunately premised on the requisite of having a judicial decree of
nullity of marriage and is therefore inapplicable to the case at hand.

131
 VINCENT MERCADO, petitioner vs. MA.CONSUELO TAN, defendant
G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000

Facts:
The accused, Vincent Mercado was in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a
marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976. Despite the prior marriage he got married to
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991. On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for
bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City,
which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said
accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the
Prosecutor’s Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma.
Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage
between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void. Despite this,
the Trial Court charged Vincent with bigamy since his prior marriage was still subsisting at the
time he had contracted his second marriage. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial
court. The petitioner then filed a case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Is the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage necessary for remarriage?

RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed decision. Under Article
40 of the Family Code, ‘the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.’ But
here, the final judgment declaring null and void accused’s previous marriage came not before the
celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was
already tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who
shall contract a second subsequent marriage ‘before’ the former marriage has been legally
dissolved.
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of
the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage.

132
 LUPO ATIENZA, plaintiff vs HON. FRANCISCO BRILLANTES, defendant
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

Facts:
Respondent Judge Francisco Brillantes was married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom
he has five children on April 25, 1965. The marriage was contracted without a marriage license.
He remarried Ongkiko again without the requisite marriage license on June 5, 1965. Ongkiko
abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single
parent. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and
purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
The petitioner on the other hand alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his
(complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been
cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left
the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children. Lupo A. Atienza
then filed a complaint for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge
Francisco Brillantes.

Issue:
Is the second marriage valid when celebrated without the judicial decree of nullity of the
prior marriage?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the respondent from government service. Under the
Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before a
party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides: The absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to
him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of
the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of
the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is
particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any
vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.

133
 ROBERT DOMINGO, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 104818. September 17, 1993

Facts:
The petitioner Roberto Domingo married Emerlinda Paz on April 25, 1969. Roberto had
remarried again with the respondent Delia Soledad on November 29, 1976. She worked
primarily in Saudi Arabia and filed for a case of bigamy against Roberto. Her husband had been
solely dependent on her earnings and had been cohabiting with another woman. She filed a
petition for declaration of nullity and separation of property. Delia appointed her brother Moises
as her attorney-in-fact and for assigned him to take care of the properties managed by Roberto.
Roberto filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The
marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is therefore
superfluous and unneccessary. Roberto also claimed that private respondent had no property in
his possession. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court to deny the motion.

Issues:
When does a void marriage require a judicial declaration of nullity?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the lower courts. A
marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact under the Family Code even
for purposes other than remarriage. The necessity of final judgment however applies when the
purpose of nullity is for remarriage. The declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a
judgment for the liquidation of property/custody, and support of children, etc. There is no need
of filing a separate civil action for such purpose. It should also be noted that the husband
admitted to possessing his properties based on the respondent wife's earnings.

134
 MEYNARDO BELTRAN, petitioner vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16,
1973. On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed
a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged
that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named
Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against
petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution
dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information against
them. On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest,
filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the
criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of
his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. The Trial
dismissed his petition. Undaunted, the petitioner filed a motion to the higher courts.

Issue:
a. Is there a prejudicial question involved in the case above?
b. Can a party judge for himself the nullity of his own marriage?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. In the case at bar it must be
held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits
with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming
the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for
nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.

135
 CHI MING TSOI, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 119190. January 16, 1997

Facts:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were married as evidence by their
marriage contract. From May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. Gina made attempts for sexual activity to no avails. Medical
examinations showed that both Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were capaple of sexual conduct. Gina
was still a virgin at the time of the medical examination. Gina filed a motion for declaration of
nullity and the Trial Court declared their marriage as void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision. Petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi subsequently filed a motion to the Supreme Court
citing that it was she and not he that had the problem regarding sexual intimacy.

Issue:
a. What is psychological incapacity?
b. Can non-desire of sexual consumation be an indicator of psychological incapacity?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court found the petition to be bereft of merit. Since the action to declare
the marriage void may be filed by either party, the question of who refuses to have sex with the
other becomes immaterial. If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform
his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Aligned with this is the essential marital obligation, "the procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage.
After ten months of marriage, the reluctance to perform the sexual act was indicative of a
hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity
to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.

136
 LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 112019. January 4, 1995

Facts:
Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20, 1986. A year after the marriage, the
couple when quarreling over a number of things including the interference of Julia's parents into
their marital affairs. On May 18, 1998, Julia finally left for the United States. Leouel was then
unable to communicate with her for a period of five years and she had then virtually abandoned
their family. Leouel filed a case for nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity. The
Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
What is psychological incapacity?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated and must be incurable.
Mere abandonment cannot therefore qualify as psychological incapacity on the part of Julia.

137
 REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 108763. February 13, 1997

Facts:
Roridel and Reynaldo were married on APril 14, 1985. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father. He depended on his parents for aid and assistance, was
never honest with her, was habitually quarrelsome. He abandoned his family in the course of their marriage. Roridel
filed a case in the courts and Reynaldo's claims were that she was inefficient in the discharge of her marital duties.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage as void ab initio. The decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals. The Office of the Solicitor General challenged the decision, citing that opposing personalities as was
evinced is not equivalent to psychological incapacity. The ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature."

Issue:
How must psychological incapacity be interpreted?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and set aside the rulings of the lower courts. What
was shown was more of a difficulty rather than psychological incapacity. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. There had been no showing of the
gravity of the problem, neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
The Supreme Court also laid down the Molina guidelines for future reference in interpreting psychological
incapacity:

"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13,
1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not
be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may
be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less in will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

138
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."

139
 BERNARDINO ZAMORA, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 141917. February 7, 2007

Facts:
Bernardino S. Zamora and Norma Mercado Zamora were married on June 4, 1970. The
union did not produce any child. In 1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as
a nurse. She intermittently returned to the Philippines but also went back to the United States.
This contrinued until 1989, when she was already a US citizen. Petitioner filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage alleging psychological incapacity of private respondent, citing
the grounds of abandonment and non-desire to have children. Respondent rejected the claim
citing her experiences showing affection for children and pointing out husband's infidelity as a
source of her abandonment. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition owing to the fact
that nothing in the evidence of plaintiff shows that the defendant suffered from any
psychological incapacity or that she failed to comply with her essential marital obligations. Upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the Trial Court and added that the petitioner
failed to present any medical expert to prove prsychological incapacity. Petitioner filed a motion
to the Supreme Court questioning the validity of that requiment among other things.

Issues:
a. How must psychological incapacity be alleged?
b. Is the presence of a medical expert necessary to prove incapacity?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Examination of the person by a physician in
order for the former to be declared psychologically incapacitated is not considered a requirement
in Republic vs CA, 268 SCRA 198 [1997]. In Marcos vs Marcos, it was held that if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity then medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. In the case, there is proof as to the
existence of psychological incapacity nor was there proof that it had existed at the inception of
the marriage.

140
 MA. ARMIDA-FERRARIS, petitioner vs BRIX FERRARIS, defendant
G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006

Facts:
The Regiona Trial Court denied the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
between petitioner Ma. Armida-Ferraris with Brix Ferraris. It found that his "violence" during
episodes of epilepsy did not constitute psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision and cited that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent
was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already
presen t at the inception of the marriage. Dr Dayan's testimony of the respondent's mixed-
personality was unsufficiently arrived at. It was alleged that he had Schizoid characteristics in his
persona. The testimony however failed to establish how this was arrived at or that there was a
natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondent's character that
effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital
obligations. The petitioner then filed a motion to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Can epilepsy constitute psychological incapacity?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition with finality. The Supreme Court found
respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they
quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment
and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family,
are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code should not be
confused with Divorce or with Legal Separation.

141
 ANTONIO, petitioner vs REYES, respondent
G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married on 6
December 1990. On 8 March 1993, petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent
declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code
alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. As manifestations of respondent’s
alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about
herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events
or things. The Trial Court declared the marriage as null and void since it found that respondent's
propensity to lie rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The
Church also annuled the Catholic marriage of the parties. The Court of Appeals nevertheless held
that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s
psychological incapacity and thus reversed the decision of the trial court. The petitioner then
filed a motion to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Can pathological lying constitute psychological incapacity?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reinstated the decision of the Trial Court.
The Molina guidelines did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as
it raised the bar for its allowance. The guidelines are in fact used to interpret incapacity in the
present case. The decision of the Church to nullify the marriage was given great weight in the
consideration of the case. The other guidelines were also satisfied in affirming the psychological
condition. The pathological lying of the respondent shows a dangerous if not unhealthy inability
to distinguish reality from the fantasy world which makes the fulfillment of marital obligations
and duties impossible.

142
 REPUBLIC, plaintiff vs. CRASUS IYOY, defendant
G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005

Facts:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church,
Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr.,
Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of
their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and
extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.),
leaving all of their five children. In 1984, she filed for divorce while in the United States. In
1985 respondent Fely married an American citizen and became an American citizen herself
sometime in 1988. Respondent eventually filed a petition to the courts alleging in his Complaint
that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being
incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Regional Trial rendered its decision in favor of the respondent and declared the
marriage as null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision also citing that
under Art. 26 of the Family Code, divorce was permissible since Fely was already an American
citizen. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) then intervened claiming that mere
abandonment and sexual infidelity does not constitute psychological incapacity and that there
was error in applying Art. 26 of the Family Code. The respondent questions the participation of
the OSG.

Issues:
a. How is psychological incapacity properly alleged?
b. Is the divorce of Fely valid?
c. Can the OSG rightly intervene in the case cited above?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and set aside the decisions of the
lower courts. The root cause of psychological incapacity was not proven. According to the
Molina guidelines, psychological incapacity must be medically proven to be existent. There was
also improper application of Art. 26 of the Family Code. Since Fely only acquired American
citizenship in 1988, she was still a Filipino citizen when she acquired her divorce in 1984.
Filipinos cannot be granted divorce unless they are within the context of a mixed marriage which
was not the case back then in 1984.
While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the
State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the
Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or
this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts
when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the
proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already
exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to
better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.

143
 JAIME VILLALON, petitioner vs. MA. CORAZON VILLALON, respondent
G.R. No. 167206

Facts:
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his
psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage. According to
petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to
maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married life; (b)
his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as
husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal
obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and
consortium towards respondent.
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged
psychological disorder of “Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder” with “Casanova
Complex”. A person afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his
emotional and sexual feelings and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with
“Casanova Complex” exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to
another. Respondent claimed that her husband was a dutiful husband and father during their
marriage and alleged that his sexual infidelity was exhibited only on 2 occasions which were 13
years apart which was not consistent with his supposed psychological disorder. The Regional
Trial Court decided in favor the petitioner while the Court of Appeals reversed the earlier
decision and held the marriage as valid.

Issue:
What quantum of evidence must be present to properly psychological incapacity?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for annulment of the marriage. Sexual infidelity,
by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must
be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which
make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. The
evidence at record did not show the alleged gravity and incurability of the husband's
psychological incapacity. In fact the evidence shows that the husband was a responsible husband
and father. It appears that petitioner has simply lost his love for respondent and has consequently
refused to stay married to her. Also, at the time of respondent’s testimony, petitioner’s illicit
relationship has been going on for six years. This is not consistent with the symptoms of a person
suffering from “Casanova Complex” who, according to Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one
relationship to another. Dr. Dayan also failed to provide vital links and the basis for her findings.
Hence the grounds for psychological incapacity were betrayed by a lack of sufficient evidence
indicating the same.

144
 NOEL BUENAVENTURA, plaintiff vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 127358. March 31, 2005

Facts:
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, declared the marriage between Noel A.
Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura (on July 4, 1979) null and void ab
initio. Noel was revealed to have been psychologically incapacitated; that he had married out of
parental pressure and not out of love; that he had abandoned his family; that this caused
defendant to suffer moral damages. The Regional Trial Court awarded the defendant with
damages based on Art. 2217 and Art. 21 of the New Civil Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the ruling. The plaintiff-appellee therefore filed for a petition of certiorari alleging that the Court
of Appeals erred in awarding damages.

Issue:
Can award for damages be provided when the alleged offender is psychologically
incapacitated?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court deleted the award for moral and exemplary damages. It is
contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity and hence beyond the
control of the party because of an innate inability while at the same time considering the same set
of acts as willful. Psychological incapacity therefore removes the basis for the contention that the
petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. Therefore, the award of moral damages
damages was without basis in law and in fact. Since the award of moral and exemplary damages
was no longer justified, the award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is left without
basis.

145
 DIANA BARCELONA, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003

Facts:
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (“respondent Tadeo”) filed a
Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (“petitioner Diana”).
On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court
granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995. On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition
for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana.Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss
the second petition on two grounds. First, the second petition fails to state a cause of action. The
root cause of psychological incapacity was not properly alleged. Second, it violates Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (“Circular No. 04-94”) on forum shopping.
Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in
Support of the Motion. The lower courts rejected the petition, after which it was sent to the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
a. Is a statement of a cause for action required in the declaration of nullity of marriage?
b. Is there forum shopping constituted by respondent Tadeo?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code
shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage
at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration. Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules also provides that expert testimony need
not be alleged. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root
cause of the psychological incapacity.
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action,
it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving
the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits
of the case.
The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent Tadeo to
keep the peace between him and his grown up children. The dismissal happened before service
of answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis pendentia since respondent Tadeo
had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition when he subsequently filed
the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissal order was not a decision
on the merits but a dismissal “without prejudice.” Thusly, forum shopping could not be
applicable in this case.

146
 REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. TOSHIO HAMANO, defendant
G.R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004

Facts:
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration
of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went
back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their
child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after
the marriage. Her husband had sent them financial support for two months and had abandoned
ever since. He did not even visit them when he returned to the Philippines. The wife filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of the marriage citing the the husband did not fulfill any of
his marital obligations. The Regional Trial Court granted the petition which was affirmed by the
Appellate Court.The Court of Appeals also added that this case could not be equated with
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina and Santos vs. Court of Appeals. In those cases, the
spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a “mixed marriage,” the husband being a
Japanese national.The petitioner Republic however forwarded the case to the Supreme Court for
review.

Issue:
Are the Molina Guildelines inapplicable in the instance of mixed marriages?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition. In proving psychological incapacity, there is no
distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. There cannot be leniency in the
application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated
happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological
incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the
norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of
nationality.
In the case above, the Molina guildelines were not strictly followed in that there was no
medical illness that was properly identified. As it is, mere abandonment by itself is insuffient to
prove psychological incapacity.

147
 FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, plaintiff vs. EDMUNDO MACARUBBO, defendant
A.C. No. 6148. February 27, 2004

Facts:
Atty. Edmundo L. Macarrubo was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982. Despite
this existing marriage, he contracted a second one with Florence Teves Macarrubo, with whom
he had borne two children, on December 28, 1991. On August 21, 1998 a decision was rendered
by the courts declaring his first marriage void on the basis of his wife's psychological incapacity.
Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself and on behalf of her two children, filed on
June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo
(respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The respondent had left his second
wife and was married to another woman, Josephine Constantino, with whom he had another
pending case of annulment. The respondent provided all relevant documents showing that he had
no mark of criminality or wrong and that he had provided support for his family though
sometimes intermittent. The investigating body hence recommended that he be suspended for a
period of three months.

Issue:
Can the respondent validly contract a second marriage when the prior marriage was
annulled on the basis of psychological incapacity years after the second marriage was
solemnized?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent from legal practice. The respondent's
actions show his disrespect for the institution of marriage and the family. While a first shotgun
marriage may be excusable on the part of a lawyer respondent, two consecutive claims of being
the victim in marriage raises some questions. The fact that another petition for annulment is
lodged against the respondent's third wife shows his non commitment to the social institution.
His intermittent support to his children also does not compensate for the monthly support that is
needed in their sustenance. The respondent exhibited gross immoral conduct in the instances
mentioned above.
The decision, rendered in default of complainant, cannot serve as res judicata on the final
resolution of the present case. As this Court held in In re Almacen, a disbarment case is sui
generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the Court
into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not
determinative of an administrative case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a
disbarment case does not affect its course, then the judgment of annulment of respondent’s
marriage does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the
quantum of proof – clear preponderance of evidence – in disciplinary proceedings against
members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.

148
 DAVID DEDEL, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner David B. Dedel married respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel on May 20, 1967.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature
wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian
national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes
Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop
her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married
and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon
returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back
and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995,
Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then,
Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions. Finally the petitioner then filed a
motion for the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on psychological incapacity. The
petitioner presented Dr. Dayan Natividad who alleged that Sharon suffered from Anti-Social
disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity and abandonment. These characteristics
render her unable to perform essential marital obligations.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage as null and void. The Office of the
Solicitor General appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed the earlier ruling. The petitioner
then filed a motion to the Supreme Court alleging that there was error in the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.

Issue:
Does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the
term “psychological incapacity?”

Ruling:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the ruling the ruling of the Court
of Appeals. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondent’s
promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed
by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and
which produced four children. Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do
not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with
psychological incapacity.

149
 REPUBLIC, petitioner vs. AVELINO DAGDAG, respondent
GR. No. 109975. February 9,2001

Facts:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matis married Avelino Parangan Dagdag. A week after
the wedding signs of the husband's immaturity began to manifest. He indulged in drinking sprees
and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she
refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her. On October 1993, he left his family again and
that was the last they heard from him. It was learned that Avelino became an escaped convict and
remained at-large to date. On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed a petition for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Erlinda testified and presented her sis-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness. The
trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Averlino void under Article
36 of the Family Code. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration on
the ground that the decision was not in accordance with the evidence and the law.

Issue:
What properly constitutes psychological incapacity?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition of the OSG and reversed and set aside the
assailed decision. Since the Molina guildelines were laid down, the courts were expected to
better understand how to facilitate cases of psychological incapacity. Erlina failed to comply
with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts. Expert testimony should
have also been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's psychological
incapacity. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered.

150
 LORNA PESCA, petitioner vs ZOSIMO PESCA, respondent
GR No. 136921. April 17, 2001

Facts:

Petitioner Lorna G pesca and respondent Zosimo A . Pesca were married on March 1975.
In 1988, the petitioner started noticing signs of respondent's "psychological incapacity" through
his habitual drinking and physical abuse. Eventually, petitioner forwarded a case to the courts for
the annulment of the said marriage. On Nevember 15, 1995, the Regional Trial Court rendered
its decision, declaring the marriage between the petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab
initio on the basis of psychologicl incapacity. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals
which rendered its decision in his favor. Based on Article 68 of the Family Code, incapacity
must be grave, psychological no physical, etc. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court and declared the marriage as valid. The petitioner filed a motion to the
Supreme Court stating that :
1) The doctrine laid down in Santos vs CA and Republic vs CA and Molina should bear no
retoractive effect.
2) The application of the Santos and Moiline dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to
the Trial Courts for further proceedings and not dismissal.

Issues:
a. What constitutes psychological incapacity?
b. How should previous judicial decisions affect future cases?

Ruling:
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. It was held that the clause "psychological
incapacity" under Article 35 of the Family Code has not been meant to encompass all possible
psychoses, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility involved. The decisions from Santos and
Molina has the force of law under the doctrine of Stare Decisis, ordained in Article 8 of the New
Civil Code. Jurisprudence would constitute part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted.

151
 BRENDA MARCOS, petitioner vs. WILSON MARCOS, respondent
GR No. 136490. October 19,2000

Facts:
The marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos
was solemnized on September 6, 1982. Wilson was a military man but left the service after the
downfall of Marcos in 1987. Thereafter, the couple began experiencing marital problems. Wilson
was unable to find gainful employment over which they would quarrel. He would beat his wife
and children and force her to have sex with him. He would also leave several times during their
cohabitation. In 1992, they were already living separately. The petitioner filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The petitioner
submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D for psychologcal evaluation. The
Regional Trial Court found the marriage null and void. The Court of Appeals reversed this and
held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the the totality of the evidence
presented. The appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation either.

Issue:
Is psychological examination of the respondent required for the declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent was not a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented
did not show such incapacity. There was absolutely no showing that respondent's "defects" were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that they were incurable. The behavior of the
respondent could be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed
for a period of not more than six years. At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only
to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.

152
 LUCITA HERNANDEZ, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
GR No. 126010. December 8, 1999

Facts:
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were
married on January 1, 1981. On July 10, 1992 filed a petition seeking the annulment of her
marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. It was
alleged that he failed to support the family and contribute to the management of the household.
He was a habitual drinker, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitemate
child, and had transmitted to her a sexually transmitted disease (STD) because of his
promiscuity. He was irresponsible, immature, unprepared for the duties of married life. Ester
Alfaro, petitioner's childhood friend testified during the hearing on the petition for annulment.
Ester testified that Lucita was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by Mario. The Trial
Court dismissed the petition. It found the grounds alleged as grounds for legal separation and not
for a declaration of nullity of marriages. The STD was also transmitted five years after marriage
and thusly could not constitute fraud. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision which left
petitioner to forward a motion to the Supreme Court.

Isssue:
What constitutes psychological incapacity?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The petitioner failed
to establish the fact that private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect at the start
of their marriage. Private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or peversion,
and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he was suffering from
a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that
the acts are manifestations of a disrdered personality which make private respondent completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private
respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome. Morever, expert testimony
should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's psychological
incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the incaption of the marriage.

153
 VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner vs DITA MAQUILAN, respondent
GR No. 155409. June 8, 2007

Facts:
Virgilio Maquilan and Dita Maquilan lived a blissful married life and out of which were
blessed to have a son. However, the romance ended when the wife was found out to have an
extra-marital affair. She and her paramour were convicted of adultery and were sentenced to
suffer imprisonment. On June 15, 2001, private respondent, through counsel, filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage, dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership of gains
and damages. During pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a
compromise agreement. The compromise agreement was given judical imprimatur, which was
erroneously dated January 2, 2002. However, petitioner filed an Omnibus motion dated January
15, 2002 praying for the repudiation of the said agreement. With the lower courts continuously
denying repudiation, petitioner eventually came to the Supreme Court with the same motion
citing among his reasons that the agreement is void for having failed to secure the presence of
the State through the Office of the Solicitor General duing its enactment.

Issue:
When is State presence required in Marital Cases (as defined under Art. 48 of the Family
Code)?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and validated the compromise agreement. The
purpose of the active participation of the public prosecutor or the OSG is to ensure that the
interest of the state is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriage by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication, or suppression
of evidence. Nothing in the subject compromise agreement touched into the very merits of the
case of nullity of marriage. It merely pertains to an agreement between petitioner and private
respondent to separate their conjugal properties partially.

154
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CUISON-MELGAR, respondent
G.R. No. 139676. March 31, 2006

Facts:
In 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married and their union begot five children. In 1996, Norma filed for
declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with his
essential marital obligations. Summons were served to Eulogio, however, he failed to file an answer within the
reglementary period. The RTC ordered the Public Prosecutor to conduct an investigation on the case to determine
whether or not there exists collusion between the contending parties and with this, found none. Upon motion of
Norma’s counsel, the RTC allowed the presentation of evidence. She testified that Eulogio was suffering from
psychological incapacity manifested by the latter’s immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy,
maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his family since 1985.On January 20, 1997 or twelve days
after the reception of evidence, the RTC rendered its decision nullifying the marriage of Norma and Eulogio which
the CA affirmed. Petitioner, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an appeal with the CA,
contending that the evidence presented are not sufficient to declare the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Issue:
a. Whether the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent of respondent is in the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code.
b. Whether defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation are accepted in courts.

Ruling:
a. The OSG submits that Norma’s comments are irrelevant and not responsive to the arguments in the
petition. Nonetheless, the OSG reiterates that Norma’s evidence fell short of the requirements of the
law since no competent evidence was presented during the trial to prove that Eulogio’s inability to look
for a job, his resulting drunkenness, jealousy and other disagreeable behavior are manifestations of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
b. Section 6 of Rule 18 of the 1985 Rules of Court,[23] the rule then applicable, provides:

Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. - If the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not acollusion between the parties exists, and if there is
no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case
may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court
such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court.

In this case, the State did not actively participate in the prosecution of the case at the trial level.
Other than the Public Prosecutor’s Manifestation that no collusion existed between the contending parties
and the brief cross-examination which had barely scratched the surface, no pleading, motion, or position
paper was filed by the Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The State should have been given the opportunity to
present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.

The decision of RTC and CA is reversed and set aside.

155
 MARGIE CORPUS, petitioner, vs. OCHOTORENA, respondent
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861. July 30, 2004

Facts:
In 2001, a verified complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed against Mrs. Margie Corpus-
Macias by Mariano Joaquin S. Macias, her husband and incumbent presiding judge of RTC, Branch 11, Liloy,
Zamboanga Del Norte.  The case was raffled to the judge Ochotorena’s court. On the same day the complaint was
filed, the respondent immediately issued summons to Mrs. Macias. However, the summons was not served on Mrs.
Macias because her whereabouts were allegedly unknown. Consequently, Mr. Macias filed a motion to serve
summons by publication. The respondent granted the motion in his order dated March 7, 2001, with the directive
that Mrs. Macias should file her answer within 30 days after notice. Thereafter, Mr. Macias caused the publication
of the summons in the local weekly newspaper. Within the 30-day period to file an answer, she filed a motion to
dismiss, which she set for hearing on April 20, 2001. However, instead of first acting upon the motion, the
respondent judge set the hearing on the merits of the subject on April 19, 2001 or one day before. On April 19, 2001,
respondent judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and re-set the hearing on the merits to April 30, May 2 and 3, 2001.
After the scheduled hearings and while various motions by the petitioner were still pending, the respondent judge
terminated the proceedings and declared the case submitted for decision. Thus, Mrs. Macias filed a complaint
against respondent before the Office of the Court Administrator.

Issue:
Whether Judge Ochotorena acted with gross ignorance of the law and procedure which deprived of the
petitioner her fundamental right to due process with utmost bias and partiality for Mr. Macias.

Ruling:
The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure, which states that: After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to
promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial. Considering that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias’
Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias’
motion to set the case for pre-trial.
What happened in the case is a classic example of “railroading” or “procedural short-cut.”
It is also worth mentioning that even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the complaint after the
period therefor had elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to conduct a hearing of the case on its merits.
The Rules of Court prohibits default proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage.
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure makes the report of the Public Prosecutor a
condition sine qua non for further proceedings to go on in the case. This was ignored by respondent judge. While the
record shows that the public prosecutor had filed a Certification stating that he appeared in behalf of the Solicitor
General during the ex-parte presentation of plaintiff’s evidence and had no objection to the granting of the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage, such Certification does not suffice to comply with the mandatory requirement
that the court should order the investigating public prosecutor whether a collusion exists between the parties.  Such
directive must be made by the court before trial could proceed, not after the trial on the merits of the case had
already been had.  Notably, said Certification was filed after the respondent judge had ordered the termination of the
case.
Respondent compulsorily retired from the service on June 04, 2001, thus, dismissal or suspension from the
service is no longer possible.  Nonetheless, a penalty of fine worth P20,000.00 was imposed pursuant to Section 3 in
relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which grants that gross ignorance of the law is considered a
serious offense, for which a penalty of either dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, suspension from
office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) but not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed.

156
 MARIANO MACIAS, petitioner, vs. MARGIE MACIAS, respondent
G.R. No. 149617. September 3, 2003

Facts:
Judge Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (herein petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Margie Corpus Macias
(herein respondent) on February 6, 2001. Summons was not served on Mrs. Macias because her whereabouts were
allegedly unknown. Consequently, Mr. Macias filed a motion to serve summons by publication. The latter was
granted and in an order dated March 7, 2001 was a directive that Mrs. Macias should file her answer within 30 days
after notice. Thereafter, Mr. Macias caused the publication of the summons in the local weekly newspaper. Instead
of filing an answer, respondent, through counsel, on April 10, 2001, filed a motion to dismiss the petition. On April
19, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying respondent’s motion to dismiss.  Incidentally, in the same Order,
the trial court granted respondent’s request (via long distance telephone call) to set the hearing on April 30, 2001.
The hearing set on April 30, 2001 was cancelled for failure of respondent and counsel as well as the expert witness
to appear.  On the same day, the trial court issued an Order setting the hearing anew on May 2 and 3, 2001. 
Respondent received a copy of this Order only on May 8, 2001.  Thus, when the case was called for hearing as
scheduled, respondent and counsel, not being duly notified, did not appear.  Surprisingly, the trial court allowed the
petitioner to present his evidence ex parte.
On May 5, 2001, respondent still unaware that the case had been submitted for decision, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated April 19, 2001 denying her motion to dismiss.  The trial court merely noted the
motion for reconsideration in his Order dated May 16, 2001. Consequently, on May 18, 2001, respondent filed with
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ
of preliminary injunction challenging the trial court’s Order dated April 19, 2001 which denied her motion to
dismiss. Acting thereon, the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated May 23, 2001, enjoined the trial court from
conducting further proceedings.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner was deprived, by the Respondent Court, of her right to due process enshrined in
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling:
The hearings of the complaint of the private respondent, on its merits, were a blatant transgression by the
respondent of the fundamental right of the petitioner to due process. Petitioner learned of the complaint and
summons about the first week of April, 2001 on the basis of the March 11-17, 2001 issue of the ‘Tingog Peninsula.’
Even if the thirty-day period fixed by the Respondent Court was reckoned from the March 11-17, 2001 issue of the
‘Tingog Peninsula,’ the Petitioner had until April 16, 2001 within which to file a ‘Motion to Dismiss’ under Section
1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure or file an Answer to the complaint.  However, she opted to file, on
April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to Dismiss,’ instead of filing an Answer to the complaint.  The filing of said motion
suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the complaint.  Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent
Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. 
The Petitioner may file a ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ of said Order conformably with Section 5, Rule 135
of the Rules of Court. Until then, a hearing of the case on its merits is impermissible and a travesty.   However, even
before the Petitioner could be served with a copy of the order of the Respondent Court denying her ‘Motion to
Dismiss,’ the Respondent Court proceeded with the hearing of the case on its merits. In the case at bar, the trial court
did not observe the rudimentary principle of due process enshrined in our Constitution.  Neither did it comply with
pertinent procedural rules.

157
 FLORENCE SIN, petitioner, vs. PHILLIP SIN, respondent
G.R. No. 137590. March 26, 2001

Facts:

On January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence and respondent Philipp T. Sin
(hereafter “Philipp”), a Portugese citizen, were married. In 1994, Florence filed a complaint for “declaration of
nullity of marriage” against Philipp. RTC dismissed the said petition which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
despite motions for reconsideration. Throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not participate in the
proceedings.  While Fiscal Jose Danilo C. Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 16, 1994,
stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively participate therein. Other than entering his
appearance at certain hearings of the case, nothing more was heard from him.  Neither did the presiding Judge take
any step to encourage the fiscal to contribute to the proceedings.

Issue:
What is the mandatory obligation of the State in the procedures embodied within the prosecution of a case
for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

Ruling:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. It
can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil sought to be prevented (i.e., dissolution of
the marriage) did not come about, hence, the lack of participation of the State was cured.   Not so. The task of
protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-
forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and
genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. In Republic vs. CA, it was clearly stated that: The trial
court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.   No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons  for  his  agreement  or opposition as the case may be, to the
petition. The records are bereft of any evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case not just at
the trial level but on appeal with the Court of Appeals as well. 
The Family Code emphasizes the permanent nature of marriage, hailing it as the foundation of the family.
However, this inviolability depends on whether the marriage exists and is valid.  If it is void ab initio, the
“permanence” of the union becomes irrelevant, and the Court can step in to declare it so.   Article 36 of the Family
Code is the justification. A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code requires the
application of procedural and substantive guidelines.  While compliance with these requirements mostly devolves
upon petitioner, the State is likewise mandated to actively intervene in the procedure. Because of non-compliance by
the State with its statutory duty, the case is therefore remanded to the lower court for proper trial.

158
 MARIETTA ANCHETA, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO ANCHETA, respondent
G.R. No. 145370. March 4, 2004

Facts:
Marietta, petitioner, together with their seven children, after three years of marriage, was
abandoned by her husband Rodolfo. Thus the former filed an action for dissolution of their
conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea for support and thereby
executed a compromise agreement which was granted by the court. The respondent, with his
intention to remarry, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage from Marietta on the
ground of psychological incapacity. With his full knowledge that his wife already resided in
Cavite, he entered an address different from that of the former’s where summons for the trial be
served. Corollary to this, summons was returned not served resulting to petitioner’s inability to
attend and participate. Trial ensued and respondent presented pieces of evidence ex parte which
led to petitioner’s default and thereby granted the annulment of their marriage. Marietta therefore
filed a motion for reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction which the Court of Appeals denied.

Issue:
Is the decision granting the declaration of nullity of marriage by default tenable?

Ruling:
No. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article
48 of the Family Code, which reads:

Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.

The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985
Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:

Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation.— If the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court
shall order the prosecuting  attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties
exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.

159
 EMILIO TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON, respondent
G.R. No. 116607. April 10, 1996

Facts:

Maria Victoria Tuason filed a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her
marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. She alleged that they were married in 1972 and from
this union, begot two children; that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was already
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which became
manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights; that petitioner used prohibited drugs, was a
womanizer, left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in succession, gave minimal
support to the family, a spendthrift; that attempts at reconciliation were made but they all failed
because of petitioner’s refusal to reform. Petitioner denied the imputations against him. The trial
was reset due to Emilio’s counsel’s petition for suspension of trial which the court granted.
However, during the agreed date of trial, petitioner failed to appear thereby garnering a decision
in default which is in favor of private respondent. Petitioner, through new counsel, filed with the
trial court a petition for relief from judgment. Petitioner also insisted that he has a valid and
meritorious defense. He cited the Family Code which provides that in actions for annulment of
marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer should intervene for the state because the
law “looks with disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default.”

Issue:

Is the petitioner’s contention tenable?

Ruling:

No. The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60
of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to
answer.  Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by
private respondent.  He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings
and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the
litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.

The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal
separation proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take
care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated.  Petitioner’s vehement opposition to the
annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties.  There
is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the
parties.  Under these circumstances, the Court is convinced that the non-intervention of a
prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the
validity of the proceedings in the trial court.

160
 CONCEPCION PACETE, petitioner, vs. HON. CARRIAGA, JR., respondent
G.R. No. 53880. March 17, 1994

Facts:

Concepcion Alanis-Pacete filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage

between her husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion whom he married when his
marriage with Concepcion Alanis was still subsisting, as well as for legal separation, accounting
and separation of properties. Alanis averred that Pacete also ignored overtures for an amicable
settlement and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since the latter
evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served summons
and as response, they filed for several motions for extension which the court granted except for
the last motion. The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which
the court granted and consequently directed her to present evidence. As a result thereof, a decree
of legal separation of their marriage was issued.

Issue:

Is the court’s denial for the petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file their answer
and in declaring them in default valid?

Ruling:

No. Under Article 60 of the Family Code, no decree of legal separation shall be based
upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. In any case, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppresses. Also, in Article 58 of the same
Code, an action for legal separation shall in case be tried before six months shall have elapsed
since the filing of the petition. The significance of these substantive provisions of the law is
underscored in Section 6, Rule 18 of Rules of Court: “No defaults in action for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation.” If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated.

161
 CARLITOS E. SILVA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
SUZANNE T. GONZALES, respondents
G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997

Facts:

Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local

actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage and their union begat two children. However,
not long enough, the two eventually parted ways. The instant petition started with the refusal of
Gonzales to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the
children in his company on weekends.  Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children
but the petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and
womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children. An order
ordering herein respondent to allow petitioner visitorial rights to her children during weekends.
However, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City reversed the former decision thereby denying
petitioner his visitorial rights.

Issue:

Should petitioner be denied of his visitorial rights over his children?

Ruling:

The answer is in the negative. The Constitution itself speaks in terms of the "natural and
primary rights” of parents in the rearing of the youth. Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of
the Family Code states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and those exercising
parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give them love
and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding.  The allegations of
respondent against the character of petitioner, even assuming as true, cannot be taken as
sufficient basis to render petitioner an unfit father.  The fears expressed by respondent to the
effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their children once allowed to even
temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of respondent's unfounded imagination,
for no man, bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and
expense in instituting a legal action for the purpose of seeing his illegitimate children.  It can just
be imagined the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children of tender ages. The
Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant concern for the
children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue
designs more than a parent’s natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief
visits, his own children. 

162
 SUSAN CARIÑO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent
G.R. No. 132529. March 4, 2004

Facts:

During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first was with
petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (referred to as Susan Nicdao) and the second was with respondent Susan Yee Cariño
(referred to as Susan Yee), with whom cohabited with almost ten years. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became ill and
bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis.  He passed away on November 23, 1992 under
the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses.  Both petitioner and respondent filed claims
for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 while respondent Susan Yee received a
total of P21,000.00. Respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner
Susan Nicdao praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000.00 collectively
denominated as “death benefits”. Susan Yee admitted that they contracted the marriage while SPO4 Cariño’s
marriage with Susan Nicdao was still subsisting. However, she claimed that the latter’s marriage was void ab initio
for lack of marriage license supported by her presenting their marriage contract bearing no marriage license number
and a certification from the LCR that their marriage license was not on record. RTC favored the petition, granting
her half of the P146,000.00.

Issue:

Whether Susan Yee is entitled to the collection of one-half of the P146,000.00.

Ruling:

Susan Yee is not entitled to the said share. Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
deceased is a bigamous marriage, the application of Article 148—the properties acquired by the parties through their
actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.  Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or
her exclusively is therefore in order. The disputed P146,000 are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer.  Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to
the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these
monetary benefits.  Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. 

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code
governs.  This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage
license. Under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be
owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the
wages and the other did not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by
the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the
petitioner to share one-half thereof.  As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first
marriage are presumed to be in good faith.  Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to
the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.

163
 VIRGINIA A. LEONOR, petitioner, vs. BELDIA, JR. and LEONOR, JR., respondent
G.R. No. 112597. April 2, 1996

Facts:

Virginia A. Leonor, herein petitioner, was married to the private respondent, Mauricio D.
Leonor, Jr., in San Carlos City. They had been separated for a substantial part of their married
life for, while Mauricio resided in Switzerland studying and working, Virginia stayed in the
Philippines working as a nurse in Laguna. Mauricio became unfaithful and lived with a certain
Lynda Pond abroad. This induced petitioner to institute a civil action in Geneva, Switzerland for
separation and alimony. Private respondent counter-sued for divorce. Cantonal Civil Court of
Switzerland pronounced the divorce of the spouses Leonor but reserved the liquidation of the
matrimonial partnership. The said Swiss Court denied alimony to petitioner. On appeal to the
higher Cantonal Civil Court, Mauricio asked for the cancellation of his marriage in the
Philippines. In 1992, the higher Cantonal Civil Court granted petitioner alimony, prompting
Mauricio to elevate the matter on appeal to the Federal Court of Switzerland. In its decision, the
Federal Court affirmed the decision of the higher Cantonal Civil Court. Mauricio, represented by
his brother Teodoro Leonor, filed a petition for the cancellation of the late registration of
marriage in the civil registry; given as grounds for the cancellation were the tardiness of the
registration and the nullity of his marriage with Virginia “due to the non-observance of the legal
requirements for a valid marriage.” After several hearings, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring said marriage null and void for being sham and fictitious.

Issue:

Is the judgment rendered by the regional trial court voiding a marriage under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court valid and proper?

Ruling:

No. The summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Art. 412 of the
Civil Code, cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia’s civil status from married to
single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. Neither does the trial court,
under said Rule, have any jurisdiction to declare their marriage null and void and as a result
thereof, to order the local civil registrar to cancel the marriage entry in the civil registry. The
only errors that can be cancelled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical errors,
not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. Where the effect of a
correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her children from
legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial proceeding
Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under.

164
 LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents
G.R. No. 83598. March 7, 1997

Facts:

Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal who died
intestate. Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners,
claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino and that they were entitled to the one-third share of
Gavino in the estate of their grandparents. Petitioners denied knowing private respondents. Petitioners presented two
witnesses to fortify their claims. Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino. She testified that after
the wedding, she was handed a “receipt,” presumably the marriage certificate but it was burned during the war.  She
said that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three children. Private respondents produced a
certificate from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that the Register of Marriages did not have a record of the
marriage of Gavino and Catalina; another certificate from the Office of the Treasurer that there was no record of the
birth of Ramonito in that office and, for this reason, the record must be presumed to have been lost or destroyed
during the war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias that there was likewise no record of birth of
Ramonito in the church, the records of which were either lost or destroyed during the war. Petitioner Leoncia
Balogbog testified that Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias.  She obtained a certificate from the
Local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that that office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and
Catalina. The Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents, ordering petitioners to
render an accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private
respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva.

Issue:

Should the marriage of Gavino and Catalina be proven under Articles 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889
and that the existence of their marriage cannot be presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular
that they declared that they take each other as husband and wife during their marriage?

Ruling:

Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect, therefore, articles. 53 and 54
never came into force.  Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage was to
be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules on
evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband
and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. Evidence
consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage.  Indeed, although a marriage
contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took
place.  Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. The argument that the existence of the marriage cannot
be presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two
witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife is without merit. An exchange of vows can
be presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the
very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment.  It would indeed be unusual to have
a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence.

165
 ESTRELLITA TAMANO, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO ORTIZ, respondent
G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998

Facts:
Senator Mamintal Tamano married Zorayda A. Tamano in civil rites.  Their marriage
supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death in 1994.  Prior to his death, Tamano
also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano in civil rites. In 1994, Zorayda joined by her son
Adib A. Tamano filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and
Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous.  They contended that Tamano and Estrellita
misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the
marriage contract false and fraudulent.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC was without jurisdiction over
the subject and nature of the action.  She alleged that "only a party to the marriage" could file an
action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse, hence, it was only Tamano who could
file an action for annulment of their marriage.  Petitioner likewise contended that since Tamano
and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the
instant case was vested in the shari’a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws.

Issue:
Is the marriage between Tamano and Zorayda under the jurisdiction of shari’a courts and
not the civil courts?

Ruling:
No. Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have
jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of  marriage and marital relations. In the
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was
alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant
case.  Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws,
the same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married
both in civil and Muslim rites.  Consequently, the shari’a courts are not vested with original and
exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws. 
Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction
under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides – Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. -
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:  x x x (6) In all cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions x x x x

166
 DELIA DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G. R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993

Facts:
Delia Soledad A Domingo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property against petitioner Roberto Domingo. She alleged that Roberto Domingo
has a previous marriage when their marriage was solemnized and came to know of the prior
marriage when petitioner’s wife, Emerlina sued them for bigamy. Furthermore, petitioner who
was unemployed and completely dependent upon her has been allegedly disposing some of her
properties without the latter’s consent. Delia thus prayed for their marriage to be declared null
and void and for all of her properties to be declared in favor of her as the sole and exclusive
owner. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, with the contention that the marriage being void ab
initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is irrelevant.

Issue:
Whether a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary

Ruling:
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.

167
 MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON.
JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., respondents

G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000

Facts:

Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were marriedafter twenty-four
years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Cod petitioner's wife
Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with
a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour
Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage
posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Petitioner contends that
the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the
suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.

Issue:
Is the contention of the petitioner tenable?

Ruling:

Petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that
his marriage is void from the beginning is not tenable. The pendency of the case for declaration
of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil
case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter
pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. It must also be held that parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment
of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for
all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage.

168
 IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent
G. R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000

Facts:

Isagani Bobis, herein respondent contracted a first marriage with Maria Dulce Javier.
Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, respondent contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis and allegedly a third marriage with a
certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner’s complaint-affidavit, an information for
bigamy was filed against respondent. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was
celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first
marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to
suspend the criminal case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

Issue:
Whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.

Ruling:

The civil action for declaration of nullity of marriage does not constitute a prejudicial
question to a criminal case for bigamy. Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the
time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for
the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage.
Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because
there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted.
It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements
concur – two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have
been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.

In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into
the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial
declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will
also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes
regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against
this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a
decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his
own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.

169
 OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and
EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.
G. R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000

Facts:

Edgardo Reyes, herein private respondent, married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva on
August 4, 1980. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court declared their marriage null and
void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.  The church wedding on was also declared null
and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. Even before the decree was issued nullifying
his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner. Private
respondent filed a civil case praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void.  He
alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married.  He also averred that at the time
he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria.  He stated that at the time he married
petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. Petitioner, in
defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their marriage was
contracted without a valid license is untrue. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court. These documents were submitted as evidence during trial and,
according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. In 1996, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision.  It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be
validly contracted. 

Issue:
Whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly?

Ruling:

Private respondent’s first and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979,
respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code.  Pertinent to the present
controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 83.  Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance.

A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause

of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. In the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in
1979, before Wiegel.  At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and
Aragon.  The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent,
there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage.  In this case, therefore, the Court concluded that private respondent’s second marriage
to petitioner is valid. Moreover, the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her
children. 

170
 ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT and
CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents.
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996

Facts:

Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Valdes sought
the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. After
hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, in its decision of 29 July 1994,
granted the petition. The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to
comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days
from notice. Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing
compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code
contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions
without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner.

Issue:
What property regime should govern in unions without marriage?

Ruling:

Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and
respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a void marriage, regardless of the
cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous
cases; it provides:

"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.

171
 ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 132955. October 27, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got
married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan.  On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed
with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and
duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he
later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. In her
counterclaim, Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their
marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private
respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy,
which ended in their son being born prematurely.  

Issue:
Whether the marriage be annulled on the ground that the consent of the petitioner, as he
alleged, has been obtained by fraud, intimidation and undue and improper pressure and
influence.

Ruling:
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage.  Given
that at the time their marriage took place, his employment as a security guard in a bank would at
least enable him to know the rudiments of self-defense. Neither did he inform the judge about his
predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage. Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his
marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when
they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because
he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst.  The
complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. 

172
 AURORA ANAYA, petitioner, vs. FERNANDO PALAROAN, respondent
G.R. No. 27930. November 26, 1973

Facts:

Before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, a complaint was brought by Aurora
Anaya against her husband Fernando Palaroan, praying for the annulment of their marriage.
Plaintiff contends that the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted fraud in
obtaining her consent. This contention was premised in the allegation that her husband divulged
to her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close
relative of his and that the non-divulgement wrecked their marriage.

Defendant in his answer denied the allegations and filed a counterclaim for damages for
the malicious filing of the suit. In her reply, Anaya alleged, among others, that her husband
secretly intended from the very beginning not to perform his marital duties and allegations
appurtenance thereto and furthermore, he covertly made up his mind not to live with her.

The court a quo dismissed the complaint for non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital
relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances that would
constitute a ground for annulment. Anaya appealed the case contending that the lower court erred
in ignoring as cause of action her allegations in her reply.

Issue:

Whether the allegation in the reply will constitute a cause of action, which the court must
adjudicate.

Ruling:

No. The averment made in the reply is an entirely new and additional cause of action.
According to the plaintiff herself, the allegation “is apart, distinct and separate from that earlier
averred in the complaint. . .” Said allegation were, therefore, improperly alleged in the reply,
because if in a reply a party plaintiff is not permitted to amend or charge the cause of action as
set forth in his complaint, there is more reason not to allow such party to allege a new and
additional cause of action in the reply. Otherwise, the series of pleadings of the parties could
become interminable.

173
 CESAR REYES, PETITIONER VS. AGRIPINO ZABALLERO, RESPONDENT
89 PHIL 39

FACTS:

This case originated from a loan of P6,500 with interest at 10 per cent per annum payable
in advance, made by Dr. Ceasar Reyes to Agripino Zaballero on October 1, 1942. Zaballero
secured the payment with a first mortgage on ten parcels of land.

The installments due for 1942 and 1943 totaling the sum of P1,300 plus interest were
paid in Japanese Military Script and the Payments were unreservedly accepted. On November
30, 1944, Zaballero offered to pay the third installments and its interests which fell due on
October of the same year, but Reyes refused to accept on the ground that it was immoral and
unjust that the payment be made in Japanese Military notes which had considerably devaluated,
and that he had an option according to the contract to have the payment in Philippine or United
States currency. Zaballero announced that the next day he would tender the whole balance.
Reyes, acting upon advice given by his attorneys to whom he had meanwhile resorted for
guidance, received the money and executed the notarial deed of release of the real estate
mortgage. On the same day, he received payment, the mortgagee (Reyes), executed an affidavit
in secret, without defendants’ knowledge, before a Notary Public stating that he had accepted
under protest the payment of P5,200 plus interest in the sum of P612, and that he had deposited
the whole amount paid by the debtors.

ISSUE:

What constitutes Duress or Intimidation?

RULING:

According to the Civil Code, there is Duress or intimidation when one of the contracting
parties is inspired by a rational and well-grounded fear or suffering an imminent and serious
injury to his person or property, of his spouse, descendants and ascendants.

Mere reluctance does not detract from the voluntariness of one’s acts. There is a
distinction between a case where a person gives his consent reluctantly and even against his good
sense and judgment, and where he, in reality, gives no consent at all, as where he executed a
contract or performs an act against a pressure which he cannot resist. It is clear that one acts as
voluntarily and independently in the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation
as when he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely
when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as when he acts in conformity with
them. Between the two acts there is no difference in law.

174
 BUCCAT, plaintiff v BUCCAT, defendant
G.R. No 47101 April 25, 1941

Facts:

The 20 of March of 1939 the inico plaintiff present/display cause, in which not
comparecio the demanded one, despite properly to be located. By that, allowed the plaintiff to
present/display its tests, the inferior Court failure the subject in favor of the demanded one. The
plaintiff requests the cancellation of his marriage are been with the demanded Luida Mangonon
de Buccat the 26 of November of 1938, in the City of Baguio, being based in which, when
allowing in this marriage, she did because demanded habia assured to him that she was
virgin.The plaintiff conocio to demanded the month of March of 1938. After several interviews,
both were it jeopardize the 19 of September of he himself year. The 26 of November of equal
year, the plaintiff contracted marriage with the demanded one in catedrla catholic of the City of
Baguio. Desoues to coexist maritally by space of eighty and nine days, the demanded one gave to
light a boy of nine months, the 23 of February of 1939. From you are from this event, the
plaintiff abandonment to demanded and volvio not to make marital life with her.

Issue:

Whether or not the was attended by fraud.

Ruling:

Yes. The court does not see reason some to revoke the appealed sentence. In effect, the
allegation of the plaintiff and apellant is improbable that nor followed habia suspected the
gravido state the demanded one, being this, as it is proven, in pregnant condition very outpost.
Reason why there is place no to consider the fraud of which the apellant speaks. The alleged
thing by this in the sense that ses rare not to find people of developed abdomen, seems to us
pueril to deserve our consideration, as much but whatever that the plaintiff was student of first
year of right.The marriage is an institution sacratisima: it is the foundation in which the society
rests. In order to annul it, they are necessary clear and fehacientes tests. In this subject such tests
do not exist.

175
 ENRICO L. PACETE, petitioner, vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, respondent
G.R. No. L-53880. March 17, 1994

Facts:
On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
the marriage between her husband Enrico L. Pacete, as well as for legal separation (between
Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of property. In her complaint, she averred that she
was married to Pacete on April 30, 1938 before the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato, Cotabato;
that they had a child named Consuelo who was born on 11 March 1943; that Pacete subsequently
contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan, North
Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on August 1, 1979; that during her marriage to
Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several
motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and
the name of Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita; that Pacete ignored overtures for
an amicable settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he
evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were served with summons on
November 15, 1979. They filed a motion for an extension of 20 days within which to file an
answer. The court granted the motion. On the due date, the defendants again asked for a second
extension which was again granted by the court. Again, on the agreed due date, defendants asked
for another 15-day extension which was however denied by the court. Initial proceedings using
the evidence only of Concepcion followed thereafter.
On 17 March 1980, the court through the Hon. Glicerio Carriga promulgated the herein
questioned decision namely: the valid issuance of the legal separation between Concepcion and
Enrico Pacete; that the following properties namely the 10 parcels of land, which were originally
only named after Enrico Pacete, are hereby declared as the conjugal properties of the partnership
of Concepcion and Enrico Pacete; ordering Enrico Pacete to pay Concepcion the sum of
P46,950.00 which is her share in the unaccounted income of the rice mill and corn sheller from
1971 to 1973; and declaring the subsequent marriage between Enrico Pacete and Clarita de la
Concepcion to be void ab initio.
Because of this, Enrico Pacete filed a special action of certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not appearance of the state is essential?

Ruling:
The Civil Code provides: "Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated
upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the
defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion
between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the
State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated." Article 103 of the
Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal
separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the
petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this interim, the
court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
It was found out that the aforequoted statutory requirements were not followed by both
Concepcion Alanis and Hon. Glicerio Carriaga.
The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to an end are
impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its intention not to leave
the matter within the exclusive domain of the parties to alone dictate, which was not present in
this case since the decision was only based on the evidence of Concepcion. It is clear that
Concepcion did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other remedies which have
likewise been sought in the same action cannot excuse compliance, with any of the statutory
requirements aforequoted. Therefore, there is the need for the intervention of the state.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari by Enrico Pacete is hereby GRANTED and the
Decision of 17 March 1980 are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

176
 EMILIO TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
G.R. No. 116607. April 10, 1996

Facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner
Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent alleged that she and petitioner were
married on June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot two children; that at the time of the marriage,
petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital
obligations which became manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights between husband and
wife; that petitioner used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to
a one-year suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner was a womanizer;
that after he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave minimal support to the family and even
refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children compelling private respondent to accept
donations and dole-outs from her family and friends; that attempts at reconciliation were made
but they all failed because of petitioner’s refusal to reform. In addition to her prayer for
annulment, private respondent prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal
properties from further dissipation.
After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30, 1990. Private respondent
presented her evidences. On the scheduled reception of the petitioner’s evidences on May 11,
1990, petitioner’s counsel filed for postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was
out of the country. The court granted the motion and reset the hearing on June 8, 1990. On the
said date, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private respondent, the court declared
petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for
decision on the basis of the evidence presented. On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the nullity of private respondent’s marriage to petitioner and awarding
custody of the children to private respondent.
The petitioner appealed but was again denied by the CA. at the Supreme Court, petitioner
alleges that the proper process for annulment of marriage or legal separation was not properly
followed by the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in the process of rendering the marriage null and
void?

Ruling:
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger
of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the
purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot
declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if
collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the
application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in
his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. Our Constitution is committed to the
policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally
interested.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of
the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to
answer. Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and
cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the
litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion. The role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to
determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner’s vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates

177
the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner
that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we
are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion
between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.

178
 ONG ENG KIAM, petitioner vs. LUCITA ONG, respondent
G.R No. 153206. October 23, 2006

Facts:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong and Lucita G. Ong were married on July 13,
1975 at the San Agustin Church, Manila. They have three children. On March 21, 1996, Lucita
filed a complaint for legal separation under Art. 55 (1) of the family Code before the RTC-
Dagupan alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats,
intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. The said abuses were repeated almost everyday.
William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle
of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on
her and box her. There was even one time when William pointed a gun at her and asked her to
leave the house. Both the RTC and CA granted the petition for Legal Separation. William claim
that the only parties who will benefit from a decree of legal separation are Lucita’s parents and
siblings while such decree would condemn him as a violent and cruel person, a wife-beater and a
child-abuser and will taint his reputation especially among the Filipino-Chinese community. He
further allege that what took place were mere disagreements. He also argues that a decree for
legal separation should not be granted because Lucita abandoned the conjugal dwelling. Hence
the appeal to this court.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in disregarding clear evidence repudiating respondent’s
claim of repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct on the part of petitioner?

Ruling:
As correctly observed by the RTC, William admitted that there was no day that he did
not quarrel with his wife, which made his life miserable and he blames her for being negligent of
her wifely duties. Lucita and her sister also gave numerous accounts of the instances when
William displayed violent temper against Lucita and their children. William claims that the
witnesses of Lucita are not credible because of their relationship with her. We do not agree.
Relationship alone is not enough reason to discredit and label a witness’ testimony as biased and
unworthy of credence. William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is in
order for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties. The court finds such
reasoning hard to believe. What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground for legal
separation, a cause so strong that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. Also without merit
is the argument of William that no decree should be granted because of the abandonment done
by Lucita. The abandonment referred to is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than 1
year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not
constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.

179
 AIDA BANEZ, petitioner vs. GABRIEL BANEZ, respondent
G.R No. 133628. January 23, 2002

Facts:
On September 23, 1996, the RTC-Cebu decreed the legal separation between petitioner
Aida Banez and respondent Gabrial Banez on the ground of the latter’s sexual infidelity; the
dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the division of the conjugal net assets; the
forfeiture of respondent’s ½ share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children and
an order to respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. In another motion, petitioner sought moral
and exemplary damages. The RTC this time denied her petition. In turn, in a petition for
certiorari, Gabrial Banez elevated the case to the CA which decided that the grant of execution
by the RTC be set aside. The CA also denied Aida’s motion for reconsideration. Hence this
appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the decision of the RTC ordering respondent
to vacate their residential house?

Ruling:
In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner that she and her children be
allowed to occupy and enjoy the house considering that during the entire proceedings before the
RTC, she did not have the chance to occupy it, we are in view that there is no superior or urgent
circumstances that outweighs the damage which respondent would suffer if he were ordered to
vacate the house since even he was not given the chance to occupy the said house.
Further, petitioner alleges that an action for legal separation is one where multiple
appeals are allowed. We do not think so. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to
the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation such as
entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community, and custody
of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation. They are not separate or
distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the
decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation. Thus, they may
not be subject to multiple appeals.
Wherefore, the petitions are denied. The decision of the CA is affirmed.

180
 FROILAN GAUDIONCO, petitioner, vs. HON. SENEN PENARANDA, respondent
G.R No. 79284. November 27, 1987

Facts:
On 29 May 1986, Teresita Gaudionco, the legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan
Gaudionco, filed with the RTC-Misamis Oriental, presided over by respondent Judge, Hon.
Senen Penaranda, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. On 13 October 1986, Teresita
Gaudionco also filed with the MTC-General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for
concubinage. On 14 November 1986, an application for the provisional remedy of support
pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by Teresita
Gaudionco in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent judge then ordered the payment
of support pendente lite.
The petitioner believes that the civil action for legal separation is grounded on
concubinage, so that all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended to
await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case. Petitioner also argues that his
conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal separation can
prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of
concubinage. He also alleges that the judge acted in abuse of discretion in ordering him for
payment of support.

Issue:
Whether or not the ground is sufficient in this case?

Ruling:
In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for
legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a
criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil liability
arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to
the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the
legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody
of offspring’s support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among
others. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary.
Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife must also fail, as
we find no proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the
same. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and
granted at the discretion of the judge. If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite
ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
Wherefore, the petition of petitioner is dismissed.

181
 EDUARDO ARROYO J.R., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 96602. Nov. 19, 1991

Facts:
On November 2, 1982, accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs. Linda Sare
and witness Jabunan, took the morning plane to Baguio. Arriving at around 11:00 a.m., they
dropped first at the house of Mrs. Vera, mother of Ruby Vera at Crystal Cave, Baguio City then
proceeded to the Mines View Park Condominium owned by the Neri spouses. At around 7 pm,
accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the Neris' condominium. Jabunan opened the door for Arroyo
who immediately went knocked at the master's bedroom where accused Ruby Neri and her
companion Linda Sare were. On accused Ruby Neri's request, Linda Sare left the master's
bedroom and went upstairs to the sala leaving the two accused alone in the master’s bedroom.
About forty-five minutes later, accused Arroyo Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that she could
already come down. The event was made known to Dr. Jorge Neri, husband of Ruby Neri, who
thereafter, filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the RTC-Benguet against his wife, Ruby
Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo. Both the RTC and the CA found the two accused guilty of
adultery.
Ruby Vera Neri and Eduardo Arroyo filed for a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the CA. On appeal, both accused alleges the following: that they were into an illicit
affair, however, they denied that they had sexual intercourse on November 2, 1982 which Dr.
Neri claims; and finally, that a pardon had been extended by Dr. Neri, and that he had later
contracted marriage with another woman with whom he is presently co-habiting.

Issue:
Whether or not the pardon of Dr. Neri is tenable to free the two accused of their criminal
liability?

Ruling:
The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
"Art.344-The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution
without including both parties, if they are both alive, or in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders.
While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that
consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair,
nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the
filing of a criminal complaint. In the present case, the compromise agreement stating the pardon
given by Dr. Neri, was executed only on February 16, 1989, after the trial court had already
rendered its decision dated December 17, 1987 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. Because of this, the said pardon is not sufficient to free the two accused namely Ruby
Vera Neri and Eduardo Arroyo of the crime adultery.

182
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant, vs.LEONILA GINEZ, defendant-appellee.
G.R No. L-10033. December 28, 1956

Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant
Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan. Immediately after their marriage, the
couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. At about July, 1951,
Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she
had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan. As early as July, 1951, Benjamin
Bugayong began receiving letters from his sister-in-law and some from anonymous writers
informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. On cross-examination, Benjamin admitted
that his wife also informed him by letter, that a certain "Eliong" kissed her. All these
communications prompted him in to seek the advice of the navy legal department. In August,
1952, Benjamin went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom he met in the house
of Leonila’s godmother. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of a cousin
ofBenjamin, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. On the
second day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that
she had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and
left. After that and despite such belief, Benjamin still exerted efforts to locate her and failing to
find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded feelings". On November 18,
1952, Benjamin filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint for legal
separation against his wife, Leonila who filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of
the complaint and setting up affirmative defenses. After the issues were joined and convinced
that reconciliation was not possible, the court set the case for hearing on June 9, 1953. Benjamin
presented his evidences, but the counsel of Leonila moved for the dismissal of the complaint due
to the fact that there was “condonation.” Both the RTC and CA believed that there was indeed
condonation.

Issue:
Whether or not there has been condonation?

Ruling:
Condonation is the “forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal
separation” or, condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of
a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed". It is to be noted, however, that in
defendant's answer she vehemently and vigorously denies having committed any act of infidelity
against her husband, and even if we were to give full weight to the testimony of the plaintiff,
who was the only one that had the chance of testifying in Court and link such evidence with the
averments of the complaint, we would have to conclude that the facts appearing on the record are
far from sufficient to establish the charge of adultery preferred against the defendant. Certainly,
the letter that plaintiff claims to have received from his sister-in-law, must have been too vague
and indefinite as to defendant's infidelity to deserve its production in evidence; nor the
anonymous letters which plaintiff also failed to present; nor the alleged letter that, according to
plaintiff, his wife addressed to him admitting that she had been kissed by one Eliong, whose
identity was not established, do not amount to anything that can be relied upon.
The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has
been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to
obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband clearly shows that there
was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity amounting
to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the
infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant-wife, reconciliation was
effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with
him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin
and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact
that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife- all

183
these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between
them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The
reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity
amounting to adultery. Although he believed that her wife committed adultery, he still persuaded
her wife.
It is important to note that a divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the parties
continue to live together after it was known, or there is sexual intercourse after knowledge of
adultery, or sleeping together for a single night, and many others. The resumption of marital
cohabitation as a basis of condonation will generally be inferred, nothing appearing to the
contrary, from the fact of the living together as husband and wife, especially as against the
husband.
Because of this, the Supreme Court agreed with the RTC and CA’s findings that there
was indeed condonation on the part of Benjamin Bugayong, therefore, the foregoing case is
hereby dismissed.

184
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GUADALUPE ZAPATA and
DALMACIO BONDOC, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-3047. May 161951

Facts:
In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by Andres
Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting
and having repeated sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 to March 14, 1947.
The defendant-wife entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months of arresto
mayor which penalty she served. In the same court, on September 17, 1948, the offended
husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and her paramour
from March 15, 1947 to September 17, 1948. On February 21, 1949, each of the defendants filed
a motion to quash the complaint on the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the defendants and
quashed the second complaint.
The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the first and second complaints
must be deemed one continuous offense, the defendants in both complaints being the same and
identical persons and the two sets of unlawful acts having taken place continuously during the
years 1946, 1947 and part of 1948 is within the scope and meaning of the constitutional
provision that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.”

Issue:
Whether or not consent attended the case?

Ruling:
Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency; it is an instantaneous crime which is
consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual
intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery. True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the
same defendants are against the same person- the offended husband; the same status- the union
of the husband and wife by their marriage; and the same community represented by the State for
its interest in maintaining and preserving such status. But this identity of the offended party,
status and society does not argue against the commission of the crime of adultery as many times
as there were carnal acts consummated, for as long as the status remain unchanged, the nexus
undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime.
There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for
adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime.
In the instant case the last unity does not exist, because as already stated the culprits
perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they need not do another or other adulterous
acts to consummate it. After the last act of adultery had been committed as charged in the first
complaint, the defendants again committed adulterous acts not included in the first complaint and
for which the second complaint was filed.
Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts does
not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, at the time of
the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, the paramour already knew that
his codefendant was a married woman and yet he continued to have carnal knowledge of her.
Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife
and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon was
granted, because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts
The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby
reversed and set aside, and the trial court is directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in
accordance with law.

185
 JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.
G.R. No. L-13553. February 23, 1960

Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children. In
March 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital
relations with another man, plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture,
where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city, defendant
was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June 1952,
when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived
separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with
another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition
for legal separation; to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged
with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal
separation.
The RTC and CA held that a legal separation could not be decreed due to the confession
of judgment by the defendant.

Issue:
Whether or not pardon attended the case at bar?

Ruling:
The mere circumstance that defendant told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally
separated from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she
refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does
not order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against
collusion, which implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement. In this
connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty
party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to
prove it; and proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself
collusion. Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place without collusion by the parties,
according to the evidence. The Supreme Court does not think plaintiff's failure actively to search
for defendant and take her home constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations
with Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and
after he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for
her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the
appealed decision and decree a legal separation between this spouse. Costs of all instances
against Serafina Florenciano.

186
 SOCORRO MATUBIS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-11766. October 25, 1960

Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur.
For failure to agree on how they should live as husband and wife, the couple, on May 30, 1944,
agreed to live separately from each other, which status remained unchanged until the present. On
April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement,the significant portions of which
are hereunder reproduced: (a) That both of us relinquish our right over the other as legal husband
and wife; (b) That both without any interference by any of us, nor either of us can prosecute the
other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from our separation; (c) That
I, the, wife, is no longer entitled for any support from my husband or any benefits he may
received thereafter, nor I the husband is not entitled for anything from my wife; (d) That neither
of us can claim anything from the other from the time we verbally separated, that is from May
30, 1944 to the present when we made our verbal separation into writing.
In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting and deporting themselves as husband and
wife who were generally reputed as such in the community with Asuncion Rebulado and on
September 1, 1955, said Asuncion gave birth to their child. On April 24, 1956, plaintiff Socorro
Matubis filed a complaint for legal separation Alleging abandonment and concubinage on the
part of defendant. The RTC and CA dismissed the case due to the presence of condonation on the
part of the plaintiff.

Issue:
Whether or not condonation attended the case?

Ruling:
The very wording of the agreement gives no room for interpretation other than that given
by the trial judge. Counsel in his brief submits that the agreement is divided in two parts. The
first part having to do with the act of living separately which he claims to be legal, and the
second part, that which becomes a license to commit the ground for legal separation which is
admittedly illegal. We do not agree in appellant’s defense. Condonation and consent on the part
of plaintiff are the most vital part in the said agreement. The condonation and consent here are
not only implied but expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil Code) specifically provides that legal
separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation
of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and or consented in writing, the
plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy. Plaintiff's counsel even agrees that the
complaint should be dismissed. He claims however, that the grounds for the dismissal should not
be those stated in the decision of the lower court, "but on the ground that plaintiff and defendant
have already been legally separated from each other, but without the marital bond having been
affected, long before the effectivity of the new Civil Code." Again, we cannot subscribe to
counsel's contention, because it is contrary to the evidence.
Wherefore, the decisions of both RTC and CA are hereby affirmed.

187
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs.
RODOLFO SCHNCKENBERGER, defendant-appellant
No. 48183. November 10, 1941

Facts:
On Mach 16, 1926, the accused, Rodolfo Schneckenberger married the complainant
Elena Cartegena and after 7 years of marital life, they agreed, for reason of alleged
incompatibility of character, to live separately from each other. And on May 25, 1935, they
executed a document in which they agreed to live separately and to choose who they want to live
with. On June 15, 1935, the accused, without leaving the Philippines, secured a divorce from the
civil court of Juarez, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he contracted another marriage with his co-
accused, Julia Medel. Complainant herein instituted 2 actions for Bigamy in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and the other for concubinage in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The first
culminated in the conviction of the accused. On the trial of concubinage, accused interposed the
plea of double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed. But upon appeal by the fiscal, accused was
convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence. Hence this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting accused in the offense of concubinage?

Ruling:
As to appellant’s plea for double jeopardy, it need only be observed that the offense of
bigamy for which he was convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial are two
distinct offenses in law and in fact as well as the mode of their prosecution. The celebration of
the second marriage, with the first still existing, characterizes bigamy; in the present case, mere
cohabitation by the husband with a woman who is not his wife characterizes concubinage.
Upon the other hand, we believe and so hold that the accused should be acquitted of the
crime of concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused clearly shows that
each party intended to forego the illicit acts of the other. As the term “pardon” unquestionably
refers to the offense after its commission, “consent” must have been intended, agreeably with its
ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior its commission. No logical difference can indeed be
perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party has
chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and
invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. In arriving at this conclusion, we do not wish to be
misconstrued as legalizing an agreement to do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must be
taken only to mean that an agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties herein,
operates, within the plain language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from
prosecuting the offense.
Wherefore, judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby acquitted in the crime of
concubinage.

188
 PEOPLE OF THE PILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
URSULA SENSANO, defendant-appellant
No. 37720. March 7, 1933

Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. they had one
child. Shortly after the birth of the child, the husband left his wife to go to Cagayan where he
remained for three years without writing to his wife or sending her anything for the support of
herself and their son. Poor and illiterate, she struggled for an existence of herself and her son
until the day she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child to live with him.
On the return of the husband in 1924, he filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for
adultery and both were sentenced to 4 months and 1 day. After completing her sentence, the
accused left her paramour. Thereafter, she begged for the husband’s pardon and promised to be a
faithful wife if he would take her back. He refused to pardon her or to live with her and said she
could go where she wished, that he would have nothing to do with her anymore and she could do
as she pleased. Abandoned for the second time, she and her child went back to Marcelo Ramos.
The husband, knowing that she resumed living with her codefendant did nothing to interfere with
their relations or to assert his rights as husband. Thereafter, he left foe Hawaii where he remained
fro seven years completely abandoning his wife and child. On his return to the Philippines, he
presented the second charge of adultery.

Issue:
Whether or not the second complaint would prosper?

Ruling:
We have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case and his conduct warrant
the interference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between the accused and
therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding. We cannot accept the
argument that the 7 years of consent on his part in the adultery of his wife is explained by his
absence from the Philippines during which period it was impossible for him to take any action
against the accused. There is not merit in the argument that it was impossible for him to take any
action against the accused during the said 7 years.
Wherefore, the judgment is reversed.

189
 AGUEDA BENEDICTO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ESTEBAN DELA RAMA, defendant
No. 1056. December 8, 1903

Facts:
From the affidavit of the plaintiff is the following: that plaintiff and defendant had lived
together from the time of their marriage in July 1891 to August 1892. It is also admitted that the
defendant suddenly, without any previous warning, took his wife to the house of her parents, left
her there, and never lived with her afterwards. She also charged defendant with having
committed concubinage with Gregoria Bermejo in 1982. She produced no evidence to support
this allegation. On the other hand, the defendant presented his counter-affidavit where he agreed
on the time of their marriage. That on his return from an inspection of one of his estates, his
wife’s maid gave him a letter in the own handwriting of his wife which was directed to his lover,
a Spanish corporal of the civil guard named Zabal. She admitted the genuineness of the letter,
fell upon her knees, and implored him to pardon her. That same day, he took her to the home of
her parents, told what had occurred, and left her there.
Respondent then filed for Legal Separation which was given by the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the Legal Separating filed by the respondent would prosper?

Ruling:
It is said that if the plaintiff is guilty, the defendant has condoned the offense. The wife
can defeat the husband’s suit by proving that he has pardoned her.
Our conclusion is that neither one of the parties is entitled to Legal Separation. As
conclusion of law from the foregoing facts, we hold that neither party is entitled to judgment of
Legal Separation against the other. That judgment be entered that the plaintiff take nothing by
her action.

190
 WILLIAM H. BROWN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JUANITA YAMBAO, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-10699. October 18, 1957

Facts:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while
interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942-1945, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with
one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl; that Brown learned of his wife’s misconduct
only in 1945, upon his release from internment; that thereafter the spouse lived separately and
later executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties
to the erring wife as her share, the complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation
agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage and that the defendant be declared
disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and equitable. The
court subsequently directed the City Fiscal to “investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the
Civil Code, whether or not a collusion exists between the parties.” As ordered, Assistant City
Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-examined plaintiff Brown. His questions
elicited the fact that after liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had
begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation
asked, on the ground that, while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a
misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil
Code that there had been consent and connivance, and because Brown's action had prescribed
under Article 102 of the same Code since the evidence showed that the learned of his wife's
infidelity in 1945 but only filed action in 1955.

Issue:
Whether or not the prescription barred the success of the case?

Ruling:
ART. 100 of the New Civil Code states that “The legal separation may be claimed only
by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation or of consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of
them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the
petition.” It is clear in this court that the case should be dismissed because of Brown’s illegal act
of cohabiting with another woman.
This court also found, and correctly held that Brown’s action was already barred, because
he did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's
adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new
Civil Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one 1 year from and after the
plaintiff became cognizant of the cause; and within five years from and after the date when such
cause occurred.
Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the remedy
sought, it becomes unnecessary to delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown's inaction
for ten years also evidences condonation or connivance on his part. The decision of the RTC
dismissing the complaint is therefore affirmed.

191
 JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.
G.R. No. L-13553. February 23, 1960

Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They begot several children. In
March 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant carrying marital
relations with another man, plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture,
where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city, defendant
was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June 1952,
when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived
separately. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with
another man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition
for legal separation; to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged
with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal
separation.
The RTC and CA held that a legal separation could not be decreed due to the confession
of judgment by the defendant.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition will not prosper?

Ruling:
Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The
defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might
send her to jail the moment her husband requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have
practiced deception at such a personal risk. In this connection, it has been held that collusion may
not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables
the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it. And proof that the defendant desires
the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion.
Moreover, Art. 102 of the New Civil Code stating that an action for legal separation
cannot be filed except within one 1 year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the
cause; and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred. This court
decided that the 1-year requirement was followed. The instance when plaintiff caught his wife in
1955 with another man was deemed to be start of the 1-year requirement period. Since he filed
on that same year-1955, he properly followed the above stated provision.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the
appealed decision and decree a legal separation between this spouse. Costs of all instances
against Serafina Florenciano.

192
 ELENA CONTRERAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
CESAR J. MACARAIG, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970

Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic Church of
Quiapo, Manila. Out of their Marriage, three children were born. Immediately before the election
of 1961, defendant was employed as manager of the printing establishment owned by plaintiff's
father known as the MICO Offset. In that capacity, defendant met and came to know Lily Ann
Alcala, who place orders with MICO Offset for propaganda materials for Mr. Sergio Osmeña,
who was then a Vice-Presidential candidate. After the elections of 1961, defendant resigned from
MICO Offset to be a special agent at Malacañang. He began to be away so often and to come
home very late. Upon plaintiff's inquiry, defendant explained that he was out on a series of
confidential missions.
In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant
was living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. When defendant, the following October, returned
to the conjugal home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos' report from defendant in her
desire not to anger nor drive defendant away. Although plaintiff, in April 1963, also received
rumors that defendant was seen with a woman who was on the family way on Dasmariñas St.,
she was so happy that defendant again return to the family home in May, 1963 that she once
more desisted from discussing the matter with him because she did not wish to precipitate a
quarrel and drive him away. All this while, defendant, if and whenever he returned to the family
fold, would only stay for two or three days but would be gone for a period of about a month.
After plaintiff received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to a baby, she sent Mrs.
Felicisima Antioquia, her father's employee, to verify the reports. The latter was driven by Lubos
to the house in Singalong and between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock that afternoon, she saw defendant
was carrying a baby in his arms. Mrs. Antioquia then went to the parish priest of Singalong
where she inquired about the child of Cesar Macaraig and Lily Ann Alcala and she was given a
copy of the baptismal certificate of Maria Vivien Mageline Macaraig which she gave to plaintiff
sometime in October 1963.
Plaintiff then entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant
and to convince him to return to his family. Mr. Macaraig; however, Macaraig refused. In
November 1963, plaintiff requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta
Majul, and the latter obliged and arranged a meeting at her home in Buendia between plaintiff
and Lily Ann Alcala. Lily Ann said she was willing to give up defendant as she had no desire to
be accused criminally but it was defendant who refused to break relationship with her. In the
early part of December 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children went to talk to
defendant at his place of work. Plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and
to return to the conjugal home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant
informed plaintiff that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate
family.
On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation. When
defendant did not interpose any answer after he was served summons, the case was referred to
the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to the provisions of Article 101 of the Civil
Code. After a report was received from Asst. Fiscal Primitivo M. Peñaranda that he believed that
there was no collusion present, plaintiff was allowed to present her evidence. Defendant has
never appeared in this case.
The RTC and CA dismissed the complaints because it failed to follow Article 102 of the
New Civil Code providing that an action for legal separation cannot be instituted except within
one year after plaintiff "became cognizant of the cause."

Issue:
Whether or not the rule on Prescription should be followed?

Ruling:
The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year
after the date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the

193
essence of the cause of action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable
social institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of
its status.
In the instant action, the Court has to find that plaintiff became cognizant of defendant's
infidelity in September, 1962. Plaintiff made successive attempts to induce the husband to amend
his erring ways but failed. Her desire to bring defendant back to the connubial fold and to
preserve family solidarity deterred her from taking timely legal action.
The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided for in Article
102 of the Civil Code should be counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September
1962 or from December 1963. Computing the period of one year from the former date, it is clear
that plaintiff's complaint filed on December 14, 1963 came a little too late.
The period of "five years from after the date when such cause occurred" is not here
involved.
Upon the undisputed facts it seems clear that, in the month of September 1962, whatever
knowledge appellant had acquired regarding the infidelity of her husband, that is, of the fact that
he was then living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala, was only through the information given to
her by the driver of their family car. Much as such hearsay information had pained and
anguished her, she apparently thought it best, and no reasonable person may justifiably blame her
for it, not to go deeper into the matter herself because in all probability even up to that time,
notwithstanding her husband's obvious neglect of his entire family, appellant still cherished the
hope, however forlorn, of his coming back home to them. Indeed, when her husband returned to
the conjugal home the following October, she purposely refrained from bringing up the matter of
his marital infidelity "in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant away." True, appellant
likewise heard in April 1963 rumors that her husband was seen with a woman on the family way
on Dasmariñas Street, but failed again to either bring up the matter with her husband or make
attempts to verify the truth of said rumors, but this was due, because "she was so happy that
defendant again returned to the family home in May 1963 that she once more desisted from
discussing the matter with him because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him
away." As a matter of fact, notwithstanding all these painful information which would not have
been legally sufficient to make a case for legal separation, appellant still made brave, desperate
attempts to persuade her husband to come back home. In the words of the lower court, she
"entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince him
to return to his family" and also "requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs.
Enriqueta Majul" for the same purpose, but all that was of no avail. Her husband remained
stubborn.
After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the
only time when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the
early part of December 1963 when plaintiff, accompanied by their two children went to talk to
defendant where she pleaded but however was refused by the defendant.
From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the
preceding paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no
longer leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be
under obligation to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then
that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have commenced.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is set aside and another is hereby rendered
holding that appellant is entitled to legal separation.

194
 LUIS MA. ARANETA, petitioner vs.
HON. HERMOGENES CONCECPCION, respondent
G.R No. L-9667. July 31, 1956

Facts:
The main action was brought by petitioner against his wife for legal separation on the
ground of adultery. Defendant filed an omnibus petition alleging that she was being molested
and harassed, to secure custody of their three minor children and a monthly support of P5,
000.00. Plaintiff opposed the petition, denying the allegation and further alleging that defendant
has abandoned the children; alleging that conjugal properties were only worth P80,000.00, not 1
million pesos as alleged by defendant; also alleging that defendant had abandoned them and had
committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit to educate her children, being
unstable in her emotions and unable to give the children the love, respect and care of a true
mother and without means to educate them.
The RTC granted the custody of the children to defendant. The main reason given by the
judge, for refusing plaintiff’s request that evidence be allowed to be introduced on the issues, is
the prohibition contained in Art. 103 of the Civil Code stating that an action for legal separation
shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.

Issue:
Whether the “cooling-off” period is tenable in the case at bar?

Ruling:
It is conceded that the period of six months fixed in Art. 103 is evidently intended as a
cooling-off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their
grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed passions against one
another.
Take the case at bar for instance. Why should the court ignore the claim of adultery
supported by circumstantial evidence the authenticity of which cannot be denied? And why
assume that the children are in the custody of the wife when it is precisely alleged in the petition
and affidavits that she has abandoned the conjugal home?
Evidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the
court as to the custody and alimony pendent elite may be lawfully exercised. The rule is that all
provisions of the law even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand and given
effect by reconciling them if necessary. Thus, the determination of the custody and alimony
should be given effect and force provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of
the cooling-off period.

195
 ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs.
HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, respondent
G.R. No. L-53880. March 17, 1994

Facts:
On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
the marriage as well as for legal separation between her husband Enrico L. Pacete. In her
complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on April 30, 1938 before the Justice of the
Peace of Cotabato, Cotabato; that they had a child named; that Pacete subsequently contracted in
1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in Kidapawan, North Cotabato; that she
learned of such marriage only on August 1, 1979; that during her marriage to Pacete, the latter
acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles;
that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and the name of
Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita; that Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable
settlement; and that reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently
preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were served with summons on
November 15, 1979. They filed a motion for an extension of 20 days within which to file an
answer. The court granted the motion. On the due date, the defendants again asked for a second
extension which was again granted by the court. Again, on the agreed due date, defendants asked
for another 15-day extension which was however denied by the court. Initial proceedings using
the evidence only of Concepcion followed thereafter.
On 17 March 1980, the court through the Hon. Glicerio Carriga promulgated the herein
questioned decision namely: the valid issuance of the legal separation between Concepcion and
Enrico Pacete and declaring the subsequent marriage between Enrico Pacete and Clarita de la
Concepcion to be void ab initio.
Because of this, Enrico Pacete filed a special action of certiorari questioning the period of
trial by the Hon. Carriaga.

Issue:
Whether or not the cooling-off period is mandatory?

Ruling:
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that
an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since
the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The special
prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled
by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave
the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.
It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That other
remedy, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action cannot
dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements aforequoted. The 6-
months period is clear in this court to have been followed by the RTC judge.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted and the proceedings are Nullified
and Set Aside. No costs.

196
 SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994

Facts:
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his
successive tours of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, respondent Remedios
Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years.
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and
their children but to Thelma Cumareng whom he conducted a second marriage on October 1981
and their three children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a
building and lot located at Greenhills, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He
claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any income. Private
respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged
that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their six children. She also informed
the court that despite her husband's retirement, he had not returned to his legitimate family and
was instead maintaining a separate residence. In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the
decree of legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of
her husband's share. After trial, the court decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the
forfeiture of the petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not
entitled to support from his respondent wife. This decision was appealed to the CA. Pendente
lite, the respondent wife filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
command the petitioner from interfering with the administration of their properties in Greenhills
and Forbes Park. After hearing, the CA granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife.
The petitioner argues that since the law provides for a joint administration of the conjugal
properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other.

Issue:
Whether or not the courts erred in their decision?

Ruling:
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties
as clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61 states
that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a
written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act
as the administrator. While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been
made, such designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any
share in the conjugal properties. That designation was in effect approved by the CA when it
issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge. The
primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the
things subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the
plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may,
before final judgment, do or continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain
and thus make ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the
plaintiff.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or
threatened violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be denied that as the
petitioner's legitimate wife (and the complainant and injured spouse in the action for legal
separation), the private respondent has a right to a share (if not the whole) of the conjugal estate.
There is also, in our view, enough evidence to raise the apprehension that entrusting said estate
to the petitioner may result in its improvident disposition to the detriment of his wife and
children. We agree that inasmuch as the trial court had earlier declared the forfeiture of the
petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, it would be prudent not to allow him in the
meantime to participate in its management. Let it be stressed that the injunction has not
permanently installed the respondent wife as the administrator of the whole mass of conjugal
assets. It has merely allowed her to continue administering the properties in the meantime
without interference from the petitioner, pending the express designation of the administrator in
accordance with Article 61 of the Family Code.

197
Wherefore, the petition is denied.

198
 REYNALDO ESPIRITU, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115640. March 15, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu who was employed by the National Steel Corporation and
respondent Teresita Masauding who was a nurse, first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan. In 1977,
Teresita left for Los Angeles to work as a nurse. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, to
Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common
law relationship of husband and wife. On August 16 1986, their daughter was born. On October
7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got
married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child was born on January 12,
1988. The couple decided to separate sometime in 1990. Instead of giving their marriage a
second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and
went back to California. She claims however, the she keeps in constant touch with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh
was not yet completed, he was sent back to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his
sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita claims that she did not
immediately follow her children because Reynaldo had filed a criminal case for bigamy against
her and she was afraid of being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the bigamy case was
actually rendered only on September 29, 1994. Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the
Philippines and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against
the two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings to gain
custody over the children.
The RTC suspended Teresita's parental authority and declared Reynaldo to have sole
parental authority. On appeal, the CA however gave custody to Teresita.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in suspending petitioner’s parental authority?

Ruling:
Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing the records to
discover the choice of the children and rather than verifying whether that parent is fit or unfit,
respondent court simply followed statutory presumptions and general propositions applicable to
ordinary or common situations. A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita is
more intent on emphasizing the "torture and agony" of a mother separated from her children and
the humiliation she suffered as a result of her character being made a key issue in court rather
than the feelings and future, the best interest and welfare of her children. While the bonds
between a mother and her children are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother,
is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering,
pride and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration. The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was
given custody suffers a future character and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be
re-examined. Decision should be based on the testimony of the daughter giving all negative
characteristics about her mother. Teresita. Moreover, the court finds Teresita being as she
entered into an illicit relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right there in the house of petitioner
Reynaldo in Pennsylvania. The record shows that the daughter suffered emotional disturbance
caused by the traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a boarder in their house.
The record also shows that it was Teresita who left the conjugal home and the children.
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now
both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear front
the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements
found in the First paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the
second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming
that the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the
age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant
considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate
shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.

199
 CARMEN LAPUZ SY, petitioner-appellant, vs. EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

Facts:
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married on September 30, 1934; that
they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage; and
that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about
March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others,
would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the
conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and
counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy,
on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and
customs, with one Go Hiok. But before the trial could be completed Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in
a vehicular accident on May 31, 1969. On June 9, 1969, Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition
for legal separation" on two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed
beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of
Carmen abated the action for legal separation. On June 26, 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner
moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz Both the RTC and CA
denied the substitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal
separation, abate the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property
rights?

Ruling:
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in
its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse to claim legal separation; and in its Article
108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and
even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows
that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff,
even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation,
their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so
that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death
supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a
more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
Accordingly, the decision of both the RTC and the CA are hereby affirmed.

200
 POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000

Facts:
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is
about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many
years, he was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. On July 11, 1942,
Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of
30 years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived
at Urdaneta Condominium, Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse,
Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo
City. Out of their marriage, the spouses had 6 children. On December 30, 1997, upon
Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about 5 months in
Antipolo City. The children alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an
overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug. As a consequence,
Potenciano’s health deteriorated. On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in
Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Makati. On
March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of
Potenciano Ilusorio due to his advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
She alleged that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband. The CA
denied petitioner’s motion.

Issue:
Whether or not a wife may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live
with her in conjugal bliss?

Ruling:
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner
of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the
grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact
that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not
necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or
medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. Being of sound
mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices
revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not
appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to
Potenciano. He made it clear before the CA that he was not prevented from leaving his house or
seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no
reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. With his full mental capacity coupled
with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his
free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run
against his fundamental constitutional right.
Wherefore, this court affirms the decision of the CA, however, it nullifies the decision
insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio.

201
 MARIANO ARROYO, plaintiff vs. DOLORES VAZQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant
G.R No. 17014. August 11, 1921

Facts:
Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by
marriage in 1910 and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they lived together
as husband and wife until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common home with
the intention to live separately from her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband
without avail to induce her to resume marital relations, an action was initiated by him to compel
her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The wife answered that
she had left her husband’s home without his consent because of the cruel treatment on the part of
her husband. Upon hearing the cause, the lower court gave judgment in favor of the wife,
authorizing her to live apart from her husband. They concluded that the husband was more to
blame than the wife and that his continued ill-treatment was a sufficient justification for her
abandonment of the conjugal home.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in their judgment favoring the wife?

Ruling:
To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife
is a duty universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in Art. 142 and 143 of
the Civil Code. Accordingly, it has been determined that where the wife is forced to leave the
matrimonial abode, she can, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance.
Nevertheless, the interests of both parties and the society at large require that the courts should
move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife.
From this consideration, it follows that provisions should be made for separate maintenance in
favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become
impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband.
We are therefore hold that Mariano Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional
and absolute return of the wife to the marital domicile. He is entitled to a judicial declaration that
his wife has absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.
Therefore, reversing the judgment of the lower court, it is declared that Dolores Vazquez
de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and that she is
admonished that it is her duty to return.

202
 ELOISA GOITIA Y DELA CAMARA, plaintiff vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant
No. 11263. November 2, 1916

Facts:
This is an action by the wife against the husband for support outside of the conjugal
domicile. Eloitia Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were legally married on January 7, 1915 and
established residence at San Marcelino where they lived together for one month because the wife
returned to the home of her parents due to the following reasons: that the husband demand wife
to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that whenever wife rejected
husband’s indecorous demands, husband would maltreat wife by words and inflict injuries on
wife’s lips, face and different parts of her body; and that because wife was unable to desist
husband’s repugnant desires and maltreatment, she was obliged to leave the conjugal home. The
wife also seeks for support from his husband even if she lives separately. The husband on the
other hand, seeks the relief of the courts in compelling his wife to return back to their conjugal
home.

Issue:
Whether or not the wife is compelled to return to the marital dwelling?

Ruling:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties
and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law
which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the legal existence is
merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the government
upon principles of public policy for the benefit of the society as well as the parties.
Marriage is an institution and its maintenance is in its purity which the public is deeply
interested. In the case at bar, when the continuance of the marriage becomes intolerable to one or
both parties and gives no possible good to the community, relief from the court should be
attainable. The Supreme Court made the observation that implied approval by the court of a
wife’s separate residence from her husband doe not necessarily violate the sacredness and
inviolability of the marriage. Since separation de-facto is allowed in this case, it is only due to
the fact that public peace and wife’s purity must be preserved.
Lastly, the husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to
support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful, illegal and unbearable
conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take the advantage of her
departure to abrogate his duty to still support his wife. In law, the wife is legally still within the
conjugal domicile, even if living separately, thus he is entitled to support and maintenance by the
husband.

203
 PASTOR TANCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA ESCANO, defendant-appellee
No. L-19671. November 29, 1965

Facts:
On February 24, 1948, Vicenta Escano and Pastor Tanchavez got married and the
marriage was unknown to the parents of Vicenta. The said marriage was solemnized by Lt.
Lavares, an Army Catholic Chaplain. Their marriage was the culmination of a previous love
affair and was duly registered with the local civil registrar.
Upon the knowledge of the parents of Vicenta, they took her to their house.
Consequently, she admitted her marriage with Tanchavez. Her parents were surprised because
Tanchavez never asked for the hand of Vicenta and were disgusted because of the great scandal
because of the clandestine marriage would provoke.
Thereafter, Vicenta continued to live with her parents, while tanchavez returned to
Manila to his job. As of June 1948, the newlyweds were already estranged. Vicenta filed a
petition to annul her marriage; however, she did not sign the said document. Thus, the case was
dismissed because of her non- appearance at the hearing.
In 1950, Vicenta left for United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint
for divorce. And on October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce, final and absolute was issued. In
1954, Vicenta married an American and she lived with him and begotten children.

Issue:
Whether or not Vicenta failed to perform her wifely duties.

Ruling:
It was held that the refusal to perform her wifely duties and her denial of consortium and
her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through he fault. Thus, the
husband is entitled for indemnity.

204
 DIOSDIDIT CUENCA, et al, petitioner, vs RESTITUTO CUENCA, et al
No. L-72321. December 8, 1988

Facts:
Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon- Cuenca were legally married, begotten two
children, Restituto and Meladora as their heirs. Maria Bangahon brought properties into her
marriage. Said property was inherited by her from her parents.
However, Agrapi had a second family who claimed to be the legitimate family of
Agrapino. Thus, they claimed that the said properties are the conjugal property of Agrapino and
Engracia, second wife.
The trial court decided in favor of the second family. However, the Court of Appeals
decided otherwise and thus favored the first family.

Issue:
Whether or not the said property of Maria is the conjugal property of Agripino and
Engracia.

Ruling:
The Court held that, the said property an exclusive property of Maria which she inherited
from her parents and brought it to the marriage. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that,
“all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Thus, heirs of Maria were able
to prove that that said property is the exclusive property of their mother Maria. On the other
hand, Engracia failed to prove otherwise.

205
 JANE GO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 114791. May 29, 1997

Facts:
Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1987. The video coverage of the
wedding was provided by the petitioner spouses Nancy and Alex Go. Spouses Ong claimed the
video of their wedding three times but they failed to have it. Because the newlywed couple will
be having their honeymoon in US, they agreed to have the video tape upon their return.
When the couple came home, they found out that the said tape had been erased by
spouses Go.
Furious at the lost of the tape which suppose to be the only record of their wedding. Thus,
they filed a complaint. The RTC rendered its decision making spouses Go liable to the said
erased tape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not Alex Go be held liable.

Ruling:
The Court held that, Alex Go argues that when his wife entered into the contract with
Ong, she was acting alone for her sole interest. Thus, they found it with merit. Under the law, a
wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the
husband.
Thus, it was only Nancy Go who entered into the contract. She is solely liable to the
complainant for the damage awarded.

206
 CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner vs. VDA. DE BATOCAEL, respondent
G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001

Facts:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zozima Montallana are owners of
several pieces of land. However, when Zosima died Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights. On June 27, 1961, Francisco registered those
said lots in his name.
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece
Leticia and His cousin Luzveminda and Cirila Abarca to take care of his house and the store as
well.
There are however conflicting testimonies as to the relationship of Francisco and Cirila.
Niece of Francisco, Leticia said that her uncle and Cirila were lovers and they slept in the same
room. Another niece of Fernando said that Francisco himself told her that Cirila is her mistress.
Cirila on the other hand claimed that they are not lovers nor she is a mistress of Francisco. She is
just a mere helper of Francisco.
Few months before the death of Francisco, he executed an instrument dominated “Deed
of Donation Inter Vivos” in favor of Cirila. Cirila on the other hand accepted the said donation.
A complaint was filed by the heirs of Francisco for the declaration of nullity of the deed
of donation inter vivos basing it on Article 87 of the Family Code.
Thus, the said donation was nullified by the RTC and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

Issue:
Whether or not the said donation is valid.

Ruling:
It was held by the Court that, Francisco and Cirila as proved by evidences and
testimonies, they actually lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. Thus, the
said donation is invalid or void basing it on Article 87 of the Family Code which provides: “
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect between the spouses during
the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage.

FELIX MATABUENA, plaintiff-appellant, vs.

207
 PETRONILA CERVANTES, defendant-appellee vs.
FELIX MATABUENA, plaintiff-appellent
No. L-28771. March 31, 1971

Facts:
Felix Matabuena donated a parcel of land to Petronila Cervantes while living martially
without the benefit of marriage.
The Deed of Donation was executed by Felix in Favor of Cervantes on February 20,
1956, which same donation was accepted by Cervantes.
After six years, they got married on March 28, 1962. Felix died on September 13, 1962.
after the death of Felix, Cornelia Matabuana, sister of Felix being the sole heir claimed that the
donation made by his brother is void for it was executed while her brother and Cervantes were
living together as husband and wife without the benefit of valid marriage.
The RTC decided in favor of Cervantes on the ground that the said prohibition is applied
only for couples living together with the benefit of a valid marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not the donation is valid.

Ruling:
The Court held that, while Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation
between the spouses during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well
as the dictates of morality requires that the same prohibition should be applied to a common-law
relationship,
However, the lack of validity of the donation to Cervantes does not necessarily result in
Cornelia’s exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix, the relationship
between him and Cervantes was legitimated by their marriage. Cervantes is therefore his widow.
Thus she is entitled to one-half of inheritance and Cornelia as the surviving sister, to the other
half.

208
 HILARIO GERCIO, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
SUN LIFE CO. OF CANADA, defendant-appellant
No. 23703. September 28, 1925

Facts:
Andrea Zialcita was the lawful wife of Hilario Gercio. Towards the end of the year 1919,
she was convicted of the crime of adultery. On September 4, 1920, a decree of divorce was
issued which had the effect of completely dissolving the bonds of matrimony contracted by
Hilario Gercio and Andrea Zialcita.
On march 4, 1922, Gercio notified the Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada that he had
revoked his donation in favor of Zialcita, and he had designated in her stead his present wife, as
the beneficiary of the policy. Gercio requested the company to eliminate Zialcita as beneficiary,
however, the company refused.

Issue:
Whether or not Gercio can change the beneficiary of the policy.

Ruling:
It was held by the Court that, the insured-the husband- has no power to change the
beneficiary- the former wife- and to name the stead his actual wife, where the policy of the
insurance does not expressly reserve to the insured the right to change the beneficiary.

HARDING, plaintiff-appellees vs.

209
 COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY, defendant-appellant
No. 12707. August 10, 1918

Facts:
A husband donated an automobile to his wife, who subsequently insured it for P 3,000.
When the car was later completely destroyed, the wife sought to recover the insurance
indemnity, but the insurance pleaded in defense that the wife had no insurable interest in the car,
the donation by the husband being void.

Issue:
Whether or not the insurance can raise the validity of the donation as a defense.

Ruling:
It was held by the Court that, the insurance company failed to show that the gift was not a
moderate one, considering the circumstances of the parties. Furthermore, even if the gift had not
been a moderate one, the company cannot assail the validity of the donation, because at the time
of the transfer, it was not a creditor.

210
 PACITA VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 143286. April 14, 2004

Facts:
Eusebia Napisa and Nicolas Retuya were married on October 7, 1926. out of the
marriage, they begotten five children. During their marriage, they acquired real properties.
In 1936, Nicolas started to cohabit with Pacita Villanueva and out of wedlock they had an
illegitimate child, Procopio Villanueva.
Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties, claiming
the subject properties are her conjugal properties with Nicolas. On November 23, 1996, Eusebia
died.
The RTC ruled in favor of Eusebia represented by her son. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the said decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not Eusebia has the right for the reconveyance of the said properties.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that in the affirmative. Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly
mandates that the Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code
to vest rights already acquired under the Civil Code. Thus, under the Family Code, if the
properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. This is
counter balanced by the requirement that properties must first be proven to have been acquired
during the marriage before it is presumed to be conjugal.
Eusebia was able to prove that those properties were acquired during their marriage.
Though Nicolas and Pacita cohabited, Nicolas and Eusebia were still married. Thus, any property
acquired during the period is considered conjugal, unless it is proven that Pacita contributed in
the acquisition of said property. However, Pacita failed to prove the exception.

211
 ALFREDO CHING, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 124642. February 23, 2004

Facts:
On September 26, 1978, PBMCI obtained a loan of P9,000,000 from Allied Banking
Corporation. On December 28, 1978, ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI through its
Executive Vice President Alfredo Ching. However, PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its
loans.
PBMCI and Alfredo Ching jointly filed a petition for suspension of payments with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and at the same time seeking the PBMCI’s rehabilitation.
On July 9, 1982, the SEC issued an order placing PBMCI’s business, including its assets
and liabilities under rehabilitation. In the mean time, on July 21, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the
trial court levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of stocks in the name of Ching.
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching filed a motion to set
aside the levy on attachment. She alleged that the 100,000 shares of stock levied on by the sheriff
were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds. Encarnacion
showed to the court copy of her marriage contract with Alfredo as an evidence.
The RTC ruled in her favor but the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision of the
RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the said 100,000 shares of stock be excluded from the case.

Ruling:
It was held by the court that, for conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability, that
should appertain to the husband alone, there must be showing that some advantages accrued to
the spouses. Certainly, to make conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should
appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show
the utmost concern for solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore,
is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the
conjugal partnership. ABC failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of Encarnacion and
Alfredo was benefited by Alfredo’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the respondents for and in behalf of PBMCI.

212
 ETERIA TAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
G.R. No. 120594. June 10, 1997

Facts:
On April 17,1989, a case for partition and accounting was instituted by the spouses
Alfonso and Eteria Tan against Alfonso’s brothers, Celestino and Maximo Tan.
Spouses claimed that 1/3 of the 906 square meter residential lot was brought to their
conjugal property during their marriage. However, brothers of Alfonso objected the claim. They
claimed that the subject property was inherited by them from their mother and was divided
among them, Alfonso, Celestino and Maximo.
Eteria, admitted that she is legally married to Alfonso but they were now living
separately by virtue of a decree of legal separation.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Alfonso and Eteria, however, the Court of
Appeals decided otherwise.

Issue:
Whether or not the said 1/3 of the subject property is a conjugal property of Eteria and
Alfonso.

Ruling:
It was held by the Court that, the Husband’s acquisition by succession of a parcel of land
during his marriage to his wife simply means that the lot is his exclusive property because it was
acquired by him during the marriage by lucrative title.

213
 JANE GO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 114791. May 29, 1997

Facts:
Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1987. The video coverage of the
wedding was provided by the petitioner spouses Nancy and Alex Go. Spouses Ong claimed the
video of their wedding three times but they failed to have it. Because the newlywed couple will
be having their honeymoon in US, they agreed to have the video tape upon their return.
When the couple came home, they found out that the said tape had been erased by
spouses Go.
Furious at the lost of the tape which suppose to be the only record of their wedding. Thus,
they filed a complaint. The RTC rendered its decision making spouses Go liable to the said
erased tape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not spouses Go be jointly held liable.

Ruling:
The Court held that, since the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in
business without the consent of the husband, the husband may not be held jointly and severally
liable with his wife for breach of a contract that the latter had entered into.

214
 BAUTISTA, plaintiff v. BERLINA SILVA, defendant
G.R. No.157434. September 19,2006

Facts:
A parcel of land was registered in the names of spouses Berlina Silva and Pedro Silva. In
1988, Pedro Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife Berlina, thru a Special Power of
Attorney executed by Berlina in his favor, signed and executed a Deed of absolute sale over the
said parcel of land in favor of defendants-spouses Carlo and Nida Bautista.
The RTC found out that the said Special Power of Attorney as signed by Berlina is a
forgery. It appears that the SPA was executed, when she was in Germany and has no knowledge
to the said execution with is tantamount to not consent. The defendants prayed that the share of
Berlina in the parcel of land sold to them be excluded and the share of Pedro be retained. Thus,
the RTC did not entertain the defendant’s prayer and ruled in favor of Berlina. On appeal, the
court of appeals affirmed the decision rendered by the RTC in toto.

Issue:
Whether or not the share of Berlina in the parcel of land to the defendants be excluded
and the share of Pedro be retained.

Held:
The court ruled that, the nullity of the sale of conjugal property contracted by the husband
without the marital consent of the wife affects the entire property not just the share of the wife.

215
 HOMEOWNER SAVINGS LOAN BANK, petitioner vs.
MARCELINO DAILO, respondent
G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005

Facts:
Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo Jr. are husband and wife who bought a house and lot.
The absolute deed of sale was executed only in favor of Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to
the exclusion of the wife.
In 1993, Marcelino obtained a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank
to be secured by the spouse house and lot. An amount of P300,000.00 was obtained as a loam
and a Real Estate Mortgage was executed on the subject property in favor of the petitioner. That
said transaction entered into took place without the knowledge and consent of the wife.
Upon maturity the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale
thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of the petitioner as the highest bidder. In 1995,
Marcelino died.
Miguela calimed that she had no knowledge of the mortgaged constituted on the subject
property which was conjugal in nature. The trial court rendered its decision favoring Miguela,
and it ordered the reconveyance of the subject property. On Appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial Courts decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the husband may sale the conjugal property even without the consent of
the wife.

Ruling:
The court ruled that, the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and wife. In the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void,
including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.

216
 ESTHER ABALOS, plaintiff v. MACATANGAY J.R., defendant
G.R. No.155043. September 30,2004

Facts:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owner of a parcel of land with
improvements. Armed with Special Power of Attorney, purportedly issued by his wife, Arturo
executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in Favor of respondent Macatangay, binding
himself to sell to respondent the subject property ad not to offer the same to any other party with
in thirty days (30) from date.
Subsequently, Arturo’s wife, Esther, executed a Special Power of Attorney appointing
her sister Ramos, to act for and in her behalf relative to the transfer of the property to respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not spouses can dispose their own share in the conjugal property even
without the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Held:
The court held that, even on the supposition that the parties only disposed of their
respective shares in the property the sale. Assuming that it exists, is still void because the right of
the husband and wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not rest until the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non habet. No one can give what he has not.

217
 MELANIA ROXAS, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 92245. June 26, 1991

Facts:
Melania Roxas and Antonio ROxas are husband and wife, however, they were living
separately. Plaintiff Petitioner Melania discovered that her estranged husband entered into a
contract of lead covering a portion of their conjugal lot.
Melania filed a complaint, however, the Trial Court Dismissed the same because the
complaint fails to satisfy the test of sufficiency of action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals,
affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

Issue:
Whether or not the husband may enter into a contract of lease involving conjugal real
property without the knowledge and consent of his wife.

Ruling:
The court held that, in the contract of lease the leesor transfers his rights of use in favor
of the lessee. The lessors right is impaired, therein. Therefore, lease is a burden o the land, it is
an emcoimferance on the land.
Thus, under Art.176 of the Civil Code, in care the wife’s consent is not secured by the
husband as required by law, the was has the remedy of filing an action for the annulment of the
contract.

218
 NICOLAS, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
No. L-37631. October 1987

Facts:
Anastacio Madlangsakay married to Lourdes Manuel Brought parcels of land. At the time
of purchase, petitioners were occupying one of the land’s as tenants. Anastacio sold that said
parcel of the land occupied by the tenants to them.
The controversy arose when criminal case of robbery was filed by Anastacio against the
petitioners when they allegedly cut bamboos from the said land. On the other hand, petitioners
filed a criminal case of perjury against Anastacio in encroaching on their rights by gathering the
fruits on the subject land.
Anastacio claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale that was executed is a forgery, there
being no marital consent from his wife as required by law. Thus, the said sale is null and void.
The RTC rendered judgment favoring Anastacio was the court of Appeals when the case
was about for appeal by the petitioners.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale of property being conjugal in nature without marital consent from
one is valid.

Ruling:
The court held that, the very conspicuous absence of the wife conform to such ganancial
property, there being no showing that Lourdes Manuel- wife of Anastacio is legally
incapacitated-renders the scale void ab initio.

219
 ELENA MULLER, petitioner vs. HELMUT MULLER, respondent
G.R. No. 149615. August 29,2006

Facts:
Elena Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany in 1989. they
resided at the house owned by the respondents parents but decided to move and reside in the
Philippines permanently in 1992. Helmut inherited the house in Germany from his parents and
sold it. He used the money to purchase a parcel of land and to construct a house in the
Philippines.
Elena filed a petition from legal separation due to incompatibilities. In 1996, the Regional
Trial Court rendered its judgment and terminated the regime of absolute community of property
of the spouses. It also decreed a legal separation of properties located in the country but
excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. However, respondent cannot
recover the funds because the property was purchased in violation of Sec.7, Art. XII of the
Constitution.
Respondent appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the regional Trial
Court. It ruled that respondent may claim reimbursement of the amount of the said property.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent can claim reimbursement of the property in dispute.

Ruling:
The court ruled that, the respondent was aware of the Constitutional Prohibition. He
declared that he had the property titled in the name of the Filipino wife because of the
Constitutional prohibition against aliens.
His claim a right in the said property cannot be sustained. In cases of hereditary
succession, respondents disqualification in owning lands in the Philippine is absolute. Not even
an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in isolation of an existing
statute and in evasion of its express provision, not trust can result in favor of the party who is
guilty of fraud.

220
 OPAZ OLIGORIO, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 104892. November 14, 1994

Facts:
Aurelia and Marciliano Go owned a parcel of land. The spouses were child less but
reared and educated Rivera, Paz Oligario and Socorro Teves- respondents. On the other hand,
Bonifacio Ologario is the brother of Marciliano and Adelaida is the niece of Aurelia.
Aurelia died on March 19, 1986. To preclude the heirs of his wife and to avoid the
payment of tax, Marciliano sold the property to the respondents. On 1988, Marciliano died
intestate.

Issue:
1) Whether or not Bonifacio and Adeliada have the legal right to inherit.
2) What is the proper liquidation of the said property?

Ruling:
1) The Court held that, the petitioners being the sole heir of the deceased, have the legal
right to inherit. The unlawful motive of Marciliano in selling the property rendered
the sale null and void.

2) The lot is presumed to be conjugal property. The death of Aurelia dissolved the
conjugal partnership. By virtue of such dissolution, ½ of the said property should
appertain to Marciliano as his share from the conjugal partnership and ¼ representing
his share as surviving spouse. Adelaida as the surviving niece of Aurelia is entitled to
¼ of the lot.

221
 NABLE-JOSE, plaintiff-appellant vs. NABLE-JOSE, respondent-appellee
41 P 713

Facts:
Couples were legally married, however, the marital bond was dissolved when the wife
died.

Issue:
Whether or not the surviving husband has the power to sell or mortgage the community
property after the death of his wife.

Held:
It was held by the court that, when a conjugal partnership is dissolved by the death of the
wife, the surviving husband and not the judicial administrator appointed in the proceedings for
the settlement of the wife’s estate, is entitled to the possession of the property of the conjugal
partnership until he has liquidated its affairs; the husband is the administrator of the affairs of the
conjugal partnership until they are finally settled and liquidated; and that the liquidation is to be
conducted by him as administrator. Thus, the husband has the power to dispose properties for
settlements of debts but not for his own interest if the said sale is prior liquidation.

222
 DIOSDIDIT CUENCA, et al, petitioner, vs RESTITUTO CUENCA, et al
No. L-72321. December 8, 1988

Facts:
Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon- Cuenca were legally married, begotten two
children, Restituto and Meladora as their heirs. Maria Bangahon brought properties into her
marriage. Said property was inherited by her from her parents.
However, Agrapi had a second family who claimed to be the legitimate family of
Agrapino. Thus, they claimed that the said properties are the conjugal property of Agrapino and
Engracia, second wife.
The trial court decided in favor of the second family. However, the Court of Appeals
decided otherwise and thus favored the first family.

Issue:
Whether or not the conjugal property be affected by the de facto separation.

Ruling:
The Court held that, properties in the conjugal partnership will still remain. There being
no judicial declaration of legal separation nor legal separation of conjugal properties.

223
 WONG, petitioner vs. COURT OFAPPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 70082. August 19, 1991

Facts:
Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda got married in 1964, out of their marriage they
have three children, but during the early age of their marriage, they had been living separately.
Romarico bought a parcel of land for PhP 11, 492 from his father and the money he used was
barrowed by him from his officemate.
Year later, a complaint was filed against Katrina holding her civilly liable because of her
debt from the jewelries she purchased from Wong and for the issuance of check which was
dishonored for lack of fund.
The RTC rendered its decision and held Katrina liable for those offenses incurred against
Wong. Hence, said liability was charged against the property bought by Henson.
Henson on the other hand objected the said decision contending that, the said property is
his exclusive property because he bought it using his own fund and did not know anything about
the transactions entered into by her wife.
RTC favored him, so as the Court of Appeals who affirmed the decision of the RTC in
toto in his favor.

Issue:
Whether or not the said property be held liable for the offense incurred by the wife.

Ruling:
The Court held that, on the matter of ownership of the property involved, the Court
disagrees with the appellate court that the said property is exclusively owned by Henson. Having
been acquired during the marriage, they are still presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
even though Henson and Katrina had been living separately.
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption or to prove that the property
is exclusively owned by Henson. While there is proof that Henson acquired the property with the
money he loaned from his officemate, if he paid out of his salaries, then the money is part of the
conjugal assets and not exclusively his.

224
 PRIMA PARTOSA-JO, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992

Facts:
Jo having cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children. The first of those
women is Partosa- Jo, his legal wife whom he fathered one daughter.
Partosa-Jo filed a complaint for legal separation of property and an action for support
against his husband Jo. Thus, based on the facts presented, the RTC rendered its decision in
favor of Partosa-Jo ordering Jo to support her and the child. However, the trial court failed to
provide in its depositive portion as to its decision concerning the legal separation of conjugal
properties.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal contending that the said complaint
lacks merit because such claim was based on their mutual agreement and thus there is no
abandonment.

Issue:
Whether of not legal separation of conjugal properties be declared.

Ruling:
The Court held that, abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed
intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause and without in the
meantime providing in the least for one’s family although able to do so. There must be absolute
cessation of marital relations, duties and rights with the intent of perpetual separation.
As shown by evidences presented, Jo refused to accept Pertosa-Jo in their conjugal
dwelling without just cause and even denied that they were married. Thus, such act is tantamount
to abandonment.

225
 DOROTEA DE OCAMPO, petitioner-appellant vs.
NICOLAS DELIZO, respondent-appellee
Nos. L-32820-21. January 30, 1976

Facts:
Nicolas Delizo contracted two marriages, first was in 1891 with Rosa Villasfer and their
marriage ended in 1909 when Villasfer died. In his first marriage, he had three children. His
second marriage was in 1911 with Dorotea de Ocampo and it ended when Delizo died on May 3,
1957. Out of the second marriage, he had nine children.
On April 15, 1957 before the death of Delizo, an action for partition was instituted by his
son and daughter in his first marriage, all against him and de Ocampo. de Ocampo opposed the
said partition, claiming that the properties described in the complaint were those of the second
marriage.
Those subject properties were alleged to be acquired by Nicolas as homestead during the
first marriage, however, the requirements for the patent were perfected on the second marriage.
Thus, improvements of the said property were introduced during the second marriage through the
joint effort of Nicolas and de Ocampo.

Issue:
how should the subject properties be liquidated?

Ruling:
The Court held that, the decisive factor in the determination of whether a parcel of land
acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the first or second marriage is not
necessary the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfillment of the
requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such right to the patent.
There is the established facts that the produce of the lands acquired homestead
contributed considerably to the acquisition of the properties acquired during the existence of the
second marriage. Also the children of the first marriage as a matter of equity should share in the
properties acquired by homestead.

VDA. DE CONSEGRUA, petitioner-appellant vs.

226
 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondent-appellee
No. L-28093. January 30, 1971

Facts:
At the time of death of Jose Consuegra, he was an employee of the Office of the District
Engineer of Surigao del Norte. In his life time, he contracted two marriages, the first with Diaz
whom he fathered two children but predeceased him; and the second marriage in which he
contracted in good faith, seven children were born.
Being a member of GSIS, when he died the proceeds of his life insurance were paid by
GSIS to Berdin his second wife and to seven children who were the beneficiaries of the said
policy. Having been in the government service for twenty years, he was entitled to retirement
insurance benefits in the sum of PhP 6, 304. 47. However, he did not designate any beneficiary
who would receive the retirement benefits due to him.
First wife Diaz filed a cliam with GSIS asking that the retirement insurance benefits be
paid to her as the only legal heir of Jose. Berdin on the other hand claimed that the benefits be
paid to her and to their children being the designated beneficiaries of the life insurance.
To solve the conflict, GSIS divided the said amount of benefits equally to both parties.
Dissatisfied with the apportionment made by GSIS, petitioner filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance. The said court upheld the division made by GSIS.

Issue:
Whether or not the liquidation is proper.

Ruling:
The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance. Thus, the court held that,
in construing the rights of two women who were married to the same man since the deceased
first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void, the conjugal partnership established by
that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir
of her husband under the New Civil Code, entitled to share in the estate upon his death should
she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partnership in a still subsisting marriage or
as such putative heir has an interest in the husband’s share in the property in dispute. And with
respect to the second wife, the Court observed that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting,
still there is a need for judicial declaration of nullity. And in as much as the conjugal partnership
formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “the only
just and equitable solution is to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in
the property acquired by her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage.

227
REMEDIOS G. SALVADOR and MA. GRACIA G. SALVADOR, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, ALBERTO and ELPIA YABO, FRANCISCA YABO, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 109910. April 5, 1995.

Facts:
Alipio Yabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180. Title thereto devolved
upon his nine children, namely, Victoriano, Procopio, Lope, Jose, Pelagia, Baseliza, Francisca,
Maria, and Gaudencia, upon his death sometime before or during the second world war.
On April 28, 1976, Pastor Makibalo, husband of Maria Yabo, child of Alipio filed with
the Court of First Instance a complaint against the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo. In such
complaint, Pastor alleged that he owned a total of 8 shares of the said lots having purchased the
share of seven of Alipio’s children and inherited the share of his wife Maria, and that except for
the portion corresponding to Gaudencia’s share which he did not buy, he occupied, cultivated
and possessed continuously, openly, peacefully and exclusively the two parcels of land. He
therefore prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of 8/9 of the lots questioned.
The trial court rendered judgment, finding Pastor, now Eugelio Salvador and Remedios
Salvador owners of eight shares on Lot No.6080 and some shares on Lot No.6180.
On October 8, 1976, the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the late Alipio Yabo
lodged within the same court a complaint for partition and quieting of title with damages against
Pastor, Enecia, Cristal, and the spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador. They alleged that the
aforesaid lots are common properties of the heirs of Alipio and that the defendants after Alipio’s
death became the de facto administrators of the lots and to their surprise discovered that the
Salvadors have been harvesting coconuts from the lots.
The plaintiffs prayed that they and the defendant be declared as the owners of the lots and
that the Salvador spouses be declared as having no rights thereto. The two cases thereby were
consolidated and jointly heard. The trial court however ruled against the plaintiffs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Maria did not sell her share to Alberto and
Elpia Yabo; that prescription and laches have not ran against the private respondents with respect
to the 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and to her conjugal share in the portions
acquired from her brother and sisters and Procopio never sold his share in Lot. No. 6080 to
Pastor Makibalo.

Issue:
Whether or not, the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, Baseliza, Procopio and Francisca in
Lot No.6180 and in Lot No. 6080 which had been purchased by Pastor during his marriage with
Maria is the husband’s exclusive property.

Ruling:
No.
The Court ruled that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to either of them. In the instant case,
the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, Baseliza, Procopio and Francisca in Lot No.6180 and in Lot
No. 6080 had been purchased by Pastor during his marriage with Maria. Such shares would have
been the exclusive property of Pastor had there been proof that the properties were acquired or
purchased by him with his exclusive money. Thus, absent such proof the same was deemed by
the Court to belong to the conjugal partnership of Pastor and Maria.

228
 CESAR SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
HON. REGINA G. ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, as the Presiding Judge of Branch XLVII of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, NORMA
SARMIENTO, LORNA SARMIENTO and LERMA SARMIENTO, respondents.
G.R. No. 75409. August 17, 1987.

Facts:
Petitioner Cesar Sarmiento was married to private respondent Norma Sarmiento. On May
10, 1977, private respondent Norma sued her husband, Cesar, for support. The case was filed
with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and later assigned to Regional Trial Court,
Branch XLVII, presided over by Judge Regina Ordoñez-Benitez. On March 1, 1984, Judge
Ordoñez-Benitez rendered a decision ordering the defendant, Cesar, to pay his wife, Norma, the
sum of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) monthly as support.
On August 1, 1984, the private respondent brought another action against the petitioner
for a declaration that the retirement benefits due the petitioner from the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) were conjugal and that 50% thereof belonged to the private respondent as her share.
Branch XXVII of the RTC of Manila rendered a decision ordering the PNB to desist and
refrain from releasing to defendant Cesar all monetary benefits and emoluments which may be
due him by reason of his retirement from service, but instead, to deliver one-half (1/2) thereof to
his wife.

Issue:
Whether or not the order of RTC Branch XXVII is proper when it ordered the freeze of
one-half (1/2) of the retirement benefits of Cesar, as allegedly a conjugal property of the spouses.

Ruling:
No.
The default judgment dated February 20, 1986 which ordered the PNB to desist and
refrain from releasing to petitioner all monetary benefits and emoluments due him as retirement
benefits and to deliver one-half thereof to private respondent comes within the prohibition
imposed by Sec. 26, as amended, of the GSIS Charter which states: "Sec. 26. Exemption from
legal process and liens. No policy of life insurance issued under this Act, or the proceeds
thereof, when paid to any member thereunder, nor any other benefit granted under this Act, shall
be liable to attachment, garnishment, or other process, or to be seized, taken, appropriated, or
applied by any legal or equitable process or operation of law to pay any debt or liability of such
member, or his beneficiary, or any other person who may have a right thereunder, either before
or after payment; nor shall the proceeds thereof; when not made payable to a named
beneficiary, constitute a part of the estate of the member for payment of his debt: Provided,
however, That this section shall not apply when obligations or indebtedness to the System and
the employer are concerned, nor when the retirement annuity is assigned to any person,
corporation, association or bank or other financial institution, which is hereby authorized."
This, in effect, is a freeze order which is illegal and improper.
The directive to deliver one-half (1/2) of the retirement benefits to private respondent
makes the default judgment doubly illegal because retirement benefits have been adjudged as
gratuities or reward for lengthy and faithful service of the recipient and should be treated as
separate property of the retiree-spouse. Thus, if the monetary benefits are given gratis by the
government because of previous work, this is a gratuity and should be considered separate
property.

229
 CONSOLACION VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, JESUS BERNAS and REMEDIOS Q. BERNAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 74577. December 4, 1990.

Facts:
Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were the owners of a parcel of land
identified as Lot 13. After they died, their surviving children, Modesto Aranas and Federico
Aranas, adjudicated the land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition executed on
May 2, 1952. The southern portion, described as Lot 13-C, was thereby assigned to Modesto; the
northern, to Federico.
On March 21, 1953, Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name. He died on
April 20, 1973 while his wife, Victoria Comorro, predeceased him dying on July 16, 1971. They
had no children but Modesto was survived by two (2) illegitimate children named Dorothea
Aranas Ado and Teodoro C. Aranas. These two borrowed P18,000.00 from Jesus Bernas. As
security therefor they mortgaged to Bernas their father's property, Lot 13-C.
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result, Bernas caused the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage over Lot 13-C on June 29, 1977 and acquired the land.
On November 24, 1978, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a
complaint against Jesus Bernas and his spouse, Remedios Bernas. They alleged that they be
declared as co-owners of the land as stated in the will they have discovered that was executed by
Victoria Comorro.
The trial court declared the defendants spouses Jesus Bernas and Remedios O. Bernas as
legal owners of Lot No. 13-C and including all the improvements thereon;
The plaintiffs appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, where they succeeded only
in having the award of actual and moral damages deleted, the judgment of the trial court having
been otherwise affirmed in toto.
From this judgment of the Appellate Court, Consolacion Villanueva appealed to the
Supreme Court. Her co-plaintiff, Raymundo Aranas, did not.

Issue:
Whether or not Lot 13-C is a conjugal property of spouses Modesto Aranas and Victoria
Comorro which gives Consolacion Villanueva all of said Victoria's interests, rights and
properties, real and personal as her net share from the conjugal partnership property with her
husband, Modesto Aranas.

Ruling:
No.
Lot 13-C was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria Comorro and her husband,
Modesto Aranas. It was the latter's exclusive, private property, which he had inherited from his
parents Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa as provided in Article 148 of the Civil Code that
to be considered as the exclusive property of each spouse is inter alia, that which is brought to
the marriage as his or her own, or that which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative
title. Thus, even if it be assumed that Modesto's acquisition by succession of Lot 13-C took place
during his marriage to Victoria Comorro, the lot would nonetheless be his exclusive property
because acquired by him, during the marriage, by lucrative title.
Moreover, Victoria Comorro died on July 16, 1971, about two years ahead of her
husband, Modesto Aranas, exclusive owner of Lot 13-C, who passed away on April 20, 1973.
Victoria never therefore inherited any part of Lot 13-C and hence, had nothing of Lot 13-C to
bequeath by will or otherwise to Consolacion Villanueva.

230
 ALFONSO TAN and ETERIA TEVES TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES CELESTINO U. TAN and ROSARIO DY KUSHIN and SPOUSES MAXIMO
U. TAN and TERESITA SY TAN, respondents.
G. R. No. 120594. June 10, 1997.

Facts:
Eteria Teves Tan was married to Alfonso U. Tan but they were now living separately by
virtue of a decree of legal separation rendered by the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
on August 31, 1977.
On April 17, 1989, a case for partition and accounting was instituted by the spouses
Alfonso and Eteria Tan against herein private respondents who are Alfonso's brothers, Celestino
and Maximo, and their respective wives, Rosario and Teresita. It was alleged in the complaint
that the parties are co-owners of a 906-square meter residential lot with improvements thereon
situated at Banaue, Cebu City acquired sometime in 1970. Pursuant to the provisions of Article
494 of the New Civil Code, the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan, being co-owners to the extent of
one-third (1/3) portion of the aforesaid lot, sought partition of the same.
On January 16, 1990, Alfonso U. Tan filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss
contending that the case was filed only at the instance of his estranged wife, Eteria, and that he
had no claim whatsoever against his brothers insofar as the family business is concerned.
On July 12, 1991, a decision was rendered after trial finding that the 906-square meter lot
with improvements was acquired by the three (3) brothers by sale through installments and so it
should be partitioned equally among them and their respective wives. Consequently, since the lot
was acquired during the marriage of petitioner and Alfonso, the former could not be deprived of
her share of the one-third portion which is the conjugal property of the spouses.
Spouses Celestino and Rosario Tan and the spouses Maximo and Teresita Tan, interposed
an appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, reversed and set aside the said judgment.
Respondent court ruled that although the subject property was acquired during the marriage of
the spouses Eteria and Alfonso, it was established by the Tan brothers that the same was
inherited from their mother, hence, their exclusive property.

Issue:
Whether or not the property in dispute was inherited by Alfonso, Celestino and Maximo
from their late mother, Trinidad Uy Tan, making one-third of the said portion an exclusive
property of Alfonso.

Ruling:
Yes.
Conclusive evidence points to the fact that the undivided one-third (1/3) of the parcel of
land in question is not the conjugal partnership property of the spouses Alfonso Tan and Eteria
Teves Tan. It is the former's exclusive property which he had inherited from his mother, Trinidad
Uy, the original owner of the property.
Although acquired during Alfonso's marriage to Eteria, the said property should be
regarded as Alfonso's own exclusively, as a matter of law pursuant to Article 148 of the Civil
Code which provides that: Article 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each
spouse: xxx that which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is then affirmed.

231
 MANOTOK REALTY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
FELIPE MADLANGAWA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-45038. April 30, 1987.

