The International Journal of Psychoanalysis

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Fanaticism: Reflections based on phenomena in

the analytic field

Roosevelt Cassorla

To cite this article: Roosevelt Cassorla (2019) Fanaticism: Reflections based on phenomena
in the analytic field, The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 100:6, 1338-1357, DOI:
10.1080/00207578.2019.1672176

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207578.2019.1672176

Published online: 15 Jan 2020.

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INT J PSYCHOANAL
2019, VOL. 100, NO. 6, 1338–1357
https://doi.org/10.1080/00207578.2019.1672176

Repetition and the Death Drive

Repetition and the possibility of change

Fanaticism: Reflections based on phenomena in the analytic

field*
Roosevelt Cassorla
Brazilian Psychoanalytic Society of São Paulo and Campinas Psychoanalytic Study Group, Campinas, Brazil

ABSTRACT
The paper presents and discusses hypotheses related to the
manifestation of fanatical aspects in the analytical field. Initially,
fanaticism is discussed as a social phenomenon. In sequence,
clinical facts are presented. The first hypothesis involves factors
related to primitive symbioses that manifest themselves mainly in
adolescence, through adherence to religions, ideologies and other
social facts. Clinical vignettes of adult patients deepen the study
of possible factors that contribute to fanatical behaviour. It is
proposed that container/contained relationships experienced in
childhood as insufficient and fraudulent, and defensive narcissistic
organizations, articulated with early inculcations of fanatic
configurations, originate fantasies which manifest themselves as
fanaticism. Deficits in the symbolisation processes, resentment
and transformation into hallucinosis, among others, are presented
as clinical facts. The text ends with analogies between the
delusions of the Schreber case and fanatical behaviour.

When the football teams play a derby in my city, rumours emerge that result in violent
confrontations between the supporters of the opposing teams. After the discharge,
there is a return to normality. This holds until the next game, when everything is repeated.
When players from both teams are summoned to form part of a national team, the sup-
porters unite against a common “enemy.” This everyday fanaticism makes us think
about a mythical origin, when rival brothers of the primitive horde would fight each
other before uniting to fight the father (Freud 1911).
Humanity has always coexisted with evil. The investigator must take care that repulsion
and outrage do not interfere with their capacity to reason about the subject. They need to
take into consideration that the factors that contribute to evil are likely to be just as
complex as those that influence goodness. Hannah Arendt’s ideas and thinking (1963)
on the banality of evil do not take the psychoanalyst, who knows the perennial fight
between Eros and Thanatos, by surprise.
The complexity of the subject demands difficult interdisciplinary studies that open
innumerable paths. There is a great quantity of investigations—especially in the social
sciences—that seek to understand phenomena like violence and evil. It needs to be

CONTACT Roosevelt Cassorla rcassorla@uol.com.br Brazil Av. Francisco Glicério 2331/24-Campinas-Brazil

*Translated by Lasse Ullven.
© 2019 Institute of Psychoanalysis
 INT J PSYCHOANAL 1339

remembered that science itself may be manipulated to justify fanatic theories about the
superiority of human groups.
Some psychoanalysts have proposed theoretical hypotheses about fanatical behaviour,
principally through studies of social and historical facts (Mazon 1982; Armengol 1999;
Goldberg 2003; Viñar 2006; Rubinstein 2015; Tizón 2015; Catz 2016; Rozenberg and
Boraks 2016; Sor and Senet 2010; Ferrari Filho 2017; Fonseca 2018; Goldstein 2019).1 Refer-
ring to different theories, they speculate about the factors that induce the fanatic to attack
the perception of reality, substituting it with absolutist beliefs. However, most of these
works are not based on clinical situations, as fanatics do not generally seek psychoanalysts.
The objective of this text is to bring us closer to understanding the clinical configur-
ations that manifest themselves in the analytic field, in a similar form to the social beha-
viours considered fanatical. This similarity may help us formulate hypotheses based on the
factors involved.

Fusion with the idealised object

Previous works (Cassorla 2016, 2017) studied factors that, in adolescence, contribute to
beliefs being taken as certainties. These will be taken up again here. Threatened by
violent drives and by contact with reality, the young person seeks protection in an ideal-
ised object. Adherence to this object will be proportional to the feelings of terrifying help-
lessness that bring back traumas experienced in early life.
Clinically speaking, these young people put themselves in symbiosis with an object. By
analogy, we can say that the young person becomes addicted to the object, or a “fanatic”
for it. These aspects make up part of the vicissitudes of “normal” adolescence. When the
configurations become rigid, we come face to face with the functioning of narcissistic
pathological organisations.
The triangular reality, however, threatens the preservation of the symbiotic-parasitic
relationship. When it is broken, the young person is assaulted by terrors of annihilation.
The term fanatic makes more sense when there is violence against a “betraying” object
that detached itself from the symbiotised self. Sometimes there is a suicidal act, which,
apart from vengeance, seeks an idealised life after death. In situations of intense resent-
ment (triggered, for example, by chronic bullying), the young person may attack their
schoolmates with a firearm and subsequently commit suicide.
The necessity of a dual relationship is an important factor that contributes to people
becoming attached to religious, ideological, mystical or criminal groups etc. The idealised
object fills the void and the alleged power of the group is assumed. A person may identify
with one truth, which will become their cause. Fanatic groups, such as Nazi or Communist
Youth, are constituted to spearhead the dissemination of the alleged truth.
Nowadays, young people who come from developed countries may affiliate themselves
with fanatic Islamic groups, and through this attack their own countries. Deprived children
and adolescents who become involved with criminal organisations begin to feel that they
“exist.” In precarious social situations it is easier to find weakened persons who, when
feeling welcomed, join the relative group and become fanatics.2
1
A deep interdisciplinary study (involving history, politics and psychoanalysis) was written by Haynal, Miklos, and Puymege (1983).
2
In fanatical societies, children and adolescents may denounce their parents. In another text (Cassorla 1998), the fanaticism
of Pavlik Morozov, the “first Soviet pioneer,” used as propaganda by the Stalinist regime, is studied.
1340 R. CASSORLA

Addiction to dietary systems, physical exercise, drugs, gambling, the internet, work and
so on may reveal similar defensive organisations that persist into adult life. Sometimes
society accepts and stimulates this type of “fanaticism.”
Therefore, our first hypotheses take us in the direction of narcissistic organisations that
protect against psychotic explosion. When the defences falter, the frustrating object
becomes threatening and is attacked in a vengeful and resentful manner. Evidently, in
order for these organisations to pursue a fervent dissemination (as happens in fanaticism),
there must be other factors involved.

Knowledge, belief and fanaticism

The fanatic transforms the perception and the understanding of reality in order to adapt it
to their conscious and unconscious needs and desires. They have absolute certainty that
they possess the only truth. Facts that do not coincide with it are isolated or perverted, and
absorbed by the fanatic structure. Reinforcing the defensive configuration, the fanatic pro-
jects himself onto the world, phagocytosing followers, on which he feeds.
In the fanatic’s mind, there is no room for doubt, tolerance, otherness, guilt, mourning,
depression or reparation. There is neither sadness nor happiness. The latter is confused
with excitement. Life takes place in a hyper-real world, where things are what fanatics
imagine them to be, and nothing more.
When the fanatical functioning coexists with a non-psychotic part of the mind, a certain
contact with reality is maintained, as we see in everyday “fanaticism,” when the idealised
object is a rock singer, a football team or even political, ideological or scientific institutions;
these do not demand complete fidelity.
The fanatical aspects of the mind have some characteristics that differentiate them from
those that predominate in the psychotic part of the personality. The fanatic forms a reality
that is consensual and convincing within given social groups, even though to others it is
bizarre. The neo-reality created by a psychotic, however, seems bizarre to almost anyone.
Unlike those with fanatic characteristics, the psychotic is not usually looking for followers.
Fanatic and psychotic aspects may nonetheless coexist and suffer from mutual
influence. Psychotic outbursts, explosions that lead to genocide or collective suicide (for
example the followers of Jim Jones)3—a combination of perverse and psychotic aspects
—indicate a violent interference in the fanatic organisation.
At this point, let us consider a few terms the understanding of which will help us in our
investigation: Knowledge [Conhecimento4], comes from Latin Cognoscere, meaning: 1. in
common, with someone; 2. become or generate; 3. understand. It is something generated
in intersubjective form (La Puente 1992). Knowledge is ephemeral and always transform-
ing. The ultimate truth is inaccessible. A belief takes something as the truth, but admits the
possibility that it is not the truth (Britton 1998). For example, psychoanalysis is knowledge
and I consider (believe) that it will help my patient. There is a possibility that it will not.
When the possibility is removed and belief becomes a certainty, we are confronted with
delusional beliefs (for example healing a bone fracture with psychoanalytic interpret-
ations) and/or fanatical beliefs (only X possesses the “true psychoanalysis”). The term
3
Jim Jones was a cult leader who conspired with his inner circle to direct a mass suicide and mass murder of his followers.
4
Translator’s note: In original Portuguese.
 INT J PSYCHOANAL 1341

fanatic comes from the Latin fanus, which means temple. The Romans associated the word
with the verb for, fari, which means to speak solemnly. The fanatic was a doorman who
carefully looked after the sanctuary. In time, the term came to mean someone passionately
religious who dedicated themselves exclusively to the one and only god. The term was
amplified to mean a crazy person with delusional enthusiasm—frenzied, illuminated,
and exalted for their belief.5
The fanatic considers himself to be infallible. Confident of the superiority of his truth, he
fights to “save” the other. When the other resists salvation, the fanatic is sure of envious
rivalry. Thus, they need to attack all evidence that would upset their ideas, as well as
the people who doubt them. Any form of perversity is justified, in the name of the
truth or of the cause.
Therefore, behind the supposedly unshakable truth, there are terrible insecurities, and
the psychoanalyst is not surprised to discover that the fanatical mind conceals fragile and
terrified elements. Terrorists are, in fact, terrified people.6
One important characteristic of fanatical thought is the deforming generalisation and
the uncritical valorisation of causal relations. One given situation, real or false, is general-
ised and the responsibility is attributed to all individuals of the same category (ethnic or
religious, for example), who will be considered enemies. If, at any time, the evidence
proves the contrary, the fanatic will create new beliefs in order to confirm their truth.
The contagious capacity of fanaticism can obscure the observer’s capacity to think and
put them at risk of becoming a follower of the belief. A fanatic belief can disseminate itself
in the same way as infectious diseases that affect vulnerable hosts, which we will consider
further below.
The facts noted up to this point lead us to suppose that the rise of fanaticism is facilitated,
in a person, social group or in a society, when they become weakened and threatened. To
counterbalance this desperation, something salvaging and powerful enough to change
insecurity into certainty is sought.7 Such a powerful instance is attributed to the sociocul-
tural beliefs acquired inside social groups and/or blown up by leaders. This inculcation is
an important factor that determines the transformation of beliefs into fanaticism. The trans-
mission of the fanatical functioning is initiated in early infancy, and possibly even before.8
There is a clear relationship between fanaticism and resentment. The resentful subject
traumatically feels they have suffered an injustice, and starts to live in order to bring ven-
geance to the object that supposedly, or actually, was unjust to them. As we have seen, a
transgenerational transmission of resentment makes it so that disputes and wars proceed
for generations (Freud 1913; Kancyper 1994).

The clinic
Up to this point, we have addressed well-known social facts. The clinical psychoanalyst,
however, aims to approach similar aspects as they manifest themselves in the analytic
5
For a detailed study of the etymology, see Haynal, Molnar, and Puymege (1983), Mazon (1982) and Marimaa (2018).
6
The fundamentalist (fanatic or not) clings to the Scriptures and lives in the past; other fanatics idealise the future. Abella
(2018) has offered a profound revision of the theme.
7
Like post-war Germany, which resulted in Nazism.
8
Some Islamic families inculcate beliefs in their children when they are babies, so that they will become suicide terrorists. All
totalitarian societies do something similar.
1342 R. CASSORLA

field. Their work searches for hypotheses about the workings of the unconscious. Even-
tually, these may contribute to interdisciplinary studies.
As a fanatic will not submit themselves to psychoanalysis, we have no access to clinical
facts. Our investigation will study situations, manifested in the analytic field, during the
treatment of patients who are not labelled as fanatics. These observations encouraged
us to propose that certain facts may reveal the precursors of what will eventually be con-
sidered socially fanatical behaviour.

Fanatical transformations in the beginning of an analysis

T. seeks me in desperation, after going through many medical, psychological and mys-
tical treatments. He lives with terrible “dizziness” and with the fear that it will never
cease, a persistence of a state that—according to T.—would make him a useless
human being.
The idealised transference set in quickly. The frustrations inherent in the analytic work
were projected onto other professionals who, in his opinion, were incompetent.
I felt pressured by his demand for a quick “cure.” He wanted to know “psychological
factors” but, at the same time, maintained the belief that he was experiencing a deadly
somatic disturbance.
The first sessions reveal narcissistic defences that had been useful in securing great pro-
fessional and social success, hiding his affective difficulties. T. was a respected scientist, but
had experienced disappointments with his colleagues at the university laboratory. He also
told me of situations in which he tried to “correct the ingenuity” of his adult children, and
how he would not conform because they did not understand him. However, he main-
tained the certainty that these situations were under his control and that they were not
in the least bit important.
The transference quickly became competitive. He insisted on challenging me to find the
“aetiology” of his disease. My interventions were belittled and he was trying to show me
the superiority of his hypotheses about the origin of the symptoms and the advantages of
medication, even though he had not improved at all by taking it. At times, he distorted my
remarks in order to maintain a belief that I would have a magical solution to his symptoms.
Other times, he tried to maintain the idealisation, thanking me in an exaggerated manner
for being available.
Soon his unconscious belief that his intellectualised way of life was better than any
other became evident. The possibility of giving meaning to his suffering seemed
remote. Yet his desperation kept him returning for further sessions.
I will describe a moment in the last session of a turbulent week. At the end of the
session, T. tells me how he was surprised by the death of a famous actress in an acci-
dent. This reminded me of the first interview when T. had told me, in an indifferent
manner, about the death of his sister, also in an accident. I share this memory with
T. He says that he had also remembered his sister when he was telling me about
the death of the actress. I tell him that perhaps this subject will come up in another
session.
On the morning of the following day, a public holiday, I receive a message in which he
tells me that he is discontinuing the analysis. At night on the same day, he writes to me
again and tells me that he is in a bad state and asks me, kindly, to help him.
 INT J PSYCHOANAL 1343

T. starts the session by saying, upset, that he had thought of discontinuing the analysis
because I wasn’t helping him. That I do not have the sensibility to perceive his pain. That
he is suffering a great deal and that my mishandling was hurting him a lot. That he thought
it was absurd that I had told him in the previous session that we should talk about the
death of his sister. What is the connection between the death of his sister and his
present pain? None, his sister died 15 years ago! That is in the past, it has already been
resolved. How does a respected professional make such basic mistakes? Why poke at
things that are unnecessary? His speech is authoritarian.
Surprised, I imagine myself demonstrating to him his need to deny the realisation of
suffering in relation to death. I also think about the separation over the holiday. I
quickly perceive that if I were to put forward these facts, T. would feel misunderstood
and inferior in my presence. My intuition was that it might result in a futile dispute. I
remain silent, waiting for something more productive to come to me.
As if to confirm that the problem is not the death of the sister, he changes the direction
of his rebuke. He tells me how angry he was with me during another session. He had
shown me his desperation with the persistence of his symptoms, and at the end of the
session he had asked me: “Do you think I will get better, do you think there is a cure?” I
had responded: “I hope so.” I perceive that he had deformed my reply.
T. berates me violently for this alleged statement. He says I was cold and inhuman and
that he felt destroyed and annihilated. He instructs me:
When someone is at the brink of death, they expect the other to tell them: “Yes, you will live.
I’m sure of it. I’m absolutely sure.” Even if you have doubts, it is important that you say this, so
that the other person does not give up.

He repeats the phrase, in several forms, detailing passionately the way in which I ought to
behave.
When I get the chance to speak, I tell him that I am very sorry he had to go through this
suffering. What is important is that we can continue speaking about what we feel in order
to perceive divergences and convergences.
I am surprised by T.’s response: “I greatly appreciate the way you work.”

Some theoretical aspects

This scenario illustrates the manifestation of part of the belief system in the analytic field.
Here, the most evident circumstances are the certainty that the death of his sister does not
have any importance and is already “resolved,” and the omnipotent way in which he
decides how I ought to behave and what I should say. Implicit in these certainties is the
belief that his symptoms have a somatic origin. And, finally, the belief that life inside his
narcissistic structure is superior to life in triangular reality.
The rivalry between his beliefs and psychoanalysis manifests itself in proportion to the
intensity with which his beliefs feel threatened.
It is also evident that T. is resentful because I would have refused to help him in the way
he felt was correct. I am seen as an unfair, avaricious analyst, who refuses to “give” what
T. needs. He imagines that I am sadistically enjoying his suffering. Soon, I am being blamed
for his illness. As this disease is equated with death, with non-existence, I am seen as
someone who is stealing his vitality.
1344 R. CASSORLA

On the other hand, T. is certain that he will find a cure if I convert to his cause. He tells
me, with fervour, how I ought to work, “saving me” from my incompetence. My refusal had
increased the desperation and the violence.
To summarise, the fanatical thinking of T. presents itself in the following way – “I’m
dying,” but, at the same time: 1. I hold the Truth; 2. My analyst does not believe in the
Truth; 3. I have to convince him of the Truth; 4. By converting him, I save my analyst for
the Truth; 5. Then, I won’t be dying. In addition: 1. I’m dying because of the lack of faith
of my analyst, who is not converting to the Truth; 2. In order to stay alive, I must kill
him; 3. After the cause of my death has been eliminated, I will continue to be alive;
4. The Truth will triumph.
The narcissistic structure of T. does not function any longer, but T. cannot abandon
it. The triangular reality (equated with the analyst and psychoanalysis) is responsible
for his suffering and eventual death. T. finds himself in a blind alley and the deadly
repetitive methods, which he imagines will liberate him (which perhaps, in fantasy,
were working in the past), make him return to the same spot, which becomes
more and more suffocating. This is comparable to what happens in mafia organis-
ations (Rosenfeld 1987; Steiner 1993), which one escapes only through death,
suicide or murder.
An investigator seeks models that amplify their capacity to “dream” that which happens
in the analytic field. I choose a mother/baby (container/contained) relationship and intuit
that this choice seeks to reveal primitive aspects of the mental functioning. The model
more easily facilitates the creation of hypotheses, conjectures and speculations.
Let us imagine a terrified baby, who does not find a sufficient container for their raw
emotions. The desperation is proportionate to the insufficiency of the container and the
violence of the unthinkable. I speculate with the image of a premature baby/T. being
cast out of the “uterus” (physical/mental), violently thrown into a world without
meaning. The baby activates all possible defences, which manifest in the analytic field,
in a transformed and repetitive form. We will attempt to describe the facts in more or
less the same sequence as that found in the clinical vignette. The reader may transpose
the description to any psychoanalytic dialect.

(1) The first mechanism is the idealisation of the analyst. T. splits and projects the terrors
onto objects outside the analytic field. But they remain in his body as symptoms. In
addition to hallucinating an idealised breast, T. merges himself with his analyst,
who is experienced as a part of himself. The dual relationship protects against the tri-
angular reality, which would be felt as traumatic because the baby/T. has not acquired
sufficient capacity to give it meaning.
I suggest we are faced with initial factors that contribute to the development of the
fanatical part of the mind. As we saw, the symbolic absence is filled by people, drugs,
religions and ideologies. In this ideal world, everything is possible, everything is
known, and everything is controlled. There are no doubts. These characteristics
make up part of the moralistic superego (Bion 1962), which attacks the ego and
blocks learning by experience.
(2) Evidently the symbiosis (or parasitism) cannot be permanent. At every moment, the
triangular reality makes itself present and T. has to perceive that the analyst has a
life of their own. The idealised continent becomes insufficient and persecuting. The
 INT J PSYCHOANAL 1345

baby/T. sees itself as thrown into the outer space, out of communication with the
“uterus”-ship from which he was expelled. New attempts at idealisation seek to
recover the paradise lost and the cycle repeats itself, while psychotic dissolution
does not occur. The baby/T. will attribute his suffering to the triangular reality,
making the analyst responsible. In society, the fanatic will blame whoever doubts
their belief.
(3) We will add that, making part of the insufficiency, the baby/T. experiences the con-
tainer as envious, voracious, deceitful and fraudulent. This is a container that promises
continence but sadistically refuses it, and “enjoys” the suffering caused to the baby.
This model is useful in order to understand the resentment that manifests itself in
the analytic field. T/baby repeats, with their analyst, the unconscious belief that the
container is a fraud – a seducer, false and deceitful, attracting the victim so as to vor-
aciously and enviously use them. T. feels betrayed and wronged.
At the same time that he feels the analyst subduing him and attacking his vitality,
the baby/T. sees himself as being inculcated with erroneous ideas. The fanatic attri-
butes to the other their capacity to seduce, deceive and defraud, capabilities that
he refuses to perceive in himself.
As a resentful fanatic, the baby/T. will feel a compulsive duty to denounce the farce,
to expose the tricks of the analyst, to make him confess his maliciousness and his
incompetence. We are in the territory of vengeance, an important characteristic in
the creation of a fanatic mind.
(4) We can amplify the reflection on the vicissitudes of the container/contained relation-
ship into possible adjacent areas that manifest themselves in the analytic field, but are
difficult to identify here. Areas that would be evident in the most affected patients,
such as the case of Schreber (Freud 1911) that we will discuss later. The same baby
described previously is still looking for a container for the non-meaningful. If this is
not found, the projection gets more and more intensified. That which does not
have a meaning grows exponentially, propagating itself in an uncontrolled manner
in an infinite space. Life happens in a self-generated, hallucinated world dominated
by a moralist superego. The certainties, which are of a maniacal nature, are immutable
because they do not connect with the symbolic network of thought. The patient,
omnipotent and omniscient, embodies the truth.
(5) We propose, as a hypothesis, that these projected aspects can be agglomerated
together with the fanatic contents instilled during the development of the individual.
In this way, fanatical, bizarre and delusional narratives are created. The propagation
can occur and reach into immeasurable spaces (Schreber, for example). In the next
vignette (Paul), the propagation is more limited.

To summarise these hypotheses and speculations: in order to escape the terrors

without meaning and the threats of non-existence, T. protects himself through narcissis-
tic configurations, believing in the omnipotence of the idealised container with which he
is merged, a belief that makes him think he holds the truth. When the idealisation fails,
he relives the resentment and lack of trust. He had to denounce the unjust traumas
caused by deceitful seduction. At the same time that he annuls and depreciates the
analyst, he seeks to “save” him by convincing him of the purity and superiority of his
beliefs. Fanatical inculcated thoughts are activated. Simultaneously, the elements that
1346 R. CASSORLA

are without meaning could be projected, sometimes configuring themselves as bizarre

objects that, in their turn, bring fanatical aspects with them. The analyst tries to maintain
his analytic function even though he may be feeling seduced, confused, underappre-
ciated, immobilised etc. If his analytic function was disturbed, he could, eventually,
become a follower of the cause.9
The scenario shows us the fanatical aspects as forming part of psychotic configurations.
The description is close to what is called transformations in hallucinosis (Bion 1965).
Perhaps the specificity deriving from the fanatic’s part could become clearer if our material
originated from people labelled as fanatic.
Other contributions made by Bion (1958) allow us to identify, in the described configur-
ations, a triad of arrogance, stupidity and curiosity, indicating a psychotic catastrophe.
Arrogance, unbridled pride, accompanies a feeling of omnipotence and omniscience.
The ensuing stupidity impedes perception of the inadequacy of the defences. The intru-
sive curiosity (connected with Thanatos) is both voracious and envious. However, this
same curiosity, when connected with Eros, leads the patient to seek treatment.
The distinction between psychotic, perverse and fanatic aspects is not easy to discern
when they constitute a conglomeration. One possible differentiation of a descriptive
nature suggests that the psychotic and perverse parts seek to paralyse the analytic
process, impeding and/or deforming the possible creative transformations. Both attack
the intuitive capacity of the analyst. The fanatic part aims to convince the analyst of
what the patient considers to be the truth.
The fanatic cannot stand psychoanalysis because through it there is a connection to
the limitations imposed by reality; through it the capacity to think is developed (which
depends on the perception of otherness and, therefore, on consideration and respect
for the other). This in turn permits doubts and is open to creativity and self-knowl-
edge. Psychoanalysis is a weapon against the cancerous dissemination of the lack
of meaning filled with hallucinated truths. This results in the need to devitalise it,
attack it and destroy it. Burning books will not be enough. The psychoanalysts must
be burned.
When resentment constitutes an important part of the fanatic configuration, the ideal is
to keep the victim alive so that the vengeance becomes permanent. Maniacal and obses-
sive reparation have this function, as we saw in the presented material.
Sor and Senet (2010) carried out a comprehensive study of fanaticism. They point out
that transformation occurs in the psychotic part while the fanatic part is an area of non-
transformation. They propose that, in fanaticism, a profound split between the mental
elements results in them becoming isolated, and constituting autistic situations. There is
no connection between the fanatic aspects and the rest of the mind.
In the dissemination of fanaticism, the authors give value to the defenceless receptor.
They emphasise that it is probably creative (and I suppose also naïve). Here, we are dealing
with dependent people who have a tendency to form symbiotic unions. As means of con-
tagion, they propose: the contamination inside the maternal uterus, the transmission
between people, repeated exposure to fanatical statements, especially in infancy, and
other unknown factors besides. They describe the Maximum Idea as an alienated,

9
Freud (1905) reminds us of a joke in which a priest was trying to convert an atheist insurance broker who was dying. After
hours of talking, the priest was convinced he should buy security policies. The atheist continued to be an atheist … .
 INT J PSYCHOANAL 1347

causal idea that does not join other ideas, does not accept transformations and is extre-
mely coherent and stupid.10
The ideas of these authors, on several points, draw near to what we are proposing. We
can imagine, inside the fanatic’s mind, a logical and highly complex but impervious and
immutable narrative (simulating thoughts), as in the paraphernalia of rules of the Inquisi-
tion or of Nazism. This conglomeration, which appears as thoughts, behaves like non-
thoughts and clusters itself in hallucinated transformations.
We can assume that the fanatic’s truth would not cause damage if it maintained itself in
isolation, as occurs with hermits and closed groups. However, experience shows us that
the fanatic needs to disseminate the truth. The fanatic desperately seeks new containers.
However, they will be felt as insufficient or false. That is why they are absorbed, in a ven-
geful and voracious manner, by the fanatic structure.
The truth will be considered coherent and real by the infected followers. The non-
followers can grasp its bizarreness, as the projected configuration consists of the moralistic
superego—the arrogant and stubborn parts of the ego—and other split parts of the mind.
The impartial observer experiences the Unheimlich (uncanny) (Freud 1919).
We still need to differentiate fanaticising fanatics, the creators of the truth, from the
fanatical followers. It is possible that the former acquired and developed the fanatic
structure in the cradle. The others are vulnerable to identification with a leader, in
several forms, because of their need to be “saved” from a reality full of frustration and
doubt.
The subsequent analytic process with T. revealed that he ran his university department
in a seducing/authoritarian manner, rounding up followers and using any means necess-
ary to eliminate opposition. He was doing the same thing to his family and children. His
fervent capacity of seduction was failing. The opposition from younger colleagues and
the possibility of retirement (equated with death) obliged him to confront his fragility
and his primitive traumas.

Fanatical transformations inside a psychotic episode

In patients evidently caught in a psychotic episode, it is not rare to see fanatical elements
present themselves.
Paul has always lived in a terrifying world. Something terrible, undefined, was about to
happen. He did not know he was living terrified because he imagined that everyone felt the
same. Today he is able to see himself outside of this terror.
A session is beginning, he is sitting in front of me telling me he received a gift-pen, together
with a letter requesting aid for a religious organisation. As this was not his religion (which he
considers the only truth), he threw the letter away.
He felt he needed to free himself of the pen, which had something threatening about it. He
made a list of people to whom he could give the pen: a neighbour, an employee, a cousin,
people who envy him. He does not manage to decide who to give the pen to, or even if he
will give it away at all. His head felt like it was going to explode and he imagined his
cranium opening up and his brain flowing out, as he had seen in a movie, where a criminal
was shot in the eye.
10
Oz (2005) proposes, metaphorically, the existence of a fanatic gene in all human beings.
1348 R. CASSORLA

This image makes me feel horror and satisfaction. Paul’s envy bothers me. I think that
the pen would be a present charged with envy. I know that if I tell him this, I would be
retaliating rather than helping him.
I ask him if he had thought of leaving the pen to me. He answers that he would not do that
because I could leave the pen on my table. He interrupts his speech and gazes fixedly at
another pen, on the table, in a suspicious manner. I ask him what he sees. He answers that
the pen is getting bitter and is growing, growing fast. Frightened, he moves away from the
table and asks me to remove the pen from the table. I place it in a drawer.
I tell him that the pen became like the one he had received as a gift. That both pens were
contaminated by bad emotions and that this is why they became dangerous. Because of the
atmosphere of persecution, I speak slowly, paying attention to his reactions. Paul says that
was good to hear—that he understood. But why does this happen?
The interventions that come to my mind seem intellectualised. I remain in silence. Paul
continues: when he was a child, his schoolmates envied him because his family was better off
and he lived in a beautiful house.
I tell him that perhaps he threw the letter away because it reminded him of the envy of the
people poorer than him.
Paul says he is afraid to die. I tell him that he feels scared because of what I said about bad
feelings. He responds: “We are all going to die one day.” I respond: “Yes, me as well.”
Paul smiles triumphantly, and says that I will die before him because I am older. I feel a
shiver …
Paul says that the session has ended and gets up. I tell him that there are five minutes left.
Paul answers that people take advantage of him and that he was leaving before he was sent
away. I tell him that if he stays for another five minutes, both of us can make good use of it
and no one will come out the worse for it. Paul, surprised, tells me that he had not thought
about that.
As we saw, Paul was living in a terrifying world full of bizarre objects. He was defending
himself, partially, through religious beliefs. However, he could not disseminate his truth
because he felt, in a paranoid manner, threatened by the supposed truth of others who
were envious of him. He wanted to kill the nonbelievers but he would be putting his
own life at risk. The manifestation of his envious desire to kill me indicated, paradoxically,
confidence in my capacity to give some meaning to his terrors.
When a patient, in a psychotic stage, reveals their desire to eliminate those who ques-
tion their omniscient structure, we must consider this to be “fanaticism.” I imagine that in
these situations we are faced with propitious mental configurations to be inculcated by
other fanatical elements of the environment. I think that the paranoid aspects of Paul
protect him, at that moment, from getting more deeply involved with attractive fanatic
groups.

Contagiousness
Emotional contagiousness was studied by Freud (1921) when he was referring to the “hyp-
notised” multitudes that are easily manipulated by fanatical leaders. Bion (1961) described
the basic assumptions that assault the group’s capacity to think and alerts us about the
numbing of the mind, which may take the product of massive projective identifications
 INT J PSYCHOANAL 1349

as reality. This numbness makes the masses become euphoric, submissive or violent,
responding to the emotional influences of the leader.
We know that emotional experiences are transmitted through variations of vocal inten-
sity, timbre, pauses and tones of voice, as speech acts and performative language (Austin
1962; Franco Filho 2000) as well as through corporeal movements. The fanatic knows how
to use the music that accompanies words and gestures—sugar-coated, seducing, angry
and/or threatening—in order to make their listener believe in what they say. The propa-
ganda becomes more sophisticated to mobilise emotions. Crowds roaring, military
marches (the hypnotising movement of which reminds us of heartbeats—possibly the
mother’s), orders, mandatory prayers, constant repetition of slogans, hypnotic lighting
etc. substitute the capacity to think by emotional discharge.11
The misrepresentation of the meaning of words is another prevailing weapon of per-
suasion. Klemperer (2009) studied how the passionate use of deformed language by
Nazism transformed a lie into alleged truth.12 Orwell (1949), in the classic 1984, describes
“newspeak” having the same function. In 2016, the Oxford Dictionary chose “post-truth”—
a lie induced emotionally—as the word of the year. Social networks have become instru-
ments for deforming the truth, since the members, protected by anonymity, feel free to
propagate violence and prejudice.
As they have experienced terror, helplessness and injustice, fanatics have a capacity for
intuiting the people or groups likeliest to be susceptible to fanaticisation and conversion
to their cause. Babies, young children, adolescents as well as helpless and resentful adults
are easy victims. At other times, the fanaticising fanatic associates himself with already
formed groups, and quickly gains leadership by creating rivalry with the old leaders, some-
times accusing them of heresy, treason or misrepresenting the cause.
Contagiousness and fear make attaining followers easier. Transgressions, lies and
rationalisations make everything permissible. Any remnant of humanity is sacrificed for
the cause, justifying torture, slaughter and genocide. The fanatic feels like a vigilante.
The transgenerational transfer, as seen above, enables populations or groups of human
beings to see others as enemies for generations, recruited by emotions, stories and myths,
transmitted consciously and unconsciously.

Contagion in the analytic field

The contamination, and the eventual recruitment of the analyst by aspects of the patient,
influenced contemporary studies about enactment (Cassorla 2008, 2018), already foreseen
by several authors (Racker 1953; Grinberg 1957; Joseph 1989; Baranger and Baranger
2008). Chronic enactment is described as a dual collusion in which the analyst behaves
as if he were a projected part of the patient. Normally this presents itself by way of
mutual idealisation or as sadomasochistic collusion, paralysing the analytic field in the
area in which it occurs. Neither of the members realises the collusion. A detailed study
reveals formations of compromise between the blocking and manifestation of primitive
traumatic events.
11
In a supposedly scientific experiment, “normal” people administered electric shocks to other people, which were stronger
than requested by a “professor.” This means that while “obeying orders,” anyone may become a torturer (Bassols 1999;
Sor and Senet 2010).
12
The sentence “Work Sets You Free” at the entrance of concentration camps entailed an ironic lie.
1350 R. CASSORLA

The patient has facility in intuiting ways to penetrate the mind of the analyst, seducing
him or threatening him. The obscured analyst becomes obtuse and does not perceive that
this is happening (Cassorla 2013, 2016).
We will describe situations in which the analyst turns into a follower of the truths (and
lies) of the patient, recalling the fanatic contagiousness.
Convinced of his innocence, Lord Longsford defended, over the course of 15 years, a
known killer of children. The emotional involvement with the murderess was evident
(Welldon 2012). We have observed that it is not unusual to find situations in which thera-
pists, convinced of their innocence, fall in love with the criminals they attend to
professionally.
Rosenfeld (1987) describes situations he experienced during the analysis of Caroline, a
psychiatrist who ended up being promoted to director of a clinic specialising in the treat-
ment of drug addicts. Rosenfeld started to become worried when Caroline was questioned
by the police in connection with prescribing medications illegally. He was convinced of her
innocence, sure that she had been a victim of envious defamation.
Soon afterwards, Caroline was arrested for selling prescriptions to addicts. Her lawyer
wanted Rosenfeld to help her, deeming her to be schizophrenic. At the same time, Caro-
line was writing to him from prison, saying she was healthy and innocent.
While in prison, Caroline tried to contract someone to murder her substitute as the head
of the clinic, accusing them of being responsible for her to imprisonment. Caroline was
sentenced to imprisonment. Rosenfeld describes the split between the healthy part (“a
specially caring and successful healer”) and the criminal part, in which the pathological
lie is “so complete that the analyst is generally taken in and does not know that he is
being lied to. With Caroline one never had the feeling that she was lying” (Rosenfeld
1987, 136).
In another text (Cassorla 2013), I show the contagious power of the lie, as observed by a
supervision group, when an analyst related an account about a patient who victimised
himself. The analyst and the group faithfully believed in the terrible injustices the
patient told them of. The group, obnubilated, was not able to perceive that the account
was false. After a considerable time, thanks to emotional discomfort, it was possible to per-
ceive subtle hints about the lies, negatively hallucinated by the group.
The situations described are not rare in analytic processes and may result in impasses.
When the psychoanalyst believes that their “analysing” mind would never let itself be
recruited by the view of the patient, we are faced with a stupid, sometimes fanatical,
idealisation.

Final considerations
Today, all over the world, we are experiencing a re-hardening of prejudices against colour,
ethnic origins, nationality, habits or ideas. The “politically correct,” which allegedly fights
prejudice, also becomes fanaticism, and those capable of handling diversity—often
through humour—are condemned.
The fanatic can be very pleasant, while trying to convert us to their ideas. My vegan
friend does not desist from “saving” me from my eating habits. Some colleagues caringly
try to take us to their psychoanalytic “school” in order to “deliver us from poor ideas.”
 INT J PSYCHOANAL 1351

Thus, there are subtle, less worrying fanaticisms. They can end up in envious defama-
tions and denigrations, with greater or lesser results. The most worrying ones are those
when others are mistreated, excluded or “excommunicated” from groups, sometimes
without even understanding what is happening. The studies of Bion (1970) on the mystical
and the group help us understand some of these situations.
Sometimes we can question possible fanatical elements through the cracks opened by
the non-psychotic part of the personality. I will readdress, in my own words, the account of
Oz (2005). A writer was in a taxi, in Israel, and the driver was commenting about the conflict
between Arabs and Jews. He was saying that the only solution would be to kill all of the
Arabs. The writer asks him: “And how would the Arabs be killed?” The driver affirms that
every Jew should kill one Arab. The writer continues: “And how would they be killed?” The
driver: “In whichever way, by shooting, stabbing, bombs.” The writer: “Let’s imagine, then,
that there is an Arab family living in the building in which you live, and you go to them and
kill them all.” The driver uncertainly agrees. The writer goes on: “Let’s imagine, then, that
you killed the entire family and are already leaving when you hear a cry of a baby who
survived because you didn’t notice it. What are you going to do?” The driver answers:
“How cruel you are mister!!!”
Our study has shown us the difficulties in differentiating, with clarity, the fanatical
aspects from other similar and coexisting phenomena. We are faced with a situation of
defensive complexity against the perception of reality. We were able to identify some
factors: traumas and frustrations, narcissistic structures, insufficient or fraudulent con-
tainer/contained relationships, voraciousness and envy, massive projective identification,
attacks on linking, the impossibility of dealing with mourning, symbolisation deficits,
resentment, fanatic inculcation, discharges and hallucinations. The manner in which
these facts (and others) connect will influence the clinical and social manifestations. Evi-
dently, we run the risk of reductionism if we do not take into account the cultural aspects.
To conclude, I will invoke the Schreber case (Schreber 1903; Freud 1911). Inspired by
Canetti (1984), I propose an analogical exercise in which we take Schreber’s mental work-
ings as exemplary on the basis of their similarity to fanaticism and barbarism, as they mani-
fest themselves in society. The reader will be able to find other analogies.
We recall here that Schreber was part of the fourth generation of respected pro-
fessionals whose work sought to develop a severe morality. Schreber’s father, specifically,
had created a famous medical-pedagogical doctrine full of certainties. Schreber was an
intelligent man, dedicated and with rigid principles, possibly approaching fanaticism.
The hypothesis of transgenerational transmission establishes itself.
The study of the three psychotic decompensations, recounted in his autobiography,
enables a glimpse of the fanatical elements that comprise paranoid beliefs. We will high-
light their similarity with fanaticism in societies.
Schreber lives in close connection with the Divine. God (the representative of religion,
ideology and race) is chosen by the Enlightened One to direct him—if it becomes necess-
ary, God will be substituted, because the Enlightened One is more powerful than God.
Schreber and the Enlightened Ones see themselves as the owners of infinite space and
time, of minds, of planets and the universe, and their destiny is to expand this power.
This expansion is also a way of fighting the enemies, those who do not accept the
power and the enlightenment of the just. The enemies want to take hold of the power
and for this reason there is a need to fight and expand through conquests. The fanatic
1352 R. CASSORLA

suffers from incommensurable voraciousness and ambition, and rationalises this as ways
to fight the enemy.
To Schreber, the human soul is enclosed in the nerves. God is constituted by nerves, but
infinitely more powerful than the soul, because his nerves are unlimited and eternal. The
nerves (soul) of the living attract God and He runs the risk of not being able to detach from
them, threatening His existence. For this reason, God is always on guard against the living,
paranoically attached to them. In fact, God only has access to the dead, souls and nerves.
Removing the nerves from the body, He awakens them to a celestial life after a compli-
cated process of purification. All souls merge and become a part of God. When the
souls attack him, Schreber devours them. Schreber’s power, like the power of politicians
and leaders, feeds on the masses and is constituted by them.
The conspiracy against Schreber had the destruction of his intellect as its goal. They
wanted to transform him into an imbecile, to make him crazy. He was struck by innumer-
able lightning bolts, dispatched by his enemy Flechsig and the “proven souls”—those that
still had not completed their process of purification. Schreber was hearing millions of
voices, of names and of souls that impose their speech on him, independently of one
another and at the same time, making a desperate noise. More and more souls attack
him, sometimes appearing as minuscule “little men” that fall on his head. They are
coming from thousands of stars and constellations. His nerves attract more and more
souls of an incommensurable power. Schreber reacts, not letting himself be dominated.
After a terrible fight, he attains control of the souls, becoming the centre of the universe,
the biggest mass imaginable. He becomes a leader, God itself, surrounded by monumental
masses that he attracts and who agitatedly move around him. Schreber devours them and
they become a part of his body. Now, like the dictators, Schreber prides himself on his
incommensurable, infinite power, and will use it ceaselessly. The deafening noise
reminds us of the fanaticised multitudes, and the destructive attacks to the mind
become similar to wars, bombardments and barbarism.
Schreber, Stalin, Hitler and other powerful people consider themselves to be just and
good and living under threat from evil. The more powerful they are, the bigger the quan-
tity and power of the Evil Ones. In order to defend themselves, massive systems of espio-
nage and counter-espionage are necessary. Their objective is to identify the Evil Ones and
eliminate them. One of the biggest threats is the desire of the Evil Ones to infiltrate the
ranks of the Enlightened, corrupting them. Comrades should be spied upon, for they
are potential traitors. The barbarity reaches the group itself. At the same time, the
masses ought to be seduced, and should this fail, intimidated, kept under the threat of
torture and death. If they do not yield, vengeance will fall upon their families. One has
to take advantage of the sentimentality of self-love, resulting from weakness. The just
and good love is the cause, not people.
As we saw, for all God’s power it is not convenient that He mingles with the living. Fana-
tics may prohibit contact with the strange and threatening, that which is different in
appearance, colour, religion, habits or ideas.
The capacity to think needs to be killed off in those perceived as potential enemies, and
they need to be included in the mixture of stupefied followers that will be in Heaven (the
cause). All totalitarian ideologies (and many religions) fight to expand and to maintain
dominance over everything. In the delusion of Schreber, after the purification, the
minds and bodies will be absorbed by God, becoming a part of Him. The fanatic, Nazi
 INT J PSYCHOANAL 1353

or otherwise, feels like a God, superior to everything, seeking to amplify their power
infinitely. There are no more necessities—if there were, they would be supplied by the
divine mass of which he forms part. But one has to always stay alert, seeking out
enemies. These need to be conquered, to be blessed, purified. If they should be ungrateful,
they need to be re-educated, tortured, in a hell that can be eternal, in life and after death.
Fanatics could be fought, making them also feel the fear of dying. But this is not the
case when the terrorist (or a follower of a suicidal sect) not only does not fear dying
but also has a desire for death. This referential shift renders their victims powerless. The
fanatic is Almighty even beyond their death—not only in fantasy but also in reality.
Merged with God, they will live forever as heroes.
The purification involves rituals. The preference is fire: the inquisitorial fires, gas
chambers, firearms, the outbreaks of fire, bombs, the destruction of cities and crops, all
imply the annihilation of the enemy (and the liberation of their soul, according to Schre-
ber). One has to be careful that this soul does not linger in memory. Fire is ideal, better
than the common trenches which, if discovered, may transform themselves into places
of pilgrimage. One needs to eliminate bodies and memories without leaving a trace. Tech-
nology is advancing and we can quickly make millions of people, archives, History itself,
disappear. Or rather “purify it.”
But there is a paradox: the elimination of the Evil Ones needs to be announced in order
to terrorise them. The terror should also reach the indifferent mass, because no one is
innocent. Thus, secret elimination is not always suited to the purpose. The terror should
be televised, as with the fall of the World Trade Centre, the metro explosions, the luminous
bombs laying waste to the cities, and the decapitations. The “purification” is done through
example. Therefore, the dilemma is how to eliminate the enemy without leaving a trace,
and at the same time, how to show this elimination so that it serves as an example. This is a
complicated situation—this is why the witnesses need to be killed, and at the same time,
the propaganda that makes the masses stupid or terrorises them needs to be maintained.
To make a mistake because of excess is better than making a mistake because of lack, and
the cause is superior to the life of one, few or many people, even when they are wronged.
Many who were shot on Stalin’s orders, permeated by the cause, paid homage to him
before dying, justifying his “involuntary” error.
We can suppose that the fanatic desperately fights against the reality of finitude. A
system where the fanatic controls death, projecting it onto the alleged enemy, needs to
be created. Systems of reasoning that justify the use of deadly violence, which is always
believed to be defensive, are created. The finitude is substituted by the conquest of
infinite power. When the enemy is a barbarian, one must be more barbarian than they
are. On the basis of this reasoning, everything is justified.
The fanatics perceived in the delusion of Schreber make part of a complex conglomera-
tion, the evil. Green (2005) illustrates dehumanisation at its highest level when he
describes aspects of the de-objectalising function:
You do not exist. … I don’t even need to hold my nose any longer to protect myself from the
nauseous smell you give off, for I can no longer feel anything that comes from you. To feel or
sense what you exude, what you show or give me to understand, would be to accept implicitly
your existence. But you don’t have any existence. You are not even a piece of shit. You are a
pile of ashes. Dust. And your death is retroactive. You have only ever existed, in fact, by virtue
1354 R. CASSORLA

of an accident, which has to be resolved. The mourning that takes place for you will confer a
retroactive existence on you. Thus it must not happen. You are a non-lieu. (109–110)

Our understanding of the inhuman falls short. Facing it, we feel perplexed, terrified and
powerless. We can ignore it, or conform ourselves. We also run a formidable risk of
naïvely imagining that we can fight inhumanity with more inhumanity. We must “question
evil with its own logic, so that, beginning with the denunciation of its false premises, it can
become undone or … be highlighted when it tries to camouflage itself” (Chuster, Soares,
and Trachtenberg 2014, 119; our translation).

Translations of summary

L’auteur présente et considère les hypothèses liées à la manifestation d’aspects du fanatisme dans le
domaine analytique, et, suivant l’ordre de présentation des hypothèses, sont présentés des faits clin-
iques. Le fanatisme est d’abord présenté comme phénomène social. La première hypothèse con-
cerne des aspects de symbiose primitive se manifestant principalement à l’adolescence par
l’adhésion à des religions, idéologies ou autres composantes sociales. Des vignettes cliniques de
patients adultes approfondissent l’étude des raisons possibles contribuant au comportement fana-
tique. Il est proposé que des relations contenant/contenu vécues dans l’enfance comme insuffisantes
et frauduleuses, et des organisations narcissiques défensives, articulées avec de premières inculca-
tions de configurations fanatiques, proviennent des fantasmes qui se manifestent comme le fana-
tisme. Carences dans les processus de symbolisation, rancœur et transformation en hallucinose,
entre autres éléments, sont présentées. L’auteur termine par des analogies entre les délires de Schre-
ber et le comportement fanatique.

Der Beitrag präsentiert und diskutiert Hypothesen in Bezug auf die Manifestation fanatischer
Aspekte auf dem Gebiet der Analyse. Zunächst wird Fanatismus als soziales Phänomen erörtert. Kli-
nische Fakten werden der Reihe nach präsentiert. Die erste Hypothese beinhaltet Faktoren, die mit
primitiven Symbiosen in Verbindung stehen und sich hauptsächlich im jugendlichen Alter durch
Anhängerschaft von Religionen, Ideologien und anderen gesellschaftlichen Fakten zeigen. Klinische
Vignetten von erwachsenen Patienten vertiefen das Studium möglicher Faktoren, die zu fanatischem
Verhalten beitragen können. Es wird unterbreitet, dass in der Kindheit als unzureichend und betrü-
gerisch erlebte Container/Contained-Beziehungen und abwehrende narzisstische Strukturen, ver-
bunden mit frühen Einschärfungen fanatischer Gruppierungen Fantasien erzeugen, die sich als
Fanatismus zeigen. Als klinische Fakten werden unter anderem Defizite im Symbolisierungsprozess,
Groll und Umwandlung in die Halluzinose präsentiert. Der Text endet damit, dass er Analogien
zwischen den Wahnvorstellungen im Fall Schreber und fanatischem Verhalten aufzeigt.

Questo studio presenta e discute alcune ipotesi relative alla manifestazione di aspetti di fanatismo
all’interno del campo analitico. Il fanatismo viene discusso innanzitutto come fenomeno di tipo
sociale, dopodiché viene presentata una serie di fatti clinici. La prima ipotesi riguarda i fattori
legati ai tipi di simbiosi primitiva che si manifestano soprattutto durante l’adolescenza nella forma
di adesione a religioni, ideologie o altri gruppi sociali. Attraverso delle vignette cliniche, vengono esa-
minati più in profondità i possibili fattori alla base del comportamento fanatico: in particolare, l’arti-
colo suggerisce che la relazione contenitore/contenuto esperita durante l’infanzia possa essere stata
insufficiente e di natura essenzialmente fraudolenta, e che inoltre le fantasie che si incarnano poi in
atteggiamenti di fanatismo traggano origine da organizzazioni difensive di tipo narcisistico nelle
quali siano state inculcate delle configurazioni psichiche fanatiche in fasi precoci dell’esistenza.
Tra le varie manifestazioni cliniche rilevanti rispetto a questo tipo di contesto sono i deficit nel pro-
cesso di simbolizzazione, i vissuti di risentimento e i processi di trasformazione in allucinosi. Il testo si
conclude tracciando delle analogie tra le convinzioni deliranti descritte nel caso Schreber e il com-
portamento fanatico.

En este artículo se presentan y examinan hipótesis vinculadas con la manifestación de aspectos faná-
ticos en el campo analítico. Primero, se analiza el fanatismo como fenómeno social. Luego se presen-
tan hechos clínicos. La primera hipótesis comprende factores relacionados con la simbiosis primitiva,
 INT J PSYCHOANAL 1355

que se manifiestan sobre todo en la adolescencia, mediante la adhesión a religiones, ideologías y

otros hechos sociales. Se presentan viñetas clínicas de pacientes adultos, que profundizan el
estudio de los posibles factores que contribuyen al comportamiento fanático. Se propone que las
relaciones continente/contenido experimentadas en la niñez como insuficientes y fraudulentas, y
las organizaciones narcisistas defensivas, articuladas con la inculcación temprana de configuraciones
fanáticas, originan fantasías que se manifiestan como fanatismo. Se presentan como hechos clínicos:
el déficit en los procesos de simbolización, el resentimiento y la transformación en alucinaciones,
entre otros. El texto finaliza con analogías entre los delirios del caso Schreber y el comportamiento
fanático.

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