Coverage next meeting Feb.
7 immediately walloped Hernan on the right side of the neck
Art. 23, 29, 39, 48-49, 70
Anti-Fencing Law
Accessories
People vs. Tolentino (Angeles)
FACTS
On February 28, 1996, appellant Jonathan Fabros and his
cousins, Sheila Guilayan and Merwin Ledesma, were at their
house in Luyahan, Pasonanca, Zamboanga City when their
neighbor Wilfredo Tolentino called them.
When asked what it was all about, Wilfredo simply motioned to
them to come to his house located just across the road. Once
they were inside the house, Wilfredo immediately revealed his
plan to kill Hernan Sagario, Sheila's stepfather. Wilfredo
explained that it was the only way to free Sheila's mother
(appellant's aunt) of the sufferings being caused by Hernan.
Wilfredo then instructed Merwin to go back to the house and
get the bolo of Hernan. Merwin obliged, got the bolo, and gave
it to Wilfredo. Thereafter, they were told by Wilfredo to go
home and wait for Hernan.
Around 8:30 in the evening, Hernan arrived. He went directly
to the kitchen and fixed the bag of rice he was carrying.
Jonathan together with Sheila and Merwin, just stayed quiet in
the living room.
Later, Wilfredo with a 2"x2" piece of wood in his hand entered
the house. He then followed Hernan towards the kitchen.
When about an armslength away from Hernan, Wilfredo,
sending the latter unconscious and falling face down to the
ground. Wilfredo immediately instructed appellant and Merwin
to help him bring Hernan out of the house. Lifting Hernan out
of the house, Wilfredo held him by the neck while both
appellant and Merwin grasped his feet. They then carried
Hernan towards the creek, upon reaching the creekside, the
three stopped, then Wilfredo successively stabbed Hernan on
different parts of the body causing the latter's instant death.
After throwing the victim's lifeless body in the creek, the three
immediately left. Tolentino called Jonathan, Sheila and Merwin
and warned them that if they will tell other people, he will kill
them. Out of fear, they just followed whatever Tolentino told
them.
On 01 March 1996, however, Jonathan was arrested for the
death of Hernan Sagario. Accused Jonathan Fabros and
Wilfredo Tolentino both denied killing the victim. Instead, they
pointed to each other as the one who killed Hernan Sagario.
Fabros pointed to Tolentino as the assailant and the latter also
fingered the former as the killer of Sagario.
However, on 14 July 2000, long after the trial court's decision
had become final and executory on his part, Wilfredo
Tolentino, apparently conscience-stricken, executed an
affidavit admitting sole responsibility for the death of Hernan
Sagario and retracted his testimony implicating accused-
appellant Jonathan Fabros.
The trial court held that the prosecution's evidence positively
identified Wilfredo Tolentino as the person who had hit the
victim with a piece of wood and later stabbed him with a bolo.
It also ruled that the killing was qualified by treachery and
attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
The court a quo observed that overt and positive acts of
appellant (Jonathan Fabros) manifested his approval of the
killing and the concurrence of his acts with those of the other
accused. Thus, the RTC concluded that Fabros was a co-
conspirator and should be held equally responsible for the
murder.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not appellant (Jonathan Fabros) should be
convicted as an accomplice
RULING
Neither can appellant be convicted as an accomplice. Article
18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those
persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts." To
be convicted as an accomplice, it is necessary that the
accused be aware of the criminal intent of the principal and
then cooperate knowingly or intentionally by supplying material
or moral aid for the efficacious execution of the crime.
To consider a person an accomplice in the commission of the
offense, the following must concur: (1) community of design —
knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, one concurs therein; (b) cooperation in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with
the intention of supplying material and moral aid in the
execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (c) a relation
between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to
the person charged as accomplice. To be deemed an
accomplice, one needs to have had both knowledge of and
participation in the criminal act. In other words, the principal
and the accomplice must have acted in conjunction and
directed their efforts to the same end.
Thus, it is essential that both were united in their criminal
design.In the case before us, appellant did not concur in or
lend support to the nefarious intent of Tolentino. The mere fact
that the former had prior knowledge of the latter’s criminal
design did not automatically make him an accomplice. This
circumstance, by itself, did not show his concurrence in the
principal’s criminal intent.That appellant helped Tolentino carry
the victim from the house to the creek did not necessarily
demonstrate concurrence of wills or unity of purpose or action.
Quite the contrary, the former’s attempt to dissuade the latter
from killing Sagario was attested to by the prosecution
witness. With the nominal role appellant played in the drama
that had been thrust upon him, we cannot declare that he was
an accomplice in the crime charged.