Facts:
Private respondent Felipe Madlangawa claims that he has been occupying a parcel of
land in the Clara de Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being
obtained from Andres Ladores, then an overseer of the subdivision.
On April 2, 1950, the owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate,
including her paraphernal properties which covered the lot occupied by the private respondent
were placed under custodia legis.
On April 22, 1950, the private respondent made a deposit for the said lot in the sum of
P1,500.00 which was received by Vicente Legarda, husband of the late owner, which was
appointed as a special administrator of the estate on April 28, 1950.
Subsequently, petitioner Manotok Realty Inc., became the successful bidder and vendee
of the Tambunting-Legarda Subdivision consisting of 44 parcels of land pursuant to the deeds of
sale executed in its favor by the Philippine Trust Company on March 13 and 20, 1959, as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda. The lot in dispute was one
of those covered by the sale and private respondent was one of the many occupants who refused
to vacate the lots they were occupying, so that on April 26, 1968, the petitioner filed an action to
recover the said lot.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the only right remaining to the petitioner is to enforce the
collection of the balance of payment from private respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not the property sold by Vicente Legarda to private respondent is conjugal
making the sale valid, binding, and enforceable against the petitioner.

Ruling:
No.
Article 136 of the Civil Code provides that The wife retains the ownership of the
paraphernal property while Article 137 states that The wife shall have the administration of the
paraphernal property, unless she delivers the same to the husband by means of a public
instrument empowering him to administer it.
It is not proved that Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal properties
of Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have
validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator of the paraphernal properties
of Clara Tambunting. It is also undisputed that the probate court appointed Vicente Legarda as
administrator of the estate only on August 28, 1950, more than three months after the questioned
sale had taken place.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. Private
respondent is ordered to surrender the material and physical possession of the lot to the petitioner
because the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab initio, the
former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property.

232
 RAMON C. ONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCO BOIX and
ARSENIO CAMINO AS DEPUTY SHERIFF OF CAMARINES NORTE, respondents.
G.R. No. 63025. November 29, 1991.

Facts:
Teodora B. Ong conducted her own logging business in Camarines Sur. In furtherance of
her business operation, on August 18, 1955, she secured from Francisco Boix a loan in the
amount of P2,827.83. Unfortunately, because of mismanagement, Teodora defaulted in her
obligation. This prompted Boix to file a complaint against Teodora and Ramon Ong, the latter
being joined as husband of the former. Defendant-spouses were declared in default and judgment
was rendered, in favor of Boix. After the decision became final and executory, Boix moved to
execute the judgment. The motion was granted and a corresponding writ of execution was issued.
Accordingly, the Sheriff of Camarines Norte levied and attached a parcel of land in the
sole name of Teodora B. Ong. In a notice of levy or Execution and notice of Public Auction sale,
auction sales was held on October 10, 1958 with defendant Boix having adjudged as highest
bidder.
On November 16, 1961, Ramon C. Ong filed a complaint against defendants Arsenio
Camino as Deputy Sheriff of Camarines Norte and Francisco Boix, to annul the auction sale of a
parcel of land, allegedly owned conjugally by plaintiff and his former wife Teodora B. Ong,
awarded in favor of Boix, as highest bidder, in an auction sale conducted by Deputy Sheriff
Camino.
Petitioner contends that the auction sale of the property in dispute is null and void; that
the subject property is really conjugal which the wife in the case at bar could not legally bind,
and considering that the indebtedness was contracted by the wife only, the levy of the subject
property not owned exclusively by the wife but owned jointly with the husband is improper.
The subject property is paraphernal property, in view of the fact that it was declared,
under Tax No. 05378, in the name of Teodora B. Ong while the house erected thereon was
declared under Tax No. 06022 in the name of Ramon C. Ong and Teodora B. Ong is petitioner's
claim that the subject property is conjugal. Petitioner stresses heavily on the fact that since the
surname "Ong" (which is the surname of the husband Ramon C. Ong) was carried by Teodora in
the tax declaration, that indicates that the subject property was acquired during the marriage. By
reason thereof, the property in dispute is presumed to be owned jointly by both spouses.

Issue:
Whether or not the property in dispute was a conjugal ownership of spouses Ramon and
Teodora Ong.

Ruling:
No.
The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property
is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore
conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wife's name, but the
house built thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. Under such circumstances, coupled
with a careful scrutiny of the records of the present case, the Supreme Court held that the lot in
question is paraphernal, and is therefore, liable for the personal debts of the wife.

233
ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 124642. February 23, 2004.

Facts:
On September 26, 1978, the Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI)
obtained a loan of P9,000,000.00 from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this
loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory
note for the said amount promising to pay on December 22, 1978 at an interest rate of 14% per
annum. As added security for the said loan, on September 28, 1978, Alfredo Ching, together with
Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding
themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing
the ABC to the extent of P38,000,000.00. The loan was subsequently renewed on various dates,
the last renewal having been made on December 4, 1980.
Earlier, on December 28, 1979, the ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the
amount of P13,000,000.00 payable in eighteen months at 16% interest per annum. As in the
previous loan, the PBMCI, through Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note to evidence the
loan maturing on June 29, 1981. This was renewed once for a period of one month.
The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans. Hence, on August 21, 1981, the
ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against
the PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank
charges.
In the meantime, on July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court levied on
attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching.
On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband Alfredo Ching,
filed a Motion to set aside the levy on attachment. She alleged inter alia that the 100,000 shares
of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out
of conjugal funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines. Furthermore, the indebtedness
covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by petitioner
Alfredo Ching for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.

Issue:
Whether or not the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in the name of
petitioner-husband should be set aside for the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature;
hence, not liable for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the PBMCI.

Ruling:
Yes.
Article 161 (1) of the New Civil Code now Article 121 (2 and 3) of the Family Code of
the Philippines provides: “The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership.
The Supreme Court held in this case that the private respondent failed to prove that the
conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing
a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of
PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the
benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-
husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal
partnership would thereby be benefited.

234
SPOUSES VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES B. MIAT and ALEXANDER
V. MIAT, petitioners, vs. ROMEO V. MIAT, respondent.
G.R. No. 143297. February 11, 2003.

Facts:
Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought two parcels of land during their coverture.
The first is located in Parañaque, Metro Manila and the second is located in Paco, Manila.
Concordia died on April 30, 1978. They had two children: Romeo and Alexander.
While at Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Moises agreed that the Parañaque and Paco
properties would be given to Romeo and Alexander. However, when Moises returned in 1984, he
renegotiated the agreement with Romeo and Alexander. He wanted the Parañaque property for
himself but would leave the Paco property to his two sons. They agreed.
It appears that Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property on installment basis on
May 17, 1977. However, it was only on December 14, 1984 that Moises was able to pay its
balance. He secured the title over the property in his name as a widower. According to Romeo,
Moises violated the agreement that their (Romeo’s and Alexander’s) names would be registered
in the title once the balance was paid.
Romeo and Alexander lived on the Paco property but in April 1988, Alexander agreed to
sell to Romeo his share in the Paco property.
In February 1988, Romeo learned that Rosalina Castro, mother of petitioner Virgilio
Castro, had given Moises P30, 000.00 as down payment for the sale by Moises of the Paco
property to her son. Romeo was informed that the Paco property had been sold to Castro by
Moises by virtue of a deed of sale dated December 5, 1988 for P95, 000.00. Alexander testified
that after the sale, his father got one-third of the proceeds while he received two-thirds. Romeo
did not get a single centavo.
Romeo then filed an action to nullify the sale between Moises and the Castro spouses and
to compel Moises and Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance of the Paco property to him
upon payment of the balance of its agreed price.
The petitioners contend that the Paco property is the capital property of Moises. They
allege that the spouses Moises and Concordia purchased the property on installment basis in
1977 but stress that it was Moises who paid the balance of P12, 000.00 pesos in 1984. At that
time, Concordia had long been dead.

Issue:
Whether or not the Paco property is the capital property of Moises.

Ruling:
No.
The Paco property is a conjugal property of Moises and Concordia. Since Moises and
Concordia were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, the provisions of the New
Civil Code apply. Article 153(1) of the New Civil Code provides that “The following are
conjugal partnership property: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of
the spouses; x x x.” Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during their marriage —
Moises did not bring it into their marriage, hence it has to be considered as conjugal.
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that “all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.”
Petitioners-spouses Castro were not buyers in good faith. A purchaser in good faith must
be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. It was proven that Romeo told
Virgilio in a meeting that Romeo has a right over the Paco property by virtue of an oral partition
and assignment. Virgilio even admitted that he knew Romeo was in possession of the title and
Romeo then insisted that he is the owner of the property. Petitioners-spouses therefore have no
right in the property.

235
 TERESITA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS; and
CONCHITA EVANGELISTA and Her Husband SIMEON EVANGELISTA; ARACELI
F. MARILLA and Her Husband FREDDY MARILLA; ANTONIO V. FRANCISCO; and
EUSEBIO FRANCISCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 102330. November 25, 1998.

Facts:
Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco by his second
marriage. Private respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco
are children of Eusebio by his first marriage.
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10, 1962, she and Eusebio have
acquired the following: (1) a sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment house
and; (2) a house and lot located at Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further avers that these properties
were administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease
and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to administer them. Petitioner also claims that private
respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney which
authorized Conchita Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with the apartments
situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said general
power of attorney. Petitioner also sought to be declared as the administratrix of the properties in
dispute. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents. It held
that the petitioner failed to adduce proof that said properties were acquired during the existence
of the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject properties are conjugal properties of the spouses.

Ruling:
No.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife". However, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition
sine qua non for the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership but petitioner failed to
adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were
acquired during her marriage with Eusebio.
Property already owned by a spouse prior to the marriage, and brought to the marriage, is
considered his or her separate property. As regards the house, apartment and sari-sari store,
petitioner relied on the building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the
applicant although in the name of Eusebio. She also invoked the business license for the sari-sari
store issued in her name alone. It must be emphasized that the aforementioned documents in no
way prove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. And the fact that
one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property
is conjugal or not.
Regarding the property at San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, private respondents assert that
their father purchased it during the lifetime of their mother. In contrast, petitioner claims
ownership over said property inasmuch as the title thereto is registered in the name of "Eusebio
Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco." It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon
which petitioner anchors her claim is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the
name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco", is no proof that the property was
acquired during the spouses coverture.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

236
 CONCESO DIAZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TOMAS DE GUZMAN,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-42180. November 10, 1986.

Facts:
The late Teodulo Diaz, who died intestate before the last World War, was the registered
owner of a tract of land located in Ilagan, Isabela. He was survived by his wife Maria Espejo
(now also deceased) and five children, one of whom is the herein petitioner Conceso Diaz.
On June 9, 1947, the widow, Maria Espejo sold a portion of the land to herein private
respondent Tomas de Guzman. The transaction was evidenced by a Deed of Sale.
Tomas de Guzman declared the land he purchased for taxation purposes, and he has been
paying the taxes thereon. In a letter dated September 22, 1971 private respondent requested the
Register of Deeds of Isabela to issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title of the land
conveyed. The Register of Deeds in turn wrote a letter to petitioner Conceso Diaz to surrender
the owner's duplicate certificate of title in order that the deed of sale could be properly annotated.
Due to the refusal of petitioner to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of title, de Guzman
had to file on April 5, 1972, in the Court of First Instance of Isabela, a petition for the surrender
of the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title in the name of the late Teodulo Diaz.
Among his contention, Diaz argued that the property sold is part of the intestate estate of
his late father, thus, Maria Espejo did not have any judicial authority to sell the portion of the lot
in question.

Issue:
Whether or not the property of Teodulo Diaz and Maria Espejo is conjugal giving her the
authority to sell the lot in question to Tomas De Guzman.

Ruling:
Yes.
Upon a consideration of the established facts, it was shown that the property was
acquired during the existence of the conjugal partnership. It is a settled rule that adjudication of
real property to one of the spouses only, does not necessarily mean that it is his or her exclusive
property, if said land was acquired during the marriage.
Upon the death of Teodulo Diaz, the land was divided into two, one-half became the
conjugal share of Maria Espejo and the other half became the hereditary share of the heirs of
Teodulo Diaz by operation of law.
When Maria Espejo Vda. de Diaz sold the lot to respondent in 1947, she did not sell the
same as an administratrix; she sold it as owner of the other half. There was, therefore, no need
for any judicial authority for her to sell her own property or share in the conjugal partnership.

237
 AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION
CHING, respondents.
G.R. No. 118305. 12 February 1998.

Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50, 300,000 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the credit line
extended to PBM, respondents Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executes
security agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable with BM’s indebtedness to
AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the Court of First Instance (CFI).
The CFI rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P 50,300,000 with interests.
Pending appeal of judgment in the civil case, upon motion of AIDC, the lower court
issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Upon AIDC’s putting up of an P8,000,000 bond, a
writ of execution was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr. appointed sheriff in
the civil case caused the issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of a sheriff
sale on three of their conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the auction sale of
the properties levied.
Upon application of private respondents, the lower court issued a temporary restraining
order to prevent petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of
execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction.
However, after filing of a petition for certiorari by AIDC, the CA issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the lower court from enforcing its order, thus paving the way for the
scheduled auction sale of respondents-spouses conjugal properties.
The auction sale took place, AIDC being the only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale
by petitioner Magsajo which was registered.
Eventually, the trial court promulgated its decision declaring the sale on execution null
and void. The CA promulgated the assailed decision, affirming the decision of the RTC which
held that “the loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC was for the advancement and
benefit of the PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioner-appellees.

Issue:
Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by respondent husband alone in this
case are considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership which is chargeable against the
conjugal partnership.

Ruling:
No.
Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law
presumes and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e. he directly
received money and services to be used in and for his own business or his own profession, that
contract falls within the term “obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Here, no
actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit of the family in apparent at the time
of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family
stands to benefit from the loan or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband.

238
REMEDIOS G. SALVADOR and MA. GRACIA G. SALVADOR, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, ALBERTO and ELPIA YABO, FRANCISCA YABO, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. 109910. April 5, 1995.

Facts:
Alipio Yabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180. Title thereto devolved
upon his nine children, namely, Victoriano, Procopio, Lope, Jose, Pelagia, Baseliza, Francisca,
Maria, and Gaudencia, upon his death sometime before or during the second world war.
On April 28, 1976, Pastor Makibalo, husband of Maria Yabo, child of Alipio filed with
the Court of First Instance a complaint against the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo. In such
complaint, Pastor alleged that he owned a total of 8 shares of the said lots having purchased the
share of seven of Alipio’s children and inherited the share of his wife Maria, and that except for
the portion corresponding to Gaudencia’s share which he did not buy, he occupied, cultivated
and possessed continuously, openly, peacefully and exclusively the two parcels of land. He
therefore prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of 8/9 of the lots questioned.
The trial court rendered judgment, finding Pastor, now Eugelio Salvador and Remedios
Salvador owners of eight shares on Lot No.6080 and some shares on Lot No.6180.
On October 8, 1976, the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the late Alipio Yabo
lodged within the same court a complaint for partition and quieting of title with damages against
Pastor, Enecia, Cristal, and the spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador. They alleged that the
aforesaid lots are common properties of the heirs of Alipio and that the defendants after Alipio’s
death became the de facto administrators of the lots and to their surprise discovered that the
Salvadors have been harvesting coconuts from the lots.
The plaintiffs prayed that they and the defendant be declared as the owners of the lots and
that the Salvador spouses be declared as having no rights thereto. The two cases thereby were
consolidated and jointly heard. The trial court however ruled against the plaintiffs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Maria did not sell her share to Alberto and
Elpia Yabo; that prescription and laches have not ran against the private respondents with respect
to the 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and to her conjugal share in the portions
acquired from her brother and sisters and Procopio never sold his share in Lot. No. 6080 to
Pastor Makibalo.

Issue:
Whether or not, the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, Baseliza, Procopio and Francisca in
Lot No.6180 and in Lot No. 6080 which had been purchased by Pastor during his marriage with
Maria belong to their conjugal partnership.

Ruling:
Yes.
The Court ruled that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to either of them. In the instant case,
the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, Baseliza, Procopio and Francisca in Lot No.6180 and in Lot
No. 6080 had been purchased by Pastor during his marriage with Maria. Such shares would have
been the exclusive property of Pastor had there been proof that the properties were acquired or
purchased by him with his exclusive money. Thus, absent such proof the same was deemed by
the Court to belong to the conjugal partnership of Pastor and Maria.

239
 Spouses DANILO and ALBERTA DOMINGO, and EDUARDO QUITEVES, Petitioners,
vs. GUILLERMO REED, Respondent.
G.R. No. 157701. December 9, 2005.

Facts:
Respondent Guillermo Reed was an overseas contract worker from 1978 to 1986 and
came home only for short vacations. He purchased from the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) on installment basis a 166 square meter property. Because he was working
abroad, it was his wife, Lolita Reed, who paid the consideration to the GSIS. The title covering
said property was issued by the Registry of Deeds in the name of Lolita Reed, married to
Guillermo Reed.
Guillermo had allowed his brother, Dominador, and the latter’s wife, Luz, to stay in the
house constructed on his property.
In December, 1991, Dominador and Luz Reed were summoned to the barangay in
connection with the complaint for ejectment filed against them by Eduardo Quiteves and Alberta
Domingo, who claimed to be the owners of the lot where their house stands. Guillermo denied
having sold his property.
On March 8, 1994, Guillermo filed a complaint for reconveyance of property against
Lolita, spouses Ardaniel and Natividad Villanera, spouses Danilo and Alberta Domingo, and
Eduardo Quiteves, alleging that his wife, Lolita Reed, from whom he had been estranged,
conspiring with the other petitioners, caused the preparation of a special power of attorney
wherein it was made to appear that he authorized his wife to sell the subject property; that he did
not sign the special power of attorney nor appear before the notary public because he was
working abroad.
The trial court rendered judgment against Guillermo. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not Lolita is justified in effecting a sale of the subject property without her
husband’s consent for the maintenance and support of the family.

Ruling:
No.
Lolita’s rights over the property were merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. There was also absolutely no proof to her allegations that she used the
proceeds of the sale to purchase necessities for the maintenance and support of the family.
Having failed to establish any of these circumstances, she may not unilaterally bind the conjugal
assets.

240
LUCIA EMBRADO and ORESTE TORREGIANI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
PACIFICO CIMAFRANCA, MARCOS SALIMBAGAT, EDA JIMENEZ and
SANTIAGO JIMENEZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 51457. June 27, 1994.

Facts:
Lucia Embrado was married to Oreste Torregiani in 1943. Prior to the marriage, there
was a sale of Lot 564, a 366-square meter lot to Lucia when she was still single. However, only
on 2 July 1946 when a Venta Definitiva, a notarized document written entirely in Spanish, was
executed by the Carpitanos to Lucia.
The couples, after the marriage made their conjugal abode on the lot and in 1958
constructed a residential commercial building thereon.
On May 1, 1971 an absolute deed of sale was executed by Lucia Embrado Torregiani of
the said lot described as her own paraphernal property to her adopted daughter, Eda Jimenez, for
the sum of P 1,000.00.
On March 6, 1972, Eda Jimenez sold 65 square meters of the said lot to Marcos
Salimbagat for P 6,500.00. On August 1972, the Torregianis spouses instituted an action for
declaration of nullity of contract, annulment of sales, reconveyance and damages against the
spouses Santiago and Eda Jimenez alleging that the sail of said lot to Eda Jimenez was void not
only for lack of consideration but also because the husband of Lucia did not consent to the sale,
which consent is necessary because the lot was a conjugal property.
The trial court held in favor of Lucia. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the lot in question is paraphernal property of Lucia.

Ruling:
No.
While the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the property in question
was originally a paraphernal property of Lucia, the Supreme Court cannot adopt its conclusion
that because Lucia and the original owners agreed for its purchase and sale, ownership was
already acquired by Lucia at that moment. Under Art. 1496 of the Civil Code, "ownership of the
thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways
specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the
possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee," and under Art. 1498, "when the sale is
made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the
thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot
clearly be inferred."
The Venta Definitiva over the lot in favor of Lucia Embrado was executed by the
Carpitanoses on 2 July 1946 when her marriage to petitioner Oreste Torregiani was already
subsisting.
Another thing more, the second paragraph of Art. 158 of the Civil Code (now Article
120, Family Code) provides that "buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership,
during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but
the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same." Under this article,
the land becomes conjugal upon the construction of the building without awaiting reimbursement
before or at the liquidation of the partnership upon the concurrence of two conditions, to wit: (a)
the construction of the building at the expense of the partnership; and, (b) the ownership of the
land by one of the spouses. 18 The conditions have been fully met in the case at bench. Thus,
even if Lot 564 was originally the paraphernal property of Lucia as evident from the "Venta
Definitiva", the same became conjugal upon the construction of the residential/commercial
building in 1958.

241
 HONORIO L. CARLOS, petitioner, vs. MANUEL T. ABELARDO, respondent.
G.R. No. 146504. April 9, 2002.

Facts:
Petitioner averred in his complaint filed on October 13, 1994 that in October 1989,
respondent Manuel T Abelardo, his son-in-law, and the latter’s wife, Maria Theresa Carlos-
Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 for the
purchase of a house and lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street, Executive Heights Village,
Paranaque, Metro Manila. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life
independently and on their own, petitioner, in October 31, 1989, issued a check in the name of a
certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged receipt thereof.
When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the status of the amount he
loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a
position to make a definite settlement of the same. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent
resistance to petitioner’s inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats
against petitioner.
On August 24, 1994, petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of
US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation. Thus, petitioner filed a
complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the loan by the husband and wife is the liability of the conjugal property.

Ruling:
Yes.
The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the Family
Code. Notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent husband, he shall be solidarily
liable for such loan together with his wife.
The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the
marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the
benefit of the family. The defendants never denied that the check of US$25,000.00 was used to
purchase the subject house and lot. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal
home, thus benefiting the family. On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan made by
the defendant-wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of
the family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the
payment of the loan.

242
 BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, AUGUSTO YULO, LILY YULO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61464. May 28, 1988.

Facts:
On July 1, 1975, private respondent Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in
the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as
representative of the A & L Industries. Respondent Yulo presented an alleged special power of
attorney executed by his wife, respondent Lily Yulo, who manages A & L Industries and under
whose name the said business is registered, purportedly authorizing Augusto to procure the loan
and sign the promissory note. About two months prior to the loan, however, Augusto had already
left Lily and their children and had abandoned their conjugal home. When the obligation became
due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same.
Private respondent Lily filed her answer with counterclaim, alleging that although
Augusto and she are husband and wife, the former had abandoned her and their children five
months before the filing of the complaint; that they were already separated when the promissory
note was executed; that her signature in the special power of attorney was forged because she
had never authorized Augusto in any capacity to transact any business for and in behalf of A & L
Industries, which is owned by her as a single proprietor, that she never got a single centavo from
the proceeds of the loan mentioned in the promissory note; and that as a result of the illegal
attachment of her properties, which constituted the assets of the A & L Industries, the latter
closed its business and was taken over by the new owner.
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitioner's complaint against the private
respondent Lily Yulo and A & L Industries. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the loan incurred by respondent Augusto is a liability of the conjugal
partnership.

Ruling:
No.
There is no dispute that A & L Industries was established during the marriage of Augusto
and Lily Yulo and therefore the same is presumed conjugal and the fact that it was registered in
the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. However, for the said
property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. In the present case, the obligation which the petitioner is
seeking to enforce against the conjugal property managed by the private respondent Lily was
undoubtedly contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he incurred the
obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he
made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L Industries, to procure
such loan from the petitioner.

243
 JOHNSON & JOHNSON (PHILS.), INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ALEJO M. VINLUAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 102692. September 23, 1996.

Facts:
Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Incorporated is engaged in the manufacturing and selling of
various cosmetics, health, and body care products, as well as medical drugs. On several
occasions in the year 1982, the defendant, Delilah Vinluan, purchased products of the said
corporation, as she was also engaged in the business of retailing Johnson products. The
defendants, under the name and style of "Vinluan Enterprises," thus incurred an obligation of
Two Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Pesos and Eighty-Nine
(P235,880.89) Centavos, for which she issued seven (7) Philippine Banking Corporation checks
of varying amounts and due dates. When presented on their respective due dates, however, the
checks given in payment of the obligation bounced and were dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds.
Several demands thereafter for payment were to no avail, despite the several extensions
given to the defendant spouses to settle the obligation. It was only on January 5, 1983 that the
defendants made a partial payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, thereby reducing their
principal obligation to P230,880.89. When no further payments were made to settle the
obligation despite repeated demands, Johnson & Johnson was constrained to file a complaint on
June 8, 1983 against defendant spouses Vinluan, for collection of the principal obligation plus
interest, with damages.

Issue:
Whether or not Alejo Vinluan, as well as their conjugal property, can be held liable for
his wife’s obligation to plaintiff corporation.

Ruling:
No.
The Supreme Court ruled that the decision of the trial court is final and executory. Thus,
it affirmed the lower court’s decision when it charged defendant Delilah Vinluan alone to pay the
plaintiff corporation, having already declared that the defendant-husband cannot be held legally
liable for his wife’s obligation. Perhaps, when it was later discovered that the defendant Delilah
Vinluan did not have sufficient property of her own to settle their obligation, the conjugal
properties of the defendant spouses became the object of levy. But in order to bind the conjugal
partnership and its properties, the New Civil Code provides that the debts and obligations
contracted by the husband or the wife must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and that
the husband must consent to his wife’s engaging in business. However, in this case, the husband
did not give his consent neither did the obligation redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence,
the conjugal partnership as well as the defendant cannot be held liable.

244
 SPOUSES CLARO AND NIDA BAUTISTA, petitioners, v. BERLINDA F. SILVA,
respondent.
G. R. No. 157434. September 19, 2006.

Facts:
On August 14, 1980, a Transfer Certificate of Title No. B- 37189 over a parcel of land
was registered in the names of Spouses Berlinda F. Silva and Pedro M. Silva.
On March 3, 1988, Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife,
Berlinda, thru a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed on November 18, 1987 by
Berlinda in his favor, signed and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land
covered by TCT No. B-37189 in favor of spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista.
As a consequence, TCT No. B-37189 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. V-2765
of the Registry of Deeds for the Valenzuela Branch was issued in the names of spouses Claro
Bautista and Nida Bautista on March 4, 1988.
Evidence shows that the signature appearing on the Special Power of Attorney as that of
Berlinda is a forgery, and that consequently, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in
favor of spouses Bautista is not authorized by Berlinda.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale made by Pedro is null and void.

Ruling:
Yes.
The sale of conjugal property by the husband without marital consent of the wife affects
the entire property, not just the share of the wife and it is considered a nullity.
Petitioners are not buyers of good faith since they were dealing with a seller (Pedro) who
had title to and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that marital
consent of respondent is required before he could convey the property.

245
 SPOUSES GODOFREDO ALFREDO and CARMEN LIMON ALFREDO, et al.,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ARMANDO BORRAS and ADELIA LOBATON BORRAS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 144225. June 17, 2003.

Facts:
The registered owners of the Subject Land, which is the subject of controversy in this
case, were petitioner spouses, Godofredo and Carmen Alfredo. The Subject Land is covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 284 issued to Godofredo and Carmen.
On 7 March 1994, the private respondents, spouses Armando Borras and Adelia Lobaton
Borras, filed a complaint for specific performance against Godofredo and Carmen before the trial
court. Armando and Adelia alleged in their complaint that Godofredo and Carmen mortgaged the
Subject Land for P7,000.00 with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). To pay the
debt, Carmen and Godofredo sold the Subject Land to Armando and Adelia for P15,000.00, the
buyers to pay the DBP loan and its accumulated interest, and the balance to be paid in cash to the
sellers.
Armando and Adelia gave Godofredo and Carmen the money to pay the loan to DBP.
Godofredo and Carmen introduced Armando and Adelia, as the new owners of the Subject Land,
to the old tenants of the same. Armando and Adelia then took possession of the Subject Land.
Armando and Adelia discovered that Godofredo and Carmen had re-sold portions of the
Subject Land to several persons. Thus, Armando and Adelia filed a complaint for specific
performance.
The trial court ruled in favor of Armando and Adelia. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the contract of sale made by Carmen is void because she did not obtain
the consent and authority of her husband, Godofredo.

Ruling:
No.
The Supreme Court ruled that the contract of sale was voidable subject to annulment by
the husband. Following petitioners’ argument that Carmen sold the land to Armando and Adelia
without the consent of Carmen’s husband, the sale would only be voidable and not void.
The Family Code provides that any alienation or encumbrance made by the husband of
the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is void. However, when the
sale is made before the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the disposition of conjugal property without the
wife’s consent is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 reads: “The wife may, during the
marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment
of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required,
or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the
conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after
the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.”
Godofredo can no longer question the sale either. Voidable contracts are susceptible of
ratification. Godofredo ratified the sale when he introduced Armando and Adelia to his tenants
as the new owners of the Subject Land. If the sale was truly unauthorized, then Godofredo
should have filed an action to annul the sale. He did not. The prescriptive period to annul the sale
has long lapsed. Godofredo’s conduct belies his claim that his wife sold the Subject Land
without his consent.
Moreover, Godofredo and Carmen used most of the proceeds of the sale to pay their debt
with the DBP. This shows that the sale redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Hence, even if Carmen sold the land without the consent of her husband, the sale still binds the
conjugal partnership.

246
 TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, petitioner, vs. GILDA L. JARDELEZA, ERNESTO L.
JARDELEZA, JR., MELECIO GIL L. JARDELEZA, and GLENDA L. JARDELEZA,
respondents.
G.R. No. 112014. December 5, 2000.

Facts:
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza were married long before 03 August
1988, when the Family Code took effect. The union produced five children, namely: petitioner,
Ernesto, Jr., Melecio, Glenda and Rolando.
On 25 March 1991, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. then 73 years old, suffered a stroke and
lapsed into comatose condition.
On 3 July 1991, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of letters of
guardianship to him, rather than to his mother, on the ground that she considered the property
acquired by Dr. Jardeleza as her own and did not want to be appointed guardian.
On 09 August 1991, respondents filed with the trial court an opposition to the petition for
guardianship and the motion for issuance of letters of guardianship to petitioner.
On 20 August 1993, the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition for
guardianship. The trial court concluded, without explanation, that the petition is superfluous and
would only serve to duplicate the powers of the wife under the explicit provisions of Article 124,
second paragraph, of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 124 of the Family Code renders superfluous the appointment of a
judicial guardian over the person and estate of an incompetent married person.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Article 124 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
situation of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and that the proper procedure was an application for
appointment of judicial guardian under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
The Supreme Court remands the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with this decision.

247
 ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
GILDA CORPUZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 125172. June 26, 1998.

Facts:
Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. They were married on
December 24, 1968. The couple has three children, namely: Junie, Harriet and Jodie.
On February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located
from Manuel Callejo. Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple sold one-half portion of the said
lot to Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda, Judie pushed through the sale of the
remaining one-half portion of their lot on March 1, 1990 to Luzviminda Guiang.
On May 28, 1990, Gilda filed an Amended Complaint against her husband Judie and
petitioners-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint sought the declaration
of a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her
husband, null and void.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the remaining one-half portion of the conjugal lot made by the
husband is valid without the consent of his wife.

Ruling:
No.
The Supreme Court held that any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988
when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without
the consent of the wife is null and void.
The said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code,
which states: "Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.”

248
 SANTIAGO NICOLAS, et al., petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-37631. October 12, 1987.

Facts:
In 1951, respondent Anastacio Madlangsakay, a rice dealer, married to Lourdes Manuel,
bought from Felipe Garcia three parcels of land. The Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on
October 19, 1951 in the name of Madlangsakay. At the time of the purchase, petitioners were
occupying Lot No. 8 as tenants.
Negotiations begun for the sale of Lot No. 8 to petitioner tenants and in an affidavit dated
August 26, 1958, Madlangsakay promised to subdivide the land among them at P0.70 per square
meter. Nothing came out of the negotiations.
Soon thereafter, the relationship between the new owner and the occupants soured and
quickly deteriorated into a series of legal squabbles which culminated in the present controversy.
On April 26, 1961, petitioners filed an amended complaint against Madlangsakay to quiet
title over Lot. No. 8.
In his answer, Madlangsakay averred that the deeds of sale and the affidavits which he
purportedly executed were all forgeries and that the land in question, being conjugal property
and mortgaged with the Philippine National Bank, could not be alienated without his wife's
consent.
The trial court upheld Madlangsakay. It dismissed the complaint, nullified the deeds of
sale and the affidavits.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property made by Madlangsakay is valid.

Ruling:
No.
The land is a conjugal property and, as such, it could not be alienated without the
conformity of his wife. Moreover, it was heavily mortgaged with the Philippine National Bank,
Malolos branch, and could not be transferred without the bank's consent. As a matter of fact, the
transfer certificate of title was then in the possession of said bank.

249
 JOSE UY and GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000.

Facts:
This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza, against his mother Gilda L.
Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza. The
controversy came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.’s suffering of a stroke on March
25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto, Sr.
is the father of herein Teodoro Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent Gilda
Jardeleza.
On June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda herself filed a petition regarding the declaration of
incapacity of Ernesto, Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties,
and authorization to sell the same.
The trial court rendered its decision finding that it was convinced that Ernesto, Sr. was
truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, and that the sale
of Lot No. 4291 and the improvements thereon was necessary to defray the mounting expenses
for treatment and hospitalization.
On June 24, 1991, Teodoro filed his Opposition to the proceedings being unaware and
not knowing that a decision has already been rendered on the case by public respondent.
On July 3, 1991, Teodoro filed a motion for reconsideration. He propounded the
argument that the petition for declaration of incapacity, assumption of sole powers of
administration, and authority to sell the conjugal properties was essentially a petition for
guardianship of the person and properties of Ernesto, Sr. As such, it cannot be prosecuted in
accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings set out in Article 253 of the Family
Code. It should follow the rules governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court
which require procedural due process, particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits

Issue:
Whether or not Gilda, as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a
parcel of land with its improvements, with the approval of the court in a summary proceedings,
to her co-petitioners, her own daughter and son-in-law, for the amount of eight million pesos.

Ruling:
No.
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code
govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one
where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld
or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is
incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject
spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke,
cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem
infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of
the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

250
 SAMSON T. SABALONES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-SABALONES, respondents.
G.R. No. 106169. February 14, 1994.

Facts:
Petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-
Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years having been
assigned to different countries during his successive tours of duties as a member of the
diplomatic service.
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his
wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a
building and lot in Greenhills belonging to the conjugal partnership.
In her answer, the private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim
for legal separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and their
six children and that they were depending for their support on the rentals from another conjugal
property in Forbes Park. She also informed the court that despite her husband's retirement, he
had not returned to his legitimate family and was instead maintaining a separate residence in
Quezon City, with Thelma Cumareng and their three children.
Remedios also asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the
liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of
his adultery.
The trial court found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a bigamous marriage with
Thelma Cumareng, to whom he had returned upon his retirement at a separate residence. The
court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the petitioner's share
in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to support from his
respondent wife.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent should be the sole administrator of the conjugal
properties.

Ruling:
Yes.
The Supreme Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for
almost nineteen years, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not
alleged, much less shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal
partnership.
Thus, it was held that pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole mass
of conjugal assets, private respondent is allowed to continue with her administration; and
petitioner should be enjoined from interfering with his wife's administration pending resolution
of the appeal.
The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties
as provided in Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61 states that after a petition for
legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement
between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the
administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such
designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the
conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation
was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the
preliminary injunction.

251
 IMELDA RELUCIO, petitioner, vs. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 138497. January 16, 2002.

Facts:
On September 15, 1993, Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for “APPOINTMENT AS
SOLE ADMINISTRATRIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES,
FORFEITURE, ETC.,” against Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio. In the petition,
Angelina alleged that sometime in 1968, Alberto, who is legally married to the her, abandoned
the latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and exclusive
control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole
gain and benefit to the total exclusion of the private respondent and their four children; that
defendant Lopez, after abandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited
with herein petitioner since 1976.
It was further alleged that Alberto and petitioner Relucio, during their period of
cohabitation since 1976, have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-
owned or controlled corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments
and buildings, cars and other motor vehicles, bank accounts and jewelry. These properties,
which are in the names of Alberto and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly or their dummies and
proxies, have been acquired principally if not solely through the actual contribution of money,
property and industry of Alberto with minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from petitioner
Relucio.

Issue/s:
(a) Whether respondent’s petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal
property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto established a cause of action against
petitioner.
(b) Whether or not there is a basis in law to forfeit Alberto’s share in property co-owned
by him with petitioner, and a dissolution of the conjugal partnership with private respondent.

Ruling:
(a) No. The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as
administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property arising from her
marriage to Alberto. Petitioner is a complete stranger to this cause of action. There is no right-
duty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action.
(b) Yes. The Supreme Court upheld that the trial court can issue a judgment ordering
Alberto to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent, and give support to
respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto’s conjugal partnership with respondent, and
forfeit Alberto’s share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be
perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.

252
 AMPARO NABLE-JOSE et al., STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK and
CARMEN CASTRO, plaintiffs and appellants, vs. MARIANO NABLE-JOSE et al.,
defendants and appellees.
No. 7397. December 11, 1916.

Facts:
Macario Nable-Jose was married to Paz Borja in Dagupan, Pangasinan. In the year 1897, Paz
Borja passed away. On 31 July 1907, Mariano entered into a contract with Standard Oil
Company of New York. He executed as a mortgage a conjugal property and a real estate, a house
and a camarin situated in Dagupan, Pangasinan measuring about 7,091 square meters.
On 24 October 1910, the Standard Oil Company of New York through its lawyers presented
its complaint to Mariano Nable Jose. Said action was known as No. 833 of the Court of First
Instance of Dagupan, Pangasinan. The purpose of the action was to recover from Mariano the
sum of 633,191.244 pesos and the foreclosure of the said mortgages given by Mariano to the
plaintiff upon certain property particularly described in the complaint to secure the payment if
the said sum of money.

Issue:
Whether or not Mariano Nable-Jose after the death of Paz Borja has the power to sell or
mortgage the community property acquired during their coverture.

Ruling:
The husband has the exclusive right as the surviving spouse to take the possession of the
common property, and to administer it, until the same is liquidated and he is entrusted to make
the liquidation upon the death of the wife. The interest of the wife in the community property is
an inchoate interest, a mere expectancy, and after her death, her interest constitutes neither a
legal nor equitable estate, and only ripens into title when upon liquidation and settlement there
appear to be assets in the community partnership.
The contract executed by a person, who, according to the registry has a right thereto,
cannot be invalidated with regard to third persons after it has been recorded. The mortgage is
perfectly valid and binding upon all parties.

253
 ARTURO R. ABALOS, petitioner, vs.
DR. GALICANO S. MACATANGAY, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 155043. September 30, 2004.

Facts:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land with
improvements. On June 2, 1988, armed with a Special Power of Attorney, purportedly issued by
his wife, Arturo executed a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement (RMOA) in favor of
respondent, binding himself to sell to respondent the subject property.
Subsequently, Arturo’s wife, Esther, executed a Special Power of Attorney dated October
25, 1989, appointing her sister, Bernadette Ramos, to act for and in her behalf relative to the
transfer of the property to respondent. Ostensibly, a marital squabble was brewing between
Arturo and Esther at the time and to protect his interest, respondent caused the annotation of his
adverse claim on the title of the spouses to the property on November 14, 1989.
On November 16, 1989, respondent sent a letter to Arturo and Esther informing them of
his readiness and willingness to pay the full amount of the purchase price. The letter contained a
demand upon the spouses to comply with their obligation to turn over possession of the property
to him. Arturo and Esther failed to deliver the property which prompted respondent to file a
complaint for specific performance with damages against petitioners.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for specific performance. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property executed by Arturo and Esther on
separate documents is valid before the dissolution of their marriage.

Ruling:
No.
Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the effectivity of the Family Code.
There being no indication that they have adopted a different property regime, their property
relations would automatically be governed by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The
subject land which had been admittedly acquired during the marriage of the spouses forms part
of their conjugal partnership.
The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as administrator of the conjugal
partnership, cannot validly alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership
without the wife’s consent. Similarly, the wife cannot dispose of any property belonging to the
conjugal partnership without the conformity of the husband.
More significantly, it has been held that prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership,
the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which
constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that
there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of
each spouse is limited to the net remainder or “remanente liquido” (haber ganancial) resulting
from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the
husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally
determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be
divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.
The sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the
consent of the wife when there is no showing that the latter is incapacitated is void ab initio
because it is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Article 166 of the Civil Code.
Since Article 166 of the Civil Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that acts or
transactions executed against this mandatory provision are void except when the law itself
authorizes their validity.
As an exception, the husband may dispose of conjugal property without the wife’s
consent if such sale is necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities mentioned in Articles 161 and

254
162 of the Civil Code This is one instance where the wife’s consent is not required and,
impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary.
Inescapably, herein petitioner’s action for specific performance must fail. Even on the
supposition that the parties only disposed of their respective shares in the property, the sale,
assuming that it exists, is still void for the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the
conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non
habet. No one can give what he has not.

255
 ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 132955. October 27, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got
married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan.  On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed
with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and
duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he
later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. In her
counterclaim, Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their
marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private
respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy,
which ended in their son being born prematurely.  

Issue:
Whether the marriage be annulled on the ground that they did not cohabit during their
marriage.

Ruling:
Appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of
cohabitation between him and his wife.  Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a
marriage.  Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who
can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate.  The failure to cohabit becomes
relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the
marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x
x.  Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.        

         

256
 FLORENCE MACARRUBO, petitioner, vs. EDMUNDO MACARRUBO, respondent
A.C. No. 6148. February 27, 2004

Facts:
Florence Teves-Maccarubo filed an administrative complaint of disbarment against Atty.
Edmundo Maccarubo, respondent. Florence claimed that Atty. Maccarubo contracted marriage
with Florence while his first marriage with Helen Espanza with whom he had two children was
still subsisting. According to Florence, her consent was gained by the respondent with deception
and that he adroitly convinced her family his marriage with the first wife was void. While
Florence and Atty. Maccarubo’s marriage was still subsisting, the latter abandoned their family
and cohabited with Josephine Constantino whom he married.
Respondent assailed the claims of Florence denying that he employed deception and that
he was the one whose consent was vitiated because of the former and her family’s threat, force
and intimidation. He said that it was a sham wedding and that he was forced to marry Florence to
save the family’s reputation because Florence was at that time three-months pregnant. He
submitted pieces of evidence to the Investigating Commission that indicated final and executory
decision of declaring his marriage with Florence void ab initio; a certification that their marriage
license was not filed in the records of NSO; certification showing he was a civic-spirited person;
judicial decree of annulment to complainant which was res judicata upon present administrative
case. He further claimed that his first marriage was also declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity by his wife, Helen.

Issue:
Whether Atty. Maccarubo is guilty of gross misconduct in his private affairs which
warrant disciplinary action.

Ruling:

Upon the evidence on record, respondent is indeed guilty of gross misconduct in his
private affairs which warrant disciplinary action. The incontrovertible facts show that while
respondent had a subsisting marriage with Helen Esparza with whom he had two children, he
entered into a second marriage with complainant. While the marriage between complainant and
respondent has been annulled by final judgment, he and complainant started living as husband
and wife in 1991 when his first marriage was still subsisting, rendering him liable for
concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is required for the
continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and
is a public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage. Even assuming arguendo that
respondent was coerced by complainant to marry her, the duress, by his own admission as the
following transcript of his testimony reflects, ceased after their wedding day, respondent having
freely cohabited with her and even begot a second child by her.

The decision, rendered in default of complainant, cannot serve as res judicata on the final
resolution of the present case.  A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor
purely criminal but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. In sum,
respondent has breached the following precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility—
Rule 1.01, CANON 7, and Rule 7.03. Respondent was found guilty of gross immorality and
therefore disbarred.

257
 PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. FELIPE SANTIAGO, respondent

Facts:

Felipe Santiago, herein appellant, asked Felicita Masilang, his niece, to accompany him
across the river on some errand. The girl agreed and after crossing the river, Santiago manifested
a desire to have sexual intercourse with the former, but notwithstanding her resistance,
accomplished his purposes by force and against her will. After that deed, Santiago conducted
Felicita to his uncle’s house that brought in a protestant minister who solemnized a marriage
between the two. After the ceremony, Santiago gave the girl a few pesos and sent her home. The
father of Felicita, having known of what transpired, filed a criminal case of rape against the
appellant, resulting to his conviction. The latter now forwarded the defense of his marriage to
Felicita.

Issue:

Is the appellant’s defense tenable?

Ruling:

No. the ceremony cannot be considered binding on her because of duress. It is therefore
void for lack of essential consent, and it posed no impediment to the wrongdoer’s prosecution.
The marriage ceremony was a mere ruse to escape from the consequences of his act. The manner
in which appellant dealt with the girl before and after the marriage shows that he had no bona
fide intention of making her his wife.

258
 HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR-REYES, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES CIPRIANO
MIJARES and FLORENTINA MIJARES, respondents
G.R. No. 143826. August 28, 2003

Facts:
Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had been separated since 1974. Sometime
in 1984, Ignacia learned that on March 1, 1983, Vicente sold a lot belonging to the conjugal
properties to spouses Cipriano and Florentina Mijares on March 1, 2983, without her knowledge
and consent. On August 9, 1984, Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter to respondent spouses
demanding the return of her ½ share in the lot. Failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, she
filed a complaint for annulment of sale against respondent spouses. Respondent spouses claimed
that they are purchasers in good faith and that the sale was valid because it was duly approved by
the court.
On February 15, 1990, the trial court declared the sale of the lot void with respect to the
share of Ignacia. On May 31, 1990, the trial court modified its decision by declaring the sale void
in its entirety and ordering Vicente Reyes to reimburse respondent spouses the purchase price of
P110,000.
Both Ignacia and respondent spouses appealed in the Court of Appeals. Pending the
appeal, Ignacia died and she was substituted by her compulsory heirs.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale should be annulled in its entirety or only with respect to the share
of Ignacia

Ruling:
The husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the
consent, express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. In the case, the
contract is void and not merely voidable. The trial court correctly annulled the sale of the lot in
its entirety. In Bucoy v. Paulino, a case involving the annulment of sale with assumption of
mortgages executed by the husband without the consent of the wife, it was held that the
alienation or encumbrance must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the
wife in the conjugal property is concerned.

259
 Spouses VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES MIAT and ALEXANDER
MIAT, petitioners, vs. ROMEO MIAT, respondent
G.R. No. 143297. February 11, 2003

Facts:
Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought two parcels of land during their coverture.
On April 30, 1978, Concordia died. Moises agreed that such properties would be given to his two
sons, Romeo and Alexander. However, when Moises returned, he negotiated the agreement with
his sons in which he kept the Paranaque property for himself and would leave the Paco property
to his two sons. In February 1988, Romeo learned that the mother of petitioner, Virgilio, have
Moises P30,000.00 as down payment for the sale by Moises of the Paco property.
Ceferino Miat, brother of Moises, testified that even before the death of Concordia, there
was already an agreement that the Paco property would go to Romeo and Alexander. This was
reiterated at the deathbed of Concordia as well as to the extended Miat family members.
Romeo filed an action to nullify the sale between Moises and the Castro spouses, to
compel Moises and Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance or assignment of the Paco
property to him upon payment of the balance of its agreed price, and to make them pay damages.

Issue:
Whether or not the Paco property is conjugal or capital

Ruling:
The property is conjugal. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that “all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is to be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” This article does not require proof that the
property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the
manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.

260
 NERISSA PEREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
RAY PEREZ, respondents
G.R. No. 118870. March 29, 1996

Facts:
Private respondent Ray Perez, a doctor of medicine, is married to petitioner, Nerissa
Perez, a registered nurse. Nerissa began working in the U.S. in October 1988 and she used a part
of her earning to build a modest house for her family in Mandaue City, Cebu. She became a
resident alien in February 1992. After 6 miscarriages and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa finally
gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only
Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five week vacation and
they all had roundtrip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick
mother and promised to follow her with their baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to stay
permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and
continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding her affairs.
When Nerissa arrived home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no
longer in good terms. The petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws. She only wanted to be
with her only child but he was being kept away from her by his husband. On the other hand, Ray
wanted to stay here in the Philippines and maintained that it would not be very difficult to live
here since they have their own home and car. Nerissa was forced to move to her parents.
On July 26, 1993, Nerissa filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent Ray to
surrender the custody of their child to her.
On August 27, 1993, the court issued an order awarding custody of the one-year old child
to his mother. Upon appeal by Ray, the Court of Appeals, on September 27,1993, reversed the
decision of the court and awarded the custody of the child to his father.

Issue:

Whether or not the custody of the child should be given to his father.

Ruling:
The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his
mother finds its raison d'etre in the basic need of a child for his mother's loving care. Only the
most compelling of reasons shall justify the court's awarding the custody of such a child to
someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the
past the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of
custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a
communicable disease.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. The custody of the child
belongs to the mother, Nerissa Perez.

261
 VIRGILIO MAQUILAN, petitioner, vs. DITA MAQUILAN, respondent
G.R. No. 155409. June 8, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent are spouses, having a son. Respondent and her paramour was
convicted for adultery. After which, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership of gains, and damages, imputing
psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the case, the spouses entered into a compromise agreement. The
said agreement was given judicial imprimatur. However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for
the repudiation of the compromise agreement and the reconsideration of the same on the grounds
that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential
effects of the compromise agreement. Such was denied by the RTC.
On August 30, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition holding that the conviction of the
respondent of the crime of adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the
conjugal property.

Issue:
Whether or not the partial voluntary separation of property by the spouses pending the
petition of nullity of marriage is valid

Ruling:
Yes. The compromise agreement partially divided the properties of the conjugal
partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal
separation. Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected
voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned compromise
agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under
the law. This holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still
pending.

262
IN RE VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF JOSE
BERMAS, SR. AND PILAR MANUEL BERMAS, petitioners-appellants
No. L-20379. June 22, 1965

Facts:
On May 31, 1962, the spouses Jose and Pilar Bermasn executed a deed entitled
"Agreement for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and Separation of Property". Such contract
pertains to the voluntary dissolution of their conjugal partnership and the establishment between
them of the regime of separation of property grounded on Article 191 of the civil code.
The trial court denied the petition upon the ground that, under Article 191 of the Civil
Code, a conjugal partnership shall only be dissolved once a legal separation has been ordered.

Issue:

Whether or not a conjugal partnership may be dissolved upon agreement of the spouses

Ruling:
Yes. The fourth paragraph of Article 191 of the Civil Code provides that the husband and
wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to
judicial approval. However, in the case, the liquidation cannot be effected without a liquidation
of the conjugal partnership between Jose Bermas, Sr. and his first wife, in which the children by
first marriage have an interest. The decision appealed from is set aside and the case was
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in conformity with this decision.

263
ALFONSO LACSON, petitioner vs. CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents
No. L-23482. August 30, 1968

Facts:
On February 14, 1953, Alfonso Lacson and Carmen San Jose-Lacson were married. To
them were born four children.
On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left the conjugal home in Santa Clara
Subdivision, Bacolod City, and commenced to reside in Manila. She filed on March 12, 1963 a
complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) of Manila for custody of all
their children as well as support for them and herself.
However, the spouses, thru the assistance of their respective attorneys, succeeded in
reaching an amicable settlement respecting custody of the children, support, and separation of
property. On April 27, 1963 they filed a joint petition dated April 21, 1963, to which the CFI
rendered judgment approving and incorporating in toto their compromise agreement
On May 7, 1963 the respondent spouse filed in the JDRC a motion wherein she alleged
that she "entered into and signed the Joint Petition as the only means by which she could have
immediate custody of the minor children who are all below the age of 7," and thereafter prayed
that she "be considered relieved of the agreement pertaining to the custody and visitation of her
minor children and that since all the children are now in her custody, the said custody in her
favor be confirmed pendente lite." On May 24, 1963 the petitioner spouse opposed the said
motion and moved to dismiss the complaint. The JDRC, on May 28, 1963, sustained the
petitioner spouse's plea of bar by prior judgment and lis pendens, and dismissed the case. After
the denial of her motion for reconsideration, the respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals wherein she raised, among others, the issue of validity or legality of the
compromise agreement in connection only with the custody of their minor children. On October
14, 1964 the Court of Appeals certified the said appeal to the Supreme Court, since "no hearing
on the facts was ever held in the court below no evidence, testimonial or documentary,
presented-only a question of law pending resolution in the appeal."

Issue:
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and the judgment
of CFI grounded on the said agreement, are conformable to law

Ruling:
It is valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership. It is not however, within the province of the court to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit, andrender conjugal rights to the other.
The order dated April 27, 1963 of the CFI, in so far as it awarded custody of the two
older children who were 6 and 5 years old, respectively, to the father, in effect sought to separate
them from their mother. To that extent therefore, it was null and void because it is clearly
violative of article 363 of the Civil Code.

264
 MARGARET, FLORENCE, AND LUCILLE MAXEY, petitioners vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND SPOUSES BEATO MACAYRA AND ALACOPUE MONDAY,
respondents
No. L-45870. May 11, 1984

Facts:
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales were united together in a marriage performed in a
military fashion in 1903. During their cohabitation, they had six children. The disputed property
involving a parcel of land was acquired in 1911 before the church wedding in 1919.
Regina Morales died sometime after their marriage in 1919. The husband remarried Julia
Pamatluan who sold the properties using a power of attorney to spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato C.
Macarya.
Plaintiffs instituted the present case on January 26, 1962, before the Court of First
Instance of Davao, praying for the annulment of the documents of sale covering the subject
parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from the herein defendant
spouses, alleging that the realties were common properties of their parents, having been acquired
during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital; and that the sales of the said lands
in favor of the defendant spouses in 1953, after the death of their mother, Regina Morales, was
executed by their father, Melbourne Maxey, without their knowledge and consent; and that they
came to know of the above-mentioned sales only in 1961.
On the other hand, defendant-spouses deny the material allegations of the complaint and
assert by way of affirmative defenses that they are the true and lawful owners and possessors of
the properties in question having purchased the same in good faith and that since then, they have
been in possession thereof openly, exclusively and continuously in concept of owners.

Issue:

Whether or not the properties in question are the exclusive properties of the late
Melbourne Maxey, to the exclusion of his wife Regina Morales.

Ruling:
No. Where a man and woman lived as common-law partners in 1903, got married in
1919, and after the death of the woman in 1919, the surviving spouse sold a parcel of land
acquired before they got legally married, article 144 of the new civil code applies and their
children entitled to recover ½ from the vendee.
The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of
his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically speaking, the petitioners should
return one-half of the P1, 300.00 purchase price of the land while the private respondents should
pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable considerations,
however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of P650.00 on the other

265
 FRANCISCO GONZALES, petitioner, vs. ERMINDA GONZALES, respondent
G.R. No. 159521. December 16, 2005

Facts:
After two years of cohabitation, Francisco and Erminda got married on February 4, 1979.
They begot four children from the said union. On October 29, 1992, respondent filed a complaint
for annulment of their marriage on the ground that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his marital obligations. Moreover, she prays for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
On February 12, 1997, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent. The petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals, not satisfied with the manner their properties were divided. He
did not contest the decision declaring his marriage to respondent void ab initio.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the properties should be divided equally
between the parties

Ruling:
No. their property relations shall be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which
creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties under a void
marriage, have been acquired through their joint efforts; work or industry shall be owned by
them in equal shares. It further provides that a party who did not participate in the acquisition by
the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition if
the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

266
 FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR CALPATURA, and TOMAS
CALPATURA, JR., heirs of TOMAS CALPATURA, SR., petitioners, vs. ROBERTO,
ERLINDA, DANIEL, GLORIA, PATRICIO, JR., EDNA, and NARCISA PRADO,
respondents
G.R. No. 156879. January 20, 2004

Facts:
After the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., Narcisa subsequently married Bonifacio
Calapatura. In order to support her minor children with her first husband, Narcisa and her
brother-in-law, Tomas Calapatura, Sr., excuted on April 26, 1968 an Agreement of Purchase and
Sale whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter the northern half portion of the property.
Narcisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Tomas over the said property. In 1976,
Tomas’ daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, built a two-storey duplex on the northern part half
portion of the property. Likewise, Maximo Calpatura, son of Tomas’ cousin, built a small house
on the northern portion of theproperty.
On April 8, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and
delivery of possession of the northern half portion of the subject property.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property conjugal or paraphernal

Ruling:
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale was entered into,
provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. In the case, while
Narcisa testified that she bought the property with her own funds, she, however, admitted in the
contract that the property was her conjugal share with her first husband. A verbal assertion that
she bought the land with her own funds is inadmissible to qualify the terms of a written
agreement under the parole evidence rule.

267
 ELENA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs. BRUNO FEHR, respondent
G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003

Facts:
The marriage between petitioner and respondent was declared null and void ab initio by
the trial court under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership of property.
On October 5, 2000, the trial court held that since the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was declared void ab initio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in the liquidation
and partition of the properties they own in common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner’s motion was dismissed for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 147 of the Family Code applies in the dissolution of their
properties

Ruling:
Yes. All the elements required in Article 147 are present in the case at bar. Considering,
however, the merits of the case, the Court believes that a blind adherence to the general rule will
result in miscarriage of justice as it will divest the petitioner of her just share in their common
property, and thus, deprive her of a significant source of income to support their children whom
the court had entrusted to her care. The Court held that where a rigid application of the rule that
certiorari cannot be substitute for appeal will result in a manifest failure of justice, the provisions
of the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed.

268
 SUSAN NICDAO CARINO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARINO, respondent
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the
first was with petitioner Susan Nicdao Carino and the second was with respondent Susan Yee
Cariño.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated
by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his
medical and burial expenses.  Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits
and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.  Petitioner
Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 while respondent Susan Yee received a
total of P21,000.00. On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be
ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos
(P146,000.00) collectively denominated as “death benefits” which the petitioner received.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased.  She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she
met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased.  To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage
license. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not Susan Yee Carino should be entitled to one half of the benefits received
by Susan Nicdao Carino

HELD:
Since the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Article
147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.” In this
property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution
shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her
exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children, and household, ar
excluded in this regime.
One-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her
share in the property regime, and the other half to the deceased legal heirs, his children with
Susan Nicdao.

269
 ANTONIO VALDES, petitioner, vs. RTC, BR. 102 Q.C. AND CONSUELO GOMEZ-
VALDES, respondents
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996

Facts:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971. Begotten during
their marriage were five children. In a petition dated June 22, 1992, Valdes sought the
declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to article 36 of the Family Code. After hearing the
parties following the joinder of issues, the marriage of Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez is
declared null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, on the ground of their mutual
Psychological Incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations. The three older
children shall choose which parent they would want to stay with, the younger children shall be
placed in the custody of their mother. The petitioner and respondent are directed to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification on that portion directing compliance with Art. 50,
51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage.” Parenthetically,
during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to
remain with their father Antonio Valdes.

Issue:
Whether the trial court failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition
of a family dwelling in a situation wherein a marriage is declared null and null and void because
of Psychological Incapacity on the part of either or both parties to the contract.

Ruling:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of cause thereof,
the property relation of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Art. 137 or 148.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have obtained through
their joint efforts.
The rules set up to govern liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and viodable marriages are
irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exist between common-law spouses.

270
 EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR., petitioner, vs. MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO, respondent
G.R. No. 136803. June 16, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner, Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo were both married
and with children but are separated from their respective spouses, they cohabited while their
respective marriages still subsisted. Petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal
properties which were registered solely in respondent’s name. But due to irreconcilable
differences the couple separated. Petitioner the demanded his share in the subject properties but
respondent refused.

Issue:
Whether or not the parties be considered as co-owners of the properties considering the
present status of the parties as both married and incapable of marrying each other even assuming
that they lived together as husband and wife.

Ruling:
The Family Code Provides that a co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who
live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that if the
parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their contributions which, in the absence of proof to contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is
thus co-ownership even if the parties are incapacitated to marry.

271
GUILLERMA TUMLOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES
FERNANDEZ, respondents
G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000

Facts:
Herein respondents were the plaintiffs in a Civil Case, an action for ejectment filed
before the MTC of Valenzuela, Metro Manila against Guillerma Tumlos, Toto Tumlos, and Gina
Tumlos. In their complaint dated July 5, 1996.
Petitioner Guillerma Tumlos was the only one who filed an answer to the complaint. She
averred therein that the Fernandez spouses had no cause of action against her, since she is a co-
owner of the subject premises as evidenced by a Contract to Sell wherein it was stated that she is
a co-vendee of the property in question together with respondent Mario Fernandez. She then
asked for the dismissal of the complaint.
After an unfruitful preliminary conference on November 15, 1996, the MTC required the
parties to submit their affidavits and other evidence on the factual issues defined in their
pleadings within ten days from receipt of such order, pursuant to section 9 of the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure. Guillerma Tumlos submitted her affidavit/position paper on November
29, 1996, while the respondents filed their position paper on December 5, 1996, attaching thereto
their marriage contract, letters of demand to the defendants, and the Contract to Sell over the
disputed property.

Issue:

Whether or not the claim of co-ownership by Guillerma Tumlos valid.

Ruling:
Petitioner's central theory and main defense against respondents' action for ejectment is
her claim of co-ownership over the property with respondent Mario Fernandez. At the first
instance before the MTC, she presented a Contract to Sell indicating that she was his spouse. The
MTC found this document insufficient to support her claim. The RTC, however, after
considering her allegation that she had been cohabiting with Mario Fernandez as shown by
evidence presented before it, ruled in her favor.
On the other hand, the CA held that the pieces of evidence adduced before the RTC could
no longer be considered because they had not been submitted before the MTC. Hence, the
appellate court concluded that the claim of co-ownership was not satisfactorily proven.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, a man and woman who are not legally capacitated
to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together conjugally, may be deemed co-owners of
a property acquired during the cohabitation only upon proof that each made an actual
contribution to its acquisition. Hence, mere cohabitation without proof of contribution will not
result in a co-ownership.

272
 NENG MALANG, petitioner, vs. HON. COROCOY MOSON et. al., respondents
G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000

Facts:
The applicability of the regular rules of procedure and case law in this jurisdiction. to
civil cases before the District Shari'a Courts is the issue in this petition.
On November 14, 1988, petitioner-spouses filed a complaint against private respondents
for "Quieting of Title to Property, Annulment of Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-122 and P-
138, and Damages, With Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction" with the Shari'a District
Court, 6th Shari's District at Cotabato City, Public respondent Register of Deeds of the same city
was impleaded as a nominal party. Private respondents filed their answer dated December 1,
1988.
The case was set for trial on the merits on May 22, 1989 but it was postponed at the
instance of private respondents. Other settings were postponed for one reason or another.
However, on July 4, 1989, private respondents filed a pleading designated as "Amplification of
Affirmative or Special Defenses with Prayer for Dismissal of Complaint on the Ground of Lack
of Jurisdiction." On the basis thereof, the trial court issued an order on November 7, 1989
dismissing the complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not the Civil Code shall govern the property relations of Muslim Marriages
celebrated before the Muslim Code

Ruling:
Yes. Since it is the Civil Code which determines the validity of the marriages contracted
before P.D. 1083, it is the same code that determines and governs the property relations of the
marriages, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question, the Civil
Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses,
whether Muslim or non-Muslim.

273
 JOSEFINA FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. MASTER IRON WORKS AND
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and ROBERTO ALEJO, respondents
G.R. No. 151967. February 16, 2005

Facts:
On August 31, 1984, the Imus Rural Bank, Inc. executed a deed of absolute sale in favor
of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential
land with a house thereon. On February 15, 1985, the Register of Deeds made a record entry of
an Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he waived whatever claims he had over the
property. On June 11, 1990, Eduardo bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works and
Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay for the same. On November 27, 1990,
MIWCC filed a complaint against him and was rule by the trial court in favor of the respondent.
Sheriff Roberto Alejo included the parcels of land mentioned earlier at a public auction for the
recovery of the balance of the amount due.
On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two
parcels of land in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that her
husband had no propriety right or interest over them as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver.
The trial court ruled in favor of Josefina. However, the CA reversed the decision of the
RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina Castillo and
Eduardo Francisco

Ruling:
No. The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds
before the cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The
petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money, property, or
industry in the acquisition of the subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of the property.
Petiitioner admitted that when she and Eduardo cohabited, the latter was incapacitated to marry
her. Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Eduardo
and Carmelita, the same should be presumed to be the conjugal property of Eduardo and
Carmelita.

274
 MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS REYES, petitioner, vs. LOURDES,
MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM, AND RODOLFO, JR.-all surnamed REYES,
respondents
G.R. No. 154645. July 13, 2004

Facts:
Respondent Lourdes Reyes was legally married to Rodolfo Reyes on January 3, 1947 in
which they had four children. At the time of the death of Rodolfo, he was living with his
common-law wife with whom they begot three children. During the common-law relationship of
Rodolfo and Milagros, they decided to buy a house and lot in which a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed in favor of Milagros.
Petitioner, in order to secure finances with which to pay the purchase price, executed a
Special Power of Attorney in favor of Rodolfo, as attorney-in-fact to secure a loan. The loan was
payable for ten years. After the death of Rodolfo, the balance was fully paid by the Philam Life
Insurance Co. as insurer of the deceased.

Issue:
Whether or not the salaries and earnings of Rodolfo, which were his and Lourdes’
conjugal funs, paid for the loan and, hence, the disputed property was conjugal

Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 145 of the Civil Code, a conjugal partnership of gains is created upon
marriage and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation, or
judicial separation of property. On the other hand, Article 144 of the Civil Code mandates a co-
ownership between a man and a woman not legally married provided that the couple must not be
incapacitated to contract marriage.
Article 148 of the Family Code likewise finds application to the case at bar, thus, when a
common-law couple have legal impediment to marriage, only the property acquired by them—
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry—shall be owned by them
in common and in proportion to their respective contributions.
Respondents have shown that the property was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo
and Lourdes, a fact that gives rise to the presumption that it is conjugal. Also, they have
established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were used to pay for the property.

275
 JACINTO SAGUID, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, MARINDUQUE, and GINA REY, respondents
G.R. No. 150611. June 10, 2003

Facts:
Seventeen-year old Gina Rey was married, but separated de facto from her husband,
when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid sometime in July 1987. After a brief courtship, they
decided to cohabit as husband and wife. When her relationship with Jacinto’s relatives turned
sour, she decided to work as an entertainer in Japan. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and
end their 9-year cohabitation.
On January 9, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for partition and recovery of personal
property with receivership against petitioner, alleging that she was able to contribute P70,000.00
in the completion of their unfinished house from her salary as entertainer in Japan. Also, she was
able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture, and household effects. She prayed
that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of
P70,000.00 be reimbursed to her.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 148 of the Family Code applies although the adulterous
cohabitation commenced prior to the effectivity of the same code

Ruling:
Yes. In the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by parties to a bigamous
marriage and adulterous relationship, a proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties
commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on 1988,
Article 148 applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code. Respondent Gina Rey is declared co-owner of petitioner Jacinto in the
controverted house and personal properties. Petitioner is ordered to reimburse the required
amount as determined by the Court.

276
TSHIATE UY and RAMON UY, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, NATIVIDAD
CALAUNAN-UY, and THE ESTATE OF MENILO UY, respondents
G.R. No. 102726. May 27, 1994

Facts:
Respondent Natividad was the common-law wife of the late Menilo Uy, Sr. for about
thirty-six years. Their union bore four children. After the death of Menilo, Sr., petitioners
initiated a special proceeding entitled, “In the Matter of the Petition for Letters of Administration
of the Estate of Menilo Uy, Sr.” Respondent filed a civil case for “Partition of Properties Under
Co-ownership,” against the estate of Menilo, Sr.
The parties, upon the suggestion of the RTC, submittes a Compromise Agreement. On
April 24, 1991, a judgment was rendered based on such compromise. Petitioner Tshiate filed an
omnibus motion alleging that by virtue of Hong Kong marriage, she was the surviving legal
spouse of Menilo, Sr. Petitioners contended that the compromise was a patent nullity.

Issue:
Whether or not the action for partition of property on alleged co-ownership in the case at
bar be governed by Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code

Ruling:
Yes. The action for partition is predicated on an alleged co-ownership between private
respondent Natividad and deceased Menilo, Sr. of property evidently acquired during the period
of their common-law relationship. The governing provisions, applicable to their case, are now
found in Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, considering that Menilo, Sr. died on
September 27, 1990, well after the effectivity of Executive Order No. 209 or the Family Code of
the Philippines on August 3, 1988.

277
 JOSEPHINE BELCODERA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET. AL., respondents
G.R. No. 89667. October 20, 1993

Facts:
Alayo D. Busing married Juliana Oday on 27 July 1927, with whom he had three
children, namely, Flora, Teresita, and Gaido. In 1946, he left the conjugal home, and he
forthwith started to live instead with Josefa Rivera with whom he later begot one child, named
Josephine Bosing, now Josephine Belcodero.
On 23 August 1949, Alayo purchased a parcel of land on installment basis from the
Magdalena Estate, Inc. In the deed, he indicated his civil status as "married to Josefa R. Bosing,"
the common-law wife. In a letter, dated 06 Dctober 1959, which he addressed to Magdalena
Estate, Inc., he authorized the latter to transfer the lot in the name of his "wife Josefa R. Bosing."
The final deed of sale was executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., on 24 October 1959. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 48790 was issued in the name of "Josefa R. Rosing, married to Alayo
Bosing, On 6 June 1958, Alayo married Josefa even while his prior marriage with Juliana was
still subsisting. Alayo died on 11 March 1967. About three years later, or on 17 September 1970,
Josefa and Josephine executed a document of extrajudicial partition and sale of the lot in
question, which was there described as "conjugal property" of Josefa and the deceased Alayo.
The notice of extrajudicial partition was published on 04, 05 and 06 November 1970 in the
Evening Post; the inheritance and estate taxes were paid; and a new Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 198840 was issued on 06 June 1974 in the name of Josephine.
On 30 October 1980, Juliana and her three legitimate children filed with the court a quo
an action for reconveyance of the property. On the basis of the above facts, the trial court ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs, and it ordered that Josephine Bosing execute a deed of reconveyance of
the property in question to the legal heirs of the deceased Alayo D. Bosing, and that both
defendants pay, jointly and severally, actual damages by way of attorney's fees and expenses in
litigation.

Issue:
Whether the property in question was acquired by Alayo in 1949 when an agreement for
its purchase on installment basis was entered into between him and Magdalena Estate, Inc., or in
1959 when a deed of sale was finally executed by Magdalena Estate, Inc., the legal results would
be the same.

Ruling:
Yes. The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his
legitimate wife Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code
(Article 1407), "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.”
The applicable prescriptive period for an action seeking a reconveyance of the properties
by the beneficiaries is ten years (Article 1144, civil code). The case has been initiated
seasonably.

278
 VICTOR JUANIZA, Heirs of Josefa Leus, etc., et al. plaintiffs and appellees, vs. EUGENIO
JOSE, THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., AND ROSALIA ARROYO,
defendants and appellants

Facts:
Eugenio was the registered owner and operator of a passenger jeepney involved in an
accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways which resulted to
the death pf seven and physical injuries to five passengers.
Eugenio was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-
appellant Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen years. The ruling of the case for damages held Eugenio and
Rosalia to pay the damages. The lower court based her liability on the provision of Artcile 144 of
the civil code.
Rosalia then appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the ruling of the lower
court.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 144 of the Civil Code is applicable in a case where one of the
parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to marry

Ruling:
No. the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man
and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since
Eugenio is legally married to Socorro, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with
Rosalia, thus, Rosalia cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Eugenio and Socorro. There is therefore, no legal basis for the liability of Rosalia
for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered, by the passengers of the
jeepney. Only the registered owner of the public service vehicle is responsible for damages.

279
 MARINO, RENATO, LETICIA, IMELDA, ALICIA, LIGAYA, AND ZENAIDA, all
surnamed ADRIANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CELESTINA, MANOLO
AND AIDA, all surnamed ADRIANO, respondents
G.R. No. 124118. March 27, 2000

Facts:
On October 29, 1933, Lucio Adriano married Gliceria Dorado; they had three children,
namely, Celestina, Manolo, and Aida, private respondents in this case. On or before 1942, Lucio
and Gliceria separated. The latter settled in Laguna where she died on June 11, 1968. After their
separation Lucio cohabited with Vicenta Villa and subsequently five months after the death of
Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta with whom he had eight children: Marino, Renato, Leticia,
Imelda, Maria, Alicia, Ligaya, Jose Vergel, and Zenaida. All were petitioners except to Jose
Vergel due to his death before the inception of the proceedings. In 1972 the spouses separated.
On October 10,1980, Lucio executed his last will and testament disposing of all his
properties, and assigning, among others his second wife Vicenta and all his children by first and
second marriages as devisees and legatees therein. The properties bequeathed in the will were a
45,000 sq. m. lot and the residential house, rice mill, warehouse and with all the equipment
situated thereon in Candelaria, Quezon. On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and Celestina
Adriano, Lucio’s executrix, filed a petition for the probate of the will immediately after the death
and Vicenta opposed the said petition, but still granted. Hence, the petitioner filed an action for
the annulment of Lucio Adriano’s will.

Issue:
Whether or not the property bequeathed in the will of Lucio Adriano were conjugal
property of the latter and his second wife, Vicenta Villa-Adriano.

Ruling:
No. The properties, which were under this issue, belong to the conjugal property of Lucio
and Gliceria. The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that a man and woman
living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must not in any way be in
capacitated to marry. Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucio’s
marriage with Gloria subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Because it was clearly supported that the
properties was in fact purchased by Lucio with proceeds of the conjugal fund from his first
marriage.

280
 GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner, vs. RTC OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE
LUIS BELLO, AND PEDRO HERNANDO, respondents
G.R. No. 109068. January 10, 1994

Facts:
There was a complaint filed by Gaudencio Guerrero against Pedro Hernando, respondent.
On December 7, 1992, at the pre-trial conference, the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio
Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they being
married to half-sisters hence are brothers-in-law. This case was dismissed by respondent Judge
on the ground that the parties being brothers-in-law the complaint should have alleged that
earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise. Thus, the petitioner appealed.

Issue:
Whether or not brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family.
Ruling:

The court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private
respondent Hernando was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing
the present suit. The enumeration of “brothers and sisters” as members of the same family does
not comprehend “brothers-in-law”. In Gayon vs. Gayon it was emphasized that “sisters-in-law”
(hence, also “brothers-in-law”) are not listed under Article 217 of the New Civil Code as
members of the same family. Article 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same
enumeration of “members of the family”, then there is no reason to alter existing jurisprudence
on the matter.

281
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. EDMUNDO ACUNA and
ALBERTO MORENO, respondents
G.R. No. 154132. August 31, 2006

Facts:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC a complaint against Hiyas
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., his wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the
Register of Deeds for cancellation of mortgage.
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that private
respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no
suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code applies in the case at bar

Ruling:
No. once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same family, the
law no longer makes it a condition to precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a
compromise before an action can prosper.

282
 APRIL MARTINEZ, FRITZ DANIEL MARTINEZ and MARIA OLIVIA MARTINEZ,
petitioners, vs. RODOLFO MARTINEZ, respondent
G.R. No. 162084. June 28, 2005

Facts:
On March 6, 1993, Daniel, Sr. executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision
of the property owned by him and his wife Natividad into three lots bequeathed to each of his
sons.
On May 1995, Daniel, Sr. suffered a stroke which resulted in the paralysis of the right
side of his body. On October 26, 1996, Natividad died. Daniel, Sr. passed away on October 6,
1997.
On September 16, 1998, Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on
September 15, 1996, where the latter appears to have sold the lot to Manolo and his wife Lucila.
Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale against his brother Manolo and his
sister-in-law before the RTC. He also filed a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification
of public document against Manolo.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the spouses holding that the spouses
substantially complied with Article 151 of the Family Code based on the allegations of the
complaint and the appended certification to file action issued by the barangay captain.
On November 27, 2003, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code was duly complied with

Ruling:
Yes. The petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 of the
Family Code because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against
the respondent for unlawful detainer in the Katarungang Pambarangay, in compliance with P.D.
No. 1508; and that, after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at, resulting in the
barangay chairman’s issuance of certificate to file action.
The petitioner’s petition is granted.

283
 SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS, petitioners, vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT and TEODORA AYSON, respondents.
G.R. No. 125465.  June 29, 1999

Facts:

On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a
complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. In said complaint, petitioners alleged that they are
the owners of a parcel of land, in the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz, in a land registration
case filed by private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros, brother of Augusto; that petitioners were
deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case; that such
income consisted of rentals from tenants of the land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from
1968 to 1987, and P595,000.00 per year thereafter; and that private respondents filed the land
registration case and withheld possession of the land from petitioners in bad faith. The
respondents filed an answer denying all allegations by the petitioner. Private respondents prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay damages to private
respondents by way of counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the subject land to private
respondents.On November 23, 1995, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion.  At the same time,
however, it dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as required by
Art. 151 of the Family Code and, therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made
to arrive at a compromise. 

Issue:

Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code was attended in the case

Held:

Art. 151 provides, “No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed.  It if is shown that no such efforts were in fact
made, the case must be dismissed.” This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the
subject of compromise under the Civil Code. Art. 151 of the Family Code do not apply in this
case since the suit is not exclusively among family members. The private respondent Ayson is
admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the requirements of
Art. 151 of the Family Code. The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 do not affect
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the complaint.  The verification is merely a
formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and
correct.  If the court doubted the veracity of the allegations regarding efforts made to settle the
case among members of the same family, it could simply have ordered petitioners to verify them.

284
 PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and
ISABELITA MANALO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 129242.  January 16, 2001

Facts:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 died intestate on February 14, 1992.  He was survived
by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio
Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo
Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo, and Imelda Manalo, who are all of
legal age. At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real
properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac. On November 26, 1992, the eight (8)
of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina,
Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of
Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the
appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. The order of general
default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein petitioners namely: Pilar S. Vda.
De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten (10) days within which to file
their opposition to the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code shall be applied

Held:

Under Article 222 of the Civil Code, No suit shall be filed or maintained between
members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035. This is
clear from the term “suit” that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or
others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him
for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil
action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Besides, an excerpt from the
Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to
make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and
involve members of the same family.

285
 NICANOR T. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS CONSUELO T. SANTOS-
GUERRERO and ANDRES GUERRERO, respondents.
G.R. No. 134787. November 15, 2005

Facts:

Petitioner Nicanor T. Santos and private respondent Consuelo T. Santos-Guerrero are

brother and sister, born to spouses Urbano Santos and Candelaria Santos, now both deceased.
Sometime in 1956, Nicanor, Consuelo, and eight their siblings, executed a “Basic Agreement of
Partition” covering properties they inherited from their parents.Two years later, Consuelo, joined
by her husband, herein respondent Andres Guerrero, filed suit with the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal against petitioner and two other brothers, for recovery of inheritance. They
sought for the judicial declaration of validity in the 1956 Agreement of Partition. The Santos
heirs executed on May 5, 1959 another document, denominated “Deed of Partition.” Spouses
Guerreros filed another complaint against Nicanor for the recovery of her share under the 1959
Deed of Partition. The Judge, in his decision, ordered Nicanor and others to comply with his part
of the Deed of Partition and deliver to the Guerreros the amount of P26,650.00 without prejudice
to the right of reimbursement under the same deed.Subsequently, the Guerreros instituted another
complaint against Nicanor with the CFI at Pasig for recovery of sums of money under the 1959
Deed of Partition. Thereat, Nicanor, as defendant a quo, filed a third party complaint against
brothers Ernesto et al. And albeit not touched upon in the basic pleadings, the issue of whether
Nicanor was obligated to pay Consuelo the amount stated in the 1959 partition. Nicanor was
ordered by the Court to pay Consuelo the amount due her under the May 5, 1959 deed of
partition plus damages and attorney’s fees. Nicanor appealed in the Intermediate Appellate Court
to reverse the decision of the trial court but the appellate court affirmed and modified the
decision of the lower court.Approximately six years later, the Guerreros filed a complaint for
revival of the IAC’s decision in the RTC of Malabon- Navotas but the said court dismissed the
complaint. However, on motion for reconsideration and following a new trial, the trial court
reversed itself. Therefrom, Nicanor went on appeal to the Court of Appeals and the court
dismissed his appeal.

Issue:

(a) Whether or not Article 222 of the New Civil Code, now pursuant to 151 of the Family
Code shall be applied
(b) Whether or not res judicata can barred the Court’s decision

Held:

(a) A lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers;
While a complaint in ordinary civil actions involving members of the same family must
contain an allegation that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made pursuant
to Article 222of the Civil Code, now pursuant to Article 151 of the Family Code, a
complaint otherwise defective on that score may be cured by introduction of evidence
effectively supplying the necessary averments of a defective complaint. The complaint
filed in this case contains no allegations. An action for revival of judgment of a dormant
decision rendered in an original action can hardly be the kind of suit contemplated in
Article 222 of the Code. It cannot be over-emphasized in this regard that the rationale of
said provision is to obviate hatred and passion in the family likely to be spawned by
litigation between and among the members thereof.
(b) Res Judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment rendered by the court of a competent
jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and,
as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim,
demand or cause of action. Res judicata is not a nullifying factor, such that the final
judgment in the former action works to nullify the proceeding in a subsequent action
where the doctrine is invoked.

286
 CECILION MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and
LUISA DE LA ROSA MENDOZA, respondents.
No. L-23102. April 24, 1967

Facts:

Cecilio and Luisa were married on September 2, 1953 and lived together as husband and
wife until July 14, 1954, when the husband departed for the United States to further his studies
and practice his profession. Since then, the husband without justifiable cause or reason
deliberately abandoned and neglected the wife and despite repeated demands from her, the
husband failed and refused to provide for the maintenance and support of the wife who is
pregnant sickly and without source of revenue. Thus, she filed a complaint against her husband.
The husband filed two motions of dismissal consecutively but both were denied. Then he
petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to stop to
stop the Court of First Instance from further proceeding with the case. After the CA heard and
considered the merits, it d3enied the writ of prohibition and dissolved the injunction.

Issue:

(a) Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code shall be applied

(b) Whether or not Article 2053 of the Civil Code shall be applied to claim future support

Held:

(a) Article 222 of the Civil Code requires that before a suit between members of the family is
filed or maintained, it must appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made and the only way to make it so appear when the suit is filed is by proper averment
to that effect in the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit being initiated unless such
efforts at compromise appear, the showing that efforts in question were made is a
condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It follows that the failure of
the complaint to plead that plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of
court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it may be so attacked at any
stage of the case even on appeal.
(b) A claim for future support that under Article 2053vof the Civil Code cannot be subject of
a valid compromise, therefore, outside the sphere of Article 222 of the Code upon which
petitioner relies. The validity of marriage is also a non-compromisable issue. Since no
valid compromise is valid on these issues, a showing of previous effects to compromise
them would be superfluous.

287
MARGARET ANN WAINRIGHT VERSOZA, JOSE MARIA VERSOZA JR., CHARLES
JOHN VERSOZA, and VIRGINIA FELICE VERSOZA, petitioner-appellant, vs. JOSE
MARIA VRERSOZA, defendant-respondent
No. L-25609. November 27, 1968

Facts:
On March 4, 1964, a verified complaint later amended, for monthly support in arrears and
damages and custody of the children with a petition for support pendiente lite was lodged against
Jose Maria Versoza by his wife and their three minor children. Reason gives are that defendant
has abandoned plaintiff without providing for their support and maintain illicit relation with
another woman.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code is applicable in the case

Ruling:
Article 222 of the Civil Code , construed in relation of Section 1 (j) Rule 16, Rules of
Court; Meaning of no suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
unless it should appear that earnest effects toward a compromise have been made but that the
same have failed, subject to limitations in Article 2035. The right to support cannot be: (1)
removed; (2) transmitted to third persons; (3) nor compensated with what the receipients owes
the obligor (Article 301). The alleged defect is that the complaint does not state a cause of action.
The proposed amendment seeks to complete it. An amendment to the effect that the requirements
of Article 222 have been complied with does not confer jurisdiction upon the lower Court. The
defect is curable.

288
 JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner, vs. HON.AUGUSTO V. BREVA, respondents
G.R. No. 86355. May 31, 1990

Facts:
The debt was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident and the money judgment
arising there from was rendered by the Appellate Court on January 27, 1988 which ordering the
petitioner to pay the Salinas spouses the due damages. The said judgment having become final
and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Court to satisfy the said judgment on the
goods and chattels of the defendants including the petitioner. On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied
on a parcel of residential land registered in the name of Jose Modequillo. A motion to quash or
set aside levy of execution was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land located is
where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is
exemt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code
except for liabilities mentioned in article 155 thereof; and that the judgment debt sought to be
enforced against the family home of the defendant is not one of those enumerated under article
155 of the Family Code. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.

Issue:
Whether or not the case fall under the exemption from the execution provided in the
Family Code

Ruling:
Case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family
Code.Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from time
it is occupied as a family residence. Thus, the creditors should take necessary precautions to
protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family owes the home.
Exemption is effective from the time of the Constitution of the Family home as such and lasts so
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. The residential house and lot of petitioner
was not constituted as a family home whether judicial or extrajudicial under the Civil Code. It
became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code of the
Philippines on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila
Chronicles on August 4, 1987.

