Professional Documents
Culture Documents
-respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration holding that "[f]ailure to allege that earnest efforts towards a
compromise is jurisdictional such that for failure to allege same the court would be deprived of its jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case." He warned that unless the complaint was amended within five (5) days the case would be
dismissed.
- the 5-day period having expired without Guerrero amending his complaint, respondent Judge dismissed the case,
declaring the dismissal however to be without prejudice
- Guerrero appeals by way of this petition for review the dismissal by the court a quo.
Issue: Is the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted,
which efforts failed, a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction? Are brothers by affinity considered members of the
same family contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j),
Rule 16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them may be
instituted and maintained?
Held:Yes! No!
- The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to strengthen it as a basic autonomous social
institution. 2 This is also embodied in Art. 149, 3 and given flesh in Art. 151, of the Family Code, which provides:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same had failed. If it is
shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
-This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.Considering that
Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word "No", the requirement is mandatorythat the complaint or petition,
which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the same
failed, so that "[i]f it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed."
- O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit, 9 citing Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, that the attempt to compromise as well as the inability
to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family, the absence of such
allegation in the complaint being assailable at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of
action
-Further, Art. 151 is contemplated by Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which provides as a ground for
motion to dismiss "(t)hat the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made."
- But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the above-quoted provisions. As early as two
decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayonthat the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as members of the
same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law". In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that
"sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the
same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of "members of the family",
we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that
petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts
towards a compromise before filing the present suit
Clearly, MAC was afforded the opportunity to be heard as its opposition to the motion to dismiss was considered by
the RTC in resolving the issue raised by PAF. Objectively speaking, the spirit behind the three (3)-day notice
requirement was satisfied.
Claim or demand set forth in the pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or extinguished
Cua vs WallemPhils.
A petition for review on certiorari
Facts:- Cua filed a civil action for damages against Wallem and Advance Shipping before the RTC of Manila. Cua
sought the payment of P2,030,303.52 for damage to 218 tons and for a shortage of 50 tons of shipment of Brazilian
Soyabean consigned to him, as evidenced by Bill of Lading No. 10. He claimed that the loss was due to the
respondents’ failure to observe extraordinary diligence in carrying the cargo. Advance Shipping (a foreign
corporation) was the owner and manager of M/V Argo Trader that carried the cargo, while Wallem was its local agent.
- Advance Shipping filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, 6 assailing the RTC’s jurisdiction over Cua’s claim; it
argued that Cua’s claim should have first been brought to arbitration. Cua opposed Advance Shipping’s argument; he
contended that he, as a consignee, was not bound by the Charter Party Agreement, which was a contract between
the ship owner (Advance Shipping) and the charterers. The RTC initially deferred resolving the question of jurisdiction
until after trial on the merits, but upon motion by Advance Shipping, the RTC ruled that Cua was not bound by the
arbitration clause in the Charter Party Agreement
-Wallem filed its own motion to dismiss, raising the sole ground of prescription. Section 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act (COGSA) provides that “the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or
damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods.” Wallem alleged that the goods were
delivered to Cua on August 16, 1989, but the damages suit was instituted only on November 12, 1990 – more than
one year than the period allotted under the COGSA. Since the action was filed beyond the one year prescriptive
period, Wallem argued that Cua’s action has been barred.