People vs. Antonio (Barba)
Doctrines:
The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as
one who has knowledge of the commission of the crime, yet
did not take part in its commission as principal or accomplice,
but took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of three
modes: (1) profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit
by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the
body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in order
to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or
assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided
the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when
the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to
be habitually guilty of some other crime.
Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code,
there are two (2) classes of accessories, one of which is a
public officer who harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of
the principal. Such public officer must have acted with abuse
of his public functions, and the crime committed by the
principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony. Appellant
SPO4 Nieto is one such public officer, and he abused his
public function when he failed to effect the immediate arrest of
accused Antonio and to conduct a speedy investigation of the
crime committed.
Facts:
1. On November 1, 1996, Antonio, Tuadles and Debdani
were friends. They had agreed to meet at a club for a
poker session, their third night in a row. However, on
the agreed date, Debdani failed to appear. So, the two
decided to play “pusoy dos”, a game for two players
only. They played until 9am in the morning. When it
came to tally theirs scores, and collect the winnings, an
argument arose between the two.
2. Prosecution alleged and sought to prove that without
warning, Antonio pulled his gun from behind his back
and shot Tuadles at a very close range. On the other
hand Tuadles opposed the testimony saying that
Tuadles suddenly grabbed Antonio’s gun from a top of
the sidetable. Fearing for his life, Antonio claimed that
he reached for Tuadle’s hand and grappled for the
possession of the gun. As they wrestled, a single shot
roared and Tuadles fell down to the floor. Antonio was
stunned to recall who had actually pulled the gun.
Antonio alleged that the shooting was accidental, and
his only purpose is to defend himself. While Tuadles
lay bloodied and still, no one remembered to call an
ambulance or check if he was alive. (Note: Until this
point, these are disputable facts, real facts
appeared after trial court rendered judgment)
3. Instead, Antonio convinced the 2 security guards,
Bobis to accompany him in his home in Quezon City,
after which they proceeded to San Juan Police Station.
He was then accompanied by SPO4 Nieto, remained at
his residence for several hours and Antonio called his
lawyer.
4. At 3pm in the afternoon, Antonio accompanied by Nieto
placed himself and his gun in the custody of San Juan
Mayor Estrada and the police authorities. Later, the 2
security guards and SPO4 Nieto were driven back to
the club where they waited for police investigators.
Sometime thereafter SG Bobis narrated the events and
executed his statement at the police station.
5. On November 18, 1996 an information was filed
against Antonio for the crime of murder. Charged as
accessories are SPO4 Nieto and SPO1 Cartalla Jr.
6. At the arraignment, all of them pleaded “not guilty”.
7. After the trial, all the three accused were found guilty
as charged. All three accused filed separate appeals.
8. Facts after the trial court decision; immaterial to
the issue but please also read.
Bobis, the prosecution witness first testified that he did not see
the actual shooting since he was still ascending the stairs
leading to the second floor where the crime took place.
However, after trial he changed his testimony and testified that
he had seen the appellant Antonio pull his gun from behind
without warning or provocation aim the gun at the head of
Tuadle and shoot the latter.
Bobis explained that moments after he saw appellant shoot
Antonio, the appellant warned him “Ikaw, wag kang tumistigo
ha.” Later he and other security guards were coerced to go at
the appellant’s house. While they were there, appellant
Antonio and his lawyer instructed him that should the police
investigator ask him who shot Tuadles, to say what happened
was only an accident.
At the police station, appellant SP04 Nieto told Bobis to say
that they were both outside the club when the trouble started.
Issue: Whether or not SP04 Nieto and SP01 Cartalla Jr.
may be held liable as an accessories for the crime of
murder?
Ruling: The court ruled that there was no treachery in this
case. Evidence shows that incident was an impulse killing.
SPO4 Nieto is LIABLE an accessory to the crime of
homicide.
SP01 Cartalla, Jr. is NOT liable as an accessory to the
crime of homicide.
Under par 3 of Art 19 of the Revised Penal Code, there are
two classes of accessories, one of which is a public officer
who harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the principal.
Such public officer must have acted with abuse of his public
functions and the crime committed by the principal is any
crime provided it is not a light felony.
Evidence shows that in the middle of the argument between
Antonio and Tuadles, Antonio called Nieto and the latter went
upstairs. Immediately thereafter, appellant shot Tuadles and
ordered Nieto to get the scoresheet and the cards from the
table which Nieto did. Despite this knowledge, he failed to
arrest the appellant and instead left the crime scene together
with the latter. To this extent he assisted appellant Antonio’s
escape.
Further he provided false information to deceive the
investigators. He instructed Bobis to answer falsely to
questions in order to make it appear that there were no eye
witnesses to the incident and thus make it more difficult for the
police to solve the crime.
SPO4 Cartalla however is not liable as an accessory.
The trial court’s sole reason of convicting him was his failure to
produce the laser light of the gun as evidence during trial.
However such omission does not amount to concealing or
destroying the body of the crime or the effects or instruments
thereof to prevent discovery. The laser sight had been
surrendered to the police authorities so there was no more
need for discovery.
From the foregoing, it is clear that SPO1 Cartalla Jr., did not
intentionally conceal or destroy the laser sight and the
prosecution failed to prove that he did so with the intent to
derail the prosecution of the principal accused.
While the laser sight was an accessory device attached to the
gun, it was not essential to the commission, investigation and
prosecution of the crime. The gun itself was eventually
surrendered to authorities and presented as evidence in court.
It did not in any way affect the outcome of the trial, much less
prevent the discovery of the crime. Furthermore, there is no
showing that SP01 Cartalla Jr., profited by the non-
presentation of the laser sight.
People vs. Verzola (Bernardez)
Anti-fencing law
Ong vs. People (Buño)
• Complainant Azajar owned 44 Firestone truck tires. He
marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them
inside the warehouse in Parañaque.
• He learned from the caretaker that 38 tires were stolen
• Azajar chanced upon Jong’s Marketing, a store selling tires
in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by appellant Ong.
There, he recognized the tires that were missing through
the chalk marking that he made.
• A buy-bust operation was conducted which resulted to the
confiscation of 13 tires.
• Ong’s Defense: He had been engaged in the business of
buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and
denying that he had any knowledge that he was selling
stolen tires in Jong Marketing. That a certain Ramon Go
(Go) offered to sell thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires
allegedly from Caloocan.
• RTC: Tires prima facie evidence of fencing, GUILTY; CA:
AFFIRMED
• ISSUE: W/N Ong is guilty of Fencing. (YES)
• Fencing is act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or
in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything
of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to
have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft.
• Elements:
1. Robbery or theft has been committed
• Here, the crime of robbery had been committed
2. The accused, who is not a principal or on
accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft
• Here, he never denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires
of Azajar were caught in his possession.
3. The accused knew or should have known that the
said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft
• Here, Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell
of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years, ought to
have known the ordinary course of business in
purchasing from an unknown seller.
• Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling
second hand tires. In fact, Ong has practiced the
procedure of obtaining clearances from the police
station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in
this particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty
as a diligent businessman.
4. There is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain
for oneself or for another.
 • Here, there was evident intent to gain for considering
that during the buy-bust operation, Ong was actually
caught selling the stolen tires in his store.
• Finally, fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612
creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good,
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher
penalty based on the value of the property.
Francisco vs. People (De Luna)
Tan vs. People (Diocales)
Facts:
Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal
Industries engaged in the business of manufacturing
propellers or spare parts for boats. Manuelito Mendez was one
of the employees working for her. Manuelito Mendez left the
employ of the company. Complainant Lim noticed that some of
the welding rods, propellers and boat spare parts, such as
bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws were
missing. She conducted an inventory and discovered that
propellers and stocks were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim
informed Victor Sy, uncle of Manuelito Mendez, of the loss.
Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas
and he admitted that he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop
stole from the complainant's warehouse some boat spare parts
such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws.
Manuelito Mendez asked the complainant's forgiveness. He
pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought the
stolen items and who paid cash to Mendez and Dayop, and
they split the amount with one another. Complainant did not
file a case against Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop.
An Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed an information
against petitioner charging him with violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law). Petitioner denies the
allegation stating that he was engaged in selling hardware
parts and that he never bought the stolen articles and talked to
Mendex.
Trial Court: Tan is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt
CA: Affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution has successfully established
the elements of fencing as against petitioner - NO
Ruling:
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is "the act of
any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another,
shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or
should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the
existence of the essential elements of fencing, there can be no
conviction for such offense.
Complainant Lim testified that she lost certain items and
Manuelito Mendez confessed that he stole those items and
sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim never reported
the theft or even loss to the police. She admitted that after
Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the
unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not
prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It can be prosecuted de
oficio, or even without a private complainant, but it cannot be
without a victim. As complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss,
we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of
theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent,
that is, crime of robbery or theft has been committed.
There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of
another's property. True, witness Mendez admitted in an extra-
judicial confession that he sold the boat parts he had pilfered
from complainant to petitioner. However, an admission or
confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in
evidence only against the person admitting or confessing.
Even on this, if given extra-judicially, the confessant must have
the assistance of counsel; otherwise, the admission would be
inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting.
Here, the extra-judicial confession of witness Mendez was not
given with the assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible
against the witness. Neither may such extra-judicial confession
be considered evidence against accused. There must be
corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding
of guilt. Corpus delicti means the "body or substance of the
crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the
crime has been actually committed.
The "essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal
property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking
away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was
done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking
away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things (U.S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil.
1000)." In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1)
that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost
by felonious taking. In this case, the theft was not proved
because complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public
authorities of the felonious taking of her property. She sought
out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed
that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the
complainant and sold them to petitioner. Such confession is
insufficient to convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.
There was no showing at all that the accused knew or should
have known that the very stolen articles were the ones sold
him. "One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the
cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware
of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with
facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with
certitude and clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a
particular factis an element of an offense, such knowledge is
established if a person is aware of a high probability of its
existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On
the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a
person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would
ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or
would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about
a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an
accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it
must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts
of that person. And given two equally plausible states of
cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose the
one which sustains the constitutional presumption of
innocence."
Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he
cannot be guilty of "fencing".
Pardon
Risos vs. Vidal (Doringo)
Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
Facts:
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former
President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was sentenced
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007,
however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President
Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and
political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of President. None of the disqualification cases
against him prospered but he only placed second in the
results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena,
and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local
elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification
against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada is
disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for
plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner
relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in
relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding
that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been
effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former
President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections.
Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes,
intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be
proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
Issue:
May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office
despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder which
carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to
hold public office?
Held:
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully
restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point
of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to
former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of
the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is
that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon
given to and accepted by former President Estrada does not
actually specify which political right is restored, it could be
inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately
intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage
and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was
the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the
pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by
legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and
Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the
Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with
other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations
shall be granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that
the only instances in which the President may not extend
pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that
have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases
involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in
which there was no favorable recommendation coming from
the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of
Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the
pardoning power of the President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in
the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the
pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section
40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was
removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to
him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a)
of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC
provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary
pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows
any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty
after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office,
whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to
make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular
clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada
has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position
or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate
against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to
suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly
impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified
use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential
part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that
explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by
the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a
statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the
operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas
clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the
pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to
make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity
contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned
commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is
merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot
be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither
expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be
conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a public
office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the
same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President
Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of
pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd
preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the
pardon extended to former President Estrada.
Art. 29 Spouses Alapan averred that their account was closed
People vs. Alapan (Elmido) because they
suffered business reverses.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SALVADOR ALAPAN In May 2006, respondent Salvador Alapan and his wife Myrna
Alapan
G.R. No. 199527; January 10, 2018 were charged with 8 counts of violation of B.P. 22.
MTC:
DOCTRINE: Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency It convicted respondent of 8 counts of violation of B.P. Big. 22.
must be It also imposed a penalty of fine of P30,000 for each case (or a
expressly stated in the judgment of conviction. If there is no total of
judgment P240,000) instead of imprisonment considering that
sentencing the accused to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in respondent’s act
case of of issuing the bounced checks was not tainted with bad faith.
insolvent to pay the fine imposed upon him, the court could not Meanwhile, it acquitted Myrna because she did not participate
legally in the
compel him to serve said subsidiary imprisonment. issuance of the dishonored checks.
FACTS: After the MTC Decision became final and executory, a writ of
In August 2005, the Spouses Alapan borrowed ₱400,000.00 execution was
from issued. However, the writ was unsatisfied. This prompted
petitioner Brian Victor Britchford with a promise that they would petitioner to file a
pay Motion to Impose Subsidiary Penalty for respondent’s failure to
the said amount within 3 months. pay the fine
To secure the indebtedness, respondent issued 8 postdated imposed by the MTC.
checks. RTC: Respondent could not be made to undergo subsidiary
When the checks matured, petitioner deposited then at the imprisonment
PNB. After because the judgment of conviction did not provide for such
a week, PNB informed petitioner that the checks were penalty in case
dishonored of non-payment of fine.
because the account against which the checks were drawn CA: It dismissed the petition as it was filed without the
was intervention of the
closed. OSG contrary to the Administrative Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent may undergo subsidiary case of failure to pay the penalty of fine. Thus, subsidiary
imprisonment for imprisonment may
failure to pay the fine – NO. not be imposed without violating the RPC and the
constitutional provision on
RULING: The first paragraph of article 39 of the Revised Penal due process.
Code states: DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 22
“If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine November
mentioned in 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall be subject to 118333 is
a subsidiary AFFIRMED.
personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos,
subject to the
following rules: ...” Also, Article 78 of Chapter V of the Revised
Penal Code,
which deals with the execution and service of penalties,
provides: “No
penalty shall executed except by virtue of a final judgment.”
No person may be deprived of liberty without due process of Complex Crimes
law. This People vs. Esugon (Fabula)
constitutional provision was in a sense incorporated in Article
78 of the People v. Alvin Esugon
Revised Penal Code, which prescribes that no penalty shall be
executed FACTS:
except by virtue of a final judgment. If there is no judgment
sentencing the Alvin Esugon was charged of robbery with homicide for
accused to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvent stabbing Josephine B. Castro, with the following information:
to pay the fine
“That on or about the 22nd day of October 2003, in the City of
imposed upon him, it is clear that the court could not legally
Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
compel him to
Honorable Court, the above named accused, with intent to
serve said subsidiary imprisonment.
gain, with the use of a bladed weapon, by means of force and
Here, the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary
violence, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
imprisonment in
feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting
to P13,000.00 belonging to JOSEPHINE CASTRO y
BARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of the latter; that by
reason or on occasion of said robbery, accused did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab with the said bladed weapon said JOSEPHINE CASTRO
y BARRERA, thereby inflicting upon her physical injuries which
directly caused her death. CONTRARY TO LAW.”
During trial it was established that Carl, or Muymoy, the 5-year
old son of the victim, was sleeping in the ground floor of their
house, with his mother and father, and his younger sister.
Then he saw the accused enter into their house and stab her
mother with a knife while he was peeping through a chair. His
father got up and chased the accused. When his father did not
catch the accused, they brought his mother to the hospital, but
she was dead on arrival. Carl, in his testimony, said that the
accused took money from his father’s wallet. While he said
that there was no light in the ground floor, there was light in
the second floor of the house, and he was sure of what he
saw, and he recognized the accused because he frequents the
billiard hall which his family maintains. During the police
interrogation, Carl pointed to the accused and said “siya po
yung pumasok sa bahay namin.” He later pinpointed and
positively identified the appellant as the one who stabbed his
mother and robbed them of their money.
The husband of the victim’s version, meanwhile, said that he
woke up because he heard someone shout “Magnanakaw!”.
He turned on the light and saw that their door was open. He
got their bolo and ran outside. When he did not reach the
accused, he asked for help, and his brother-in-law helped him
bring her wife to the hospital, where she eventually died. He
admitted having no personal knowledge as to who stabbed his
wife. It was only Carl who saw him.
The RTC pronounced the accused guilty of the crime of
robbery with homicide, punished under Article 293 and
punished under Article 294 (1) of the RPC, sentencing him to
Reclusion Perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of Josephine
B. Castro of: Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity; PhP 57,500.00
actual damages; and PhP 50,000.00 as moral damages.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, while deleting the award
of Php 57,500.00 as moral damages, ordering in lieu thereof,
the amount of PhP 25,000.00 as temperate damages in favour
of the heir of Josephine Castro.
ISSUE:
1. RELATED:
Whether the accused should be held liable for the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide. YES
ACCUSED’S ARGUMENT: He cannot be held liable for
robbery by using force considering that the culprit had neither
broken any wall, roof, floor, door or window to gain entry in the
house or entered the house through an opening not intended
for entrance. If at all, he could only be liable only for the
separate crimes of theft and homicide, not of the composite
crime of robbery with homicide.
2. SIDE ISSUE (But the main issue):
Whether the testimony of Carl is credible and admissible in b.
court to hold the accused liable for the crime. YES
HELD:
CA and RTC decisions affirmed. Accused is guilty of robbery
with homicide, with modifications. Accused shall pay to the
heirs of late Josephine Castro the following: civil indemnity of
PhP 75,000.00; moral damages of PhP 75,000.00; exemplary
damages of PhP 30,000.00; temperate damages of PhP
25,000.00, and interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum.
RATIO:
c.
1. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide,
the following elements must concur: the taking of personal
property belonging to another; with intent to gain; with the
use of violence or intimidation against a person; and the
crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was
committed on the occasion or by reason of robbery.
Robbery must be certain and the main objective, and the
killing is merely incidental.
a. The fact that the accused was armed with
the long-bladed weapon, which was
undoubtedly a deadly weapon, competently
proved the presence of violence or
intimidation against persons that qualified
the offense as robbery instead of theft. The
patent intent of the accused was originally
to commit robbery, with the homicide being
committed only in the course or on the
occasion of the perpetration of the robbery.
The records show that the husband of the
victim was awakened by the shout
“Magnanakaw!”, which was probably made
by the victim, whom the appellant then
stabbed in order to facilitate his escape.
Considering that the original criminal design
to rob had been consummated with the
taking of the money amounting to PhP
13,000.0, the killing of the victim under the
circumstances rendered the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide.
Robbery with homicide is a composite
crime, or a special complex crime,
composed of two or more crimes but
treated by the law with a specific penalty
provided by law. A composite crime is
distinct from a complex or compound
crime, in that the composition of the
offenses is fixed by law, but in a
complex or compound crime, the
combination of the offenses is not
specified but generalized, that is, grave
and/or less grave, or one offense being
the necessary means to commit the
other. In a composite crime, the penalty
for the specified combination of crimes
is specific, but in a complex or
compound crime the penalty is that
corresponding to the most serious
offense, in the maximum period.
2. The witness, being a child, cannot be the sole
reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness of the
testimonies of child witnesses has long been erased, and
every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. Only
when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the
child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish
truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth
in court, will the court, motu proprio, or on motion of a
party, conduct a competency examination of a child.
a. The accused did not object to Carl’s
competency. He did not attempt to adduce
evidence to challenge such competency by
showing that the child was incapable of
perceiving events and of communicating his
perceptions, or that he did not posses the
basic qualifications of a competent witness.
All the accused did was to discredit the
testimony of the child, but not for once did
he challenge Carl’s capacity to distinguish
right from wrong, or to perceive, or
communicate his perception to the trial
court. Consequently, the trial judge
favourably determined the competency of
Carl to testify against the accused.
b. Although children have different levels of
intelligence and different degrees of
perception, the determination of their
capacity to perceive and of their ability to
communicate their perception to the courts
still pertained to the trial court, because it
concerned a factual issue and should not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of a
strong showing of mistake or
misappreciation on the part of the trial court.
Moreover, according credence to a child’s
testimony is not unprecedented, as
jurisprudence has shown children’s
testimonies to be accepted in court proceedings.
c. Carl positively identified the appellant as the
culprit during the investigation and during the
trial. Worthy to note is that the child could not
have been mistaken about his identification of
him in view of his obvious familiarity with the
appellant as a daily presence in the billiard
room, maintained by the child’s family.
Ivler vs. Modesto (Golla)
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner)
was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court with two
separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained
by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent
Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release
in both cases.
Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No.
82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking
this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the
two cases.
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated
the matter to the Regional Trial Court in a petition for certiorari
(S.C.A. No. 2803).
Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, invoking S.C.A. No.
2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s
motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because
of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce
sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for
petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. The RTC
dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing
to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to
arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his
petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues
that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal
Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal
Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence
charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the
multiple consequences of such crime are material only to
determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the
RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his
petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls
the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light
offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was
obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366
for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367
for the homicide and damage to property.
ISSUES:
1) Was there double jeopardy in this case?
2) Does Article 48 (complex crimes) apply to acts
penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code (reckless imprudence, a quasi-crime)?
RULING:
1) Yes. The doctrine is that reckless imprudence under
Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that
conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts. This is
undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of
 jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article
365.
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once
convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted
again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes
thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the
careless act is single, whether the injurious result
should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and cannot be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
2) We hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should
proceed from a single charge regardless of the
number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each consequence
alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.
To explain:
The confusion lies in the attempts to harmonize
conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural
rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of
crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is
a procedural device allowing single prosecution of
multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1)
when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light
felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means
for committing the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of
serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of
the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not
an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care
or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of
the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted
as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more
consequences.
The complexities of human interaction can produce a
hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models – that
of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-
crime damages to persons and property with varying
penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave
offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious:
how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should
Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single
quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal)
consequences (excluding those amounting to light
offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the
prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively
alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to
be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties
under Article 365?
In view of the foregoing, either (1) we allow the
"complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its
resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light
felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon
its present framing under Article 365, and treat the
multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate
intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II
under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of
Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-
crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts
regardless of their number and severity, separately
penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus
maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted
under Article 365.
In the first method: We apply Article 48 by "complexing"
one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences unless
one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case
charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting
acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing
the charge with the second level courts and, on the other
hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing
the charge with the first level courts. Expectedly, this is
the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and
respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic
Act No. 7691, the MeTC has now exclusive original
jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under
Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium
period.
People vs. Sanidad (Landicho)
In the second method: We nix Article 48 and sanction a
single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime
collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their
number or severity, penalizing each consequence
separately.
The second method prevails. Prosecutions under
Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the
consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no
more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be
no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.
By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365,
irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting
acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible
second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that
scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to
proper use.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article
365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the
favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by
the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects
qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly).

PER CURIAM:
- CONDEMNED TO DEATH by the trial court on 26 July
20001 for the complex crime of murder and multiple
attempted murder, accused-appellants JIMMEL
SANIDAD and PONCE MANUEL alias PAMBONG now
seek the reversal of their conviction as we review
automatically the judgment pursuant to Sec. 22, Rep.
Act No. 7659, amending Art. 47 of The Revised Penal
Code.
FACTS:
- On 16 January 1999 at around five o'clock in the
afternoon Marlon Tugadi with 8 others left Budac,
Tagum, Abra, on board a passenger jeepney driven by
Delfin Tadeo to attend a barangay fiesta in the
neighboring town of Lagangilang, Abra.
- They joined the residents in the drinking spree where
in the course of their conviviality, accused Sanidad,
Ponce Manuel and several other residents joined the
drinking that lasted until wee hours in the morning.
- Marlon Tugadi and accused Jimmel Sanidad were
drinking buddies and members of the CAFGU before
then.
- At 4 AM, Sanidad and his companions finished drinking
and left. Then the group of Tugadi also headed home
boarding same jeepney.
- Seated next to Delfin in front were Ricardo Tadeo and
Rolando Tugadi, while on the left rear seat were Marlon
Tugadi, Jun Quipay and Raymund Fontanilla. Seated on
the right rear seat were Bobby Velasquez, Dennis
Balueg, Edwin Tumalip and Pepito Tugadi.5
- With Delfin Tadeo on the wheels the jeepney cruised
the rough and gravelly dirt road of Abra-Cervantes
with its passengers completely unaware that danger
lurked ahead in the dark and dreary stretch of the
road. The jeepney's headlights sharply ablaze and
glaring illuminated the path and radiated towards the
lush vegetation of the surrounding landscape.
- As the jeepney approached a plantation, its headlights
beamed at accused-appellants Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce
Manuel and two (2) other unidentified companions who
were positioned next to a mango tree at the left side of
the road approximately fifteen (15) meters away.
Accused-appellants were armed with an armalite, a .45
caliber pistol and shotguns with buckshots.
- As the jeepney moved closer, the unleashed a volley of
shots at the jeepney.6 Delfin stepped on the gas in a
vain effort to elude their assailants, but they continued
firing at the hapless victims. Bullets plowed the side of
the vehicle and all the passengers sitting at the back
instinctively ducked on the floor to avoid being hit. The
accused pursued the vehicle on foot and fired at it
incessantly until it finally stalled a few meters away.
(AMBUSHED)
- Miraculously, almost all of its passengers, with the
exception of Rolando Tugadi. Marlon Tugadi tried to
pull his brother Rolando Tugadi from the vehicle to
safety only to realize that he was not only too heavy,
he was already dead. As the pursuing gunmen drew
near, Marlon decided to abandon Rolando and
scampered away with the other victims until they
reached a bushy area about fifteen (15) meters away
from the vehicle.
- The fire engulfed the jeep, illuminated the malefactors
who stood nearby and watched it blaze.
- It could not be determined whether the accused
purposely set the vehicle on fire or the fuel tank was
hit during the shooting that ignited the fire. Marlon
Tugadi and Pepito Tugadi later heard one of the
unidentified companions of accused-appellant Sanidad
say to him: "My gosh, we were not able to kill all of
them."10 Thereafter, the accused left the scene, firing
 their guns indiscriminately into the air as they walked
away.11
- An Information for murder with multiple attempted
murder and malicious mischief was filed against
Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel alias Pambong, John
Doe and Peter Doe.
- RTC: convicted them to death.
- SC: We affirm the conviction. We find that the
prosecution succeeded overwhelmingly in meeting the
quantum of proof required to overturn the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
- We fully agree with the lower court that the instant
case comes within the purview of Art. 48 of The
Revised Penal Code which, speaking of complex
crimes, provides that when "a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed in its maximum period."
- In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are
actually committed, they constitute only one crime in
the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the
offender.25
- Although several independent acts were
performed by the accused in firing separate shots
from their individual firearms, it was not possible
to determine who among them actually killed
victim Rolando Tugadi.
- Moreover, there is no evidence that accused-appellants
intended to fire at each and every one of the victims
separately and distinctly from each other. On the
contrary, the evidence clearly shows a single criminal
impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi's group as a whole. 26
Thus, one of accused-appellants exclaimed in
frustration after the ambush: "My gosh, we were not
able to kill all of them." Where a conspiracy animates
several persons with a single purpose, their individual
acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked
upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise
to a single complex offense.28
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo of 26 July 2000
finding accused-appellants JIMMEL SANIDAD and PONCE MANUEL
alias PAMBONG guilty of the complex crime of murder and multiple
attempted murder and imposing upon them the supreme penalty
of DEATH is AFFIRMED.
People vs. Gonzales (Montellano)
People vs. Delos santos (Palattao)
Reodica vs CA (Panlilio)
FACTS: Petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along
Doña Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque,
Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van
hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result,
complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to
his car amounted to P8,542.00. Hence, the complainant filed
an information charging petitioner with "Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury."
The RTC of Makat rendered a decision convicting petitioner of
the "quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property with slight physical injuries”, and sentencing her:
[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
and to pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the
sum of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542),
Philippine Currency, without subsidiary impairment in case of
insolvency; and to pay the costs.
The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this
wise:
As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused,
complainant suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs. D, H and I).
In view of the resulting physical injuries, the penalty to be
imposed is not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental
of Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988, p. 711). Slight
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished
with penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period.
The CA affirmed.
Petitioner avers that the courts below should have pronounced
that there were two separate light felonies involved, namely:
(1) reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries; and (2)
reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of
considering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she
insists, "do not . . . rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or
imprisonment of six months.” She then suggests that "at worst,
the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their
maximum period and computed or added together, only sum
up to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as imposed by
the lower courts."
ISSUE: Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code applies to the quasi offenses in
question.
RULING: III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.
Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than
one felony, should Article 48 of the Revised Code on complex
crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. - When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same
to be applied in its maximum period.
Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two
or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is
committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, 27 this Court
declared that where one of the resulting offenses in criminal
negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex
crime, thus:
Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is
no complex crime. The resulting offenses may be treated as
separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave
felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and
slight physical injuries, both resulting from a single act of
imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot
be charged in one information. They are separate offenses
subject to distinct penalties.
Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less
serious physical injuries, damage to property amounting to
P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not
err in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries
and another complaint for the lesiones menor graves and
damage to property.
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following
felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of
P8,542.00 and the light felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in physical injuries.
Ponce Enrile vs Salazar (Pantaleon)
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS, JUAN
PONCE ENRILE vs. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR
FACTS: 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested
on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of RTC QC in
Criminal Case. The warrant had issued on an information charging Senator
Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan
with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from
November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held
overnight at the NBI without bail, none having been recommended in the
information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. Then, he was brought to
Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City.
Senator Enrile filed the petition for habeas corpus alleging that he was
deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the
statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no
complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was
conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally determined
the existence of probable cause.
Solicitor General filed a return for the respondents and urged that the
petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this
is putting it very simply-the information in Hernandez charged murders and
other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission
of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged
murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would
distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from
an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is
referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is
the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito
compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or
less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph,
with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should
not apply.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following
options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in
the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion
cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with
common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the
Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his
written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in
furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of
rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion
which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave
character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all
other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary
to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
ISSUE: WON the crime charged against Petitioners is a Complex Crime of
Rebellion or a Compound Crime
RULING:
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against
abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should be
re-examined. In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its
substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and
no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete
reversal.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory
that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to offenses
committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that
the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of
rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance, thereof
Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority
opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why
Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar.
If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes
were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the
following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely:
(1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and
prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of
prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be
imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would
have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single
aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be
unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose
of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more
severe than that which would be proper if the several acts
performed by him were punished separately.
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71
(later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our
Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, inserted in said
amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the
graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not
exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts
charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation
in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the
spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more
offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver
than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In
directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case,
imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no
other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the
aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed separately.
The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily
discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single
act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits
said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing
him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer
the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the
assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate
penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of
the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on
the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as
an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
However, this does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or
innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the
trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely provides a
take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the
petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of
the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules that the information filed against the petitioner does
in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that
would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that
indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in
Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended
information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the
murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said
defendants, as means "necessary" for the perpetration of said
offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned
amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and
robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such
charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a
fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy of this
court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar
punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does
not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court
has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses
committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a
mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information
does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and
punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners.
and/or preliminary investigation conducted? Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the
corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio.
The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple No pronouncement as to costs.
rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation,
and that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was
conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the
questioned information. There is nothing inherently irregular or
contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an
offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if
warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary
investigation.

In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to

petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be
accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the
facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this
Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its
denial?

The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for
invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and
judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction
by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by
reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that
remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this
Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the
Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez

ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily,
theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense, would
not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either
hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash
brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge.

FALLO: WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine

enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed
against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said
petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right.
The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in
character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the