Liyao vs Tanhoti Liyao

OVERVIEW
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in declaring William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L.
Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao and
entitled to all successional rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit. 

FACTS
1. Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said
civil case.
2. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William's untimely demise on December 2, 1975.
3. They lived together in the company of Corazon's two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely: Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo.
4.  William Liyao's legitimate children from his subsisting marriage with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao were Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga.
5. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then vice president and
president, respectively. 
6. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account
of William Liyao. William Liyao asked his secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billy's birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon
to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein. William Liyao
would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good-looking son and had their pictures taken together.
7. During the occasion of William Liyao's last birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly acknowledged
Billy as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends. Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of
the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latter's direct and overt acts.
8. After William Liyao's death, it was Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left
his personal belongings, collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where he shared his last moments
with Corazon. 
9. Maurita Pasion, close friend of Corazon; Gloria Panopio, owner of a beauty parlor and neighbor of William and Corazon; and Enrique Garcia Yulo, son
of Corazon to Ramon, have testified and witnessed in favor of the petitioner and exhibited several pictures showing family pictures together with
William, Billy, Corazon and others.
10. Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, daughters of William to Juanita and Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard of William Liyao, testified
and witnessed in favor of the respondent. They have painted a different picture of the story. According to them, they have never received any formal
demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. (Billy) as an illegitimate son of William Liyao. Also, to their knowledge, Corazon is only an
employee of William’s company.
11. On August 31, 1993, RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The trial court was convinced by preponderance of evidence presented in court.
12. However, Court of Appeals reversed he ruling of the trial court saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child and "the
presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy between husband and wife was physically impossible at
the period cited in Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code."
13. Motion for reconsideration was denied thus petitioner filed the present petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON the petition initiated by Corazon to compel recognition by respondents can prosper.
2. WON petitioner’s action to impugn his legitimacy is proper.

RULING:  
1. No. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress.(Art 167,FC)
2. No. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional
circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his
own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter
cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot
elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption. (Art 170-171, FC)

Thus, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Eceta vs Eceta 428 SCRA 783
Rosalina P. Eceta vs Ma. Theresa Vell Lagura Eceta

OVERVIEW
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the trial court's ruling that
respondent Maria Theresa Vell Lagura Eceta is entitled to one-eight (1/8) portion of the disputed property. 

FACTS
1. Petitioner Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta sometime in 1926. They had a son named Vicente. 
2. The couple acquired several properties, among which is the disputed property located at Stanford, Cubao, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 61036.
3. Isaac died in 1967 leaving behind Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs. 
4. In 1977, Vicente died. During his lifetime, however, he sired Maria Theresa, an illegitimate daughter. Thus at the time of his death, his compulsory
heirs were his mother, Rosalina, and illegitimate child, Maria Theresa. 
5. In 1991, Maria Theresa filed a case before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, for "Partition and Accounting with Damages"against
Rosalina alleging that by virtue of her father's death, she became Rosalina's co-heir and co-owner of the Cubao property.
6. Rosalina alleged that the property is paraphernal in nature and thus belonged to her exclusively. 
7. During the pre-trial conference, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts wherein they both admitted their relationship to one another, i.e., that
Rosalina is Maria Theresa's grandmother.
8. RTC ruled in favor of Theresa, stating that she is entitled to one fourth share of said property.
9. CA affirmed the decision held by RTC with modification that the one-fourth (1/4) share erroneously decreed to Appellee is hereby REDUCED to one-
eight (1/8) undivided share of the entire disputed property, covered by TCT No. 61036, in accordance with law. 
10. Rosalina’s Motion for reconsideration was denied thus this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: 
1. WON the certified xerox copy from a xerox copy of the certificate of live birth is competent evidence to prove the alleged filiation of the respondent as
an "illegitimate daughter" of her alleged father Vicente Eceta.
2. WON the admission made by Rosalina that Theresa was her granddaughter is enough to prove the filiation with the deceased.

HELD:

1. Maria Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed Maria
Theresa's birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter. By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity
over Maria Theresa.
2. What was tried before the trial court and CA was for partition and accounting of damages only.  The filiation or compusolry recognition by Vicente of
Theresa was never put in issue.  In fact both agreed in the trial court’s pre trial order that Theresa was Rosalina’s granddaughter. 

To note from Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by:
(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or 
(2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. 
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or 
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 

The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. 

