ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
SEARCH WARRANT
IN RE MORALES
571 SCRA 361
FACTS:
1. The Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) received an unsigned, undated
letter of complaint regarding Atty. Miguel
Morales of the Office of the Clerk of Court
(OCC). The letter alleged that Atty.
Morales was consuming his work hours
filing and attending to personal cases, and
was using office supplies, equipment and
utilities.
2. Deputy Court Administrator (DCA)
Reuben Dela Cruz conducted a spot
investigation and gained access to
Morales’ personal computer. Pleadings
to two of Atty. Morales’ personal cases
were found among the computer files. The
computer was seized and taken to the
custody of the OCA.
3. Morales filed a motion for the release of
his computer. The Court granted his
motion but ordered that the files be
retrieved first.
4. Morales filed a letter-complaint addressed
to then CJ Davide against DCA Dela
Cruz for alleged conspiracy and
culpable violation of the Constitution.
Morales asserted that the “raid
“conducted by DCA Dela Cruz without
search and seizure orders violated his
right to privacy and the articles seized
should therefore be considered
inadmissible.
Issues:
1. Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales's
personal computer admissible in the present
administrative case against him?
2. May the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures be invoked in an administrative
case?
3. Was there consented warrantless search in this
case?
4. Is there a ground to hold Atty. Morales liable of
the charge?
RULING:
1. While Atty. Morales may have fallen short
of the exacting standards required of
every court employee, the Court cannot
use the evidence obtained from his
personal computer against him for it
violated his constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
2. As expounded in Zulueta v. Court of
Appeals, any violation of the aforestated
constitutional right renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
3. Consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred and must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. It must be voluntary
in order to validate an otherwise illegal
search; that is, the consent must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently
given and uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. The burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony,
that the necessary consent was obtained
and that it was freely and voluntarily given
lies with the State. Acquiescence in the
loss of fundamental rights is not to be
presumed and courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver
of fundamental constitutional rights.
- To constitute a valid consent or waiver of
the constitutional guarantee against
obtrusive searches, it must be shown that:
(1) the right exists;
(2) that the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; and
(3) the said person had an actual intention
to relinquish the right.
- In this case, what is missing is a showing
that Atty. Morales had an actual intention
to relinquish his right. While he may have
agreed to the opening of his personal
computer and the printing of files
therefrom during the spot
investigation, it is also of record that
Atty. Morales immediately filed an
administrative case against said
persons questioning the validity of the
investigation, specifically invoking his
constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
4. And as there is no other evidence,
apart from the pleadings, retrieved from
the unduly confiscated personal computer
of Atty. Morales, to hold him
administratively liable, the Court had no
choice but to dismiss the charges against
him for insufficiency of evidence.
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RAUL
NUÑEZ Y REVILLEZA
G.R. NO. 177148 | JUNE 30, 2009
FACTS:
1. In a search and seizure conducted based
on reports of drug possession, the
appellant’s room was surveyed in his
presence while his family, PO2 Ortega
and the two barangay officials remained in
the living room. 31 packets of shabu,
lighters, improvised burners, tooters, and
aluminum foil with shabu residue and a
lady’s wallet containing P4,610 inside
appellant’s dresser were found.
2. The group also confiscated a
component, camera, electric planer,
grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester,
and assorted carpentry tools on
suspicion that they were acquired in
exchange for shabu. Following the
search, SPO1 Ilagan issued a Receipt for
Property Seized and a Certification of
Orderly Search which appellant signed.
3. The RTC convicted appellant guilty,
beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of
Republic Act 6425, as amended.
Appellant elevated the case to this Court
on appeal, but the case was transferred to
the Court of Appeals where the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision affirming
appellant’s conviction.
ISSUE:
WON there was an irregularity in the seizure of
personal property conducted.
RULING:
SEC. 3. (Rule 126 of the Rules of Court) Personal
property to be seized. – A search warrant may be
issued for the search and seizure of personal
property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other
proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the
means of committing an offense.
As a rule, only the personal properties described
in the search warrant may be seized by the
authorities. In the case at bar, Search Warrant
No. 42 specifically authorized the taking of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and
paraphernalia(s) only.
Thus, SC here constrained to point out
an irregularity in the search conducted.
Certainly, the lady’s wallet, cash, grinder, camera,
component, speakers, electric planer, jigsaw,
electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were
not encompassed by the word paraphernalia as
they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of
drugs. In seizing the said items then, the police
officers exercised their own discretion and
determined for themselves which items in
appellant’s residence they believed were
"proceeds of the crime" or "means of committing
the offense." This is, in our view, absolutely
impermissible.
The purpose of the constitutional
requirement that the articles to be seized be
particularly described in the warrant is to limit the
things to be taken to those, and only those
particularly described in the search warrant -- to
leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they should seize. A
search warrant is not a sweeping authority
empowering a raiding party to undertake a
fishing expedition to confiscate any and all
kinds of evidence or articles relating to a
crime. Accordingly, the objects taken which
were not specified in the search warrant
should be restored to appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ESTELA
TUAN Y BALUDDA
G.R. NO. 176066| AUGUST 11, 2010
FACTS:
1. On January 2000, two informants namely,
Tudlong and Lad-ing arrived at the office
of CIDG (Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group) in Baguio City, and
reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the
Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU),
that a certain "Estela Tuan" had been
selling marijuana at Barangay Gabriela
Silang, Baguio City.
2. SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the
report of Tudlong and Lad-ing. On the
afternoon of the same day, he gave
Tudlong and Lad-ing P300.00 to buy
marijuana, and accompanied the two
informants to the accused Tuan’s house.
Tudlong and Lad-ing entered the house,
while SPO2 Fernandez waited at the
adjacent house. Later, Tudlong and Lad-
ing came out and showed SPO2
Fernandez the marijuana they bought.
Upon returning to the CIDG office,
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
SPO2 Fernandez requested a 1. WON there was probable cause for the
laboratory examination on the
specimen and yielded positive results
for marijuana.
3. SPO2 Fernandez, together with the
informants, filed the Application for a
Search Warrant before Judge
Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge
Cortes) of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Baguio City on January
25, 2000.
4. Two hours later, at around three
o’clock, Judge Cortes personally
examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong,
and Lad-ing, after which, she issued a
Search Warrant, which stated Tuan’s
residence as “the house of the
accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela
Silang, Baguio City”.
5. Even though accused Tuan was not
around, the CIDG team was allowed
entry into the house by Magno Baludda
(Magno), accused’s father, after he was
shown a copy of the Search Warrant.
SPO2 Fernandez guarded the
surroundings of the house, while SPO1
Carrera and PO2 Chavez searched
inside. They saw, in the presence of
Magno, a movable cabinet in Tuan’s
room, below of which they found a brick of
marijuana and a firearm.
6. Later Tuan arrived and thereafter, the
police officers asked Tuan to open a
cabinet, in which they saw more bricks
of marijuana.
7. The defense, on the other hand,
disclaimed ownership of the bricks and
alleged that a Search Warrant was
issued for her house because of a
quarrel with her neighbor named
Lourdes Estillore (Estillore).
8. The RTC found accused guilty as
charged.
9. On appeal, the CA modified by
acquitting Tuan of the charge for illegal
possession of firearm but affirming her
conviction for illegal possession of
marijuana.
10. Tuan raised the matter to the Supreme
Court contending, among others, that the
warrant failed to particularly describe
the place because the house was a
two-storey building composed of
several rooms.
ISSUES:
judge to issue a Search Warrant and
whether the search warrant particularly
described the place to be searched.
2. WON the search warrant particularly
described the place to be searched.
RULING:
1. YES. The validity of the issuance of a
search warrant rests upon the
following factors:
(1) it must be issued upon
probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and
not by the applicant or any other
person;
(3) in the determination of
probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant
and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be
seized.
- The only issue is compliance with the first
and fourth factors, i.e., existence of
probable cause; and particular description
of the place to be searched and things to
be seized. Probable cause generally
signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. It likewise refers to the existence
of such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the item(s),
article(s) or object(s) sought in connection
with said offense or subject to seizure and
destruction by law is in the place to be
searched.
- Before a search warrant can be issued, it
must be shown by substantial evidence
that the items sought are in fact seizable
by virtue of being connected with criminal
activity, and that the items will be found in
the place to be searched.
- A magistrate’s determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant is paid great deference
by a reviewing court, as long as there
was substantial basis for that
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
determination. Substantial basis
means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such
facts and circumstances as would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in
connection with the offense sought to
be seized are in the place sought to be
searched. Such substantial basis exists in
this case. Judge Cortes found probable
cause for the issuance of the Search
Warrant for Tuan’s residence after said
judge’s personal examination of SPO2
Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing and
Tudlong, the informants. SPO2 Fernandez
based his Application for Search Warrant
not only on the information relayed to him
by Lad-ing and Tudlong. He also arranged
for a test buy and conducted surveillance
of Tuan.
2. YES. A description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer
serving the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the
community. A designation or
description that points out the place to
be searched to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry unerringly leads
the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of
definiteness. In the case at bar, the
address and description of the place to be
searched in the Search Warrant was
specific enough. There was only one
house located at the stated address,
which was accused-appellant’s residence,
consisting of a structure with two floors
and composed of several rooms.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision dated September 21, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
00381, was AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
PEOPLE V MAMARIL
GR 147607 | January 22, 2004
Facts:
1. SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the
RTC for a search warrant authorizing
the search for marijuana at the family
residence of appellant Mamaril. During
the search operation, the searching
team confiscated sachets of suspected
marijuana leaves.
2. Police officers took pictures of the
confiscated items and prepared a receipt
of the property seized and certified that
the house was properly searched, which
was signed by the appellant and the
barangay officials who witnessed the
search.
3. The PNP Crime Laboratory issued a
report finding the seized specimens
positive for the presence of marijuana.
Moreover, the examination on the urine
sample of appellant affirmed that it was
positive for the same.
4. Appellant denied that he was residing at
his parent’s house, and that he was at his
parent’s house when the search was
conducted only because he visited his
mother.
5. He also said that he saw the Receipt of
Property Seized for the first time
during the trial, although he admitted
that the signature on the certification
that the house was properly search
was his.
Issue:
 Whether or not the trial court erred in
issuing a search warrant
Ruling:
 YES. The issuance of a search warrant
is justified only upon a finding of
probable cause.
 Probable cause for a search has been
defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be
searched.
 In determining the existence of probable
cause, it is required that:
o The judge must examine the
complaint and his witnesses
personally
o The examination must be under
oath
o The examination must be reduced
in writing in the form of searching
questions and answers
 The prosecution failed to prove that the
judge who issued the warrant put into
writing his examination of the applicant
and his witnesses in the form of
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
searching questions and answers
before issuance of the search warrant.
 When the Branch Clerk of Court was
required to testify on the available records
kept in their office, he was only able to
present before the court the application for
search warrant and supporting affidavits.
