CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
Contents
RENVOI
1 – Aznar vs. Garcia.............................................................1
2 – Bellis vs. Bellis...............................................................4
3 - LLorente vs Llorente......................................................5
CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE
4 - Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC....................................8
5 – San Luis vs San Luis...................................................19
1 – Aznar vs. Garcia
G.R. No. L-16749             January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of
the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No.
622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things
the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse
Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen
Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during
her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue
to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with
the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will
was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following
provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was
born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and
who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and
no descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx     xxx     xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that
she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to
me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who,
from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos,
Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the
same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National
Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal
thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued
thereon, is exhausted..
xxx     xxx     xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-
beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue
of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of
which I may be possessed at my death and which may have
come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime:
....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor
in his final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only
P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of
the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen
Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as
an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in
G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that
the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and
(b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies
to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-
half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above
grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the
deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California
alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are
involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were
decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which
requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having
been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of
the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death,
the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will
are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a
testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires,
because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and
inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d
952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179,
Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through
counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were
denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF
HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL
FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE
RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD
BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
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CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS
CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER
THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS
ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL
OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But
there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled
in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the
executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the
facts of record show that the deceased Edward E.
Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York
City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an
appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the
U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as
the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A.
He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United
States and stayed there for the following nine years until
1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching
school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July
of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the
Philippines for the United States and came back here the
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he
again returned to his own country, and came back to the
Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing
other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by
the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World
War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United
States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945.
Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622,
as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l",
"MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to
California shortly after the making of his last will and
testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his
lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the
St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953.
(pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New
York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since
he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely
and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he
appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that
state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of
meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote
something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on
Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he
acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, California from
1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter
was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the
deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California
by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he
was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended
to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This
conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by
Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to
mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But
domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical
meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he
has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has
no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he
divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in
it. But if he went on business which would require his
presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be
said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called
a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his
settlement as continuing only for the particular business in
hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a
domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice
requires the exercise of intention as well as physical
presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many
shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to
the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that
any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is
defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as
follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the
determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own
private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the
state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above
quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general
American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the
State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the
disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below,
sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will
in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes
the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its
owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
Page 2 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and
is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is
there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the
decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is
correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law
thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of
which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists
that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law
of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors,
thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict
of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law
for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of
law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign
law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court
chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of
Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to
Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of
Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why
the reference back should not have been to Michigan
Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless
chain of references" which has so often been criticized be
legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked
merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi
or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical
reason why the original reference should be the internal law
rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a
solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who
have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis
circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that
point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to
internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors
to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from
adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is
the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-
of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws
form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether
the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept
the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the
choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the
Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have
been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the
Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment
would be for the woman. The same result would happen,
though the courts would switch with respect to which would
hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances:
where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of
a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict
of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the
parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any
further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a
person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be
recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the
domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in
France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts,
England, and France. The question arises as to how this
property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts
court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate
succession to movables calls for an application of the law of
the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last
domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts
court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions,
or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a
distribution accordingly. An examination of French law,
however, would show that if a French court were called upon
to determine how this property should be distributed, it would
refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus
applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on
the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it
alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French
law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a
French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of
distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French
court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it
will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which
the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law,
the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter
back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the
narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-
571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to
be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further
question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is
a question which, while it has been considered by the courts
in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine
involved has been descriptively designated by them as the
"Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the
question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the
foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning
the main controversy to be decided according to the law of
the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the
court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must
take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but
also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to
the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction
prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of
the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American
authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the
reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in
an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531.
The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of
the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not
only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According
to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its
law.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of
International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the
following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as
regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists,
the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims
the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards
their personal statute, and desires that said
personal statute shall be determined by the law of
the domicile, or even by the law of the place where
the act in question occurred.
Page 3 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of
law, provided it be certain that one of them is
necessarily competent, which agree in attributing
the determination of a question to the same
system of law.
xxx     xxx     xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute
the personal estate of an Englishman who has died
domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his
domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium
would distribute personal property upon death in accordance
with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law
would make the distribution in accordance with the law of
nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this
reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of
laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal
law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California
are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate
sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living
in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are
not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down
of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters
with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of
American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or
rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more
states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution
of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled
at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal
questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of
situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is
logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of
the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same
rules should determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not
that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the
domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as
controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property,
and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate
succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The
New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle
that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile
of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal
application. It had its origin in that international comity which
was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
business intercourse and the process of accumulating
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical
wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as
above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of
laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should
enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing
therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled
abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are
bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we
must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express
mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for
residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled
abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the
provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should
govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the
various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16
of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil
Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the
question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when
a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and
should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave
the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like
a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the
country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the
conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to
be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law,
Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural
children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs.
Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock
Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.
Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision
can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons,
i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state
in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not
appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject
is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California
Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a
citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of
his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should
be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946
of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the
case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be
made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment
reversed, with costs against appellees.
2 – Bellis vs. Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-
appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis,
et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an
order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964,
approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No.
37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and
of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he
divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George
Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander
Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy,
who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate
children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in
which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in
trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children,
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his
first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.
Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Page 4 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of
San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the
Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all
the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form
of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their
respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from
time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the
various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial
advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the
executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia,
the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of
shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount
of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition,
the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last
Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal
portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his
first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of
service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April
27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order
overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16
of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in
this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the
lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this
Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or
Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss,
the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen
Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent
where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of
another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was
both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule
providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should
govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas
has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for
the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are
found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the
conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from
ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation
to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions,
with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will;
and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless
of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of
the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the
Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-
quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article"
when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the
new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the
second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new.
It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art.
16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may
be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional
rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail
over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills —
one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate —
arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in
executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as
this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal
and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of
the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are
no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto,
with costs against appellants. So ordered.
3 - LLorente vs Llorente
G.R. No. 124371               November 23, 2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur,
Branch 35, Iriga City2 declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter
referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of whatever property she and the
deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Lorenzo")
Page 5 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived
together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the
United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente
(hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married before a parish priest,
Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the
United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio
Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.5
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States
citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in
his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New
York.6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945,
Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his
wife and he visited the Philippines. 7 He discovered that his wife Paula
was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship
with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the
Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the
certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the
father’s name was left blank.9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February
2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all
the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of
Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance
and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital
union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a
separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during
their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her
adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to
separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both
Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s father and
stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro
Osabel.10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed
for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for
the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John
Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27,
1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of
San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an
interlocutory judgment of divorce.11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in
Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even
if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the
marriage or cohabitation.14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and
wife.15 Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul,
Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The
will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed
by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco
Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his
property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively
my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and
other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to
my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente,
in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever
located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay
Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R.
Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and
Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in
Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the
Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties,
whether real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded,
sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded,
conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor
of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of
the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful
substitute should served (sic) without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or
testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published,
by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any
degree in the Llorente’s Side should ever bother and disturb in any
manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with
respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed
respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and
Testament."17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his
last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed
Special Administratrix of his estate.18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason
that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial
court admitted the will to probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated,
Lorenzo died.21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition 22 for
letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula
contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the
various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that
Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal
property.23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc.
No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the
trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the
newspaper "Bicol Star".26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision,
thus:
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce
decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in
the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia
Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so
the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary
is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the
Page 6 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo
having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular
Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will
of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her
entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal
properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also
entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the
illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente,
for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining
free portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate
of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding
letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the
amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the
court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all
goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time
come to her possession or to the possession of any other person for
her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies
and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be
decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of
her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other
time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court
by her to be performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of
evidence could not be granted.
"SO ORDERED."27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of
the aforequoted decision.28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for
reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and
Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since
they were not legally adopted by him.29 Amending its decision of May
18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only
illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate
and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals.31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision,
affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever
properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-
five (25) years of cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED."32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion
for reconsideration of the decision.33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack
of merit.
Hence, this petition.35
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various
arguments raised,36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from
the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand
the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of
the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen
long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage
to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established,
admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily
governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and
to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."
(emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of
Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the
trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was
"referred back" to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case,
Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was
not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the categorical,
albeit equally unproven statement that "American law follows the
‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the
validity of Lorenzo’s will.38
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The
"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly
apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the
validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of
the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only
within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the
State of which the decedent was a resident. 39 Second, there is no
showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or
required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it
contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion
was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice,
and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice
entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo
acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of
the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the
formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual
and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of
Appeals,41 that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino
citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van
Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her
right to inherit" from him.
Page 7 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the
respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we
stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of
Appeals must be reversed.43 We hold that the divorce obtained by
Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized
in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce
(as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best
left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country,
the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in
their execution." (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife
and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do
not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered
by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity."44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo
are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and
proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the
formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact,
the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public
policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional
rights to the decedent's national law.45
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other
issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is
SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial
Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in
favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the
State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on
December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and
determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of
foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all
deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the
framework of the Rules of Court.
4 - Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 221697
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS
AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with extremely urgent
application for an ex parte issuance of temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23
December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-
001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No.
15-139 (DC) for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found
abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a
certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care
and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives,
Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September
1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her
Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was
given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a.
Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted
their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from
"Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo
on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed
adoption,2 the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime
in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's
adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live
Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive
parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit
attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-
Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth
in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner
registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City.
On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's
Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila.5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine
Passport No. F9272876 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).
Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her
Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos.
L881511 and DD156616.7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development
Studies at the University of the Philippines 8 but she opted to continue
her studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in
1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts
Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in
Political Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the
U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of
being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple
flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29
July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian
Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992. 12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie
(Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on
10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
Page 8 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American
citizen. 14 She obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December
2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together
with Hanna to support her father's candidacy for President in the May
2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her
youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two
daughters on 8 July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner
rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's
deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma and
eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February
2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to
assist in the settlement of his estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a
severe blow to her entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her
grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of
2005.19 The couple began preparing for their resettlement including
notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to
Philippine schools for the next semester; 20 coordination with property
movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars
from the U.S. to the Philippines; 21 and inquiry with Philippine authorities
as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into
the country.22 As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the
U.S.23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 24 and
without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed25 while
her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending
projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until
she and her husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking
slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second
half of 2005.27 The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title
covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the Register of
Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February
2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age began attending
Philippine private schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to
supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining household
belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S.
Postal Service of the family's change and abandonment of their
address in the U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold on 27 April
2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April
2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a
major Philippine company in July 2006.33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter
lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their family
home34 and to this day, is where the couple and their children have
been residing.35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property
was issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City on 1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. 36 Under the
same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition
to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006. 37 As
can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on
petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have
reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered
as citizens of the Philippines. 38 Consequently, the BI issued
Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of
her three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San
Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new
Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.41 This passport was
renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport
No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed
petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, petitioner
executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a
notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, 44 in satisfaction of the
legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. 45 The following
day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the
BI46 and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB. 47 From
then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the
U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
Nationality of the United States."49 On that day, she accomplished a
sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated
that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October
2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American
citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she
had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3
September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a
"Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective 21
October 2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections
wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period
of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013." 53 Petitioner
obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on
16 May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic
Passport No. DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the
May 2016 Elections. 56 In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a
natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the
day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to her
COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship"
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14
October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections
triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were
the subject of these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo
(Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or cancel said COC
which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the
COMELEC Second Division.59 She is convinced that the COMELEC
has jurisdiction over her petition. 60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is
that petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she stated
in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months up to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be
considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she
was a foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international law does not
confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on
foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified
to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for
she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with. 64 Even
assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is
deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized
American citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship
must be continuous from birth.66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that
petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012
COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the
country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013
Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that
petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No.
9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of the
Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from
July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said
Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost
Page 9 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to
reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's
petition as it was actually a petition for quo warranto which
could only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential
elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has
primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did
not contain allegations which, if hypothetically admitted,
would make false the statement in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that
there was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her
part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the
COC regarding her citizenship and residency qualifications
for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention
deliberations show that foundlings were
considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law
to have been born of citizens of the place where
they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship prior to the filing of her COC
for President in the May 9, 2016 Elections and that
the same is in full force and effect and has not
been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she
did not possess natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she
reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as
early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before
she reacquired natural-born citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in
her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest mistake,
not binding and should give way to evidence on
her true date of reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp
the sovereign right of the Filipino people to decide
a purely political question, that is, should she
serve as the country's next leader.68
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition
was deemed submitted for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a
Resolution finding that petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of
running for the President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May
2016 National and Local Elections, contained material representations
which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National
and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was
filed by petitioner which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23
December 2015 Resolution by denying the same.70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco
S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D.
Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which were
consolidated and raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad
alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to
qualify her for the Presidency.72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly
foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since
blood relationship is determinative of natural-born status.73 Tatad
invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not included is
excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly
included in the categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is
indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them. 74 Therefore, the
burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or
treaties to support her claim that foundlings have a
nationality.76 According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties
are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary in order
to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines.77 He
also stressed that there is no standard state practice that automatically
confers natural-born status to foundlings.78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot
avail of the option to reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 because it only applies to former natural-born citizens and
petitioner was not as she was a foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did
not comply with the ten (10) year residency requirement.80 Tatad
opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from
the time she renounced her American citizenship which was sometime
in 2010 or 2011. 81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of
intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her
husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of
petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of
a natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that former natural-born
citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their
Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as
natural-born citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for
Senator that she had only been a resident of the Philippines for at least
six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections
operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could
have validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was that
petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year residency requirement for
President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner,
Contreras' petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the
attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC
for President should be cancelled on the ground that she did not
possess the ten-year period of residency required for said candidacy
and that she made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is
a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras contended that the reckoning
period for computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be
from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship was approved by the BI.87 He asserted that petitioner's
physical presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid
evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then
living here as an American citizen and as such, she was governed by
the Philippine immigration laws.88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
Page 10 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a
cause of action. His petition did not invoke grounds proper for a
disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the
alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which
are not among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a
candidate to an elective office.90
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo
warranto as they focus on establishing her ineligibility for the
Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the
COMELEC.92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen
is on the respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in
her favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled
to a nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the country where
they are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to
be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her
natural-born status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine
Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of
the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen,
her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of
adoption of San Juan RTC.97 She believed that all these acts
reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she
started reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines as
demonstrated by her children's resettlement and schooling in the
country, purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the
construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills.99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of
choice in the Philippines even before she renounced her American
citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of domicile
are complied with.100 She reasoned out that there was no requirement
that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the
acquisition of a new domicile of choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency
portion of her COC for Senator was a mistake made in good faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC
First Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she
failed to complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that
she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she
declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a
period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the
elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded that
she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic
of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as
it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016
Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the
COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the
COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted
the present petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of
an ex parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary
restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC
and its representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The Court also ordered
the consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution
of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these
cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-
Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its
Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its
First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002
(DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No.
15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D.
Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission
En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the
Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission
En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the
First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned
Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED
CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of
petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive
ground" that she made in the certificate a false material representation.
The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the
COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications
of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet
undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC
cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or
lack thereof of the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its
provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote,
all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling
places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the
President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive
purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political
parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
Page 11 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
addition to other requirements, must present their
platform or program of government; and accredit
citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections.
Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their
goals through violence or unlawful means, or
refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or
which are supported by any foreign government
shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments
and their agencies to political parties,
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to
elections constitute interference in national affairs,
and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground
for the cancellation of their registration with the
Commission, in addition to other penalties that
may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own
initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective
measures to minimize election spending, including
limitation of places where propaganda materials
shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all
forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices,
and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of
any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for
violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its
directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a
comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of
the provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating
that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the
qualifications of the President, the Vice-President, Senators and the
Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by the
Constitution. There is no such provision for candidates for these
positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v.
Commission on Elections, 104 which was affirmatively cited in the En
Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation
in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring
the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on
February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 § 1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who
does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by
existing law or who commits any act declared by
law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent
to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which
the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX,
A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide
cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters.
[Art. IX, C, §2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for
ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident
intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their
consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from
those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings,
as already stated, are based on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of
the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local Government Code
and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a
candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word,
their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the
start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to
the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the
statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings
for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a
public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a
candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice
versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A.
No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in §2 of the
Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the]
disqualifications provided in §4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the
consequences of the respective proceedings, the importance of the
opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule".
Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized
proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a
candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected,
there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In
contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate
for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over
spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question
which should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for
which his disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that
if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not
be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be
counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has
won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set
aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates'
eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take
a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the
office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No.
120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of
Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the
elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character
proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law
makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the
COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in
their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position
which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications
to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected.
Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in
certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
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CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation
cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and
members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The
purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole
judges" under the Constitution of the election,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President
and Vice President, as the case may be.106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements
as reiterated in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the
15 February1993 version of Rule 25, which states that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all
the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or
by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds
for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate.107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a
party, is declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or
found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification
provided by law or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to
Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a
Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be
summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of
absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before
election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently
required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a
final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be
disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering
from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and
Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not
authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to
determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification
must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an
authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of
qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of
a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or
she is suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or the
Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or
denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or
her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is
not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by
which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception
that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway,
bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of
representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a
proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case, alleged false
representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and residence,
forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since foundlings108 are not
mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935
Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated
in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she
said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the
COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that herein petitioner
possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain
that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she
now has the burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation
with a Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is
DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is
neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code
of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and
Filiation.110 That said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce that
petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to
show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents
should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her
admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her
because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents
were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high
probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their
identities are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under
Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a
relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or no-
existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except
when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of
improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine
Statistics Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of
foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of
Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability
that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born
Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census
statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In
1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the
province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures
were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also
presented were figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960,
there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners
or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and
886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino
females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there
were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens
or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures. Notably,
Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral arguments, that at
the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population in
Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents
are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic
Church in Iloilo City.1âwphi1 She also has typical Filipino features:
height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and
an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of
life.113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino
features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the
population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there
would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province
would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not
statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That
probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under
Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually
impossible, as the norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not
come to the Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their
newborn babies behind. We do not face a situation where the
probability is such that every foundling would have a 50% chance of
being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to
frame our questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of
anyone born in the Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What
are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines
would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a
yearly average, there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines
to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of
foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino
children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the
statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a
natural born Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the
Philippines is 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the
Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino
Page 13 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
children is 1:661. This means that the statistical probability that any
child born in the Philippines on that decade would be a natural born
Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the
numbers for us, but I am confident that the statistical probability that a
child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be
affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the
likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be
higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or
perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners abandoning their
children here in the Philippines thinking those infants would have better
economic opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical
paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt
whether a foreign couple has ever considered their child excess
baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them
stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one
among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just
one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and
unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty -
99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born
citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial
of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should
use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political
rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional
interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate
disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings,
there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration
with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 114 this Court
held that:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be
safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution
were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the
deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the
framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The
following exchange is recorded:
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the
following is inserted: "The natural children of a foreign father and a
Filipino mother not recognized by the father.
xxxx
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the
amendment. The gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of
illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of
unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown
parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current
codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code
wherein all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are
considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of
unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in
the Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the
Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need ...
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are
[required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more]
need for amendment.
Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother
recognized by one, or the children of unknown parentage."
Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of
unknown parentage.
Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not
recognize the child, is not unknown.
President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would
exclude the children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not
recognize the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think those
of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not
recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.
President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the
Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.
Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in
the hands of the Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far
in between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By
international law the principle that children or people born in a country
of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is
not necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively. 116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because
there was any objection to the notion that persons of "unknown
parentage" are not citizens but only because their number was not
enough to merit specific mention. Such was the account, 117 cited by
petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who
said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols
presented an amendment to include as Filipino citizens the
illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who
was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this
amendment was defeated primarily because the Convention
believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the
inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them,
should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
believed that the rules of international law were already clear
to the effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship
of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of
the place where they were found, thereby making
unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed
amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General
during the 16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what
was declined was the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of
foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional
silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which
prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as
Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were
legally correct. Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules
Page 14 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR

based on assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They can
even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that
Montinola and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the
convention that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings
as Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of
linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is
clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV,
Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried
over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a
famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the
constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked
to create a just and humane society," that "they were reasonable
patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon them a
discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the
grave implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born
Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to deny foundlings the
status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the
constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the
constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict
this across the board marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against
foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic
right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render
social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the
present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to
"give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3
which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions contradict
an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their
unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings
are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in
the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15
of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights,
duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on
citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals
with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if
the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by
an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court
said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in
rem, which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only
over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over
the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that
jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the
latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the
status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over
the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.120 (Underlining
supplied)
citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that
the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the
determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the
authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination
of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child.
Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such
citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under
the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that
petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued
in her favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which
approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario
Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively affirming
petitioner's status as a foundling.123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the
1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere
of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation. 124 On the other hand, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of
the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not
derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of
international law include international custom as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as
binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States;
and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory
by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General principles of
law recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a
process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are
"basic to legal systems generally,"127 such as "general principles of
equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the
"general principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention
Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111)
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which underlie the
Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted
by this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor
denied the right to change his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following
obligations on our country:
Article 7

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino
Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-
Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children
and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption
Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on
Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have
the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as
far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her
parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in
accordance with their national law and their obligations under the
relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the
child would otherwise be stateless.

It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on
foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the
laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect
right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"
Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at
best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without Article 24
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine

Page 15 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour,
sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the
right, to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a
minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have
a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate
the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is
stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it
cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization
laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139,
both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years
old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the
Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The
first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is
presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of
the country of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its
nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where
the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been
born on the territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining
supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of
citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the
1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born
within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to
the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not
mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a
party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich 131 effectively
affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961
"United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely
"gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v.
Tagitis,  133 this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or
ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription
against enforced disappearances in the said convention was
nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of international
law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as a
generally accepted principle of international law although the
convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even
come into force and which needed the ratification of a minimum of
twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was
content with the practice of international and regional state organs,
regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the
United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not
determinative is Mijares v. Ranada,  134 where only four countries had
"either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court
also pointed out that that nine member countries of the European
Common Market had acceded to the Judgments Convention. The
Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign
judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were
considered and yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of
foreign judgments was widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the
fact that "generally accepted principles of international law" are based
not only on international custom, but also on "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article
38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the
policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles
underlying the Bill of Rights and which are "basic to legal systems
generally,"136 support the notion that the right against enforced
disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were
correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international
law" under the incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia,
North and South America, and Europe have passed legislation
recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries
follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are
parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are
not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2
February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189
countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens.
These circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis countries,
show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to
presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in
which the foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this
generally accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No.
8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly
refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the
Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed
that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law,
issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department,
acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and
the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The
presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the
empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more
than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the
matter of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight
of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own
making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a
country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of
nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is
relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable
Court that those treaties and conventions were drafted because the
world community is concerned that the situation of foundlings renders
them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable
Court ended up using the international instruments which seek to
protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to
accord them second-class citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006
under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition
of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the
applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born"
citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence
on the matter of repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in
particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET,  140 repatriation was
explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such
in several cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v.
COMELEC141 where we described it as an "abbreviated repatriation
process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included
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CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
is Parreno v. Commission on Audit, 142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of
Appeals,143 where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino
will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno v.
Commission on Audit 144 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his
Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his
natural-born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of
natural citizens as implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at
birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No.
9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to
determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it
fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it
had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the
Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must
be continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where
the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A
person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is
a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to
"acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this
Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under the
1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there
is no third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the
present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1)
those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did
not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the
absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who,
after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The
reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of
their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the
reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to
go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of
the House of Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved
to this Court. And while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule
reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales
v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we
decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it
"should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." This
Court also said that "while the future may ultimately uncover a
doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law
prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance
thereupon should be respected."148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that
petitioner committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born
to" in her application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of
her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a
natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were
the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally
adopted. One of the effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties
between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the
biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No.
8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate
"attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and
which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an amended
issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers
relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department
[of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly
confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her
adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what would be
stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict
confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to
disclose that she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which
it cannot make in the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to
opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process
undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether
or not petitioner committed false material representation when she
stated in her COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a
resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years
and eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10)
years' residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections.
Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner
must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for
ten (10) years. In answer to the requested information of "Period of
Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she
put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her pleadings in these
cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she
returned for good from the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original
domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire
a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2.
an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old
domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain
in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time;
the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her
family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines
for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport
showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines
every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in
March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for
the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds
to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry
inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her
children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005
and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on
July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February
2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006;
receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S.
acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006
e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of
address; final statement from the First American Title Insurance
Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July
2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where
petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May
2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of
petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with
affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from
petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to
relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the
U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even
listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad,
Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile
had been timely changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments,
COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the
first two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus
manendi, but maintained there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The
COMELEC disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by
petitioner on the basis of the position that the earliest date that
petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July
2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the
BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v.
COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v.
COMELEC.  157 During the oral arguments, the private respondents also
added Reyes v. COMELEC. 158 Respondents contend that these cases
decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until
he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine
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CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp being
insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any resident
visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay
from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very
different from her situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only
evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured by the
candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the
elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who
wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is distinct from
citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after
reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v.
COMELEC,  161 the candidate admitted that his place of work was
abroad and that he only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes
v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen
who had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on
the citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a
seven-month stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with
approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to
prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the
four cases cited by the respondents, the Court had no choice but to
hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition of a
permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken
together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently
abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from
U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the
U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S.,
donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning
from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and
permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her
residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children
in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a residence
here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband
getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application
to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous
stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner
returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that
she had entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer
look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act
Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding
intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after
one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been
naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the Philippines." 163 The
law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity to avail
of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become
economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the
country"164 in line with the government's "reintegration
program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of
a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into society, it would be an
unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that
the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is
obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and
reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the
necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is
exactly what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her
children and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband
and then applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of
change in domicile is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been
decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is
unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the
facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v.
COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by the respondents that the
Court intended to have its rulings there apply to a situation where the
facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided
particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of
residence of petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of
residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in
her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6)
months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC
for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a
Philippine resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC
automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the
2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood
the date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the
day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned
residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S.
house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that
regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could
be counted from 25 May 2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012
(period of residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence
as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change
which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now
"period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09,
2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not
acknowledge that the first version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than
the sale of her U.S. house and the return of her husband is plausible
given the evidence that she had returned a year before. Such
evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the school records
of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012
COC as a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could
be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means
conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as
to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by
evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 167 the candidate
mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where the
required period was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the
fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The
COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if
petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24
May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that
the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated
the pertinent period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that
petitioner actually and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not
because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position
that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation
under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the
fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here
to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been
a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so
in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide
anything. As already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed
against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from
which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence,
petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an
established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6)
months in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted that this was first
brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the
United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the
issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed
petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when Rep.
Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period of residence in the
2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were
already matters of public record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in
the SET petition for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed
on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012
COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she
misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a
longer period. Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public
record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her COC for
President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been
attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for
Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
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CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at
an intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the
2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court's
pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does
not necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole
ground for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC.
Further, as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his
COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications
for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate
as to one's qualifications to run for public office.168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually
ignored a good number of evidenced dates all of which can
evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to
the United States of America. The veracity of the events of coming and
staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus
having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for
Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and
therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only
commence sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this
declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for
President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing
jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the
person that determines residence for purposes of compliance with the
constitutional requirement of residency for election as President. It
ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of
residency have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis
of facts of residence far less in number, weight and substance than
that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what we
consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her
declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not even
considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator.
When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she
has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months
counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as
reference the residency requirements for election as Senator which
was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested
during the oral arguments before us that at the time the declaration for
Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie
for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never made
aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President
in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different
from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence other
than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other
facts of residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to
repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's]
husband however stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and
arrange the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San
Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in
2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika
was enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she
was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit
7F of One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her
family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their family home in
Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered
that her former lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974
failed to secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new
Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating
that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to
supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining household
belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11
March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States
Postal Service of the family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US.
He returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a
Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in
Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built their family home.170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its
intention to let the case fall under the exclusive ground of false
representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned by
petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of
petitioner for her candidacy as President of the Republic, the
questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are,
one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root
to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second
Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by
respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby
GRANTED.
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First
Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as
it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016
Synchronized Local and National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the
1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as
it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration
of SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-
LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the
Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the
11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED
QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and Local
Elections of 9 May 2016.
SO ORDERED.
5 – San Luis vs San Luis
G.R. No. 133743             February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
Page 19 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
G.R. No. 134029             February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February
4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647,
which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January
31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T.
San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of
Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His
first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which
were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita
and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin,
with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971,
Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before
the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of
America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis,
then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of
the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18
years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18,
1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146
thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the
time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico
Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six
children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the
decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at
₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any
unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets
be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children
of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.
Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed
that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she
was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her
brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February
28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to
dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on
March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his
public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in
1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by
the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus,
she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by
virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine
laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis,
separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying
their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26
of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would
impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first
marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony
E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the
motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the
decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that
venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was
deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge
Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the
resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on
November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for
reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on
which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting
the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134
presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal
capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth
in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and
June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters
of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was
the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and
not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found
that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to
Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo
who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would
impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set
aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated
February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31,
1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated
February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records
of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules
of Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a
person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that
although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he
actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to
marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry
Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a
Page 20 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to
contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26,
of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn,
Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O.
No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view
— sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2
of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against
divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the
law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to
the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having
been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino
divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws".
For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner
should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the
surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition
for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion
to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the
venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly
laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta.
Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v.
Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is
synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that
a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was
void and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of
the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article
26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested
rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent
cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has
no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2)
whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters
of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the
Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of
his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid
down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules –
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature –
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for
purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to
which when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for
purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also
maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the
address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala
Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s
calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial
address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration
was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality
and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were
then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may
validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we
need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a
foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse
alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership
should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the
divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from
the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status
or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from
the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases
to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty,
that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the
other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
Page 21 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR
below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that
she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse.
Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and
obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations  under Article
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where
the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the
said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in
filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that
"the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would
not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a
Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce
in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions
were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited
recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling
has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a
mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino
cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the
aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical
background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code,"
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending
Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed
that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino
spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation
where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With
the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof,
our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the
alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino
spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that
the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are
concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should
be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as
to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally
valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of
its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound,
because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same,
in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even
as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly
apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by
Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes
beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law
in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret
the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file
the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the
records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Page 22 of 23
CONFLICT OF LAWS | ATTY WALDEMAR GRAVADOR

Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and xxxx
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24
involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties
and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public
to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively,
or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
property is essential. x x x
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
his office. 71 affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence
and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
proved. 73
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its
and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as
she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of

administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent.
However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for

letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be

benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person

who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If
she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered
as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through
their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce

and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the
Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code
by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together
as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v.
Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect,
Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under
this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of

parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.

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