289
 MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO,
petitioners, vs. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and
HINAHON STA. INES, respondents.
G.R. No. 132537. October 14, 2005

Facts:
On June 17, 1986, Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez- Salcedo
filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Pasig against Marietta Dela Cruz Sta. Inez
alleging that they are the children of the cdeceased Purificacion Dela Cruz Gomez who, during
her lifetime, entrusted her rice land located at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta together
with the Transfer of Certificate of Title covering said land for the latter to manage and supervise.
The sisters further alleged that they have demanded for an accounting of the produce of the said
rice land while under the management of Marietta and for the return of the TCT to the property,
but the latter refused. The trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and after such judgment
became final and executor, a writ of execution was issued by the Pasig RTC, by virtue of which,
a parcel of land located at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, registered in the name of Marietta Dela
Cruz Sta. Ines, was levied upon by Flaviano Balgos Jr., to satisfy the damages awarded in the
civil case. Said property was sold at a public auction to Mary Josephine as the highest bidder.
The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya. A complaint for
annulment of sale was filed by the husband and children of Marietta on the ground that said
house and lot sold during the public auction is their family residence, and is thus exempt from
execution under Section 12 (a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and under Article 155 of the
Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 155 of the Family Code is applicable in the case

Ruling:
Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from execution,
forced sale, or attachment except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to the constitution
of the family home. In the case, the house and lots of Sta.Ines family was not constituted as a
family home, whether judicially or extrajudicially, at the time Marietta incurred her debts. Under
prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed constituted as such only upon the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, thus, the debts were incurred before the constitution before the family
home.

290
 FLORANTE F. MANACOP, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and E & L MERCANTILE, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 97898.  August 11, 1997

Facts:

Petitioner Florante F. Manacop and his wife Eulaceli purchased on March 10, 1972 a
residential lot with a bungalow, in consideration of P75,000.00. On March 17, 1986, Private
Respondent E & L Mercantile, Inc. filed a complaint against petitioner and F.F. Manacop
Construction Co., Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila to collect an
indebtedness of P3,359,218.45.  Instead of filing an answer, petitioner and his company entered
into a compromise agreement with private respondent. On April 20, 1986, the trial court
rendered judgment approving the aforementioned compromise agreement.  It enjoined the parties
to comply with the agreement in good faith.  On July 15, 1986, private respondent filed a motion
for execution which the lower court granted on September 23, 1986.  However, execution of the
judgment was delayed.  Eventually, the sheriff levied on several vehicles and other personal
properties of petitioner.  In partial satisfaction of the judgment debt, these chattels were sold at
public auction for which certificates of sale were correspondingly issued by the sheriff. On
August 1, 1989, petitioner and his company filed a motion to quash the alias writs of execution
and to stop the sheriff from continuing to enforce them on the ground that the judgment was not
yet executory.  On September 26, 1989, the lower court denied the motion to quash the writ of
execution and the prayers in the subsequent pleadings filed by petitioner and his company. 
Finding that petitioner and his company had not paid their indebtedness even though they
collected receivables amounting to P57,224,319.75, the lower court held that the case had
become final and executory.  It also ruled that petitioner’s residence was not exempt from
execution as it was not duly constituted as a family home, pursuant to the Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether or not a final and executory decision promulgated and a writ of execution issued
before the effectivity of the Family Code can be executed on a family home constituted under the
provisions of the said Code.

Ruling:

In that case, petitioner incurred the indebtedness in 1987 or prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988.  Hence, petitioner’s family home was not exempt from
attachment “by sheer force of exclusion embodied in paragraph 2, Article 155 of the Family
Code cited in Modequillo,” where the Court categorically ruled:“Under the Family Code, a
family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the
Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as
contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their
interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home. Article
155 provides that the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except:(1)   For nonpayment of taxes;(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home;(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. The exemption
provided is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. In the present case, the residential house
and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially
under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the
Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August
4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).

291
 PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T.
MORING and HUSBAND, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG, respondents.
G.R. No. 108532. March 9, 1999

Facts:

As a result of a judgment for recovery of property in favor of private respondent , two of

the petitioner’s properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount. The subject properties
were sold to a public auction to the private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently, after
petitioner’s failure to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed definitely
transferring, selling, and conveying said properties to the private respondent. The petitioners
filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a
prayer to writ of preliminary injunction. The petitioners alleged that they are the children of
Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras, who are both dead and the subject property has been
acquired through free patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not subject to any
encumberance for the payment of debt.

Issue:

(a) Whether or not the conveyance made by way of the sheriff’s sale pursuant to the writ of
execution issued by the trial court is prohibited
(b) Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution

Ruling:

(a) Court agrees with the respondent court that the conveyance made by way of the sheriff’s
sale was not violative of the law. The final deed of conveyance ceding the subject
property to Abdon Gilig was issued after the petitioners failed to redeem the property
after the reglementary period. The petitioners are not the owners of the land and cannot
claim to be such by invoking Commonwealth Act No. 141. The prohibition does not
apply since it is clear from the records that judgment debt and the execution sale took
place prior to the approval of the application for free patent.
(b) A family home is a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable, and free from attachment
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated. It cannot be
seized by creditors except in certain special cases. It may be constituted judicially and
extrajudicially. Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as the family residence. The
article does not mean that it has a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Instances where the family home
is not exempted from the execution, forced sale or attachment under the Civil Code.

292
 MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS respondent
G.R. No. 127578. February 15, 1999

Facts:

On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor,
Glen Camil Andres De Asis, broght an action for maintenance and support against Manuel De
Asis, alleging that the defendant is the father of the subject minor and the former refused and/ or
failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands.

Issue:

(a) Whether or not future support can be the subject of a compromise

(b) Whether or not a former dismissal predicated upon a compromise affecting the civil
status of persons can have force and effect

Ruling:

(a) The right to receive can neither renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article
301 of the Civil Code provides that future support cannot be the subject of a
compromise. An agreement for the dismissal of a complaint and support conditioned
upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot
be countenanced.
(b) A former dismissal predicated upon a compromise affecting the civil status of persons
and future support cannot have force and effect and cannot bar the filing of another
action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant.

293
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and MERCEDES CARANTO FERNANDEZ, HUSBAND and
WIFE EDDIE C. FERNANDEZ and LUZ FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs.
ROMEO FERNANDEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 143256. August 28, 2001

Facts:

The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de Venecia were the registered
owners of a parcel of land located at Dagupan City and the two storey building constructed
thereon. It is undisputed that Generosa gave birth to Rogelio who died when he was only 12
years old as paralytic. In the testimony of Romeo Fernandez, it was revealed that the late
Spouses being childless by the death of their son, purchased a one month baby boy, who was
later on identified as Rodolfo Fernandez. He was taken care of by the couple and was sent to
school and became a dental technician. On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died and left his
wife and Rodolfo an estate. On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa executed a Deed of
extra-judicial Partition. On the same day, Generosa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Eddie Fernandez, appellant’s son. After learning the transaction, the nephews and nieces of the
deceased, their father Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed an action to declare the Extra-Judicial
Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio. They alleged that the appellants were
motivated by unmitigated greed, deliberate and malicious acts of depriving them and other heirs
of the deceased their rights.

Issue:

Whether or not Article 1105 of the New Civil Code is applicable

Ruling:

Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the
spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of the deceased, thus the subject deed of extra-judicial
settlement of the estate between Generosa and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is
concerned pursuant to Article 1105 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines which states; “A
partition which includes a person believed to be an heir but who is not shall be void only with
respect to such person. Moreover, While one’s legitimacy be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no application in a case where the
allegation by one party is that a person claiming to be a child of the deceased spouses was not
born to said deceased persons.

294
 GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS MA. THERESA ALMONTE, respondent
G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005

Facts:

Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. After their marriage, they
lived Ma. Theresa’s parents. Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. The
couple’s relationship turned out to be short-lived. On December 19, 1991, the husband filed a
petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine years before
he married Ma. Theresa, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which married was never annulled.
Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive. The wife did not deny marrying Mario when
she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that the marriage was a sham that she never
lived with Mario at all. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and
susbsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being
bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the
child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.

Issue:

Whether or not Articles 164, 166, 49 of the Family Code is applicable

Ruling:

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family
Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.
As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the
Family Code provides: Article 167: The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. The law
requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of the legitimacy. The presumption
of legitimacy proceeds from sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of
conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166(1)(b) of the Family Code,
it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enable the
husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not
disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The presumption is
quasi-collective and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus
between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded
the birth of the child. In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article
49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his
children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each
other’s company. There being no such parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no
legally demandable rights to visit Jose Gerardo.

295
 BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, petitioner, vs. ALELI ANGELES MAGLAYA, respondent.
G.R. No.153798. September 2, 2005

Facts:
On March 25, 1998, the respondent filed a petition for letters of administration and her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles. She alleged that
she is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and together with
petitioner, decedent’s wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs of the decedent.
Petitioner opposed the petition of the respondent. She averred that respondent could not be the
daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Furthermore, the respondent failed to
present the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produce any acceptable document
to prove such union.
Issue:
(a) Whether or not the presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may
be availed by the respondent
(b) Whether or not birth certificate may use as proof of paternity and recognition
Ruling:
(a) A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal
presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact.
For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be over-
emphasized, that while a fact overthrown, stand as proved, the presumption of legitimacy
under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convinvcing proof of the
factual basis. Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise. A
legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage.
Remove the elements of the lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation
between parents and children.
(b) Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of
paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother
jointly, or by the mother if the father refuses. In this case, the Birth Certificate presented
was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by
Genoveva, instead by the attending physician, who certified to having attended the birth
of a child. Thus, the birth certificate presented is not valid to prove the paternity.

296
 ARTURO R. ABALOS, petitioner, vs. DR. GALICIANO S. MACATANGAY, respondent
G.R. No. 155043. September 30, 2004

Facts:
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owner of a parcel of land with
improvements. Armed with Special Power of Attorney (SPA), Arturo executed a Receipt and
Memorandum Agreement (RMOA) dated October 17, 1989 in favor of the respondent, binding
himself to sell to respondent the subject property and not to offer the same to any other party
within thirty (30) days from date. Arturo acknowledged receipt of a check from the respondent in
certain amount, representing earnest money for the subject property, the amount of which would
be deducted from the purchase price. Further, the RMOA stated that full payment would be
effected as soon as possession of the property shall have been turned over to respondent.
Subsequently, Esther executed a SPA dated on October 25, 1989, appointing her sister to act for
and in her behalf relative to the transfer of the property to respondent. Ostensibly, a marital
squabble was brewing between the spouses at the time and to protect is interest, respondent
caused the annotation of his adverse claim on the title of the spouses to the property. On
November 16, 1989, the respondent sends a demand letter informing the spouses of his readiness
and willingness to pay the full amount of the purchase price. The letter contained a demand upon
the spouses to comply with their obligation to turn over possession of the property to him. Arturo
and Esther failed to deliver the property which prompted the respondent to cause the annotation
of another adverse claim. On January 12, 1990, respondent filed a complaint against petitioners
for specific performance with damages. Arturo filed his answer to the complaint while his wife
was declared in default.

Issues:
(a) Whether or not the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership
(b) Whether or not the consent of both spouses is needed in the sale of property under
conjugal partnership
(c) Whether or not a written consent of the other spouse is required in selling property under
conjugal partnership
Ruling:
(a) Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This
right is clearly granted to him by law. More, the husband is the sole administrator. The
wife is not entitled as of right to joint administration. The right of the husband or wife to
one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the
conjugal partnership is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations,
there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective
heirs.
(b) The sale by the husband of the property belonging the conjugal partnership without the
consent of the wife when there is no showing that the latter is incapacitated is void ab
initio because it is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Article 166 of the
Civil Code. This Article requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that acts or transactions
executed against this mandatory provision are void except when the law itself authorize
their validity.
(c) The Family Code now requires the written consent of the other spouse, or authority of the
court for the disposition or encumberance of conjugal partnership property without
which, the disposition or encumberance shall be void.

297
 JANICE MARIE JAO, petitioner vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
No. L-49162 July 28, 1987

Facts:
On October 28, 1968, petitioner Janice Marue Jao, then minor, represented by her mother
and guardian ad-litem, filed a case for recognition and support with respondent Perico V. Jao.
The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course
conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon order of the trial court. The result of the
said test indicated that Janice could not have been the possible offspring by Perico and Arlene.

Issue:
Whether or not the result of blood grouping test may use as an evidence for filiation

Ruling:
The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as they
show only a possiblility that the alleged father or any one of many others with the same blood
type may have been the father of the child. But the Uniform Act recognizes the tests have some
probative value to establish paternity where the blood type and the combination in the child is
shown to be rare, in which case the judge is given discretion to let it in.

298
 ANDAL, petitioner, vs. MACARAIG, respondent
No. L-2474. May 30, 1951

Facts:

The husband was suffering from tuberculosis in such a condition that he could hardly
move and get up from his bed, with feet swollen and voice hoarse. The wife had carnal
intercourse with a man other than her husband during the first 120 days of the 300 days
immediately preceding the birth of the child. The husband soon died, but within 300 days
following dissolution of the marriage, a child was born to the wife.

Issue:

Whether or not the late husband is the father of the child

Ruling:

The Court held that the child is still his legitimate child. The fact that the husband was
seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. There are cases where
persons suffering from such illness can do carnal act even in the most crucial stage of his health
because then they seem to be more inclined to sexual intercourse. This presumption can only be
rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife
during the first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child. “Impossibility of
access by husband to wife would include absence during the initial period of conception,
impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable; and imprisonment, unless it can be shown
that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulation.” The fact that the
wife had illicit intercourse with a man other than her husband during the initial period, do not
preclude cohabitation between said husband and wife.

299
 TEOFISTO BABIERA, petitioner, vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent
G.R. No. 138493. June 15, 2000

Facts:

Presentacion B. Catotal filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of
Teofista Babiera in the Civil Registry of Ilagan City. She asserted that she is the only surviving
child of the late Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera. She alleged that Teofista is not her sister
because she is the daughter of Flora Guinto who is the housemaid of the spouses and gave birth
through ‘hilot’ at the house of the spouses without their knowledge. This caused the registration
of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that the child was the child of the spouses
Eugenio, then 65 years old and Hemogena, then 54 years old, and made her to be the mother of
the child. Due to lack of evidence presented that Hermogena became pregnant and was already
54 at the alleged time of Teofista’s birth, both the trial and appellate court declared the certificate
of birth of Teofista as null and void ab initio and ordering her Local Civil Registrar of Iligan to
cancel from the registry of live birth of Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE.

Issues:
(a) Whether or not Article 171 of the Family Code shall be applied
(b) Whether or not Article 170 of the Family Code shall be applied
Ruling:
(a) A legitimate child has the requisite standing to initiate an action to cancel the birth
certificate of one claiming to be the child of the former’s mother. Article 171 of the
Family Code states that the child’s filiation can be impugned only by the father or in
special circumstances, his heirs. It applies to instances in which the father impugns the
legitimacy of his wife’s child. This Article is not applicable in the present case because it
does not impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera since
there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. In Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, provides that a real party in interest is one “who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
(b) The prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. An
action to cancel a person’s Birth Certificate for being allegedly void ab initio does not
prescribe.

300
 MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA
BENITEZ- LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents
G.R. No. 105625. January 24, 1994

Facts:

Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian owned various properties especially in
Laguna. Isabel died and followed her in the grave, seven years after. He died intestate. The fight
for administration of Vicente’s estate ensued on September 24, 1990, private respondent Victoria
Benitez- Lirio and Feodor Benitez- Aguilar, Vicente’s sister and nephew, respectively. They
prayed for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s favor of private respondent
Aguilar. On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole
heir of the deceased and capable of administering his estate.

Issue:

Whether or not Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code shall be contemplated

Ruling:

Articles 164, 166, 170, and 171 of the Family Code do contemplate a situation where a
child is alleged not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. The instant case
does not contemplated by these articles. These articles govern a situation where a husband (or his
heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can
impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (a) it was physically impossible for him to have
sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
preceded the birth of the child; (b) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been his child; (c) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the
written authorization or ratification by either spouse was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation, or undue influence.

301
 WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner, vs.
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND
LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO, respondents.
G.R. No. 138961.  March 7, 2002

Facts:

Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for
more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the civil case filed by her in favor to her
son. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s
untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazon’s two (2)
children from her subsisting marriage. This was with the knowledge of William Liyao’s
legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting
marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far East
Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then vice president and president,
respectively. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos
Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and
stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital
expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even
asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billy’s birth
certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein.
William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had
their pictures taken together. During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken
showing, among others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billy’s godfather, Fr. Julian
Ruiz, William Liyao’s legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio. Corazon also
presented pictures in court to prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao while
attending various social gatherings and other important meetings.

Issue:

Who shall invoke the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code

Ruling:

Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be
legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration
contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from
the odium of illegitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive
and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the
New Civil Code provides: Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution
or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no
evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility may be caused:1) By the impotence of
the husband;2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access
was not possible;3) By the serious illness of the husband. The fact that Corazon Garcia had been
living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born
is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that
the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code
may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth
under Article 262 of the Civil Code.

302
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors, represented
by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, respondent.
G.R. No. 142877.  October 2, 2001

Facts:

The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in
lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their
respective shares in the latter’s estate under the rules on succession. Danilo B. de Jesus and
Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964.  It was during this marriage that
Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, were born, the former on 01 March 1979
and the latter on 06 July 1982. In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina
Aves de Jesus.  Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable
assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property.  It was on the
strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for
“Partition with Inventory and Accounting” of the Dizon estate. Respondents, the surviving
spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of
which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for
altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus
and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased
Juan Dizon. 

Issue:

Whether or not Articles 170 and 171 shall be observed in the case

Ruling:

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that
there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300
days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of
the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which
took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer
be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.

303
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R. TIJING, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents
G.R. No. 125901. March 8, 2001

Facts:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children and the youngest is Edgardo
Tijing Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989 at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes-
Vasquez. Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of angelita, the respondent. On August, 1989,
angelita went to her house to fetch for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way
to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month
old son, Edgardo Jr. under the care of Aangelita as she usually let her take care of the child while
Bienvenida was doing laundry. When she came back from the market, the two were gone
already. She went to Angelita’s home but she was informed that Angelita already moved to other
place. Bienvenida and her husband searched for their missing son in other places.
Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts. Four years later,
Bienvenida read in the tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common husband
of Angelita. They went to the place and saw her son. She claims that the boy was already named
John Thomas Lopez. The spouses filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in
order to recover their son. The petitioners presented two witnesses, Lourdes Vasquez, the
midwife and Benjamin Lopez, the brother of Tomas. Benjamin Lopez declared that his brother
could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as he was sterile. The trial court granted
the petition while in the appellate court, it reversed the decision of the lower court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Edgardo Jr. and John Thomas is the same person

Ruling:
Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance of birth should cause the
recognition of such birth and only is default of the physician or midwife can the parent register
the birth of his child. A false entry in the birth certificate regarding the alleged marriage between
the parents of the child puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate. Moreover,
resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to
establish parentage. Bienvenida and the subject child have a common resemblance. Thus, the
court considered this in the decision. Parentage will shall be resolved using conventional
methods unless adopt the modern and scientific ways available like Deoxyrebonuclei Acid
(DNA) test.

304
 WILLIAM GO KIM HUY, petitioner, vs. SANTIAGO GO KIM HUY, BONIFACIO GO
KIM & SONS, SANTIAGO GO KIM & SONS, Co., respondents.
G.R. No. 137674. September 20, 2001

Facts:
Bonifacio Go Kim died on February 26, 1974. William Go Kim Huy claims hereditary
rights over the mass of property, rights, and assets belonging to his estate. Heard by six RTC
judges of Quezon City, this 2 decade-old controversy started on June 18, 1980 when petitioner
filed a complaint against the respondents to declare the properties and businesses held by them as
part of the estate of Bonifacio Go Kim and compel them to render an accounting. Respondent
Santiago avers that he is the only son of Bonifacio Go Kim. He maintains that petitioner has
lived and worked with them and was treated as a family member because petitioner’s real father
was close friend of the decedent. His real parents were Gaw Gee and Ng Kee appearing in his
landing certificate. He denied any relation with petitioner ad declares that the grant of petition for
change of name from Gaw Piak to William Go Kim Huy did not make petitioner a member of
the family of Bonifacio Go Kim.

Issue:
Whether or not William Go Kim Huy established his filiation with the deceased

Ruling:
From the time of death of Bonifacio Go Kim in 1974, his heirs acquired a definite right to
inheritance. By provision of will or operation of law, his heirs are called to succeed.
Nevertheless, the burden of proof is on petitioner to establish his affirmative allegation that
Bonifacio is his father. Under our legal system, filiation is established by any of the following:
(a) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a fial judgment; (b) an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws.

305
 MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR.), respondents.
G.R. No. 161434.  March 3, 2004

Facts:

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
forthcoming national elections.  In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan"
Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Petitioner
initiated a petition to disqualify the respondent and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate
of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth his parents were foreigners. His
mother was Bessie Kelley Poe, an American and his father was Allan Poe, a Spanish national,
being the son of Lorenzo Poe, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated that Allan Poe
was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate
birth of respondent on two assertions- first, Allan Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain
Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley, and second, even if no such prior marriage
had existed, His parents got married only a year after the birth of respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not FPJ is a legitimate child

Ruling:

Under Article 172 of the Family Code, The filiation of legitimate children is established
by any of the following:(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or (2)  An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2 any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Under
Article 173, the action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime
and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. 
In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. The
action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both
of the parties”; “Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.”, “The action must be brought
within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.” The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the
code reads: "Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” The 1950
Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into
voluntary, legal or compulsory.  Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.  Legal
acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child
who was recognized or judicially declared as natural.  Compulsory acknowledgment could be
demanded generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. 
Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might
pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could
only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent. In case of an illegitimate child, the
birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the

306
mother if the father refuses.  In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the
document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified. In order that the birth certificate could then
be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was
required to be signed or sworn to by the father.  The failure of such requirement rendered the
same useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.

307
 CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
CAMELO REGODOS, respondents
G.R. No. 124814. October 21, 2004

Facts:
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia
Regodos in behalf of her son, Camelo Regodos. Camelo was born on September 9, 1982. In
1981, Florencia was hired as petitioner’s household help. During the course of her employment,
she often went home to her husband in the afternoon and return to work for the morning. This
displeased petitioner’s wife, hench, she was told to look for another job. One time, petitioner and
Florencia accidentally saw each other in a bus. They went for a dinner and spent the night in a
Hotel, where they had sexual intercourse. In that time, the woman confessed that she was
pregnant with the child of her husband. They went home following that day. Florencia went to
petitioner’s house hoping to be re-employed as servant. Since petitioner’s wife was in need one
that time, she was re-hired. However, petitioner’s wife noticed her pregnancy and she disclosed
that the father was her husband. Thus, she was again told to go home and after that they did not
see each other anymore.

Issue:
Whether or not paternity or filiation was duly established

Ruling:
An order for recognition and support may create a wholesome situation or may be on
irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing
that the putative father was in the preparation of the said certificate. The presumption of
legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but it is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded
on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. The fact that
Florencia’s husband is living and there is a valid subsistence marriage between them gives rise to
presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the matter may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

308
 ROSALINA P. ECETA, petitioner vs.
MA. THERESA VELL LAGURA ECETA, respondent.
G.R. No. 157037. May 20, 2004

Facts:
Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1962. During the
subsistence of their marriage, they begot a son, Vicente. The couple acquired several property
located at Starford, Cubao, Quezon City. Isaac died in 1967, leaving behind Rosalina and
Vicente as his compulsory heirs. In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime however he sired
Maria Theresa an illegitimate daughter. Thus, at the time of his death his compulsory heirs are
his mother and illegitimate daughter. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City for “Partition and Accounting with Damages” against Rosalina
alleging by virtue of her father’s death, she became Rosalina’s co-heir and co-owner of the
Cubao property. Trial, Appellate, and Supreme Court granted Maria Theresa’s prayers.

Issue:
Whether or not Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation

Held:
Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly
authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed the birth certificate thereby acknowledging
that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity
over Maria Theresa. Thus, the filiation of illegitimate children like legitimate children is
established by: (a) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (b)
admission of legitimate filiation is public document or private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by: (a) the open and
continuous possession of the status of the legitimate child; or (b) only other means allowed by
the Rule of the Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is in itself a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child and no further court action is required.

309
 MA. THERESA R. ALBERTO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, INTESTATE
ESTATE OF JUAN M.ALBERTO YOLANDA R.ALBERTO, respondents.
G.R. No. 86639. June 2, 1994

Facts:
On September 18, 1953, Ma. Theresa Alberto was born out of wedlock to Aurora Reniva
with Juan Alberto as the father. She used “Alberto” as surname in all her School records and
correspondences. On September 18, 1967, Juan died intestate. His widow, Yolanda Alberto, filed
a petition for the administration of his estate. After the publication of notices, she was appointed
as the administratrix of the estate. After the Inventory and Appraisal and the Administratrix’
Accounting were approved, the proceedings were ordered closed and terminated. On September
15, 1978, Ma. Theresa filed a motion for leave to intervene as oppositor and to re-open the
proceedings praying that she be declared to have acquired the status of a natural child and as
such, entitled to share in the estate of the deceased. The motion was granted by the probate court.
The Court was convinced that the petitioner had been in continuous possession of the status of a
natural child. Thus, it compelled the decedent’s heirs and estate to recognize her as a natural
daughter and allow her to participate in the estate proceedings.

Issues:
(a) Whether or not the natural child occupies the highest position under the old Civil Code
(b) Whether or not the petitioner is barred to file an action
Ruling:
(a) While he did contract marriage subsequently with another woman, it was only too clear
that he had no intentions of closing definitively that chapter in his life when he begat his
first-born. Of the different categories of illegitimate children under the old Civil Code,
the natural child occupies the highest position, she being the child of parents who, at the
time of her conception, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other and
could, therefore, have contracted a valid marriage.
(b) An illegitimate child whose father or mother dies during her minority has four (4) years
from the attainment of her majority within which to file an action for the recognition. The
motion of the petitioner was seasonably filed three days before the expiration of the four-
year period. Hence, the said motion is valid.

310
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors, represented
by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, respondent.
G.R. No. 142877.  October 2, 2001

Facts:

The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in
lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their
respective shares in the latter’s estate under the rules on succession. Danilo B. de Jesus and
Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964.  It was during this marriage that
Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, were born, the former on 01 March 1979
and the latter on 06 July 1982. In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina
Aves de Jesus.  Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable
assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property.  It was on the
strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for
“Partition with Inventory and Accounting” of the Dizon estate. Respondents, the surviving
spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of
which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for
altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus
and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased
Juan Dizon. 

Issue:
Whether or not voluntary recognition of illegitimate children is present

Ruling:

The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners’ alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to
be of any relevance in this instance.  Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount
declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated
or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such
wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress. The filiation of illegitimate
children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.  In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on
other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment. A scrutiny of
the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents.  The
certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.

Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon,
petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus
and Carolina Aves de Jesus.  This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the
legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents.  The presumption of

311
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional
instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife.  Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected.

312
 CONSOLACION LUMAIN DE APARICIO accompanied by the husband BENITO
APARICIO, petitioner-appellant, vs. HIPOLITO PARAGUYA, defendant-respondent
March 29, 1987

Facts:
Trinidad Montilde, a young lass had a love affair with a priest, Fr. Felipe Lumain and in
the process she conceived. When she almost four-months pregnant and in order to conceal her
disgrace in the public, she decided to marry Anastacio Mamburao. Fr. Lumain solemnized their
marriage. They never lived together as man and wife. On September 12, 1924, 192 days after the
marriage, Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion Lumain. As shown by her birth certificate her
registered parents are Trinidad and Anastacio. On October 31, 1986, Fr. Lumain died but he left
a last will and testament wherein he acknowledge Consolacion his daughter and instituted her as
the sole and universal heir of all property rights and interests. This was duly probated by the
Court of First Instance of Bohol and on appeal it was affirmed by Court of appeals. Soon
afterreachung the age of majority, Consolacion filed an action against Hipolito for the recovery
of certain parcel of lands she claim to have inherited from Fr. Lumain and for damages.

Issue:
Whether or not Consolacion is the lawful heir

Ruling:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will all his estate or any part of it in
favor of any person having capacity to succeed; Determination of paternity not even necessary.
In the last will anjd testament of Fr. Lumain, he not only acknowledged appellee, Consolacion as
his natural daughter but designated her as his only heir. Thus, Consolacion is the lawful heir.

313
 JOSE RIVERO, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 141273. May 17, 2005

Facts:

On August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint[2] against Mary Jane Dy
Chiao-De Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao, in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Naga City, for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their father, Benito
Dy Chiao, Sr., and for the administration and partition of his estate as he had died intestate on
July 27, 1995. Since Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley
Arevalo, filed the complaint on his behalf. Concepcion, Benito Sr.’s wife, was not impleaded as
she had died on July 7, 1995. The CA nullified the decision of the RTC on the ground, inter alia,
that the filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise, and that Mary Jane had
no authority to execute the compromise agreement for and in behalf of her brothers.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick Arevalo for
recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao, Sr

Ruling:
The petitioners’ claims that there was no factual basis for the appellate court’s finding
that the respondents were incompetent cannot prevail. It must be stressed that the CA conducted
a hearing before arriving at the conclusion that respondent Benito, Jr. was incompetent. More
importantly, such claim involves a factual issue which cannot be raised before this Court under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The contention of the petitioners is bereft of merit. The Court
finds and so holds that the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by
Mary Jane is null and void. , the Court is convinced that the compromise agreement signed by
Mary Jane and Benedick was a compromise relating to the latter’s filiation. Mary Jane
recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of her deceased father, the consideration for which
was the amount of P6, 000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, the waiver of other claims from
the estate of the deceased, and the waiver by the Dy Chiao siblings of their counterclaims against
Benedick. This is readily apparent, considering that the compromise agreement was executed
despite the siblings’ unequivocal allegations in their answer to the complaint filed only two
months earlier, that Benedick was merely an imposto

314
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff v. MORENO BAYANI, defendant
OCT. 8, 1996

Facts:
Sgt. Moreno Bayani, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), seeks the
reversal of the 28 April 1995 decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch
11, in Criminal Case No. 6433, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
provided by law; to indemnify complainant Maria Elena Nieto in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50, 000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs.
In her sworn complaint dated 22 February 1993 and filed on 24 February 1993 with the court
below, the complainant charged the accused with the crime of rape allegedly committed.

Issue:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE ON A

SWORN STATEMENT OF THE COMPLAINANT CHARGING THE APPELLANT
THE CRIME OF RAPE, FOR THE REASON THAT THE SIGNATURE APPEARING
THEREON WAS NOT IDENTIFIED BY COMPLAINANT AND NOT PRESENTED
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT BY THE PROSECUTION.

Ruling:
Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children on
the mother, and likewise provides for their entitlement to support in conformity with the Family
Code. As such, there is no further need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of the
offspring by an offender who is married, which would vest parental authority in him. Therefore,
under Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is married can only
be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there be any. In the instant
case then, the accused should also be ordered to support his illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen
Nieto, 72 with Marie Elena Nieto, but in light of Article 20173 of the Family Code, the amount
and terms thereof to be determined by the trial court only after due notice and hearing.

315
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff vs. MANUEL MANAHAN, defendant
September 29, 1999

Facts:
Complainant Teresita Tibigar, 16 years old, worked at the Espiritu Canteen in Dagupan
City. On 5 January 1995, at about two o'clock in the morning, Teresita who was asleep was
suddenly awakened when she felt someone beside her. Upon opening her eyes she saw accused
Manuel Manahan as he immediately placed himself on top of her. . He succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of her. Within the month Teresita left the canteen and returned home to her
parents in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The sexual encounter resulted in her pregnancy. From there
they proceeded to the police station where a statement of Teresita was taken by SPO1 Isagani L.
Ico. Police Chief Inspector Wendy G. Rosario later endorsed the complaining witness to the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan City for appropriate legal action. Thereafter, with the
assistance of her mother, Teresita filed a criminal complaint accusing Manuel Manahan alias
Maning of rape. Meanwhile, on 2 October 1995, she gave birth to a healthy baby girl and
christened her Melanie Tibigar. The accused banks heavily on his "sweetheart theory," a usual
defense in alleged rape, but the accused miserably failed to prove that he and the complaining
witness indeed had a romantic liaison as this claim was categorically denied by her. In
September 1995, the accused was arrested in connection with the case filed by Teresita. On
review ofthe records and the court sustain the conviction of the accused. The prosecution for rape
almost always involves sharply contrasting and irreconcilable declarations of the victim and the
accused.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused of rape

Ruling:
In the instant case, the complaining witness may not have even filed the rape charge had
she not become pregnant. This Court has taken cognizance of the fact that many of the victims of
rape never complain or file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy
in painful silence rather than reveal their shame to the world and risk the rapists' making good
their threats to kill or hurt their victims.
On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of the
court a quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of
rape shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him
from doing so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case before us, compulsory
acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in
doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As pronounced by this Court in People
v. Guerrero, 16 the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize
the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate."
Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, the
court sustains that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance with law.

316
 ELINO RIVERA, plaintiff vs. HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA, defendant
G.R. No. 14150 July 21, 2006

Facts:
Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers (Elino and Dominador), the half-sister-
in-law (Soledad), and the children of a half-brother (Teofila and Cecilia) of the deceased Pacita
Gonzales (hereinafter Gonzales). Respondents Catalino, Lucia, Purificacion and Melchor, all
surnamed Villanueva, and Arnaldo V. Avendano are allegedly the siblings, full and half-blood of
Romualdo Villanueva (hereinafter Villanueva).They are denominated as the heirs of Villanueva
and are represented by Melchor. They were allowed to substitute for Villanueva upon his death.
The remaining respondents, Angelina Villanueva (hereinafter respondent Angelina) and husband
Victoriano de Luna, are allegedly the daughter and the son-in-law, respectively, of the late
Villanueva. Petitioners (Gonzales' half-brothers, etc.) filed a case for partition of Gonzales' estate
and annulment of titles and damages, with the Regional Trial Court. In dismissing the complaint,
the RTC made two findings: (1) Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and (2) respondent
Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion of
petitioners.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in finding that respondent Angelina was Gonzales'
illegitimate daughter

Ruling:

Both the trial court and the CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the illegitimate
daughter of the decedent, based solely on her birth certificate. According to the assailed decision,
"the birth certificate clearly discloses that Pacita Gonzales was the mother of Angelina
Villanueva while municipal treasurer Romualdo Villanueva was denominated therein as her
father."13 The CA found this to be adequate proof that respondent Angelina was Gonzales'
illegitimate child.
However, a closer examination of the birth certificate14 reveals that respondent Angelina
was listed as "adopted" by both Villanueva and Gonzales. A record of birth is merely a prima
facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927 to 1963 was adulterous,
their property relations during those 36 years were not governed by Article 144 of the Civil Code
which applies only if the couple living together is not in any way incapacitated from getting
married.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
are reversed and set aside, and a new one entered ANNULLING the deed of extrajudicial
partition with sale and REMANDING the case to the court of origin for the determination and
identification of Pacita Gonzales' heirs and the corresponding partition of her estate.

317
 MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, et.al., petitioners v.
EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, respondent
G.R. No. 140422

Facts:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro
Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura
Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents
(Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez. Sometime in the
year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades later, petitioners
learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property
and transferred its title to their names.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal
certificates of Elisa, [3] Anselmo, [4] and the late Socorro [5] were presented. After trial on the
merits, the trial court rendered a judgment [8] on 11 July 1997, dismissing the case, ruling that
petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the
baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that petitioners’
inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches.

Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its Decision [9] dated
22 July 1999, ruled that they were able to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura
Cristobal thru “other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” but affirmed the
ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover their share of the subject property because of
laches.

Issue:
Whether or not filiation was properly proven by the respondents with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal

Ruling:
The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are, indeed,
children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:

(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE;

(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late Buenaventura
Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;
(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not binding upon
petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in the execution thereof;

(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and No. 165135,
in the name of private respondents consisting of 535 square meters is ORDERED to be
partitioned and distributed in accordance with this Decision and appropriate certificates of title
be issued in favor of each of the recognized heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura, and

(5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00)
PESOS as damages, to be paid by private respondents.

318
 CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner VS. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004

Fatcs:
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
March 15, 1996 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 which in turn affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C which
compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge private respondent Camelo Regodos as
his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter in the amount of P 500 per month.

This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia
Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.

Issue:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 283 OF
THE CIVIL CODE ON THE COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT
IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS

Ruling:
Both the trial court and the appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of
Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as
minor which did not affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencia’s
husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the
presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[11] The
presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on
the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is
grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.[12]

In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely
subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to
prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz
City is reversed and set aside.

319
 IDA LAGABALA, plaintiff v. JOSE SANTIAGO, defendant
DECEMBER 4, 2001

Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision dated March 4, 1997, of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817, which reversed and set aside the judgment
dated October 17, 1990, Of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, in Civil Case No.87-
41515, finding herein petitioner to be the owner of 1/3 pro indiviso share in a parcel of land. Jose
T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729, located in Rizal Avenue
Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it in his name alone,
his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents herein) sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of
the property. On April 20, 1981, the trial court in that case decided in favor of the sisters,
recognizing their right of ownership over portions of the property covered by TCT No. 64729.
The Register of Deeds of Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in
the certificate of title to said property. Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5,
1987, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession against
herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to, recover from
her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's sole
possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to them by operation of law,
because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and without issue. They
claimed that the purported sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner sometime in
March 1979 was executed through petitioner's machinations and with malicious intent, to enable
her to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 172334) in petitioner's name
alone.
On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner. Ida C. Labagala, thus
affecting their credibility. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Hence, the present petition wherein the following issues are raised for consideration:
1. Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant evidence to prove that she is the daughter
of the late Jose T. Santiago, and
2. Whether or not respondents could still impugn the filiation of the petitioner as the daughter of
the late Jose T. Santiago.

Ruling:
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove
that a person is not a man’s child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning a
petitioner’s legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate
child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. Moreover, the present action is one for
recovery of title and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive
periods. Article 263 should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on
paternity and filiations in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it
contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man’s child by his wife, and
the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the child’s filiations. It does not refer to
situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. Article 263
should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and
filiations in the civil code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates
situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man’s child by his wife, and the husband
denies the child’s filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the
child at all of a particular couple.A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive
proof of filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that
income tax has been paid and the amount thereof. The Supreme Court is constrained to agree
with the factual finding of the court of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon
Labagala and Cornelia abrigas, and contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza
Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner cannot inherit from him through

320
intestate succession. It now remains to be seen whether the property in dispute was validly
transferred to petitioner through sale or donation.

321
 CARLITO FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT
230 SCRA 130

Facts:

In 1983,Violeta Esguerra, single, met Carlito S. Fernandez, married, at the Meralco

Compound tennis courts where Violeta’s father worked as a tennis instructor. The two then
started an illicit sexual relationship six months after their first meeting. The tryst allegedly gave
birth to herein petitioners Carlo Antonio and John Paul Fernandez.

Petitioners filed a civil case for support against Carlito in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The case however, was dismissed on the basis of immateriality, and insufficiency
and incompetence of evidence.

Another action for recognition and support was filed on February 19, 1987 at the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 87. Eventually, the decision was rendered in favor of
the petitioners.

On appeal, the decision was set aside and the complaint was dismissed by respondent
appellate court on October 20, 1992. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied in
December 22, 1922.

Hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners are entitled to recognition and support from private
respondent?

Ruling:

It is the Court’s findings that that petitioners’ evidence failed to substantiate their cause
of action. Respondent appellate court was correct in applying the doctrine of res judicata as
additional reason for dismissing the case.

322
 FRANCISCO JISON, PETITIONER VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT
286 SCRA 495

Facts:

Francisco Jison married Lilia Lopez in 1940. At the end of 1945 or at the beginning of
1946, Francisco impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar, who was a nanny for Francisco’s daughter,
Lourdes. As a result, Monina Jison was born on August 6, 1946. Petitioner alleges she enjoyed
continuous implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco. Monina further alleges that
Francisco has always given her support and support for her education.

On March 15, 195, Monina Jison, praying for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate
status and for Francisco to recognize her as such, filed a complaint against Francisco L. Jison in
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. A decision was rendered dismissing the complaint with
costs against Monina Jison.

On appeal by Monina, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court in April 25, 1995.

Hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the action for recognition is of merit?

Ruling:

Monina Jison’s evidence hurdled “the high standard of proof” required for the success of
an action to establish one’s illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding
“open and continuous possession” or “any other means allowed the by the Rules of Court and
special laws”; moreover, Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of
evidence.

323
 EDGARDO A. TIJING, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001

Facts:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse
Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of
private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida
forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Angelita's
maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back
later. She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved
to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police
who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance Four years later or in October 1993,
Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law
husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order
to recover their son. On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her
common-law husband could not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an
impossibility.5 The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial
similarity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the
trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its
view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother
of the minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John
Thomas Lopez are one and the same person

Issue:
Whether or not Eduardo Tijing Jr. is the same person as John Tomas Lopez?

Ruling:
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son,
Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
There is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of
siring a son. The trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both
in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to
establish parentage. All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed
the son of petitioners.

324
 ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005
Facts:
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they
entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on
November 10, 1999. Despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave
birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in
Quezon City. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for
Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child. In his pre-trial brief filed on
May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to
consider any proposal to settle the case.On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance
of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to
Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court.

Issue:
Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without
violating petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination

Ruling:
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny
their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much
needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the
merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a
perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of
evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA
testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the
basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is
entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for
determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch
of our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for.

325
 ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner vs. ROSENDO ALBA,
represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, respondent
460 S 197

Facts:

On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (“respondent”), represented by his

mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim
where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical
contact with respondent’s mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos,
Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where
she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences
Research Institute (“UP-NSRI”), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the
University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular
Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the
process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in
establishing paternity.[4]
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability.
Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to conduct
DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba.

Issue:
Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation

Ruling:
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity
and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of
the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses.[57] Where the evidence to aid this
investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such
evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the court AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2000.

326
 ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 132955. October 27, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got
married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan.  On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed
with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and
duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her
pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he
later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. In her
counterclaim, Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their
marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private
respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy,
which ended in their son being born prematurely.  

Issue:
Whether the marriage be annulled on the ground that the defendant allegedly concealed
her pregnancy at the time of the celebration of marriage.

Ruling:
The appellant’s contention that his wife’s concealment of her pregnancy during the
solemnization of their marriage constitutes a ground to annul his marriage, as he was made to
believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married, is
untenable. Appellant’s excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because he did
not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst.  The
complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. In the light of
appellant’s admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his
failure to attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot complain that he was
deceived by the appellee into marrying her.
 

         

327
 JOEL JIMENEZ, petitioner, vs. REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES, respondent
No. L-12790. August 31, 1960

Facts:
Joel Jimenez, herein petitioner, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
the defendant, Remedios Cañizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was
too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation and that this condition
of her genitals existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist. Remedios was summoned
but failed to answer. Thereupon, pursuant to Article 88 of the Civil Code, the court directed the
city attorney to inquire whether there was collusion between the parties or if otherwise, to see
that the evidence for the plaintiff is nor fabricated. The court further directed defendant to
undergo physical examination and t submit a medical certification. Still, defendant failed to
participate and comply. Hearing of the case ensued and a decree annulling the marriage between
the plaintiff and the defendant was issued.

