ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CRIMINAL LAW 1 Reviewer

A.Y. 2023-2024,
First Semester
Atty. Mark Erwin C. Castillo, LLM

Preliminaries
a. People vs. Sullano, G.R. No. 228373, March 12, 2018
Facts:
• Sullano was a police officer in Butuan City Police Office. Butuan chief of police
Bermundo ordered a random drug testing to 50 police officers. Sullano
underwent testing and his specimen gave a positive result for the presence of
shabu. Bermundo filed a complaint-affidavit against Sullano for violating
Sec.15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Sullano filed his counter-affidavit, pleaded
for the dismissal of the complaint. He underwent a rehabilitation program.
Assistant City Prosecutor Plaza recommended the dismissal of the complaint
through a Resolution but was reversed by Deputy City Prosecutor Aljay O. Go
in an Order finding probable cause against respondent. Respondent pleaded
not guilty to the charge and filed a Demurrer to Evidence. He asserted that he
was not arrested nor apprehended committing an offense. The RTC granted
the demurrer to evidence through its order. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of this RTC order but was denied. Petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting the demurrer to evidence, but the petition was dismissed
for failing to show that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting the demurrer to evidence.
Issue:
• Whether or not Section 15, Article II of the R.A. No. 9165 requires the
apprehending or arrest of a person to be considered in violation of the
provision.
Ruling:
• Yes. the provision reads, “A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to
be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be
imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a
government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII
of this Act…”. In the present case, the respondent was not arrested nor
apprehended committing an offense. Hence, although the respondent was
positive on using shabu, he did not violate provision.
Doctrine:
 • The cardinal rule in statutory construction is the plain-meaning
rule. Verba legis non est recendendum - "from the words of a statute
there should be no departure." When the statute is clear, plain, and
free from ambiguity, the words should be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.
• Criminal law is rooted in the concept that there is no crime unless a
law specifically callsfor its punishment. Nullum crimen poena sine
lege. All doubts should be resolved in favor of theaccused.

b. AAA vs. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018

Facts:
• AAA and BBB were married in 2006 in QC. They produced two children CCC
and DDD. In 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef where he
acquired permanent resident status in 2008. AAA claimed that BBB sent little
to no financial support, and only sporadically. There were also allegations of
virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and
sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an
affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has
been living in Singapore. Things came to a head in 2011 when AAA and BBB
had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their
kids. BBB was charged under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 (Anti-Violence
Against Women and their Children Act of 2004). A warrant of arrest was issued
against BBB. The investigating prosecutor discovered enough evidence to
accuse BBB of causing AAA mental and emotional distress as a result of his
suspected marital infidelity. As a result, an Information was filed against BBB
for a violation of R.A. 5(i). No. 9262.
In 2013, lawyers for the accused filed an Omnibus Motion to Revive Case,
Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order, and Warrant of Arrest on behalf
of BBB. The RTC approved the petition to quash on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, and the case was dismissed. The RTC concluded that because
BBB's alleged actions happened in Singapore, the Court had no jurisdiction
over the offense accused because they occurred outside the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court.
AAA sought direct recourse to the Supreme Court via the instant Rule 45
petition on a pure question of law.
Issue:
• Whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may
even be filed within the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad
Ruling:
• Yes. In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction.
As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed
where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
 complainant. What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the
law contemplates that acts of violence against women and their children may
manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material
and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one
municipality or territory, while some occur in another. It is necessary for
Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of
violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a),
Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a
resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered
being a material element of the offense. In the present scenario, the offended
wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March
of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Doctrine:

• Even if the alleged extra marital affair causing the offended wife
mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not
place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach
of Philippine courts.

c. Desmoporan vs. People, G.R. No. 233598, March 27, 2019

Facts:
• Desmoparan applied for a salary loan in the amount of P105,000.00 from Cebu
CFI. He misrepresented himself to be an employee of the City Engineer's
Office, by using the name "Rodulfo M. Cordura," to Chiyenne Mirasol (Mirasol),
loan clerk of CFI. However, on March 16, 2012, the real Rodulfo Cordura
(Cordura) went to CFI to verify the information that somebody had fraudulently
applied for a salary loan using his name and qualifications. Desmoparan was
eventually apprehended. He was charged with estafa through falsification of
commercial documents. The RTC and CA convicted Juvy Desmoparan for the
crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents. Desmoparan
applied for a salary loan (Php105,000) from Cebu CFI.

Issue:
• Whether or not Desmoparan be held liable despite no proof that he was the
author of the falsification.
Ruling:
• Yes. The elements of the crime of falsification of commercial documents under
Article 172 in relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that
the offender is a private individual; (2) that [the offender] committed any of
the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code;
 and,(3) that the [act of] falsification [is] committed in a commercial document.
In the instant case, we likewise find that all the above-mentioned elements
were sufficiently established. First, Desmoparan is a private
individual; second, the acts of falsification consisted in Desmoparan's act of
causing it to appear that Cordura had participated in the act of applying for a
loan when, in fact, he did not do so; and third, the falsification was committed
in a loan application, a deed of assignment, and a promissory note dated
February 27, 2012, which are all commercial documents considering that, in
general, these documents or instruments are "used by merchants or
businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions. Hence,
Doctrine:
• In Domingo v. People,[30] we have held that falsification of a
commercial document may be a means of committing estafa because,
before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another,
the crime of falsification has already been consummated; damage or
intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of
falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words,
the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that
falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is
estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not by
the falsification of the document. In this case, Desmoparan could not
have succeeded in getting hold of the money without falsifying the
loan documents bearing the name and qualifications of Cordura, and
make it appear that he is actually the real Cordura. The falsification
was, therefore, a necessary means to commit estafa, and falsification
was already consummated even before the falsified documents were
used to defraud CFI.

Article
1.
2.
3. mistake of fact
a. United States vs. Ah Chong, G.R. No. 5272, March 19, 1910
Facts:
• In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was
awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is
there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he
leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill
you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been
placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he
seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned
out to be his roommate. Ah Chong was charged with the crime of assassination
 and found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating
circumstances. At the trial, defendant admitted that he killed his roommate
but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful
act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self defense.
Issue:
• Whether or not the defendant is criminally liable.
Ruling:
No. There is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance
or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. By reason of a
mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal
liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts
at the time when he committed the act. In the present case, the defendant acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, on the belief that he was exercising his
legitimate right of self-defense.
Doctrine:
• The misapprehension of facts on the part of the person who caused
injury to another. He is not, however, criminally liable because he did
not act with criminal intent. It is necessary that had the facts been
true as the accused believed them to be, the act is justified. Moreover,
the offender must believe that he is performing a lawful act. An honest
mistake of fact destroys the presumption of criminal intent which
arises upon the commission of a felonious act.
• Mistake of fact is a defense only in intentional felonies.
• Requisites of Mistake of Fact
1. That the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the
accused believed them to be;
2. That the intention of the accused in performing the act is lawful;
and
3. That the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part
of the accused.

b. People vs. Oanis, G.R. No. 47722, July 27, 1943

Facts:
• Chief of Police Antonio Oanis and Corporal Alberto Galanta were under
instructions to arrest Anselmo Balagtas, a notorious criminal and an escaped
convict, and if empowered, to get him dead or alive. They proceeded to the
suspected house and went into a room. Upon seeing a man sleeping with his
back towards the door, they simultaneously or successively fired at him. It
turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal
 Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson.
Oanis averred that he fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently about to
pick up something from the floor. Galanta on the other hand claims that he
fired at Tecson when the latter was rushing at him.
• They further contend that they incurred no criminal liability as they both acted
in an innocent mistake of fact and in the honest performance of their official
duties believing that Tecson was Balagtas.
Issue:
• Whether or not Chief of Police Oanis and Corporal Galanta were guilty of
murder.
Ruling:
• Yes. The theory of non-liability by reason of honest mistake of fact or the
maxim ignorantia facti excusat applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness. In this case, there are no circumstances
whatsoever which would press the police into immediate action. The person in
the room, being then asleep, they had ample time and opportunity to ascertain
his identity without hazard to themselves and could even effect a bloodless
arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was
unarmed. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for them to follow
even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill
Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if
resistance or aggression happens. Hence, the defendants were not acted in
innocent mistake of fact and were guilty of murder.
Doctrine:
• The new Rules of Court states that no unnecessary or unreasonable
force shall be used in making an arrest. In addition, the person
arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint that is necessary
for his detention.
• A peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he
uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest.

c.People vs. Gervero, G.R. No. 206725, July 11, 2018

Facts:
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, armed with firearms, they were then
provided, through treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, shoot and hit
HERNANDO VILLEGAS, JOSE VILLEGAS and BENITO BASUG, JR. with said firearms
inflicting upon said Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas and Benito Basug, Jr. numerous
gunshot wounds on different parts of their bodies which caused their deaths
immediately thereafter.
On the defense, the accused contend that the were given instructions to conduct a
patrol against NPA member. In the order, they are to use coded calling and response.
When they notice the people approaching, they used coded calling simoy and amoy,
and instead of answering, victims fired at them, prompting accused to fired back
which resulted in the death of the victims. Accused now invoke mistake of fact. The
court a quo ruled out the defense happened, Banes, Castigador, and 2 others
unidentified CAFGU members came to the house of Hernando to ask for money,
indicating that they knew each other; and that Gervero was likewise bound by his
testimony that he knew Hernando.
The CA affirmed the conviction of the accused.

Issue:
Whether the Trial Court erred in not appreciating the defense of mistake of fact.

Ruling:
No. Mistake of fact finds no application in this case. As early as in the case of People
v. Oanis the Court has ruled that mistake of fact applies only when the mistake is
committed without fault or carelessness. In the instant case, even assuming that
they were indeed tasked to capture members of the NPA, their actions on that fateful
night disprove their defense of fulfillment of duty as shown by the way they had
viciously attacked their helpless victims. The evidence speaks in no uncertain terms
that the accused, instead of fulfilling their sworn duty to protect the public in
accordance with law, allowed their personal grudges and thirst for vengeance to
prevail and killed Jose, Hernando, and Benito in cold blood. Hence, the defense of
misencounter due to mistake of fact was unbelievable.

Doctrine:
In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a
fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the
subject of the prosecution. Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a
defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the
crime.
4. proximate cause
a. Seguritan vs. People, G.R. No. 172896, April 19, 2010
Facts:
• Roño Seguritan alias Ranio was having a drinking session with his uncles, one
of whom is Lucrecio Seguritan. Ranio and Lucrecio had a heated argument as
the former claimed that the latter’s Carabo entered his farm and destroyed the
crops therein. When Lucrecio was about to stand up, Ranio punched him twice,
hitting him in the right and left temple causing him to fall face up to the ground.
His head hit a hollow block that was being used as an improvised stove.
Lucrecio rode a tricycle home. When his wife noticed blood on his forehead and
asked about it, he said that he was just stoned. ater that night, Lucrecio’s wife
and daughter noticed that his complexion had darkened, and that foamy
substance was coming out of his mouth while he was sleeping. They tried to
revive Lucrecio but to no avail. Several days after, Lucrecio’s wife found out
about the incident with Ranio and requested the assistance of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI). NBI Medio-Legal concluded that Lucrecio’s
cause of death was a traumatic head injury. Ranio was charged with the crime
of homicide before the RTC. He appealed to the CA, but the latter affirmed the
lower court’s decision. He contends that he should be held liable only for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide due to the absence of intent to kill.
He further said that his uncle died of a heart attack.
Issue:
• Whether or not Segurritan should be held liable only for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide due to the absence of intent to kill.
Ruling:
• No. Person committing a felony liable although the wrongful act done be
different from that intended. According to Art. 4 of the RPC states that criminal
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In the present
case, the accused committed an unlawful act by punching the victim, even if
he did not intend to cause the latter’s death. Hence, he must be held guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for killing him pursuant to Art. 4 of the RPC. He who
is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
Doctrine:
• Person committing a felony liable although the wrongful act done be
different from that intended.
• He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
b. Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 216642, September 8, 2020
Facts:
Police officer Cruz was charged with homicide and frustrated homicide under the
following Information. That on or about September 9, 2008, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon:
1. GERWIN TORRALBA Y FERNANDEZ, 9 years old, a minor, by then and there
firing and hitting the latter's head with a gun, thereby inflicting upon the said
GERWIN TORRALBA Y FERNANDEZ mortal gunshot wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
2. ARCHIBALD BERNANDO. Firing and hitting his right wrist and left shoulder acts
of execution which should have produced a homicide however, it was not
produced by reason or causes other than the will of the aforementioned
ARCHIBALD BERNARDO Y DAVID, which prevented his death.
Cruz pleaded not guilty to both charges.
RTC found Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide with
respect to the shooting of Bernardo. On the other hand, with respect to the death
of Torralba, the RTC held that Cruz is only guilty of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide because of the lack of criminal intent.
CA promulgated the assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.

Issue:
Whether the CA committed a reversible error when it upheld the RTC ruling that, with
respect to the death of Torralba, Cruz is guilty only of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide instead of homicide.

Ruling:
Yes. Under Article 4, criminal liability is incurred "by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." In
the present case, it has already been established that Cruz committed an intentional
felony when he fired multiple shots at Bernardo. The death of Torralba, who was hit
by one of those bullets intended for Bernardo, is a direct, natural, and logical
consequence of said intentional felony. The death of Torralba is an example
of aberratio ictus. Hence, Cruz should be held guilty of homicide as originally charged.
Doctrine:
• Article 4, criminal liability is incurred "by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended
c. People vs. Lalap, G.R. No. 250895, June 16, 2021
Facts:
That on or about the 4th day of August, 1997, at 10:00 o'clock in the evening, more
or less, at Barangay San Gabriel, Municipality of Victoria, Province of Oriental
Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation and while
armed with a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab one HONORIO VILLANUEVA, who was then unarmed and
defenseless, inflicting upon the latter mortal wound on his body which cause[d] his
early death. That in the commission of the crime of murder, the aggravating
circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation were attendant.
At the arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.
On the Version of the Prosecution, Honorio was eating, Mario Lalap entered the house
through the kitchen's door and immediately stabbed Honorio from behind. Honorio
stood up but Mario tried to pull the former outside of house. Alter failing to pull him
outside. Mario stabbed Honorio for the second time in his belly. While Honorio was
being stabbed. Mario shouted at Honorio saying. "Putangina mo, papatayin kita.
Tsismoso ka." After Mario left, Honorio was brought by his family to the Oriental
Mindoro Provincial Hospital where he was treated before he died after ten (10) days.
On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant as its lone witness. He
asserted self-defense, thus: During the drinking session, accused had an altercation
with Honorio because the latter was spreading gossips that his (accused) sister was
"nanlalalaki". Honorio left ahead of the group, and after about an hour and a half (1
½ ), the accused headed home. As the accused was passing by Honorio's house, the
latter called the accused and told him that he was hurt during their altercation and
grabbed the accused by his collar. Out of anger and as the accused could no longer
control his emotions, he drew his knife and stabbed [Honorio] on the right side of his
body then went home, while [Honorio] was brought to the hospital. The accused
learned from his wife, after the latter monitored the condition of Honorio that he was
getting better and was about to be discharged from the hospital, however. Honorio
suddenly suffered a cardiac arrest and died as a consequence.
RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder.
Accused-appellant appealed to the CA.
CA denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision.

Issue:
WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
EVIDENCE TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE CRUCIAL LINK BETWEEN
THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE VICTIM AND THE CAUSE OF HIS DEATH.

Ruling:
No. In Quinto v. Andres, the Court discussed that a person committing a felony is
criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom
unless there was an efficient intervening active force that intervened between the
felony committed and the resulting injury. In this case, While the immediate cause
of the victim's death as reflected in the Medical Certificate is cardiorespiratory arrest,
the stab wound that accused-appellant inflicted on the vital part of the victim's body
is the proximate cause of the victim's death. Hence, Lalap (accused-appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Doctrine:
• Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.

Impossible crime
a. Intod vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992
Facts:
Suplicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio, Avelino Daligdig and Salvador
Mandaya planned to kill Bernardina Palampangan because of a land dispute between
her and Intod. They then went to Palampangan’s house one night, all armed with
firearms. As soon as Mandaya pointed the bedroom of Palampangan, his companions
immediately fired at it. It turned out, however, that their subject was in another city
and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the
room when the accused fired the shots.
RTC convicted them of attempted murder, which was affirmed by the CA’s decision.
Thus they filed a petition for review. According to them, they cannot be held liable
for attempted murder because Palangpangan’s absence from her room on the night
they riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. On the other hand,
the People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the
facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted
murder.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused shall only be liable for impossible crime.
Ruling:
Yes. Factual impossibility in the crime of attempted murder. Article 4(2) penalizes an
act that, if it were not meant to be something quite impossible or carried out with
inadequate resources, would be a felony against person or property. To be
impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature
one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either legal impossibility or
physical or factual impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify
the act as an impossible crime. In this case, Intod and the others fired at the place
where they thought their victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not
present in said place and thus, they failed to accomplish his end. Thus they were
found guilty of an impossible crime.
Doctrine:
There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act as an
impossible crime.
b. People vs. Callao, G.R. No. 228945, March 14, 2018
Facts:
The prosecution presented its lone witness, Sario who testified that he was at the
flea market of Guincalaban, Tayasan, Negros Oriental together with his friends
Hesson, Junello and one Remmy. While in the market, Hesson and Junello discussed
a plan to kill the victim, Fernando Adlawan (Fernando) as ordered by one Enrile. Sario
was not part of the planning and did not know why Enrile wanted to have Fernando
killed. When the group reached Fernando's house, Junello, upon seeing Fernando,
approached the latter and asked for a cigarette lighter. After Fernando gave Junello
the lighter, they suddenly attack and strike the forehead of Fernando Adlawan with
the use of an iron rod and thereafter, with the use of a knife, opened the stomach of
the said Fernando Adlawan and took out his liver and throw it to the pig which ate it
and proceeded to slice the flesh of the thigh of said victim and again throw the same
to the pig which also ate it, which injuries caused the immediate death of victim
Fernando Adlawan.
On the defense, Hesson put forth the defense of denial. On cross-examination,
Hesson again recounted the incident but this time, he testified that he saw Junello
hack Fernando in the chest, once after which Enrile hacked him on the left side of his
body twice. Hesson told no one about the incident because of fear.
Trial court found Hesson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
qualified by treachery.
Hesson appealed to the CA via Notice of Appeal.
CA affirmed the trial court's conviction with modification only as to the damages
awarded.
Without admitting his guilt, Hesson argues that he should only be convicted of
committing an impossible crime. Allegedly, he cannot be held liable for Murder
because it was legally impossible for him to kill Fernando as the latter was already
dead when Hesson stabbed him.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime committed was not murder but an impossible crime.

Ruling:
No. Hesson is liable for Murder, not for an impossible crime. Impossible crime is
defined and penalized under paragraph 2, Article 4 of RPC to wit: ART. 4. Criminal
liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred: 2. By any person performing an act
which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate
to ineffectual means. Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act
performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was
done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently
impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. In
this case, while Sario testified that he thought Fernando was already dead after he
was hacked by Junello because the former was already lying on the ground
motionless, this statement cannot sufficiently support the conclusion that, indeed,
Fernando was already dead when Hesson stabbed him. Sario's opinion of Femando's
death was arrived at by merely looking at the latter's body. No other act was done
to ascertain this, such as checking of Fernando's pulse, heartbeat or breathing.
Hence, Hesson is still liable for murder because of the clear presence of conspiracy
between Hesson and Junello.
Doctrine:
•
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators
are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of
their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or
crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
5. a. People vs. Santos, G.R. No. 237982, September 8, 2020
Facts:
Yolanda P. Santos, accused-appellant, was the Officer In Charge (OlC)-Property
Accountant of Dasman Realty for its Dasman Residences project. Prompted by a
report alleging that accused-appellant failed to account for and remit various
payments received by her from clients to Dasman Realty, the latter issued a
Memorandum dated July 11, 2013 authorizing Bañares to conduct a recording and
bookkeeping review of the sale transactions and payment receipts due to the
corporation under the accountability of accused-appellant. Upon evaluation of the
original receipts and acknowledgment receipts as well as records of transactions,
Bañares discovered that within the period of August 2011 to July 2013, fourteen (14)
receipts, the aggregate value of which amounted to PI,029,893.33 under the
accountability of the accused-appellant were unremitted to Dasman Realty. On July
11, 2014, fourteen (14) Informations for qualified theft under Article 310 of the RPC
were filed against accused-appellant in RTC Pasay City. The RTC found the accused-
appellant guilty of qualified theft. Aggrieved, the accused-appellant appealed, but the
CA affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this case.
Issue:
Whether the respondent-appellant is liable for qualified theft for the failure to remit
several sums of money.Ruling:
Yes. Thus, the elements of qualified theft punishable under Article 310 in relation to
Article 308 of the RPC are as follows: (1) there was a taking of personal property;
(2) the said property belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without the consent
of the owner; (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; (5) the taking was
accomplished without violence or intimidation against person, or force upon things;
and (6) the taking was done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article
310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence. In the instant case, the
prosecution was able to establish the presence of all the elements of qualified theft
under Article 310 in relation to Article 308 of the RPC. Accused-appellant, as part of
her duty as OIC-Property Accountant of Dasman Realty, admitted that she received
the payments from Dasman Realty’s clients for the period September 2011 to May
2013 in the total amount of P1,029,893.33, thus, she had actual possession of the
monies, yet failed to remit the same to Dasman Realty. As an employee tasked to
merely collect payments from Dasman Realty’s clients, she did not have a right over
the thing as she was merely entrusted to collect the cash collections in behalf of
Dasman Realty. In fact, accused-appellant never asserted any such right over the
collections, as she even admitted that upon receipt of the monies, it was her duty to
remit the collections to the cashier.
Doctrine:

• ARTICLE 5. Duty of the Court in Connection with Acts Which Should

Be Repressed but Which are Not Covered by the Law, and in Cases of
Excessive Penalties. — Whenever a court has knowledge of any act
which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by
law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which
induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject
of penal legislation.

In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be
deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence,
when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result
in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the
offense.