PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appelle, -versus- FERNANDO MADARANG y

MAGNO, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 132319, FIRST DIVISION, May 12, 2000, PUNO, J.
In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished
as an offense.Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given
by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude
that the accused was insane based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is
qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist. The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to
the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. In the
case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was committed to the
NCMH months after he killed his wife. None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he
exhibited any of the myriad symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with
the stabbing incident.

FACTS:

The accused and Lilia Mirador were legally married and their union was blessed with seven (7) children. The
accused worked as a seaman for sixteen (16) years. He worked as a seaman in Germany and stayed there for
nine (9) years. Thereafter, he returned to his family in Infanta, Pangasinan, and started a hardware store
business. His venture however failed. Worse, he lost his entire fortune due to cockfighting. The accused, his
wife Lilia and their children were forced to stay in the house of Avelina Mirador as the accused could no longer
support his family. Moreover, Lilia was then already heavy with their eight child and was about to give birth.
The accused and Lilia had a squabble. The accused was jealous of another man and was accusing Lilia of
infidelity. In the heat of the fight and in the presence of their children, the accused stabbed Lilia,
resulting in her untimely demise. The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the
stabbing incident. He could not remember where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the
whereabouts of his wife. It was only during one of the hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a picture of
his wife in a coffin that he learned about her death. He, however, was not aware of the cause of her demise.
He claimed that he did not know whether he suffered from any mental illness and did not remember being
confined at the NCMH for treatment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant’s defense of insanity should hold water. (NO)

RULING:
In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an offense.
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the usual
means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a
person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused
requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the
accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on the witness'
own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.The
testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged. In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be
suffering from schizophrenia when he was committed to the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Medical
books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between
fantasy and reality and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. None of the witnesses
presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad symptoms associated with
schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure, the record is bereft of
even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to that fateful day.
Although the appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few months after the stabbing incident, the
evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also
proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Evidence on
the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution. In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish
his claim of insanity at the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the
appellant was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime.
An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He admits committing the crime
but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at the time of its commission. Hence, the accused is
tried on the issue of sanity alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial
on the issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the crime. As the appellant, in the case at bar,
failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed his wife, we are constrained
to affirm his conviction.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NICANOR
SALOME, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

[ G.R. NO. 169077, August 31, 2006 ]

(THE ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALY IN THE PHILIPPINES

Issue: Whether or not Reclusion Perpetua should be imposed in lieu of Death Penalty.

Facts:

That on or about or within the period comprised between July 1, 1997 to July 31, 1997
in the morning, in [B]arangay Lourdes, [M]unicipality of Pandan, [P]rovince of
Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said
accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a bladed weapon,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, did lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge
of SALLY IDANAN, a minor who was then 13 years old at the time of the commission
of the offense.

That the commission of the crime was aggravated by dwelling the fact that the crime
was committed inside the house of the offended party.

Sally Idanan, fifteen years old, single, and a resident of Lourdes, Pandan,
Catanduanes testified before the trial court that she personally knew appellant because
they used to be neighbors. In 1997, they transferred residence but appellant would
frequently pass by their place.

Sometime in July of 1997, Sally, then thirteen years old, was sleeping with her three-
year old brother inside their house when appellant entered their house. She was
awakened by the presence of the latter who, allegedly, was poking a knife at the base
of her neck. While holding the knife with one hand, appellant undressed her with his
other hand. He threatened her that he would kill her and her family if she would tell
anyone about the incident. After undressing her, appellant forced her to lie down. He
removed his shorts and underwear.

Appellant denied having raped Sally and offered the defense of alibi. He claimed that in
the month of July 1997, he went fishing at the sea of Gigmoto, Catanduanes on three
different days but could not exactly remember when. Villarey and Torralba
corroborated the fact that they went fishing with appellant in July of 1997. They
maintained, however, that while they had been appellant's fishing companions, they
would go their separate ways after fishing and were not aware of appellant's activities
after that.
Ruling:
Yes. In light, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into
law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on June 24, 2006, the imposition of the
death penalty has been prohibited. However, the corresponding civil liability should be
the civil liability corresponding to death.

It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is
still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000. On the
other hand, the automatic appeal in cases when the trial court imposes the death
penalty will henceforth not apply, since its imposition is now prohibited, so that there is
a need to perfect an appeal, if appeal is desired, from a judgment of conviction for an
offense where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua in lieu of the death penalty
pursuant to the new law prohibiting its imposition.
 People vs. Santiago
51 Phil. 68, No. 27972 October 81, 1927
FACTS:
On November 23, 1926, the appellant asked Felicita, his niece who was then about 18
years of age, to accompany him across the river on some errand. After crossing the
river, the appellant conducted the girl to a place about twenty paces from the highway
where tall grass and other growth hid them from public view. Appellant forced his niece
to have sexual intercourse, but she refused to give her consent, until he finally
accomplished his purpose by force and against her will. After the deed had been done
the appellant conducted the girl to the house of his uncle, Agaton Santiago, who lived
not far away. They arrived here about 11 a. m., and remained for several hours. In the
course of the afternoon Agaton Santiago brought in a protestant minister who went
through the ceremony of marrying the couple. After this was over the appellant gave
the girl a few pesos and sent her home.
ISSUE: Can the marriage of appellant and accused extinguish criminal liability of
accused?
RULING:
No. After the accused had consummated the crime of rape upon a girl of the age of 15,
niece of his deceased wife, he procured a marriage ceremony to be celebrated on the
same day between himself and the girl, with the evident purpose of extinguishing his
criminal liability under the proviso to section 2 of Act No. 1773 of the Philippine
Commission, and without any intention on his part of living maritally with the girl.
Article 23 of the Revised Penal Code states that a pardon by the offended party does
not extinguish criminal action except as provided in article 344 of this Code; but civil
liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his express
waiver. The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential consent, and it supplies
no impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer.