Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage

in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate.
Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen
hand of Him who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her

uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch
89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial
court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which
affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and
correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and
reproduced by the Court of Appeals  its decision are as follows:
1

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were

preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at
the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by
their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at

the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for
the first night of their married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations,

that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or
having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just
went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and
went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them
during the first night. The same thing happened on the second,
third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where

they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and
wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her
mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all
invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio
City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual
intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by
taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a
rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in
the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of
sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not:
even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical

examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the
Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is
healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's
examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential.
No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked
by the doctor to return but he never did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet

homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had
observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes
the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her,
the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly
maintain the appearance of a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their

marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity,
the fault lies with his wife.

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife
annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very
much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically
and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is
still very young and if there is any differences between the two of
them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either
one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that
this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any
defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology
or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22,

1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no
sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according
to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual
intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever
 he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands.
The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with
him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking
and she did not like it. So he stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the
plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is
afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will
consummate their marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid

because they are still very young and there is still a chance to
overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His

penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of
finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr.
Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is
stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"),
and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to

find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that
from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters,
the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one
centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is
capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no

collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not
fabricated."2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of

which reads:
 ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as
VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant
on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev.
Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this
decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City.
Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no

sexual intercourse between the parties without making any
findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual

communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity
inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties

decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there
was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-
3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in
her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove
the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other
basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that
public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should
retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by
the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their
pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have
been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved. 3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails

to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations
of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that
party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What

said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial.
The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the
pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the
trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and
was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented
evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it
be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted
that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated

by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a
marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of
Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want
their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and
his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each
other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing
the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by
Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court
is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not
the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a
basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the
documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance
or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly
indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of
this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that

the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to
have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a
categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an
in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be
necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might
have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches,
pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would not want
to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a
short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent
court made a finding on who between petitioner and private
respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At
any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by
either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question
of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to

show that any of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity.
Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private
respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not
be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have

discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and
why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the
record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the
problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and
he is capable of erection.  Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason
5

is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of

private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a
claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to

perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal
is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. 6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family

Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy
the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's

plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does
not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he
refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from
May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed
with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he
deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven
though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited
in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is
the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did
not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his
claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal
expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's
inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino
woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private
life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her
husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to
rest her marital status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the

evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to
perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity,
and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After
almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with
his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not
posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches,
is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality
disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge
the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the
Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family
Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or
court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless
unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the
cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared
less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The
egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual
intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the
continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and

private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between
husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive
interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can
go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is
definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the
relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a
sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of

the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED
in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Roe v. Wade Case Brief
Case Summary of Roe v. Wade:

Roe brought suit against Wade, a state official, claiming a Texas

law restricting her right to an abortion was unconstitutional
The court discussed the different types of interests a state may
have at different stages during the pregnancy, specifically the
interests in protecting the life of the mother and the unborn fetus.
The United States Supreme Court held, that the law was
unconstitutional because a woman has a right to an abortion
protected under the fundamental right to privacy.
Roe v. Wade Case Brief
Statement of the Facts:

Texas Resident, Jane Roe, wanted to terminate her pregnancy.

However, Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code limited abortions
to circumstances when “procured or attempted by medical advice
for the purposes of saving the life of the mother.” Claiming the
statute unconstitutionally restricted her right to an abortion, Roe
sued Texas official Wade in court.

Procedural History:

The Federal District Court issued declaratory relief and held that
the statute was both vague and overbroad. When Roe was not
granted Injunctive relief, she appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.
Issue and Holding:

Is a woman’s right to have an abortion protected under the

constitutional right to privacy? Yes.

Judgment:

Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion that the Texas law was
unconstitutional and a woman’s right to an abortion is protected
under the constitutional right to privacy.

Reasoning:

Criminal abortion laws were enacted for three main reasons:

To discourage illicit sexual conduct

To protect pregnant woman against hazardous abortion
procedures
To preserve the state’s interest in protecting the sanctity of life
The court held the first reason, though traditional, is not seriously
considered by the courts. The second reason is outdated due to
modern medical techniques. The court held the third reason of
protecting prenatal life is partially negated after considering that a
pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of an abortion.
In reaching a decision, the Court acknowledged that a woman’s
right to an abortion is covered under the fundamental right to
privacy and how each fundamental right is subject to strict
scrutiny (regulation must be justified by a compelling state interest
and legislation must be narrowly tailored to further the stated
interest). However, although a woman’s privacy right outweighs
any state interest during the early stages of pregnancy, the state
interest in protecting both the mother and unborn fetus grows
throughout the pregnancy.

The Court ultimately decided that prior to completion of the first

trimester, a woman may have an abortion and electing to do so
may not be criminalized.

After the first trimester, the state may regulate abortion in a

manner reasonably related to the mother’s health because the
state has an interest in preserving the health of the mother.

The remainder of the pregnancy after the fetus reaches viability,

the state may regulate or prevent abortion unless such procedure
is vital to protect the mother’s life. This authority is based on the
state’s interest to protect the life of the unborn child.

Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:

Under the constitution, the right to privacy protects a woman’s
right to have an abortion. The state may regulate abortions after
the first trimester and may be prohibited once the fetus reached
viability. Exceptions are made when the life of the mother is in
jeopardy.
Concurring/Dissenting Opinions:

Concurring (Burger):
The abortion statute wrongfully restricts abortions for the purpose
of preserving the pregnant woman’s health.

Concurring (Stewart):
The liberty interest at stake is best supported by substantive due
process, not a “vague” right to privacy.

Concurring (Douglas):
Douglas agrees with the majority that a woman’s right to have an
abortion exists and is not outweighed by the state’s stated
interest, but says the right to an abortion is a basic right under
marriage and family decisions in the Bill of Rights.

Dissent (White):
The holding merely creates a new constitutional right for women
and is not supported by the Constitution.

Dissent (Rehnquist):

The right to privacy is not at issue in the present case. Regulation

of abortion should be treated as economic and social regulations,
which are upheld if it can meet a rational basis standard of review.
A sweeping decision that the state has no interest during the first
trimester is improper.

Significance:

Roe v. Wade was the landmark case which established a

woman’s right to an abortion is protected under the fundamental
right to privacy. It is important to note that, although the court
implements a strict scrutiny analysis, later the established (and
current) standard will not be strict scrutiny but an “undue burden”
test.
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA and Gina Lao-Tsoi (CASE DIGEST)

GR No. 119190

16 January 1997

TOPIC: Persons, Persons and Family Relations, Family Code,

Psychological Incapacity, Legal Medicine

FACTS:

On 22 May 1988, plaintiff and the defendant got married. Although they slept
in the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, no sexual
intercourse took place. Because of this, they submitted themselves for
medical examinations. She was found healthy, normal and still a virgin. Her
husband’s examination was kept confidential.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual, and
that the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance
of a normal man. The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

The defendant claims that should the marriage be annulled, it is his wife’s
fault. He claims no defect on his part, as he was found not to be impotent,
and any differences between the two of them can still be reconciled. He
admitted that they have not had intercourse since their marriage until their
separation because his wife avoided him. He added that his wife filed this
case against him because she is afraid that she will be forced to return the
pieces of jewellery of his mother, and, that the defendant, will consummate
their marriage.

The trial court declared the marriage void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is psychologically incapacitated?

RULING:

Yes. Senseless and protracted refusal to consummate the marriage is

equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after
almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of the Court clearly demonstrates an ‘utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage’
within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the
alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. However, neither
the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the
other. But the fact remains that there has never been coitus between them.
At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by
either party,  the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes
immaterial.

One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” In the case at bar, the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfil the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The petition is DENIED.

Facts:

petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first
name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.

Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several doctors in... the United States.
He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January
27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery[2] in Bangkok, Thailand.

He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel
Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals.[6] It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex... alteration.

the Court of Appeals[7] rendered a decision[8] in favor of the Republic.

Issues:

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

Ruling:

Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment.
He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed
himself into through surgery.

RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.[19] In addition, he
must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.[20] In
this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a
result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner's
first name was not within that court's primary jurisdiction as the petition should have
been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It
was an... improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was
in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More
importantly, it had no merit... since the use of his true and official name does not
prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner's petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

The birth certificate of petitioner... contained no error. All entries therein, including
those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is
necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts...
and judicial decrees

These acts, events and judicial decrees produce... legal consequences that touch upon
the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events
mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by... any law,
expressly or impliedly.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by... examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth,
if not attended by error,[30] is immutable.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change
of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for
his petition for the... correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Principles:

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes
of identification.[11] A change of name is a privilege, not a right.[12] Petitions for
change of name are controlled by statutes.[13] In this connection, Article 376 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In
particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of

First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or... nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this
Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.[14] It vests the power and authority
to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications...
for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned
administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of
first name from the coverage of Rules 103... and 108... f the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied.

RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be
allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1)

The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2)

The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or

(3)

The change will avoid confusion.

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
[24]

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage;
(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8)
adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or
(12) recovery of... citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.[25] However, no reasonable interpretation of
the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground... of
sex reassignment.

"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total
of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his
family membership.

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term...
status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity
to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.[28] (emphasis supplied)

A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a

person's legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil
Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or

midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either
parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the...
civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall
be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn
child.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth.[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by... examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth,
if not attended by error,[30] is immutable.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676,       September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of

Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her
name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from
female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is sufferingfrom
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where
afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer
Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her
petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing
that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is
issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of
the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that
“Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male
hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of
both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of
the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the
same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the
said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be

changed.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in
deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not
be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the availale
evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks
of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that
Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which
is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.”

The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of
nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out.
That is, the Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital condition and
his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the
consequences that will follow.