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Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations

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Islamic theology between tradition and

challenge of modernity
a
Nedžad Grabus
a
Faculty of Islamic Studies, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Version of record first published: 22 Jun 2012

To cite this article: Nedžad Grabus (2012): Islamic theology between tradition and challenge of
modernity, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations, 23:3, 267-277

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 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations
Vol. 23, No. 3, July 2012, 267–277

Islamic theology between tradition and challenge of modernity1

Nedžad Grabus*

Faculty of Islamic Studies, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

A number of different approaches to the interpretation of cognition have always existed side
by side within Islam, from those relying mainly on the basic sources – the Qur’an and the
Sunna – to those that attempt to clarify the issue of cognition largely by way of rational
and logical argumentation, as is the case with philosophical texts. For this reason it is
important to consider the literature that emerged in the classical period, which is still
being brought to light and which this article endeavours to make more accessible to
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present-day readers.
The debate that took place between the main theological schools of the Muʿtazilīs,
Māturīdīs and Ashʿarīs is of great significance for present-day readers, since it provides an
insight into the emergence and development of the substantive contents of systematic
belief in Islam. From the late eleventh to the early twentieth century, Muʿtazilism was seen
as anathema in most of the Muslim world, and only the Māturīdīs and the Ashʿarīs were
accepted among Sunnis. At the end of the nineteenth century, a critical traditionalist
movement appeared, led by Muh.ammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905) and Sayyid Ah.mad Khān (d.
1898). Many scholars have associated the interest in Muʿtazilī learning in the early
twentieth century with the renaissance (nahd.a) in Arabic literature in the late nineteenth
century. The nahd.a emerged in response to the challenges of Western civilization’s
irresistible cultural penetration into the Arab world, which was frozen in conservatism.
Muh.ammad ʿAbduh, aware of the changes that had occurred in the Muslim world as a
result of Western colonialism, was trying to respond to the challenges with which social
and political change confronted Muslims, and in the ideas he articulated he revived some
Muʿtazilī theses.
Keywords: Cognition; rationalism; traditionalism; modernism; ideology

As a rule, research in the area of acquisition of knowledge and possibilities of cognition within
Western European thought and the history of philosophy is contextualized in and dated to
Antiquity. It is a problem that the contribution to the development and formulation of
philosophy provided by Muslim thinkers has usually been neglected or underrated. Wilhelm
Windelband expressed this by maintaining that in European thought there persists a most
regrettable lack of knowledge of Arab and Jewish philosophy and, consistent with that, lack
of awareness of its influence upon the stream of Western thought at particular points. He is
of the opinion that this could possibly constitute the most sensitive gap in exploring the
origins of philosophy. Knowledge of religious substance and issues dealt with by the most
prominent Islamic theological schools in the domain of the theory of cognition is even more
problematically absent and inadequately covered within Western European thought
(Windelband 1988, 100–1). It is particularly interesting that only literature from the domain
of Islamic philosophy is referred to, while the major works of ʿilm al-kalām and ʿaqāʾid
(theology) have generally been neglected.

*Email: ngrabus@gmail.com

ISSN 0959-6410 print/ISSN 1469-9311 online

© 2012 University of Birmingham
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2012.686263
http://www.tandfonline.com
 268 N. Grabus

We encounter several problems when trying to summarize the development and establishment
of the essential aspects of ʿaqāʾid. The first serious problem is the multiplicity and diversity of
views regarding this issue, not only between the mainstream interpreters of ʿaqāʾid (the
Muʿtazila, Ashʿarī, Māturīdī and Salafī schools), but also among the followers and the
promoters of the views of these schools. The second problem is of a more technical nature,
namely the fact that no comprehensive and generally accepted assessment of the importance of
the theory of knowledge in ʿaqāʾid and particularly in kalām (speculative theology) yet exists.
Nevertheless, it is impossible to correctly understand this matter without at least a summary
review of directly related works and topics, which means it is necessary to become acquainted
with the general characteristics and individual features of the most prominent authors of
ʿaqāʾid literature, and their exposition of the theory of cognition.
Every doctrine employs its own arsenal of terms. In kalām it very important to use the terms
proof (dalīl), reasoning (naz.ar), knowledge (ʿilm) and presumption (z.ann). There is no particular
need to insist that understanding the concepts expressed by these terms is vital for the
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understanding of any epistemological form in kalām. A holistic insight into this discipline and
consideration of its epistemological form is certainly more important than understanding the
terms in themselves. ʿAqāʾid covers not only strictly substantive theological issues, but also
those that belong to the epistemological and methodological field. In any serious study of
issues in the field of Islamic belief, particularly theological issues, both these elements should
be taken into account for a correct understanding of the theoretical aspect of theology.

