G.R. No.

137882             February 04, 2005

SPS. ELIZABETH DE LA CRUZ and ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ, petitioners,

vs.
OLGA RAMISCAL represented by ENRIQUE MENDOZA, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This petition for review assails (1) the Resolution1 dated 11 September 1998 of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the appeal
filed by petitioners from the Decision dated 31 July 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 91, Quezon City, for
Demolition of Illegally Constructed Structure, and (2) the Resolution2 dated 05 March 1999 denying the subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

The following facts, as recapitulated by the trial court, are undisputed.

Respondent Olga Ramiscal is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at the corner of 18th Avenue and Boni Serrano
Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 300302 of the Register of Deeds for Quezon
City.3 Petitioners SPS. ELIZABETH and ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ are occupants of a parcel of land, with an area of eighty-five (85)
square meters, located at the back of Ramiscal’s property, and covered by TCT No. RT-56958 (100547) in the name of
Concepcion de la Peña, mother of petitioner Alfredo de la Cruz.4

The subject matter of this case is a 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of land owned by respondent which is being used
by petitioners as their pathway to and from 18th Avenue, the nearest public highway from their property. Petitioners had
enclosed the same with a gate, fence, and roof.5

In 1976, respondent leased her property, including the building thereon, to Phil. Orient Motors. Phil. Orient Motors also owned
a property adjacent to that of respondent’s. In 1995, Phil. Orient Motors sold its property to San Benito Realty. After the sale,
Engr. Rafael Madrid prepared a relocation survey and location plan for both contiguous properties of respondent and San
Benito Realty. It was only then that respondent discovered that the aforementioned pathway being occupied by petitioners is
part of her property.6

Through her lawyer, respondent immediately demanded that petitioners demolish the structure constructed by them on said
pathway without her knowledge and consent. As her letter dated 18 February 1995 addressed to petitioners went unheeded,
the former referred the matter to the Barangay for conciliation proceedings, but the parties arrived at no settlement. Hence,
respondent filed this complaint with the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-95-25159, seeking the demolition of the structure allegedly
illegally constructed by petitioners on her property. Respondent asserted in her complaint that petitioners have an existing
right of way to a public highway other than the current one they are using, which she owns. She prayed for the payment of
damages.7

In support of the complaint, respondent presented TCT No. RT-56958 (100547) covering the property denominated as Lot 1-B in
the name of Concepcion de la Peña, mother of petitioner herein Alfredo de la Cruz. The aforesaid TCT reveals that a portion of
Lot 1-B, consisting of 85 square meters and denominated as Lot 1-B-2, is being occupied by petitioners. To prove that
petitioners have an existing right of way to a public highway other than the pathway which respondent owns, the latter
adduced in evidence a copy of the plan of a subdivision survey for Concepcion de la Peña and Felicidad Manalo prepared in
1965 and subdivision plan for Concepcion de la Peña prepared in 1990. These documents establish an existing 1.50-meter wide
alley, identified as Lot 1-B-1, on the lot of Concepcion de la Peña, which serves as passageway from the lot being occupied by
petitioners (Lot 1-B-2), to Boni Serrano Avenue.8

On the other hand, petitioners, in their Answer, admitted having used a 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of land on
the northern side of respondent’s property as their pathway to and from 18th Avenue, the nearest public highway from their
property, but claimed that such use was with the knowledge of respondent.9
Petitioners alleged in their Answer that in 1976, respondent initiated the construction on her property of a motor shop known
as Phil. Orient Motors and they, as well as the other occupants of the property at the back of respondent’s land, opposed the
construction of the perimeter wall as it would enclose and render their property without any adequate ingress and egress. They
asked respondent to give them a 1.50-meter wide and 40.15-meter long easement on the eastern side of her property, which
would be reciprocated with an equivalent 1.50-meter wide easement by the owner of another adjacent estate. Respondent did
not want to give them the easement on the eastern side of her property, towards Boni Serrano Avenue but, instead, offered to
them the said 1.10-meter wide passageway along the northern side of her property towards 18th Avenue, which offer they had
accepted. 10

Petitioners additionally averred in their Answer that they were made to sign a document stating that they waived their right to
ask for an easement along the eastern side of respondent’s property towards Boni Serrano Avenue, which document was
among those submitted in the application for a building permit by a certain "Mang Puling,"11 the person in charge of the
construction of the motor shop. That was why, according to petitioners, the perimeter wall on respondent’s property was
constructed at a distance of 1.10-meters offset and away from respondent’s property line to provide a passageway for them to
and from 18th Avenue. They maintained in their Answer that respondent knew all along of the 1.10-meter pathway and had, in
fact, tolerated their use thereof.

On 31 July 1997, the RTC handed down a decision,12 giving probative weight to the evidence adduced by respondent. The
decretal portion enunciates:

Plaintiff’s claim for moral damages must be denied as no evidence in support thereof was presented at all by her. Consequently,
plaintiff is not entitled to exemplary damages.13 However, for having been compelled to file this suit and incur expenses to
protect her interest, plaintiff is entitled to an attorney’s fees in the amount of P10,000.00.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and ordering the defendants to
demolish the structure built by them along the pathway on the eastern side of plaintiff’s property towards 18th Avenue,
Murphy, Quezon City and to pay [the] plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees.

Costs against the defendants.14

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal filed by petitioners from the RTC decision for failure to file brief within the
reglementary period. The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision, provides:

WHEREFORE, for failure of the defendants-appellants to file brief within the reglementary period, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Compliance/Explanation filed by defendants-appellants, submitting the Letter-withdrawal of Atty. Judito Tadeo addressed
to the said defendants-appellants is NOTED.

Let a copy of this Resolution be likewise served on defendants-appellants themselves.15

The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners met the same fate in the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 05 March
1999.

Petitioners now lay their cause before us through the present petition for review, raising the following issues:

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE DENIAL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ITS
RESOLUTION DATED SEPTEMBER 11, 1998 IS SANCTIONED BY THE RULINGS AND LEGAL PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT?

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE NONETHELESS ENTITLED TO A LEGAL EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY, ASSUMING NO
VOLUNTARY RIGHT OF WAY WAS GRANTED THEM BY THE RESPONDENT?

C. WHETHER OR NOT OPERATIVE EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE OF LACHES TO BAR THE RESPONDENT FROM DEPRIVING THE
PETITIONERS CONTINUED USE OF THE SAID RIGHT OF WAY?16
The issues rivet on the adjective as well as on the substantive law, specifically: (1) whether or not the Court Appeals erred in
dismissing the appeal filed by petitioners for failure to file appellants’ brief on time, (2) whether or not petitioners are entitled
to a voluntary or legal easement of right of way, and (3) whether or not respondent is barred by laches from closing the right of
way being used by petitioners.

On the first issue, petitioners assert positively that the petition was filed on time on 30 April 1998, which is well within the 45-
day period reckoned from 17 March 1998, when the secretary of their former counsel received the notice to file appeal.

Petitioners’ arguments fail to persuade us.

Press earnestly as they would, the evidence on record, nevertheless, evinces contrariety to petitioners’ assertion that they have
beat the 45-day period to file appellants’ brief before the appellate court. It is clear from the registry return receipt card17 that
the Notice to File Brief was received on 12 March 1998 by one May Tadeo from the Office of Atty. Judito Angelo C. Tadeo,
petitioners’ previous counsel. Thus, on 30 April 1998, when their new counsel entered his appearance and at the same time
filed an appellants’ brief, the 45 days have run out. For failure of petitioners to file brief within the reglementary period, the
Court of Appeals correctly dismissed said appeal pursuant to Section 1(b), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.18

Neither can the members of this Court lend credence to petitioners’ contention that the written note of Atty. Tadeo’s office on
the face of the Order reads that the said office received it on 17 March 1998.19

It is a rule generally accepted that when the service is to be made by registered mail, the service is deemed complete and
effective upon actual receipt by the addressee as shown by the registry return card.20 Thus, between the registry return card
and said written note, the former commands more weight. Not only is the former considered as the official record of the court,
but also as such, it is presumed to be accurate unless proven otherwise, unlike a written note or record of a party, which is
often self-serving and easily fabricated. Further, this error on the part of the secretary of the petitioners’ former counsel
amounts to negligence or incompetence in record-keeping, which is not an excuse for the delay of filing.

Petitioners’ justification that their former counsel belatedly transmitted said order to them only on 20 March 1998 is not a good
reason for departing from the established rule. It was the responsibility of petitioners and their counsel to devise a system for
the receipt of mail intended for them.21 Rules on procedure cannot be made to depend on the singular convenience of a party.

Petitioners next take the stand that even assuming the brief was filed late, the Court of Appeals still erred in dismissing their
petition in light of the rulings of this Court allowing delayed appeals on equitable grounds.22 Indeed, in certain special cases and
for compelling causes, the Court has disregarded similar technical flaws so as to correct an obvious injustice made.23 In this case,
petitioners, however, failed to demonstrate any justifiable reasons or meritorious grounds for a liberal application of the rules.
We must remind petitioners that the right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right - it is a statutory privilege
and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute.24 Thus, it may be exercised only in the
manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of the law. 25

Anent the second issue, an easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable property of another,
by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do, something on his property, for the
benefit of another thing or person.26 The statutory basis for this right is Article 613, in connection with Article 619, of the Civil
Code, which states:

Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
belonging to a different owner.

The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the
servient estate.

Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter
voluntary easements.

Did respondent voluntarily accord petitioners a right of way?

We rule in the negative. Petitioners herein failed to show by competent evidence other than their bare claim that they and their
tenants, spouses Manuel and Cecilia Bondoc and Carmelino Masangkay, entered into an agreement with respondent, through
her foreman, Mang Puling, to use the pathway to 18th Avenue, which would be reciprocated with an equivalent 1.50-meter
wide easement by the owner of another adjacent estate. The hands of this Court are tied from giving credence to petitioners’
self-serving claim that such right of way was voluntarily given them by respondent for the following reasons:

First, petitioners were unable to produce any shred of document evidencing such agreement. The Civil Code is clear that any
transaction involving the sale or disposition of real property must be in writing.27 Thus, the dearth of corroborative evidence
opens doubts on the veracity of the naked assertion of petitioners that indeed the subject easement of right of way was a
voluntary grant from respondent. Second, as admitted by the petitioners, it was only the foreman, Mang Puling, who talked
with them regarding said pathway on the northern side of respondent’s property. Thus, petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz testified
that she did not talk to respondent regarding the arrangement proposed to them by Mang Puling despite the fact that she often
saw respondent.28 It is, therefore, foolhardy for petitioners to believe that the alleged foreman of respondent had the authority
to bind the respondent relating to the easement of right of way. Third, their explanation that said Mang Puling submitted said
agreement to the Quezon City Engineer’s Office, in connection with the application for a building permit but said office could no
longer produce a copy thereof, does not inspire belief. As correctly pointed out by the trial court,29 petitioners should have
requested a subpoena duces tecum from said court to compel the Quezon City Engineer’s Office to produce said document or
to prove that such document is indeed not available.

The fact that the perimeter wall of the building on respondent’s property was constructed at a distance of 1.10 meters away
from the property line, does not by itself bolster the veracity of petitioners’ story that there was indeed such an agreement.
Further, as noted by the trial court, it was Atty. Federico R. Onandia, counsel of Phil. Orient Motors, who wrote petitioners on
25 August 1994 advising them that his client would close the pathway along 18th Avenue, thereby implying that it was Phil.
Orient Motors, respondent’s lessee, which tolerated petitioners’ use of said pathway.30

Likewise futile are petitioners’ attempts to show that they are legally entitled to the aforesaid pathway under Article 649 of the
Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by
other immovables pertaining to other persons, and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right
of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.

The conferment of a legal easement of right of way under Article 649 is subject to proof of the following requisites: (1) it is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the
isolation is not the result of its own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
(5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest.31 The first three requisites are not obtaining in the instant case.

Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the trial court found from the records that Concepcion de la Peña had provided petitioners
with an adequate ingress and egress towards Boni Serrano Avenue. The trial court, gave weight to TCT No. RT-56958 (100547)
covering the property denominated as Lot 1-B in the name of Concepcion de la Peña, mother of petitioner herein Alfredo de la
Cruz. Said TCT indicates that a portion of Lot 1-B, consisting of 85 square meters and denominated as Lot 1-B-2, is the one being
occupied by petitioners.32 In this connection, a copy of the plan of a subdivision survey for Concepcion de la Peña and Felicidad
Manalo prepared in 1965 and subdivision plan for Concepcion de la Peña prepared in 1990 revealed an existing 1.50-meter
wide alley, identified as Lot 1-B-1, on the lot of Concepcion de la Peña, which serves as passageway from the lot being occupied
by petitioners (Lot 1-B-2) to Boni Serrano Avenue.33 During the trial, petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz herself admitted knowledge
of the existence of the subdivision plan of Lot 1-B prepared for Concepcion de la Peña by Engr. Julio Cudiamat in 1990. The
Subdivision Plan subdivided Lot 1-B into three portions, namely:

(1) Lot 1-B-1, which is an existing alley, consisting of 59.60 square meters, towards Boni Serrano Avenue;

(2) Lot 1-B-2, consisting of 85.20 square meters, which is being occupied by petitioners; and

(3) Lot 1-B-3, consisting also of 85.20 square meters, which is being occupied by the sister of petitioner Alfredo dela Cruz.34
From petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz’s own admission, Lot 1-B-1 was intended by the owner, Concepcion de la Peña, to serve as
an access to a public highway for the occupants of the interior portion of her property.35 Inasmuch as petitioners have an
adequate outlet to a public highway (Boni Serrano Avenue), they have no right to insist on using a portion of respondent’s
property as pathway towards 18th Avenue and for which no indemnity was being paid by them.

Petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz claimed before the trial court that although there was indeed a portion of land allotted by
Concepcion de la Peña to serve as their ingress and egress to Boni Serrano Avenue, petitioners can no longer use the same
because de la Peña had constructed houses on it. As found by the trial court, the isolation of petitioners’ property was due to
the acts of Concepcion de la Peña, who is required by law to grant a right of way to the occupants of her property. In the trial
court’s rationale:

…Article 649 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right of way is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is
due to the proprietor’s own acts. To allow defendants access to plaintiff’s property towards 18th Avenue simply because it is a
shorter route to a public highway, despite the fact that a road right of way, which is even wider, although longer, was in fact
provided for them by Concepcion de la Peña towards Boni Serrano Avenue would ignore what jurisprudence has consistently
maintained through the years regarding an easement of right of way, that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not
enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity
for it."… In Francisco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 527, it was likewise held that a person who had been granted
an access to the public highway through an adjacent estate cannot claim a similar easement in an alternative location if such
existing easement was rendered unusable by the owner’s own act of isolating his property from a public highway, such as what
Concepcion de la Peña allegedly did to her property by constructing houses on the 1.50 meter wide alley leading to Boni
Serrano Avenue. And, if it were true that defendants had already bought Lot 1-B-2, the portion occupied by them, from
Concepcion de la Peña, then the latter is obliged to grant defendants a right of way without indemnity.36

We hasten to add that under the above-quoted Article 649 of the Civil Code, it is the owner, or any person who by virtue of a
real right may cultivate or use any immovable surrounded by other immovable pertaining to other persons, who is entitled to
demand a right of way through the neighboring estates. In this case, petitioners fell short of proving that they are the owners of
the supposed dominant estate. Nor were they able to prove that they possess a real right to use such property. The petitioners
claim to have acquired their property, denominated as Lot 1-B-2, from Concepcion de la Peña, mother of defendant Alfredo de
la Cruz, who owns Lot 1-B-3, an adjacent lot. However, as earlier noted, the trial court found that the title to both lots is still
registered in the name of Concepcion de la Peña under TCT No. RT-56958 (100547).37 Neither were petitioners able to produce
the Deed of Sale evidencing their alleged purchase of the property from de la Peña. Hence, by the bulk of evidence, de la Peña,
not petitioners, is the real party-in-interest to claim a right of way although, as explained earlier, any action to demand a right
of way from de la Peña’s part will not lie inasmuch as by her own acts of building houses in the area allotted for a pathway in
her property, she had caused the isolation of her property from any access to a public highway.

On the third issue, petitioners cannot find sanctuary in the equitable principle of laches under the contention that by sleeping
on her right to reclaim the pathway after almost twenty years, respondent has, in effect, waived such right over the same. It is
not just the lapse of time or delay that constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus giving
rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it had either abandoned or declined to assert it.38

The essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to
the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainant’s rights after he had knowledge of defendant’s acts and after he
has had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which
he bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the complainant.39

The second and third elements, i.e., knowledge of defendant's acts and delay in the filing of such suit are certainly lacking here.
As borne by the records, it was only in 1995 that respondent found out that the pathway being used by petitioners was part of
her property when a relocation survey and location plan of her property and the adjacent land bought by San Benito Realty
were prepared.40 She immediately demanded petitioners to demolish the structure illegally constructed by them on her
property without her knowledge and consent. As her letter dated 18 February 1995 addressed to petitioners fell on deaf ears,
and as no settlement was arrived at by the parties at the Barangay level, respondent seasonably filed her complaint with the
RTC in the same year.41

Respondent, in her Comment,42 brings the Court’s attention to petitioners’ conversion of the pathway, subject matter of this
case, into a canteen and videoke bar, as shown by the pictures43 showing the property bearing the signage,
"FRED’S44 CANTEEN/VIDEOKE KAMBINGAN." Respondent, likewise, complains in her Comment about the structures installed by
petitioners that encroached on respondent’s property line as a result of the commercial activities by petitioners on the disputed
property. Petitioners have implicitly admitted this conversion of the property’s use by their silence on the matter in their
Reply45 and Memorandum.46 Such conversion is a telltale sign of petitioners’ veiled pecuniary interest in asserting a right over
the litigated property under the pretext of an innocuous claim for a right of way.

Viewed from all angles, from the facts and the law, the Court finds no redeeming value in petitioners’ asseverations that merit
the reversal of the assailed resolutions.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated 11 September 1998 and 5 March 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68216 are AFFIRMED. The Decision dated 31 July 1997 of the Regional Trial Court is likewise UPHELD.
Costs against petitioners.

PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. RAMON DUMADAG, EMMA BACABAC, RONALDO NAVARRO, JIMMY

PAGDALIAN, PAY DELOS SANTOS, ARMANDO TRILLOS, FELICISIMO TRILLOS, ARCANGEL FLORES, EDDIE MARTIN, PRESILLA
LAYOG, CONRADO CAGUYONG, GINA GONZALES, ARLENE PEDROSA, JOCELYN ABELINO, ROQUE VILLARAZA, ROLANDO
VILLARAZA, CAMILO GENOVE, NILDA ROAYANA, SUSAN ROAYANA, JUANCHO PANGANIBAN, BONG DE GUZMAN, ARNOLD
ENVERSO, DONNA DELA RAZA, EMELYN HAGNAYA, FREDDIE DE LEON, RONILLO DE LEON, MARIO MARTINEZ, and PRECY
LOPEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure are the March 5, 2010
Decision1 and October 29, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90254, which affirmed the May 30,
2007 Decision3 of the Las Piñas Regional Trial Court, Branch 197 (trial court) dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner.

On July 1, 2002, petitioner filed a Complaint4 for accion publiciana with damages against respondents for allegedly building their
shanties, without its knowledge and consent, in its 5,613-square-meter property located at Daisy Road, Phase V, Pilar Village
Subdivision, Almanza, Las

Piñas City. It claims that said parcel of land, which is duly registered in its name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 481436 of
the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, was designated as an open space of Pilar Village Subdivision intended for village
recreational facilities and amenities for subdivision residents.5 In their Answer with Counterclaim,6 respondents denied the
material allegations of the Complaint and briefly asserted that it is the local government, not petitioner, which has jurisdiction
and authority over them.

Trial ensued. Both parties presented their respective witnesses and the trial court additionally conducted an ocular inspection
of the subject property.

On May 30, 2007, the trial court dismissed petitioner's complaint, finding that the land being occupied by respondents are
situated on the sloping area going down and leading towards the Mahabang Ilog Creek, and within the three-meter legal
easement; thus, considered as public property and part of public dominion under Article 5027 of the New Civil Code (Code),
which could not be owned by petitioner. The court held:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

x x x The land title of [petitioner] only proves that it is the owner in fee simple of the respective real properties described
therein, free from all liens and encumbrances, except such as may be expressly noted thereon or otherwise reserved by law x x
x. And in the present case, what is expressly reserved is what is written in TCT No. T-481436, to wit "that the 3.00 meter strip of
the lot described herein along the Mahabang Ilog Creek is reserved for public easement purposes. (From OCT 1873/A-50) and
to the limitations imposed by Republic Act No. 440. x x x"8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The trial court opined that respondents have a better right to possess the occupied lot, since they are in an area reserved for
public easement purposes and that only the local government of Las Piñas City could institute an action for recovery of
possession or ownership.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order dated August 21,
2007.9 Consequently, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which, on March 5, 2010, sustained the dismissal
of the case.

Referring to Section 210 of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 99-21 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), the appellate court ruled that the 3-meter area being disputed is located along the creek which, in turn, is a form of a
stream; therefore, belonging to the public dominion. It said that petitioner could not close its eyes or ignore the fact, which is
glaring in its own title, that the 3-meter strip was indeed reserved for public easement. By relying on the TCT, it is then
estopped from claiming ownership and enforcing its supposed right. Unlike the trial court, however, the CA noted that the
proper party entitled to seek recovery of possession of the contested portion is not the City of Las Piñas, but the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), pursuant to Section 10111 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141
(otherwise known as The Public Land Act).

The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the CA per Resolution dated October 29, 2010, hence, this
petition.

Anchoring its pleadings on Article 63012 of the Code, petitioner argues that although the portion of the subject property
occupied by respondents is within the 3-meter strip reserved for public easement, it still retains ownership thereof since the
strip does not form part of the public dominion. As the owner of the subject parcel of land, it is entitled to its lawful possession,
hence, the proper party to file an action for recovery of possession against respondents conformably with Articles 42813 and
53914 of Code.

We deny.

An easement or servitude is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must
refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his or her property, for the benefit of another
person or tenement; it is jus in re aliena, inseparable from the estate to which it actively or passively belongs, indivisible,
perpetual, and a continuing property right, unless extinguished by causes provided by law.15 The Code defines easement as an
encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner or for the
benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.16 There are two kinds of
easement according to source: by law or by will of the owners the former are called legal and the latter voluntary easement.17 A
legal easement or compulsory easement, or an easement by necessity constituted by law has for its object either public use or
the interest of private persons.18chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule that "the owner of the servient estate retains the ownership of the
portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the
easement," Article 635 thereof is specific in saying that "all matters concerning easements established for public or communal
use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the provisions of this
Title Title VII on Easements or Servitudes."

In the case at bar, the applicability of DENR A.O. No. 99-21 dated June 11, 1999, which superseded DENR A.O. No. 97-0519 dated
March 6, 1997 and prescribed the revised guidelines in the implementation of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 1273 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 705 and 1067, cannot be doubted. Inter alia, it was issued to further the
government's program of biodiversity preservation. Aside from Section 2.1 above-quoted, Section 2.3 of which further
mandates:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2.3 Survey of Titled Lands:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2.3.1 Administratively Titled Lands:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The provisions of item 2.1.a and 2.1.b shall be observed as the above. However, when these lands are to be subdivided,
consolidated or consolidated-subdivided, the strip of three (3) meters which falls within urban areas shall be demarcated and
marked on the plan for easement and bank protection.

The purpose of these strips of land shall be noted in the technical description and annotated in the title.
 xxx

2.3.3 Complex Subdivision or Consolidation Subdivision Surveys for Housing/Residential, Commercial or Industrial
Purposes:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

When titled lands are subdivided or consolidated-subdivided into lots for residential, commercial or industrial purposes the
segregation of the three (3) meter wide strip along the banks of rivers or streams shall be observed and be made part of the
open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216.

The strip shall be preserved and shall not be subject to subsequent subdivision. (Underscoring supplied)

Certainly, in the case of residential subdivisions, the allocation of the 3-meter strip along the banks of a stream, like the
Mahabang Ilog Creek in this case, is required and shall be considered as forming part of the open space requirement pursuant
to P.D. 1216 dated October 14, 1977.20 Said law is explicit: open spaces are "for public use and are, therefore, beyond the
commerce of men" and that "[the] areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and recreational use shall be non-alienable public
lands, and non-buildable."

Running in same vein is P.D. 1067 or The Water Code of the Philippines21 which provides:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Art. 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of
three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their
margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No
person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage
or to build structures of any kind. (Underscoring supplied)

Thus, the above prove that petitioner's right of ownership and possession has been limited by law with respect to the 3-meter
strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this, the Court cannot agree with the trial court's opinion, as to
which the CA did not pass upon, that respondents have a better right to possess the subject portion of the land because they
are occupying an area reserved for public easement purposes. Similar to petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it
precisely because it is public land. Likewise, we repeatedly held that squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded
upon.22 The length of time that they may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have entered the
same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the same character throughout their
occupancy.23chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone, We find and so
hold that both the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and the local government of Las Piñas City, may file an action
depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141,
while the latter may also bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (otherwise known as the
Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992).24 Under R.A. 7279, which was enacted to uplift the living conditions in the
poorer sections of the communities in urban areas and was envisioned to be the antidote to the pernicious problem of
squatting in the metropolis,25 all local government units (LGUs) are mandated to evict and demolish persons or entities
occupying danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public
places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds.26 Moreover, under pain of administrative and criminal liability in case
of non-compliance,27 it obliges LGUs to strictly observe the following:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 29. Resettlement. - Within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act, the local government units, in coordination with
the National Housing Authority, shall implement the relocation and resettlement of persons living in danger areas such as
esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and in other public places such as sidewalks, roads,
parks and playgrounds. The local government unit, in coordination with the National Housing Authority, shall provide relocation
or resettlement sites with basic services and facilities and access to employment and livelihood opportunities sufficient to meet
the basic needs of the affected families.