Thus, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial
Court is AFFIRMED in toto.
Rodriguez vs Lim 508 SCRA 113

OVERVIEW
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari filed by the spouses Reynaldo and Nancy Rodriguez seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals. The assailed decision affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court declaring, inter alia, Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. T-128607 in the names of
petitioners Reynaldo and Nancy Rodriguez null and void and directing them to vacate the lots subject of litigation. Likewise sought to be reversed is the
appellate court's Resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

FACTS
1. Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. filed with the court a quo a complaint for cancellation of certificate of title and injunction against the spouses Rodriguez. Pablo
alleged that his mother, Dominga Goyma, was the owner of two parcels of land (subject lots). The subject lots were registered in the name of Dominga
Goyma on February 6, 1948 under TCT No. T-2857. 
2. Dominga Goyma died on July 19, 1971 and was survived by her only son, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr., a spurious son acknowledged and recognized by
her. 
3. Reynaldo and Nancy Rodriguez allegedly unlawfully and fraudulently made it appear that they had purchased the subject lots from persons who were
not the owners thereof. They allegedly caused the cancellation of TCT No. T-2857 to TCT No. T-128605 to TCT No. T-128606 and lastly to TCT No. T-
128607 issued in the name of the spouses Rodriguez.
4. Since May 1975, the spouses Rodriguez allegedly tried to enter and occupy the subject lots by force and intimidation. Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr. thus
prayed in his complaint that the spouses Rodriguez be permanently enjoined from entering and occupying the subject lots; TCT No. 128607 be
declared null and void and TCT No. T-2857 in the name of Dominga Goyma be reinstated; and the spouses Rodriguez be ordered to pay Pablo
Goyma Lim, Jr. damages, attorney's fees and the costs of suit.
5. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent, Pablo Goyma Lim, Jr.
6. CA affirmed in toto the decision held by RTC.
7. Spouses Rodriguez filed a motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied. Thus this petition for review on certiorari .
 
ISSUE: 
1. WON respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, Pablo Goyma Lim, was a co-owner of the subject properties and entitled to one-half share despite the fact
that he was not recognized by his parents as an illegitimate child and the alleged documents proving his voluntary acknowledgement do not suffice to
prove his filiation to his parents.

HELD:
1. The contention is erroneous. It is axiomatic that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive and
binding on the Court. In this case, the court a quo and the appellate court are in agreement that, based on the evidence presented, Pablo Goyma Lim,
Jr. was the illegitimate and acknowledged son of Dominga Goyma.

To note from Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by: (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned. 
 In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 

Thus, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED in toto.
Verceles vs Posada G.R. No. 159785 Apr. 27, 2007

OVERVIEW
This case involves a petition for review that seeks reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The appellate court had affirmed with modification the
decision held by the Regional Trial Court. The RTC held petitioner liable to pay monthly support to Verna Aiza Posada since her birth on September 23, 1987
as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. 
 

FACTS
1. Sometime in 1986, respondent Maria Clarissa Posada met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of Pandan.
2. Petitioner Teofisto offered Clarissa a job. Clarissa accepted the offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayor’s office. 
3. Sometime in November 1986, Clarissa accompanied Verceles to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on town planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
After Verceles ordered food, he started making amorous advances on her. Clarissa panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room and after
she hurriedly exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went on as casual employee. 
4. In December 1986, on orders of Verceles, Clarissa went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds for barangay projects. At around 11:00 a.m. the
same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on instructions of Verceles who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. Instead, however,
Verceles opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly embraced her, as he told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would “divorce” her
anytime. He also claimed he could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But again Clarissa kept the
incident to herself.
5. Sometime in January 1987, when Clarissa missed her menstruation, she wrote a letter to Verceles informing that she might be pregnant. Verceles
replied stating that he had no regret because he loves Clarissa. They even used alias “Ninoy” for Verceles and “Chris” for Clarissa because of their 25-
year age gap.
6. Three other handwritten letters were sent to Clarissa by Verceles, two of which were in his letterhead as mayor of Pandan. Clarissa avers that
Verceles was aware of her pregnancy. The mayor even handed her a letter and P2,000 pocket money to go to Manila and to tell her parents that she
would enroll in a CPA review course or look for a job. In June 1987, Verceles went to see her in Manila and gave her another P2,000 for her delivery. 
7. Sometime in July, when Clarissa’s parents learned of her pregnancy, fetched her and brought her back to Pandan
8. On September 23, 1987, she gave birth to a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada.
9. Clarissa and her parents (Clarissa et. al.) filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite before the RTC. The trial court issued a
judgment in their favor. The trial court further directed Verceles to pay Clarissa the amount of  P30,000.00 as moral damages;P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages;and P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
10. Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment with modification as to the award of damages. 
11. Hence, Verceles filed a petition for review to the Supreme Court. Verceles asserts that the issue of filiation should be resolved in a direct and not a
collateral action.

