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Johns 10e Irm ch14 PDF
Johns 10e Irm ch14 PDF
LO14.1 Discuss the open systems concept of an organization and the components of an
organization’s external environment, and explain how environmental uncertainty and
resource dependence affect what happens in organizations.
LO14.2 Define strategy and describe how organizational structure can serve as a strategic
response to environmental demands.
LO14.3 Define organizational structure and explain how it corresponds to division of
labour.
LO14.4 Discuss the relative merits of various forms of departmentation.
LO14.5 Review the more basic and more elaborate means of achieving organizational
coordination.
LO14.6 Discuss the nature and consequences of traditional structural characteristics and
explain the distinction between organic and mechanistic structures.
LO14.7 Discuss the emergence of ambidextrous, network, virtual, and modular
organizations.
LO14.8 Explain how vertical integration, mergers, acquisitions, strategic alliances, and
the establishment of legitimacy reflect strategic responses.
Customers. All organizations have potential customers for their products and services.
Organizations must be sensitive to changes in customer demands. Successful firms are
highly sensitive to customer reactions.
Suppliers. Organizations are dependent on the environment for supplies which include
labour, raw materials, equipment, and component parts. Shortages can cause severe
difficulties.
Competitors. Environmental competitors vie for resources that include both customers
and suppliers. Successful organizations devote considerable energy to monitoring the
activities of competitors.
Social/Political Factors. Organizations cannot ignore the social and political events that
occur around them. Changes in public attitudes toward ethnic diversity, the proper age for
retirement, the environment, corporate social responsibility, or the proper role of big
business will soon affect them. Organizations must cope with a series of legal regulations
that prescribe fair employment practices, proper competitive activities, product safety,
and clients’ rights, and environmental protectionism.
Technology. The environment contains a variety of technologies that are useful for
achieving organizational goals. The ability to adopt the proper technology should
enhance an organization’s effectiveness.
Environmental Uncertainty
Environmental uncertainty is a condition that exists when the external environment is
vague, difficult to diagnose, and unpredictable. Uncertainty depends on the
environment’s complexity (simple versus complex) and its rate of change (static versus
dynamic).
Increasing uncertainty has several predictable effects on organizations and their decision
makers including being less clear about cause-and-effect relationships, more difficulty
agreeing on priorities, political jockeying within the organization, and more information
must be processed by the organization to make adequate decisions. Organizations will act
to cope with or reduce uncertainty because uncertainty increases the difficulty of
decision-making and thus threatens organizational effectiveness.
Resource Dependence
Because organizations are open systems that receive inputs from the external
environment and transfer outputs into this environment, they are in a state of resource
dependence with regard to their environments. Resource dependence refers to the
dependency of organizations on environmental inputs, such as capital, raw materials, and
human resources as well as outputs such as customers. Carefully managing and coping
with this resource dependence is a key to survival and success. Although all organizations
are dependent on their environments for resources, some organizations are more
dependent than others. As well, resource dependence can be fairly independent of
environmental uncertainty, and dealing with one issue will not necessarily have an effect
on the other.
Resource dependence does not mean that organizations are totally at the mercy of their
environments. It means that they must develop strategies for managing both resource
dependence and environmental uncertainty.
Strategy is the process by which top executives seek to cope with the constraints and
opportunities posed by an organization’s environment. Strategy formulation follows from
executives’ perceptions of the objective organizational environment. These perceptions
are influenced by their experience and personality. Thus, it is the perceived environment
that comprises the basis for strategy formulation. Strategy formulation involves
determining the missions, goals, and objectives of an organization. There is no single
correct strategy. The chosen strategy must correspond to the constraints and opportunities
Organizational structure is the manner in which an organization divides its labour into
specific tasks and achieves coordination among these tasks. It broadly refers to how the
organization’s individuals and groups are put together or organized to accomplish work.
To achieve its goals, an organization has to divide labour among its members and then
coordinate what has been divided. There are two basic dimensions to the division of
labour: a vertical dimension and a horizontal dimension. Once labour is divided, it must
be coordinated to achieve organizational effectiveness.
Autonomy and Control. The domain of decision making and authority is reduced as the
number of levels in the hierarchy increases. A flatter hierarchy pushes authority lower
and involves people further down the hierarchy in more decisions.
Job Design. The horizontal division of labour strongly affects job design and it has
profound implications for the degree of coordination necessary. It also has implications
for the vertical division of labour and where control over work processes should logically
reside.
Departmentation
Departmentation refers to the assignment of jobs into departments and is an important
aspect of the horizontal division of labour. There are several common methods of
departmentation each of which has its strengths and weaknesses.
The key contrast is between functional and product departmentation, since the other
forms are to some degree variations on product departmentation. Functional
departmentation is efficient because it does not duplicate effort, and it enhances
communication within functions. It provides clear career ladders within functions.
However, it may lead to excessive differentiation between functions. Within product
lines, product departmentation solves this problem, but it is at the expense of potential
duplication of effort. As organizations grow and offer more products or services, product
departmentation is preferable.
Standardization of Work Processes. Some jobs are so routine that the technology itself
provides a means of coordination and little direct supervision is necessary. Work
processes can also be standardized by rules and regulations.
Standardization of Skills. Technicians and professionals who work together closely may
be coordinated because of their standard training and through standardization of skills.
They know what to expect of each other due to their standard training.
The five methods of coordinating divided labour can be crudely ordered in terms of the
degree of discretion they permit individual workers in terms of task performance. Direct
supervision permits little discretion. Standardization of processes and outputs permits
successively more discretion. Finally, standardization of skills and mutual adjustment put
even more control into the hands of those who are actually doing the work. Movement
from direct supervision to mutual discretion is associated with greater potential for jobs
to be designed in an enriched manner. An improper coordination strategy can destroy the
intrinsic motivation of a job. The use of the various methods of coordination tends to vary
across different parts of the organization.
Liaison Roles. Liaison roles are those in which a person is assigned to help achieve
coordination between his or her department and another department. One person serves
as a part-time link between two departments.
Task Forces and Teams. Task forces are temporary groups set up to solve coordination
problems across several departments. Self-managed and cross-functional teams are also
an effective means of achieving coordination. They are especially useful for new-product
development and introduction.
Span of Control
The span of control is the number of subordinates supervised by a manager. The larger
the span, the less potential there is for coordination by direct supervision.
As the span increases, the attention that a supervisor can devote to each subordinate
decreases. Spans at upper levels tend to be smaller.
organization because a given number of decisions are apportioned among fewer levels.
Flatter structures generally enhance vertical communication and coordination.
Formalization
Formalization refers to the extent to which work roles are highly defined by an
organization. A more formalized organization tolerates little variability in the way
members perform their tasks. Very complex tasks dictate high formalization.
Centralization
Centralization refers to the extent that decision-making power is localized in a particular
part of the organization. In a more centralized organization, it is concentrated at the top
with a single individual such as the president. In a more decentralized organization,
decision-making power is dispersed down through the hierarchy and across departments.
The proper degree of centralization should put decision-making power where the best
knowledge is located. This often means decentralizing functions with direct customer
contact, while centralizing functions that have a more internal orientation.
Complexity
Complexity is the extent to which an organization divides labour vertically, horizontally,
and geographically. A fairly simple organization will have few management levels and
not many separate job titles. A very complex organization will be tall, will have a large
number of job titles and departments, and might be spread around the world. The
essential characteristic of complexity is variety. As the organization becomes more
complex, it has more kinds of people performing more kinds of tasks in more places,
whether these places are departments or geographic territories.
and informal communication are emphasized over rigidity and a strict chain of command.
They are more in line with the human relations movement. The matrix form is organic.
The labels mechanistic and organic represent theoretical extremes, structures can and do
fall between them. There is no “one best way” to organize. Organic structures are not
superior to mechanistic ones — each type has advantages and disadvantages. The one
that allows better performance depends on an organization’s environment and
technology. In general, more mechanistic structures are called for when an organization’s
environment is more stable and its technology is more routine. Organic structures tend to
work better when the environment is uncertain, the technology is less routine, and
innovation is important. Many organizations do not have only a single structure and that
structure can and should change over time.
Recent years have seen the advent of new, more organic organizational structures that
remove unnecessary bureaucracy and decentralize decision making. The result is a more
adaptable organization. Some examples are described below.
Networking and virtual organizations face some special problems. Problems can occur
when stable networks deteriorate and the companies dealing with the core firm devote so
much of their effort to this firm that they are isolated from normal market demands. This
can make them “lazy,” resulting in a loss of their technological edge. Virtual
organizations lose their organic advantage when they become legalistic, secretive, and
too binding of the other partners. Virtual partners sometimes exploit their loose structure
to profit at the expense of the core firm.
By outsourcing non-core activities, modular organizations are able to keep unit costs low
and develop new products more rapidly. They work best when they focus on the right
specialty and have good suppliers. However, because they are dependent on so many
outsiders, it is critical that they find suppliers who are reliable and loyal and can be
trusted with trade secrets. As well, they must be careful not to outsource critical
technologies, which could diminish future competitive advantages. The modular
organization is a streamlined structure with great flexibility making it particularly well
suited to organizations in rapidly changing environments.
Mergers and Acquisitions. Mergers and acquisitions involve the joining of two
organizations and the acquiring of one organization by another. Attempts to improve
economies of scale, vertical integration, or to reduce uncertainty due to competition are
common motives for mergers and acquisitions.
Establishing Legitimacy. One way for organizations to respond to the dilemma of making
correct organizational responses when it is hard to know which response is correct is to
do things that make the organization appear legitimate to various constituents.
Establishing legitimacy involves taking actions that conform to prevailing norms and
expectations. It will often be strategically correct, but equally important, it will have the
appearance of being strategically correct. In turn, management will appear to be rational,
and providers of resources will feel comfortable with the organization’s actions.
The first thirteen chapters of text focus primarily (although not exclusively) on the
internal environment of organizations. Your students may appreciate some help in
understanding the role of the external environment. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R.
Salancik have provided the following fine example of the external environment’s impact
on organizational functioning with which students will be able to identify.
Consider the following case, described by a student at the University of Illinois. The
student had worked in a fast-food restaurant near the campus and was concerned about
how the workers (himself) were treated. Involved in what he was studying the student
read a great deal about self-actualizing, theories of motivation, and the management of
human resources. He observed at the restaurant that workers would steal food, make
obscene statements about the boss behind his back, and complain about the low pay. The
student’s analysis of the situation was a concise report summarizing the typical human
relations palliatives: make the boring, greasy work more challenging and the indifferent
management more democratic. The student was asked why he thought management was
unresponsive to such suggestions. He considered the possibility that management was
cruel and interested only in making a profit (and the operation was quite profitable). He
was then asked why the employees permitted management to treat them in such a fashion
— after all, they could always quit. The student responded that the workers needed the
money and that jobs were hard to obtain.
This fact, that the workers were drawn from an almost limitless labour pool of students
looking for any kind of part-time employment was nowhere to be found in the student’s
discussion of the operation of the restaurant. Yet, it was precisely this characteristic of the
labour market which permitted the operation to disregard the feelings of the workers.
Since there were many who wanted to work, the power of an individual worker was
severely limited. More critical to the organization’s success was its location and its ability
both to keep competition to a minimum and to maintain a steady flow of supplies to serve
a virtually captive market. If the workers were unsatisfied, it was not only because they
did not like the organization’s policies; in the absence of any base of power and with few
alternative jobs, the workers had neither the option of voice nor exit (Hirschman, 1970).
More important to this organization’s success than the motivation of its workers was its
location on a block between the campus and dormitories, the path of thousands of
students. Changes in policies and facilities for housing and transportation of students
would have a far greater effect than some disgruntled employees. Our example illustrates,
first, the importance of attending to contextual variables in understanding organizations,
but also that organizational survival and success are not always achieved by making
internal adjustments. Dealing with and managing the environment is just as important a
component of organizational effectiveness.
Source: Pfeifer, J., & Salancik, G.R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A
resource dependence perspective. New York: Harper & Row, pp. 3-4.
4. As SpinelIi Construction Company grew in size, its founder and president, Joe
SpinelIi, found that he was overloaded with decisions. What two basic structural
changes should SpinelIi make to rectify the situation without losing control of the
company?
Joe Spinelli should delegate some authority to decentralize the company. He may have to
add a layer of management. This will mean that fewer decisions reach his desk. To
maintain control, he may wish to increase formalization by developing specific rules for
bidding contracts, dealing with subcontractors, and so on.
1. Discuss the division of labour in a restaurant. What methods are used to coordinate
this divided labour? Do differences exist between fast-food versus more formal
restaurants?
There is a vertical division of labour and horizontal division of labour in most restaurants.
The vertical division of labour usually consists of the restaurant manager who is
responsible for planning and decision making. Below the manager and the horizontal
division of labour are the cooks, servers, dishwashers, and cashier, and in some
restaurants there are also host(ess), bartenders, and bus boys. Some restaurants might also
have assistant managers who report to the manager. The methods used to coordinate the
labour in a restaurant include direct supervision (the manager is responsible for
coordinating the work of the restaurant’s employees) as well as the standardization of
work processes and skills as follows: Servers take orders from customers and give them
to cooks; cooks prepare the meals; servers take the meals to the customers; servers take
dirty dishes and cutlery to the kitchen; dishwashers wash the dishes and cutlery; the
cashier prepares the bill and completes the transaction. Thus, the task associated with
each job is very clear as is the work process which ensures the coordination of the labour.
Workers in each job know what to expect from those in other job categories. The
standardization of the process and skills are especially likely in fast-food restaurants
which are more mechanistic than formal restaurants which tend to be more organic and
might also allow for some mutual adjustment through informal communication between
workers. Formal restaurants often allow for customer requests and often have special
items added to the menu on a daily basis. This requires some deviation from the kind of
rigid rules and regulations and stringent routine found in fast-food restaurants. Thus,
more discretion is possible and allowed in formal restaurants compared to fast-food
restaurants where the tasks are more routine.
3. Discuss the logic behind the following statement.’ “We don’t want to remove the
differentiation that exists between sales and production. What we want to do is
achieve integration.”
Differentiation exists when members of sales and marketing departments have different
time spans, goals, and interpersonal styles. The speaker is saying that these differences
are natural, appropriate, and helpful for the organization as long as the departments are
coordinated. Integration achieves coordination without removing needed differences in
orientation.
6. Why are mergers and acquisitions a common and popular form of strategic response?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of each?
Mergers and acquisitions are popular forms of strategic responses because they can
reduce environmental uncertainty and resource dependence and they have a number of
advantages. For example, they are often stimulated by simple economies of scale. They
can also be an attempt for greater vertical integration. They can occur within the same
industry or across different industries. When they occur in the same industry they can
help to reduce the uncertainty associated with competition. When they occur across
different industries, they can reduce dependence on a particular segment of the
environment. As a result, if resources become threatened in one part of the environment,
the organization can still survive in another part of the environment. A disadvantage of
mergers and acquisitions is the difficulty and challenge of integrating organizations with
different cultures and the high potential for failure. The greatest threat to the success of a
merger or acquisition is the potential clash of cultures of the two firms. Strong cultures
can mix as badly as oil and water when a merger or acquisition pushes them together
under one corporate banner. Thus, although mergers and acquisitions are an increasingly
common strategic response, they often do not work and many result in failure. The
primary reason for such problems is the inability to merge the cultures of the two
organizations.
Since organizations dislike uncertainty, those subunits with the ability to cope with the
unexpected are most likely to obtain power. Those functions that can provide the
organization with greater control over what it finds problematic and can create more
certainty will acquire more power. For example, the intervention of governments into
human resource policies has allowed human resource departments to gain power by
coping with the various uncertainties.
Subunits tend to acquire power when they are able to secure scarce resources that are
important to the organization as a whole. When resources such as budget dollars become
scarce, subunits that are able to secure additional resources from outside the organization
can obtain power. For example, university departments that have the ability to bring in
external funding through consulting contracts and research grants gain power in this way.
In effect, they reduce the organization’s dependence on the environment.
Thus, environmental uncertainty and resource dependence have implications for subunit
power in organizations because those subunits that can reduce uncertainty and make the
organization less dependent on the environment for scarce resources will have more
power. Furthermore, to the extent that such power is used in the pursuit of self-interest
within an organization, environmental uncertainty and resource dependence also have
implications for organizational politics.
In sum, environmental uncertainty and resource dependence can predict and explain the
distribution and use of power and politics in organizations.
In terms of leadership behaviour, communication and decision making processes, and the
distribution and use of power in organizations, it is important to first recognize that
organic structures favour flexibility and informal communication over rigidity and the
strict chain of command along the lines of the human relations movement.
Communication in mechanistic structures is more likely to be formal and probably more
downward than upward. In terms of leadership, you are more likely to find directive and
transactional leadership behaviour in mechanistic structures. Organic structures are more
likely to have participative, transformational, and empowering leaders. Decision making
is more likely to be centralized at the higher levels of the organization in mechanistic
structures. In organic structures, decision making is more likely to be decentralized,
participative, and to employ groups. Finally, power in mechanistic structures is likely to
be based on legitimate authority along with the reward and coercive power that is
associated with it. Expert and referent power are more likely to be found in organic
structures along with the empowering of individuals throughout the organization.
problem might arise if one of the cultures is pathological. Pathological cultures threaten
organizational effectiveness and they might also threaten the success of a merger or
acquisition. However, the greatest threat to the success of a merger or acquisition is the
potential clash of cultures of the two firms. Strong cultures can mix as badly as oil and
water when a merger or acquisition pushes them together under one corporate banner.
Thus, a critical factor for the success of mergers and acquisitions is to carefully manage
the integration of the two cultures. This requires careful attention and understanding of
each firm’s culture as well as an understanding of the kind of culture that the newly
formed organization will require to succeed. Task forces and committees might be set up
to work with members of each organization in the development of a new culture.
What does this structural feature tell you about how work is organized at Google? How
does a large span of control promote grassroots innovation?
The large span of control reported at Google is typical of a flat organic structure in which
direct supervision plays little role in day-to-day operations. Work is coordinated by
standardization of skills and mutual adjustment. Under this structure, well trained and
fairly treated individuals will tend to innovate because they are intrinsically motivated
and the boss is not looking over their shoulder. Indeed, as described in Chapters 8 and 15,
Google employees are given free time to devote to innovative products that might help
Google clients. This reinforces the lack of direct supervision provided by the wide span
of control.
The purpose of this exercise is for students to get some idea of their preference for a
mechanistic versus an organic organizational structure. In most organizations, there are
differences of opinion and preferences as to how the organization should be structured
and how people should conduct themselves.
This exercise can be used to introduce the topics of traditional structural characteristics
and organic and mechanistic organizational structures. To begin class discussion, the
instructor might ask students to describe the structure of organizations that they have
worked in with respect to the structural characteristics described in the text.
This discussion can then lead into the Organizational Structure Preference Scale. You
might have students work in groups to compare and discuss their scores and determine
the group average. A class discussion might follow in which the instructor calculates the
class average. The following questions can be used for group or class discussion:
1. What is your score on the Organizational Structure Preference Scale and what are
the implications of it?
2. Based on your previous work experiences in mechanistic and/or organic
organizations, how accurate is your score?
3. Describe how you have felt working in a mechanistic or organic organization, and
how does your score on the Organizational Structure Preference Scale help you to
understand your attitudes and behaviour?
This exercise is suitable for an individual, a group project completed outside the class, or
a class discussion guided by the instructor. In the case of the group project, each group
might choose and contact a local organization for information. Alternatively, library
resources might be consulted to diagnose a prominent national or international
organization. Your instructor might suggest one or more organizations for diagnosis.
The purpose of this exercise is for students to learn how the degree of “fit” among the
environment, strategy, and organizational structure influences the effectiveness of
organizations. Students are instructed to choose an organization and to diagnose it in
terms of the concepts covered in the chapter. To conduct the diagnosis, students should
answer the questions in the exercise.
This exercise is suitable for an individual or group project completed outside the class or
a class discussion guided by the instructor. In the case of the group project completed
outside the class, each group might choose and contact a local organization for
information. Alternatively, library resources might be consulted to diagnose a prominent
national or international organization. As the instructor, you might want to suggest one or
more organizations. It might be particularly interesting to suggest an organization that has
received considerable coverage in the press at the time of the course.
When presenting or discussing their diagnosis in class, make sure students understand the
influence of the environment on the organization and the links between strategy and
structure. Make sure they understand why the organization is structured the way it is and
the impact the environment has had on strategy and the organization’s structure. Students
should also explain how the organization has managed uncertainty and resource
dependence and how it has influenced the organization’s structure.
1. Describe the structure of Conway Manufacturing. What are some of the problems
that Conway is having? Is organizational structure a factor?
The structure of Conway Manufacturing is a classic functional departmentation. That is,
employees with closely related skills and responsibilities (functions) are located in the
same department. Thus, those with skills in sales and advertising are assigned to the
marketing department, and those with skills in research are assigned to the research and
development department. The main problems that Conway is having stem from the
disadvantages of functional departmentation. These disadvantages include a high degree
of differentiation – differences in terms of goals, time spans, and interpersonal styles -
between functional departments, poor coordination, slow response to organizational
problems, open conflict between departments, and neglect of customers’ needs.
2. What would be the most effective structure to design new, high-quality products in a
short period of time? What are some methods for improving coordination?
Conway needs an organizational structure that will improve coordination between the
functional specialties and increase the response time to develop new products. One
In addition, instead of being organized around functions, the organization would be made
up of self-managing and cross-functional work teams that are organized around core
business processes that are critical for satisfying customers’ needs.
1. Describe the organizational structure of DSS Consulting in the late 1990s. What
method of departmentation did they use, and why did they choose it?
During the late 1990s, DSS organized itself into four practice departments:
Procurement and Systems, Information Technology, Contract Negotiation, and
Facilities Planning. They chose this structure to deal with different types of
engagements. This is an example of product departmentation. With product
departmentation, departments are formed on the basis of a particular product, product
line, or service. Each department operates fairly autonomously because it has its own
set of functional specialists dedicated to the output of that department. A key
advantage of product departmentation is better coordination among the functional
specialists who work on a particular product line. Since their attentions are focused on
one product and they have fewer functional peers, fewer barriers to communication
should develop. Other advantages include flexibility, since product lines can be added
or deleted without great implications for the rest of the organization. Also, product-
focused departments can be evaluated as profit centres, since they have independent
control over costs and revenues. This is not feasible for most functional departments.
Product departmentation often serves the customer or client better, since the client
can see more easily who produced the product. All in all, product structures have
more potential than functional structures for responding to customers in a timely way.
However, professional development might suffer without a critical mass of
professionals working in the same place at the same time. Also, economies of scale
might be threatened and inefficiency might occur if relatively autonomous product-
oriented departments are not coordinated.
2. Discuss the changes that began to affect DSS in 2005. Use the material in the chapter
on the components of the external environment, interest groups, environmental
uncertainty, and resource dependence to explain how the environment was affecting
DSS.
A number of changes began to affect DSS in 2005. As the founders were cutting back
their involvement in the company, management decisions were being passed on to
new leaders. As well, without the involvement of the founders who had generated
much of DSS’s business, there was a need for new marketing strategies. In addition,
the types of problems for which districts were looking for help was becoming more
diverse and did not fit clearly into one of the practice areas. As a result, this created a
demand for new types of services. In addition, state standards for school districts
were diverging and as a result certain issues were more important in one region than
in another. As a result of these changes, DSS experienced stagnation in revenue
growth. With respect to the issues in the chapter, these changes suggest the following:
therefore require new types of services. Second, changes in state standards for school
districts (social/political factors) means that the issues of importance across various
regions will differ.
Interest groups: Interest groups are parties or organizations other than direct
competitors that have some vested interest in how an organization is managed.
Different interest groups evaluate organizational effectiveness according to different
criteria. Interest groups that have a vested interest in DSS include school districts and
state governments.
Environmental uncertainty: Environmental uncertainty exists when an environment is
vague, difficult to diagnose, and unpredictable. Uncertainty depends on the
environment’s complexity (simple versus complex) and its rate of change (static
versus dynamic). For DSS, the environment is becoming more uncertain as it is no
longer clear what services are required by different school districts and state standards
across regions are diverging. Thus, it would seem that the environment is becoming
more complex given that the needs of various school districts and regions are
changing, and more dynamic given the changing needs of clients. The result is a
dynamic/complex environment which provokes the most uncertainty. Thus, the
environment of DSS is increasing in uncertainty.
Resource dependence: Resource dependence refers to the dependency of
organizations on environmental inputs, such as capital, raw materials, and human
resources as well as outputs such as customers. With the founders of DSS reducing
their involvement in the company, there is a greater dependence on finding new
leaders including those hired from other consulting companies (greater dependency
on inputs). In addition, with the changes in school districts and needs and differences
in state standards, there is a greater dependency on finding new customers (outputs).
Thus, DSS is becoming more dependent on inputs and outputs.
3. How did DSS Consulting respond to the changes in the environment? Use Exhibit
14.4 to explain their response. Do you think this was an appropriate response to the
changes in the environment?
In response to the changes in the environment, the founders of DSS decided that a
shift in strategy was necessary for DSS to continue to grow and be successful. It was
determined that to continue to be successful, DSS would need to expand beyond its
traditional customer base of small districts and offer services to larger districts more
so than in the past. To accomplish this, they would need to develop new services and
re-organize into a more cross-functional, customer-focused organization. With respect
to Exhibit 14.4, one can see that the founders perceived the increasing uncertainty and
resource dependence (see answer to question #2), formulated a strategic response (a
change in strategy), that resulted in a change in organizational structure that they
believed will result in continued success and organizational effectiveness.
Given the changes in the environment which will require providing new services to
new customers, a change in strategy seems appropriate and is in fact called for.
Furthermore, a change in structure is also required given that the types of problems
school districts are now facing no longer fit clearly into the current four practice areas
of DSS, and are more diverse meaning that more and varied types of services will
need to be provided to new customers in both small and larger school districts.
In summary, a new strategy and structure is required to provide new and varied
services to new and diverse customers.
4. Discuss the new organizational structure in terms of the division and coordination of
labour and departmentation. What are the pros and cons of the new organizational
structure? What effect did the new organizational structure have on the Southwest
Region Team and its ability to successfully complete its project?
As described in the case, a major part of the strategic change involved reorganizing
DSS from a purely practice-oriented functional structure to a hybrid structure. As a
result, the consultants are to be assigned to new cross-functional teams that will be
responsible for marketing and delivering services to districts within a particular
geographic region. The practice groups were maintained to provide specialized
expertise to support the cross-functional teams in their work but with many fewer
staff members than in the past. The cross-functional teams had two responsibilities.
They were to build relationships with the school districts in their regions and provide
a full range of DSS consulting services to those districts. They were also to develop
new consulting offerings in response to district needs. The intention was that the
cross-functional teams would eliminate the functional “silos” that constrained the
services DSS could provide and would help DSS develop services that could be sold
to larger districts.
Thus, in terms of the various terms used in the chapter, this is primarily geographic
departmentation. Relatively self-contained units deliver an organization’s products or
services in a specific geographic territory. In the case of DSS, the cross-functional
teams are responsible for marketing and delivering services to districts within a
particular geographic region. This form of departmentation shortens communication
channels, allows the organization to cater to regional tastes, and gives some
appearance of local control to clients and customers. In the case, they refer to the new
structure as a hybrid because they are retaining the functional “silos” from the
previous structure. Hybrid departmentation is a structure based on some mixture of
functional, product, geographic, or customer departmentation. Hybrids attempt to
capitalize on the strengths of various structures, while avoiding the weaknesses of
others.
The advantages and disadvantages of a geographic structure parallel those for product
departmentation. Thus, one can expect better coordination and communication among
the members of each cross-functional team, and greater flexibility, since services can
be added or deleted in response to district needs without great implications for the rest
of the organization. In addition, each cross-functional team can be evaluated as profit
centres, since they have independent control over costs and revenues, and they can
serve the customer or client better, since the client can see more easily who provides
the service. Thus, they are more effective for responding to customers in a timely
way. On the down side, economies of scale might be threatened and inefficiency
might occur if cross-functional teams are not coordinated. Thus, two cross-functional
teams might be working on the development of the same new service for months
without being aware of each other’s efforts or might even be working at cross
purposes.
With respect to the division and coordination of labour, the new structure provides
more autonomy and control within each cross-functional team and can facilitate
timely communication and coordination within the team. However, the new structure
also creates greater differentiation which is the tendency for managers in separate
units, functions, or departments to differ in terms of goals, time spans, and
interpersonal styles. In particular, the various cross-functional teams will create high
differentiation in the organization as each cross-functional team operates more
autonomously on its own projects. In terms of coordinating labour, direct supervision
is provided by the leader of each group (Chris Peterson is the leader of the Southwest
Region Team) and mutual adjustment occurs among group members. The main
problem, however, is that there is little communication and coordination between the
various cross-functional teams and with the functional specialists which contributed
to the difficulty that the Southwest Region Team had in its ability to successfully
complete its project.
5. What effect do you think the new organizational structure had on the decision to
cancel the Southwest Region’s project? Explain your answer.
The new organizational structure had a great deal to do with the decision to cancel the
Southwest Region’s project. Part of the problem stems from the fact that the cross-
functional teams were so autonomous and differentiated that they had little interaction
and communication with each other. As noted in the case, members of the Southwest
Region Team spent nearly all their time working with one another and saw little of
the other consultants not on their team. In addition, there was little interest in what
other teams were doing and when someone brought it up it was sometimes seen as a
distraction to the group. Further, one of Chris’ goals was to help the group avoid
distractions and to continue to build cohesion. Even Chris acknowledged to Meg that
she only had a general idea of what other teams had been working on and that her
team had focused on their own project. Thus, the structure had the effect of insulating
the team from the other teams and the rest of the organization which meant that they
did not know what other teams were working on and did not receive very much
feedback from the other teams about their project.
In addition, the new organizational structure also made it very difficult for the
Southwest Region Team to get help and support from others in the organization,
especially the functional specialists. For example, when Chris sent the program
description to the DSS functional specialists who would be needed to provide
technical support in developing the consulting protocols and specifying parts of the
code for managing the data base, most of the functional specialists simply
acknowledged receiving them but did not offer any real comments. Meg responded
by asking a couple of questions and saying that she and Chris would talk more about
it later. The group took all this to mean that all was well. They were pleased with the
response as no one had raised any objections to the program design or identified any
difficulties that would slow the project down.
As the group made changes to the project specifications following comments from the
districts, they began to have problems. There were disagreements, teams members
had concerns about the direction DSS was going, and they questioned whether the
team would be able to accomplish its task. Chris arranged for a Friday barbeque and
meeting which seemed to put the team back on track to complete the project.
However, completing the project required the specialized knowledge of the DSS
specialists in the practice groups. When a question came up that group members
could not answer, a member of the Southwest Region Team would email a question
or have a face-to-face meeting with the specialist. This seemed to work well for
simple issues but not for complex problems. And when team members tried to get
functional specialists to spend time working on the more complex problems, they
were often not given much help and were occasionally rebuffed. Chris would then
have to go to the manager of the practice area to try and get support but that too often
did not help. Further, even when the manager of an area said that one his specialists
will work with the team when they are contacted by a team member, team members
were then told that the project had not been built into the schedule and they would not
be able to help until other things got done. Chris then arranged a meeting with Meg to
discuss the difficulty her team was having in getting support from the specialists.
However, while Meg seemed sympathetic she did take direct action to solve the
problem.
In summary, the organizational structure resulted in a complete lack of support for the
Southwest Region Team project. It seems that nobody in the organization including
other teams, the functional specialists, and even Meg had much knowledge or interest
in the Southwest Region Team project and as a result, it failed to get the support of
others in the organization and was cancelled.
6. Do you think the outcome of the Southwest Region’s project would have been more
positive if a different organizational structure had been adopted? Is there anything
else that might have prevented the cancellation of the project? Consider the potential
effects of the different methods of coordinating divided labour. What might have
saved the project?
At first one gets the impression that the Southwest Region Team has done a great job.
As noted by Chris, the group had done a terrific job of specifying and developing a
new product that was ready for a beta test and it had received positive comments from
the district. In addition, the team itself had been very effective. Team members
worked well together, they were cohesive, and made decisions easily and quickly.
What’s more, the team completed the project even though they did not receive very
much help from the specialists in the practice groups. Further, even though some
members initially had doubts about the new direction of DSS, they were now all
committed to the new direction. However, according to Meg the teams in other
regions had not reported any interest on the part of the districts they had worked with
for this type of product and that it might not be of interest to the large districts.
However, Chris does not understand how other regional teams could say that there
would not be a demand for the product when they did not even know what the
planning and scheduling system could do. Meg also told Chris that the Southwest
Region Team would now focus exclusively on marketing DSS products and not be
involved in product development work and that there would be some change to the
composition of the team.
It is quite possible that this outcome would have been different if a different
organizational structure had been adopted. The problem with the hybrid
departmentation was that the cross-functional teams which were a geographic
departmentation were completely separate from the DSS functional specialists. As a
result, they had little to no interaction and the functional specialists did not believe
they had any responsibility for working with the Southwest Region Team. Thus, the
Southwest Region Team was highly autonomous but completely separated from other
teams and the specialists which made it very difficult to get the help and support it
needed for the project to be a success.
In summary, the outcome of the Southwest Region Team’s project might have been
more positive if a matrix departmentation structure had been adopted rather than a
hybrid departmentation, and if various methods of coordination had been used such as
a liaison role or an integrator. This might have prevented the cancellation of the
project because it would have provided greater interaction, communication,
involvement, and support of other members of the organization.
In February 1984, a radical new experiment began with the establishment of the Group of
99, which consisted of 99 individuals representing a broad cross-section of members of
the United Auto Workers (UAW), General Motors (GM) managers, and staff from 55
plants and 14 UAW regions. The group’s mission was to study GM divisions as well as
other organizations and to create a new approach to building automobiles. The group
travelled some two million miles and concluded that employees perform best when they
feel part of the decision-making process, which meant that to overcome the traditional
difficulties of automobile manufacturing, auto plants would have to operate under a
different philosophy.
On January 8, 1985, then-GM Chairman and CEO Roger B. Smith held a press
conference in Detroit to make a “historic announcement”: the unveiling of Saturn, GM’s
first new brand in 70 years. Saturn was conceived as a totally new corporation, a wholly
owned General Motors subsidiary that delivered its first cars in the fall of 1990. The
autonomous division, headquartered in Spring Hill, Tennessee, had its own sales and
service operations.
Why did GM decide to separate Saturn so decisively from the existing corporate
structure, rather than just add yet another product line to its Chevrolet, Oldsmobile,
Pontiac, Buick, and Cadillac lines?
General Motors insiders and auto industry analysts cited two primary reasons. First,
GM badly needed to find ways to cut costs to compete in the small-car market, in which
estimates suggested that Japanese manufacturers enjoyed a great cost advantage.
According to Smith, Saturn’s mission was “to develop and produce an American-made
small car that will be fully competitive with the best of the imports…[and] affirm that
American ingenuity, American technology, and American productivity can once again be
the model and the inspiration for the rest of the world.”
Second, top GM executives hoped to use the Saturn venture as a testing ground for
innovations that could be applied throughout the rest of the organization, especially ones
that could get new models to the market more quickly. According to Smith, the
techniques GM learned from Saturn would spread throughout the company, “improving
the efficiency and competitiveness of every plant we operate… Saturn is the key to GM’s
long-term competitiveness, survival and success as a domestic producer.” To accomplish
both these goals, the freedom of a completely “fresh start” and the protection autonomy
offered seemed to be essential.
With the exception of the use of plastic for vertical body parts, Saturn cars did not
represent a radical technical departure for GM. Rather, it was the way in which the cars
were built and marketed that was innovative. A primary goal was to create a culture in
which employees had a sense of ownership over the functions they performed and a
better understanding and bigger picture of the business. Tasks traditionally performed by
management were performed by assembly workers. Extensively trained self-managed
work teams assembled the cars, maintained their own equipment, ordered supplies, set
work schedules, and even selected new team members. In addition, a consensus-based
decision-making process involved employees in decisions that affected them. Each team
had to feel 70 percent comfortable with a decision.
To control quality and reduce transport costs, much subassembly was done by
suppliers located close to the plant or even within the plant itself, thus fostering a close
cooperative arrangement. Parts that did come in from the outside were delivered precisely
when they were needed and directly to the location where they were used in assembly. In
the marketing domain, dealers were given more exclusive territories than is typical of
North American auto manufacturers. As long as they met stiff requirements in several
key areas, they were given substantial autonomy to tailor their operations to local needs.
Understanding,” as it was called, meant that Saturn would not be bound by the union’s
cumbersome contract, which included 200 job classifications at some GM factories and
rules prohibiting members of one group performing the work of another group. Rather,
Saturn would have only a handful of job classifications. There were no time clocks, and
workers were on salaries, although these salaries averaged less than industry hourly
wages (80 percent). In addition, restrictive work rules were eliminated to support the
team assembly concept. In exchange for these concessions, GM devoted a percentage of
the industry hourly wage to performance incentives tied to quality and productivity and a
profit-sharing plan for Saturn workers. Also, 80 percent of the workforce was granted
what amounted to lifetime employment security. GM agreed that it would not lay off
more than 20 percent of the workforce under any circumstances. Union representatives
sat on planning and organizing committees. Saturn advertisements used the tagline “A
Different Kind of Company. A Different Kind of Car.”
Did Saturn fulfill the promise of its multi-billion-dollar investment? Early cars
suffered from quality glitches that the company attended to quickly, even replacing some
faulty cars for free. As a result of such tactics and extremely cooperative dealers (many of
whom organized customer picnics and car clinics), intense customer loyalty resulted in
Saturn turning a profit three years after the first car rolled off the assembly line.
However, the company operated in the red most years and had not recouped the initial
investment. Many observers noted the failure of other parts of GM to embrace the Saturn
innovations. The United Auto Workers consistently resisted Saturn-type labour
agreements at any other manufacturing sites. Saturn was slow to develop new models,
and competitors were outpacing the company in terms of technical refinement and safety,
even while copying some of its “buyer-friendly” sales techniques. Although Saturn
buyers had good demographics in terms of income and education, the company was slow
to develop larger sedans, minivans, and sport utility vehicles to offer them. Gaining
investment funds for such projects from GM had been difficult because the parent firm
was busy recentralizing much vehicle development and engineering. When Saturn
executives sought funds to develop a Saturn SUV, the response from GM was that
customers should buy Chevy SUVs.