Neither transcript of the proceedings of a
searching question and answer nor the
sworn statements of the complainant and
his witnesses showing that the judge
examined them in the form of searching
questions and answers in writing was
presented. Mere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are not
sufficient.
 Such written examination is necessary in
order that the judge may be able to
properly determine the existence and non-
existence of probable cause. Therefore,
the search warrant is tainted with illegality
by failure of the judge to conform with the
essential requisites of taking the
examination in writing and attaching to the
record, rendering the search warrant
invalid.
 No matter how incriminating the
articles taken from the appellant may
be, their seizure cannot validate an
invalid warrant. Consequently, the
evidence seized pursuant to an illegal
search warrant cannot be used in
evidence against appellant.
ROMER SY TAN VS SY TIONG GUE, ET AL.
G.R. No. 174570 | December 15, 2010
FACTS:
1. Petitioner (Romer Sy Tan) filed a criminal
case against respondents (Tiong Gue, et
al.).
2. The Respondents moved for the
withdrawal of the information which was
subsequently granted by the RTC on the
ground that the information for robbery
did not contain the essential elements
of robbery as decided upon by the
Court of Appeals on a prior complaint.
3. Hence the case was dismissed.
4. Now the petitioner, seeking shelter
from the Supreme Court contended
that he filed information for qualified
theft based on the same subject matter
of the dismissed robbery and would
like to use the item seized in the
previously conducted search for the
new information of qualified theft.
Issue:
Whether or not the items seized in the previously
conducted search warrant issued by the court for
robbery be included and used for the filing of for
an information for qualified theft.
Ruling:
- No, petitioner cannot include the seized
items as part of the evidence in the new
information. Sec. 4 of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court provides:
- Section 4. Requisites for issuing search
warrant. — A search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to
be seized which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
- Thus, as search warrant may be issued
only if there is probable cause in
connection with only one specific
offense alleged in an application on the
basis of the applicant's personal
knowledge and his or her witnesses.
Therefore, petitioner cannot utilize the
evidence seized by virtue of the search
warrant issued in connection with the case
of robbery in a separate case of qualified
theft, even if both cases emanated from
the same incident. Also, the withdrawal of
the information was justifiable, since there
was no probable cause as to indict
respondents of the crime of robbery since
unlawful taking which is an essential
element for Robbery and likewise for
Qualified Theft is not present.
- Moreover, considering that the
withdrawal of the Information was
based on the findings of the CA, as
affirmed by this Court, that there was
no probable cause to indict
respondents for the crime of Robbery
absent the essential element of
unlawful taking, which is likewise an
essential element for the crime of
Qualified Theft, all offenses which are
necessarily included in the crime of
Robbery can no longer be filed, much
more, prosper.
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
TY VS. NBI SUPERVISING AGENT DE JEMIL
G.R. No. 182147 | December 15, 2010
FACTS:
1. Petitioners are stockholders of Omni Gas
Corporation ("Omni"). They are being
suspected of engaging in illegal trading of
petroleum products and underfilling of
branded LPG cylinders in violation of B.P.
33, as amended by P.D. 1865. NBI
Agents Marvin De Jemil and Edgardo
Kawada conducted surveillance
operations on Omni. On 15 April 2004, the
NBI Agents carried out a test-buy. Using
eight branded LPG cylinders from Shell,
Petron and Total, they went to Omni for
refilling. Omni refilled the cylinders. The
NBI agents paid more than P1500. LPG
Inspector Noel Navio found that the LPG
cylinders were without LPG valve seals
and one of the cylinders was actually
underfilled.
2. On 28 April 2004, Agent De Jemil
obtained a search warrant from Pasig
RTC branch 167. The NBI seized several
items from Omni's premises.
Subsequently, Agent De Jemil filed his
Complaint-Affidavit before the DOJ. The
Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasig found
probable cause for violation of BP 33. This
was later approved by Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno.
3. Petitioners appealed the decision to the
Secretary of Justice, who later reversed
the decision of the Office of the Chief
State Prosecutor. NBI Agent De Jemil
moved for reconsideration. Denied. He
thus filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals.
4. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of Secretary of Justice. It later
reversed itself and reinstated the
Resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor.
Issues:
(1) Whether the petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals was proper even if Agent De
Jemil did not appeal to the Office of the President?
(2) Whether probable cause exists against
petitioners for violations of Sec. 2 (a) and (c) of BP
33, as amended?
(3) Whether petitioners can be held liable
therefor?
RULING:
1. YES. The determination of probable
cause by the public prosecutor, and,
later on, by the Secretary of Justice, is
subject to judicial review where it is
established that grave abuse of
discretion tainted the determination.
The aggrieved party need not resort to the
Office of the President before availing of
judicial remedies because the Secretary
of Justice is an alter ego of the President
who may opt to exercise or not to exercise
his or her power of review over the
former’s determination in criminal
investigation cases. Also, under the
doctrine of qualified political agency, the
determination of probable cause by the
Secretary of Justice is presumably that of
the Chief Executive unless disapproved or
reprobated by the latter.
2. YES. The test-buy conducted on 15
April 2004 tends to show that Omni
illegally refilled the eight branded
cylinders. Such act is a clear violation
of Sec. 2 (a), in relation to Secs. 3 (c)
and 4 of BP 33, as amended.
- Omni has no authority to refill LPG
cylinders as shown by the certifications
provided by Shell, Petron and Total. The
seized items also show that Omni has no
authority to refill the cylinders. It shows
that Omni really refilled branded cylinders
without authorization. Omni’s
unauthorized refilling of branded LPG
cylinders, contrary to Sec. 2 (a) in relation
to Sec. 3 (c) of BP 33, as amended.
- Granting arguendo that the customers
already owned the LPG cylinders, such
fact does give Omni authority to refill the
cylinders without authorization from the
brand owners. Only the duly authorized
dealers and refillers of the brand owners
may refill the branded LPG cylinders. The
offense of refilling a branded LPG cylinder
without the written consent of the brand
owner constitutes the offense regardless
of the buyer or possessor of the branded
LPG cylinder.
- Petitioner's contention that they are not
liable because the underfilling that took
place during the test-buy is an isolated
event is UNTENABLE. A single
underfilling under BP 33 is already a
criminal act.
3. Only Arnel Ty, as President of Omni, is
liable. The other petitioners, who are
members of Omni's Board of Directors,
are not liable. Sec. 4 of BP 33 enumerates
the persons who may be held liable, viz:
(1) the president, (2) general manager, (3)
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
managing partner, (4) such other officer
charged with the management of the
business affairs of the corporation or
juridical entity, or (5) the employee
responsible for such violation. The Board
of Directors is primarily a policy-making
body of the Corporation who doesn't
concern itself with day-to-day operations.
 BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 33 - AN ACT
DEFINING AND PENALIZING CERTAIN
PROHIBITED ACTS INIMICAL TO THE
PUBLIC INTEREST AND NATIONAL
SECURITY INVOLVING PETROLEUM
AND/OR PETROLEUM PRODUCTS,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFOR
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
o SEC. 2. Prohibited Acts. - The following
acts are prohibited and penalized:
(a) Illegal trading in petroleum and/or
petroleum products;
(b) Hoarding of petroleum and/or
petroleum products;
(c) Overpricing in the sale of petroleum
and/or petroleum products;
(d) Misuse of petroleum allocations;
(e) Speed contests and rallies involving
mainly the use of motor vehicles, motor-
driven watercraft or aircraft utilizing
petroleum-derived fuels, including car and
motorcycle rallies and drag racing; and
(f) Skydiving and water skiing.
BRICCIO “RICKY” A. POLLO V. KARINA
CONSTANTINO-DAVID
G.R. NO. 181881, OCTOBER 18, 2011
Facts:
1. Ann anonymous letter-complaint was
received by the respondent Civil Service
Commission Chairperson alleging that an
officer of the CSC has been lawyering for
public officials with pending cases in the
CSC. Chairperson David immediately
formed a team with background in
information technology and issued a
memorandum directing them “to back up
all the files in the computers found in
the [CSC-ROIV] Mamamayan Muna
(PALD) and Legal divisions.”
2. The team proceeded at once to the office
and backed up all files in the hard disk of
computers at the PALD and the Legal
Services Division. Within the same day,
the investigating team finished the task. It
was found that most of the files copied
from the computer assigned to and
being used by the petitioner were draft
pleadings or letters in connection with
administrative cases in the CSC and
other tribunals. Chairperson David
thus issued a Show-Cause Order
requiring the petitioner to submit his
explanation or counter-affidavit within
five days from notice.
3. Petitioner denied that he is the person
referred to in the anonymous letter-
complaint. He asserted that he had
protested the unlawful taking of his
computer done while he was on leave,
and that the files in his computer were his
personal files and those of his relatives
and associates, and that he is not
authorize the activities as they are in
violation of his constitutional right to
privacy and protection against self-
incrimination and warrantless search and
seizure. Also, the files/documents
copied from his computer without his
consent are inadmissible as evidence,
being “fruits of a poisonous tree.”
4. The CSC found prima facie case against
the petitioner and charged him with
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service and Violation of R.A. No.
6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and
Employees). On 24 July 2007, the CSC
issued a Resolution finding petitioner
GUILTY of the same merits and meted
the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE
SERVICE with all its accessory
penalties. This Resolution was also
brought to the CA by herein petitioner.
5. By a Decision dated 11 October 2007, the
CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition for
certiorari after finding no grave abuse of
discretion committed by respondents CSC
officials. His motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the CA, petitioner
brought this appeal before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search conducted and the
copying of petitioner’s files without his knowledge
and consent lawful?
RULING:
- Yes. The right to privacy has been
accorded recognition in this
jurisdiction as a facet of the right
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure
under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The constitutional
guarantee is not a prohibition of all
searches and seizures but only of
“unreasonable” searches and seizures.
- Applying the analysis and principles
announced in O’Connor and Simons for
warrantless searches involving public
employees for work related reasons to the
case at bar, we now address the following
questions: (1) Did petitioner have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in
his office and computer files? (2) Was
the search authorized by the CSC Chair
reasonable in its inception and scope?
- The petitioner had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his office and
computer files for he failed to prove
that he had an actual expectation of
privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which
contained his personal files.  He did not
allege that he had a separate enclosed
office which he did not share with anyone,
or that his office was always locked and
not open to other employees or visitors.  is also untenable considering the
He did not use passwords nor adopted
any means to prevent access by others of
his computer files. The CSC also
implemented a policy which implies on-
the-spot inspections may be done to
ensure that the computer resources were
used only for such legitimate business
purposes.
- The search authorized by the respondent
CSC Chair was reasonable since it was
conducted in connection with investigation
of work-related misconduct. A search by
a government employer of an
employee’s office is justified when
there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence
that the employee is guilty of work-
related misconduct.
- Even conceding for a moment that
there is no such administrative policy,
there is no doubt in the mind of the
Commission that the search of Pollo’s
computer has successfully passed the
test of reasonableness for warrantless
searches in the workplace.  It bears
emphasis that the Commission
pursued the search in its capacity as a
government employer and that it was
undertaken in connection with an
investigation involving a work-related
misconduct, one of the circumstances
exempted from the warrant
requirement.  The nature of the
imputation was serious, as it was
grievously disturbing.  If, indeed, a CSC
employee was found to be furtively
engaged in the practice of “lawyering” for
parties with pending cases before the
Commission would be a highly repugnant
scenario, then such a case would have
shattering repercussions.  It is settled that
a court or an administrative tribunal must
not only be actually impartial but must be
seen to be so, otherwise the general
public would not have any trust and
confidence in it. Considering the
damaging nature of the accusation, the
Commission had to act fast, if only to
arrest or limit any possible adverse
consequence or fall-out.
- Thus, petitioner’s claim of violation of
his constitutional right to privacy must
necessarily fail.  His other argument
invoking the privacy of communication
and correspondence under Section
3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution
recognition accorded to certain
legitimate intrusions into the privacy of
employees in the government
workplace under the aforecited
authorities.  We likewise find no merit in
his contention that O’Connor and Simons
are not relevant because the present case
does not involve a criminal offense like
child pornography. As already mentioned,
the search of petitioner’s computer was
justified there being reasonable ground for
suspecting that the files stored therein
would yield incriminating evidence
relevant to the investigation being
conducted by CSC as government
employer of such misconduct subject of
the anonymous complaint.  This situation
clearly falls under the exception to the
warrantless requirement in administrative
searches defined in O’Connor.
MOVING VEHICLES
ANIAG VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 104961 | OCTOBER 7, 1994
FACTS:
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
1. In preparation for the synchronized
national and local elections, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323,
“Gun Ban”, promulgating rules and
regulations on bearing, carrying and
transporting of firearm or other deadly
weapons on security personnel or
bodyguards, on bearing arms by members
of security agencies or police
organizations, and organization or
maintenance of reaction forces during
the election period.
2. COMELEC also issued Resolution No.
2327 providing for the
summary disqualification of
candidates engaged in gunrunning, using
and transporting of firearms, organizing
special strike forces, and establishing
spot checkpoints.
3. Pursuant to the “Gun Ban”, Mr. Serrapio
Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of
Representatives, wrote petitioner for the
return of the two firearms issued to him by
the House of Representatives.
4. Petitioner then instructed his driver,
Arellano, to pick up the firearms from
petitioner’s house and return them to
Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint.
When the car driven by Arellano
approached the checkpoint, the PNP
searched the car and found the firearms.
Arellano was apprehended and detained.
He then explained the order of petitioner.
5. Petitioner also explained that Arellano
was only complying with the firearms ban,
and that he was not a security officer or a
bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued
Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing
of information against petitioner and
Arellano for violation of the
Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner
to show cause why he should not be
disqualified from running for
an elective position. Petitioner then
questions the constitutionality of
Resolution No. 2327.
6. He argues that “gunrunning, using or
transporting firearms or similar weapons”
and other acts mentioned in the resolution
are not within the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code.
7. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution
No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on
the disqualification of petitioner from
running in the elections was rendered
moot when he lost his bid for a seat in
Congress in the elections.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not petitioner can be validly
prosecuted for instructing his driver to
return the firearms issued to him on the
basis of the evidences gathered from the
warrant less search of his car
RULING:
- A valid search must be authorized by a
search warrant issued by an
appropriate authority.
- However, a warrantless search is not
violative of the Constitution for as long as
the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search,
and the inspection of the vehicle is merely
limited to a visual search. In the case at
bar, the guns were not tucked in
Arellano’s waist nor placed within his
reach, as they were neatly packed in
gun cases and placed inside a bag at
the back of the car. Given these
circumstances, the PNP could not have
thoroughly searched the car lawfully as
well as the package without violating
the constitutional injunction.
- Absent any justifying circumstance
specifically pointing to the culpability
of petitioner and Arellano, the search
could not have been valid.
- Consequently, the firearms obtained from
the warrantless search cannot be
admitted for any purpose in any
proceeding. It was also shown in
the facts that the PNP had not informed
the public of the purpose of setting up
the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not
among those charged by the PNP with
violation of the
Omnibus Election Code. He was not
informed by the City Prosecutor that he
was a respondent in
the preliminary investigation. Such
constituted a violation of his right to
due process.
- Hence, it cannot be contended that
petitioner was fully given the opportunity
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
to meet the accusation against him as he
was not informed that he was himself a
respondent in the case.
- Thus, the warrantless search
conducted by the PNP is declared
illegal and the firearms seized during
the search cannot be used as evidence
in any proceeding against the
petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is
unconstitutional, and therefore, set
aside.

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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
Epie vs. Ulat-Marredo
GR 148117, March 22, 2007
Facts:
1. In an information, Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Benguet Province Epie and
Palasi was charged violating Section 68 of
PD 705 or the Forestry Reform Code of
the Philippines in that he possessed and
transport 870 bd ft., of Benguet Pine
Lumber without any permit from the
DENR.
2. As per prosecution, September 6, 1998,
2:30 PM, SPO2 Ngina received
information from a confidential agent that
a jeepney was loaded with the said trees
in Atok. He then relayed information to
other police officers and swiftly
established a checkpoint in Atok. At 4:00
PM, they spotted a jeepney heading to La
Trinidad, which they flagged down. It
didn’t stop so they chased. When it halted
at first they found it loaded with
vegetables but upon close inspection,
found pieces of lumber. The driver and
others admitted not having permits for it
and were arrested and investigated but
only petitioners Epie and Palasi were
charged.
3. Epie et. al filed a Motion to Suppress
Evidence Prosecution as lumber was
illegally seized which was denied.
Reconsideration likewise denied. It was
appealed to CA but was dismissed and
reconsideration as well.
Pertinent Issue:
- Whether or not the police officers have probable
cause to believe that the subject vehicle was
loaded with illegal cargo and therefore can be
stopped and searched without warrant.
Supreme Court Ruling:
- SC denied petition
- In People vs. Sarap, we listed the exceptions
where search and seizure may be conducted
without warrant, thus: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle;
(3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure
of the evidence in plain view; (5) search when the
accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) stop and
frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances. The only requirement in these
exceptions is the presence of probable cause.
People v. Belen Mariacos
[G.R. No. 188611 ; June 16, 2010]
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Warentless search of a moving vehicle has been
justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought. This is no
way, however, gives the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause
when a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extension search, such a warrantless search has
been held to be valid only as long as officers
conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe before the search that
they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched.
FACTS:
1. On October 26, 2005, the San Gabriel Police
Station conducted a checkpoint near the police
station at the poblacion to intercept a suspected
transportation of marijuana from Barangay
Balbalayang. The group at the checkpoint was
composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc ("PO2
Pallayoc"), the Chief of Police, and other
policemen. When the checkpoint did not yield any
suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police
instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay
Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation.
2. On October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2
Pallayoc met with secret agent of the Barangay
Intelligence Network who informed him that a
baggage of marijuana had been loaded in a
passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the
poblacion. The agent mentioned 3 bags and 1
plastic bag. Further, the agent described a
backpack bag with O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc
boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself
on top thereof. He found bricks of marijuana
wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the other
passengers about the owner of the bag, but no
one know.
3. When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2
Pallayoc alighted together with other passengers.
Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black
backpack from atop the jeepney. He only realized
a few moments later that the said bag and 3 other
bags were already being carried away by two (2)
women. He caught up with the women and
introduced himself as a policeman. He told them
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
that they were under arrest, but the women got
away.
4. PO2 Pallayoc brought the other woman he
caught, who was later identified as herein
accused-appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags
to the police station. At the police station, the
investigators contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel
to witness the opening of the bags. Three (3)
bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2)
round bundles of marijuana, and two (2) bricks of
marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a
newspaper, were recovered.
5. Thereafter, the investigators marked,
inventoried and forwarded the confiscated
marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination.
The laboratory examination showed that the stuff
found in the bags all tested positive for marijuana,
a dangerous drug.
6. When it was accused-appellant’s turn to present
evidence, she testified that: On October 27, 2005,
at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant,
together with Lani Herbacio, was inside a
passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion. While
the jeepney was still at the terminal waiting for
passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang ("Lao- ang"), her
neighbor, requested her to carry a few bags which
had been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first,
accused-appellant refused, but she was
persuaded later when she was told that she would
only be carrying the bags. When they reached the
poblacion, Lao-ang handed accusedappellant and
her companion, Lani Herbacio, the bags, and then
Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later,
PO2 Pallayoc was upon them, arresting them.
Without explanation, they were brought to the
police station. When they were at the police
station, Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also at
the police station that accused-appellant
discovered the true contents of the bags which
she was asked to carry. She maintained that she
was not the owner of the bags and that she did not
know what were contained in the bags.
7. RTC found Belen Mariacos guilty. The CA
affirmed RTC decision. Both the trial court and the
CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact
that the search was conducted on a moving
vehicle to justify the validity of the search.
ISSUE(S: WON Mariacos’ constitutional right
against unreasonable searches was flagrantly
violated by the apprehending officer.
HELD: NO.
RATIO: The SC is asked to determine the limits of
the powers of the State’s agents to conduct
searches and seizures. Thus, the Court must
determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then
there would have been probable cause for the
warrantless arrest of petitioner.
Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution
provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Law and jurisprudence have laid down the
instances when a warrantless search is valid.
These are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12 [now Section 13],
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the
elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion
based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified
mere seizure of evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by
the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable
cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of
the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure
shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued
by a judge after personally determining the
existence of probable cause. The purpose for
allowing warrantless search in moving vehicle is
justified on the ground that the mobility of motor
vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
However, this in no way gives the police officers
unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless
searches of automobiles in the absence of
probable cause when a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extension search, such a
warrantless search has been held to be valid only
as long as officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before
the search that they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched.
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a
cautious man to believe that the person accused
is guilty of the offense charged.
The rules governing search and seizure have
been steadily liberalized whenever a moving
vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a
warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge – a requirement
which borders on the impossible in instances
where moving vehicle is used to transport
contraband from one place to another with
impunity.
This exception is easy to understand. It is
impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search
is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in
other motor vehicles since they can quickly be
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the
warrant must be sought.
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent
that the search in this case is valid. The vehicle
that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs
was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a
quick decision and act fast. It would be
unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant
before conducting the search under the
circumstances. Time was of the essence in this
case. The searching officer had no time to obtain
a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to
board the vehicle before the same left for its
destination.
Moreover, in her defense, appellant averred that
the packages she was carrying did not belong to
her but to a neighbor who had asked her to carry
the same for him. This contention, however, is of
no consequence.
When an accused is charged with illegal
possession or transportation of prohibited drugs,
the ownership thereof is immaterial.
Consequently, proof of ownership of the
confiscated marijuana is not necessary.
Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not
constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal intent
and good faith are not exempting circumstances
where the crime charged is malum prohibitum, as
in this case. Mere possession and/or delivery of a
prohibited drug, without legal authority, is
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
INCIDENTAL TO A VALID ARREST
WILLIAM CHING, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
569 SCRA 711 (2008)
FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assails the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 27 March 2007 in CA G.R.
CR HC No. 00945 which affirmed in toto the 19
January 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, finding petitioner
William Ching, alias Willy (Ching), guilty of
violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. It arises when on
or about October 19, 1998, at Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, a foreign national from
Amoy, China but married to a Filipina with two
children, and not being authorized by law to do so,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and deliver to a NARGROUP
"poseur-buyer" some 3,076.28 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated
drug commonly known as "SHABU", in violation of
the above-cited law during the entrapment
operation. Petitioner vigorously insist that, on the
day he was arrested, a group of men swooped
down upon him and dragged him from his sister's
apartment unit and took him to a vehicle where his
captors demanded a huge amount of money from
him, and after his refusal to heed to their
demands, he was tortured and his captors planted
evidence against him. Without the said buy-bust or
entrapment operation, there was no valid basis for
his warrantless arrest. Hence, the operatives
violated his constitutional right against warrantless
arrest. He also claims that the search done in the
apartment unit was illegal since such was effected
following an illegal arrest.
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s warrantless arrest is
invalid and his allegation is true.

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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
RULING:
In the case under consideration, there is no
evidence of any improper motive on the part of the
police officers who apprehended Ching. His
allegations that the police officers beat him up in
their attempt to extract money from him is belied
by the absence of any proof to that effect. He did
not present any medical record that he was
physically abused. If the police officers indeed
tried to extort money from Ching by beating him
up, he could have filed the proper charges against
the erring police officers. The fact that no
administrative or criminal charges were filed lends
cogency to the conclusion that the alleged frame-
up was merely concocted as a defense ploy. In
addition, if indeed the supposed disinterested
witnesses of the defense, i.e., the pedicabdriver
and the vendor, really saw Ching being forcibly
dragged by unidentified men, they could have at
least informed the local authorities of such fact.
This they did not do. Thus, the story of the
defense is simply implausible. And the court
observed that drug pushers sell their prhobited
articles even in daytime since what matters is not
the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of
agreement and the acts constituting sale and
delivery of the prohibited drugs. The rule is settled
that an arrest made after an entrapment does not
require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a
valid warrantless arrest pursuant to Rule 113,
Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court. Having
established that the buybust operation is factual
and legitimate, the subsequent warrantless arrest
of Ching and as well as the warrantless seizure of
the illegal drugs was permissible.
People vs. Racho
626 SCRA 633, August 3, 2010
Facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the
police transacted through cellular phone with
appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent
reported the transaction to the police authorities
who immediately formed a team to apprehend the
appellant. The team members posted themselves
along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at
around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus
arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the
bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the
person he transacted with, and when the latter
was about to board a tricycle, the team
approached him and invited him to the police
station as he was suspected of carrying shabu.
When he pulled out his hands from his pants’
pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which,
when opened, yielded a small sachet containing
the suspected drug. The team then brought
appellant to the police station for investigation and
the confiscated specimen was marked in the
presence of appellant. The field test and
laboratory examinations on the contents of the
confiscated sachet yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. Appellant was
charged in two separate informations, one for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting
or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the
same law for possessing, dangerous drugs.
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not
Guilty" to both charges. On July 8, 2004, the RTC
rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of
Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 but
acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section
11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the RTC decision. The appellant brought
the case to SC assailing for the first time he
legality of his arrest and the validity of the
subsequent warrantless search.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant has a ground to
assail the validity of his arrest.
Held:
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that
"reliable information" alone is not sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in
addition, that the accused perform some overt act
that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from
this well-established doctrine. Appellant herein
was not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Neither did the arresting officers
have personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested had committed, was
committing, or about to commit an offense. At the
time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from
the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle.
Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner
that would engender a reasonable ground for the
police officers to suspect and conclude that he
was committing or intending to commit a crime.
Were it not for the information given by the
informant, appellant would not have been
apprehended and no search would have been
made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu
would not have been confiscated. Neither was the
arresting officers impelled by any urgency that
would allow them to do away with the requisite
warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio
Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their
office received the "tipped information" on May 19,
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
2003. They likewise learned from the informant
not only the appellant’s physical description but
also his name. Although it was not certain that
appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19),
there was an assurance that he would be there
the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had
ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.
PEOPLE v. ARANETA
634 SCRA 475, October 20, 2010
PETITIONER: People of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Rolando Araneta and Marilou
Santos
SUMMARY: Upon receipt of condifdential
information, police officers formed an entrapment
unit against the live-in partners Rolando Araneta
and Marilou Santos. According to the information,
the two are engaged in selling crystalline
substance belived to be metampethamine
hydrochloride (shabu). The buy-bust operation
was successful and yielded 9 plastic sachets of
shabu and one plastic sachet of marijuana. The
respondents were found guilty of selling shabu.
Also, Rolando was convicted of illegal possession
of 8 sachets of shabu and one sachet of
marijuana. They now contend that the items
seized are not admissible as evidence for being
derived from unlawful arrest. The Court ruled that
they were caught in fladrante delicto; hence, the
subsequent seizure was valid.
DOCTRINE: A search warrant or warrant of arrest
is not needed in a buy-bust operation. The
accused caught in such operation is caught in
flagrante delicto. This is an admissible method of
capturing offenders as the criminal intent
originates from the offender and not from law
enforcement officers. Hence, the search and
seizure subsequent to the arrest is admissible as
evidence.
FACTS:
1. The police officers received, between 3:00 to
3:30 in the morning, an information of an alleged
peddling of illegal drugs from a confidential
informant. The peddlers were Rolando and
Marilou.
2. SPO4 Lara formed a team with SPO2 Zigapan
as team leader and PO2 Damasco as poseur-
buyer. SPO4 Zigapan gave PO2 Damasco the
P100 bill marked money to be used for the
operation.
3. The team arrived around 4:00 am on the target
place where they saw the respondents standing
outside their house. The informant talked to the
respondents and introduced PO2 Damasco as
buyer.
4. Rolando went inside the house to get the drugs
to be sold. PO2 Damasco handed over the
marked bill to Marilou. When Rolando went
outside their house, he gave a plastic sachet
containing the crystalline substance. Upon receipt,
PO2 Damasco examined it.
5. PO2 made the signal and the respondents were
promptly apprehended. Aside from the marked
money and the plastic sachet containing shabu
sold to PO2 Damasco, Rolando was also found to
have 8 sachets of shabu and one sachet of
marijuana.
6. On trial, respondents posed the defense of
frame-up, planting evidence, forcible entry and
extortion.
7. The found guilty by the RTC of selling illegal or
prohibited drugs. Rolando is also found guilty of
possessing shabu and marijuana. The CA
affirmed.
8. They now contend that the evidence should not
be admissible for there is not valid warrant of
arrest and search warrant. Also, they contend that
there is failure on the part of the officers to
observe proper custody of dangerous drugs. As
such, the prosecution was not able to establish
that the drugs presented were actually the drugs
seized.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON illegal sale of dangerous drugs is
established – YES
2. WON the defense of denial and alibi can be
admitted – NO
3. WON the seized items were admissible - YES
RULING: CA decision is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
1. The prosecution was able to establish all the
elements required in the prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs, namely: 1) the identity of
the buyer and seller; 2) the identity of the object of
the sale and the consideration; and 3) the delivery
of the thing sold upon payment. Malou gave the
marked money to Botong who, in turn, gave Malou
a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance. The plastic sachet was then handed
over to PO2 Damasco who examined it and
immediately gave the prearranged signal to arrest
the accused. During the arrest, the marked money
was recovered from Rolando and so were several
other plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substances together with a plastic sachet
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
containing marijuana. The testimony of PO2
Damasco was clear, consistent and convincing.
2. Aside from their bare allegations, the accused
had nothing more to show that the apprehending
police officers did not properly perform their duties
or that they had ill motives against them. They
failed to substantiate their argument that they
were framed-up for extortion purposes.
3. The seized items were admissible. A search
warrant or warrant of arrest was not needed
because it was a buy-bust operation and the
accused were caught in flagrante delicto in
possession of, and selling, dangerous drugs to the
poseur-buyer. It was legal for the buy-bust team to
arrest, and search, them on the spot because a
buy-bust operation is a justifiable mode of
apprehending drug pushers. A buybust operation
is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means
are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and
capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their
criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is
legal and an effective method of apprehending
drug peddlers, provided due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
PLAIN VIEW
Abenes v. CA
GR No. 156320 14 February 2007 Austria-
Martinez, J.
FACTS:
Rodolfo Abenes, a barangay chairman, was
charged with illegal possession of high powered
firearm and its ammunitions during the election
period. Two Informations were filed for (1) illegal
possession of firearms and its ammunitions; and
(2) violation of the Omnibus Election Code.
The firearm was confiscated from Abenes at a
checkpoint wherein his vehicle was stopped and
he was asked to alight the same for routine
inspection. The police saw the firearm tucked in
his waist, and asked him to produce a license for
it. When Abenes could not produce one, the police
confiscated the firearm. It was then found that
Abenes was not a registered nor a licensed
firearm holder.
The trial court then convicted Abenes on both
charges. Abenes appealed to the CA alleging that
the checkpoint was not shown to have been
legally set up, and that his constitutional right
against unlawful search and seizure was violated.
The CA affirmed the trial court.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the checkpoint was legally set up.
2. W/N Abenes’ constitutional right against
unlawful search and seizure had been
violated.
RULING:
1. YES. The production of a mission order is
not necessary in view of the fact that the
checkpoint was established three days
before the May 11, 1998 elections; and
the circumstances under which the
policemen found the gun warranted its
seizure without a warrant (plain view).
2. NO. The law enforcement officers lawfully
made an initial intrusion because of the
enforcement of the Gun Ban and were
properly in a position from which they
particularly viewed the area. In the course
of such lawful intrusion, the policemen
came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating Abenes where they
saw the gun tucked into his waist. The
gun was in plain view and discovered
inadvertently when Abenes alighted from
the vehicle. However, there is insufficient
evidence that the firearm Abenes carried
had no license. Thus, for failure of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that Abenes was carrying a firearm
without prior authority, license or permit,
the latter must be exculpated from
criminal liability under the illegal
possession of firearms law. However,
Abenes is still convicted for violation of the
Comelec Gun Ban.
DOCTRINE:
Not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are
warranted by the exigencies of public order and
are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists
are allowed. For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited
to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be
regarded as violative of an individual’s right
against unreasonable search.
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the
“plain view” of an officer who has a right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence.
The plain view doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he
can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item
he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
SUSAN ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
G.R. No. 182010. August 25, 2010.
FACTS:
Susan Esquillo was convicted of the violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Acts. On the time of the
arrest, two police officers came to Esquillo and
another person while they were transacting. While
the officers were coming, one of the officers saw
Esquillo hide a transparent plastic bag with white
substance in it. When asked, she fled but was
eventually caught.
Esquillo argues that the arrest was invalid and that
the officers planted evidence against her.
The lower cause said that the officers had
probable cause to search Esquillo under the stop-
and-frisk doctrine.
ISSUE:
Whether the arrest was valid.
RULING:
The SC denied the appeal.
Firstly, the issue whether the arrest was valid was
waived by the petitioner when she did not quash it
before arraignment. The issue was only raised the
first time during appeal on the appellate court.
On regards her arrest, when the officer saw the
white substance from a distance, the plain view
doctrine was imposed. When searched the officers
followed the definition and requirements of a valid
stop-and-frisk as stated in People v. Chua - that
he should properly introduce himself and make
initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person
who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in
order to check the latter’s outer clothing for
possibly concealed weapons.
Ramon Martinez y Goco/Ramon Goco y
Martinez, Petitioner, v. People of the
Philippines, Respondent.
G.R. No. 198694: February 13, 2013
FACTS:
On December 29, 2007, while PO2 Roberto
Soque, et. al, conducting a routine foot patrol
along Balingkit Street, Malate, Manila, they heard
a man shouting Putanginamo!
Limangdaannabaito?. For purportedly violating
Section 844 of the Revised Ordinance of the City
of Manila which punishes breaches of the peace,
the man, later identified as Ramon, was
apprehended and asked to empty his pockets. In
the course thereof, the police officers were able to
recover from him a small transparent plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance
suspected to be shabu. Consequently, Ramon
was charged with possession of dangerous drugs
under Section 11(3), Article II of RA 9165.
In defense, Ramon denied the charge and
contented that hile walking along Balingkit Street
to borrow a welding machine, a man in civilian
clothing approached and asked him if he is
Ramon Goco. Upon affirming his identity, he was
immediately handcuffed by the man who
eventually introduced himself as a police officer.
Together, they boarded a tricycle (sidecar)
wherethe said officer asked him if he was carrying
illegal drugs. Despite his denial, he was still
brought to a precinct to be detained. Thereafter,
PO2 Soque for P20, 000.00 in exchange for his
release, unable to give the money asked for,
Ramon was brought to the Manila City Hall for
inquest proceedings.
The RTC convicted Ramon of the crime of
possession of dangerous drugs; finding all its
elements to have been established through the
testimonies of the prosecutions disinterested
witnesses. It also upheld the legality of Ramons
warrantless arrest, observing that Ramon was
disturbing the peace in violation of the Manila City
Ordinance during the time of his apprehension.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the factual findings of
RTC and likewise sustained the validity of the
body search made on Ramon as an incident of a
lawful warrantless arrest for breach of the peace
which he committed in the presence of the police
officers, notwithstanding its (the case for breach of
the peace) subsequent dismissal for failure to
prosecute.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid?
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
POLITICAL LAW: exclusionary rule
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution enshrines a persons right against
unwarranted intrusions by the government.
Accordingly, so as to ensure that the same
sacrosanct right remains revered, effects secured
by government authorities in contravention of the
said provision rendered inadmissible in evidence
for any purpose, in any proceeding in relation to
Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution.
Commonly known as the exclusionary rule, the
above-cited proscription is not, however, an
absolute and rigid one. As found in jurisprudence,
one of the traditional exceptions, among others, is
searches incidental to a lawful arrest which is of
particular significance to this case and thus,
necessitates further disquisition.
REMEDIAL LAW: valid warrantless arrest
A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a
subsequent search is one that is carried out under
the parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court14which requires that the
apprehending officer must have been spurred by
probable cause to arrest a person caught in
flagrante delicto. The term probable cause,
specifically with respect to arrests has been
understood to mean such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested.
Based on the records in the case at bar, PO2
Soque arrested Ramon for allegedly violating
Section 844 (breaches of peace) of the Manila
City Ordinance. Evidently, the gravamen of these
offenses is the disruption of communal tranquillity.
Thus, to justify a warrantless arrest based on the
same, it must be established that the
apprehension was effected after a reasonable
assessment by the police officer that a public
disturbance is being committed. However, PO2
Soques testimony surrounding circumstances
leading to Ramons warrantless warrant clearly
negates the presence of probable cause when the
police officers conducted their warrantless arrest
of Ramon.
To elucidate, it cannot be said that the act of
shouting in a thickly populated place, with many
people conversing with each other on the street,
would constitute any of the acts punishable under
Section 844 of the said ordinance. The words he
allegedly shouted "Putangina mo! Limang daan na
ba ito?" are not slanderous, threatening or
abusive, and thus, could not have tended to
disturb the peace or excite a riot considering that
at the time of the incident, Balingkit Street was still
teeming with people and alive with activity.
Further, no one present at the place of arrest ever
complained that Ramons shouting disturbed the
public. On the contrary, a disinterested member of
the community (a certain Rosemarie Escobal)
even testified that Ramon was merely standing in
front of the store of a certain Mang Romy when a
man in civilian clothes, later identified as PO2
Soque, approached Ramon, immediately
handcuffed and took him away.
In its totality, the facts and circumstances could
not have engendered a well-founded belief that
any breach of the peace had been committed by
Ramon at the time that his warrantless arrest was
effected. Thus, no probable cause existed to
justify Ramons warrantless arrest.
POLITICAL LAW: inadmissible evidence
Consequently, since it cannot be said that Ramon
was validly arrested, the warrantless search that
resulted from it was also illegal. Thus, the subject
shabu purportedly seized from Ramon is
inadmissible evidence.
The decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals is reversed and set aside.
STOP AND FRISK
POSADAS VS CA 188 SCRA 288 (1990)
OVERVIEW
This case questions the validity of warrantless
search.
FACTS
1. On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00
o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio
Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both
members of the Integrated National Police
(INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned
with the Intelligence Task Force, were
conducting a surveillance along
Magallanes Street, Davao City.
2. While they were within the premises of the
Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
Posadas carrying a "buri" bag and they
noticed him to be acting suspiciously.
3. The police officers approached him, but
the latter attempted to flee.
4. The police officers checked the buri bag
and found 1 caliber .38 revolver and two
live ammunitions for .22 caliber gun.
5. Posadas was brought to the police station
and was asked to show license for the
items recovered, but he failed to show
them.
6. He was brought to the Metrodiscom office
and later on was charged for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions
in the RTC.
7. He pleaded NOT Guilty. RTC rendered a
GUILTY judgment against him. CA
affirmed the decision.
ISSUES
WON there was a valid warrantless search and
seizure?
RULING
YES. At the time the peace officers in this case
identified themselves and apprehended the
petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not
know that he had committed, or was actually
committing the offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected
that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They
did now know what its contents were. The said
circumstances did not justify an arrest without a
warrant.
However, there are many instances where a
warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest,
foremost of which is the "stop and search"
without a search warrant at military or police
checkpoints.
The probable cause is that when the petitioner
acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the
buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was
the right and duty of the police officers to inspect
the same.
Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court a
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of
a commission of an offense without a search
warrant.
PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE SCRA 12 (1992)
OVERVIEW
This case acquittal from a crime of illegal
possession of firearms.
FACTS
1. Western Police District received a
telephone call from an informer that there
were three suspicious-looking persons at
the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay
Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A
surveillance team of plainclothesmen was
forthwith dispatched to the place.
2. Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto
Juan narrated that they saw two men
"looking from side to side," one of whom
was holding his abdomen. They
approached these persons and identified
themselves as policemen, whereupon the
two tried to run away but were unable to
escape because the other lawmen had
surrounded them.
3. The suspects were then searched. One of
them, who turned out to be the accused-
appellant, was found with a .38 caliber
Smith and Wesson revolver with six live
bullets in the chamber.
4. His companion, later identified as Nicanor
Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his
front right pants pocket. The weapons
were taken from them. Mengote and
Morellos were then turned over to police
headquarters for investigation by the
Intelligence Division.
5. One other witness presented by the
prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan,
who identified the subject weapon as
among the articles stolen from him during
the robbery in his house in Malabon on
June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as
one of the robbers. l Mengote made no
effort to prove that he owned the firearm
or that he was licensed to possess it and
claimed instead that the weapon had been
"Planted" on him at the time of his arrest.
6. It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief
that the revolver should not have been
admitted in evidence because of its
illegal seizure. No warrant therefor
having been previously obtained.
Neither could it have been seized as an
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
incident of a lawful arrest because the
arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful,
having been also effected without a
warrant.
7. The defense also contends that the
testimony regarding the alleged robbery in
Danganan's house was irrelevant and
should also have been disregarded by the
trial court.
ISSUES
WON the arrest was lawful
RULING
NO. The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5
Rule 113 of rules of court requires that a person
be arrested after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to
commit an offense in the presence of the arresting
officer.
These requirements have not been established in
the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused was merely “looking from
side to side” and “holding his abdomen”. There
was apparently no offense that has just been
committed or was being actually committed or at
least being attempted by Mengote in their
presence.
The Court takes note that there was nothing to
support the arresting officers' suspicion other than
Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his
abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it
have been inferred from these acts that an offense
had just been committed, or was actually being
committed, or was at least being attempted in their
presence.
 
MANALILI VS. CA 280 SCRA 400 (1998)
OVERVIEW
In this case, the Narcotics officers were doing
surveillance and chanced upon the accused in a
cemetery who seemed to be high on drugs. He
tried to resist the police officers and upon
inquiry, found that the accused was
possessing what seemed to be crushed
marijuana leaves.
FACTS
1. The policemen conducted surveillance
because of information that drug addicts
were roaming the area in front of the
Kalookan City Cemetery.
2. The policemen chanced upon a male
person in front of the cemetery who
appeared high on drugs. The male person
was observed to have reddish eyes and to
be walking in a swaying manner.
3. When this male person tried to avoid the
policemen, the latter approached him and
introduced themselves as police officers.
They then asked the male person what he
was holding in his hands.
4. The male person tried to resist but later
showed his wallet where a crushed
marijuana residue was found inside.
5. Version of Defense: He and the trike
driver was bodily searched, but no
marijuana was found. The driver was
released, but he was brought to the
headquarters.
ISSUES
WON the search was valid?
RULING
YES. The policemen had sufficient reason to
accost accused-appellant to determine if he was
actually high on drugs due to his suspicious
actuations, coupled with the fact that based on
information, this area was a haven for drug
addicts.
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular
designation of the right of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him
for weapons. It has been held as one of the
exceptions to the general rule against searches
without warrant.
The recent case of People vs. Lacerna
enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule
against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1)
search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search
of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view,
(4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the
accused themselves of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure." In People
vs. Encinada, the Court further explained that "[i]n
these cases, the search and seizure may be made
only with probable cause as the essential
requirement.
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as
another exception to the general rule against a
search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
Appeals,the Court held that there were many
instances where a search and seizure could be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk.
EXPRESS WAIVER
VEROY VS LAYAGUE 210 SCRA 14 (1992)
OVERVIEW
This case involves whether police officers acted in
excess of the qualified consent.
FACTS
1. The Veroys moved to QC when Leopoldo
Veroy was promoted Asst. Admin of SSS
and left their house at Skyline, Catalunan,
Davao City to houseboys Jimmy Favia
and Eric Burgos. A caretaker Edna
Soguilon who had keys to the kitchen
only. The Veroys had the keys to the
interior of the house.
2. Capt. Obrero raided the house based on
an information that rebel soldiers are
allegedly hiding there.
3. With the help of caretakers, they were
able to enter only up to the yard since the
owner was not around and they did not
have a search warrant.
4. They contacted Mrs. Veroy, and explained
that the house was reportedly being used
as a hideout and recruitment center of
rebel soldiers. Mrs. Veroy then gave
permission to search the house with the
condition that Major Macasaet, a long-
time family friend, must be there during
the search.
5. Despite the qualified consent, the officers
entered various rooms, including the
children’s room, which was opened
through the help of the locksmith and
confiscated a .45 caliber gun and other
effects, which were the basis of the
charge of illegal possession of firearms
against them.
6. Despite the fact that the warrants for their
arrest have not yet been served on them,
petitioners voluntarily surrendered
themselves to Brig. Gen. Pantaleon
Dumlao, PC-CIS Chief, since it was the
CIS that initiated the complaint. However,
the latter refused to receive them on the
ground that his office has not yet received
copies of their warrants of arrest.
7. The Spouses Veroy assailed the
admissibility of the evidence for being
obtained in violation of their constitutional
right against unreasonable search and
seizure.
ISSUES
WON the consent is tantamount to warrantless
search and seizure.
RULING
No. Petitioners aver that while they concede that
Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa
Veroy to break open the door of their residence, it
was merely for the purpose of ascertaining thereat
the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The
permission did not include any authority to
conduct a room to room search once inside the
house. The items taken were, therefore, products
of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional
rights As such, they are inadmissible in evidence
against them.
The objects seized, being products of illegal
searches, were inadmissible in evidence in the
criminal actions subsequently instituted against
the accused-appellants.
Undeniably, the offense of illegal possession of
firearms is malum prohibitum but it does not follow
that the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per
se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the
subjects of this kind of offense may not be
summarily seized simply because they are
prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.
PEOPLE VS. DEQUINA 640 SCRA 111 (2011)
OVERVIEW
This case involves the violation of Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.
FACTS
1. Accused Nelida Dequina was charged for
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, the pertinent facts of the case are
as follows: P03 Masange along with two
other companions were given a tip that a
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
huge amount of marijuana will be
delivered in the corner of Juan Luna and
Rexabano Street in Tondo Manila.
2. Being given the description of the
purported carriers, P03 Masange et al.
proceeded to the area and, a male and
two females were seen getting off the taxi
and carrying individual black bags.
3. The officers went to the individuals and
the three began to panic. One of them is
accused Nelida Dequina who dropped the
bag she was carrying, causing the zipper
to open and revealed what seemed to be
bricks of marijuana.
4. The bags of her two other companion
contained the same. Dequina raised as a
defense that she only did what she did
because she was under the gun, that her
daughter was in the hands of the
mastermind threatening her that
something bad is to happen to her
daughter if she would not complete what
she is asked to do.
5. The RTC convicted her party of the crime
and was affirmed by the CA. Dequina and
party assail their conviction, asserting that
their arrests were illegal.
6. They were not doing anything illegal that
would have justified their warrantless
arrest, much less a warrantless search of
their persons and belongings. A search
made without a warrant cannot be justified
as an incident of arrest unless the arrest
itself was lawful.
7. The People counters that accused-
appellants’ arrests were lawful as they
were then actually committing a crime.
Since accused-appellants were lawfully
arrested, the resulting warrantless search
of their persons and belongings was also
valid.
8. In addition, accused-appellants did not
refute that they were indeed transporting
prohibited drugs when they were arrested
and, instead, alleged as defenses that
Dequina acted under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear, and Jundoc and
Jingabo were merely accommodating a
trusted childhood friend.
ISSUES
W/N the warrantless arrest of Dequina is valid.
RULING
Yes. The party of Dequina was in inflagrante
delicto at the time of the arrest.
Ratio: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
provides that a lawful arrest without a warrant may
be made by a peace officer or a private person
under the following circumstances: 1. When the
person to be arrested is in inflagrante delicto. 2.
When the arresting officer is in hot pursuit. 3.
When the person to be arrested is an escapee.
“Transport” as used under the Dangerous Drugs
Act is defined to mean “to carry or convey from
one place to another.” The evidence in this case
shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-
appellants were caught in flagrante
carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in
their traveling bags. PO3 Masanggue need not
even open Dequina’s traveling bag to determine
its content because when the latter noticed the
police officers’ presence, she walked briskly away
and in her hurry, accidentally dropped her
traveling bag, causing the zipper to open and
exposed the dried marijuana bricks therein. Since
a crime was then actually being committed by the
accused-appellants, their warrantless arrest was
legally justified, and the following warrantless
search of their traveling bags was allowable as
incidental to their lawful arrest.
PEOPLE VS. UYBOCO 640 SCRA 146 (2011)
OVERVIEW
This is a kidnapping kidnapping for ransom case.
FACTS
1. On 20 December 1993, Nimfa and her
wards, siblings Jeson Kevin and Jeson
Kirby Dichaves were abducted and
brought to a house in Merville Subdivision,
Parañaque.
2. Nimfa was able to recognized one of the
kidnappers as appellant, because she had
seen the latter in her employer’s office.
3. The kidnappers called Jepson and
demanded for ransom of P26 Million. In
one of the calls of the kidnappers, Jepson
was able to recognize the voice of
appellant because he had several
business transactions.
4. After, numerous times of negotiation, the
parties finally agreed to a ransom of P1.5
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
Million, some in ash and the balance to be
paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol.
5. Appellant asked Jepson to bring the
ransom alone at Pancake House in
Magallanes Commercial Center and
ordered him to put the bag in the trunk,
leave the trunk unlocked, and walk away
for ten (10) minutes without turning back.
6. P/Insp. Escandor and P/Supt. Chan were
assigned to proceed to Magallanes
Commercial Center and brought a camera
to take photo and video coverage of the
supposed pay-off.
7. He identified Macias together with
appellant and the latter as the one who
took the ransom. Later, appellant checked
on his trunk and the bag was already
gone.
8. Appellant then apprised him that his sons
and helper were already at the Shell
Gasoline Station along South Luzon
Expressway.
9. He immediately went to the place and
found his sons and helper seated at the
corner of the gas station.
10. P/Supt. Cruz and his group was assigned
at Fort Bonifacio then heard on their radio
that the suspect’s vehicle, a red Nissan
Sentra was heading in their direction. A
few minutes later, they saw the red car
and tailed it until it reached Dasmariñas
Village in Makati.
11. When said car slowed down, they blocked
it and immediately approached the
vehicle.
12. They introduced themselves as police
officers and accosted the suspect, who
turned out to be appellant. Appellant
suddenly pulled a .38 caliber revolver and
a scuffle took place. They managed to
subdue appellant and handcuffed him.
13. Appellant was requested to open the
compartment and a gray bag was found
inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money, jewelry
and a gun inside the bag.
ISSUES
WON there was a valid search?
RULING
YES. The instance of lawful warrantless arrest
covered by paragraph (b) cited above
necessitates two stringent requirements before a
warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense
has just been committed; and (2) the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it. Records show that both
requirements are present in the instant case. The
police officers present in Magallanes Commercial
Center were able to witness the pay-off which
effectively consummates the crime of kidnapping.
Such knowledge was then relayed to the other
police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where
appellant was expected to pass by. Personal
knowledge of facts must be based on probable
cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. Section 5, Rule
113 does not require the arresting officers to
personally witness the commission of the offense
with their own eyes. It is sufficient for the arresting
team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a
number of hours long enough for them to be
informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the
kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal
knowledge based on probable cause.
The search conducted inside the car of appellant
was legal because the latter consented to such
search as testified by P/Supt. Cruz. Even
assuming that appellant did not give his consent
for the police to search the car, they can still
validly do so by virtue of a search incident to a
lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission
of an offense without a search warrant.
 
CUSTOMS SEARCH
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS VS OGARIO 329 SCRA
289 (2000)
OVERVIEW
This case involves whether reimbursement may
be asked by surety.
FACTS
1. On December 9, 1998, Felipe A.
Bartolome, District Collector of Customs
of Cebu, issued a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention1 of 25,000 bags of rice, bearing
the name of "SNOWMAN, Milled in
Palawan" shipped on board the M/V
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"Alberto," which was then docked at Pier 6
in Cebu City.
2. The warrant was issued on the basis of
the report of the Economic Intelligence
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Region
VII that the rice had been illegally
imported.
3. The report stated that the rice was landed
in Palawan by a foreign vessel and then
placed in sacks marked "SNOWMAN,
Milled in Palawan." It was then shipped to
Cebu City on board the vessel M/V
"Alberto."
4. Forfeiture proceedings were started in the
customs office in Cebu, docketed as Cebu
Seizure Identification Case No. 17-98.
5. On December 10, 1998, respondent Mark
Montelibano, the consignee of the sacks
of rice, and his buyer, respondent Elson
Ogario, filed a complaint for injunction
(Civil Case No. CEB-23077) in the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, alleging
that the acts of the defendants in
stopping the loading and unloading
activities of the plaintiffs laborers
[have] no basis in law and in fact; thus,
unlawful and illegal. A mere suspicion
which is not coupled with any proof or
evidence to that effect is [a] matter
which the law prohibits, among others.
6. However, the SC ruled that RTC and CA
don’t have jurisdiction on this.
ISSUES
WON the BoC has the power and basis for the
seizure?
RULING
YES. Even if the seizure by the Collector of
Customs were illegal, which has yet to be proven,
we have said that such act does not deprive the
Bureau of Customs of jurisdiction thereon.
Respondents cite the statement of the Court of
Appeals that regular courts still retain jurisdiction
"where, as in this case, for lack of probable cause,
there is serious doubt as to the propriety of placing
the articles under Customs jurisdiction through
seizure/forfeiture proceedings." They overlook the
fact, however, that under the law, the question of
whether probable cause exists for the seizure of
the subject sacks of rice is not for the Regional
Trial Court to determine. The customs authorities
do not have to prove to the satisfaction of the
court that the articles on board a vessel were
imported from abroad or are intended to be
shipped abroad before they may exercise the
power to effect customs searches, seizures, or
arrests provided by law and continue with the
administrative hearings.12 As the Court held in
Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya.
The governmental agency concerned, the Bureau
of Customs, is vested with exclusive authority.
Even if it be assumed that in the exercise of such
exclusive competence a taint of illegality may be
correctly imputed, the most that can be said is that
under certain circumstances the grave abuse of
discretion conferred may oust it of such
jurisdiction. It does not mean however that
correspondingly a court of first instance is vested
with competence when clearly in the light of the
above decisions the law has not seen fit to do so.
The proceeding before the Collector of Customs is
not final. An appeal lies to the Commissioner of
Customs and thereafter to the Court of Tax
Appeals. It may even reach this Court through the
appropriate petition for review.
RIETA VS. PEOPLE 463 SCRA 146 (2004)
OVERVIEW
This case involves questioning the admissibility of
evidence, after a PD authorizing ASSO was
declared void.
FACTS
1. On October 12, 1979, Col. Panfilo Lacson,
the[n] Chief of the Police Intelligence
Branch of the Metrocom Intelligence and
Security Group (MISG for brevity),
received information that certain
syndicated groups were engaged in
smuggling activities somewhere in Port
Area, Manila.
2. It was further revealed that the activities
[were being] done at nighttime and the
smuggled goods in a delivery panel and
delivery truck [were] being escorted by
some police and military personnel.
3. He fielded three surveillance stake-out
teams the following night along Roxas
Boulevard and Bonifacio Drive near Del
Pan Bridge, whereby they were to watch
out for a cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-
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167 bound for Malabon. Nothing came out
of it.
4. At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of
October 14, 1979, Col. Lacson and his
men returned to the same area, with Col.
Lacson posting himself at the immediate
vicinity of the 2nd COSAC Detachment in
Port Area, Manila, because as per
information given to him, the said cargo
truck will come out from the premises of
the 2nd COSAC Detachment.
5. COSAC stands for Constabulary Off-
Shore Anti-Crime Battalion. The night
watch lasted till the wee hours of the
following morning. About 3:00 a.m. an
Isuzu panel came out from the place of
the 2nd COSAC Detachment. It returned
before 4:00 a.m. of [the] same day.
6. At around 5 minutes before 4:00 o'clock
that morning, a green cargo truck with
Plate No. T-SY-167 came out from the
2nd COSAC Detachment followed and
escorted closely by a light brown Toyota
Corona car with Plate No. GR-433 and
with 4 men on board.
7. At that time, Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson had
no information whatsoever about the car,
so he gave an order by radio to his men to
intercept only the cargo truck. The cargo
truck was intercepted.
8. Col. Lacson noticed that the Toyota car
following the cargo truck suddenly made a
sharp U-turn towards the North, unlike the
cargo truck [that] was going south. Almost
by impulse, Col. Lacson's car also made a
U-turn and gave chase to the speeding
Toyota car, which was running between
100 KPH to 120 KPH.
9. Col. Lacson sounded his siren. The chase
lasted for less than 5 minutes until said
car made a stop along Bonifacio Drive, at
the foot of Del Pan Bridge.
10. Col. Lacson and his men searched the car
and they found several firearms,
particularly: three (3) .45 cal. Pistols and
one (1) armalite M-16 rifle. He also
discovered that T/Sgt. Ernesto Miaco was
the driver of the Toyota car, and his
companions inside the car were Sgt.
Guillermo Ferrer, Sgt. Fidel Balita and
Sgt. Robartolo Alincastre, [all] belonging
to the 2nd COSAC Detachment. They
were found not to be equipped with
mission orders.
11. Rieta was found guilty in RTC and CA.
12. Petitioner contends that his arrest by
virtue of Arrest Search and Seizure Order
(ASSO) No. 4754 was invalid, as the law
upon which it was predicated -- General
Order No. 60, issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos -- was subsequently
declared by the Court, in Tañada v.
Tuvera, to have no force and effect.
Thus, he asserts, any evidence obtained
pursuant thereto is inadmissible in
evidence.
ISSUES
Were the evidence obtained against the accused
inadmissible in evidence because petitioner and
his co-accused were arrested without a warrant
but by virtue of an arrest and seizure order
(ASSO) which was subsequently declared illegal
and invalid?
RULING
YES. The Chicot doctrine cited in Tañada
advocates that, prior to the nullification of a
statute, there is an imperative necessity of taking
into account its actual existence as an operative
fact negating the acceptance of "a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever was
done while the legislative or the executive act was
in operation should be duly recognized and
presumed to be valid in all respects. The ASSO
that was issued in 1979 under General Order No.
60 -- long before our Decision in Tañada and the
arrest of petitioner -- is an operative fact that can
no longer be disturbed or simply ignored.
The search and seizure of goods, suspected to
have been introduced into the country in violation
of customs laws, is one of the seven doctrinally
accepted exceptions to the constitutional
provision. Such provision mandates that no search
or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge who has personally
determined the existence of probable cause.
Under the Tariff and Customs Code, a search,
seizure and arrest may be made even without a
warrant for purposes of enforcing customs and
tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly
obtain a judicial warrant, the Code specifically
allows police authorities to enter, pass through or
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search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or
building that is not a dwelling house; and also to
inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft
and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any
person on board; or to stop and search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected
of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited
article introduced into the Philippines contrary to
law.
SALVADOR VS. PEOPLE
Facts: Petitioners, PAL ground crew employees
were allegedly caught with dutiable goods
(branded watches, etc) after PAF officers were
observing their conduct and found it to be
suspicious during a special mission given to them
to make a routine surveillance to check on reports
of alleged trafficking and smuggling being
facilitated by PAL employees.
Petitioners were convicted. Hence, the present
petition.
Issue: WON the seized items are admissible in
evidence.
Held:
Here, it should be noted that during the incident in
question, the special mission of the PAF
operatives was to conduct a surveillance operation
to verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling
by certain PAL personnel in the vicinity of the
airport. In other words, the search made by the
PAF team on petitioner and his co-accused
was in the nature of a customs search. As
such, the team properly effected the search
and seizure without a search warrant since it
exercised police authority under the customs
law.
In Papa vs. Mago, involving a customs search, we
held that law enforcers who are tasked to effect
the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are
authorized to search and seize, without a search
warrant, any article, cargo or other movable
property when there is reasonable cause to
suspect that the said items have been
introduced into the Philippines in violation of
the tariff and customs law. They may likewise
conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or
person suspected of holding or conveying the said
articles, as in the case at bar.
In short, Mago clearly recognizes the power of the
State to foil any fraudulent schemes resorted to by
importers who evade payment of customs duties.
The Government’s policy to combat the serious
malady of smuggling cannot be reduced to futility
and impotence on the ground that dutiable articles
on which the duty has not been paid are entitled to
the same Constitutional protection as an
individual’s private papers and effects. Here, we
see no reason not to apply this State policy which
we have continued to affirm.
EXIGENCY
PEOPLE V. DE GRACIA
G. R. Nos. 102009-10 July 6, 1994
FACTS:
1. Reform the Armed Forces Movement-
Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP)
staged a coup d’état on December 1989
against the Government.
2. Efren Soria of Intelligence Division, NCR
Defense Command, together with his
team, conducted a surveillance of the
Eurocar Sales Office in EDSA, QC .
3. Such surveillance was conducted
pursuant to an intelligence report that the
said establishment was being occupied by
the elements of the RAM-SFP as
communication command post.
4. Near the Eurocar office, there were crowd
watching the on-going bombardment near
Camp Aguinaldo when a group of five
men disengaged themselves and walked
towards their surveillance car.
5. Major Soria ordered the driver to start the
car and leave the area. However, as they
passed the area, the five men drew their
guns and fired at them, which resulted to
the wounding of the driver.
6. Nobody in the surveillance team retaliated
for they were afraid that civilians might be
caught in the crossfire.
7. Thereafter, the search team raided the
Eurocar Sales Office and confiscated 6
cartons of M-16 ammunition, 5 bundles of
C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different
calibers, and molotov.
8. Obenia, who first entered the
establishment, found De Gracia holding a
C-4 and suspiciously peeping through the
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door in the office of a certain Colonel
Matillano,
9. No search warrant was secured by the
raiding team because, according to them,
there was so much disorder considering
that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was
being mopped up by the rebel forces and
there was simultaneous firing within the
vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from
the fact that the courts were consequently
closed.
10. Appellant was convicted for illegal
possession of firearms in furtherance of
rebellion but was acquitted of attempted
homicide.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON appellant is guilty of illegal
possession of firearms
2. WON there were a valid search and
seizure in this case.
HELD:
1. YES. There is no doubt in our minds that
appellant De Gracia is indeed guilty of having
intentionally possessed several firearms,
explosives, and ammunition without the requisite
license or authority therefor.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was passed
because of an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting
public order and safety due to the proliferation of
illegally possessed and manufactured firearms,
ammunition and explosives, and which criminal
acts have resulted in the loss of human lives,
damage to property and destruction of valuable
resources of the country. The series of coup d'
etats unleashed in the country during the first few
years of the transitional government under then
President Corazon P. Aquino attest to the ever-
growing importance of laws such as Presidential
Decree No. 1866 which seek to nip in the bud and
preempt the commission of any act or acts which
tend to disturb public peace and order.
The rule is that ownership is not an essential
element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. What the law requires is merely
possession which includes not only actual physical
possession but also constructive possession or
the subjection of the thing to one's control and
management.
Moreover, When the crime is punished by a
special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is
not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has
the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the
special law.
The Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia
categorically testified that he was the first one to
enter the Eurocar Sales Office when the military
operatives raided the same, and he saw De
Gracia standing in the room and holding the
several explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits
D to D-4. At first, appellant denied any knowledge
about the explosives. Then, he alternatively
contended that his act of guarding the explosives
for and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not
constitute illegal possession thereof because there
was no intent on his part to possess the same
since he was merely employed as an errand boy
of Col. Matillano. His pretension of impersonal or
indifferent material possession does not and
cannot inspire credence.
2. YES. It is a valid search and seizure.
The instant case falls under one of the
exceptions to the prohibition against a
warrantless search. In the first place, the military
operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining
in this case, had reasonable ground to believe
that a crime was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable cause
to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the
situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no
opportunity to apply for and secure a search
warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself
manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the
raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under
such urgency and exigency of the moment, a
search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
BY PRIVATE PERSONS
People v. Marti,
G.R. No. 81561, 193 SCRA 57, January 18, 1991
FACTS:
1. Andre Marti and his wife Shirley wanted to
send packages to their friend in
Switzerland and contracted the services of
Manila Packing and Export Forwarders.
2. When asked by the forwarder if they could
examine and inspect the packages, Marti
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refused, assuring that the packages
simply contained books and cigars.
3. However, the proprietor opened the boxes
for final inspection as part of their
Standard Operating Procedure. Upon
opening, they suspected that the contents
were illegal drugs.
4. The proprietor reported the incident to NBI
which confirmed that the suspected
content were marijuana.
5. In the presence of the NBI agents, the
boxes were opened and found dried
marijuana leaves inside.
6. After Marti was traced by NBI, he was
charged with violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
7. Marti assailed the admissibility of the
drugs as evidence against him, which,
according to him, is obtained in violation
of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and
privacy of communication.
ISSUE:
WON the act of a private individual, allegedly in
violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be
invoked against the State?
RULING:
NO. The Court ruled that in the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties granted by
the Constitution cannot be invoked against the
State. The constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure refers to the
immunity of one's person, whether citizen or
alien, from interference by government. Its
protection is directed only to governmental action.
This right does not require exclusion of
evidence obtained through a search by a
private citizen.
In this case, the evidence was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person,
acting in a private capacity and without the
intervention of State authorities. Therefore,
there is no reason why it should not be
admitted to prosecute him.
Marti, however, alleged that the NBI agents made
an illegal search and seizure of the evidence.
The Court pointed out that: a) It was the proprietor
who made a reasonable search of the packages in
compliance with SOP (Standard operating
procedure) AND b) the mere presence of the
NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search effected into a warrantless search and
seizure. Merely to observe and look at that which
is in plain sight is not a search.
Marti further argued that since the Constitution
expressly declares as inadmissible any evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional
prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it
matters not whether the evidence was procured by
police authorities or private individuals.
The Court answered that the Constitution, in
laying down the principles of the government and
fundamental liberties of the people, does not
govern relationships between individuals.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. OCTAVIO MENDOZA y LANDICHO,
Accused-Appellant.
FACTS:
1. That on or about the 11th day of
November, 1988, in the Municipality of
Las Piñas, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill and without justifiable motive,
did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shot with
a .38 caliber revolver one Cecilia Eusebio
Mendoza, his wife, thereby inflicting upon
her serious and mortal gunshot wounds
which directly caused her death.
2. That on or about the 11th day of
November, 1988, in the municipality of
Las Piñas, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control
and direct custody a firearm one .38
caliber revolver, Colt with Serial No.
41001 and four (4) live ammunitions use
in the crime of parricide, without first
securing the necessary license or permit
therefor.
3. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to
both charges but the court rendered a
decision saying he is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
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PARRICIDE and of the crime of ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARM AND
AMMUNITIONS.
4. Accused appealed, thus the instant case.
ISSUES:
WON the trial court erred in substantially and
almost totally relying on illegally procured and/or
inadmissible, unauthenticated, questionable
documents, in grave violation of accused’s
constitutional right to privacy of communication
and papers, and/or his right against unreasonable
search and seizure.
RULING:
The Court said that The Solicitor General is
correct in explaining that such right applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and
its agencies. The case in point is People v. Marti
(193 SCRA 57 [1991]) where this Court had the
occasion to rule that the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures refers to the immunity of one’s
person from interference by government and it
cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion.
In the instant case, the memorandum receipt and
mission order were discovered by accused-
appellant’s father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a private
citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON
G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002
FACTS:
1. The accused was convicted of violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). The
antecedent facts of his conviction are as
follows:
2. Evidence for the prosecution shows that
on March 11, 1999, an interisland
passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed
from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00
a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was
about to dock at the port of Iligan City
when its security officer, Diesmo, received
a complaint from passenger Canoy about
her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one
of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as
the culprit.
3. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the
vessel security force accompanied Canoy
to search for the suspect whom they later
found at the economy section. The
suspect was identified as the accused,
Basher Bongcarawan.
4. The accused was informed of the
complaint and was invited to go back to
cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was
bodily searched, but no jewelry was
found. He was then escorted by 2 security
agents back to the economy section to get
his baggage. The accused took a
Samsonite suitcase and brought this back
to the cabin. When requested by the
security, the accused opened the
suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small
plastic packs containing white crystalline
substance. Suspecting the substance to
be “shabu,” the security personnel
immediately reported the matter to the
ship captain and took pictures of the
accused beside the suitcase and its
contents. They also called the Philippine
Coast Guard for assistance.
5. But the accused countered this by saying
that the Samsonite suitcase containing the
methamphetamine hydrochloride or
“shabu” was forcibly opened and
searched without his consent, and hence,
in violation of his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure.
Any evidence acquired pursuant to such
unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is
inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE:
WON the search was valid and admissible as
evidence
HELD: YES
The right against unreasonable search and
seizure is a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution. Evidence acquired in violation of this
right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. Whenever this right is challenged, an
individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by
giving consent to the search and seizure. It should
be stressed, however, that protection is against
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transgression committed by the government
or its agent. The constitutional proscription
against unlawful searches and seizures
applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be
invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of
power is imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the
accused-appellant was searched by the vessel
security personnel. It was only after they found
“shabu” inside the suitcase that they called the
Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The
search and seizure of the suitcase and the
contraband items was therefore carried out
without government intervention, and hence,
the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure does not
apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-
appellant that the search and seizure performed
by the vessel security personnel should be
considered as one conducted by the police
authorities for like the latter, the former are armed
and tasked to maintain peace and order. The
vessel security officer in the case at bar is a
private employee and does not discharge any
governmental function.
AIRPORT SECURITY
PEOPLE VS. LEILA JOHNSON
FACTS:
1. Leila Johnson was arrested at the airport
after she was found to have in her
possession more than 500 grams of
shabu when she was initially frisked by a
security personnel at a gate in the airport.
The security personnel felt something
hard in respondent’s abdominal area and
when asked she said that she had to wear
2 girdles because of an operation.
Unconvinced, the security personnel went
to her supervisor. Subsequently, after a
thorough search on respondent, packets
of shabu were seized from her.
2. Accused (respondent) was subsequently
convicted and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.
3. In the present appeal, respondent
contended that the search made upon her
was not valid and that her constitutional
rights were infringed when such search
was conducted.
ISSUE:
WON a valid search was made.
Held:
The constitutional right of the accused was not
violated as she was never placed under
custodial investigation but was validly
arrested without warrant pursuant to the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and…
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the
accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b)
of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that
she has been subjected to custodial investigation
is far from being accurate.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from
her during the routine frisk at the airport was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security
procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and
seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack
of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in
airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has
come increased security at the nation’s airports.
Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-
on baggages as well as checked luggage are
routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these
procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are. There is little
question that such searches are reasonable, given
their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the
safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
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expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs, and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice
that ordinary constitutional protections
against warrantless searches and seizures do
not apply to routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride
having thus been obtained through a valid
warrantless search, they are admissible in
evidence against the accused-appellant herein.
Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although
likewise without warrant, was justified since it was
effected upon the discovery and recovery of
“shabu” in her person in flagrante delicto.
PEOPLE VS CANTON
G.R. No. 148825 December 27, 2002
FACTS:
1. Appellant Susan Canton was charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City with the violation of Section 16 of
Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as
amended, under an Information whose
accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above named accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
has in her possession NINE HUNDRED
NINETY EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT
HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809)
GRAMS of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without
the corresponding prescription or license.
2. Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial
court, SUSAN imputing to the trial court
the following errors: (1) in justifying the
warrantless search against her based on
the alleged existence of probable cause;
(2) in holding that she was caught
flagrante delicto and that the warrantless
search was incidental to a lawful arrest;
(3) in not ruling that the frisker went
beyond the limits of the “Terry search”
doctrine; (4) in not ruling that SUSAN was
under custodial investigation without
counsel; (5) in admitting to the records of
the case the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette
Arcena, which was not testified on or
offered in evidence, and using the same in
determining her guilt; (6) in justifying
under the rule on judicial notice its
cognizance of the medical report that has
not been offered in evidence; and (7) in
applying the ruling in People v. Johnson.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless search and
subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well
as the arrest of Susan were violative of her
constitutional rights.
RULING:
No, the search was made pursuant to routine
airport security procedure, which is allowed under
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235, “Every ticket
issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier
concerned shall contain among others the
following condition printed thereon: “Holder hereof
and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to
search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or
substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall
not be allowed to board the aircraft,” which shall
constitute a part of the contract between the
passenger and the air carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the
proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and shown in
Annex “D” of her Brief, the afore-quoted provision
is stated in the “Notice to All Passengers” located
at the final security checkpoint at the departure
lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that the
search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to
weapons. Passengers are also subject to search
for prohibited materials or substances.
Further, persons may lose the protection of the
search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures.
JAIL SAFETY
PEOPLE VS CONDE
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 ALPHA AND AMEGA Constitutional Law 2: Case Digests (Part I)
(Dili ko sure kung mao bani ang case kay daghan voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
kaayog People vs Conde and mao lang ni ang na of the court and the judicial process. Any
fall sa violation of constitutional rights.) objection, defect, or irregularity attending their
arrests should had been made before they
Facts: entered their pleas. It is much too late for
1. Apollo Romero, was home sitting by the appellants to raise the question of their
window and drinking coffee when he saw warrantless arrests. Their pleas to the information
four men block the path of two decease upon arraignment constitute clear waivers of their
Indian nationals (bombay) on a rights against unlawful restraint of liberty.
motorcycle. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not
2. One of the men, later identified as Oscar sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
Conde, poked a gun at the two Indians rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free
while his three companions approached from error. The warrantless arrest, even if
and stabbed the Indians. illegal, cannot render void all other
3. After the stabbing, the four men fled. proceedings including those leading to the
Romero was about 25 to 35 meters away conviction of the appellants and his co-
from the place where the crime was accused, nor can the state be deprived of its
committed. PO3 Rodencio Sevillano, right to convict the guilty when all the facts on
testified that he was assigned with the record point to their culpability.
Intelligence and Investigation Division
(IID) of the PNP, he was told to
investigate the abovecited incident.
4. The police arrested the three accused.
Police recovered the weapons used in the
robbery, when Felicidad Macabare,
Conde’s wife, went to the police station
to talk to the accused. These weapons
were discovered inside her bag after a
routine inspection. Sevillano admitted,
however, that they did not have a
warrant of arrest when they
apprehended the accused. Nor did they
have a search warrant when they
inspected Felicidad’s bag and when
they searched the house of a certain
Jimmy where they found the stolen
items.

Issue: Whether the conviction of the accused is

valid even if their arrest was conducted in violation
for their right against warrantless arrest.

Held: Yes, the conviction is valid. The arrest was

a clear violation of their constitutional right;
unfortunately, appellants did not assert their
constitutional rights prior to their arraignment. This
is fatal to their case. An accused is estopped from
assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to
move for the quashing of the Information against
him before his arraignment. When the appellants
entered their pleas on arraignment without
invoking their rights to question any irregularity,
which might have accompanied their arrests, they

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