Section 30. Prohibition Against New Illegal Structures. - It shall be unlawful for any person to construct any structure in areas
mentioned in the preceding section. After the effectivity of this Act, the barangay, municipal or city government units shall
prevent the construction of any kind or illegal dwelling units or structures within their respective localities. The head of any
local government unit concerned who allows, abets or otherwise tolerates the construction of any structure in violation of this
section shall be liable to administrative sanctions under existing laws and to penal sanctions provided for in this Act.

Yet all is not lost for petitioner. It may properly file an action for mandamus to compel the local government of Las Piñas City to
enforce with reasonable dispatch the eviction, demolition, and relocation of respondents and any other persons similarly
situated in order to give flesh to one of the avowed policies of R.A. 7279, which is to reduce urban dysfunctions, particularly
those that adversely affect public health, safety, and ecology.28chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Indeed, as one of the basic human needs, housing is a matter of state concern as it directly and significantly affects the general
welfare.29chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 5, 2010 Decision and October 29, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 90254, which affirmed the May 30, 2007 Decision of the Las Piñas RTC, Branch 197, dismissing petitioner's
complaint, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF THE LATE JOAQUIN LIMENSE, namely: CONCESA LIMENSE, Surviving Spouse; and DANILO and JOSELITO, both
surnamed Limense, children, Petitioners, v. RITA VDA. DE RAMOS, RESTITUTO RAMOS, VIRGILIO DIAZ, IRENEO RAMOS,
BENJAMIN RAMOS, WALDYTRUDES RAMOS-BASILIO, TRINIDAD RAMOS-BRAVO, PAZ RAMOS-PASCUA, FELICISIMA RAMOS-
REYES, and JACINTA RAMOS, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals dated December 20, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589 affirming in toto the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 15, dated September 21, 1990 in Civil Case No. 83-16128.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Dalmacio Lozada was the registered owner of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 12, Block No. 1074 of the cadastral survey of
the City of Manila covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 7036 issued at the City of Manila on June 14,
1927,3 containing an area of 873.80 square meters, more or less, located in Beata Street, Pandacan, Manila.

Dalmacio Lozada subdivided his property into five (5) lots, namely: Lot Nos. 12-A, 12-B, 12-C, 12-D and 12-E. Through a Deed of
Donation dated March 9, 1932,4 he donated the subdivided lots to his daughters, namely: Isabel, Salud, Catalina, and Felicidad,
all surnamed Lozada. The Deed of Donation was registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of Manila on March 15,
1932.

Under the said Deed of Donation, the lots were adjudicated to Dalmacio's daughters in the following manner:

A. Lot No. 12-A in favor of Isabel Lozada, married to Isaac Limense;

b. Lot No. 12-B in favor of Catalina Lozada, married to Sotero Natividad;

c. Lot No. 12-C in favor of Catalina Lozada, married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel Lozada, married to Isaac Limense; and Salud
Lozada, married to Francisco Ramos, in equal parts;

d. Lot No. 12-D in favor of Salud Lozada, married to Francisco Ramos; andcralawlibrary

e. Lot No. 12-E in favor of Isabel Lozada, married to Isaac Limense, and Felicidad Lozada, married to Galicano Centeno.
By virtue of the Deed of Donation executed by Dalmacio Lozada, OCT No. 7036, which was registered in his name, was cancelled
and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) bearing Nos. 40041, 40042, 40043, 40044, and 40045 were issued in
favor of the donees, except TCT No. 40044, which remained in his name. These new TCTs were annotated at the back of OCT
No. 7036.5

TCT No. 40043, which covered Lot No. 12-C, was issued in the name of its co-owners Catalina Lozada, married to Sotero
Natividad; Isabel Lozada, married to Isaac Limense; and Salud Lozada, married to Francisco Ramos. It covered an area of 68.60
square meters, more or less, was bounded on the northeast by Lot No. 12-A, on the southwest by Calle Beata, and on the
northwest by Lot No. 12-D of the subdivision plan. In 1932, respondents' predecessor-in-interest constructed their residential
building on Lot No. 12-D, adjacent to Lot No. 12-C.

On May 16, 1969, TCT No. 968866 was issued in the name of Joaquin Limense covering the very same area of Lot No. 12-C.

On October 1, 1981, Joaquin Limense secured a building permit for the construction of a hollow block fence on the boundary
line between his aforesaid property and the adjacent parcel of land located at 2759 Beata Street, Pandacan, Manila, designated
as Lot No. 12-D, which was being occupied by respondents. The fence, however, could not be constructed because a substantial
portion of respondents' residential building in Lot No. 12-D encroached upon portions of Joaquin Limense's property in Lot No.
12-C.

Joaquin Limense demanded the removal of the encroached area; however, respondent ignored both oral and written demands.
The parties failed to amicably settle the differences between them despite referral to the barangay. Thus, on March 9, 1983,
Joaquin Limense, duly represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Teofista L. Reyes, instituted a Complaint7 against respondents before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 15, for removal of obstruction and damages.

Joaquin Limense prayed that the RTC issue an order directing respondents, jointly and severally, to remove the portion which
illegally encroached upon his property on Lot No. 12-C and, likewise, prayed for the payment of damages, attorney's fees and
costs of suit.

Respondents, on the other hand, averred in their Answer8 that they were the surviving heirs of Francisco Ramos,9 who, during
his lifetime, was married to Salud Lozada, one of the daughters of Dalmacio Lozada, the original owner of Lot No. 12. After
subdividing the said lot, Dalmacio Lozada donated Lot No. 12-C in favor of his daughters Catalina, married to Sotero Natividad;
Isabel, married to Isaac Limense; and Salud, married to Francisco Ramos. Being the surviving heirs of Francisco Ramos,
respondents later became co-owners of Lot No. 12-C. Lot No. 12-C has served as right of way or common alley of all the heirs of
Dalmacio Lozada since 1932 up to the present. As a common alley, it could not be closed or fenced by Joaquin Limense without
causing damage and prejudice to respondents.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision10 dated September 21, 1990 dismissing the complaint of Joaquin Limense.
It ruled that an apparent easement of right of way existed in favor of respondents. Pertinent portions of the decision read as
follows:

The Court finds that an apparent easement of right of way exists in favor of the defendants under Article 624 of the Civil Code.
It cannot be denied that there is an alley which shows its existence. It is admitted that this alley was established by the original
owner of Lot 12 and that in dividing his property, the alley established by him continued to be used actively and passively as
such. Even when the division of the property occurred, the non-existence of the easement was not expressed in the
corresponding titles nor were the apparent sign of the alley made to disappear before the issuance of said titles.

The Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which forms the alley, he knew that said lot could serve no other
purpose than as an alley. That is why even after he acquired it in 1969, the lot continued to be used by defendants and
occupants of the other adjoining lots as an alley. The existence of the easement of right of way was therefore known to plaintiff
who must respect the same in spite of the fact that his transfer certificate of title does not mention the lot of defendants as
among those listed therein as entitled to such right of way. It is an established principle that actual notice or knowledge is as
binding as registration.11

Aggrieved by said decision, Joaquin Limense filed a notice of appeal. The records of the case were transmitted to the Court of
Appeals (CA). During the pendency of the appeal with the CA, Joaquin Limense died in 1999.12
The CA, Seventh Division, in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589, in its Decision13 dated December 20, 2001 dismissed the appeal and affirmed
in toto the decision of the RTC.

Frustrated by this turn of events, petitioners, as surviving heirs of Joaquin Limense, elevated the case to this Court via a Petition
for Review on Certiorari14 raising the following issues:

1. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION,
IN HOLDING, LIKE THE TRIAL COURT DID, THAT RESPONDENTS' LOT 12-D HAS AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY OVER JOAQUIN
LIMENSE'S LOT 12-C?cralawred

2. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION,
IN FAILING TO HOLD, LIKE THE TRIAL COURT DID, THAT THE PROTRUDING PORTIONS OF RESPONDENTS' HOUSE ON LOT 12-D
EXTENDING INTO JOAQUIN LIMENSE'S LOT 12-C CONSTITUTE A NUISANCE AND, AS SUCH, SHOULD BE REMOVED?

Petitioners aver that the CA erred in ruling that since Lot No. 12-C was covered by two TCT's, i.e., TCT Nos. 40043 and 96886,
and there was no evidence on record to show how Joaquin Limense was able to secure another title over an already titled
property, then one of these titles must be of dubious origin. According to the CA, TCT No. 96886, issued in the name of Joaquin
Limense, was spurious because the Lozada sisters never disposed of the said property covered by TCT No. 40043. The CA
further ruled that a co-ownership existed over Lot No. 12-C between petitioners and respondents. Petitioners countered that
TCT No. 96886, being the only and best legitimate proof of ownership over Lot No. 12-C, must prevail over TCT No. 40043.

Respondents allege that it was possible that TCT No. 96886, in the name of Joaquin Limense, was obtained thru fraud,
misrepresentation or falsification of documents because the donees of said property could not possibly execute any valid
transfer of title to Joaquin Limense, as they were already dead prior to the issuance of TCT No. 96886 in 1969. Respondents
further allege that petitioners failed to produce proof substantiating the issuance of TCT No. 96886 in the name of Joaquin
Limense.

Apparently, respondents are questioning the legality of TCT No. 96886, an issue that this Court cannot pass upon in the present
case. It is a rule that the validity of a torrens title cannot be assailed collaterally.15 Section 48 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1529 provides that:

[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.

In the case at bar, the action filed before the RTC against respondents was an action for removal of obstruction and damages.
Respondents raised the defense that Joaquin Limense's title could have been obtained through fraud and misrepresentation in
the trial proceedings before the RTC. Such defense is in the nature of a collateral attack, which is not allowed by law.

Further, it has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed,
modified, enlarged or diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, the reliance on registered titles
would be lost. The title became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from the time of its registration
and issuance. Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that "upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration
and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may
pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or other persons responsible for the fraud."16 It has, therefore,
become an ancient rule that the issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in
an action expressly instituted for that purpose.17 In the present case, TCT No. 96886 was registered in 1969 and respondents
never instituted any direct proceeding or action to assail Joaquin Limense's title.

Additionally, an examination of TCT No. 40043 would readily show that there is an annotation that it has
been "CANCELLED."18 A reading of TCT No. 96886 would also reveal that said title is a transfer from TCT No. 4886619 and not TCT
40043. Thus, it is possible that there was a series of transfers effected from TCT No. 40043 prior to the issuance of TCT No.
96886. Hence, respondents' position that the issuance of TCT No. 96886 in the name of Joaquin Limense is impossible, because
the registered owners of TCT No. 40043 were already dead prior to 1969 and could not have transferred the property to
Joaquin Limense, cannot be taken as proof that TCT No. 96886 was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation or falsification of
documents.
Findings of fact of the CA, although generally deemed conclusive, may admit review by this Court if the CA failed to notice
certain relevant facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion, and if the judgment of the CA is premised
on a misapprehension of facts.20 As with the present case, the CA's observation that TCT No. 96886 is of dubious origin, as TCT
No. 40043 does not appear to have been disposed of by Catalina, Isabel and Salud Lozada, is improper and constitutes an
indirect attack on TCT No. 96886. As we see it, TCT No. 96886, at present, is the best proof of Joaquin Limense's ownership over
Lot No. 12-C. Thus, the CA erred in ruling that respondents and petitioners co-owned Lot No. 12-C, as said lot is now registered
exclusively in the name of Joaquin Limense.

Due to the foregoing, Joaquin Limense, as the registered owner of Lot 12-C, and his successors-in-interest, may enclose or fence
his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon.21

However, although the owner of the property has the right to enclose or fence his property, he must respect servitudes
constituted thereon. The question now is whether respondents are entitled to an easement of right of way.

Petitioners contend that respondents are not entitled to an easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-C, because their Lot No.
12-D is not duly annotated at the back of TCT No. 96886 which would entitle them to enjoy the easement, unlike Lot Nos. 12-A-
1, 12-A-2, 12-A-3, 12-A-4, 12-A-5, and 12-A-6. Respondents, on the other hand, allege that they are entitled to an easement of
right of way over Lot No. 12-C, which has been continuously used as an alley by the heirs of Dalmacio Lozada, the residents in
the area and the public in general from 1932 up to the present. Since petitioners are fully aware of the long existence of the
said alley or easement of right of way, they are bound to respect the same.

As defined, an easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must
refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person
or tenement.22

Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent.

Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant, without the intervention of any act of man.
Discontinuous easements are those which are used at intervals and depend upon the acts of man. Apparent easements are
those which are made known and are continually kept in view by external signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of the same.
Non-apparent easements are those which show no external indication of their existence.23

In the present case, the easement of right of way is discontinuous and apparent. It is discontinuous, as the use depends upon
the acts of respondents and other persons passing through the property. Being an alley that shows a permanent path going to
and from Beata Street, the same is apparent.

Being a discontinuous and apparent easement, the same can be acquired only by virtue of a title.24

In the case at bar, TCT No. 96886, issued in the name of Joaquin Limense, does not contain any annotation that Lot No. 12-D
was given an easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-C. However, Joaquin Limense and his successors-in-interests are fully
aware that Lot No. 12-C has been continuously used and utilized as an alley by respondents and residents in the area for a long
period of time.

Joaquin Limense's Attorney-in-Fact, Teofista L. Reyes, testified that respondents and several other residents in the area have
been using the alley to reach Beata Street since 1932. Thus:

Atty. Manuel B. Tomacruz:

Q: Mrs. Witness, by virtue of that Deed of Donation you claim that titles were issued to the children of Dalmacio Lozada namely
Salud Lozada, Catalina Lozada and Isabel Lozada, is that right?cralawred

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And after the said property was adjudicated to his said children the latter constructed their houses on their lots.
A: Yes, sir.

Q: As a matter of fact, the herein defendants have constructed their houses on the premises alloted to them since the year
1932?cralawred

A: Yes, sir, they were able to construct their house fronting Beata Street.

Q: And that house they have constructed on their lot in 1932 is still existing today?cralawred

A: Yes, sir and they still used the alley in question and they are supposed to use Beata Street but they are not using Beata
Street.

Q: They are using the alley?cralawred

A: Yes, sir, they are using the alley and they do not pass through Beata Street.

Q: And they have been using the alley since 1932 up to the present?cralawred

A: Yes, sir they have been using the alley since that time. That was their mistake and they should be using Beata Street because
they are fronting Beata Strret.

Q: As a matter of fact, it is not only herein defendants who have been using that alley since 1932 up to the present?cralawred

A: Yes, sir they are using the alley up to now.

Q: As a matter of fact, in this picture marked as Exh. "C-1" the alley is very apparent. This is the alley?cralawred

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And there are houses on either side of this alley?cralawred

A: Yes, sir.

Q: As a matter of fact, all the residents on either side of the alley are passing through this alley?cralawred

A: Yes, sir, because the others have permit to use this alley and they are now allowed to use the alley but the Ramos's family
are now [not] allowed to use this alley.25

In Mendoza v. Rosel,26 this Court held that:

Petitioners claim that inasmuch as their transfer certificates of title do not mention any lien or encumbrance on their lots, they
are purchasers in good faith and for value, and as such have a right to demand from respondents some payment for the use of
the alley. However, the Court of Appeals found, as a fact, that when respondents acquired the two lots which form the alley,
they knew that said lots could serve no other purpose than as an alley. The existence of the easement of right of way was
therefore known to petitioners who must respect the same, in spite of the fact that their transfer certificates of title do not
mention any burden or easement. It is an established principle that actual notice or knowledge is as binding as registration.

Every buyer of a registered land who takes a certificate of title for value and in good faith shall hold the same free of all
encumbrances except those noted on said certificate. It has been held, however, that "where the party has knowledge of a
prior existing interest that was unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior
unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him."27
In the case at bar, Lot No. 12-C has been used as an alley ever since it was donated by Dalmacio Lozada to his heirs. It is
undisputed that prior to and after the registration of TCT No. 96886, Lot No. 12-C has served as a right of way in favor of
respondents and the public in general. We quote from the RTC's decision:

x x x It cannot be denied that there is an alley which shows its existence. It is admitted that this alley was established by the
original owner of Lot 12 and that in dividing his property the alley established by him continued to be used actively and
passively as such. Even when the division of the property occurred, the non-existence of the easement was not expressed in the
corresponding titles nor were the apparent sign of the alley made to disappear before the issuance of said titles.

The Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which forms the alley, he knew that said lot could serve no other
purpose than as an alley. That is why even after he acquired it in 1969 the lot continued to be used by defendants and
occupants of the other adjoining lots as an alley. x x x28

Thus, petitioners are bound by the easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-C, even though no registration of the servitude has
been made on TCT No. 96886.

However, respondents' right to have access to the property of petitioners does not include the right to continually encroach
upon the latter's property. It is not disputed that portions of respondents' house on Lot No. 12-D encroach upon Lot No. 12-C.
Geodetic Engineer Jose Agres, Jr. testified on the encroachment of respondents' house on Lot No. 12-C, which he surveyed.29 In
order to settle the rights of the parties relative to the encroachment, We should determine whether respondents were builders
in good faith.

Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition; and it encompasses, among
other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of a design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable
advantage. An individual's personal good faith is a concept of his own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined
by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put
the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior
claim, and absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not aware
that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.30

Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof.31 It
is a matter of record that respondents' predecessor-in-interest constructed their residential building on Lot No. 12-D, adjacent
to Lot No. 12-C, in 1932.32 Respondents' predecessor-in-interest owned the 1/3 portion of Lot No. 12-C at the time the property
was donated to them by Dalmacio Lozada in 1932. The Deed of Donation executed by the late Dalmacio Lozada, dated March 9,
1932, specifically provides that:

I hereby grant, cede and donate in favor of Catalina Lozada married to Sotero Natividad, Isabel Lozada married to Isaac Simense
and Salud Lozada married to Francisco Ramos, all Filipinos, of legal age, the parcel of land known as Lot No. 12-C, in equal
parts.33

The portions of Lot No. 12-D, particularly the overhang, covering 1 meter in width and 17 meters in length; the stairs; and the
concrete structures are all within the 1/3 share alloted to them by their donor Dalmacio Lozada and, hence, there was absence
of a showing that respondents acted in bad faith when they built portions of their house on Lot No. 12-C.

Using the above parameters, we are convinced that respondents' predecessors-in-interest acted in good faith when they built
portions of their house on Lot 12-C. Respondents being builders in good faith, we shall now discuss the respective rights of the
parties relative to the portions encroaching upon respondents' house.

Articles 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code provide:

Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder
or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he
shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.
The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and, in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing
until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has
defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value
which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.

In Spouses  Del Campo v. Abesia,34 this provision was applied to one whose house, despite having been built at the time he was
still co-owner, overlapped with the land of another. In that case, this Court ruled:

The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the
land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon the land that exclusively belongs to another but of which
he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-
ownership.

However, when, as in this case, the ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of defendants
overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in
good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. x x x35

In other words, when the co-ownership is terminated by a partition, and it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has
encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner, but the encroachment was in good faith, then the provisions of
Article 448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the parties. In this case, the co-ownership was terminated due to
the transfer of the title of the whole property in favor of Joaquin Limense.

Under the foregoing provision, petitioners have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of respondents upon
payment of indemnity to respondents, as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, petitioners may oblige
respondents to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is considerably much more
than the value of the portion of the house of respondents built thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land.
Respondents shall then pay the reasonable rent to petitioners upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of
disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of course, respondents may demolish or remove the said portion of
their house, at their own expense, if they so decide.36

The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of accession that the accessory follows the
principal and not the other way around.37 Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is
preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the building to instead remove it from the land.38

The obvious benefit to the builder under this article is that, instead of being outrightly ejected from the land, he can compel the
landowner to make a choice between two options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying the indemnity required by law, or
(2) to sell the land to the builder.39

The raison d etre for this provision has been enunciated, thus:

Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes
necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the
impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land
the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for
the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the owner of the land who is authorized
to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of
the accessory thing.40
In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao,41 this case must be remanded to the trial court to determine matters necessary for the
proper application of Article 448 in relation to Article 546. Such matters include the option that petitioners would take and the
amount of indemnity that they would pay, should they decide to appropriate the improvements on the lots.

Anent the second issue, although it may seem that the portions encroaching upon respondents' house can be considered a
nuisance, because it hinders petitioners' use of their property, it cannot simply be removed at respondents' expense, as prayed
for by petitioner. This is because respondents built the subject encroachment in good faith, and the law affords them certain
rights as discussed above.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 20, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. No co-ownership exists over Lot No. 12-C, covered by TCT No. 96886, between petitioners and respondents.

2. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Manila, for further proceedings without further delay to
determine the facts essential to the proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.

G.R. No. 90596             April 8, 1991

SOLID MANILA CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
BIO HONG TRADING CO., INC. and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Balgos & Perez for petitioner.

Alfredo G. de Guzman for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This is an appeal filed by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The petitioner raises two questions: (1) whether or not the Court of Appeals1 erred in reversing the trial court which had
rendered summary judgment; and (2) whether or not it erred in holding that an easement had been extinguished by merger.

We rule for the petitioner on both counts.

It appears that the petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 157750 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name of the
private respondent corporation under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 128784.

The private respondent's title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement
of way:

. . .a portion thereof measuring NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS, more or less, had been converted into a
private alley for the benefit of neighboring estates, this being duly annotated at the back of the covering transfer
Certificate of title per regulations of the Office of the City Engineer of Manila and that the three meterwide portion of
said parcel along the Pasig River, with an area of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE (179) SQUARE METERS, more or less,
had actually been expropriated by the City Government, and developed pursuant to the beautification drive of the
Metro Manila Governor. (p. 3, Record).2

As a consequence, an annotation was entered in the private respondent's title, as follows:

 Entry No. 7712/T-5000 –– CONSTRUCTION OF PRIVATE ALLEY –– It is hereby made of record that a construction of
private alley has been undertaken on the lot covered by this title from Concepcion Street to the interior of the
aforesaid property with the plan and specification duly approved by the City Engineer subject to the following
conditions to wit: (1) That the private alley shall be at least three (3) meters in width; (2) That the alley shall not be
closed so long as there's a building exists thereon (sic); (3) That the alley shall be open to the sky; (4) That the owner
of the lot on which this private alley has been constituted shall construct the said alley and provide same with
concrete canals as per specification of the City Engineer; (5) That the maintenance and upkeep of the alley shall be at
the expense of the registered owner; (6) That the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever
shall be placed thereon; (7) That the owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the public to
use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not act (sic) for any
indemnity for the use thereof; and (8) That he shall impose upon the vendee or new owner of the property the
conditions abovementioned; other conditions set forth in Doc. No. 4236, Page No. 11, Book No. 84 of Nicasio P. Misa,
Not. Pub. of Manila.3

The petitioner claims that ever since, it had (as well as other residents of neighboring estates) made use of the above private
alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its protests, the private
respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.

On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent, to have the gates removed
and to allow full access to the easement.

The court a quo shortly issued ex parte an order directing the private respondent to open the gates. Subsequently, the latter
moved to have the order lifted, on the grounds that: (1) the easement referred to has been extinguished by merger in the same
person of the dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of the property from its former owner; (2) the petitioner has
another adequate outlet; (3) the petitioner has not paid any indemnity therefor; and (4) the petitioner has not shown that the
right-of-way lies at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

The private respondent's opposition notwithstanding, the trial court issued a "temporary writ of preliminary injunction to
continue up to the final termination of the case upon its merits upon the posting of a P5,000.00 bond by the plaintiff.4 (the
petitioner herein).

Thereafter, the respondent corporation answered and reiterated its above defenses.

On April 15, 1986, the petitioner moved for summary judgment and the court a quo ruled on the same as follows:

In view of the foregoing, this Court finds it unnecessary to try this case on the merit (sic) and hereby resolve (sic) to grant the
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. (pp. 15-107, Record).5

On January 19, 1987, the trial court rendered judgment against the private respondent, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered making permanent the temporary mandatory injunction, that had been
issued against the defendant, and for the defendant to pay the plaintiff the costs of this suit.

The defendant's counterclaim against the plaintiff is hereby dismissed, for lack of merit. (Summary Judgment, p. 6).6

The private respondent appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, the private respondent itself went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition for the cancellation of the annotation in
question. The court granted cancellation, for which the petitioner instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 13421 of the respondent Court of
Appeals which ordered the restoration of the annotation "without prejudice [to] the final outcome of7 the private respondent's
own appeal (subject of this petition).

In reversing the trial court which had, as earlier mentioned, rendered summary judgment, the respondent Court of Appeals
held that the summary judgment was improper and that the lower court erroneously ignored the defense set up by the private
respondent that the easement in question had been extinguished. According to the Appellate Court, an easement is a mere
limitation on ownership and that it does not impair the private respondent's title, and that since the private respondent had
acquired title to the property, "merger" brought about an extinguishment of the easement.

The petitioner submits that the respondent Court of Appeals erred, because the very deed of sale executed between the
private respondent and the previous owner of the property "excluded" the alley in question, and that in any event, the intent of
the parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement notwithstanding the sale.

As already stated at the outset, the Court finds merit in the petition.

There is no question that an easement, as described in the deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the
seller, had been constituted on the private respondent's property, and has been in fact annotated at the back of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 128784. Specifically, the same charged the private respondent as follows: "(6) That the alley shall remain
open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon; (7) That the owner of the lot on which the alley has
been constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and
shall not [ask] for any indemnity for the use thereof. . ."8 Its act, therefore, of erecting steel gates across the alley was in
defiance of these conditions and a violation of the deed of sale, and, of course, the servitude of way.

The Court then is of the opinion that injunction was and is proper and in denying injunctive relief on appeal, the respondent
Appellate Court committed an error of judgment and law.

It is hardly the point, as the Court of Appeals held, that the private respondent is the owner of the portion on which the right-
of-way had been established and that an easement can not impair ownership. The petitioner is not claiming the easement or
any part of the property as its own, but rather, it is seeking to have the private respondent respect the easement already
existing thereon. The petitioner is moreover agreed that the private respondent has ownership, but that nonetheless, it has
failed to observe the limitation or encumbrance imposed on the same

There is therefore no question as to ownership. The question is whether or not an easement exists on the property, and as we
indicated, we are convinced that an easement exists.

It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the petitioner's contention that the deed of sale
"excluded" it, because as a mere right-of-way, it can not be separated from the tenement and maintain an independent
existence. Thus:

Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong.9

Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part.10 Although they are possessed of a separate
juridical existence, as mere accessories, they can not, however, be alienated11 from the tenement, or mortgaged separately.12

The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no argument to defeat the
petitioner's claims, because as an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the servient estate,
specifically, his right to use (jus utendi).

As the petitioner indeed hastens to point out, the deed itself stipulated that "a portion thereof [of the tenement] measuring
NINE HUNDRED FOURTEEN SQUARE METERS, more or less, had been converted into a private alley for the benefit of the
neighboring estates. . ."13 and precisely, the former owner, in conveying the property, gave the private owner a discount on
account of the easement, thus:

WHEREAS, to compensate for the foregoing, the parties hereto agreed to adjust the purchase price from THREE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P3,790,440.) to THREE MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P3,503,240.00)14

Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property –– including the disputed
alley –– as a result of the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon
and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.
The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that no genuine merger took place as a
consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when
ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person.15 Merger then, as can be seen, requires full
ownership of both estates.

One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not
in favor of a particular tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public.

Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article of the Civil Code:

Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the
encumbered estate does not belong.16

In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement pertains to
persons without a dominant estate,17 in this case, the public at large.

Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the termination of that
relation leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public –– if that is possible –– no
genuine merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement.

For this reason, the trial court was not in error in rendering summary judgment, and insofar as the respondent Court of Appeals
held that it (the trial court) was in error, the Court of Appeals is in error.

Summary judgments under Rule 34 of the Rules of Court are proper where there is no genuine issue as to the existence of a
material fact, and the facts appear undisputed based on the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits of record.18 In
one case, this Court upheld a decision of the trial court rendered by summary judgment on a claim for money to which the
defendant interposed the defense of payment but which failed to produce receipts.19 We held that under the circumstances,
the defense was not genuine but rather, sham, and which justified a summary judgment. In another case, we rejected the claim
of acquisitive prescription over registered property and found it likewise to be sham, and sustained consequently, a summary
judgment rendered because the title challenged was covered by a Torrens Certificate and under the law, Torrens titles are
imprescriptible.20

We also denied reconveyance in one case and approved a summary judgment rendered thereon, on the ground that from the
records, the plaintiffs were clearly guilty of laches having failed to act until after twenty-seven years.21 We likewise allowed
summary judgment and rejected contentions of economic hardship as an excuse for avoiding payment under a contract for the
reason that the contract imposed liability under any and all conditions.22

In the case at bar, the defense of merger is, clearly, not a valid defense, indeed, a sham one, because as we said, merger is not
possible, and secondly, the sale unequivocally preserved the existing easement. In other words, the answer does not, in reality,
tender any genuine issue on a material fact and can not militate against the petitioner's clear cause of action.

As this Court has held, summary judgments are meant to rid a proceeding of the ritual of a trial where, from existing
records,23 the facts have been established, and trial would be futile.

What indeed, argues against the posturing of the private respondent –– and consequently, the challenged holding of the
respondent Court of Appeals as well –– is the fact that the Court of Appeals itself had rendered judgment, in its CA-G.R. No.
13421, entitled Solid Manila Corporation v. Ysrael, in which it nullified the cancellation of the easement annotated at the back
of the private respondent's certificate of title ordered by Judge Ysrael in LRC Case No. 273. As the petitioner now in fact insists,
the Court of Appeals' judgment, which was affirmed by this Court in its Resolution dated December 14, 1988, in G.R. No. 83540,
is at least, the law of the case between the parties, as "law of the case" is known in law, e.g.:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the
 same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on
which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. (21 C.J.S. 330) (Emphasis
supplied).

It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or succeeding appeal is
substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated on
the prior appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be considered or readjudicated
therein. (5 C.J.S. 1267) (Emphasis supplied.)

In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where, after a definite determination, the court has
remanded the cause for further action below, it will refuse to examine question other than those arising subsequently
to such determination and remand, or other than the propriety of the compliance with its mandate; and if the court
below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the directions of the appellate court, its action will not be
questioned on a second appeal.

As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that decision
is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing. (5 C.J.S. 1276-77).
(Emphasis supplied.)

Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as the law of the case on a
subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as the presumption
is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received due consideration whether all or none of
them are mentioned in the opinion. (5 C.J.S. 1286-87). (Emphasis supplied.)24

CA-G.R. No. 13421 is the law of the case because clearly, it was brought to determine the rights of the parties regarding the
easement, subject of the controversy in this case, although as a petition for "cancellation of annotation" it may have, at a
glance, suggested a different cause of action.

And for reasons of fair play, the private respondent can not validly reject CA-G.R. No. 13421 as the law of the case, after all, it
was the one that initiated the cancellation proceedings with the Regional Trial Court in LRC No. 273 that precipitated that
appeal. In the second place, the proceedings for cancellation of annotation was in fact meant to preempt the injunction
decreed by the lower court in this case. Plainly and simply, the private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping, as we have
described the term:

x x x           x x x          x x x

There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion
(other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts
but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in
this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a
favorable court ruling. This is specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has
no jurisdiction.25

to which contempt is a penalty.26

As it happened, in its effort to shop for a friendly forum, the private respondent found an unfriendly court and it can not be
made to profit from its act of malpractice by permitting it to downgrade its finality and deny its applicability as the law of the
case.

As a personal servitude, the right-of-way in question was established by the will of the owner.

In the interesting case of North Negros Sugar Co.,  Inc. v. Hidalgo,27 this Court, speaking through Justice Claro Recto, declared
that a personal servitude (also a right of way in that case) is established by the mere "act"28 of the landowner, and is not
"contractual in the nature,"29 and a third party (as the petitioner herein is a third party) has the personality to claim its benefits.
In his separate opinion, however, Justice Jose Laurel maintained that a personal or voluntary servitude does require a contract
and that "[t]he act of the plaintiff in opening the private way here involved did not constitute an offer . . . "30 and "[t]here being
no offer, there could be no acceptance; hence no contract."31

The Court sees no need to relive the animated exchanges between two legal titans (they would contend even more spiritedly in
the "larger" world of politics) to whom present scholars perhaps owe their erudition and who, because of the paths they have
taken, have shaped history itself; after all, and coming back to the case at bar, it is not disputed that an easement has been
constituted, whereas it was disputed in North Negros' case. Rather, the question is whether it is still existing or whether it has
been extinguished. As we held, our findings is that it is in existence and as a consequence, the private respondent can not bar
the public, by erecting an obstruction on the alley, from its use.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court is hereby REINSTATED. The petitioner and its counsel are hereby required to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be
punished for contempt of court, and also administratively dealt with in the case of counsel, for forum shopping.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 124699. July 31, 2003

BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC., petitioner,  vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF MAGDALENO VALDEZ SR., Respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the decision[1 dated November
17, 1995 of the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, which reversed the decision[2 dated November 27, 1991 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch IX, which ruled in favor of herein petitioner, Bogo-Medellin Milling Company, Inc. and dismissed
herein private respondents' complaint for payment of compensation and/or recovery of possession of real property and
damages with application for restraining order or preliminary injunction; and its resolution dated March 2, 1996 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts follow.

Magdaleno Valdez, Sr., father of herein private respondents Sergio Valdez, Angelina Valdez-Novabos, Teresita Argawanon-
Mangubat and Daylinda Argawanon-Melendres (hereafter the heirs), purchased from Feliciana Santillan, on December 9, 1935,
a parcel of unregistered land covered by Tax Declaration No. 3935 with an area of one hectare, 34 ares and 16 centares, located
in Barrio Dayhagon, Medellin, Cebu.[3 He took possession of the property and declared it for tax purposes in his name.
[4cräläwvirtualibräry

Prior to the sale, however, the entire length of the land from north to south was already traversed in the middle by railroad
tracks owned by petitioner Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. (hereafter Bomedco). The tracks were used for hauling sugar cane
from the fields to petitioners sugar mill.

When Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. passed away in 1948, herein private respondents inherited the land. However, unknown to them,
Bomedco was able to have the disputed middle lot which was occupied by the railroad tracks placed in its name in the Cadastral
Survey of Medellin, Cebu in 1965. The entire subject land was divided into three, namely, Cadastral Lot Nos. 953, 954 and 955.
Lot Nos. 953 and 955 remained in the name of private respondents. However, Lot No. 954, the narrow lot where the railroad
tracks lay, was claimed by Bomedco as its own and was declared for tax purposes in its name. 5cräläwvirtualibräry

It was not until 1989 when private respondents discovered the aforementioned claim of Bomedco on inquiry with the Bureau of
Lands. Through their lawyer, they immediately demanded the legal basis for Bomedco's claim over Cadastral Lot No. 954 but
their letter of inquiry addressed to petitioner went unheeded, as was their subsequent demand for payment of compensation
for the use of the land.[6cräläwvirtualibräry
On June 8, 1989, respondent heirs filed a Complaint for Payment of Compensation and/or Recovery of Possession of Real
Property and Damages with Application for Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction against Bomedco before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu.[7 Respondent heirs alleged that, before she sold the land to Valdez, Sr. in 1935, Santillan granted Bomedco, in
1929, a railroad right of way for a period of 30 years. When Valdez, Sr. acquired the land, he respected the grant. The right of
way expired sometime in 1959 but respondent heirs allowed Bomedco to continue using the land because one of them was
then an employee of the company.[8cräläwvirtualibräry

In support of the complaint, they presented an ancient document ― an original copy of the deed of sale written in Spanish and
dated December 9, 1935[9 ― to evidence the sale of the land to Magdaleno Valdez, Sr.; several original real estate tax
receipts[10 including Real Property Tax Receipt No. 3935[11 dated 1922 in the name of Graciano de los Reyes, husband of
Feliciana Santillan, and Real Property Tax Receipt No. 09491[12 dated 1963 in the name of Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. Magdaleno
Valdez, Jr. also testified for the plaintiffs during the trial.

On the other hand, Bomedcos principal defense was that it was the owner and possessor of Cadastral Lot No. 954, having
allegedly bought the same from Feliciana Santillan in 1929, prior to the sale of the property by the latter to Magdaleno Valdez,
Sr. in 1935. It also contended that plaintiffs claim was already barred by prescription and laches because of Bomedcos open and
continuous possession of the property for more than 50 years.

Bomedco submitted in evidence a Deed of Sale[13 dated March 18, 1929; seven real estate tax receipts[14 for the property
covering the period from 1930 to 1985; a 1929 Survey Plan of private land for Bogo-Medellin Milling Company;[15 a Survey
Notification Card;[16 Lot Data Computation for Lot No. 954;[17 a Cadastral Map for Medellin Cadastre[18 as well as the
testimonies of Vicente Basmayor, Geodetic Engineer and property custodian for Bomedco, and Rafaela A. Belleza, Geodetic
Engineer and Chief of the Land Management Services of the DENR, Region VIII.

In its decision dated November 27, 1991, the trial court19 rejected Bomedco's defense of ownership on the basis of a prior sale,
citing that its evidence a xerox copy of the Deed of Sale dated March 18, 1929 was inadmissible and had no probative value.
Not only was it not signed by the parties but defendant Bomedco also failed to present the original copy without valid reason
pursuant to Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[20cräläwvirtualibräry

Nonetheless, the trial court held that Bomedco had been in possession of Cadastral Lot No. 954 in good faith for more than 10
years, thus, it had already acquired ownership of the property through acquisitive prescription under Article 620 of the Civil
Code. It explained:

Under Article 620 of the Civil Code, CONTINUOUS and APPARENT easements can be acquired by prescription after ten (10)
years. The apparent characteristic of the questioned property being used by defendant as an easement is no longer at issue,
because plaintiffs themselves had acknowledged that the existence of the railway tracks of defendant Bomedco was already
known by the late Magdaleno Valdez, herein plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest, before the late Magdaleno Valdez purchased in
1935 from the late Feliciana Santillan the land described in the Complaint where defendants railway tracks is traversing [sic]
(TSN of February 5, 1991, pp. 7-8). As to the continuity of defendants use of the strip of land as easement is [sic] also manifest
from the continuous and uninterrupted occupation of the questioned property from 1929 up to the date of the filing of the
instant Complaint. In view of the defendants UNINTERRUPTED possession of the strip of land for more than fifity (50) years, the
Supreme Courts ruling in the case of Ronquillo, et al. v. Roco, et al. (103 Phil 84) is not applicable. This is because in said case
the easement in question was a strip of dirt road whose possession by the dominant estate occurs only everytime said dirt road
was being used by the dominant estate. Such fact would necessarily show that the easements possession by the dominant
estate was never continuous. In the instant case however, there is clear continuity of defendants possession of the strip of land
it had been using as railway tracks. Because the railway tracks which defendant had constructed on the questioned strip of land
had been CONTINUOUSLY occupying said easement. Thus, defendant Bomedcos apparent and continuous possession of said
strip of land in good faith for more than ten (10) years had made defendant owner of said strip of land traversed by its railway
tracks. Because the railway tracks which defendant had constructed on the questioned strip of land had been continuously
occupying said easement [sic]. Thus, defendant Bomedcos apparent and continuous possession of said strip of land in good
faith for more than ten (10) years had made defendant owner of said strip of land traversed by its railway tracks.