Four years after its start-up, Saturn became part of the GM Small Car Group. This
required Saturn leadership to work even harder to ensure the spirit of the Saturn
partnership remained strong. In 1996, a decision was made to build a new mid-size
Saturn model at an existing GM plant in Delaware. Even though organizational and
market changes challenged Saturn’s unique culture, the original memorandum of
agreement between Saturn and its workers was renewed in late 1999.
Meanwhile, Saturn had been rebuilding its aging product line. In 1999, the new L-
series went on sale, making it the first new Saturn product in nearly a decade. In a long-
awaited move, it finally introduced a sport utility vehicle, marking the first expansion in
the division’s history beyond its coupes, sedans, and station wagons, and sending a signal
that Saturn was now in the truck business.
In December 2001, the new Vue sport utility vehicle was unveiled, followed by a
complete restyling of its mid-sized L-Series. In 2002, Saturn unveiled the Ion to replace
the S-Series, the car that first launched Saturn, and in 2003 it unveiled the Relay minivan.
However, these vehicles were, for the most part, similar to models sold by other GM
divisions.
In November 2005, General Motors announced that it would be eliminating 5000 jobs
in addition to 25 000 previously announced cuts and would be closing all or part of a
dozen plants. This time, however, even Saturn was not to be spared. What had once been
the company’s centrepiece of workplace innovation was now slated to lose one of its two
production lines and as many as 1500 jobs. Production of the Ion compact was shifted to
another GM plant, and the Saturn plant would make some non-Saturn vehicles. Why
Saturn? According to a GM spokesperson, “We really consider it to be another GM
facility, just like any other.”
In 2009, GM CEO Rick Wagoner was ousted by the U.S. government as part of a
bailout effort to save the company in the midst of the global automobile crisis. GM was
given 60 days by the government to submit a new restructuring plan. GM subsequently
filed for bankruptcy protection and as part of its restructuring plan decided to sell off
several of its brands, including Saturn. GM had initially planned to discontinue and shut
down Saturn if a buyer could not be found.
During the global auto crisis, Saturn’s sales plunged, leaving dealers with an
inventory of 32 647 vehicles. Customer loyalty to the Saturn brand was also faltering, and
the Astra, a new model, flopped and was discontinued.
In June 2009, GM made a deal to sell the Saturn brand and the service, parts, and
distribution operations to auto-racing magnate Roger Penske and his company, Penske
Automotive Group, who planned to find another manufacturer to build Saturn vehicles. In
a statement, Penske, who operated more than 300 franchised automobile dealerships,
said, “For nearly 20 years Saturn has focused on treating the customer right. We share
that philosophy, and we want to build on those strengths.”
However, a few months later the deal fell apart because Penske was unable to find an
auto maker to manufacture Saturn vehicles.
Roger Smith, who had publicly staked GM’s future on Saturn’s success, passed away
in 2007. While he had hoped to remake GM using Saturn as the model, it now seems that
the opposite happened. The experiment to create a “different kind of company” had come
to an end. GM stopped producing Saturn vehicles shortly after the Penske deal fell
through.
Sources: Austen, I. (1999, March 26). Problem child. Canadian Business, 22–31; Bennet,
J. (1994, March 29). Saturn, GM’s big hope, is taking its first lumps. New York Times,
A1, A12; Fisher, A.B. (1985, November 11). Behind the hype at GM’s Saturn. Fortune,
34–49; Garsten, E. (2002, March 28). Saturn jazzes up small-car offerings. Toronto Star,
C6; Keenan, G. (2002, February 6). GM driven to improve. Globe and Mail, C1; Staff.
(1994, October 17). Will it work this time? Autoweek, 4–5; Taylor, A., III. (1988, August
1). Back to the future at Saturn. Fortune, 63–69; Treece, J.B. (1990, April 9). Here comes
GM’s Saturn. Business Week, 56–62; Vaughn, M. (1999, July 5). Smiling happy people.
Autoweek, 20–21; Woodruff, J. (1992, August 17). Saturn. Business Week, 86–91; Kiger,
P.J. (2005, December 12). Saturn plant’s innovations live on at GM despite cutbacks.
Workforce Management, 84(14), 3–4; Solomon, C.M. (1991, June). Behind the wheel at
Saturn. Personnel Journal, 70(6), 72–74; Ingrassia, P. (2009, April 4). Saturn was
supposed to save GM. Newsweek, 153(15), 20–24; Marr, K. (2009, June 6). Racing
magnate Penske to buy Saturn from GM. The Washington Post (online),
www.washingtonpost.com; Terlep, S., & Stoll, J.D. (2009, June 6). Penske will buy,
remake Saturn—Racing legend/auto magnate will add auto brand and dealers to empire.
Wall Street Journal, B1; Stoll, J.D. (2009, June 29). At Saturn, a split relying on the
Penske name. Wall Street Journal, B1; Keenan, G. and Krashinsky, S. (2009, October 1).
End of the road for Saturn as Penske walks. Globe and Mail, B1.
Questions
1. Discuss the role that environmental constraints and opportunities may have played in
the creation and fall of Saturn. What contributed to its inception and its end?
2. Apply the concepts of environmental uncertainty, resource dependence, and strategy
to the Saturn case. To what extent does the strategy correspond to the constraints and
opportunities of the environment?
3. Consider the relationship between the strategy and structure of the Saturn plant. What
came first and how and why is the structure different from the rest of GM?
4. What strategic responses were used by Saturn to try to cope with environmental
uncertainty? What other strategic responses might have been considered?
5. What does the story of Saturn teach us about the linkages between environment,
strategy, and structure? What lessons can be learned from the Saturn experiment?
TEACHING NOTES FOR THE RISE AND FALL OF SATURN CASE STUDY
This case should help students see how many of the topics discussed in the chapter come
together. Saturn is clearly the result of environmental factors and various constraints and
opportunities. Strategies to manage environmental uncertainty and resource dependence
have been incorporated into the structure and work process. The philosophy and strategy
of Saturn required an organizational structure that differs from the rest of GM and the
more traditional approach to automobile manufacturing. Thus, the Saturn experiment
shows how the environment, strategy, and structure are all linked right to the very end
when the environment once again changed and spelled the end of Saturn.
1. Discuss the role that environmental constraints and opportunities may have played in
the creation and fall of Saturn. What contributed to its inception and its end?
A strong impetus for the Saturn venture was the $2,000 cost advantage per small car that
Japanese competitors held at the time. However, cost reductions mean little unless the
quality of the Saturn automobile is comparable with that of Japanese makes. To enhance
quality, GM exercised particular control over parts suppliers, inducing them to locate
within or near the plant to facilitate communication with Saturn engineering and
manufacturing personnel. During the recessionary early 1980s, the general economy
faltered, and unions lost considerable bargaining power. Union membership fell, and GM
capitalized on changing social attitudes toward unions to forge an innovative contract
with the United Auto Workers. However, an interest group, the National Right to Work
Legal Defence Foundation, challenged the legality of the contract. This group, which
provides legal aid to workers who do not wish to join unions, argued that it was improper
for GM to specify the United Auto Workers as a bargaining agent in advance of any
workers having been hired. The challenge failed.
Finally, the global automobile crises and recession spelled the end of Saturn as GM had
to restructure itself and become leaner and more efficient. This meant the end of several
of its brands including Saturn. Clearly, the inception and end of Saturn was the result of
environmental constraints and opportunities.
with the constraints and opportunities that an organization’s environment poses. Saturn
used a number of strategies to manage environmental uncertainty and resource
dependence. To control quality and reduce transport costs, much of the subassembly is
done by suppliers that are located close to the plant or even within the plant itself. Parts
that come from the outside are delivered precisely when they are needed and directly to
the location where they are used in assembly. In terms of labour, GM agreed to a labour
contract with the United Auto Workers in which the workers would be on salaries and
restrictive work rules were eliminated. In exchange, GM provides performance incentives
and profit sharing and 80 percent of the workforce is guaranteed lifetime employment
security. The innovative agreement between GM and the United Auto Workers regarding
Saturn is an attempt to cope with environmental uncertainty. General Motors’ strategy
involved guaranteeing itself a ready supply of flexible labour at somewhat less than the
going wage rate at its other plants.
3. Consider the relationship between the strategy and structure of the Saturn plant.
What came first and how and why is the structure different from the rest of GM?
Part of the GM Saturn organization strategy is to reduce the development time for new
models and to get them to the market more quickly. It was also to be a testing ground for
innovations that could be applied throughout the rest of the organization. To implement
the strategy, the company opted for a flatter, more organic, less bureaucratic structure for
Saturn. The more traditional, hierarchical and bureaucratic structure would not be likely
to result in innovations such as getting new models to the market more quickly. Thus, in
the case of GM Saturn, the strategy came first and determined the structure, rather than
the other way around. This is a reasonable approach given that GM Saturn involved the
formation of a new organization and a new approach to manufacturing automobiles. The
structure differs from the more mechanistic structure found in the rest of GM which was
necessary in order to be able reduce development time. Such a structure was also
necessary in order to overcome the traditional difficulties of automobile manufacturing.
4. What strategic responses were used by Saturn to try to cope with environmental
uncertainty? What other strategic responses might have been considered?
As indicated above, a key strategic response was the organizational structure of Saturn
which was flatter and more organic than the rest of GM. As a result, tasks traditionally
performed by management are now performed by assembly workers and self-managed
teams assemble the cars, maintain their own equipment, order supplies, set work
schedules, and even select new team members. Employees also participate in a
consensus-based decision-making process. In terms of other strategic responses, there is a
form of vertical integration in that much of the subassembly is done by suppliers that are
located close to the plant or even within the plant itself. This is a way of exerting greater
control over sources of organizational supply. Establishing legitimacy was also probably
important as shown by the establishment of the Group of 99 with members of the UAW,
GM managers and staff from 55 plants and 14 UAW regions.
5. What does the story of Saturn teach us about the linkages between environment,
strategy, and structure? What lessons can be learned from the Saturn experiment?
The story of Saturn demonstrates the linkages between environment, strategy, and
structure. The origin of Saturn was the result of the need to compete in the small-car
market where Japanese manufacturers held a cost advantage. This led to the strategy of
separating Saturn from the existing corporate structure in order to overcome the
traditional difficulties of automobile manufacturing. The strategy was to reduce the
development time for new models and to get them to the market more quickly. It was also
to be a testing ground for innovations that could be applied throughout the rest of the
organization. As a result, Saturn opted for a flatter, more organic, less bureaucratic
structure. The more traditional, hierarchical and bureaucratic structure would not be
likely to result in innovations such as getting new models to the market more quickly.
Thus, the strategy came first and determined the structure. This is a reasonable approach
given that GM Saturn involved the formation of a new organization and a new approach
to manufacturing automobiles. The structure differs from the more mechanistic structure
found in the rest of GM which was necessary in order to be able reduce development
time. Such a structure was also necessary in order to overcome the traditional difficulties
of automobile manufacturing.
The new organizational structure also had implications for how the cars were to be built
which involved providing employees with a sense of ownership and better understanding
of the business. Employees performed tasks that were traditionally performed by
management. They were extensively trained and participated in decision making through
a consensus-based process in which they were involved in decisions that affected them.
The shop floor organization, with its work teams and reduced supervision, is more
organic than is typical for the North American auto industry. This is also reflected in the
managerial and professional ranks, in which the technology for designing cars was
modified. Early involvement of all critical departments also points to a more organic
structure backed up by sophisticated electronic aids to facilitate coordination and
communication. The changes in technology also required the enrichment of the assembly
workers jobs. The formation of self-managing teams in which team members maintain
their own equipment, order supplies, set work schedules, and select new team members
represents a major change in job design.
The story of Saturn demonstrates how the environment was responsible for the strategy
that led to the creation of Saturn, and the Saturn strategy had direct implications for
structure. Of course, when the environment changed the Saturn strategy was no longer
viable and this led to its demise. However, some of the practices that were created in the
design of Saturn vehicles as part of the new approach to building automobiles such as
collaborative work practices, teams, and work role flexibility, have in fact spread
throughout the rest of GM.
What can we learn from the Saturn experiment? For starters, it demonstrates the
importance of strategy and structure in responding to the environment. The Saturn story
also shows us how difficult it is to implement a new strategy and innovations in a large
organization. Some say that if the Saturn strategy had been adopted throughout the auto
industry the situation facing North American auto makers during the recent economic
crises would have been very different. Others say that Saturn represents a missed
opportunity for building more competitive fuel-efficient cars and for better labour-
management relations throughout the auto industry. Interestingly, today’s more flexible
plants such as Ford Motor’s Michigan Assembly Plant require specially trained workers
who have more skills, are more flexible, and are more involved in their work. Perhaps the
Saturn experiment has had more of an impact on the auto industry than we think!