Issue:
Whether the marriage may be annulled which is grounded solely of the lone testimony of
the husband who claimed that his wife as impotent.

Ruling:
The answer is in the negative. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that
must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence to annul a marriage. The annulment of the
marriage in question forwarded in this case, was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband.
The impotence of the wife has not been satisfactorily established because from the
commencement until the entry of the decree, she had abstained from participating. Furthermore,
as to be noted, the husband left the home two nights and one day after they had married for the
reason already stated. Said duration would not be enough to fortify her claim that the wife was
impotent.

328
 JOEL JIMENEZ, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC, respondent
No. L-12790. August 31, 1960

Facts:
Joel Jimenez, herein petitioner, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
the defendant, Remedios Cañizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was
too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation and that this condition
of her genitals existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist. Remedios was summoned
but failed to answer. Thereupon, pursuant to Article 88 of the Civil Code, the court directed the
city attorney to inquire whether there was collusion between the parties or if otherwise, to see
that the evidence for the plaintiff is nor fabricated. The court further directed defendant to
undergo physical examination and t submit a medical certification. Still, defendant failed to
participate and comply. Hearing of the case ensued and a decree annulling the marriage between
the plaintiff and the defendant was issued.

Issue:
Whether the marriage may be annulled which is grounded solely of the lone testimony of
the husband who claimed that his wife as impotent.

Ruling:
The answer is in the negative. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that
must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence to annul a marriage. The annulment of the
marriage in question forwarded in this case, was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband.
The impotence of the wife has not been satisfactorily established because from the
commencement until the entry of the decree, she had abstained from participating. Furthermore,
as to be noted, the husband left the home two nights and one day after they had married for the
reason already stated. Said duration would not be enough to fortify her claim that the wife was
impotent.

329
 JOSE RIVERO, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 141273. May 17, 2005

Facts:

On August 27, 1996, Benedick Arevalo filed a Complaint against Mary Jane Dy Chiao-
De Guzman, Benito Dy Chiao, Jr., and Benson Dy Chiao, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Naga City, for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate child of their father, Benito Dy Chiao,
Sr., and for the administration and partition of his estate as he had died intestate on July 27,
1995. Since Benedick was a minor, his natural mother and guardian ad litem, Shirley Arevalo,
filed the complaint on his behalf. Concepcion, Benito Sr.’s wife, was not impleaded as she had
died on July 7, 1995. The CA nullified the decision of the RTC on the ground, inter alia, that the
filiation of Benedick could not be the subject of a compromise, and that Mary Jane had no
authority to execute the compromise agreement for and in behalf of her brothers.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of Benedick Arevalo for
recognition as the illegitimate son of the deceased Benito Dy Chiao, Sr

Ruling:
The petitioners’ claims that there was no factual basis for the appellate court’s finding
that the respondents were incompetent cannot prevail. It must be stressed that the CA conducted
a hearing before arriving at the conclusion that respondent Benito, Jr. was incompetent. More
importantly, such claim involves a factual issue which cannot be raised before this Court under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The contention of the petitioners is bereft of merit. The Court
finds and so holds that the decision of the RTC based on the compromise agreement executed by
Mary Jane is null and void. , the Court is convinced that the compromise agreement signed by
Mary Jane and Benedick was a compromise relating to the latter’s filiation. Mary Jane
recognized Benedick as the illegitimate son of her deceased father, the consideration for which
was the amount of P6, 000,000.00 to be taken from the estate, the waiver of other claims from
the estate of the deceased, and the waiver by the Dy Chiao siblings of their counterclaims against
Benedick. This is readily apparent, considering that the compromise agreement was executed
despite the siblings’ unequivocal allegations in their answer to the complaint filed only two
months earlier, that Benedick was merely an imposto

330
 ELINO RIVERA, plaintiff vs. HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA, respondent
G.R. No. 14150 July 21, 2006

Facts:
Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers (Elino and Dominador), the half-sister-
in-law (Soledad), and the children of a half-brother (Teofila and Cecilia) of the deceased Pacita
Gonzales (hereinafter Gonzales). Respondents Catalino, Lucia, Purificacion and Melchor, all
surnamed Villanueva, and Arnaldo V. Avendano are allegedly the siblings, full and half-blood of
Romualdo Villanueva (hereinafter Villanueva).They are denominated as the heirs of Villanueva
and are represented by Melchor. They were allowed to substitute for Villanueva upon his death.
The remaining respondents, Angelina Villanueva (hereinafter respondent Angelina) and husband
Victoriano de Luna, are allegedly the daughter and the son-in-law, respectively, of the late
Villanueva. Petitioners (Gonzales' half-brothers, etc.) filed a case for partition of Gonzales' estate
and annulment of titles and damages, with the Regional Trial Court. In dismissing the complaint,
the RTC made two findings: (1) Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and (2) respondent
Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the exclusion of
petitioners.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in finding that respondent Angelina was Gonzales'
illegitimate daughter

Ruling:

Both the trial court and the CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the illegitimate
daughter of the decedent, based solely on her birth certificate. According to the assailed decision,
"the birth certificate clearly discloses that Pacita Gonzales was the mother of Angelina
Villanueva while municipal treasurer Romualdo Villanueva was denominated therein as her
father."13 The CA found this to be adequate proof that respondent Angelina was Gonzales'
illegitimate child.
However, a closer examination of the birth certificate14 reveals that respondent Angelina
was listed as "adopted" by both Villanueva and Gonzales. A record of birth is merely a prima
facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927 to 1963 was adulterous,
their property relations during those 36 years were not governed by Article 144 of the Civil Code
which applies only if the couple living together is not in any way incapacitated from getting
married.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
are reversed and set aside, and a new one entered ANNULLING the deed of extrajudicial
partition with sale and REMANDING the case to the court of origin for the determination and
identification of Pacita Gonzales' heirs and the corresponding partition of her estate.

331
 MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, petitioner v. EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, respondent
G.R. No. 140422

Facts:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro
Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura
Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents
(Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez. Sometime in the
year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades later, petitioners
learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property
and transferred its title to their names.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal
certificates of Elisa, [3] Anselmo, [4] and the late Socorro [5] were presented. After trial on the
merits, the trial court rendered a judgment [8] on 11 July 1997, dismissing the case, ruling that
petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the
baptismal and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that petitioners’
inaction for a long period of time amounts to laches.

Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its Decision [9] dated
22 July 1999, ruled that they were able to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura
Cristobal thru “other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” but affirmed the
ruling of the trial court barring their right to recover their share of the subject property because of
laches.

Issue:
Whether or not filiation was properly proven by the respondents with the deceased
Buenaventura Cristobal

Ruling:
The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are, indeed,
children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:

(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE;

(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late Buenaventura
Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;
(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not binding upon
petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in the execution thereof;

(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and No. 165135,
in the name of private respondents consisting of 535 square meters is ORDERED to be
partitioned and distributed in accordance with this Decision and appropriate certificates of title
be issued in favor of each of the recognized heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura, and

(5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00)
PESOS as damages, to be paid by private respondents.

332
 CAMELO CABATANIA, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 124814, October 21, 2004

Fatcs:
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
March 15, 1996 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 which in turn affirmed
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C which
compelled petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge private respondent Camelo Regodos as
his illegitimate son and to give support to the latter in the amount of P 500 per month. This
controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in
behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision.
Held:
Both the trial court and the appellate court brushed aside the misrepresentation of
Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as
minor which did not affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree. The fact that Florencia’s
husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives rise to the
presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.[11] The
presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on
the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is
grounded on the policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.[12]

In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely
subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to
prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz
City is reversed and set aside.

333
 JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
230 S 130

Facts:

In 1983,Violeta Esguerra, single, met Carlito S. Fernandez, married, at the Meralco

Compound tennis courts where Violeta’s father worked as a tennis instructor. The two then
started an illicit sexual relationship six months after their first meeting. The tryst allegedly gave
birth to herein petitioners Carlo Antonio and John Paul Fernandez.
Petitioners filed a civil case for support against Carlito in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The case however, was dismissed on the basis of immateriality, and insufficiency
and incompetence of evidence.
Another action for recognition and support was filed on February 19, 1987 at the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 87. Eventually, the decision was rendered in favor of
the petitioners. On appeal, the decision was set aside and the complaint was dismissed by
respondent appellate court on October 20, 1992. Their motion for reconsideration was also
denied in December 22, 1922.
Hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners are entitled to recognition and support from private
respondent?

Ruling:

It is the Court’s findings that that petitioners’ evidence failed to substantiate their cause
of action. Respondent appellate court was correct in applying the doctrine of res judicata as
additional reason for dismissing the case.

334
 BIENVENIDO RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff VS. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
245 SCRA 150

Facts:

On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support was brought
before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio-Benguet, Br. 9, by herein respondent Clarito Agbulos
against Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner herein. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother,
Felecitas Agbulos Haber, as first witness. In the course of her direct examination, she was asked
by counsel t reveal the identity of the plaintiff’s father but the defendant’s counsel raised a timely
objection, which the court sustained. The plaintiff file before the Supreme Court a petition for
review on certiorari questioning the said order in UDK 8516 entitled “Clarito Agbulos vs. Hon.
Romeo A. Brawner and Bienvenido Rodriguez.” On March 18, 1988, the Supreme Court
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals, which promulgated the questioned decision dated
November 2, 1988.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action for compulsory recognition is deserves merit?

Ruling:

In view in Art. 172 of the Family Code, with respect to Art. 283 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, filiation may be proven by “any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.”

335
 RAYMOND PE LIM, Petitioner VS. COURT OF APPEALS, Defendant
270 SCRA 1

Facts:

In 1978, Maribel Cruz, then 16, was a part-time student at the same time a receptionist at
the Tonight’s Club and Resthouse. It was here where she met Raymond Pe Lim on her first night
on the job. Lim allegedly wooed Maribel and the latter reciprocated. They soon lived together
with Lim paying the apartment rentals. Maribel left for Japan, already pregnant, in July 1981 and
returned to Manila in October of the same year.
On January 17, 1982, Maribel gave birth to a girl and was named Joanna Rose C. Lim.
Lim paid the bills for Maribel’s confinement.
Towards the latter part of 1983, petitioner abandoned the mother and child.
Unfortunately, various jobs and he from relatives were not enough to meet their needs. Maribel
asked Lim for support but, despite promises, were never given. Maribel then filed a complaint
for support in the Regional Trial Court on Manila. The trial court rendered its decision enjoining
Lim to provide support for Joanna Rose and pay litigation expenses.
Lim elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which in turn affirmed the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court.
Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the action for compulsory recognition is of merit?

Ruling:

Petitioner has never controverted the evidence on record. His love letters to Maribel
vowing to be a good father to Joanna Rose; pictures of himself on various occasions cuddling
Joanna Rose and Certificate of Live Birth say it all. The rule in Art. 283 of the Civil Code that
filiation may be proven by “any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father” shall govern.

336
 EDGARDO A. TIJING, Plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Defendant
G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001

Facts:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse
Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of
private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone.
Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them
there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told
Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to discover
that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman
and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance Four years later or in
October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the
common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order
to recover their son. On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her
common-law husband could not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an
impossibility.5 The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial
similarity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the
trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its
view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother
of the minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John
Thomas Lopez are one and the same person

Issue:
Whether or not Eduardo Tijing Jr. is the same person as John Tomas Lopez?

Ruling:
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son,
Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
There is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of
siring a son. The trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both
in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to
establish parentage. All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed
the son of petitioners.

337
 ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005
Facts:
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they
entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on
November 10, 1999. Despite Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave
birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in
Quezon City. The baby’s birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s repeated requests for
Martin’s support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child. In his pre-trial brief filed on
May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied having sired Martin but expressed willingness to
consider any proposal to settle the case.On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance
of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to
Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court.

Issue:
Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without
violating petitioner’s constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination

Ruling:
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny
their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much
needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the
merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a
perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of
evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA
testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the
basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is
entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for
determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch
of our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for.

338
 ROSENDO HERRERA, plaintiff vs.
ROSENDO ALBA, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, defendant
460 S 197

Facts:

On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (“respondent”), represented by his

mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim
where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical
contact with respondent’s mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos,
Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where
she taught Cell Biology. She was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences
Research Institute (“UP-NSRI”), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the
University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular
Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the
process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in
establishing paternity.[4]
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability.
Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondent’s motion to conduct
DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba.

Issue:
Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation

Ruling:
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity
and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of
the putative parent to claim his or her own defenses.[57] Where the evidence to aid this
investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology, such
evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the court AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29
November 2000.

339
 RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE

A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC

(2 October 2007)

SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply whenever DNA evidence, as defined in Section 3
hereof, is offered, used, or proposed to be offered or used as evidence in all criminal and civil
actions as well as special proceedings.
DNA analysis is found to have several uses for forensic investigation, including, but not
limited to the 1) Identification of potential suspects whose DNA may match evidence left at
crime scene; 2) Exoneration of persons wrongly accused of crimes; 3) Identification of crime and
catastrophe victims; 4) Establish paternity and other family relationships, through its variable
number tandem repeats (VNTR) patterns; 5) Identification of endangered and protected species
as an aid to wildlife officials (could be used for prosecuting poachers; 6) Detection of bacteria
and other organism that may pollute air, water, soil and food; 7)Match organ donors with
recipients in transplant programs; and 8) Determination of pedigree for seed or livestock breeds.
DNA is now being used as evidence in trial courts especially in various criminal cases. In A. M.
No. 06-11-5-SC, the Supreme Court has approved has approved on October 2, 2007 the Rules on
DNA Evidence to apply in civil, criminal and special proceedings whenever DNA is offered or
used as evidence.
The said rules defined “DNA” (acronym for “deoxyribonucleic“) as the chain of molecules
found in every nucleated cell of the body. The totality of an individual’s DNA is unique for the
individual, except identical twins. “DNA profile” refers to the genetic information derived from
DNA testing of a biological sample obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly
identifiable as originating from that person. “DNA evidence”, on the other hand, constitutes the
totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic information directly generated from DNA
testing of biological samples.
While the Supreme Court provides for DNA Evidence Rules, it is important therefore that
Congress shall immediately pass the present bill centering on the capacity of forensic DNA
technology to contribute to the criminal justice system. Specifically, this bill will provide the
statutory authority for the creation of the National DNA Index System (NADIS) in the country.
The greatest role of DNA analysis lies in its capability to accelerate criminal
investigations by identifying perpetrators and excluding individual’s right at the onset of the
criminal investigation. With the aid of DNA analysis, a fair and swift administration of justice
system in the country can be expected.
The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo discussed DNA analysis as evidence. This may be
considered a 180 degree turn from the Court’s wary attitude towards DNA testing in the 1997 Pe
Lim case, where we stated that “DNA, being a relatively new science, xxx has not yet been
accorded official recognition by our courts.” In Vallejo, the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs
taken from the rape victim matched the accused’s DNA profile. By 2002, there was no longer
any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence.

340
 GUY, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 163707. September 15, 2006

Facts:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent – minors Karen and Kamille Oanes Wei
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes, filed a pertition for letters of administration before
the Regional trial court of Makati.
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledge illegitimate children of
Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at 10,
000, 000. 00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are surviving spouse
Guy, children Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael all surnamed Guy. Petitioners argued
that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the
lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code, they further alleged that
private respondents’ claim had been paid, waived, abandoned, extinguished by reason of
Remedios’ June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial
and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge
the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.

Issue:
Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming
their hereditary rights?

Ruling:
Remedios’ Release and Waiver of claim does not bar private respondents from claiming
succession rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and equivocal
terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of her
children, such waiver does not bar the latter’s claim. Article 104 of the Civil Code requires
judicial authorization of the said waiver which it lacks. Since the affiliation of the private
respondents as co heirs to Sima Wei’s Estates, it would thus be inconsistent to rule that they
waived their hereditary rights when they do not have such right.

341
 JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, respondent

Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor
child Michael Kevin Pineda. The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his
illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996
as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a
Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that the custody of his
son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and [as] he has demonstrated
his capability to support and educate him.
The said case was withdrawn ex-parte. Applying Article 213 (paragraph 2) of the Family
Code, the CA awarded the custody of Michael Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother, Respondent
Loreta P. Miguel. While acknowledging that petitioner truly loved and cared for his son and
considering the trouble and expense he had spent in instituting the legal action for custody, it
nevertheless found no compelling reason to separate the minor from his mother. Petitioner,
however, was granted visitorial rights.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner, as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental
care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away

Ruling:

Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling factor,
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental
authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone
else.In the past, the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a
communicable disease. Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the
age of majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the
child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was
awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case,
parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother.

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been
eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and
those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives
them legitimate status.

Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under
one category, without any distinction between natural and spurious. The concept of “natural
child” is important only for purposes of legitimation. Without the subsequent marriage, a natural
child remains an illegitimate child.

Obviously, Michael is a natural (“illegitimate,” under the Family Code) child, as there is
nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry
at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and
pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta,
notwithstanding his father’s recognition of him.

342
 EUTIQUIO MARQUINO, PETITIONER VS.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, RESPONDENT
233 SCRA 348
FACTS:

On January 10, 1971,Bibiana Romano-Pagadora brought a civil action for the Judicial
Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support, and Damages against Eutiquio
Marquino. Also included, as defendants were Maria Terenal-Marquino, Eutiquio’s wife, and
their children, Luz, Ana, and Eva. Romano-Pagadora was born on December 2, 1926 by Gegoria
Romano and allegedly by Eutiquio, who was single then. The Marquinos personally knew
romano-Pagadora for she was hired as a helper in their household. She claims she has always
enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct acts of
the Marquinos. The Marquinos, on the other hand, denied the allegations.
During the pendency of the trial, Bibiana died on March 17, 1979. Six days later, her
heirs were ordered to substitute for her. On May 17, 1983, the Marquinos filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that an action for recognition is intransmissible to the heirs, the same
being a personal act. The case was dismissed.

The heirs of the deceased interposed an appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
On August 20, 1983 however, Eutiquio Marquino died. On June 17, 1895, the appellate court
decided in favor of the heirs of Romano-Pagadora reversing the decision of the trial court.

Hence this petition.

Issue:
a) Whether or not the death of the natural child during the pendency of her action for
recognition is transmissible to the heirs?
b) Whether or not the death of the putative parent also during the pendency of the case is
transmissible to the heirs?

Ruling:

Art. 173 is the governing provision wherein the child can bring the action during his or
her entire lifetime and even after the death of the parents. In other words, the action does not
prescribe as long as he lives. The article cannot be given any retroactivity for it will prejudice
vested rights transmitted to them at the time of the death of their father.

343
 OCAMPO TAYAG, PETITIONER VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT
209 SCRA 665

Facts:

On April 9, 1987, Emilei Dayrit Cuyugan, as other and legal guardian of minor Chad D.
Cuyugan, filed a complaint for “Claim of Inheritance” against Corito Ocampo Tayag, the
administatrix of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. Emilei D. Cuyugan, petitioner therein, alleged
that several years before Atty. Ocampo died, they had an illicit relationship, which later brought
about Chad on October 5, 1980, therefore Chad is entitled to a share of the estate of Atty.
Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs.

Petitioner Tayag, respondent therein, filed a counterclaim and a Motion to Dismiss. The
motion was denied on October 12, 1987. Likewise her Motion for Reconsideration was also
denied on November 19, 1987.

Tayag proceeded to the Court of Appeals on December 10, 1987 and filed a petition
praying for certiorari and prohibition, which was granted on August 2, 1989 and enjoined the
trial court judge to resolve petitioner’s motion to dismiss. In compliance with the order, the trial
court acted on and denied motion to dismiss the complaint. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied on January 30, 1990.

As a consequence, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition on March
12, 1990 with the Court of Appeals, praying to set aside the orders of the Regional Trial Court.
On May 10, 1990, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and on September 5,1990, denied
motion for reconsideration

Hence this petition

Issue:

Whether or not the right of a minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested
right?

Ruling:

Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to this case
since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequently, of the
minor child she represents, both of which has been vested with the filing of the complaint in
court. The trial court, therefore, was correct in applying Article 285 of the Civil Code and
holding that private respondent’s cause of action has not yet prescribed.

344
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff v. MORENO BAYANI, defendant
OCT. 8, 1996

Facts:
Sgt. Moreno Bayani, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), seeks the
reversal of the 28 April 1995 decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch
11, in Criminal Case No. 6433, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
provided by law; to indemnify complainant Maria Elena Nieto in the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50, 000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs.
In her sworn complaint dated 22 February 1993 and filed on 24 February 1993 with the court
below, the complainant charged the accused with the crime of rape allegedly committed.

Issue:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE ON A

SWORN STATEMENT OF THE COMPLAINANT CHARGING THE APPELLANT
THE CRIME OF RAPE, FOR THE REASON THAT THE SIGNATURE APPEARING
THEREON WAS NOT IDENTIFIED BY COMPLAINANT AND NOT PRESENTED
AS EVIDENCE IN COURT BY THE PROSECUTION.

Ruling:
Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children on
the mother, and likewise provides for their entitlement to support in conformity with the Family
Code. As such, there is no further need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of the
offspring by an offender who is married, which would vest parental authority in him. Therefore,
under Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a rape case who is married can only
be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there be any. In the instant
case then, the accused should also be ordered to support his illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen
Nieto, 72 with Marie Elena Nieto, but in light of Article 20173 of the Family Code, the amount
and terms thereof to be determined by the trial court only after due notice and hearing.

345
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
GERSON R. ABADILLA, respondent
G.R. No. 133054 January 28, 1999

Facts:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children,
Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with
the surname "Abadilla" and the name of their father was entered as "Herson" Abadilia.
Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the children's parents appeared as June
19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
Thereafter, an Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation of Entries dated February 5,
1997 3 was filed by Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor children,
Emerson and Rafael, with the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. During the hearing of the
petition, both Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino testified that they are not yet married
to each other despite bearing two children.
In a decision dated February 17, 1998, the trial court granted the petition and ordered the
corresponding correction to be made. the Civil Registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte is hereby
ordered to issue an Amended Birth Certificate and Change an Entry therein by deleting the first
name HERSON in the column "Name of Father" and substitute it with GERSON, and also to
delete the entry appearing the column "Date of Marriage of Parents" and "Place of Marriage of
Parents. The instant petition for review on certiorari has been interposed by the Office of the
Solicitor General on the ground that the trial court committed a reversible error when it allowed
the deletion of the "date and place of marriage of parents" from the birth certificates of minors
Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla but failed to order the change of the minors'
surname from "Abadilla" to "Celestino.

Issue:
Whether or not illegitimate children can use surname of biological father

Ruling:
Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla are illegitimate children, their parents,
Spouses Herson and Luzviminda not being married to each other even up to now.
During the birth of Emerson and Rafael, the Family Code was already the governing law and
Article 176 of which explicitly provides as follows:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of their mother,
Luzviminda Celestino. Resultingly, with the correction of the entries in their birth certificates
which deleted the entry in the date and place of marriage of parents, the corresponding correction
with respect to their surname should have also been made and changed to Celestino, their
mother's surname.

346
 TEOFISTO I. VERCELES, plaintiff vs. MARIA CLARISSA POSADA, defendant
G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007

Facts:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass from the barrio of Pandan,
Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor
of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job. On
December 22, 1986, on orders of petitioner, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds
for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on
instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at the
lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at the
upper floor. Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly
embraced her, as he told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime.
He also claimed he could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to
his advances.
Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of her pregnancy, handed her a
letter and P2,000 pocket money to go to Manila and to tell her parents that she would enroll in a
CPA review course or look for a job. In June 1987, petitioner went to see her in Manila and gave
her another P2,000 for her delivery. When her parents learned of her pregnancy, sometime in
July, her father fetched her and brought her back to Pandan. On September 23, 1987,7 she gave
birth to a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada. The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled
with Support Pendente Lite before the RTC, Virac, Catanduanes against petitioner on October
23, 1987. On January 4, 1995, the trial court issued a judgment in their favor.
Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment with modification,
specifying the party to whom the damages was awarded.

Issue:
Whether or not the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner
was proven

Ruling:
Petitioner argues he never signed the birth certificate of Verna Aiza Posada as father and
that it was respondent Clarissa who placed his name on the birth certificate as father without his
consent. He further contends the alleged love letters he sent to Clarissa are not admissions of
paternity but mere expressions of concern and advice. As to the award for damages, petitioner
argues Clarissa could not have suffered moral damages because she was in pari delicto, being a
willing participant in the "consensual carnal act" between them.13 In support of his argument
that the issue on filiation should have been resolved in a separate action, petitioner cited the case
of Rosales v. Castillo Rosales14 where we held that the legitimacy of a child which is
controversial can only be resolved in a direct action.
Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself presented no
evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

347
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
454 S 541

Facts:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition[1] to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others,
that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that
Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower
and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be
changed to “Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to
“Catindig,” his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption.
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration[5]
praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as
her middle name and on May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

Issue:
Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father

Ruling:
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner
that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural
mother. The Court said that, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with
her natural mother becuse under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate
heir of athe latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her
relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained and that ,
there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED
in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname “GARCIA” as her
middle name.

348
 JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, respondent

Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor
child Michael Kevin Pineda. The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his
illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996
as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a
Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays that the custody of his
son Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological father and [as] he has demonstrated
his capability to support and educate him.
The said case was withdrawn ex-parte. Applying Article 213 (paragraph 2) of the Family
Code, the CA awarded the custody of Michael Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother, Respondent
Loreta P. Miguel. While acknowledging that petitioner truly loved and cared for his son and
considering the trouble and expense he had spent in instituting the legal action for custody, it
nevertheless found no compelling reason to separate the minor from his mother. Petitioner,
however, was granted visitorial rights.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner, as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental
care of his own child in the absence of the mother who is away

Ruling:

Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling factor,
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental
authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone
else.In the past, the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a
communicable disease. Parental authority over recognized natural children who were under the
age of majority was vested in the father or the mother recognizing them. If both acknowledge the
child, authority was to be exercised by the one to whom it was awarded by the courts; if it was
awarded to both, the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other words, in the latter case,
parental authority resided jointly in the father and the mother.

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been
eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and
those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All
children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives
them legitimate status.

Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under
one category, without any distinction between natural and spurious. The concept of “natural
child” is important only for purposes of legitimation. Without the subsequent marriage, a natural
child remains an illegitimate child.

Obviously, Michael is a natural (“illegitimate,” under the Family Code) child, as there is
nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry
at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and
pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta,
notwithstanding his father’s recognition of him.

349
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUSTINIANO GLABO alias
“TOTO BUGOY”, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 129248. December 7, 2001

Facts:
That on or about the month of October, 1991, at Sitio Siniaran, Bgy. Banbanan, in the
Municipality of Taytay, Province of Palawan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused with lewd design and by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
one Mila Lobrico against her will and consent to the damage and prejudice of said Mila Lobrico
in such amount as may be awarded her by the court.
In his defense, accused-appellant alleged that during the entire month of October 1991, he
was plowing the field of one of his sisters in Sitio Yakal, new Guinto, Taytay, Palawan. The
victim’s mother, Gloria Glabo-Lobrico, testified for the defense. She stated that she wanted the
case to be settled to restore her good relationship with accused-appellant, who is her brother.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is further obliged to provide support to the victim’s
child born out of the rape, subject to the amount and terms to be determined by the trial court in a
proper proceeding?

Ruling:
Concerning the acknowledgement and support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the
Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the
offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgement of the offspring, unless the law should
prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the
Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal
fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental
authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an
offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses the power to exercise parental
authority over his children, no “further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself
provides for the child’s status.” Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify
and support the victim’s child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be determined
by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.

350
 DINAH B. TONOG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
EDGAR V. DAGUIMOL, respondents.
G.R. No. 122906. February 7, 2002

Facts:
On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde
Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. Petitioner was
then a nursing student while private respondent was a licensed physician. They cohabited for a
time and lived with private respondent’s parents and sister in the latter’s house in Quezon City
where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the family.
A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America where
she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (private
respondent herein) and paternal grandparents.
On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053, in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On March 9,
1992, the trial court rendered judgment appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the
minor, Gardin Faith.
Issue:
With regard to guardianship, who is entitled over Gardin Faith, an illegitimate child, would
it be the father or the mother?
Ruling:
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been
terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the
minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that
the appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the
meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her
familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to
which she had apparently formed an attachment.
A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to imply a preference
toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to the final custody of the minor, Gardin
Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a statement against petitioner’s fitness to have final
custody of her said minor daughter. It shall be only understood that, for the present and until
finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father, the
private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053.

351
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GERSON R. ABADILLA,
LUZVIMINDA M. CELESTINO, and THE MINORS EMERSON C. ABADILLA AND
RAFAEL C. ABADILLA, REPRESENTED BY THEIR GUARDIAN AD LITEM
LUZVIMINDA M. CELESTINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 133054. January 28, 1999

Facts:
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino have been living together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, Luzviminda begot two children,
Emerson and Rafael. In the Certificates of Birth of these two children, they were registered with
the surname “Abadilla” and the name of their father was entered as “Herson” Abadilla.
Moreover, the entry in the date and place of marriage of the children’s parents appeared as June
19, 1987 at Dingras, Ilocos Norte.
Thereafter, an Amended Petition for Correction/Cancellation of Entries dated February 5,
1997 was filed by Gerson Abadilla, Luzviminda Celestino and their two minor children,
Emerson and Rafael, with the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 65.

Issue:

Whose surname will be followed with regard to illegitimate children, that of the father’s or
of the mother’s?

Ruling:
There is no dispute that Emerson C. Abadilla and Rafael C. Abadilla are illegitimate
children, their parents, Spouses Herson and Luzviminda not being married to each other even up
to now.
During the birth of Emerson and Rafael, the Family Code was already the governing law and
Article 176.
Thus, as illegitimate children, Emerson and Rafael should bear the surname of their mother,
Luzviminda Celestino. Resultingly, with the correction of the entries in their birth certificates
which deleted the entry in the date and place of marriage of parents, the corresponding correction
with respect to their surname should have also been made and changed to Celestino, their
mother’s surname.

352
 MARISSA A. MOSSESGELD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 111455. December 23, 1998

Facts:
On December 2, 1989, petitioner Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld, single, 31 years of age, gave
birth to a baby boy at the Medical City General Hospital, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. It was
the third time that she delivered a child. The presumed father, one Eleazar Siriban Calasan, 42
years old, a lawyer, married, and a resident of 8632 San Jose St. Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati,
Metro Manila, signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the
child’s first name as Jonathan, middle name as Mossesgeld, and last name as Calasan. Both the
presumed father, Eleazar S. Calasan and the mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld, accomplished the
dorsal side of the certificate of live birth stating that the information contained therein were true
and correct. In addition, lawyer Calasan executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child.
On December 6, 1989, due to the refusal of the person in charge at the hospital to placing
the presumed father’s surname as the child’s surname in the certificate of live birth, petitioner
himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong, for
registration.
On December 28, 1989, the municipal treasurer of Mandaluyong, as officer in charge of the
office of the local civil registrar, rejected the registration on the basis of Circular No. 4, dated
October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing that under Article 176 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the
surname of their mother.
Issue:
The issue raised is whether mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a
certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father’s surname where the latter
admitted paternity.
Ruling:
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that “illegitimate children shall
use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code.” This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father
admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the
certificate of live birth of petitioner’s illegitimate child using the surname of the alleged father,
even with the latter’s consent. Of course, the putative father, though a much married man, may
legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of adoption, the child shall be considered a
legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his surname.

353
 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT, complainant, vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO M. BELEN, respondent
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362. July 18, 1997

Facts:
In this administrative complaint initiated by Corazon M. Layug, Social Welfare Officer IV
of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Field Office No. 1 stationed in
San Fernando, La Union, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is charged with rendering an erroneous decree of adoption
in violation of Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as “The Child and
Youth Welfare Code,” and the corresponding Supreme Court circular thereon, namely, Circular
No. 12 dated October 2, 1986.
Respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan is charged with disregarding the provisions of the
same Circular No. 12 of this Court in connection with the aforementioned special proceeding.
As appears from the records, the spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano,
both of whom are naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their
niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea, which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5830 of
the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, and assigned to Branch 38 thereof. In due
time, respondent Judge Belen granted the petition in a decision dated June 25, 1992, after finding
that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own.
Issue:
Is there a violation of Article 33 of PD 603 in dispensing with the procedure of adopting a
child?
Ruling:
We are, however, persuaded that respondent judge acted in good faith when he stated in his
decision that the DSWD submitted the required reports to his court through respondent Vedaña,
presumably in the belief that it was standard procedure for the Social Welfare Officer II of a
Regional Trial Court to do so in coordination with the DSWD. We also agree with the findings
of the OCA that there is no evidence whatsoever that respondent Vedaña sought to obtain any
amount from the adopting parents. In fact, this is belied by the affidavit of the child’s natural
mother, Loreta Ibea. We are, therefore, inclined to adopt a liberal view on the charges against
respondents.

354
 DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN petitioner, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006

Facts:
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America
(USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of
minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who was
born on September 7, 1987; and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989. The
minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner's brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990,
the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother,
Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no
longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she
left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the
petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000,
petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent to the
adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has
children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective
families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and
works as a restaurant server.  She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors;
her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the minors.  Petitioner's brother,
Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to
support the minors while in petitioner's custody.

Issue/s:
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following:  (a) whether the
petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother,
Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the
petitioner-adopter's children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner
is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.

Ruling:

While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children and
siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the
adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the latter.  Moreover,
the records do not prove nor support petitioner's allegation that her siblings and her children are
financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein.  The Court, therefore,
again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces
and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA.  In
any case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.

355
 HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V.
CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998

Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973,
begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977,
and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple’s relationship was undisturbed.
Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband’s alleged extramarital affair
with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos.
Upon learning of her husband’s alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal
separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Cebu which rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing
that they agreed to “live separately and apart or from bed and board.”

Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them?

Ruling:
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural
parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement
of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent
is “insane or hopelessly intemperate.” The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even
without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for
adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant exemption from compliance therewith. This is in
consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is
not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was
then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children
through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
The Court ruled that the liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption
insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of
the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall
benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and
perspective.  The Court's position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to
inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve
adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with
due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.

356
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, and
SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and
REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.
G.R. No. 117209. February 9, 1996

Facts:
On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina
Munson y Andrade, filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly
alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption,
their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and
by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition,
private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron
Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition,
and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993
when he arrived at private respondents’ residence.
Issue/s:
The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized mainly as follows:
(1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered
proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2)
whether or not there was lawful ground for the change of name.
Ruling:
The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules under the
policy of liberal construction thereof in general, and for change of name in particular, as
proposed by private respondents and adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the
Rules may be invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal deficiency or
error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and
connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person’s birth must be entered in the civil register. The
official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of
the law. And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of
the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no person can change his name or
surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the interest of the
State in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent judge is hereby
MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private respondents shall henceforth be officially
known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in
accordance with law. In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED.

357
 ROBERTO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. HERNANDO PEREZ, SEC. OF JUSTICE;
SHIRLEY ABERDE, respondents.
496 S 474

Facts:

Roberto and Shriley became sweethearts while studying law at Sto. Tomas. This resulted to
Shirley’s giving birth to Robby. They never got married. They lived separate lives. Roberto
married another woman and had children with her. Roberto gave support twice only (1992 &
1993); in 1994, he gave money for medical expenses because Robby was sick. He desisted in
giving support hence. Due to financial difficulties, Shirley worked as a factory worker in Taiwan
for a brief period. When Robby about to enter high school, Shirley demanded support from
Roberto who merely ignored her. While Shirley was in financial distress, Roberto lived a
luxurious lifestyle (5 luxury cars, 1 big house in Ayala, frequently travels abroad, sends his
children to expensive schools; stock shares worth P 750,000). Despite the obvious luxury,
Roberto maintains that he is financially incapable of supporting Robby. Hence, Shirley filed a
criminal case for NEGLECT of CHILD under Art. 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to Section 10(a)
of RA 7610.

Issue:

Is Shirley’s criminal case for neglect of child against Roberto tenable?

Ruling:

Roberto can be charged with NEGLECT OF CHILD. That the Secretary of Justice didn’t err
in its decision.

358
 MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, for and in behalf of her minor children REBECCA
ANGELA DELGADO and REGINA ISABEL DELGADO, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA,
FEDERICO C. DELGADO and FRANCISCO C. DELGADO, respondents.
G.R. No. 125041.            June 30, 2006
Facts:

On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor
children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application
for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16
February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City
Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years
old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without
the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by
the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner
gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second
husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally
abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter
college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and
second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of
Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western
New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were,
however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education.

Issue:

As legitimate children and grandchildren, are Rica and Rina entitled to general and
educational support under Articles 174 and 195(b) in relation to Articles 194(1 and 2) and 199(c)
of the Family Code?

Ruling:

Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the provision of
the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the
giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold respondent
Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support
pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to
pay this amount given his various business endeavors.

Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their education
by the time of the promulgation of this decision, we deem it proper to award support pendente
lite in arrears to be computed from the time they entered college until they had finished their
respective studies.

359
 MANUEL J. C. REYES, petitioner, vs.
HON. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO, COURT OF APPEALS and
CELIA ILUSTRE-REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-48219 February 28, 1979

Facts:

The private petitioner, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Quezon City a complaint dated June 3, 1976 against her husband, Manuel J. C. Reyes,
for legal separation on the ground that the defendant had attempted to kill plaintiff.

The plaintiff asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children. The defendant,
petitioner herein, opposed the application for support pendente lite on the ground that his wife
had committed adultery with her physician.

Issue:

In actions for legal separation, is the wife entitled to support from the husband despite the
fact that a case for adultery had been filed by the husband against her?

Ruling:

In the instant case, at the hearing of the application for support pendente lite before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court presided by the respondent Judge, Hon. Leonor Ines-
Luciano the petitioner did not present any evidence to prove the allegation that his wife, private
respondent Celia Ilustre-Reyes, had committed adultery with any person.

In a resolution dated July 31, 1978, this Court issued a temporary restraining order effective
immediately against the enforcement of the lower court's order giving support pendente lite to
private respondent in the sum of P4,000.00 monthly commencing June 1976 and in lieu thereof
to allow such support only to the extent of P1,000.00 a month.

Later the petitioner was required to pay the support at the rate of P1,000.00 a month which
had accumulated since June 1976 within ten (10) days from notice of the resolution:

The private respondent acknowledged on November 20, 1978 having received from the
petitioner, through his counsel a check in the amount of P30,000.00 as payment of support for
the period from June 1976 to November 1978 or thirty (30) months at P1,000.00 a month in
compliance with the resolution of this Court dated October 9, 1978.

In view of the foregoing, the support of P4,000.00 should be made to commence or, March
1, 1979.

360
 PRINCESITA SANTERO, FEDERICO SANTERO and WILLIE SANTERO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, ANSELMA DIAZ, VICTOR,
RODRIGO, ANSELMINA, MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61700 September 14, 1987

Facts:

In the Motion For Allowance in question guardian-movant Anselma Diaz only followed the
precedent of the Court which granted a similar motion last year to be spent for the school
expenses of her wards. In their opposition the oppositors contend that the wards for whom
allowance is sought are no longer schooling and have attained majority age so that they are no
longer under guardianship. They likewise allege that the administrator does not have sufficient
funds to cover the said allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator,
they constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the
Kawit property from which said administrator derives the only income of the intestate estate of
Pablo Santero, et al.

Issues:

a. Whether or not respondent court acted with abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in granting the allowance to the respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and
Miguel-P2,000.00 each despite the fact that all of them are not minors and all are gainfully
employed with the exception of Miguel.

b. Whether or not respondent Court acted with abuse of discretion in granting the allowance
based on the allegations of the said respondents that the abovenamed wards are still schooling
and they are in actual need of money to defray their school expenses for 1982-83 when the truth
is that they are no longer schooling.

c. Whether or not respondent Court acted with abuse of discretion in granting the motion for
allowance without conducting a hearing thereon, to determine the truth of allegations of the
private respondents.

Ruling:

The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment
and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188.
While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of
the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without
distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed
Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their
father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the
surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the
estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court
which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be
the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of the children here).

361
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA and SPOUSES SAMUEL ROBERT
DYE, JR. and ROSALINA D. DYE, respondents.
G.R. No. 95551. March 20, 1997

Facts:

On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages
13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr. a member of
the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in
Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They
have two children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their
consent to the adoption.

After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on September 10, 1990 granting the petition
and declaring Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption. Respondent
Regional Trial Court disregarded the sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses
being only fifteen years and three months and fifteen years and nine months older than Maricel
Due, on the ground that a literal implementation of the law would defeat the very philosophy
behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child. The court also found that the
petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit to adopt, possess good moral character,
sufficient financial capability and love and affection for the intended adoptees.

Issue:

The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, is contention of the
petitioner that the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due
correct?

Ruling:

As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under Article 184
of the Family Code.

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of
the welfare of children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will
sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion,
understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care
and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the
trial court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be
modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however,
that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for
adoption.

362
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JAIME B. CARANTO, and
ZENAIDA P. CARANTO, respondents.
G.R. No. 103695. March 15, 1996

Facts:

The petition below was filed on September 21 1988 by private respondents spouses Jaime B.
Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then fifteen years old, who
had been living with private respondent Jaime B. Caranto since he was seven years old. When
private respondents were married on January 19, 1986, the minor Midael C. Mazon stayed with
them under their care and custody. Private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered:

a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and
purposes;

b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and

c) That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the petitioners and
that the first name which was mistakenly registered as "MIDAEL" be corrected to
"MICHAEL."

Issue:

The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of
the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the correction sought concerned
only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for
adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Is he correct?

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED
by deleting from the decision of the Regional Trial Court the order to the local civil registrar to
change the name "MIDAEL" to "MICHAEL" in the birth certificate of the child. In other
respects relating to the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

363
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and
EVELYN A. CLOUSE, respondents.
G.R. No. 94147. June 8, 1994

Facts:

On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba,
Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph
Alcala, the younger brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on
March 12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing on April 18, 1990. The said Order was
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Zambales and City of
Olongapo for three (3) consecutive weeks.

The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born
citizen of the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at
Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of
America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting
Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.

Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala
was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent
to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to
poverty and inability to support and educate her son.

Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study,
favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption.

Issue:

The sole issue for determination concerns the right of private respondents spouses Alvin A.
Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens to adopt under Philippine Law.

Ruling:

We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote that objective. Adoption is geared more towards the
promotion of the welfare of the child and enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and
happy life. It is not the bureaucratic technicalities but the interest of the child that should be the
principal criterion in adoption cases. Executive Order 209 likewise upholds that the interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted should be the paramount consideration. These considerations
notwithstanding, the records of the case do not evince any fact as would justify us in allowing the
adoption of the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, by private respondents who are aliens.

364
 VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-18753.  March 26, 1965

Facts:

On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the
Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after the
requisite publication and service to all parties concerned.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of
the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the
following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was
physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will
was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.

Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had
no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to
intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended
her opposition by alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr.
Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix during her last
illness.

Issue:

Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would
she acquire any right to the estate in the event that the will is denied probate?

Ruling:

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quo declaring
invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having
been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set
aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he
was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements
touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be
set aside for the same reason.

WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the
will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the decision
is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.

365
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311.  March 31, 2005

Facts:

On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.  He alleged therein, among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie
has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and
qualified to be her adopting parent.  He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed
to “Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,” his
surname.

Issue:

Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father?

Ruling:

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner
that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother
for the following reasons:

First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural
mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the
latter.   Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or
proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name.  What the law does not prohibit, it allows.

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother.  This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. 
In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that “the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the
surname of the mother.”

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED

in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother’s surname “GARCIA” as her
middle name.

366
 MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant, vs.
JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR., respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-716. October 25, 1995

Facts:

In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of gross immorality
on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited
with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita
Banzuela. Adding ignominy to an ignominious situation, respondent allegedly shamefacedly
contracted marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan on May 23, 1986. Complainant claims that
this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much
married to Teresita Banzuela.

In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent caused to
be registered as "legitimate", his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan, by falsely
executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence,
excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that these children
cannot be legally registered as legitimate.

Issue:

Is the act of the judge legitimating his illegitimate child valid?

Ruling:

The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is Article 269 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which provides:

Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.

Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous
relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code: (Executive Order, No. 209),
which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned provision thus:

Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at
the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment
to marry each other may be legitimated.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of gross
immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption and, consequently, orders his dismissal from the
service. Such dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits
and retirement benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in the government-service, all
without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.

367
 MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, petitioner, vs.
HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, and CONCHITA TALAG DE SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 105619. December 12, 1995

Facts:

On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed
with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some time, their relationship
became strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor,
Conchita Talag, private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first
marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949.

Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had
been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children.
On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967,
Antonio and private respondent contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under
Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated
value of P15,000,000.00.

On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She
alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely,
herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner. There being no opposition, her petition was
granted.

On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of her administration,
the court a quo passed upon petitioner's motion. The court, citing the case of Francisco H.
Tongoy, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (23 SCRA 99 [1983]), declared private respondent's ten
children legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and
private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.

Issue:

Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized?

Ruling:

A legal fiction had to be resorted to, that device contrived by law to simulate a fact or
condition which, strictly and technically speaking, is not what it purports to be. In this case, the
term "natural children by legal fiction" was invented, thus giving rise to another category of
illegitimate children, clearly not to be confused with "natural children" as defined under Art. 269
but by fiction of law to be equated with acknowledged natural children and, consequently,
enjoying the status, rights and obligations of the latter.

Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the
provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of
children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure
fiction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of the court a
quo dated November 14, 1991 and January 9, 1992, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Maria Rosario de Santos is hereby declared the SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD of the decedent
Antonio de Santos and, as such, entitled to all the rights accorded to her by law.

368
 DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 111180. November 16, 1995

Facts:

Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a

businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four
children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent
developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9,
1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine,
born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.

The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J,
to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's
legal wife.

After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.

In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to
go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the
child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school
year.

On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.

Issue:

Is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody
of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her
own since they were born?

Ruling:

In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception,
his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the
child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the
parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority,
is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful
custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus.

Indeed, Rule 102.1 makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from
her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate
child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody
of her child.

The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art.
213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise."

369
 CARLITOS E. SILVA, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SUZANNE T. GONZALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997

Facts:

Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local

actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children:
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It
began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous
objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had
never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted
ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow
Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his company
on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional
Trial Court (“RTC”), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who
averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect
the moral and social values of the children.

Issue:

The issue is not really a question of child custody; instead, the case merely concerns the
visitation right of a parent over his children which the trial court has adjudged in favor of
petitioner by holding that he shall have “visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or
Sundays, but in no case (could) he take out the children without the written consent of the mother
x x x." The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his or her
child or children.

Ruling:

The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant concern
for the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or
undue designs more than a parent’s natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on
brief visits, his own children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably
provide this precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take out the children without
the written consent of the mother."

370
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as
“DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM”), respondent.
G.R. No. 143989. July 14, 2003

Facts:

The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children. The
realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to
take into their care Isabelita’s nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At
the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who
treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally
adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05
May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before
the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil
Registrar of Naga City changed the name “Jose Melvin Sibulo” to “Jose Melvin Lahom.”

A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom
commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 22, of Naga City.

Issue:

Can the adopter rescind the decree of adoption?

Ruling:

Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from
the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
“SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. – Upon petition of the adoptee,
with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but
is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the
life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to
comply with parental obligations.
“Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission
by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes
provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.”
It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of
adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing
to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny
to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from
having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

371
 JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner, vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL,
FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL, respondents.
G.R. No. 156343. October 18, 2004

Facts:

“On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus
against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody
of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.
“On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended Petition to include Loreta P.
Miguel, the mother of the minor, as one of the respondents.
“A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court on March 11, 2002 ordering the
respondents to produce before this Court the living body of the minor Michael Kevin Pineda
on March 21, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
“The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel.  He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by
his Birth Certificate.  The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national
and is presently residing in Japan.
Issue:
Whether or not [he], as the natural father, may be denied the custody and parental care of his
own child in the absence of the mother who is away?
Ruling:
Obviously, Michael is a natural (“illegitimate,” under the Family Code) child, as there is
nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry
at the time of his birth.  Both acknowledge that Michael is their son.  As earlier explained and
pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta,
notwithstanding his father’s recognition of him.

There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental
authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her
company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it
“except in the cases authorized by law.”

In the present case, it has been established that petitioner and Respondent Loreta were never
married. Hence, that portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to choose which parent to
live with is deleted, but without disregarding the obligation of petitioner to support the child.

372
 THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996
Facts:
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming
as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar
Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs
substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his
estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the
decedent’s will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action
for the probate of his father’s holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator’s death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar
Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the
probate and approval of Hilario Ruiz’s will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
Edmond Ruiz. Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was
executed under undue influence.
Issue:
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but
before payment of the estate’s debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance
from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator’s grandchildren; (2) to order the release
of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the
executor of the will.
Ruling:
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is
merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is
a mere trustee of his father’s estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is
held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally
assign to himself and possess all his parents’ properties and the fruits thereof without first
submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased,
rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the
obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their
veracity, propriety and justness.

373
 EDWARD V. LACSON, petitioner v. MAOWEE DABAN LACSON, respondent
G.R. No. 150644, August 28, 2006

Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters
of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on
December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of
Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home, virtually forcing mother and children to seek,
apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. After some time, they rented an
apartment only to return later to the house of Lea's mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the
sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from
one dwelling place to another not their own. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on
his promise of support, despite Lea's efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would
admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school
expenses. Through the years and up to the middle part of 1992, Edward's mother, Alicia Lacson,
also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom
eventually took up nursing at St. Paul's College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea,
in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support before the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their
mother. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Issue:
Whether the appellate court erred when it affirmwd the grant of supoort in arrears from
1976 to 1994.

Ruling:
The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA
confirmatory of that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made on the petitioner to secure
support for the respondents. As a matter of long and sound appellate practice, factual findings of
the CA are accorded respect, if not finality, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons.
Furthermore, the respondents appeared to have stayed longest with their uncle, Noel
Daban. Logically, the sisters would, thru their mother, turn to their uncle (Noel Daban) for their
sustenance and education when petitioner failed to give the same, a failing which stretched from
their pre-schooling days to their college years. Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel
Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner. As for the amount of support in
arrears, there is also no reason to disturb the absolute figures arrived at by the two courts below,
appearing as they do to be reasonable and proper. As a matter of law, the amount of support
which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other
shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.
Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to provide respondents
with support practically all throughout their growing years. At bottom, the sisters have been
deprived by a neglectful father of the basic necessities in life as if it is their fault to have been
born. This disposition is thus nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong done the
herein respondents who are no less petitioner's daughters.

374
 ROBERTO DE GUZMAN, petitioner v. PEREZ, respondent
496 S 474

Facts:
Petitioner Roberto de Guzman and respondent Shirley Aberde begot a child when they
were pursuing their studies but the two subsequently got married. In 1991, private respondent
demanded support for their child who was entering high school but petitioner ignored the
respondent’s demand. She thus filed a criminal complaint for abandonment and neglect of child
under Art. 52 (2) and (4) of PD 603 before the Office of the City Prosecutor.
In his counter-affidavit, petitioner averred that he never abandoned or neglected the child
whom he readily acknowledged as his son and pointed out that respondent was the financially
capable parent while he had no fixed job and merely depended on the charity of his father.
The City Prosecutor issued his resolution dismissing the complaint for abandonment but
charged the petitioner with neglect of child punishable under Art. 59 (4) of PD 603 in relation to
Sec. 10 (a) of RA 7610. The resolution was filed before the RTC which subsequently affirmed
such.

Issue:
Whether the court acted with grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the City Prosecutor’s
resolution.

Ruling:
The assailed resolution of private respondent was used as an evidence o record and
grounded in law.
Petitioner’s position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the neglectful parent to
shield himself from criminal liability by defeating the proscription that in all intent regarding the
care, custody, education, and property of the child and his welfare shall be paramount
consideration.
There is prima facie evidence showing from the evidence that petitioner is in fact
financially capable of supporting the child’s education. The notarized GIS of RNCD
Development Corporations indicated that petitioner owns 750,000 pesos worth of paid-up shares
in the company.
The “neglect of child” punished under Art. 59 (4) of PD 603 is also a crime. Thus,
petitioner’s guilt should still be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Petition is denied.

375
 DINA TONOG, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
7 February 2002

Facts:
On September 23 1989, petitioner Dina Tonog gave birth to a child, her illegitimate
daughter with the respondent Edgar Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner,
left for the United States where she found work as a nurse. The child was left in the care of his
father and paternal grandparents. On January 1990, respondent filed a petition for guardianship,
on which a month later, he was appointed as the legal guardian. Petitioner avers that she only
learned of the decision a month later, and accordingly filed for relief of judgment, on which she
was then granted to file her opposition to private respondent petitions, as well as a motion to
remand the custody of the child to her.
The Court of Appeals decided over the issue of guardianship and custody over the child
that such custody shall then be awarded to the respondent temporarily pending the resolution of
the main case.

Issue:
Who shall hold custody over the child pending the resolution of the guardianship
proceeding, on who shall have the final custody over the child.

Ruling:
In custody disputes, it is the axiomatic that the criteria are the welfare and well being of
the child. Incurring at its decisions, the court must take into the account the respective resources
and the social and moral situations of the contending party.
Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as
illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate
children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the
Family Code provides that “[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” It will be observed that in
both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is specially evident in
Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian.
The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the
child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has
erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative
divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not
have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation.
Bearing in mind the welfare of the minor is the controlling factor; the court finds that the
Court of Appeals did not err in the allowing the father to retain in the meantime parental custody
over the child.

376
 BONIFACIA VANCIL, petitioner v. HELEN BELMES, respondent
19 JUNE 2001

Facts:
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil is the mother of Reeder Vancil, a navy serviceman of the
United States of America who had died in the said country. During his lifetime, he had two
children from his common law wife, Helen Belmas.
Sometime in May 1987, petitioner filed guardianship proceedings over the persons and
properties of the children. A month after, petitioner was appointed legal guardian over the
persons and properties of her grandchildren. Helen, natural mother of the two children, however
submitted an opposition to the said proceedings, and concurrently, she had filed a similar petition
for guardianship.
RTC decided in favor of Bonifacia. CA reversed and favored Helen. Hence, this petition
by Bonifacia.

Issue:
Who is the legal guardian of the minors?

Ruling:
Parents are placed first in the rank of priority in matters of parental authority. The
children illegitimacy does not in any way affect the order of priority. Respondent, being the
natural mother of the minors, has the preferential right over that of the petitioner in issue of
guardianship. Petitioner as the surviving grandparent can exercise substitute parental authority
only if in case of death, absence of unsuitability of respondent.
This follows the provision of article 212 which qualify that the parents exercise parental
authority jointly. Article 214, which provides for the substitution of the parental authority by the
grandparents, applies only when the abovementioned conditions exist.
The case regarding the daughter Valerie is moot and academic since she had reached the
age of majority. In the case of Vincent, parental authority is vested on the father and mother (Art.
211 of FC). It is only in the cases of death, absence, or unsuitability of the parents wherein the
parental authority is bested on the surviving grandparents (Art. 214 of FC). There is no showing
of unsuitability of the mother. Moreover, the grandmother is a naturalized American citizen
whose residence is in America. She will find it difficult to perform her rights and duties as a
guardian. Furthermore, the grandmother has not set foot in the Philippines for more than a
decade. She is old. She has a conviction of libel in a criminal case which would make her think
twice coming here to the Philippines. Lastly, the Court emphasized that jurisprudence shows that
guardianship is not allowed where the guardian is outside the jurisdiction of Philippine courts.

377
 SABRINA BONDAGIY, petitioner v. FUOZI BONDAJGIY, respondent
7 DECEMBER 2001

Facts:
Respondent Fuozi and Sabrina were married in Manila under Islamic rites. Four months
prior to such marriage, Sabina became a Muslim by conversion. . The conversion however was
not duly registered. Out of such union, they begot two children.
Sometime in 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina’s mother. Fouzi alleged that
he could not see his children until he got an order from the court. One year thereafter Sabrina had
the children baptized as Christian and had their names changed too.
Respondent alleged also that on various occasions, Sabrina was seen with different men
at odd hours in Manila and wearing outfits detestable under the Islamic law on culture.
Respondent then filed with the Shari ‘a court an action to obtain custody of his minor
children now ages 10 and 9 respectively. The judgment rendered by the Shari ‘a Court awarded
the custody of the minors to their father finding their mother unworthy to care for her children.

Issue:
Whether or not a Christian who converted to Islam before her marriage to a Muslim and
converted back to Catholicism upon their separation, still bounded by the moral laws of Islam in
the determination of her fitness to be the custodian of their children.

Ruling:
The court applies the civil law in the best interest of the children. The standard in the
determination of sufficiency of proof to establish the unfitness of a mother who had converted to
Muslim before marriage but had converted back to Catholicism in relation to custody of her
children is not restricted to Muslim laws. The family code shall also be taken in consideration in
deciding whether she is incompetent. The burden is upon the respondent to prove that the
petitioner is not worthy to have the custody of her children.
The Court found that the evidence presented by the respondent was not sufficient to
establish her unfitness according to Muslim laws or the Family Code. However the award of
custody to the wife does not deprive the husband of parental authority and visitation rights over
the children.

378
 TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS and
MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE, respondents
G.R. No. 116773. January, 16,1997

Facts:
On June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married
after their marriage, the couple stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband.
Out of their marriage, two children were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao and Angelica Eslao. In
the meantime, Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of petitioner's mother while Angelica
stayed with her parents at respondent's house. On August 6, 1990, petitioner's husband Reynaldo
Eslao died, petitioner intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but the respondent
prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, respondent reasoning out that her
son just died and to assuage her grief therefore, she needed the company of the child to at least
compensate for the loss of her late son. In the meantime, the petitioner returned to her mother's
house in Pampanga where she stayed with Leslie.
Subsequently, petitioner was introduced by her auntie to Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a
Japanese-American, whom she became her husband. On June 24, 1993, the petitioner returned to
the Philippines then informed the respondent about her desire to take informed the respondent
about her desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband, Dr. James
Ouye, expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support
and education, however, respondent resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was
entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accused the petitioner of having abandoned
Angelica. The RTC grants the petition in favor of petitioner and the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto.

Issue:
Whether the court erred in not finding the petitioner fit to be given of minor, Angelica
Eslao.

Ruling:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being
purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts
the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is
given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority.
Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Hence, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner,
what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment
or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely
personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship
and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar.
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

379
 CRISANTO GUALBERTO, petitioner v. JOYCELYN GUALBERTO, respondent
28 June 2005

Facts:
On March 2002, Crisanto Gualberto filed a motion before the lower court a petition for
the declaration of nullity of marriage of his marriage to Joycelyn Gualberto, with an ancillary
prayer for the custody pendente lite of their almost four year old son, whom Joycelyn allegedly
took away with her from the conjugal home when she decided to abandon him sometime in the
early February of the same year. The trial court heard the ancillary prayer of Crisanto for
custody pendente lite. Because Joycelyn allegedly failed to appear despite notice, and in the face
of witnesses and evidence presented, the court awarded such temporary custody to Crisanto.
Such was affirmed by the Court of Appeals pending the resolution of the other issue
raised.

Issue:
Whether or not a child less than seven years of age, and without compelling reasons not
to, be separated from the mother, and that such custody be awarded to the father.

Ruling:
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from their
mother finds its raison d’etre in the basic need of the minor children for the their mother loving
care. In explaining the rationale for Article 213, the Code Commission said that “The general
rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of
tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of
the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she
has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative
divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not
have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her situation”.
Exception allowed by the court has to be for compelling reasons for the good of the child,
which she had erred, like in the cases of adultery when awarded a penalty of imprisonment.
The Court found no sufficient proof of any compelling reason to separate the minor from
his mother, custody should remain with her.

380
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO
and OFELIA BEDIA, respondents
G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession,
were married and beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. From the time the boy was released
from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal
grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner and wife Julia
agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter's parents, the respondent spouses
Bedia.
Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States to work. Petitioner alleged that he is not
aware of her whereabouts but private respondents claim that although abroad, their daughter
Julia had been sending financial support to them for her son. The spouses Bedia then filed a
"Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the RTC, with
Santos, Sr. as respondent, which was subsequently granted and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding custody of the boy to his grandparents.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the fact that petitioner was unable to provide financial
support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-
laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to
the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the
severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision
against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious
efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between
parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his love for his son and for the son
to experience the warmth and support which a father can give.
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority.
Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution whereby parents
rightfully assume control and protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required
by the latter' s needs. It is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the
purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of
their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, "there is
no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust
for the welfare of the minor." The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority
over the persons of their common children.
The petition is GRANTED.

381
 RENE UY GOLANGCO, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
283 SCRA 493

Facts:
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by private respondent Lucia Carlos
Golangco against petitioner Rene Uy Golangco before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 144. The couple had two children, Justin Rene and Stefan Rafael. During the proceedings
of the case, a hearing for custody pendente lite of the two children was held. In an order dated
July 21, 1994, the trial court awarded the two children to Lucia while Rene was given visitation
rights of at least one week in a month. Therafter Rene questioned the order dated July 21, 1994
with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however dismissed the petition and instead
affirmed the order of the trial court. Not contented, Rene appealed the resolution of the Court of
Appeals affirming the order dated July 21, 1994 before this court, and the case was docketed as
G.R. No. 120831. On July 17, 1995, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for failure of
petitioner Rene to show that grave abuse of discretion had been committeds by the appellate
court.
On August 15, 1995, Lucia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction because she alleged that her estranged
husband physically abused their son Justin. Due to the incident, a criminal complaint for slight
physical injuries was filed. The trial court granted the writ of preliminary injunction restraining
Rene from seeing his children. Rene Filed a petition for certiorari, however, the court of appeals
dismissed the petition for violation for on non-forum shopping. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether Rene should be prohibited from seeing his children.

Ruling:
It is a fundamental and settled rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court
are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal, unless strong and cogent
reasons dictate otherwise. This is because the trial court is in a better position to examine the real
evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case. The
court, therefore, finds no justifiable reason or exception sufficient to cause the reversal of the
trial court’s declaration in granting the writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in C.A. –G.R. No. 38866 dated January 10, 1996, is SET ASIDE. The order
dated October 4, 1995, issued by the court a quo is hereby affirmed in toto.

382
 CARLITO SILVA, plaintiff v. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997

Facts:
Carlito E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local
actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children:
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift ion their relationship surfaced. It
began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous
objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzale who claimed that she, in fact, had
never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February 1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to
allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his
company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the
RTC. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in “gambling
and womanizing” which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.
The trial court has adjudged in favor of petitioner by holding that he shall have “visitorial
rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case (could) he takes out the
children without the written consent of the mother”. The visitation right referred to is the right of
access of a noncustodial parent to his or her child or children.
Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales interposed an
appeal from the RTC’s order to the Court of Appeals.
For the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newlyweds emigrated
to Holland with Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.

Issue:
Whether or not trial court erred in awarding the petitioner visitation rights.

Ruling:
The court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant
concern for the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior
motives or undue designs more than a parent’s natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were
only on brief visits, his own children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to
understandably provide this precautionary measure, i.e., “in no case (can petitioner) take out the
children without the written consent of the mother.”
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED, reversing thereby the
judgment of the appellate court which is herby SET ASIDE. No costs.

383
 DAISIE DAVID, plaintiff v. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 111180. November 16, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a
businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four
children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent
developed into an intimate ionic, as a result of which a son, Christopher J. was followed by two
more children, both girls, namely Christine.
The relationship became known to private respondent’s wife when Daisie took
Christopher J. to Villar’s house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 and introduced
him to Villar’s legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his
house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J. then six years of age,
to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the
child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school
year.
Pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher j. is under the parental authority of his
mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody
of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by
private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

Issue:
Whether or not the mother is the rightful parent to the custody of her child.

Ruling:
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven
years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the
mother’s custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the mother’s custody over
him will have to be upheld because the child categorically expressed preference to live with his
mother. Under Art. 213 of the family code, courts must respect the “choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit” and here it has not been shown that the
mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his
child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him
(private respondent)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private
respondent is ORDERED to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his
mother, the herein petitioner, and to give him temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00
pending the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action.
.

384
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners v. COURT OF APPEALS
and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

Facts:
Petitoner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding tbegan to maintain a
common law relationship of husband and wife when petitioner was sent by his employer, the
National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison officer while respondent
worked as a nurse in Los Angeles, California. On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind
Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita
got married, and upon their return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and
given the name Reginald Vince.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate and Teresita left
Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to
the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent
back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner
Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, however, the trial court
dismissed the petition and suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald
and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to
be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court. The Court of Appeals, however,
reversed the decision and gave the Teresita the custody to her children.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual findings of the trial court.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court is inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional trial
court because it gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and considered in detail all the
relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody. In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of
the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best
custodian. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is
paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find
the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems
fit under the circumstances.
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now
both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from
the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements
found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the
second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming
that the presumption should have persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the
age of seven years mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and relevant
considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The children understand the unfortunate
shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.

385
 NERISSA Z. PEREZ, plaintiff v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and
RAY C. PEREZ, defendant
G.R. No. 118870. March 29, 1996

Facts:
Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while Nerissa,
his wife who is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. They were married and after six
miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Perez
II in New York. The couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa
returned to the U.S. because the respondent has to take care of his mother and promised to her
with the baby.
When Nerissa came home a few days before Ray II’s first birthday, the couple was no
longer on good terms. On July 26, 1993, Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas corpus
asking respondent Ray C. Perez to surrender the custody of their son, Ray Z. Perez II, to her and
the court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his mother, Nerissa
Perez. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and awarded custody of the boy to
his father.

Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding the custody of the child to his father.

Ruling:
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the
applicable law. It provides: “ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority
shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all
relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the
parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.”
Since the Code does not qualify the word “separation” to mean “legal separation”
decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such as petitioner and private respondent,
are covered within its terms.
The petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 27, 1994 as well as its Resolution dated January 24, 1995 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Order of the trial court dated August 27, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
Custody over the minor Ray Z. Perez II is awarded to his mother, herein petitioner Nerissa Z.
Perez. This decision is immediately executory.

386
 TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA PAZ
CORDERO-OUYE, respondent
G.R. No. 116773. January, 16,1997

Facts:
On June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married;
after their marriage, the couple stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband.
Out of their marriage, two children were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao and Angelica Eslao. In
the meantime, Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of petitioner’s mother in Sta. Ana,
Pamapanga, while Angelica stayed with their parents at respondent’s house. On August 6, 1990,
petitioner’s husband Reynaldo Eslao died petitioner intended to bring Angelica with her to
Pampanga but the respondent prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her,
respondent reasoning out that her son just died and to assuage her grief therefore, she needed the
company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late son. In the meantime, the
petitioner returned to her mother’s house in Pampanga where she stayed with Leslie.
Subsequently, petitioner was introduced by her auntie to Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a
Japanese-American, who is an orthodontist practicing in the United States; their acquaintance
blossomed into a meaningful relationship where on March 18, 1992, the petitioner and Dr. James
Ouye decided to get married and migrated to USA to join her new husband. On June 24, 1993,
the petitioner returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the
United States. The petitioner then informed the respondent about her desire to take custody of
Angelica and explained that her present husband, Dr, James Ouye, expressed his willingness to
adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for the support and education; however, respondent
resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten years
old and accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica. Because of the adamant attitude of
the respondent, the petitioner then sought the assistance of a lawyer, Atty. Mariano de Joya, Jr.,
who wrote a letter to the respondent demanding for the return of the custody of Angelica to her
natural mother and when the demand remain[ed] unheeded, the petitioner instituted the present
action.”

Issue:
Whether or not Parental Authority and Responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or removed.

Ruling:
When private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what
she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or
renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely
personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship
and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar.
Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that "the right of
parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a
right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created
by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.

387
 ST. MARY’S ACADEMY, petitioner v. SHERWIN CARPITANOS, respondent
February. 6, 2002

Facts:
St. Mary’s Academy conducted an enrollment drive for the school year. A facet of the
enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools where prospective enrollees were studying.
Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City concluded an enrolment drive for the
school year 1995-1996. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of
the campaigning group. Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a
Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva, were on their way to an elementary
school. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then fifteen years old and a student of the same
school. The jeep was owned by Vivicencio. The driver, James II, drove the jeep in a reckless
manner which cause it to turn turtle. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and
as a result the jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin died as a consequence. The trial court then awarded damages to the parents of
Sherwin against the petitioner by virtue of Art. 218 and 219 of the family code.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin.

Ruling:
Article 218 of the Family code enumerates those who have special parental authority over
a minor child and article 219 of the same code provides that those exercising special parental
authority are principally and subsidiary liable for damages caused by the acts or omission of the
emancipated minor under their supervision, instruction or custody.
However, for the persons and institutions enumerated therein are to be held liable, there
must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the
injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. Thus, injury
for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done.
The negligence of the petitioner was only a remote cause of the accident. There was the
intervention of the negligence of the minor’s parents who drove the jeep and the detachment of
the steering wheel of the jeep was the one which caused the accident.
The Court held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because of
negligence, must have causal connection to the accident. There is no showing of such. The
immediate cause was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Also, there was no
evidence that the school allowed the James II to drive the jeep. The one primarily liable is the
registered owner of the vehicle.

388
 ALFREDO AMADORA, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
160 SCRA 315

Facts:
Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he would a
stand the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma.
These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate would
intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the
auditorium of their school, the Collegio de San Jose-Recoletes, a classmate, Pablito Daffon,
bared a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. The victim
was only seventeen years old.
Pablito was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the parents of
the victim filed this petition for civil damages against the accused with two other students (thru
their parents) together with the College, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys,
and the physics teacher, under Art. 2180. After Trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu has
convicted the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal of the respondent court,
however, the decision was reversed in all the defendants were completely absolved.
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for criteriorai under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the
Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of Arts and Trades but an academic institution
of learning.

Issue:
Whether or not school may be held liable under diligence of bonus pater families.

Ruling:
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. 2180) should
apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Following the canon of reddendo
singular singuli: Where the school is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule. [Teachers to
pupils/students] Reason: Old academic schools, the heads just supervise the teachers who are the
ones directly involved with the students. Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head
and only he who shall be held liable as am exception to the general rule. [Heads to apprentices]
Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the masters (or heads of the school) personally and
directly instructed the apprentices. Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is
not also liable because there’s no showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline against
the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school, or condoned
their non-observance. Also, the fact that he wasn’t present can’t be considered against him
because he wasn’t required to report on that day. Classes had already ceased.

389
 JESUS SALVOSA, petitioner V. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT, respondent
166 SCRA 275

Facts:
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is an academic institution. However, it is
also an institution of arts and trade. It has so advertised itself, as its own evidence shows. Within
the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges Foundation Reserve Office
Training Corps (ROTC), Half, which is under the full control of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon,
appointed armorer of ROTC, shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an
unlicensed firearm which the armor took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a
result, Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime
of Homicide by Military Commision No. 30, AFP.
Subsequently, the heirs of napoleon Castro sued for damage, Impleading Jimmy B.
Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC, commandant), Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of
the Borad of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio
(Dean of the College of Education and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges
Foundation, Inc. as party defendants. After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1)
sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc.,
jointly and severally, to pay private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner can be held solidarily liable with Jimy B. Abon for damages
under Art. 2180 of the civil code, as a consequences of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.

Ruling:
Under Art. 2180 that the petition should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-
academic. Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli: Where the school is academic,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such
student. The teacher-in-charge is not also liable because there’s no showing that he was negligent
in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact that he wasn’t present
can’t be considered against him because he wasn’t required to report on that day. Classes had
already ceased.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED in so far as it holds
petitioners solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for his tortious act in killing of Napoleon
Castro. No costs.

390
 PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Plaintiff v.
COURT OF APPEALS, Defendant
205 SCRA 729

Facts:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista, a
student of PSBA while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial
Court. Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D.
Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M Magtalas
( Treasurer/Cashier) Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief
of Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable
for the victim’s untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of
security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the victim.
During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with the other
petitioners by resigning from his position in the school.
The defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that
since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no
cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic
institutions, such as the PSBA.
The respondent trial courtoverruled petitioner’s contention and denied their motion to
dismiss. the respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court’s orders.

Issue:
Whether or not an academic institution has a bilateral obligation upon students which
both parents are bound to comply.

Ruling:
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private
respondents complaint, the record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only
the trial court can make such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.
WHERFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of
origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this
ruling of the court. Costs against the petitioners.

391
 WENDELL LIBI, plaintiff v. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT, defendant
214 SCRA 16

Facts:
Deceased Julie Ann Gotiong (18 y.o.) and deceased Wendell Libi (bet. 18 and 19 y.o.)
were sweethearts for two years prior to the incident. After the girl decided to end the relationship
(finding the guy sadistic and irresponsible), the boy incessantly pursued her and prayed that they
be together again (which made the guy resort to threats). But, the girl hold steadfast to her
decision. In order to avoid the guy, the girl lived with her best friend. On the day of the incident,
the two were found shot dead with a Smith and Wesson revolver. The parents of the girl
instituted this case against the parents of the guy for damages. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. In the Court of Appeals the RTC decision was
reversed and ordered the Libi spouses to pay ,moral and exemplary damages.The court found out
by convincing evidence that Wendell Libi shot Gotiong before committing suicide.
Subsequently, the Libi spouses filed an appeal contending that they should only assume
subsidiary liability for damages cause by their minor child.

Issue:
Whether or not parental liability for damages cause by the minor child is subsidiary.

Ruling:
The parents of Wendel Libi are held liable for not exercising due diligence, diligentissimi
patris familias, (Art. 2180). The father of the guy owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit
box. The father and the mother each had a key. The guy knew of it. The key must have been
negligently left lying around or he had free access to it, such as the bag of his mother. The said
gun was missing. The parents were also unable to explain the photograph of their son holding a
gun. The said photograph was dedicated to the girl. Moreover, they were remiss in their duties as
parents as not being able to know that their son was a Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unite
(CANU) agent involved in a dangerous work of as either a drug informer or drug user. The
damages is based on Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Art. 101 of RPC doesn’t apply since the guy is
or above 18 y.o. already.
The Supreme Court believes that the civil liability of parents for quasi delicts of their
minor children as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code is primary and not subsidiary.
Accordingly, just like the rule in 2194 of the Civil Code the civil liability of the parents for
crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary and also subject to the
defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of the family.

392
 JENNIFER TAMARGO, plaintiff v. COURT OF APPEALS, Defendant
G.R. No. 85044. June 3, 1992

Facts:
On August 20, 1982 Adelberto Bundoc, a monor of 10 years of age shot Jennifer
Tamargo. A complaint for civil and criminal action was filed by the deceased adopting parent
and natural parents against the natural parents of Bundoc. The Regional Trial Court dismissed
the case ruling that respondents were not indespensible parties to the action. On petition for
review, respondents contend that the adopting parents namely the Rapisura spouses were the
indespensible parties to the action since parental authority have shifted to them from the moment
the successful petition for adoption was filed on November 18, 1982.

Issue:
Whether or not the effects of adoption insofar as parental authority is concern maybe
given retroactive effect.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court did not consider the retroactive effect that may be given to the decree
of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when the
adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child. This is consistent wit the doctrine
of vicarious liability. No presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents,
the Rapisura spouses could have arisen since Adelberto Bundoc was not in fact subject to their
control at the time the tort was committed.

393
 DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN, appellant v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
G.R. No. 164948. June 27, 2006

Facts:
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America
(USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of
minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos. The minors are the
natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990,
the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother,
Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there. The minors are being financially supported by the
petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad. Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered in her favor.
The court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a decision granting said
petition. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the ruling of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos.

Ruling:
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect
the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent
must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to
the adoption.
When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect.
Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained,
the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner,
that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have
adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
The petition is hereby DENIED.

394
 JOHANNA SOMBONG, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
252 SCRA 663

Facts:
Johanna Sombong allegedly brought her daughter to the clinic of spouses Ty. After
medication Doctor Vicente Ty refused to give back the child since herein petitioner Johanna
Sombong failed to pay the cost of P300.00. The petitioner, allegedly tried to seek help from
public officers to recover her child but he availed of nothing. Subsequently, she filed a petition in
the Regional Trial Court for kidnapping of minor against the spouse Ty. The spouses disclosed
that the baby was given to their staff to act as guardian. The Court of Appeals set aside the said
decision and give to Marieta Neri Alviar, the staff of the spouses in their clinic the custody of the
said child. This is because the persons concerned cannot ascertain whether the said child really
belongs to the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the child shall be given to Miss Neri Alviar.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court states that the custody of the child shall be given to Miss Neri Alviar
citing the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which provides that all questions regarding the care
and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. In the
same nein, the Family Code authorizes the courts to, the welfare of the child so demands,
deprived the parents concern of authority over the child or adopt such measures as maybe proper
under the circumstances.

395
 HATIMA C. YASIN, petitioner v. THE HONORABLE JUDGE SHARI'A DISTRICT
COURT THIRD SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, defendant
G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner Hatima Yasin is. of legal age, a divorcee, a Muslin Filipino and a resident of
Suterville, Zamboanga City, Philippines. She was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris
Yasin, also a Muslim Filipino in accordance with Muslim rites and customs, and who is now
residing at Barangay Recodo, Zamboanga City, but sometime on March 13, 1984, they were
granted a decree of divorce by the Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with
Islamic Law. The former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted another marriage to another
woman and the petitioner prayed to resume the use of her maiden name Hatima Centi y Saul in
accordance with the provisions of Rules 103, Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not a petition for resumption of maiden name and surname is also a petition
for change of name.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by
petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law
requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining
a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.
Although there is no legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal
right, nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such confirmation may be
obtained. In view of such circumstances, the onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court on change of name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced
woman to resume her maiden name and surname. In the absence of a specific rule or provision
governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been alleged supported by competent
proof as annexes, which appear to be satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of
change of civil status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course and
summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the orders of respondent court dated July
4, 1990 and August 10, 1990 are hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioner is authorized to resume her
maiden name and surname.

396
 CESARIO URSUA, petitioner v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
G.R. No. 112170. April 10,1996.

Facts:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua, a Community Environment and Natural Resources Ofiicer
assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato, had a complaint against him for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of
authority and giving of unwarranted benefits.
On August 1 1987, Atty. Francis Palmores, counsel of the petitioner requested to the
Office of the Ombudsman in Manila that he be furnished a copy of the complaint against
petitioner. He then asked his client Ursua to take his letter request to the office of the
Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal
matters.
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman, he wrote the name “Oscar
Perez” on the visitor’s logbook and upon receipt of the acknowledged by writing. Loida
Kahulugan, who handed the copy of complaint, learned that the person who introduced himself
as Oscar Perez was actually the petitioner, Cesario Ursua. She reported the matter to the Deputy
Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be charged.
The trial court found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
No. 6085. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on May 31, 1993. The petitioner asks for
review on his conviction in Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 otherwise
known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Alias.

Held:
Cesario Ursua is acquitted of the crime charged. C.A No. 142, approved on November 7,
1936 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases”, was amended by R.A. No. 6085on
August 4 1969. C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to penalize the act of using an
alias name publicly and in business transactions in addition to his real name unless such alias
was duly authorized by proper judicial proceeding.
The fact that the petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as “Oscar
Perez” served only the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which the
petitioner was a respondent. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to
use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. Hence, the use of a fictitious name
or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or
indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that
day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A.
6085. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure and that a construction of which the statue is fairly susceptible is favored.

397
 ROMMEL JACINTO and DANTES SILVERIO, petitioners v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
G.R. 174689. October 22, 1997

Facts:
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in RTC Manila. His name was registered
as “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as “male.” He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male
but feels, thinks and acts as a female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood. His attempts to transform himself to a “woman” culminated on January 27, 2001
when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. From then on, petitioner
lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his
birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to
“female.”
Judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar to
change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of petitioner, specifically for petitioner’s
first name from “Rommel Jacinto” to MELY and petitioner’s gender from “Male” to
FEMALE.The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the
trial court’s decision lacked legal basis.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

Ruling:
The petition lacks merit. Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of
name are controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that
“No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.”
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground
of Sex Reassignment. The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a
legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil
Code provides that “No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial
order.” For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as
to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the
correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the
Ground of Equity. The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm,
injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit
neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them,
life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public
policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

398
 NENITA BIENVENIDO, petitioner v.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and
LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO, respondents.
G.R. No. 111717. October 24, 1994.

Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On
February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho
contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho with whom he had been living
since 1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis “Chito” Faustino C.
Camacho, born on May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio
and Luisita had been living since 1958.
Because of their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time.
In her case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her
husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her and apparently won her heart because from June 1968
until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her, the last time in a duplex apartment in
Quezon City. Petitioner's daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito, who
lived with them for about a year in 1976.
On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner, using her Loyola Life Plan and Aurelio's
account in the PCI Bank, took care of the funeral arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in
the United States with respondent Chito, having gone there, according to her, at the instance of
Aurelio in order to look for a house in San Francisco so that Aurelio could follow and rejoin
them. Upon learning of the death of Aurelio she and her son Chito came home on May 31, 1988.
Respondent Luisita was granted death benefits by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as
the surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on Scout
Delgado Street in which Nenita had been living.
On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, seeking the annulment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the
payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any
event it was executed in fraud of her as the legitimate wife of Aurelio.
On August 29,1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property
to petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of
petitioner to be genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the
property until 1988 despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented
himself to be single.
On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court and declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in
dispute.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in presuming the validity of the marriage between Aurelio
and Luisita

Held:
On the question of validity of Luisita's marriage to Aurelio, there is no dispute on the fact
of appellant Luisita's marriage in 1962 to Aurelio. The Court finds that the presumption of the
validity of the marriage Aurelio and Luisita has not been successfully assailed by appellee. The
Court of Appeals thus presumed the validity of Aurelio's second marriage from the failure of
petitioner to prove that at the time of such marriage Aurelio's first wife, Consejo, had not been
absent for at least seven years and that Aurelio did not have news that his first wife we still alive.
It was the burden of herein respondents to prove that, at the time of his second marriage to
respondent Luisita, Aurelio's first wife, Consejo Velasco, had been absent for at least seven years
and that Aurelio had no news that she was alive. To assume these facts because petitioner has not
disproved them would be to stand the principle on its head. Since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting
marriage to Consejo Velasco, his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was void for being
bigamous.

399
 IN THE RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN WANG
G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005

Facts
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born to parents Anaa Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang.
The parents married some time after. They executed a deed of legitimation in favor of Julian.
The legitimation prayed for the dropping of the middle name for two reasons: (1) possible
confusion and discrimination, and (2) best interest of the child. The parents planned to send their
son to Singapore to study. They alleged that in there the middle name is disregarded. As such,
people might get confused and discriminate Julian and his sister who is already studying there.
Likewise, the Singaporean Mandarin language don’t have the letter “R,” instead they pronounce
it as “L.” In effect, the name of Julian will sound funny.
The Lower Courts denied the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General also pointed
out that the cause of change was only for mere convenience and not one of necessity. The link
between the change/dropping of the middle name and the child's welfare were not well
substantiated?

Issue:
When can a person avail of a name change?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. The reasons are insufficient. There is no proper
and reasonable cause for a change of name. There is no showing of Singaporean laws regarding
names, and the possible effects of confusion and discrimination are imaginary than real.
Philippine law dictates that the legitimate and legitimated children shall carry the surnames of
the father and the mother.
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and reasonable
cause’ for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must
show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been
held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.

400
 LEE TEK SHENG, plaintiff vs. COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 118387. October 11, 2001

Facts:
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of
two (2) different mothers. One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek
Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly
children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan. Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng,
Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong, Julian K. Lee,
Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee
(hereinafter referred to as private respondents) filed two (2) separate petitions for the
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-
Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma Lee
(hereinafter referred to as petitioners). On December 2, 1992, the petition against all petitioners,
with the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On February
3, 1993, a similar petition against Emma Lee. Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the
false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting and/or
canceling therein the name of “Keh Shiok Cheng” as their mother, and by substituting the same
with the name “Tiu Chuan”, who is allegedly the petitioners’ true birth mother.
The Regional Trial Court allowed itself to take cognizance of the case for the cancellation
and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners. The Court of Appeals upheld the
decision of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and
Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young then filed a motion to the Supreme Court
alleging that no change can be effected because the change would affect their civil status
contrary to previous doctrine.

Issue:
What entries in a civil register shall be changed or corrected? Is a judicial order necessary
in order to do so?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows: “No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without a judicial order.” It does not provide for a specific procedure of
law to be followed except to say that the corrections or changes must be effected by judicial
order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for obtaining
such judicial order is summary in nature.
Article 412 uses both the terms “corrected” and “changed”. In its ordinary sense, to
correct means “to make or set right”; “to remove the faults or errors from” while to change
means “to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves
as a substitute”. The provision neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected
nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may have. Hence,
it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register may be changed or corrected under
Article 412. It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions
include not only status but also nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that
Article 412 does not contemplate matters that may affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is
erroneous.

401