Synthetic ʿaqāʾid-philosophical teachings on cognition in Islamic theology as a

forerunner of modern thought
Several hundred years’ experience of searching for answers to epistemological and
methodological questions in the domain of ʿilm al-kalām have resulted in the creation of
systematized works encompassing all the concepts expressed to date. Specifically, works by
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (1984, 56–66), ʿAdud al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Rah.mān al-Ījī (n.d. 7–14) and Saʿd
al-Dīn al-Taftazānī (1989, 187–204) feature considerably more articulate and systemized
descriptions of the issues of ʿilm (knowledge) and maʿrifa (cognition).
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī2 endeavoured to master and reconcile various forms of thought in
interpreting the fundamental principles of Islam. His work Al-muh.as.s.al3 is of particular
importance for the topic of cognition, since he did not simply try to list the teachings, but
rather endeavoured to show what they had in common. Naturally, he restricted himself to the
field of kalām without delving into speculative and esoteric philosophy and wisdom,
remaining within the scope of what could be treated through reason. In the teaching of kalām
in al-Rāzī’s work, the political and dogmatic problems were already eliminated. Due to
political influence of the established authorities, earlier authors did not dare to rely on logical
and philosophical arguments in their interpretation of kalām. A dialectic approach became an
integral part of methodology of writing. Introductions into these works were much more
consistent than the earlier works in this area. Nevertheless, the apologetic character of these
works continues to be noticeable in prolonged digressions where the authorities on the subject
defend the positions of Ahl al-Sunna. It seems that in these works it is exceptionally important
to prove the value of reasoning (naz.ar), knowledge and cognition.
In the introductory part of Al-muh.as.s.al, al-Rāzī acquaints us with the ‘fundamentals’ of
kalām. He believes that kalām rests on four foundations. The first consists of the first
principles, principationes (Al-muqaddima al-ūlā: fī al-ʿulūm al-awwaliyya), followed by
the process and definition of reasoning (Fī ah.kām al-naz.ar, taʿrīf al-naz.ar). The second
foundation deals with the question of Being and its division according to the mutakallimūn
 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 269

(Taqsīm al-maʿlūmāt, taqsīm al-mawjūdāt ʿalā raʾy al-mutakallimīn). The third foundation
addresses rational theology and reasoning about the Being, attributes, actions and names of
God (Fī al-ilāhiyyāt wa-al-naz.ar fī al-dhāt wa-al-s.ifāt wa-al-afʿāl wa-al-asmāʾ). The fourth
foundation contains issues based on transference and tradition of Revelation and the Sunna of
the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him (Fī al-samʿiyyāt). Al-Rāzī is of the opinion that in
speaking about the methodology of ʿilm al-kalām one should keep in mind the preliminary
principle of science, i.e. when we recognize the reality we should make neither negative nor
positive judgements; this approach is a matter of conception, conceptio, idea (tas.awwur); if, on
the other hand, either a negative or a positive judgement is made, it then becomes a matter of
acknowledgement (aw nuh.kum ʿalayhā bi-nafy aw ithbāt wa-huwa al-tas.dīq) (Razi, 1984,
120–41). He very articulately offers a thesis that conceptual knowledge can be defined as quite
clear and understandable in itself. He further considers that any matter in relation to which we
possess no knowledge whatsoever may become known to us only by way of acquisition of
such knowledge. For this reason it is impossible for anyone except a messenger of God to
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acquire knowledge through unveiling (li-anna mā ʿadā al-ʿilm yankashif illā bihi fa-yastah.īl an
yakūn kāshifan). Al-Rāzī affirms this position, stating: ‘I am of necessity aware of my
existence because I know that I exist’ (wa-li annī aʿlam bi-al-d.arūra kawnī ʿāliman bi-wujūdī),
and conceptual knowledge is a part of that. Therefore, conceptual knowledge is of a manifest
nature. Al-Rāzī is likewise of the opinion that knowledge must necessarily be defined by
knowledge and further maintains that it is wrong to negate knowledge. Negation of knowledge
in itself means that knowledge as such exists (Rāzī 1984, 144–5).
In arguing for the importance of the concepts of knowledge, presumption, rational
speculation and Shariʿa judgment (h.ukm sharʿī), al-Rāzī believes that knowledge as such
exists and is necessary. He endeavours to present a summarized review of the theory of
knowledge. There are numerous categories of knowledge. For instance, there is knowledge
derived from sensuous perception and knowledge derived from feelings such as pleasure and
pain. There is knowledge acquired by way of intuition and knowledge acquired by rational
judgement. Again, there is knowledge derived from a combination of factors perceived by
the senses and the intellect. In addition, there are two types of such knowledge: one related
to tradition transmitted by a number of reliable sources (mutawātirāt), relying upon the
interconnection of samʿa and ʿaql (tradition and intellect); and the other based on experience
and cognitive intuition (mujarrabāt and h.adasiyyāt) relying upon the interconnection
of reason and the other five external senses. Besides this type of knowledge, there are
also blind conviction (iʿtiqād muqallid), ignorance, doubt, presumption, assessment and
conjecture (wahm).
The scholar al-Ījī4 collected and synthesized the most prominent views held on the
definition of ʿilm in classical ʿaqāʾid literature; his work Al-mawāqif fī ʿilm al-kalām
represents one of the most significant compendia of ʿaqāʾid (Islamic theology) teachings,
covering the major issues discussed over the seven centuries’ history of the subject. This is a
thoroughly systematic and, considering the huge amount of material accumulated over time,
extraordinarily concise work. Issues and topics are treated and divided in accordance with
the best ‘philosophical’ forms of thinking. The work is primarily concerned with issues that
concern the theory of cognition and knowledge, and aims to indicate the groundedness of
religious convictions (ʿaqāʾid dīniyya) by way of argumentation and elimination of doubts
(yurād al-h.ujaj wa-dafʿ al-shubah). For al-Ījī, ʿaqāʾid without practical manifestations of
religion are no more than empty ideas (wa-al-murād bi-al-aqāʾid mā yaqs.ud bihi nafs al-
iʿtiqād dūn al-ʿamal). Al-Ījī points out that Man is endowed with innate intellect (ʿaql
gharīzī), essential knowledge (ʿilm d.arūrī) and the capacity for speculation and deductive
reasoning or inference – illatio (naz.ar, istidlāl). His main purpose is to contemplate God’s
 270 N. Grabus

creation in order to acquire knowledge of existence and of the Eternal Creator. He believes that
ʿilm al-kalām is the most valuable science Man can study.
Al-Ījī’s first stance (mawqif) in Al-mawāqif addresses the question of the origin of knowledge.
The philosophical tradition that had already been adopted by scholars requires him to begin with a
description of the discipline on the basis of categories that may also be applied to other scientific
disciplines, such as definition, subject, application, benefit, type, problems and denomination
(designation). This is followed by the stances concerning knowledge. In the approach to the
definition of knowledge, al-Ījī sets out three methodological approaches taken by philosophers.
The first approach is that taken by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who, according to al-Ījī, considered
that the acquisition of knowledge was necessary for two reasons. First, it is essential that
everyone should be aware of his/her own existence (inna ʿilm kull ah.ad bi-wujūdih d.arūrī).
This is a very special kind of knowledge. Second, acquired knowledge does not exist without
effort and is acquired in a particular way through learning and has nothing to do with
conjecture. Learning, when we have no knowledge about something at a theoretical level,
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takes place by way of presumption and preconception about its essence. There is thus a
difference between acquisition, presumption and preconception of knowledge. The second
approach characterized by al-Ījī is that taken by Imam al-H.aramayn al-Juwaynī5 and al-
Ghazālī (Ījī n.d., 12–19), who considered defining knowledge as unnecessary (innahu laysa
d.arūriyyan) (ibid., 9) and difficult. The method of attaining cognition is through division
(divisio) and by analogy (qālā wa-t.arīq maʿrifatih al-qisma wa-al-mithāl). Consequently they
believed that the mode of cognition is not the same for everybody, since knowledge is
obtained using various disciplines and in a variety of ways. The third and final approach to
theoretical knowledge identified by al-Ījī includes the views of certain proponents of
Muʿtazilism, its opponents such as Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī and al-Rāzī, and philosophers, and
aims to prove that knowledge is not the same as simple conviction. These definitions are
discussed in the context of al-Bāqillānī’s polemic against the proponents of Muʿtazilism. Al-Ījī
gives the following definition of knowledge: ‘This is an attribute whose existence requires
distinction between several meanings that do not tolerate contradiction’ (innahu s.ifa tūjab li-
mah.allihā tamyīzan bayn al-maʿānī lā yah.tamil al-taqayyud.) (ibid., 11).
Al-Ījī divides the resulting knowledge into what is essential and what is acquired (al-ilm al-
h.ādith yanqasim ilā d.arūrī wa-muktasab). However, where the method of achievement of proper
reasoning is in question, we should keep in mind that a perception may be either an individual
precognition or an assertion (wa-limā kāna al-idrāk immā tas.awwuran aw tas.dīqan); if it
represents a method of conception, it is called a cognition (maʿrif), and if it is in the form of
an assertion, it is called a proof (dalīl), which encompasses both presumptive and categorical
proof. Al-Ījī maintains that the mutakallimūn considered knowledge to be a link between the
knower and the thing revealed through argument, whereas philosophers believed knowledge to
be presumptive existence (wujūd dhihnī) (ibid., 140–1), and that it is to be judged as
intelligibilities (maʿqūlāt), a thesis many mutakallimūn opposed. Knowledge is further divided
into disjunctive (tafs.īlī) and universal (ijmālī). Al-Ījī’s work contains a most detailed depiction
of ideas, interpretations, views and methodological forms of knowledge, such that it may be
regarded as an encyclopaedic overview of material collected in this field up to that time. With
al-Ījī’s work, the idea of discriminating between the problem of defining and the problem of
proving and presenting evidence progressively crystallized. The aim of ʿilm al-kalām is to
establish and substantiate essential knowledge (ʿulūm d.arūriyya). The whole of essential
knowledge can be divided into instinctive (natural) knowledge (wijdāniyyāt), which is of
limited scope and consequence, knowledge acquired by way of sensuous perception (h.issiyyāt)
and knowledge acquired through intuition (badīhiyyāt). Al-Ījī maintains that there are four
differing views regarding the source of knowledge obtained by means of the senses and
 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 271

intuition. Most of them recognize both of the above sources of knowledge. He indicates that the
group that rejected the senses as a source of knowledge is that led by Plato, Aristotle, Ptolemy and
Galen. The others reject intuition as a source of knowledge. Some of them, such as the sophists
(lā-adriyya), repudiate both sources and everything else that may lead toward knowledge. Like
the rest of the scholars (ʿulamāʾ), al-Ījī goes on to speak about rational reasoning in order to
attain a desired aim. Reasoning is defined as being either certain or improper. Natural, certain
reasoning leads toward knowledge. Similar to the earlier ʿulamāʾ, al-Ījī refers to the example of
the followers of Shaivism, a branch of Hinduism in the Middle Ages, who rejected the
possibility that knowledge may be obtained by way of reasoning. The geometricians
(muhandisūn) are of the opinion that reasoning may only lead to the acquisition of scientific
mathematical knowledge (handasiyyāt), not metaphysical knowledge (see Rosenthal 1970,
230). They are convinced that it is only in this sense that it is possible to speak of
presumptions, preconceptions and relative thought. Al-Ījī further states that even the malāh.ida
(some think that this applies to the Ismaʿili Shiʿa) reject speculation, which may lead to
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knowledge of God, without an imam, a guide or a teacher. He also discusses the methods by
which knowledge can be achieved by reasoning, and the basic criteria for using speculation.
According to al-Ījī, there is a general consensus that using rational speculation to obtain
knowledge of God (maʿrifat Allāh) is the duty of every Muslim, whether that be by using the
intellect, as the Muʿtazilis and al-Māturīdī believed, or by following tradition (samʿ), as al-Ījī
himself maintained. In fact, he considers this to be the primary obligation of every mature
Muslim. According to al-Ījī, analogous reasoning is a fruitful method of rational speculation,
and he refers briefly to using traditional evidence in the acquisition of knowledge.
Thus it is evident that the authors of kalām take over the interpretation of this matter from
philosophy, as previously written by Ibn Sīnā. All knowledge or cognition is either conceptual
(tas.awwur) or an assertion, which means presenting evidence about something by logical
argumentation (tas.dīq). Conceptual knowledge is primary knowledge that can be acquired by
defining. On the other hand, correspondent knowledge is that gained by presenting
conclusions. An example of this is the assertion to the effect that the ‘created world has a
beginning’. The above understanding is very close to the distinction, specific to modern logic,
between ‘meaning’ and ‘true substance/meaning’. On the basis of al-Ījī’s work it is understood
that aqāʾid is based on ‘knowledge’, while knowledge is adapted to aqāʾid.
Following the same line as al-Ījī, al-Taftazānī6 likewise discusses the definition of knowledge
in his work Sharh. al-maqās.id. He is of the opinion that conceptual knowledge is necessary, since
it is acquired, and we need it to help us learn the unknown. Without conceptual knowledge, the
process of learning would require a prolonged period of time. That is why any being’s awareness
of its existence is directly obvious. This awareness is to be followed by general knowledge.
Al-Taftazānī contested the notion of conceptual knowledge and its acquisition.7
Here a minor parenthesis may help us present a comparison between the understandings of
cognition in Western and Islamic thought. There is a major difference of approach to this
matter between, on the one hand, the ʿulamāʾ who were active in the milieu of Islamic culture
and civilization in the Middle Ages and, on the other, Christian theologians of the time, to say
nothing of modern Western philosophy. As a result, every researcher is torn between two
trends in the theory of cognition: the rational and empirical approach of the West, and
mainstream Islamic thought, which deals with this topic through tradition (transmission –
naql) and intellect – ratio (ʿaql), trying to work out the linkages between the two and/or to
attain a synthesis, since the absolutization of the mind and the subject has never taken place in
Islamic thought. This is why no radical interpretations emerged in Islamic thought that granted
reason priority over revelation, in contrast to European thought, where such interpretations did
accord a primary and absolute role to reason and the subject. Perhaps this is why the theory of
 272 N. Grabus

cognition in the form developed within ʿaqāʾid has remained on the margins and has been
inadequately presented to the modern reading public and scientifically trained individuals.

Islamic theological texts in a modern context

In order to understand a given topic we should acknowledge the disputes that have marked
Islamic thought in the twentieth century and led both to the further development of rational
ideas within Islamic thought and to the emergence of ideas that have promoted ideological
theological doctrine. Through these ideas, Islam has been deprived of dynamism and the
ability to adjust to new circumstances, ignoring its tenets and principles of accommodation and
affirming lines of thought that simplify and reduce its teachings and theological interpretation
to mere repetition and the proclamation of formalized attitudes and theological theses on
substantive issues. Some examples follow here of the theological ideas of the most prominent
authors representing this trend.
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In his article ‘The awakening of rationalism (Muʿtazilism) in Islam’, written in 1957 (see
Martin et al. 2003, 128), Rudi Caspar ironically noted the changing role of that school of
thought. Muʿtazilī schools developed in the eighth and ninth centuries to defend Islam against
its non-Muslim enemies and invaders. Later, the Muʿtazila would be defeated by the rising tide
of traditionalism, which accused them of doctrinal innovation (bidʿa), and even unbelief (kufr).
For almost two centuries, the Muʿtazila competed for supremacy with the traditionalists,
represented by two new forms of thinking embodied in the Māturīdī and Ashʿarī schools of
thought. From the late eleventh to the early twentieth century, Muʿtazilism was seen as
anathema in most of the Muslim world, and only Māturīdī and Ashʿarī teachings were
accepted in the Sunni part of the Muslim world. In Sunni learning, disputes between the
H.anbalī traditionalists and the Ashʿarīs continued. At the end of the nineteenth century, a
critical surge in traditionalism took place. This movement was led by Muh.ammad ʿAbduh
(d. 1905) and Sayyid Ah.mad Khān (d. 1898). Many authors, including Caspar, associated the
interest in Muʿtazila learning in the early twentieth century with the renaissance (nahd.a) in
Arabic literature in the late nineteenth century. The nahd.a emerged in response to the
challenges posed by the irresistible cultural penetration of Western civilization into the Arab
world, achieved by attacking traditional Islamic thinking, which was frozen in conservatism.
Muh.ammad ʿAbduh was trying to respond to the social and political changes that had occurred
as a result of Western colonialism, which he saw as a threat to Muslim civilization, and in the
ideas he sought to articulate he revived some Muʿtazilī theses.
ʿAbduh’s main thesis in his interpretation of classical Islamic texts was that Muslims would
not be able to resist modernity and the West until they acquired a modern education, including
in ‘rational’ science. In his Al-risāla al-ʿAdudiyya, published in 1876, ʿAbduh expressed his
inclination to Muʿtazilī learning, and presented Muʿtazilī ideas in his theological
commentary on the proposals of the Ashʿarī theologian ʿAdud al-Dīn al-Ījī. ʿAbduh later
faced strong opposition while trying to reform the teaching curriculum at Al-Azhar
University. Several authors have noted that ʿAbduh believed that, if al-Azhar underwent
reform, Islam would be reformed too. ʿAbduh learned the primary emphases of early
Islamic rational theological thinking from Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1877–1924), since
these ideas were not part of the curriculum of either al-Azhar or any other universities.
ʿAbduh had to go into exile, not because of his students, who are attended his lectures in
large numbers, but because of the traditionalist ʿulamāʾ, who were then teaching in the
faculty and who were against any kind of change in the curriculum. The specific reason
for his exile was a lecture that focused on rational interpretation of the ʿaqāʾid and
the methodological approach to interpretation set out in Al-ʿaqāʾid al-Nasafiyya with
 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 273

al-Taftazānī’s commentary (al-Nasafī is a Māturīdī theologian [mutakallim] d. 1389). The

work follows some lines of Mutaʿzilī thought and is highly critical of Ashaʿrī doctrine. One
of the older traditionalists at al-Azhar, Professor Shaykh ʿUlaysh, publicly denounced
ʿAbduh, asking him, ‘Did you abandon Ashaʿarī ʿaqīda form in order to follow the
Muʿtazila?’ Abduh replied, ‘If I gave up blind imitation (taqlīd) of Ashʿarism, why I should
blindly imitate the Muʿtazila?’ (Martin et al. 2003, 45).
After that, ʿAbduh spent 1885 in Beirut. His lectures on kalām were published under the title
Risālat al-tawh.īd, in which he demonstrated with examples the need to repeatedly redefine
epistemological procedure in the discipline of theology. The special importance of ʿAbduh’s
work lies in his understanding of the conflict between religion and reason that had been raging
in Europe since the publication of Darwin’s On the origin of species in 1859. ʿAbduh
advocated the rational construction and interpretation of text as an integrated message, not just
focusing on isolated parts of verses with narrow, specific meanings. In an important passage in
the Risāla, Abduh writes that reason (ʿaql) should not be undervalued when dealing with
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religion (dīn), since reason leads people to pursue and accept what is proclaimed in religion.
By accepting traditional theological interpretation as a legitimate alternative to the majority of
Muslim religious and educational institutions, ʿAbduh endeavoured to articulate an approach to
open dialogue between theological opponents. Since the debate that developed between the
postmodernists and the Islamists, along with the imposition of solutions from outside by the
Orientalists, who were believed to rummage in Islamic history and constantly reconstruct the
Muslim past, internal dialogue and debate among Muslims regarding the nature of theological
issues were destabilized, while the postmodernistic theological discourse acquired a global
character. The contemporary Indonesian thinker and influential professor, Harun Nasution,
perhaps exaggerated in his assessment that ʿAbduh was a Muʿtazilī, not an Ashʿarī thinker.
Nasution’s opinion is based on the importance that ʿAbduh gave to rational thinking and the
presentation of evidence (adilla), even where the sacred text was involved. ʿAbduh’s Risālat
al-tawh.īd does in many passages reflect the rationalism of the early Muʿtazila, but other
passages reflect the Puritanism of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. In fact, ʿAbduh
takes in both lines of thought, which is a response to the dichotomy in the history of Western
theological thinking and the differences between liberalism and fundamentalism in the early
years of the twentieth century. If we consider ʿAbduh’s rationalism from the perspective of
Western thought, we see that he seeks to come close to the religious liberalism and social
progressivism that characterized European thinking from the late nineteenth century till the
first half of the twentieth. When it comes to interpreting ʿAbduh’s theory of knowledge and
cognition, as well as some other aspects of his intellectual work, it must be stressed that many
authors expressed the opinion that he was merely reiterating the medieval debate on ʿaqāʾid.
According to Ahmad S. Moussali (1993, 56), however, this does not mean that ʿAbduh’s
contribution to the readjustment of the problems of ʿaqāʾid is insignificant, since he tried to
reconcile the rational study of ʿaqāʾid with, or, in a certain sense, to restore it to, traditionalist
educational institutions and circles, at the same time linking these issues to the interpretation
of modern science.
Most scholars who have worked in the second half of the twentieth century (both modernists
and postmodernists) do not identify themselves with the Muʿtazila as the early rationalists of
Islam, or as the circle that first seriously raised the issue of knowledge and theories of
cognition in ʿaqīda. Perhaps one could say that, for them, Muʿtazilism and free thinking
represented the ability of Muslims to face change, and external influences and challenges, in a
way that could be identified as Islamic. However, their selective use of certain aspects of
Muʿtazilī doctrine and intellectual theses, as well as historical elements in the debate, is not
sufficient for them to be characterized as Muʿtazilīs. We should bear in mind the growing
 274 N. Grabus

number of non-European thinkers, among them many Muslims, who are critical of Eurocentrism.
Theories developed by Muslim thinkers in the postmodern era have been recognized as
demolishing the control of Euro-American scientists over the Islamic textual tradition. Among
the most prominent thinkers to have sought to re-articulate the understanding of Islamic
classical texts is Fazlur Rahman (1919–88). In his book Islam, 1979, he emphasized the
importance of the Muʿtazilī call for speculative reasoning and their insistence on reason in
theology. Fazlur Rahman admitted that Muʿtazilī thinkers succeeded in saving the
Muslim umma from what Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), in a similar context for
nineteenth-century Christianity, called ‘cultural contempt’ (Windelband 1988, 34). He further
stressed that they conducted a ruthless, but nevertheless successful, struggle to defend Islam
against attacks from Manichaeism, Gnosticism and materialism. In so doing, however, they
unintentionally built the first systematic school of thought regarding the principles of belief in
Islam. According to Fazlur Rahman, even though the Muʿtazila, as constructive theologians,
made a significant contribution to defending Islam from external attacks, they were not able to
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build a doctrinal system that would satisfy emotional orthodox Islamic piety. He ironically
concluded that, while they were opponents of H.anbalī traditionalism, they also caused the
development of traditionalist extremism. He believed that the extreme rationalism of the
Muʿtazila was responsible, in a sense, for the extreme rigidity and fideism of the reaction of
orthodox Islam. Fazlur Rahman also believed that orthodox Islam, as he called it, eventually
went to the opposite extreme to Muʿtazilī rationalism, and that ‘Islam took a path where its
dynamic formulations were only partially and indirectly related to the living realities of faith’
(Rahman 1979, 175). Fazlur Rahman advocated overcoming the emphasis on historical,
linguistic and excessively traditionalist approaches to belief.
An important role in post-structuralist interpretations of Islam and the quest for
epistemological method has likewise been played by Professor Mohammed Arkoun, who seeks
to make Islam relevant in the modern world, encouraging self-criticism and the restoration of
proper theological rationalism in the interpretation of the fundamental tenets of faith. Unlike
Fazlur Rahman, who is a modernist, though he criticized modernist thinking, Arkoun is a
postmodernist. He was inspired by the French school of post-structural deconstruction, which,
like traditional Islam, suffered from the post-Enlightenment criticism of modernity. Islamic
sectarian discourses usually considered post-Enlightenment secularism and modernity as
Western diseases that stemmed from colonialism, infecting and weakening the great Islamic
civilization. Even according to H.asan H.anafī, a prominent modern Egyptian thinker and a very
influential intellectual, postmodern criticism is regarded as being in opposition to Islamic
rationalism. Arkoun’s opinion is interesting as it is not primarily critical of the traditional
religious arguments in the context of modernity and Islam, but rather exercises postmodern
critical theory. He advocates that the scriptures – both the Qur’an and the Bible – should be
open to ‘historical, sociological and anthropological’ analysis (Martin et al. 2003, 203),
although he does not want to challenge ‘all the sacred and transcendent interpretations
produced by the traditional theological reasoning’, believing that such an analysis would
‘demystify the phenomenon of the Books’ (ibid., 205). Thus he does not look for the
application of the biblical criticism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which
destroyed the sacred texts of Judaism and Christianity. He explains the concept of
postmodernist rationalism as follows:
The modern rationality re-establishes the psychological and cultural function of myth, developing a
global strategy of knowledge in which the rational and the imaginary constantly influence each
other, to produce individual and historical existence. We have to give up the dual framework of
knowledge that juxtaposes reason and imagination, history and myth, truth and falsehood, good and
evil, reason and faith. We have to postulate the plurality, change and welcome form of rationality
 Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 275

that is consistent with the psychological functioning of the Qur’an positioned in the heart, and what
contemporary anthropology seeks to re-introduce under the label of imaginary. (Ibid., 206)
Arkoun considers that not only the Qur’an itself, but also the great classical commentators such as
al-T.abarī (d. 310/922) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī should be re-analysed using modern linguistic
textual and interpretative theory. Arkoun argues that, in the modern age, it is not possible to
establish a genuine epistemological process based on the historical, theological and linguistic
assumptions of traditional interpretations, because that would lead to confusion regarding the
reliability of those teachings. It is therefore the duty of Muslim intellectuals today to undertake
criticism of traditional Islamic thinking, because it confuses historically-based interpretations
with the contents of divine revelation. While many traditionalist Muslims write of the
‘Islamization’ of the social sciences and other disciplines in modern secular universities,
Arkoun believes that Islamic habits of reasoning should be deconstructed and should prepare
the way for the opening up of sacred texts to modern historical and linguistic research. Arkoun
believes that, unless there is an attempt to confront traditional thinking with modern
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approaches, standards of knowledge about Islam will continue to weaken both among the
traditional ʿulamāʾ and among the Islamists.

Continuity of struggle between traditionalism and rationalism

Muʿtazilī rationalism and H.anbalī traditionalism as competing and conflicting trends and patterns
of thought developed at the opposite ends of the Islamic spectrum, and tried to influence the
religious, intellectual and political centre. This conflict was somewhat stabilized, although not
resolved, in the tenth and eleventh centuries with the growing influence of the Shāfiʿī and
H.anbalī madhhabs, and Ashʿarī and Māturīdī kalām. In fact, theological and epistemological
conflict between rationalism and traditionalism was never finally resolved, even after the fall
of the Muʿtazila movement in the eleventh century. Because of centuries of decline and lack of
dynamic development and flow of ideas in the Muslim universities and centres of education,
as well as among the ʿulamāʾ in general, traditional patterns of thought prevailed. We have
already discussed the response to ʿAbduh’s attitudes in the interpretation of ʿaqāʾid – a reaction
based on the conviction that ʿaqāʾid acquired a permanent and defined form and an integrated
system of doctrinal teachings as early as the first centuries of Islam. The ʿulamāʾ defended
faith and its tenets from external attacks and internal conflicts as well as from the sectarian
fragmentation of the whole body of Islamic teaching. The writings of authors who looked
critically at the Muslim past, especially Sayyid Qut.b (1906–66), reveal an effort to understand
Islam as ʿaqīda (conviction and belief) and as a living doctrine. For Qut.b, ʿaqīda represented a
revolutionary method with massive latent power to transform inactive people into devout,
committed and goal-oriented beings. For him, ʿaqīda itself possessed historical and trans-
historical traits and capabilities. In this approach, Qut.b deviated completely from the
epistemological foundation of ʿaqāʾid, claiming that ʿaqāʾid constituted an ideology for the
masses, with the well-known slogan that ‘Islam is/has the answer’ to all questions. According
to Qut.b, ʿaqīda is a life-driving force, the only latent force that a true Muslim in the twentieth
century should live for. He continually pointed out that Muslims everywhere, including in
Egypt, were in desperate need of a belief that would help them to consolidate their power.
They needed a unified ideology (ʿaqīda) to enable them to face life and its problems, an
ideology to give them power against external and internal enemies. Qut.b was extremely
critical of the Azhari ʿulamāʾ, but not in the same way as ʿAbduh, who felt that the ʿulamāʾ
were burdened with historical patterns of thinking, blindly following and imitating classical
authority (taqlīd). Qut.b, on the other hand, accused the ʿulamāʾ of being associated with the
ruling elite, and of supporting a reactionary educational policy that failed to meet the
 276 N. Grabus

requirements of modern times. In his view, the foundations of Islamic knowledge do not rely on
the interpretations and commentaries studied at al-Azhar; young scholars spend the best years of
their life in such studies, but when they graduate become victims of contradictory approaches and
barren controversies (Karić 2002, 209). Qut.b ignored the entire Muslim literary experience and
argued that the original sources of Islam could be found in the Qur’an and the Sunna of the
Prophet and his biography, which are alone sufficient to solve Muslims’ problems. Qutb can
be counted among the most prominent representatives of the ideological interpretation of
ʿaqāʾid, but at the same time he neglected and suppressed the epistemological process and
methods of interpretation of ʿaqāʾid, which are important for understanding the fundamental
tenets and principles of Islamic belief.
In this thematic review of classical Islamic theological texts in the field of Islamic cognition in
a modern context, we have tried to present the main trends in approaches to interpretation and the
main proponents of ʿaqāʾid that have influenced the development of this area of thought. There
have, of course, been tens of other Islamic scholars who have written on this theme, but those
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referred to in the present article are key examples of stages in the overall development of
approaches to ʿaqīda.

Notes
1. An earlier version of this article was presented at the seminar ‘Modern Islamic thought’ at the Faculty of
Islamic Studies in Sarajevo, 24–25 May 2011.
2. Imam Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī was born in 543/1149 and died in 606/1209. Of the Islamic disciplines, he was
particularly interested in kalām, philosophy and tafsīr. He also practised medicine, astrology, alchemy and
mineralogy (see Corbin 1978, 251–2).
3. Ibn Khaldūn’s first work was a commentary on al-Rāzī’s Al-muh.as.s.al, entitled Lubāb al-muh.as.s.al fi us.ūl
al-dīn. It was written to answer certain questions in the domain of theology and philosophy (see Karić
2008, 1191–2).
4. ʿAdud al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Rah.mān ibn Ah.mad al-Ījī was born about 700/1300 and died in 756/1355. His
contribution to kalām and the theory of cognition lies in the fact that he liberated them from the
influence of ideology and in the fact that his work is systemized in a certain manner; since that very
period on, kalām has developed to become a scholastic and dogmatic theology taught in religious
schools (madrasas).
5. Abū al-Maʿālī ʿAbd al-Malik al-Juwaynī, known as Imām al-H.aramayn (d. 478 AH) (see Juwaynī 1995,
15–25).
6. Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftazānī was born in 722/1322 in Taftazan in Khorasan, in north-east Iran, and died in
Samarkand in 729/1390. He wrote in the fields of tafsīr, fiqh, us.ūl, grammar, logic and ʿilm al-kalām.
7. Al-Taftazānī interprets the teachings of his teacher al-Ījī and those of mutakallimūn, particularly Fakhr al-
Dīn al-Rāzī.

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