Respondent heirs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which found that Bomedco did not acquire ownership over the lot.
It consequently reversed the trial court. In its decision dated November 17, 1995, the appellate court held that Bomedco only
acquired an easement of right of way by unopposed and continuous use of the land, but not ownership, under Article 620 of
the Civil Code.
The appellate court further ruled that Bomedcos claim of a prior sale to it by Feliciana Santillan was untrue. Its possession being
in bad faith, the applicable prescriptive period in order to acquire ownership over the land was 30 years under Article 1137 of
the Civil Code. Adverse possession of the property started only in 1965 when Bomedco registered its claim in the cadastral
survey of Medellin. Since only 24 years from 1965 had elapsed when the heirs filed a complaint against Bomedco in 1989,
Bomedcos possession of the land had not yet ripened into ownership.

And since there was no showing that respondent heirs or their predecessor-in-interest was ever paid compensation for the use
of the land, the appellate court awarded compensation to them, to be computed from the time of discovery of the adverse acts
of Bomedco.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in its resolution dated March 22, 1996, Bomedco now
interposes before us this present appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, assigning the following errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION
DISMISSING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ORDERED THE PETITIONER TO PAY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT THE REASONABLE VALUE OF LOT 954 AND THE AMOUNT OF TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS AS
REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES.

Petitioner Bomedco reiterates its claim of ownership of the land  through extraordinary acquisitive prescription under Article
1137 of the Civil Code and laches to defeat the claim for compensation or recovery of possession by respondent heirs. It also
submits a third ground originally tendered by the trial court ― acquisition of the easement of right of way by prescription under
Article 620 of the Civil Code.

Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription

Under Art. 1137 of the Civil Code

Petitioners claim of ownership through extraordinary acquisitive prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code cannot be
sustained.

There is no dispute that the controversial strip of land has been in the continuous possession of petitioner since 1929. But
possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under a claim of title, that is, it must be
adverse.[21 Unless coupled with the element of hostility towards the true owner, possession, however long, will not confer title
by prescription.[22cräläwvirtualibräry

After a careful review of the records, we are inclined to believe the version of respondent heirs that an easement of right of
way was actually granted to petitioner for which reason the latter was able to occupy Cadastral Lot No. 954. We cannot
disregard the fact that, for the years 1930, 1937, 1949, 1962 and 1963, petitioner unequivocally declared the property to be a
central railroad right of way or sugar central railroad right of way in its real estate tax receipts when it could have declared it to
be industrial land as it did for the years 1975 and 1985.[23 Instead of indicating ownership of the lot, these receipts showed
that all petitioner had was possession by virtue of the right of way granted to it. Were it not so and petitioner really owned the
land, petitioner would not have consistently used the phrases central railroad right of way and sugar central railroad right of
way in its tax declarations until 1963. Certainly an owner would have found no need for these phrases. A person cannot have an
easement on his own land, since all the uses of an easement are fully comprehended in his general right of ownership.
[24cräläwvirtualibräry

While it is true that, together with a persons actual and adverse possession of the land, tax declarations constitute strong
evidence of ownership of the land occupied by him,[25 this legal precept does not apply in cases where the property is declared
to be a mere easement of right of way.
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable property of another, by virtue of which the
owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do, something on his property, for the benefit of another thing or
person. It exists only when the servient and dominant estates belong to two different owners. It gives the holder of the
easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is an
admission that the property belongs to another.[26cräläwvirtualibräry

Having held the property by virtue of an easement, petitioner cannot now assert that its occupancy since 1929 was in the
concept of an owner. Neither can it declare that the 30-year period of extraordinary acquisitive prescription started from that
year.

Petitioner, however, maintains that even if a servitude was merely imposed on the property in its favor, its possession
immediately became adverse to the owner in the late 1950s when the grant was alleged by respondent heirs to have expired. It
stresses that, counting from the late 1950s (1959 as found by the trial court), the 30-year extraordinary acquisitive prescription
had already set in by the time respondent heirs made a claim against it in their letters dated March 1 and April 6, 1989.

We do not think so. The mere expiration of the period of easement in 1959 did not convert petitioners possession into an
adverse one. Mere material possession of land is not adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient to vest title,
unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as an owner.[27 There should be a hostile use of such a nature
and exercised under such circumstances as to manifest and give notice that the possession is under a claim of right.

In the absence of an express grant by the owner, or conduct by petitioner sugar mill from which an adverse claim can be
implied, its possession of the lot can only be presumed to have continued in the same character as when it was acquired (that
is, it possessed the land only by virtue of the original grant of the easement of right of way),[28 or was by mere license or
tolerance of the owners (respondent heirs).[29 It is a fundamental principle of law in this jurisdiction that acts of possessory
character executed by virtue of license or tolerance of the owner, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of
prescription.[30cräläwvirtualibräry

After the grant of easement expired in 1959, petitioner never performed any act incompatible with the ownership of
respondent heirs over Cadastral Lot No. 954. On the contrary, until 1963, petitioner continued to declare the sugar central
railroad right of way in its realty tax receipts, thereby doubtlessly conceding the ownership of respondent heirs. Respondents
themselves were emphatic that they simply tolerated petitioners continued use of Cadastral Lot No. 954 so as not to jeopardize
the employment of one of their co-heirs in the sugar mill of petitioner.[31cräläwvirtualibräry

The only time petitioner assumed a legal position adverse to respondents was when it filed a claim over the property in 1965
during the cadastral survey of Medellin. Since then (1965) and until the filing of the complaint for the recovery of the subject
land before the RTC of Cebu in 1989, only 24 years had lapsed. Since the required 30-year extraordinary prescriptive period had
not yet been complied with in 1989, petitioner never acquired ownership of the subject land.

Laches

Neither can petitioner find refuge in the principle of laches. It is not just the lapse of time or delay that constitutes laches. The
essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it had either
abandoned or declined to assert it.[32cräläwvirtualibräry

Its essential elements are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainants rights after he had knowledge of defendants acts and after he has had the
opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which he bases
his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the complainant.
[33cräläwvirtualibräry

The second element (which in turn has three aspects) is lacking in the case at bar. These aspects are: (a) knowledge of
defendant's action, (b) opportunity to sue defendant after obtaining such knowledge and (c) delay in the filing of such suit.
[34cräläwvirtualibräry
Records show that respondent heirs only learned about petitioners claim on their property when they discovered the
inscription for the cadastral survey in the records of the Bureau of Lands in 1989. Respondents lost no time in demanding an
explanation for said claim in their letters to the petitioner dated March 1, 1989 and April 6, 1989. When petitioner ignored
them, they instituted their complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City on June 8, 1989.

Petitioners reliance on Caro vs. Court of Appeals [35 and Vda. de Alberto vs. Court of Appeals [36  is misplaced. There, laches
was applied to bar petitioners from questioning the ownership of the disputed properties precisely because they had
knowledge of the adverse claims on their properties yet tarried for an extraordinary period of time before taking steps to
protect their rights.

Further, there is no absolute rule on what constitutes laches. It is a rule of equity and applied not to penalize neglect or sleeping
on ones rights but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly unfair situation. The question of
laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and each case must be decided according to its particular
circumstances.[37 It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, should not be guided or bound strictly by the
statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches if wrong or injustice will result.

It is clear that petitioner never acquired ownership over Cadastral Lot No. 954 whether by extraordinary acquisitive prescription
or by laches.

Acquisition of Easement of Right of Way By

Prescription Under Art. 620 of the Civil Code

Petitioner contends that, even if it failed to acquire ownership of the subject land, it nevertheless became legally entitled to the
easement of right of way over said land by virtue of prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code:

Continuous and apparent easements  are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals both upheld this view for the reason that the railroad right of way was, according to
them, continuous and apparent in nature. The more or less permanent railroad tracks were visually apparent and
they continuously occupied the subject strip of land from 1959 (the year the easement granted by Feliciana Santillan to
petitioner expired). Thus, with the lapse of the 10-year prescriptive period in 1969, petitioner supposedly acquired the
easement of right of way over the subject land.

Following the logic of the courts a quo, if a road for the use of vehicles or the passage of persons is permanently cemented or
asphalted, then the right of way over it becomes continuous in nature. The reasoning is erroneous.

Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are
exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such easements. Thus, an
easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement of
drainage;[38 and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of way.
[39cräläwvirtualibräry

The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person passes or sets foot on
somebody elses land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is
discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person passes over another's property. In
other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon the act or intervention of man which is the very essence of
discontinuous easements.

The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not in any way convert the nature of an easement of right of way
to one that is continuous. It is not the presence of apparent signs or physical indications showing the existence of an easement,
but rather the manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes such easement into continuous or discontinuous. The presence of
physical or visual signs only classifies an easement into apparent  or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way)
and a window (which evidences a right to light and view) are apparent easements, while an easement of not building beyond a
certain height is non-apparent.[40cräläwvirtualibräry
In Cuba, it has been held that the existence of a permanent railway does not make the right of way a continuous one; it is only
apparent. Therefore, it cannot be acquired by prescription.[41 In Louisiana, it has also been held that a right of passage over
another's land cannot be claimed by prescription because this easement is discontinuous and can be established only by title.
[42cräläwvirtualibräry

In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioners trains denotes the existence of an apparent but
discontinuous easement of right of way. And under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether apparent or
not, may be acquired only by title. Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco never acquired any title over the use of the railroad right
of way whether by law, donation, testamentary succession or contract. Its use of the right of way, however long, never resulted
in its acquisition of the easement because, under Article 622, the discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way can only be
acquired by title and not by prescription.

To be sure, beginning 1959 when the original 30-year grant of right of way given to petitioner Bomedco expired, its occupation
and use of Cadastral Lot No. 954 came to be by mere tolerance of the respondent heirs. Thus, upon demand by said heirs in
1989 for the return of the subject land and the removal of the railroad tracks, or, in the alternative, payment of compensation
for the use thereof, petitioner Bomedco which had no title to the land should have returned the possession thereof or should
have begun paying compensation for its use.

But when is a party deemed to acquire title over the  use  of such land (that is, title over the easement of right of way)? In at
least two cases, we held that if: (a) it had subsequently entered into a contractual right of way with the heirs for the continued
use of the land under the principles of voluntary easements or (b) it had filed a case against the heirs for conferment on it of a
legal easement of right of way under Article 629 of the Civil Code, then title over the  use  of the land is deemed to exist. The
conferment of a legal easement of right of way under Article 629 is subject to proof of the following:

(1) it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;

(2) payment of proper indemnity;

(3) the isolation is not the result of its own acts; and

(4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, the
distance from the dominant estate to the highway is the shortest.[43cräläwvirtualibräry

None of the above options to acquire title over the railroad right of way was ever pursued by petitioner despite the fact that
simple resourcefulness demanded such initiative, considering the importance of the railway tracks to its business. No doubt, it
is unlawfully occupying and using the subject strip of land as a railroad right of way without valid title yet it refuses to vacate it
even after demand of the heirs. Furthermore, it tenaciously insists on ownership thereof despite a clear showing to the
contrary.

We thus uphold the grant by the Court of Appeals of attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000 considering the evident bad faith
of petitioner in refusing respondents just and lawful claims, compelling the latter to litigate.[44cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision dated November 17, 1995 and resolution dated March 2, 1996 of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Bogo-Medellin Milling Company, Inc. is hereby ordered to
vacate the subject strip of land denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 954, remove its railway tracks thereon and return its
possession to the private respondents, the heirs of Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. It is also hereby ordered to pay private respondents
attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.

SO ORDERED.

BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE, INC. (BAPCI), Petitioner, v. EDMUNDO O. OBIAS, PERFECTO O. OBIAS,

VICTOR BAGASINA, ELENA BENOSA, MELCHOR BRANDES, ROGELIO MONTERO, PEDRO MONTERO, CLAUDIO RESARI, PILAR
GALON, ANTONIO BUISON, PRUDENCIO BENOSA, JR., MARIA VILLAMER and ROBERTO PADUA, Respondent.

DECISION
 PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the August 24,
2005 Decision2 and March 28, 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59016.

The facts of the case:

Sometime in 1972, the Bicol Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO) was established at Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur. In the
same year, BISUDECO constructed a road ("the disputed road") - measuring approximately 7 meters wide and 2.9 kilometers
long. The disputed road was used by BISUDECO in hauling and transporting sugarcane to and from its mill site (Pensumil) and
has thus become indispensable to its sugar milling operations.4

On October 30, 1992, petitioner Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Inc. acquired the assets of BISUDECO. On April 19,
1993, petitioner filed a Complaint5 against respondents Edmundo Obias, Perfecto Obias, Victor Bagasina, Elena Benosa, Melchor
Brandes, Rogelio Montero, Pedro Montero, Claudio Resari, Pilar Galon, Antonio Buison, Prudencio Benosa, Jr., Victor Bagasina
Jr., Maria Villamer, and Roberto Padua, alleging that on March 27, 1993 and April 3, 1993, respondents unjustifiably barricaded
the disputed road by placing bamboos, woods, placards and stones across it, preventing petitioner's and the other sugar
planter's vehicles from passing through the disputed road, thereby causing serious damage and prejudice to petitioner.6

Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road pursuant to an agreement with the owners of the ricefields the
road traversed. The agreement provides that BISUDECO shall employ the children and relatives of the landowners in exchange
for the construction of the road on their properties. Petitioner contends that through prolonged and continuous use of the
disputed road, BISUDECO acquired a right of way over the properties of the landowners, which right of way in turn was
acquired by it when it bought BISUDECO's assets. Petitioner prayed that respondents be permanently ordered to restrain from
barricading the disputed road and from obstructing its free passage.7

In an Order8 dated April 19, 1993, the Regional Trial Court of Pili (RTC), Camarines Sur, 5th Judicial Region, Branch 31, ordered
respondents, their agents and representatives to cease and desist from placing barricades on the disputed road.9

In their Answer,10 respondents denied having entered into an agreement with BISUDECO regarding the construction and the use
of the disputed road. They alleged that BISUDECO, surreptitiously and without their knowledge and consent, constructed the
disputed road on their properties and has since then intermittently and discontinuously used the disputed road for hauling
sugarcane despite their repeated protests. Respondents claimed they tolerated BISUDECO in the construction and the use of
the road since BISUDECO was a government-owned and controlled corporation, and the entire country was then under Martial
Law. Respondents likewise denied that the road has become a public road, since no public funds were used for its construction
and maintenance. Moreover, respondents alleged that with the exception of Edmundo and Perfecto Obias, they are actual
tillers of the ricelands, having acquired their rights over said lands under Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). Edmundo and
Perfecto Obias are the owners of the eastern portion of the property on which a portion of the road going to BISUDECO was
constructed. Respondents denied that they barricaded the road.11

Jaime Manubay and Manolito Maralit, for themselves and in representation of other sugarcane planters, filed the first
complaint-in-intervention.12

Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint13 and with leave of court a Re-Amended Complaint,14 where it averred, as an alternative
cause of action in the event the lower court does not find merit in its causes of action, that it will avail of the benefits provided
for under Article 64915 of the New Civil Code. Petitioner thus demanded from respondents a right of way over the disputed road
for its use.16

Respondents filed an Answer17 to refute petitioner's alternative cause of action. Respondents claimed that the road from the
sugarmill to the Maharlika Highway at Barangay Romero, Bula, Camarines Sur, which exits at the Rural Bank of Bula site, had a
distance of only about 15 kilometers; hence, respondents asserted that said road was shorter and was a more appropriate right
of way than the disputed road.18

On July 21, 1993, the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction19 ordering the respondents to desist from constructing
barricades across the road.
On June 28, 1994, nine other cooperatives20 filed their Complaint-in-Intervention.21

On June 25, 1997 the RTC rendered a Decision,22 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a decision is hereby rendered declaring the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued against all
the herein defendants, their agents, representatives and such other persons acting in their behalf, permanent and perpetual
BUT the plaintiff Bicol Agro-Industrial Cooperative, Inc., (BAPCI) is hereby ordered to pay the owners of the lots affected by the
road, viz: Pedro Montero - P299,040.00; Pedro Galon - P52,920.00; Clara Padua - P46,410.00; Antonio Buizon - P35,070.00;
Rogelio Montero - P41,160.00; Maria Villamer - P41,580.00; Melchor Brandes - P76,440.00; Prudencio Benosa - P41, 650.00;
Elena Benosa - P39,550.00; Victor Bagasina, Jr. - P39,410.00; and Claudio Resari - P40,950.00. Upon full payment thereof, the
plaintiff shall be declared the absolute owner of the road in question. Legal rate if interest is hereby imposed upon the plaintiff
from the finality of this decision until fully payment hereof. No costs.

SO ORDERED.23

The RTC ruled that petitioner failed to present any concrete evidence to prove that there was an agreement between
BISUDECO and respondents for the construction of the disputed road.24 Moreover, it held that petitioner did not acquire the
same by prescription.25 The RTC, however, also held that petitioner was entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way as
provided for under Article 649 of the New Civil Code upon payment of proper indemnity to respondents.26

Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision. Petitioner contended that: (1) the value of the land is
excessive; (2) the evidence is insufficient to justify the award; (3) the decision is contrary to law and jurisprudence.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that: (1) the trial court erred in declaring the persons mentioned in the decision's
dispositive portion to be entitled to indemnity for the construction and the use of the disputed road; (2) BAPCI should not be
declared the absolute owner of the disputed road upon full payment of the indemnity due to the defendants; and (3) the
decision failed to award damages.27

On September 24, 1997, the RTC denied both motions for reconsideration.28 The parties then appealed to the CA.

On August 24, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31,
Pili, Camarines Sur, in Civil Case No. P-1899 is hereby MODIFIED as follows: the awards of Php46,410.00 to Clara Padua and
Php41,650.00 to Prudencio Benosa are hereby DELETED, and the declaration that the plaintiff BAPCI shall become the absolute
owner of the disputed road upon full payment of indemnity is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the owners of the servient
estate in the easement of right of way recognized in this Decision shall retain ownership of the lands affected by the easement
in accordance with Art. 630 of the Civil Code. We hereby AFFIRM the appeal in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.29

The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that there was no conclusive proof to sufficiently establish the existence of an
agreement between BISUDECO and respondents regarding the construction of the disputed road.30 Moreover, the CA also
declared that an easement of right of way is discontinuous and as such cannot be acquired by prescription.31 The CA likewise
affirmed the finding of the RTC that petitioner was entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way upon payment of proper
indemnity to respondents. The CA, however, declared that ownership over the disputed road should remain with respondents,
despite the grant of a compulsory easement.32 Lastly, the CA deleted the awards to Prudencio Benosa (Benosa) and Clara Padua
(Padua), since the former never claimed ownership of any portion of the lands affected by the disputed road and the latter was
not a party to the proceedings below.33

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging among others that the CA Decision failed to rule on the issue of
estoppel and laches. Moreover, Benosa and Padua filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the portion of the CA Decision
deleting the award of indemnity to them. On March 28, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution denying the same.

Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following assignment of errors, to wit:
 I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED SERIOUSLY IN NOT FINDING THAT THERE WAS FORGED AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN
BISUDECO MANAGEMENT AND THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR THE CONTRUCTION OF THE ROAD IN QUESTION.

II.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE PRINCIPLES OF PRESCRIPTION,
LACHES AND ESTOPPEL IN THE CASE AT BAR.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE ROAD IN QUESTION
AS BARANGAY ROAD.

IV.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE CAUSE OF ACTION, THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE VALUATION OF THE
LANDS AFFECTED BY THE ROAD IN 1994, AND NOT IN 1974, WHEN SAID ROAD WAS CONSTRUCTED.

V.

THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED SERIOUSLY WHEN IT FAILED ALSO TO CONSIDER THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF
UNJUST ENRIGHTMENT AT THE EXPENSE OF ANOTHER.34

At the outset, this Court shall address some procedural matters. Quite noticeably, herein petition is denominated as one filed
under Rule 6535 of the Rules of Court notwithstanding that it seeks to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA. Clearly,
petitioner had availed of the improper remedy as the appeal from a final disposition of the CA is a Petition for Review under
Rule 45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.36

In Active Realty and Development Corporation v. Fernandez,37 this Court discussed the difference between petitions filed under
Rule 65 and Rule 45, viz:

A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court, or grave abuse of
discretion which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. This remedy can be availed of when "there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."

Appeal by certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, is a mode of appeal available to a party desiring to
raise only questions of law from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law.

x x x The general rule is that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of judgment on the merits is appeal. Thus, the
proper remedy for the petitioner should have been a Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court since
the decision sought to be reversed is that of the CA. The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort
to certiorari, because one of the requisites for availment of the latter is precisely that "there should be no appeal. The remedy
of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was still available to the petitioner.38

Rule 45 is clear that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the
action or proceeding involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a Petition for Review, which would be but a continuation
of the appellate process over the original case.39 Moreover, it is basic that one cannot avail of the remedy provided for under
Rule 65 when an appeal is still available. Hence, petitioner should have filed its petition under Rule 45.

The procedural infirmity notwithstanding and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court shall consider herein petition as
one filed under Rule 45 especially since it was filed well within the reglementary period proscribed under the said Rule. The
Court also takes notice that the assignment of errors raised by petitioner does not allege grave abuse of discretion or lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the CA.

On the Existence of an Agreement between BISUDECO and Respondents

Anent the first error raised, petitioner argues that the CA erred in not finding that BISUDECO and respondents forged an
agreement for the construction of the road in dispute. Petitioner thus asserts its entitlement to an easement of right of way
over the properties of respondents by virtue of said agreement.

An easement of right of way was succinctly explained by the CA in the following manner, to wit:

Easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a
different owner. By its creation, easement is established either by law (in which case it is a legal easement) or by will of the
parties (a voluntary easement). In terms of use, easement may either be continuous or discontinuous. The easement of right of
way ' the privilege of persons or a particular class of persons to pass over another's land, usually through one particular path
or linen - is characterized as a discontinuous easement because its use is in intervals and depends on the act of man. Because
of this character, an easement of a right of way may only be acquired by virtue of a title.40

Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law in the case at bar, viz:

Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by
virtue of a title.

Based on the foregoing, in order for petitioner to acquire the disputed road as an easement of right-of-way, it was incumbent
upon petitioner to show its right by title or by an agreement with the owners of the lands that said road traversed.

While conceding that they have no direct evidence of the alleged agreement, petitioner posits that they presented
circumstantial evidence which, if taken collectively, would prove its existence.41 Specifically, petitioner cites the following
circumstances, to wit:

A. The agreement was of public knowledge.42 Allegedly BISUDECO and respondents entered into an agreement for the
construction of the road provided that the latter, their children or relatives were employed with BISUDECO.

b. The road was continuously used by BISUDECO and the public in general.43

c. There was no protest or complaint from respondents for almost a period of two decades.44

d. The portions of the land formerly belonging to respondents affected by the road were already segregated and surveyed from
the main lots.45

e. The road in dispute is already a barangay road.

The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court in a Petition for
Review on Certiorari . This rule, however, is not iron-clad and admits certain exceptions, such as when (1) the conclusion is
grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are
contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings
are contrary to the admissions of both parties.46

After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds no justification to warrant the application of any exception to the
general rule.
Crucial to the petitioner's cause was its burden of proving the existence of the alleged agreement between BISUDECO and
respondents for the construction of the road. In this regard, the RTC found that petitioner failed to prove its existence, to wit:

It is clear that the plaintiff failed to present any concrete evidence to prove that there was such an agreement between
BISUDECO and defendants. Hereunder quoted are the testimonies of plaintiff's witnesses regarding the alleged agreement.

Romeo Deveterbo, Transportation Superintendent of BISUDECO testified'

Cross Examination by Atty. Pejo

Q: You also mentioned that there was an agreement between Senator Cea, Mr. Obias and some of the tenants?cralawred

A: Yes.

Q: You mentioned that this was not in writing, am I right?cralawred

A: Yes.

Q: How did you know about it that it was not in writing, who told you, Senator Cea?cralawred

A: It was commonly known to all original employees of the BISUDECO.

Q: You know it from the management?cralawred

A: From co-employees.

Q: You learned about that agreement from you co-employees?cralawred

A: Yes.

Q: In other words, therefore, that is why you said you are confused between Edmundo Cea and Perfecto Obias because you just
learned it from other employees and you were never present when they talked about it, am I right?cralawred

A: Yes. x x x

To this effect also is the testimony of Angel Lobo, head of the agricultural Department of BAPCI, to wit:

A: Yes, your Honor?cralawred

COURT: From where did you learn?cralawred

A: From people whom I talked with at that time and it is a public common knowledge at that time.

xxx

Atty. Carandang: I repeat my question, Your Honor.

You said you acquired it from or because of common knowledge and you mentioned some people. Who are those people you
are referring to whom you acquired that knowledge?cralawred
A: Most of all, the late Benjamin Bagasina, Barangay Captain at that time who was our employee in consideration of this
agreement, then we have also a Civil Engineering Head, Civil Engineering Department who is responsible for the maintenance of
this road. I learned from him that this arrangement established the fact why this road was constructed.

Q: Who is the head of the Engineering Dept?

xxx

COURT: May answer.

A: Engineer Pablo Tordilla who was then the head of our Civil Engineering Dept.

But this Engineer Pablo Tordilla, Lobo's alleged source of the information, was never presented in Court. And, according to the
Chief Accountant of BAPCI, David Severo:

A: When I was interviewing Mrs. Alma Montero Penaflor she filed to me a certain arrangement related to the used of the land
to Himaao as road going to the central.

COURT: You mean Himaao Millsite road?cralawred

A: Yes, sir.

Atty. Carandang:

Q: What arrangement is that supposedly filed to you?cralawred

A: She told me in exchange for the use of the road, the relatives or owners or tenants of the land will be hired by the sugar
Central?cralawred

COURT:

Q: So, only the tenants not the owners?cralawred

A: The tenant's children the road belongs.

xxx

Finally, intervenor Antonio Austria, in trying to show you that there was consent and approval on the part of the defendant
Edmundo Obias to give the right of way to BISUDECO at the time to be used in hauling the sugarcane of the planters to the
Central, averred the following uncertain statements:

A: Well, he has (sic) having a case against PENSUNIL, regarding the property I think the right of way going to PENSUMIL right
now we discuss it and he said he is allowing it anymore but then I reminded him wayback in 1974 to 1980 he was one of the
biggest planters in the part of Partido so he consented to the late I think Edmundo Cea, the owner of BISUDECO at that time to
pass his property since he is also milling a lot of things at that time and many other things one of the concession mill was I think
some of the tenants there in Himaao will be employed in the mill.

xxx

These aforequoted testimonies of the plaintiff's witnesses failed to satisfactorily establish the plaintiff's contention that there
was such an agreement. Likewise, the list of the Employees of Defendants' relatives, son/daughter employed by the BISUDECO
(Exhibit H) does not in any manner prove the alleged agreement.47
For its part, the CA also ruled that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the said agreement, to wit:

Like the lower court, we found no conclusive proof to sufficiently establish the existence of an agreement between BISUDECO
and the defendants-appellants regarding the construction and the use of the disputed road. The lower court correctly
disbelieved the plaintiffs-appellants' contention that an agreement existed because there is simply no direct evidence to
support this allegation. BAPCI submitted purely circumstantial evidence that are not sufficiently adequate as basis for the
inference than an agreement existed. By themselves, the circumstances the plaintiffs-appellants cited - i.e., the employment of
sixteen (16) relatives of the defendants-appellants; the defendants-appellants' unjustified silence; the fact that the existence of
the agreement is known to everyone, etc. - are events susceptible of diverse interpretations and do not necessarily lead to
BAPCI's desired conclusion. Additionally, the testimonies that the plaintiffs-appellants presented are mainly hearsay, as not one
among the witnesses had personal knowledge of the agreement by reason of direct participation in the agreement or because
the witness was present when the agreement was concluded by the parties. Thus, given the defendants-appellants' categorical
denial that an agreement existed, we sustain the lower's conclusion that no agreement existed between BISUDECO and the
defendants-appellants.48

Based on the foregoing, the inability of petitioner to prove the existence of an agreement militates its allegations in herein
petition. On this score, both the RTC and the CA are one in ruling that petitioner had failed to prove the existence of the
agreement between BISUDECO and the respondents for the construction of the road. Also, well-established is the rule that
"factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the said court affirms
the factual findings of the trial court."49 Hence, this Court finds no reason to reverse such findings.

On Acquisition by Prescription

Petitioner would have this Court re-examine Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals50 (Costabella) where the Court held
that, "It is already well-established that a right of way is discontinuous and, as such, cannot be acquired by
prescription."51 Petitioner contends that some recognized authorities52 share its view that an easement of right of way may be
acquired by prescription.

Be that as it may, this Court finds no reason to re-examine Costabella. This Court is guided by Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals53 (Bogo-Medellin), involving the construction of a railroad track to a sugar mill. In Bogo-Medellin, this Court
discussed the discontinuous nature of an easement of right of way and the rule that the same cannot be acquired by
prescription, to wit:

Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals both upheld this view for the reason that the railroad right of way was, according to
them, continuous and apparent in nature. The more or less permanent railroad tracks were visually apparent and
they continuously occupied the subject strip of land from 1959 (the year the easement granted by Feliciana Santillan to
petitioner expired). Thus, with the lapse of the 10-year prescriptive period in 1969, petitioner supposedly acquired the
easement of right of way over the subject land.

Following the logic of the courts a quo, if a road for the use of vehicles or the passage of persons is permanently cemented or
asphalted, then the right of way over it becomes continuous in nature. The reasoning is erroneous.

Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the manner they are
exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such easements. Thus,
easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement of
drainage; and it is discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of way.

The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person passes or sets foot on
somebody else's land. Like a road for the passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is
discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a person passes over another's property. In
other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon the act or intervention of man which is the very essence of
discontinuous easements.
The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not, in any way, convert the nature of an easement of right of way
to one that is continuous. It is not the presence of apparent signs or physical indications showing the existence of an easement,
but rather the manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes such easement into continuous or discontinuous. The presence of
physical or visual signs only classifies an easement into apparent  or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way)
and a window (which evidences a right to light and view) are apparent easements, while an easement of not building beyond a
certain height is non-apparent.

In Cuba, it has been held that the existence of a permanent railway does not make the right of way a continuous one; it is only
apparent. Therefore, it cannot be acquired by prescription. In Louisiana, it has also been held that a right of passage over
another's land cannot be claimed by prescription because this easement is discontinuous and can be established only by title.

In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioner's trains denotes the existence of an apparent but
discontinuous easement of right of way. And under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether apparent or
not, may be acquired only by title. Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco never acquired any title over the use of the railroad right
of way whether by law, donation, testamentary succession or contract. Its use of the right of way, however long, never resulted
in its acquisition of the easement because, under Article 622, the discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way can only be
acquired by title and not by prescription.54

Applying Bogo-Medellin to the case at bar, the conclusion is inevitable that the road in dispute is a discontinuous easement
notwithstanding that the same may be apparent. To reiterate, easements are either continuous or discontinuous according
to the manner they are exercised,  not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of
such easements. Hence, even if the road in dispute has been improved and maintained over a number of years, it will not
change its discontinuous nature but simply make the same apparent. To stress, Article 622 of the New Civil Code states that
discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.

On Laches and Estoppel

Petitioner argues that estoppel and laches bar respondents from exercising ownership rights over the properties traversed by
the road in dispute. In support of said argument, petitioner posits that BISUDECO had been peacefully and continuously using
the road without any complaint or opposition on the part of the respondents for almost twenty years. Respondents, on the
other hand, claim that they merely tolerated the use of their land as BISUDECO was a government-owned and controlled
corporation and considering that the disputed road was constructed during the time of Martial Law.

There is no absolute rule on what constitutes laches. It is a rule of equity and applied not to penalize neglect or sleeping on
one's rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly unfair situation. The question of
laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and each case must be decided according to its particular
circumstances.55 It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, should not be guided or bound strictly by the
statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches if wrong or injustice will result.56

In herein petition, the CA denied petitioner's argument in the wise:

As previously explained in our Decision, the applicable law is Article 622 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:

Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by
virtue of a title.

The eminent jurist, former Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, opines that this provision seeks to prevent the imposition of a burden
on a tenement based purely on the generosity, tolerance and spirit of neighborliness of the owners thereof.

We applied the cited provision to the case in ruling that no easement of right of way was acquired; based on the evidence
presented, the plaintiff-appellant failed to satisfactorily prove the existence of an agreement evidencing any right or title to use
the disputed road. We additionally rejected the plaintiff-appellant's position that it had acquired the easement of right of way
through acquisitive prescription, as settled jurisprudence states that an easement of right of way cannot be acquired by
prescription.
We hold the same view on the issue of acquisition of an easement of right of way by laches. To our mind, settled jurisprudence
on the application of the principle of estoppel by laches militates against the acquisition of an easement of right of way by
laches.

Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are basically courts of law and not courts of equity; equity, which has been aptly
described as "justice outside legality," should be applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law; Aeguetas
nunguam contravenit legis. Based on this principle, we find that the positive mandate of Article 622 of the Civil Code - the
statutory provision requiring title as basis for the acquisition of an easement of a right of way - precludes the application of the
equitable principle of laches.57

This Court agrees with the CA. The fact that the law is categorical that discontinuous easements cannot be acquired by
prescription militates against petitioner's claim of laches. To stress, discontinuous easements can only be acquired by title.
More importantly, whether or not the elements of laches are present is a question involving a factual determination by the trial
court.58 Hence, the same being a question of fact, it cannot be the proper subject of herein petition. On the other hand, as to
the issue of estoppel, this Court likewise agrees with the finding of the CA that petitioner did not present any evidence that
would show an admission, representation or conduct by respondents that will give rise to estoppel.59

Classification of the Road in Dispute as a Barangay Road

Petitioner argues that the CA erred when it disregarded the classification of the road in question as a barangay road. In support
of said argument, petitioner presented Exhibit Q, a Tax Declaration or Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet60 (1991 FAAS) with
Survey Number 1688-40 and PIN No. 026-01-009-08-037, dated April 30, 1991, which they claim proves that the road in dispute
is already a barangay road.

The same is again a question of fact which cannot be the proper subject of herein petition. Petitioner cannot have this Court re-
examine the evidentiary value of the documents it presented before the RTC as the same is not a function of this Court. In any
case, after a closer scrutiny of the 1991 FAAS, this Court holds that the same is insufficient to prove petitioner's claim.

Respondents, in their Comment,61 argue against the classification of the road in dispute as a barangay road in the wise:

Petitioner also stated that the Honorable Court of Appeals fails to consider the fact that the owner of the road in question is the
Municipality of Pili in the Province of Camarines Sur and as proof of such claim they presented and marked as Exhibit Q, tax
declaration no. 009-756 or Annex D of their Petition. However, private respondents wish to call the attention of this Honorable
Court to the following:

A. Tax Declaration No. 009-828 attached as Annex C-6 of the Verified Petition declared in the name of Edmundo Obias (one of
the private respondents);

b. Actual Use portion of said Annex C-6 marked as Exh. No. N-6-a-1 which states "Road Lot (BISUDECO Road)"; andcralawlibrary

c. The Memoranda portion in the second page of Annex C-6 which states: "Revised to declare the property in The name of the
rightful owner, Edmundo Obias based from the approved subdivision plan, Bsd-05-000055 (OLT) & technical descriptions.
Likewise area was made to conform with the said subdivision plan from 4,773 sq.m. to 11,209 sq.m.

Obviously, the alleged Exhibit Q of the Petitioner is an erroneous tax declaration, thus, negates the claim of the Petitioner that
the same is owned by the Municipality of Pili and has been declared a barangay road. Private respondents cannot understand
why the herein Petitioner alleged this matter and used it as a proof to support their claim when they are already in possession
of a tax declaration correcting the same and even attached the same as part of their Petition.62

In its Reply,63 petitioner counters:

II. While Petitioners claim that the road belongs to the Municipal Government of Pili, yet what they attached to the Petition as
Annex "C-7" is a tax declaration of Edmundo Obias. Petitioners have the following observations:

xxx
(b) That land of Edmundo Obias covered by Annex "C-6" to the Petition is not included or involved in this case at bar. His name
does not appear to be awarded in the Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals and also in the list of beneficiaries to receive
monetary considerations made by Mr. Angel Lobo.64

After a painstaking review of the records, this Court is more inclined to believe the claim of respondents. The claim of petitioner
to the effect that the land of Edmundo Obias is not included in the case at bar is misleading. It may be true that Edmundo was
not awarded indemnity by the lower courts, however, the same does not mean that his lands do not form part of the subject
matter of herein petition.

It bears to stress that Edmundo claimed in the CA that he was the owner of the affected ricelands and that respondents were
merely his tenants-beneficiaries under PD 27, otherwise known as the Tenant Emancipation Decree.65 The CA, however,
dismissed said claim because it was raised for the first time on appeal. It also held that the averments in the documents
submitted by Edmundo in the RTC described respondents as "owners" of the land they till; hence, the same constituted binding
judicial admissions.66

Based on the foregoing, petitioner's attempt to refute the contents of the 1995 FAAS by claiming that the lands of Edmundo are
not involved in the case at bar must fail. It is clear that respondents are the tenant-beneficiaries of the lands of Edmundo under
PD 27; hence, contrary to the claim of petitioner, the lands of Edmundo are the subject matter of herein petition.

In addition, it is curious that petitioner relies on the 1991 FAAS yet finds exception to the contents of the 1995 FAAS. After a
closer scrutiny of both documents, it appears to this Court that the land described in the 1991 FAAS is also the same land
described in the 1995 FAAS. Both FAAS involve land measuring 4,773 square meters. Likewise, both FAAS have the same PIN
Number (026-01-009-08-037) and Survey Number (1688-40). Accordingly, the annotation contained in the 1995 FAAS, to the
effect that a "BISUDECO road" does not belong to the Municipality of Pili, serves to weaken petitioner's claim.???ñ