LABOR LAW

G.R. No. 226578 January 28, 2019

AUGUSTIN INTERNATIONAL CENTER, INC.vs. ELFRENITO B.
BARTOLOME and RUMBY L. YAMAT

Labor Law; Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter vis – a – vis Dispute

Settlement Provision in Employment Contract: Section 10 of Republic
Act No. (RA) 8042, as amended by RA 10022 provides that
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety
(90) calendar days after filing of the complaint, the claims arising out
of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including
claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages.Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law and cannot be acquired or waived by agreement of
the parties. The dispute settlement provision in respondents’
employment contracts cannot divest the LA of its jurisdiction over the
illegal dismissal case.

PERLAS – BERNABE, J.:

FACTS: Respondents Bartolome and Yamat were hired as carpenter

and tile setter by Golden Arrow Company Ltd. (Golden Arrow) which
had its office in Khartoum, Republic of Sudan, through petitioner AICI,
an employment agency providing manpower to foreign corporations.
Their employment contracts stated that they would render services for
a period of not less than 24 months. Also, it included a provision on
dispute settlement which reads:

14. Settlement of disputes: All claims and complaints

relative to the employment contract of the employee shall
be settled in accordance with Company policies, rules[,]
and regulations. In case the Employee contests the decision
of the employer, the matter shall be settled amicably
with [the] participation of the Labour Attaché or any
authorised representative of the Philippines Embassy
nearest the site of employment.
Upon arrival in Sudan, Bartolome and Yamat were transferred by
Golden Arrow to its sister company, Al Mamoun Trading and
Investment Company (Al Mamoun) which terminated their services
after a year due to abandonment of duties. Respondents then filed a
complaint before the NLRC for illegal dismissal, breach of contract
and payment of unexpired portion of the contract against AICI and Al
Mamoun. The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of the respondents.
Upon appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA which led AICI
and Al Mamoun to file a petition for certiorari before the CA. The
latter denied the petition holding that AICI and Al Mamoun failed to
comply with procedural and substantive due process in dismissing the
respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the LA correctly took cognizance of the case

despite the presence of a provision in the employment contract on
dispute settlement.

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) 8042, as

amended by RA 10022, explicitly provides that LA’s have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising out of employer-employee
relations or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers
for overseas deployment.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
by law and cannot be acquired or waived by agreement of the parties.
As herein applied, the dispute settlement provision in respondents’
employment contracts cannot divest the LA of its jurisdiction over the
illegal dismissal case. Hence, it correctly took cognizance of the
complaint filed by respondents before it.

Moreover, issues not raised in the previous proceedings cannot be

raised for the first time at a late stage. In this case, the Court
observes that AICI failed to raise the issue of respondents’ supposed
non-compliance with the dispute settlement provision before the LA, as
well as before the NLRC. In fact, AICI only mentioned this issue for the
first time before the CA in its motion for reconsideration. Therefore,
such argument or defense is deemed waived and can no longer be
considered on appeal. Hence, the Court rules that the LA properly took
cognizance of this case.
G.R. No. 214906 January 16, 2019
ABOSTA SHIPMANAGEMENT CORP, CIDO SHIPPING COMPANY
LTD., and ALEX ESTABILLO vs. DANTE SEGUI

Labor Law; Permanent and Total Disability Benefits: In the case of

Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc v. Quiogue, the Court summarized
the rule in awarding permanent and total disability benefits. It
provided that (1) the company-designated physician must issue a final
medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period
of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him and (2) if the
company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the
period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's
disability becomes permanent and total.

J.C. REYES, JR., J.:

FACTS: Respondent Segui, after being declared fit to work, was hired
by petitioners as a seaman for the vessel M/V Grand Quest. During his
employment, which was covered by an ITF IBF JSU Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), respondent was on duty for more than
12 hours a day resulting to extreme fatigue and exhaustion.
Eventually, he was admitted to several medical facilities in South
Africa, Colombia, and Panama, wherein he was diagnosed with lumbar
disc problem and was recommended to be repatriated. Upon arrival in
Manila, he went to Manila Doctors Hospital and was told that he was
suffering from Lumbar Spondylosis. He underwent surgery and was
confined for 3 weeks. Despite the treatment, respondent’s pain and
discomfort persisted, thus, he sought another treatment and opinion
from an independent physician, Dr. Escutin. After a thorough
examination, Dr. Escutin concluded that respondent’s injury rendered
him permanently and totally unable to work as a seafarer which led
him to ask petitioners to pay his total and permanent disability, but to
no avail. Respondent then filed a complaint for monetary claims.
Petitioners alleged that respondent is entitled only to the
compensation corresponding to the assessment made by the
company-designated physician and that there is no basis to claim
permanent total disability compensation. The Labor Arbiter held that
applying the terms and conditions of the POEA – Standard
Employment Contract incorporated to respondent’s employment
contract, he is entitled to maximum disability benefit for work-related
injury/illness sustained during the term of the contract. Also, it ruled
that between the declaration of the company-designated physician and
respondent’s own physician, the latter’s medical certificate clearly
detailing the nature of his liability and extent of capacity should
prevail. Upon appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA. Undaunted,
petitioners elevated the case to the CA which affirmed the decision of
the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is entitled to receive permanent
and total disability benefits.

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. In the case of Elburg Shipmanagement Phils.,

Inc v. Quiogue, the Court summarized the rule in awarding permanent
and total disability benefits. It provided that the company-designated
physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's
disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the
seafarer reported to him and that if the company-designated physician
fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any
justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent
and total.

The records reveal that from Segui's repatriation and immediate

referral to the company-designated physician on December 2, 2010
until the 120-day period on March 31, 2011, the latter did not issue a
medical assessment on Segui's disability grading. It was only on the
219th day or on July 8, 2011, when Seguireached the maximum
medical cure, that the company-designated physician issued a
disability rating of "Grade 8 disability — moderate rigidity or 2/3 loss
of motion or lifting power of the trunk." The company-designated
physician failed to issue a medical assessment within the 120-day
period from the time Segui reported to him, and there was no
justifiable reason for such failure. Likewise, there was no sufficient
justification to extend the 120-day period to 240 days. Thus, following
the rules, Segui's disability becomes permanent and total, and entitles
him to permanent and total disability benefits under his contract and
the collective bargaining agreement.
G.R. No. 221967 February 6, 2019
RAMIRO LIM & SONS AGRICULTURAL CO., INC., ET. AL. vs.
ARMANDO GUILARAN, ET. AL.

Labor Law; Regular Seasonal Workers: Although respondents do not

work throughout the year and their employment depends upon a
specific season, like for instance, milling seasons; and for only a
specific task like, weeding, plowing, fertilizing, to name a few,
inasmuch as they have been performing services necessary and
desirable to private respondents' business, serve as badges of regular
employment. The fact that respondents "do not work continuously for
one whole year but only for the duration a season does not detract
from considering them regular employees. It is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence that seasonal workers who are called from time to time
and are temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from
service in said period, but are merely considered on leave until re-
employed.

Same; Task basis engagement or pakyaw; Compensation: A

distinguishing characteristic of a task basis engagement or pakyaw, as
opposed to straight-hour wage payment, is the non-consideration of
the time spent in working. In a payment by pakyaw basis, the
emphasis is on the task itself, in the sense that payment is reckoned
in terms of completion of the work, not in terms of the number of
hours spent in the completion of the work. Article 124 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines which provides that all workers paid by result,
including those who are paid on piecework, takay, pakyaw or task
basis, shall receive not less than the prescribed wage rates per eight
(8) hours of work a day, or a proportion thereof for working less than
eight (8) hours. In Pulp and Paper, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court held that in
the absence of wage rates approved by the Secretary of Labor in
accordance with the appropriate time and motion studies, the ordinary
minimum wage rates are applicable to piece-rate workers.

Same; Same; Amount of Backwages: To determine the amount of

backwages for piece-rate or pakyaw workers, there is a need to
determine the varying degrees of production and days worked by each
worker.

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: Respondents were agricultural workers paid on a mixed

pakyaw and daily basis on the 84 – hectare hacienda owned by
petitioners. Upon asking to be paid based on the rates prescribed by
the prevailing Wage Order, they were dismissed by the petitioners
which prompted them to file a complaint for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages and non-payment of allowance, separation
pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. Petitioners
argued that when respondents’ attention was called to the plan to
conduct stricter measures to prevent wastage and production losses,
respondents refused to return to work, paralyzing the business of
petitioners. Due to such, the latter considered respondents to have
abandoned their respective jobs. The Labor Arbiter (LA) and the NLRC
dismissed the complaints, ruling that respondents were considered to
have abandoned their work. Upon elevation of the case to the CA, it
held that petitioners failed to prove the existence of abandonment and
granted respondents’ reinstatement and payment of full backwages
based on the latest Wage Order in the region since the they have been
performing services necessary and desirable to the business which are
badges of regular employment. The case was remanded to the LA for
the computation of back wages from 19 July 2000 up to the date of
reinstatement. The LA adopted the computation of the Fiscal Examiner
who awarded to respondents their backwages in the amount of
P5,058,264.64 based on the mandated rates provided by law for the
period from 2000 until December 2009, and was limited to six months
of work per year, considering that sugarcane farming is not continuous
the whole year round. However, upon appeal, the NLRC set aside the
order of the LA and upheld the validity of the Work Summary of
Workers and the payrolls submitted by petitioners, which showed that
as pakyaw workers, respondents did not observe the regular eight
hour work daily. Thus, the straight computation based on six months
per year or 13 days per month could not be applied because it requires
that service was rendered for at least six months in a given year.
Records show that not all of the respondents worked for at least six
months in the last six years prior to their dismissal. The NLRC also
held that the payrolls, being entries in the course of business, enjoy
the presumption of regularity. Upon elevation of the case to the CA,
the latter reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the order
of the LA.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not respondents are considered as regular

workers.

(2) Whether or not the LA correctly computed the backwages

due to the respondents.

HELD: (1) AFFIRMATIVE. Although respondents do not work

throughout the year and their employment depends upon a specific
season, like for instance, milling seasons; and for only a specific task
like, weeding, plowing, fertilizing, to name a few, inasmuch as they
have been performing services necessary and desirable to private
respondents' business, serve as badges of regular employment. The
fact that respondents "do not work continuously for one whole year
but only for the duration a season does not detract from considering
them regular employees. It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence
that seasonal workers who are called from time to time and are
temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from service in
said period, but are merely considered on leave until re-employed.
Respondents were regular seasonal workers, paid on a pakyaw basis,
who were entitled to their backwages and reinstatement.

(2) AFFIRMATIVE. A distinguishing characteristic of a task basis

engagement or pakyaw, as opposed to straight-hour wage payment, is
the non-consideration of the time spent in working. In a payment by
pakyaw basis, the emphasis is on the task itself, in the sense that
payment is reckoned in terms of completion of the work, not in terms
of the number of hours spent in the completion of the work. To
determine the amount of backwages for piece-rate or pakyaw workers,
there is a need to determine the varying degrees of production and
days worked by each worker. It has been recognized by jurisprudence
that the season of sugar cane industries lasts for periods of six to eight
months. Although the payrolls submitted by the petitioners show that
most of the respondents rendered service for less than one month per
year, such payrolls lacked credibility and their genuineness is doubtful.

The method used by the LA in determining the amount of backwages

was based on law and jurisprudence. Article 124 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines which provides that all workers paid by result, including
those who are paid on piecework, takay, pakyaw or task basis, shall
receive not less than the prescribed wage rates per eight (8) hours of
work a day, or a proportion thereof for working less than eight (8)
hours. In Pulp and Paper, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court held that in the
absence of wage rates approved by the Secretary of Labor in
accordance with the appropriate time and motion studies, the ordinary
minimum wage rates are applicable to piece-rate workers. Petitioners
herein failed to adduce any evidence on the agreed amount of
payment for work based on pakyaw basis, and whether such amount
was determined and approved by the Secretary of Labor. Thus, the
Labor Arbiter was correct in applying the minimum wage rates based
on the applicable Wage Orders to determine the amount of backwages
due to respondents.
G.R. No. 231658 December 5, 2017
REPRESENTATIVE EDCEL LAGMAN et al vs. HON. SALVADOR
MEDIALDEA

Political Law; Constitutional Law; Declaration of Martial Law;

Requirements:The parameters for determining the sufficiency of
factual basis are as follows: 1) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public
safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3)
there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual
rebellion or invasion.

Same; Same; Same; Sufficiency of factual bases.:In determining the

sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the
suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality
of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should
the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the
proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be
expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to
him due to the urgency of the situation.To require precision in the
President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and
therefore impede the process of his decision-making.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of

Proclamation No. 216 in its July 4, 2017 Decision finding sufficient
factual bases for its issuance. Petitioners filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not there are sufficient factual bases for the
issuance of Proclamation No. 216.

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The Constitution requires sufficiency of factual

basis, not accuracy. To recall, the Supreme Court held that "the
parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as
follows: 1) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the
first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for
the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion."
Moreover, the Court stated in the assailed Decision that "the phrase
'sufficiency of factual basis' in Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial review
of the President's power to declare martial law and suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus."

As the Court explained in its July 4, 2017 Decision: In determining the

sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the
suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality
of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should
the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the
proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be
expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to
him due to the urgency of the situation. To require precision in the
President's appreciation of facts would unduly burden him and
therefore impede the process of his decision-making.Such a
requirement will practically necessitate the President to be on the
ground to confirm the correctness of the reports submitted to him
within a period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to
dictate. Such a scenario, of course, would not only place the President
in peril but would also defeat the very purpose of the grant of
emergency powers upon him, that is, to borrow the words of Justice
Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun, to 'immediately put an end to the root
cause of the emergency'. Possibly, by the time the President is
satisfied with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it would be
too late in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already
escalated to a level that is hard, if not impossible, to curtail.

Besides, the framers of the 1987 Constitution considered intelligence

reports of military officers as credible evidence that the President can
appraise and to which he can anchor his judgment, as appears to be
the case here.Certainly, the President cannot be expected to risk being
too late before declaring martial law or suspending the writ of habeas
corpus. The Constitution, as couched, does not require precision in
establishing the fact of rebellion. The President is called to act as
public safety requires.

Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the

proclamation and written report are not enough reasons for the Court
to invalidate the declaration and/or suspension as long as there are
other facts in the proclamation and the written report that support the
conclusion that there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public
safety requires the declaration and/or suspension.