ISSUE: 
1. WON paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for damages.
2. WON love letters may be considered as proof of filiation.
3. WON Clarissa and her parents are entitled to damages.
HELD:
1.  The caption is not determinative of the nature of a pleading. It is not the caption but the facts alleged which give meaning to a pleading. Courts are
called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance thereof. In determining the nature of an action, it is not the caption, but the averments in the
petition and the character of the relief sought, that are controlling. A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption states
“Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite,” All of Clarissa’s averments clearly establish a case for recognition of paternity. We have held that the
due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required.
2. The letters are private handwritten instruments of Verceles which establish Verna Aiza’s filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition,
the array of evidence presented by Clarissa, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza
is, indeed, Verceles’ illegitimate child.
3.  Clarissa is not entitled to damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states moral damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is inapplicable
in this case because Clarissa was already an adult at the time she had an affair with Verceles. Neither can her parents be entitled to damages.
Besides, there is nothing in law or jurisprudence that entitles the parents of a consenting adult who begets a love child to damages. Respondents
Constantino and Francisca Posada have not cited any law or jurisprudence to justify awarding damages to them.
The Court, however, affirm the grant of attorney’s fees in consonance with Article 2208 (2) and (11) of the New Civil Code.

Thus, the decision held by RTC and CA are affirmed with modification that the award of moral damages and exemplary damages be deleted.
Agustin vs court of appeals 460 SCRA 315

OVERVIEW
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision held by Court of Appeals in upholding the resolution and order of the Regional Trial
Court to deny petitioner’s motion to dismiss private respondents’ complaint for support and directed the parties to submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) paternity testing. 
 

FACTS
1. Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin's alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and
support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court.
2. Respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her
34th birthday. Despite Arnel's insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at
the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City.
3. The baby's birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe's
repeated requests for Martin's support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also
denied having fathered the child. 
4. On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with
the open car door hitting Fe's leg. This incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been
undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support.
5. Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martin's conception. He claimed that
Fe had at least one other secret lover.
6. Arnel admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but "he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret lover, a
certain Jun, but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and possessive. 
7. Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend. Arnel and his entire
family went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated her.
8. Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnel's wife and family. Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to demand that he
acknowledge Martin as his child.
9. According to Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had no "alternative but to move on but without bumping
or hitting any part of her body."
10. Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax... certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martin's birth certificate
were falsified.
11. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing. Arnel opposed said motion by
invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
12. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the
applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

ISSUES:
 1. WON a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for recognition.
2. WON the DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioner's constitutional right to privacy... and right
against self-incrimination.
HELD:
1. The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their
cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed
resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with
jurisprudence. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only
result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both cases are the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these
proceedings.
2. Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. Historically, it has
mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy
has been critically at issue. Petitioner's case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy
holds no water.
DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in some instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The growing sophistication of
DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits...
of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past.
Principles:
The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff's primary right and the... defendant's corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or
omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by
the facts alleged.

Thus, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, is
AFFIRMED in toto.
Herrera vs Alba 493 SCRA 197

OVERVIEW
This case involves a petition for review to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed two orders issued by the Regional Trial
Court. The first order directed Rosendo Herrera to submit to deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") paternity testing, while the second order denied petitioner's motion
for reconsideration. 
 
FACTS
1. On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for
compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner.
2. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied
physical contact with respondent’s mother.
3. Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the
testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell Biology. She was also
head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute (UP-NSRI), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the
University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular Biology. Dr. Halos
described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.
4. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing
violates his right against self-incrimination. 

ISSUE:

1. WON DNA Paternity testing violates Herrera’s right against self-incrimination.

RULING:

1. No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not yet recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he
questioned the order of the trial court, the prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no question as to the
acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This was the decisive ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo
(2002).

It is also considered that the Vallejo Guidelines be considered by the courts. The Vallejo Guidelines determines weight and probative value of DNA test
results.

The Vallejo Guidelines: (1) how the samples were collected; (2)how they were handled; (3) the possibility of contamination of the samples; (4) the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples; (5) whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests; and (6) the qualification
of the analyst who conducted the tests.
 Thus, the petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the orders issued by theRegional Trial Court is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Tayag vs CA 209 SCRA 664
CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN, respondent.

OVERVIEW
This case involves a petition for review for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction on the ground that the denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case
No. 7938 of the court a quo is an interlocutory order and cannot be the subject of the said special civil action, ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's
remedy. The petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of respondent Court of Appeals and its resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration

FACTS

1. Private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim for
Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. 
2. Private Respondent has estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years. During those times, respondent had an illicit amorous
relationship with Atty. Ricardo Ocampo. As a consequence thereof, they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the
ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo
3. For being his only son, Chad was showred with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative father, Atty. Ocampo. That can be gleaned
from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo.
4. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs.
5. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of real and personal property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and in
the Province of Pampanga with approximate value of several millions of pesos.
6. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried and the inheritance of the surviving heirs including that of said Chad has not
likewise been ascertained.
7. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo,
Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this instant complaint is filed.
8. Private Respondent has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of friends and relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad, such
that it is urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be extended financial support from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo
9. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made to grant Chad's lawful inheritance, but despite said demands, herein petitioner failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to satisfy the claim for inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo
10. RTC ruled in favor of private respondent.
11. CA dismissed Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
12. Thus, elevated the matter before the SC.

ISSUE:

1. WON the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private respondent in behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint
states no cause of action
HELD:

1. NO. Although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate
child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition.
Further that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our
jurisprudence. The doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in
fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his co-heirs; and the same person may
intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother. In neither of these situations has it been thought
necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings
the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.

Thus, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Landingin vs Republic 493 SCRA 383
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner, versus REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

OVERVIEW
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the decision held by the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court in granting the Petition for Adoption of the petitioner herein.

 
FACTS

1. On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA,
filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos and Eugene Dizon Ramos.
2. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner's brother, and Amelia Ramos.
3. Landingin, petitioner, alleged that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their
biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her
children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption.
4. The petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad are financially supporting the minors.
5. On November 23, 2000, their paternal grandmother died, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent to the
adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully
employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a
restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the
minors. Petitioner's brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in
petitioner's custody. 
6. Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor
7. On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34
of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon not later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the
petition.
8. The petitioner testified in her behalf and she also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed by her
and her siblings.
9. On May 24, 2002, DSWD submitted a Child Study Report. DSWD recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos
be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. 
10. RTC granted the petition for adoption.
11. OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002. Thus, CA reversed and set aside the decision held by RTC.
12. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 21, 2004, which the CA denied.
13. Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos.
2. WON the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter's children sufficiently complies with the law.
3. WON petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees
HELD:
1. NO. Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption.  Indeed, the natural right of a parent
to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents.
In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Petitioner's contention must be rejected.  When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect.  Section 9 thereof
provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice.  If,
as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of
their legal guardian.
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of
consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship.  She was
merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints.  Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish... entirely her motherly
obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious
personal problems.  Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent
in-laws provide. It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to
deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children.
2. NO. As the alleged written consent of petitioner's legitimate children did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the
Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers. Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the
written consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
3. NO. Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered.  Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with
the means of the family. It is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the
US.  She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age.  While petitioner claims that she has the... financial support and backing of her children and
siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation
 between the former and the latter.  Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioner's allegation that her siblings and her children are
financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein.
Thus, petition is DENIED.

Lahom vs. Sibulo 406 SCRA 135

OVERVIEW
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court on the assailed judgment of the trial court to dismiss the petition
to rescind the decree of adoption.

 
FACTS

1. Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom, a childless couple, took into their care Isabelita’s nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and brought him up
as his own. 
2. In 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. 
3. Thereafter, an order granting the petition was issued by RTC and as an effect, the Civil Registrar changed Jose’s surname from Sibulo to Lahom.
4. In December of 1999, Isabellita commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court. She averred that Jose refused
to change his surname to Lahom to the utter disregard of the feelings of the petitioner. 
5. Further, it was said that Jose remained indifferent to Isabelita and would only visit her once a year and that Jose was just after his alleged rights over
the properties of the petitioner and her late husband.
6. Prior to the institution of the case, Republic Act No. 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right
of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
7. The adopters may only disinherit the adoptee for valid causes provided by the law.
8. Banking on the new law, Jose moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petitioner had no cause of action against him in view of the
enactment of RA 8552.
9. RTC dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action because of the deletion of the right to rescind an adoption by the new law
10. Assuming that the petitioner’s right to rescind under the Family Code should be respected, the action still had already prescribed for being filed more
than 5 years from the time the legal ground had been discovered.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether
or not the adopter’s action prescribed.

HELD:
1. Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the
light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code
and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had
come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of
Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a
prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested when the
right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a
consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest, which in right reason, and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but
rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best
interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are
subject to State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise
accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.

Thus, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED.
In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, 454 SCRA 541

OVERVIEW
This case involves a petition to reverse the decision of the trial court of not granting the motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. 

 
FACTS
1. Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga
be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
2. RTC granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she was now known as
Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
3. Thereafter, Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle
name.
4. The Republic, through the Office of Solicitor General, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should be maintained and
preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remained to be an intestate heir of her mother.

ISSUE:

1. WON an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name.

HELD:

1. YES. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear surname of her father and her mother. Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
surname as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18[24], Article V of
RA 8552, the law on adoption, provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can assert
her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother's surname, the
Supreme Court found no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

Thus, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother's
surname "GARCIA" as her middle name. 
Santos Jr. vs Republic 21 SRA 379

OVERVIEW
This case involves an appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, in Special Proceeding No. 0001, dismissing the petition
instituted by the spouses Luis R. Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption of the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza.

FACTS

1. Petitioner Luis and Edipola Santos filed the petition before the court praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, four (4) years old, be declared their
son by adoption.
2. The petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do not have a child of
their own blood, nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
3. Edwin Villa y Mendoza is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who are the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola Villa Santos and
the minor. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with business interests in a textile development enterprise and the IBA electric plant, and is the general
manager of Medry Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His co-petitioner-wife, is a nurse by profession.
4. The parents of the child testified that they entrusted him to the petitioners who reared and brought him up, resulting to a deep and profound love for
each other. The natural parents of the minor testified that they have voluntarily given their consent to the adoption of their son by the petitioners, and
submitted their written consent and conformity to the adoption, and that they fully understand the legal consequences of the adoption of their child by
the petitioners.

ISSUE:
1. WON an elder sister may adopt a younger brother.

HELD:

1. YES. Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has been shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not
among those prohibited from adopting. Article 339 of the same code names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is
under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the law.

Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father or
mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or stepmother. This last article is, of course, necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not
 prohibited even in these cases where there already exist a relationship of parent and child between them by nature. To say that adoption should not be
allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude adoption among
relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might be, which in the opinion of this court is not the policy of the law. The
interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of paramount consideration.

Thus, the petition for adoption of the subject minor, is hereby GRANTED.

Cang vs CA 296 SCRA 128

OVERVIEW
This case involves an instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the
Regional Trial Court affirming the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang.

FACTS

1. Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano, were married and had three children.
2. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed.
3. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband's alleged extramarital affairs. Anna Marie subsequently filed a petition for legal
separation, which was granted. 
4. They had an agreement for support of the children and that Anna Marie can enter into agreements without the written consent of Herbert.
5. Petitioner left for the United States to seek divorce from Anna Marie. 
6. The brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie filed for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang children.
7. Upon learning of the adoption, Herbert went back to the Philippines to contest it, but the petition for adoption was granted by the court.
8. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption. It held that although Article 188 of the Family Code required the written consent of the natural
parents of the children to be adopted, the consent of a parent who had abandoned the child was not necessary.
9. The appellate court found that Herbert had failed to pay monthly support to his children. Hence, Herbert elevated the case before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
1. WON the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.

HELD:

1. NO.  Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption; the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a
requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of its known
living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child.

Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for the decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent has
abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care
and support which parents owe their children."

In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as
to, constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was
physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. The Court find pieces of
documentary evidence that he maintained regular communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and send them packages
catered to their whims.
Thus, petition is hereby GRANTED. Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court, are SET
ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents
Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano.