MAHARASHTRA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY MUMBAI

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-II

FIFTH SEMESTER

‘DEVELOPMENT OF LAW UNDER ARTICLE 141 AND THEORY OF

PRECEDENT UNDER COMMON LAW IN ENGLAND’

Submitted to- Prof. Milind Gawai

Submitted by- Ayaskanta Parida

Enr. No.-2017012
Contents
1.INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................... 3
2.THEORIES OF PRECEDENT .............................................................................................................. 3
3.PRECEDENTS: A SOURCE OF “LAW” UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA ................. 5
3.1 Ratio decidendi .................................................................................................................................. 7
3.2 Departure ........................................................................................................................................... 7
4.THE ENGLISH STAND: ........................................................................................................................ 8
5. BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................. 14
CASES.................................................................................................................................................... 14
LEGISLATIVE STATEMENTS ......................................................................................................... 15
BOOKS .................................................................................................................................................. 15

2
1.INTRODUCTION
Every developed legal system possesses a judicial organ. The main function of the judicial organ
is to adjudicate the rights and obligations of the citizens where precedent serves as aid to some set
of guiding patterns in the future conduct. The term precedent is nothing but an evolution of the
guidance and authority of past decision on the landmark cases in order to serve as a helping hand
to the society while dealing with the pros and cons of the Indian legal system. Through this paper
presented the author wants to explain about the evolution of the precedent emerging from the
ancient law, to medieval and also British rule, and now to the present scenario of the Apex,
Supreme Court and the High Court through Article 141 of the Indian Constitution. The paper also
lays down the emphasis on the importance of the precedent and covers its constitutional validity.
Paper indeed explains English law concept of Stare Decisis and application of the “Doctrine of the
Precedent”. These and more are the concern of this paper which in the all in all concerns the
advancement, modification and adaptation of the precedent system in India.

In Government of India Act, 1935, the hierarchy of courts was created, with federal court as the
superior court. Section 212 of the Act provided that law declared by the federal court and any
judgment of the Privy Council shall, so far as applicable, be recognised as binding on and shall be
followed by all courts in British India. After independence, Article 141 of the Constitution
provided that law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory
of India.

2.THEORIES OF PRECEDENT
There are many theories of precedent as per legal scholars. The first is the rule model. A precedent
case normally contains, not only a description of the facts of the case along with a decision on the
basis of those facts, but also some particular rule through which that decision was reached.
According to the rule model, it is this rule that carries the precedential constraint. Constraint by
precedent just is constraint by rules; a precedent case constrains the decision of a later court when
the rule contained in that precedent applies to the fact situation confronting the later court. A
particularly strict version of the rule model is advanced by Larry Alexander and developed by
Alexander and Emily Sherwin.1 According to this strict rule model, the constraints carried by
precedent rules are very nearly absolute, with the result that the freedoms given to later courts for

1
Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1–64 (1989)

3
developing the law are extremely limited. When a precedent rule applies to a later fact situation, a
court confronting that fact situation has, at most, two choices: the court must either follow the
precedent rule, or, if that court has the authority to do so, it can overrule the precedent. There is,
however,

nothing in the general idea that precedential constraint is carried through rules that forces this very
strict interpretation. A number of writers, while still adhering to this general idea, argue for a more
flexible version of the rule model, according to which later courts have the power to develop the
law by modifying without overruling the rules contained in precedent cases. The process through
which these earlier rules might be modified, or distinguished, as well as the constraints on this
process of distinguishing a precedent rule, are described with particular care by A.W.B. Simpson
and Joseph Raz2.

The second model of precedential constraint to be considered here is the result model.3 According
to this model, what matters about a precedent case is not the rule it contains but first, the result of
the case, and second, the strength of that case for its result. Precedential constraint is then thought
to be a simple matter of a fortiori reasoning: a later court is constrained to follow the ruling of a
precedent case when the facts confronting the later court are at least as strong for the winning side
of the precedent case as were the facts of the precedent case itself. The result model of precedent
depends, of course, on some definite way of measuring the strength of a case for one side or
another.

The third view of precedential constraint to be considered here, recently introduced by Grant
Lamond, may be termed the reason model.4 According to Lamond, what is most important about
an earlier court’s decision in a precedent case is, not the rule it contains nor even the strength of
the precedent case for one side or another, but instead, the earlier court’s assessment of the balance
of reasons presented by the facts of that case. The requirement of precedential constraint can then
be defined as follows: unless it wishes to overrule the precedent, a later court is constrained to
reach a decision that is consistent with the earlier court’s assessment of the balance of reasons.

2
A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding Precedent, in OXFORD ESSAYS
IN JURISPRUDENCE 148–175 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961); and JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979),
Ch.10
3
supra note 1
4
Grant Lamond, Do Precedents Create Rules? 11 LEGAL THEORY 1–26 (2005)

4
 3.PRECEDENTS: A SOURCE OF “LAW” UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
Article 141 of the Constitution lays down that the “law declared” by the Supreme Court is binding
upon all the courts with the territory of India. The “law declared” has to be construed as a principle
of law that emanates from a judgment, or an interpretation of a law or judgment by the Supreme
Court, upon which, the case is decided. Hence, it flows from the above that the “law declared” is
the principle culled out on the reading of a judgment as a whole in the light of the questions raised,
upon which the case is decided.

The Supreme Court has consistently held that a decision which is not found on reasons nor
proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect
as is contemplated by Article 141 of the Constitution. In State of U.P. v. Synthetics & Chemicals
Ltd5. the Court held that “any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or
preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general
nature binding as precedent…. A conclusion without reference to relevant provision of law is
weaker than even casual observation”. This principle is not only the evidence of laws but source
of law also. It is instrument for persuasion of judges. Case decided by the court without any
consideration on principle of law, cannot be treated as precedent6.

The full form of the principle is “Stare decisis et non quieta movere”, which means “stand by
decisions and do not move that which is quite”. There are vertical and horizontal stare decisis. The
horizontal one is a rule of prudence, and may be diluted by factors e.g. manifest error, distinction
on facts, etc.7. The vertical principle requires only compliance, being a rule of law. Its breach
would cause judicial indiscipline and impropriety.8

Judgments of the courts are not computer outputs ensuring consistency and absolute precision but
they are product of human thoughts based on the given set of facts and interpretation of the
applicable law. If the doctrine of precedent is not applied, there may be confusion in the
administration of law and respect for law would irretrievably suffer.

5
(1991) 4 SCC 139
6
Satish Kumar Gupta v. State of Haryana, AIR 2017 SC 2072
7
Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. C.I.T. AIR 1965 SC 1636
8
Nutan Kumar v. IInd Additional District Judge AIR 2002 SC 3456

5
It is necessary to create a predictable and a non-chaotic condition. The cardinal principle of
uniformity is basic principle of jurisprudence that promotes equity, equality, judicial integrity and
fairness. Predictability is a powerful tool in the modern law literature.

- Precedents form foundation of administration of justice (Tribhovandas P. Thakker v. Rattilal

Motilal Patel, AIR 1968 SC 372).

- Precedents keep the law predictable. (Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh, AIR 1985 SC 89)

- Follow it to mark Path of Justice (Union of India v. Amrit Lal Manchanda, AIR 2004 SC 1625).

A decision made by a higher court is binding and the lower court cannot over turn it. The court not
to overturn its own precedent unless there is a strong reason to do so.

In Union of India v. Raghubir Singh,9 the Supreme Court held that the binding precedent is
necessary to be followed in order to maintain consistency in judicial decision and enable an organic
development of the law. It also provides an assurance to an individual as to the consequence of
transactions forming part of his daily affairs.

In Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanahaiya Lal,10 the Supreme Court held as under:

“Certainty of the law, consistency of rulings and comity of Courts – all flowering from the same
principle - converge to the conclusion that a decision once rendered must later bind like cases. We
do not intend to detract from the rule that, in exceptional instances where by obvious inadvertence
or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running
counter to the reasoning and result reached, it may not have the sway of binding precedents. It
should be a glaring case, an obtrusive omission.” The benefit of this doctrine is to provide certainty,
stability, predictability and uniformity. It increases the probability of judges arriving a correct
decision, on the assumption that collective wisdom is always better than that of an individual. It
also preserves the institutional legitimacy and “adjudicative integrity”. It is flexible in nature, as
there are ways to avoid precedents. It provides equality in treatment and thus prevents bias,
prejudice and arbitrariness and avoids inconsistent / divergent decisions. It prevents uncertainty

9
AIR 1989 SC 1933
10
AIR 1975 SC 907

6
and ambiguity in law11. The courts have to nurture, strengthen, perpetuate and proliferate certainty
of law and not deracinate its clarity12.

The disadvantages are to find out the ratio decidendi, if there are number of reasons. The
distinction can be made on facts to avoid inconvenient precedents. When it speaks of the law
declared, it means only the ratio decidendi of the decision and it may also include obiter dictum,
provided it is upon a legal point raised and argued. Several decisions of the Supreme Court are
exclusively determined on facts and as the facts of two cases cannot be similar, such decisions
cannot be relied upon as precedents for the decision of other cases.

Authoritative precedents are legal sources of law. Observations contained in the opinion of a
judgment cannot be regarded as laying down law on the point.13 The use of precedent is an
indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application in individual
case. It provides a basis for orderly development of legal rules14.

3.1 Ratio decidendi

It consists in the reasons formulated by the court for resolving an issue arising for determination
and not in what may logically appear to flow from observation on nonissues. A case is an authority,
for what it decides, and not for what logically follows from it15. The binding effect of decision
does not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered therein or not, provided that
the point with reference to which the argument was subsequently advanced was actually decided16.

3.2 Departure
In Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar,17 the Supreme Court overruled its own decision in
State of Bombay v. The United Motors Ltd18., observing that the Supreme Court can depart from
its previous decisions if it is convinced of its error and its baneful effect on the general interest of

11
Supra note 5
12
State of U.P. v. Ajay Kumar Sharma, (2016) 15 SCC 289
13
John Martin v. State of W.B., AIR 1975 SC 775
14
Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty, AIR 1998 SC 1872
15
Union of India v. Meghmani Organics Ltd., AIR 2016 SC 4733; and ITC Ltd. v. CIT (TDS), Delhi, (2016) 6 SCC
652
16
Somawanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151
17
AIR 1955 SC 661
18
AIR 1953 SC 255

7
the public. The overruling of a decision is permissible, “if the rule of construction accepted by the
Supreme Court is inconsistent with the legal philosophy of the Constitution”.19

In Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan20, the Supreme Court held that the court reviews its earlier
judgment in the interest of public good where it had a significant impact on the fundamental rights
of the citizens.

In Golaknath v. State of Punjab21, the Supreme Court held that the law in Article 13(2) of the
Constitution included the amendment of the Constitution under Article 368 and overruled its two
previous judgments in Sankari Prasad v. Union of India22, and Sajjan Singh v. State of
Rajasthan23,where it had been held otherwise. The most important instance of the rule that
Supreme Court is not bound by its own decision is in the case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of
Kerala24, as the Golaknath was partly overruled in this case. It was held therein that power of the
Parliament to amend the Constitution is derived from Article 245, 246 and 248 and not from Article
368. Therefore, amendment is a legislative process and in case the amendment takes away the right
conferred by Part III of the Constitution; it is void. In Maganlal Chagganlal (Pvt.) Ltd. v.
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay25, the Supreme Court held that if the previous decision
is erroneous and has given rise to public inconvenience and hardship, there is no harm in overruling
such decision.

4.THE ENGLISH STAND:

The House of Lords stands at the summit of the English Court structure and its decisions are
binding on all courts below it in the hierarchy. With regards to the horizontal application of the
doctrine, it may be stated that the House of Lords was bound by its own pervious decision until
1966. This practice was established in the mid-19th century and reaffirmed in the London Street
Tramsway v London County Council26in 1898. The rationale for this was that the decisions of the
highest court in the land should be final in order to maintain certainty in the law and to put an end

19
Superintendent and Legal Remembrancer, State of West Bengal v. Corporation of
Calcutta, AIR 1967 SC 997
20
AIR 1965 SC 845
21
AIR 1967 SC 1643
22
AIR 1951 SC 458
23
AIR 1965 SC 845
24
AIR 1973 SC 1461
25
AIR 1974 SC 2039
26
1898 AC 375

8
to litigation. However, after increasing criticism the House of Lords freed itself from the self-
imposed restraint by a practice statement from then Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner. He stated that
the House of Lords would in future regard itself free to depart from its previous decisions where
it appeared right so to do. The practice statement contained the reasons for freeing the House of
Lords; in the interest if justice and to allow proper development of the law, in order to adapt
English Law to meet changing conditions, to take into account the decisions that have been given
in the Commonwealth Countries and to keep in line with other countries of the world. It should be
noted that, given the potentially destabilizing effect on existing legal practice based on previous
decisions of the House of Lords, this is not a discretion that the House of Lords exercises lightly.

The next court in the hierarchical structure is the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal is bound
by the decision of the House of Lords. Although the Court of Appeal, notably under the aegis of
Lord Denning, attempted, on a number of occasions, to escape from what it saw as the constraints
of stare decisis, the House of Lords repeatedly asserted the binding nature of its decisions on the
Court of Appeal in cases such as Broome v Cassell27and Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles)
Ltd 28.

In order to consider the horizontal application of the doctrine in the Court of Appeal, it is necessary
to consider its civil and criminal jurisdiction separately.

The Court of Appeal in a civil case is generally also bound by its own previous decision. However,
there are a number of exceptional situations where the Court of Appeal is not bound by its own
previous decision as explained by Lord Greene MR in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd29:

1. where there are two conflicting Court of Appeal precedents on the issue;

2. where a Court of Appeal decision is inconsistent with a House of Lords’ decision; and

3. where a Court of Appeal decision appears to have been decided ‘per incuriam’, without due
care, and is consequently erroneous.

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) may follow the same guidelines as the Civil Division,
but is also entitled exercise a more generous discretion to depart from one of its own decisions

27
1972 AC 1027
28
1976 AC 443
29
1944 KB 718 CA

9
where it is convinced that such a case was wrongly decided and would cause hardship if followed
in a case where a citizen’s liberty is at stake30.

Once again there was an attempt by the Court of Appeal under Lord Denning to widen these
exceptions as in Gallie v Lee31 but again the House of Lords reaffirmed the limited nature of these
exceptions and reasserted the strict operation of the doctrine of stare decisis.

Further down the hierarchy, the High Court is bound by the decision of the House of Lords and
the Court of Appeal. The decisions by individual High Court judges are binding on courts inferior
in the hierarchy. Such decisions are not binding on other High Court judges although they are of
strong persuasive authority and tend to be followed in practice.

Although subject to binding precedent from superior courts, Crown Court cannot create precedent
and their decisions can never amount to more than persuasive authority. The decisions of county
courts and magistrates’ courts are never binding.

The aforesaid has laid down the doctrine of binding precedent as it operates in theory to control
and indeed limit the scope of judicial discretion. However, it has to be understood that the doctrine
does not operate as strictly as it appears at first sight. There are a number of particular weaknesses
in the hierarchical structure that have to be addressed in evaluating the undoubted advantages with
the equally undoubted disadvantages.

The following of precedents is a convenient time saving device as inferior courts have guidelines
to follow. Judges do not have to analyze too much work and they do not have to look at minor
details.

The second advantage proposed is that it creates certainty in the law. Examples where certainty
has been emphasized is the London Tramsway Case, the Practice Statement and the reason why
Lord Denning’s crusade met failure.

Another advantage put forward is that of consistency. This refers to the fact that like cases are
decided on a like basis and are not apparently subject to the whim of the individual judge deciding

30
1968 2 QB 65
31
1970 UKHL 5

10
the case in question. This aspect of formal justice is important in justifying the decisions taken in
particular cases.

However, all of these advantages have a converse disadvantage.

Firstly, the advantage of saving time has the disadvantage that judges start giving decisions
mechanically and therefore do not use their minds to a possible distinction between the two cases.

The advantage of consistency has the disadvantage that the law in relation to any particular area
may become ossified on the basis of an unjust precedent with the consequence that previous
injustices are perpetuated. An example of this is the long delay in the recognition of the possibility
of rape within marriage, which was after a long time recognized in R v R32. As C. K. Allen said
“error is error and should not be allowed to spread its roots”. Professor Goodhart stated that
“certainty is desirable only to a certain extent”.

With regards to certainty it can be stated that the degree of certainty provided by the doctrine of
stare decisis is undermined by the absolute number of cases that been reported and can be cited as
authorities. The uncertainty is increased by the ability of the judiciary to select which authority to
follow through use of the mechanism of distinguishing cases on their facts. A further element
leading to uncertainty has been highlighted by James Richardson, the editor of Archbold 33, the
leading practitioners’ text on criminal law, who has claimed that the lack of practical experience
of some judges in the Criminal Appeal Court is:

… compounded by an apparent willingness, on occasion, to set aside principle in order to do what

the court feels to be right (either way) in the individual case.

As Richardson suggests:

In the long run, this can only undermine a system which claims to operate on the basis of a
hierarchy of binding precedent.

Furthermore, a major disadvantage is that the operation of the doctrine of binding precedent is
dependent on the existence of an extensive reporting service to provide access to judicial decisions.

32
1991 UKHL 12
33
Richardson, J. (1880). Complete Practical Treatise on Criminal Procedure, Pleading and Evidence in Indictable
Cases (8th ed.). 20th ed. [Place of publication not identified]: New York; Albany: Banks & Bros.

11
The advent of fixed system of precedent developed with the increased reporting of cases in the
printed law reports of the eighteenth century, culminating with the foundation of the Incorporated
Council for Law Reporting in 1865. Then came the major commercial series such as the All
England Reports and the Criminal Law Review.

This weight of material has been aggravated by the use of computer technology in that LEXIS and
LAWTEL have eased the finding of cases but increased the quantity of cases reported. All cases
decided in the High Court and above are part of the precedent system and all could in theory be, if
relevant, cited in court. The House of Lords has now said that only printed cases reports will now
be accepted in argument before them unless the unreported cases raise a genuinely original point
of law in Robert Petroleum Ltd. v Kenny Ltd34. Nevertheless, the number of reported cases is so
large that the law can be ascertained only by searching through a large number of reports.
Moreover, it has always been a problem to distinguish the point of law from a case which simply
is decided on the basis of a slight difference of facts.

With the increasing quantity of cases it is now difficult to say how this system of binding precedent
can continue to survive. The concept of stare decisis will, it is submitted, crack under the strain.
Moreover, with the UK’s membership of the European Union and the desire to make uniform the
laws of the community it is a major stumbling block if the legal philosophy of the UK is at variance
with those of the Continental countries. The Continental codified system of law has the virtue of
clarity and of being contained in a specific number of texts. It is not only a major expense to collect
together the major law reports but there are problems of storage and of information retrieval
thereafter. A long-decided case does not die but the principle it states is gradually restated in newer
law. It might be reasonable to codify some of the older cases as it is rare for the courts to refer to
the older reports directly.

Whether judges rely upon the system of precedent to perpetuate the judicial myth that the judges
do not make law but only declare it is doubtful these days. It does enable a judge to say that his
hands are bound by the existing law, thus taking from himself the opprobrium if having to take
decisions in his own name, and the doctrine of precedent is therefore a useful way to distance
himself from the decision-making process. But impartiality is still possible to achieve where the

34
[1979 R. No. 34]

12
judge is able to depart from his previous decisions. The House of Lords has already taken upon
itself this right, in the Practice Statement of 196635, but it is clear that this freedom is not intended
to give similar right to other courts. Certainly, Lord Denning, when Master of the Rolls, expressed
his disappointment about the lack of freedom which the Court of Appeal has (and the need for a
litigant to appeal to the House of Lords does not solve the problem as many litigants are either
unwilling or unable to do so).

Lord Denning felt that the rigidity of precedent should give way to justice where the two were in
conflict as it is unrealistic for the judges to say that the law must be left to Parliament to change
but there is already a tendency for this to happen anyway.

The tribunal system which undertakes a large amount of work, is not so greatly bound by the
concept of precedent and this individual case can be considered on their merits. It may be that this
the way for the courts themselves to go. In Continental jurisdiction it does not appear that there is
a kind of judicial free-for-all as the judges of junior tribunals tend to follow the directions of their
seniors because there are usually the most sensible decisions. A judge who was too wild in his
decision making would not go far in the hierarchy.

The value of having a central code may be great and it is not necessarily a matter of mere
arbitrariness if judges are allowed a freedom to interpret it.

Now might be a good time to examine this issue before the problems of precedent become so great
that it is too late to cope with them easily. The real difficulty is in the nature of the expansion of
so many things which have happened over the last century. The problems of keeping up to date
are going to increase rather than decline and there must be some way of halting the mountains of
legal decisions which bear down the practitioner. Precedent has always had the danger of being
made complex by the judges’ wishes to distinguish cases where they wish to avoid a previous
decision but are not in the position to overrule, consider it obiter, per incuriam or one of the other
exceptions to the general rule as given in Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co36. If precedents were only
persuasive, they would continue to give the necessary guidance without the concomitant of tying
the hands of the judge and producing bad law.

35
[1966] 3 All ER 77
36
Supra note 25

13
Therefore, it can be stated that the doctrine of binding precedent has in fact slowed down the pace
of change in the English legal system and the very advantages of binding precedent have become
disadvantages. The methods available to a judge to avoid following a wrong decision are
insufficient as can be well illustrated in the Paul Wilson & Co. A/S v Partenreederei Hannah
Blumenthal37, where Lord Denning did not want to follow Bremer Vulkan Sciffbau und
Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corpn Ltd38 and tried to distinguish it. The House of
Lords reversing Lord Denning’s decision on the ground that Bremer Vulkan and Paul Wislon could
not be distinguished. Even when the decision of the House of Lords is per incuriam, the Court of
Appeal can face a difficulty in not following the decision of the House of Lords as a lower court
cannot state that the decision of a superior court was given per incuriam. The inflexibility of
following wrong decisions of the House of Lord by the Court of Appeal was strongly felt by Lord
Denning in his campaign and in my view the Court of Appeal should be given greater freedom to
depart from obvious and glaring mistakes of the House of Lords, otherwise the doctrine of Binding
Precedent will surely continue in many cases to result in injustice and slow down the pace of
change in the legal system even in those situations where there is a desirability of change.

5. BIBLIOGRAPHY
CASES
1. State of U.P. v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd, (1991) 4 SCC 139
2. Tribhovandas P. Thakker v. Rattilal Motilal Patel, AIR 1968 SC 372
3. Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh, AIR 1985 SC 89
4. Union of India v. Amrit Lal Manchanda, AIR 2004 SC 1625
5. Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1933
6. Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanahaiya Lal, AIR 1975 SC 907
7. State of U.P. v. Ajay Kumar Sharma, (2016) 15 SCC 289
8. Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661
9. John Martin v. State of W.B., AIR 1975 SC 775
10. Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty, AIR 1998 SC 1872

37
[1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 103
38
[1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 253

14
 11. Union of India v. Meghmani Organics Ltd., AIR 2016 SC 4733
12. ITC Ltd. v. CIT (TDS), Delhi, (2016) 6 SCC 652
13. Somawanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151
14. State of Bombay v. The United Motors Ltd, AIR 1953 SC 255
15. Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845
16. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643
17. Sankari Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458
18. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461
19. Maganlal Chagganlal (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, AIR
1974 SC 2039
20. London Street Tramsway v London County Council, 1898 AC 375
21. Broome v Cassell, 1972 AC 1027
22. Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd, 1976 AC 443
23. Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd, 1944 KB 718 CA
24. Gallie v Lee, 1970 UKHL 5
25. R v R, 1991 UKHL 12
26. Robert Petroleum Ltd. v Kenny Ltd, 1979 R. No. 34
27. Paul Wilson & Co. A/S v Partenreederei Hannah Blumenthal, [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
103
28. Bremer Vulkan Sciffbau und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corpn Ltd,
[1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 253

LEGISLATIVE STATEMENTS
1. Practice Statement of 1966, [1966] 3 All ER 77

BOOKS
1. Richardson, J. (1880). Complete Practical Treatise on Criminal Procedure, Pleading and
Evidence in Indictable Cases, 20th ed.
2. Singh Pal, Mahendra (2017). Constitution of India, 13th ed.
3. Rao, Mamta (2013). Constitutional Law, 1st ed.
4. Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1–64 (1989)
5. A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding Precedent,
in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 148–175 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961);

15
6. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979), Ch.10
7. Grant Lamond, Do Precedents Create Rules? 11 LEGAL THEORY 1–26 (2005)

16