- Cua filed an opposition to Wallem’s motion to dismiss, denying the latter’s claim of prescription
- Cua filed an opposition to Wallem’s motion to dismiss, denying the latter’s claim of prescription. Cua referred to the
August 10, 1990 telex message sent by Mr. A.R. Filder of Thomas Miller, manager of the UK P&I Club, which stated
that Advance Shipping agreed to extend the commencement of suit for 90 days, from August 14, 1990 to November
12, 1990; the extension was made with the concurrence of the insurer of the vessel, the UK P&I Club. A copy of the
August 10, 1990 telex was supposedly attached to Cua’s opposition
-Wallem filed an omnibus motion, withdrawing its motion to dismiss and adopting instead the arguments in Advance
Shipping’s motion to dismiss. It made an express reservation, however, that it was not waiving “the defense of
prescription and will allege as one of its defenses, such defense of prescription and/or laches in its Answer should
this be required by the circumstances
- RTC resolved that “the Court need not act on the Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendant Wallem Philippines
Shipping, Inc.[,]” and required the defendants therein to file their Answer. After trial on the merits, the RTC issued its
decision on December 28, 1995, 19 ordering the respondents jointly and severally liable to pay as damages to Cua
- The respondents filed an appeal with the CA, insisting that Cua’s claim is arbitrable and has been barred by
prescription and/or laches. The CA found the respondents’ claim of prescription meritorious. Cua filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA decision, which was denied by the CA
Issue: Has Cua’s claim for payment of damages against the respondents prescribed?
Held: No!
- The failure to raise or plead the grounds generally amounts to a waiver, except if the ground pertains to (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litispendentia, (3) resjudicata, or (4) prescription. If the facts supporting any of
these four listed grounds are apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record, the courts may consider these
grounds motuproprio and accordingly dismiss the complaint. Accordingly, no reversible error may be attributed to the
CA in considering prescription as a ground to dismiss Cua’s action despite Wallem’s supposed waiver of the defense.
The Court, therefore, need not resolve the question of whether Wallem actually waived the defense of prescription;
an inquiry into this question is useless, as courts are empowered to dismiss actions on the basis of prescription even
if it is not raised by the defendant so long as the facts supporting this ground are evident from the records. In the
present case, what is decisive is whether the pleadings and the evidence support a finding that Cua’s claim has
prescribed, and it is on this point that we disagree with the CA’s findings. We find that the CA failed to appreciate the
admissions made by the respondents in their pleadings that negate a finding of prescription of Cua’s claim.
- Respondents admitted the agreement extending the period to file the claim
- The vessel MV Argo Trader arrived in Manila on July 8, 1989; Cua’s complaint for damages was filed before the
RTC of Manila on November 12, 1990. Although the complaint was clearly filed beyond the one-year period, Cua
additionally alleged in his complaint (under paragraph 11) that “[t]he defendants x x x agreed to extend the time for
filing of the action up to November 12, 1990.”
-The allegation of an agreement extending the period to file an action in Cua’s complaint is a material averment that,
under Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, must be specifically denied by the respondents; otherwise, the
allegation is deemed admitted
- review of the pleadings submitted by the respondents discloses that they failed to specifically deny Cua’s allegation
of an agreement extending the period to file an action to November 12, 1990. Wallem’s motion to dismiss simply
referred to the fact that Cua’s complaint was filed more than one year from the arrival of the vessel, but it did not
contain a denial of the extension. Advance Shipping’s motion to dismiss, on the other hand, focused solely on its
contention that the action was premature for failure to first undergo arbitration. While the joint answer submitted by
the respondents denied Cua’s allegation of an extension, they made no further statement other than a bare and
unsupported contention that Cua’s “complaint is barred by prescription and/or laches[.]” The respondents did not
provide in their joint answer any factual basis for their belief that the complaint had prescribed.
Caltex vs Aguirre
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
Facts:- Dubbed as the Asia's Titanic, 1 the M/V Dona Paz was an inter-island passenger vessel owned and operated
by Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (Sulpicio) traversing its Leyte to Manila route on the night of December 20, 1987, when it
collided with M/T Vector, a commercial tanker owned and operated by Vector Shipping Corporation, Inc., (Vector
Shipping). On that particular voyage, M/T Vector was chartered by Caltex (Philippines) Inc., et al. (petitioners) to
transport petroleum products. The collision brought forth an inferno at sea with an estimate of about 4,000 casualties,
and was described as the "world's worst peace time maritime disaster." It precipitated the filing of numerous lawsuits,
the instant case included.
-In December 1988, the heirs of the victims of the tragedy (respondents), instituted a class action with the Civil
District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, United States of America (Louisiana Court), docketed as
Civil Case No. 88-24481 entitled "SivirinoCarreon, et al. v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., et al." On November 30, 2000,
the Louisiana Court entered a conditional judgment dismissing the said case on the ground of forum non-conveniens.
This led the respondents, composed of 1,689 claimants, to file on March 6, 2001 a civil action for damages for breach
of contract of carriage and quasi-delict with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 28 (RTC of
Catbalogan), against the herein petitioners, Sulpicio, Vector Shipping, and Steamship Mutual Underwriting
Association, Bermuda Limited (Steamship). This was docketed as Civil Case No. 7277 entitled "Ma. Flor Singzon-
Aguirre, et al. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., et al.
-RTC of Catbalogan, motuproprio dismissed the complaint pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure as the respondents' cause of action had already prescribed. In an unusual turn of events however, the
petitioners as defendants therein, who were not served with summons, filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that
they are waiving their defense of prescription, among others. The RTC of Catbalogan, however, merely noted the
petitioners' motion.
-The dismissal of the complaint prompted the respondents to have the case reinstated with the Louisiana Court. The
petitioners, as defendants, however argued against it and contended that the Philippines offered a more convenient
forum for the parties, specifically the RTC of Manila, Branch 39 (RTC of Manila), where three consolidated cases
concerning the M/V Dona Paz collision were pending
-RTC of Manila issued its Order 16 denying the respondents' motion to intervene for lack of merit. The RTC of Manila
ruled that the RTC of Catbalogan had already dismissed the case with finality; that a final and executory prior
judgment is a bar to the filing of the complaint in intervention of the respondents; and that the waivers of the defense
of prescription made by the petitioners, Sulpicio and Steamship are of no moment. The motion for reconsideration
filed by the petitioners, Sulpicio and Steamship was denied
Issues: DID THE CA ERR IN RULING THAT THE ORDERS CATBALOGAN BARRED THE FILING OF THE
MOTION AND INTERVENTION BEFORE THE RTC OF MANILA? DID THE CA ERR IN AFFIRMING THE RTC OF
MANILA'S DISREGARD OF THE PETITIONERS' WAIVER OF PRESCRIPTION ON THE GROUND OF BAR BY
PRIOR JUDGMENT?
Held:No! No!
-There is no dispute that the respondents' cause of action against the petitioners has prescribed under the Civil Code.
In fact, the same is evident on the complaint itself. The respondents brought their claim before a Philippine court only
on March 6, 2001, more than 13 years after the collision occurred. Article 1139 of the Civil Code states that actions
prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law. Accordingly, the RTC of Catbalogan cannot be faulted for the
motuproprio dismissal of the complaint filed before it. It is settled that prescription may be considered by the courts
motuproprio if the facts supporting the ground are apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.
-The peculiarity in this case is that the petitioners, who were the defendants in the antecedent cases before the RTCs
of Catbalogan and Manila, are most adamant in invoking their waiver of the defense of prescription while the
respondents, to whom the cause of action belong, have acceded to the dismissal of their complaint. The petitioners
posit that there is a conflict between a substantive law and procedural law in as much as waiver of prescription is
allowed under Article 1112 of the Civil Code, a substantive law even though the motuproprio dismissal of a claim that
has prescribed is mandated under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
- The Court has previously held that the right to prescription may be waived or renounced pursuant to Article 1112 of
the Civil Code.
- In the instant case, not only once did the petitioners expressly renounce their defense of prescription. Nonetheless,
the Court cannot consider such waiver as basis in order to reverse the rulings of the courts below as the dismissal of
the complaint had become final and binding on both the petitioners and the respondents
- The RTC of Manila denied the respondents' motion for intervention on the ground of the finality of the order of the
RTC of Catbalogan, there being no appeal or any other legal remedy perfected in due time by either the petitioners or
the respondents. Since the dismissal of the complaint was already final and executory, the RTC of Manila can no
longer entertain a similar action from the same parties. The bone of contention is not regarding the petitioners'
execution of waivers of the defense of prescription, but the effect of finality of an order or judgment on both parties.
-Settled is the rule that a party is barred from assailing the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him"
because the "presumption [is] that a party who did not interject an appeal is satisfied with the adjudication made by
the lower court." Whether the dismissal was based on the merits or technicality is beside the point. "[A] dismissal on a
technicality is no different in effect and consequences from a dismissal on the merits."
Swedish Match vs Ca
Facts:- Swedish Match AB (hereinafter SMAB) is a corporation organized under the laws of Sweden not doing
business in the Philippines. SMAB, however, had three subsidiary corporations in the Philippines, all organized under
Philippine laws, to wit: Phimco Industries, Inc. (Phimco), Provident Tree Farms, Inc., and OTT/Louie (Phils.), Inc.
- STORA, the then parent company of SMAB, decided to sell SMAB of Sweden and the latter’s worldwide match,
lighter and shaving products operation to Eemland Management Services, now known as Swedish Match NV of
Netherlands, (SMNV), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Netherlands. STORA, however,
retained for itself the packaging business
- SMNV initiated steps to sell the worldwide match and lighter businesses while retaining for itself the shaving
business. SMNV adopted a two-pronged strategy, the first being to sell its shares in Phimco Industries
- Several interested parties tendered offers to acquire the Phimco shares, among whom were the AFP Retirement
and Separation Benefits System, herein respondent ALS Management & Development Corporation and respondent
Antonio Litonjua (Litonjua), the president and general manager of ALS
-Litonjua submitted to SMAB a firm offer to buy all of the latter’s shares in Phimco and all of Phimco’s shares in
Provident Tree Farm, Inc. and OTT/Louie (Phils.), Inc. for the sum of P750,000,000.00.
- Thereafter, an exchange of correspondence ensued between petitioners and respondents regarding the projected
sale of the Phimco shares
- Litonjua in a letter dated 18 June 1990, expressed disappointment at the apparent change in SMAB’s approach to
the bidding process.
-Two days prior to the deadline for submission of the final bid, Litonjua again advised Rossi that they would be unable
to submit the final offer by 30 June 1990, considering that the acquisition audit of Phimco and the review of the draft
agreements had not yet been completed.
-Enriquez sent notice to Litonjua that they would be constrained to entertain bids from other parties in view of
Litonjua’s failure to make a firm commitment for the shares of Swedish Match in Phimco
- Rossi informed Litonjua that on 2 July 1990, they signed a conditional contract with a local group for the disposal of
Phimco. He told Litonjua that his bid would no longer be considered unless the local group would fail to consummate
the transaction on or before 15 September1990.
-Apparently irked by SMAB’s decision to junk his bid, Litonjua promptly responded by letter.. He pointed out that they
submitted the best bid and they were already finalizing the terms of the sale.
-More than two months from receipt of Litonjua’s last letter, Enriquez sent a fax communication to the former,
advising him that the proposed sale of SMAB’s shares in Phimco with local buyers did not materialize. Enriquez then
invited Litonjua to resume negotiations with SMAB for the sale of Phimco shares. He indicated that SMAB would be
prepared to negotiate with ALS on an exclusive basis for a period of fifteen (15) days from 26 September 1990
subject to the terms contained in the letter. Additionally, Enriquez clarified that if the sale would not be completed at
the end of the fifteen (15)-day period, SMAB would enter into negotiations with other buyers.
-Shortly thereafter, Litonjua sent a letter expressing his objections to the totally new set of terms and conditions for
the sale of the Phimco shares. He emphasized that the new offer constituted an attempt to reopen the already
perfected contract of sale of the shares in his favor. He intimated that he could not accept the new terms and
conditions contained therein.
-respondents, as plaintiffs, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for specific performance
with damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, against defendants, now petitioners.
The individual defendants were sued in their respective capacities as officers of the corporations or entities involved
in the aborted transaction
-Aside from the averments related to their principal cause of action for specific performance, respondents alleged that
the Phimco management, in utter bad faith, induced SMAB to violate its contract with respondents
-Respondents prayed that petitioners be enjoined from selling or transferring the Phimco shares, or otherwise
implementing the sale or transfer thereof, in favor of any person or entity other than respondents, and that any such
sale to third parties be annulled and set aside. Respondents also asked that petitioners be ordered to execute all
documents or instruments and perform all acts necessary to consummate the sales agreement in their favor.
-Traversing the complaint, petitioners alleged that respondents have no cause of action, contending that no perfected
contract, whether verbal or written, existed between them. Petitioners added that respondents’ cause of action, if any,
was barred by the Statute of Frauds since there was no written instrument or document evidencing the alleged sale of
the Phimco shares to respondents.
-RTC dismissed respondents’ complaint. Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that the series of
written communications between petitioners and respondents collectively constitute a sufficient memorandum of their
agreement under Article 1403 of the Civil Code; thus, respondents’ complaint should not have been dismissed on the
ground that it was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.
Issue: Did the CA err in ruling that Statute of Frauds applies in this case?
Held: Yes!
-The Statute of Frauds embodied in Article 1403, paragraph (2), of the Civil Code requires certain contracts
enumerated therein to be evidenced by some note or memorandum in order to be enforceable. The term "Statute of
Frauds" is descriptive of statutes which require certain classes of contracts to be in writing. The Statute does not
deprive the parties of the right to contract with respect to the matters therein involved, but merely regulates the
formalitiesof the contract necessary to render it enforceable. writing or a secondary evidence of its contents.
-Evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the The Statute, however, simply provides the method by
which the contracts enumerated therein may be proved but does not declare them invalid because they are not
reduced to writing. By law, contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all
the essential requisites for their validity are present. However, when the law requires that a contract be in some form
in order that it may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that requirement is absolute
and indispensable. Consequently, the effect of non- compliance with the requirement of the Statute is simply that no
action can be enforced unless the requirement is complied with. Clearly, the form required is for evidentiary purposes
only. Hence, if the parties permit a contract to be proved, without any objection, it is then just as binding as if the
Statute has been complied with.
-The purpose of the Statute is to prevent fraud and perjury in the enforcement of obligations depending for their
evidence on the unassisted memory of witnesses, by requiring certain enumerated contracts and transactions to be
evidenced by a writing signed by the party to be charged
-However, for a note or memorandum to satisfy the Statute, it must be complete in itself and cannot rest partly in
writing and partly in parol. The note or memorandum must contain the names of the parties, the terms and conditions
of the contract, and a description of the property sufficient to render it capable of identification. Such note or
memorandum must contain the essential elements of the contract expressed with certainty that may be ascertained
from the note or memorandum itself, or some other writing to which it refers or within which it is connected, without
resorting to parol evidence
-Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, the exchange of correspondence between the parties hardly
constitutes the note or memorandum within the context of Article 1403 of the Civil Code. Rossi’s letter dated 11 June
1990, heavily relied upon by respondents, is not complete in itself. First, it does not indicate at what price the shares
were being sold. In paragraph (5) of the letter, respondents were supposed to submit their final offer in U.S. dollar
terms, at that after the completion of the due diligence process. The paragraph undoubtedly proves that there was as
yet no definite agreement as to the price. Second, the letter does not state the mode of payment of the price. In fact,
Litonjua was supposed to indicate in his final offer how and where payment for the shares was planned to be made
-Specifically, in the case of a contract of sale, required is the concurrence of three elements, to wit: (a) consent or
meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (b) determinate subject matter,
and (c) price certain in money or its equivalent. Such contract is born from the moment there is a meeting of minds
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
-Quite obviously, Litonjua’s letter dated 21 May 1990, proposing the acquisition of the Phimco shares for US$36
million was merely an offer. This offer, however, in Litonjua’s own words, "is understood to be subject to adjustment
on the basis of an audit of the assets, liabilities and net worth of Phimco and its subsidiaries and on the final
negotiation between ourselves." Was the offer certain enough to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds?
Definitely not
That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with
*see Guerrero case again :)
As affirmative defenses
Considering that there was only one question, which may even be deemed to be the very touchstone of the whole
case, the trial court had no cogent reason to deny the Motion for Preliminary Hearing. Indeed, it committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied a preliminary hearing on a simple issue of fact that could have possibly settled the
entire case. Verily, where a preliminary hearing appears to suffice, there is no reason to go on to trial. One reason
why dockets of trial courts are clogged is the unreasonable refusal to use a process or procedure, like a motion to
dismiss, which is designed to abbreviate the resolution of a case.
(Basta parang sa case na to, sinasabi lang grabenaman si Rtc na dinenyyung preliminary hearing eh yungmtdngani
petitioners dinefer din. Kayanganiraisenalang as an affirmative defense. Lahatnalangbaididismiss?
PakingganmunasananiRtcyungsinasabinipetitioners!)
Tan vs Tan
A petition for review
Facts:-Petitioner and respondent were married in June of 1989 at Manila Cathedral in Intramuros,Manila
- In 2001, twelve years into the marriage, petitioner filed a case for the annulment of the marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The parties submitted to the court a compromise agreement
- the trial court issued a partial judgmentapproving the compromise agreement. On 30 March 2004, the trial court
rendered a decision declaring the marriagevoid under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of mutual
psychological incapacityof the parties. The trial court incorporated in its decision the compromise agreement of
theparties on the issues of support, custody, visitation of the children, and property relations
-It also appears from the records that petitioner left the country bringing the children with her
- Respondent filed an omnibus motion seeking in the main custody of the children. The evidence presented by
respondent established that petitioner brought the children out of the country without his knowledge and without prior
authority of the trial court
-Thus, the trial court, in its 17 May 2004 resolution, awarded to respondent custody of the children, ordered petitioner
to turn over to respondent documents and titles in the latters name, and allowed respondent to stay in the family
dwelling in Mariposa, Quezon City
- Petitioner filed on 28 June 2004 a motion for reconsideration alleging denial of due
process on account of accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
- Unconvinced, the trial court, in its 12 October 2004 Resolution, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
- petitioner filed a motion to dismissand a motion forreconsideration of the 12 October 2004 Resolution. She claimed
she was no longer interested in the suit. Petitioner stated that the circumstances in her life had led her to the
conclusion that withdrawing the petition was for the best interest of the children. She prayed that an order be issued
vacating all prior orders and leaving the parties at the status quo ante the filing of the suit
- the trial court denied both the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. It held that the
30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution had become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-
day reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party
- Undeterred, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. The trialcourt then issued a
Certificate of Finality of the resolution of the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004
- Petitioner further claims the trial court erred in applying to her motion to dismiss Section 7 of the Rule on the
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Petitioner argues that if
indeed the provision is applicable, the same is unconstitutional for setting an obstacle to the preservation of the
family.
Issue:Did the trial court err in applying Sec7?
Held: Yes!
-As for the applicability to petitioners motion to dismiss of Section 7 of the Rule on the
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, petitioner is correct. Section
7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provides:
SEC. 7. Motion to dismiss. No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a
dismissal of the case may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer.
-The clear intent of the provision is to allow the respondent to ventilate all possible defenses in an answer, instead of
a mere motion to dismiss, so that judgment may be made on the merits. In construing a statute, the purpose or object
of the law is an important factor to beconsidered. Further, the letter of the law admits of no other interpretation but
that the provision applies only to a respondent, not a petitioner. Only a respondent in a petition for the declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage files an answer where any ground that may
warrant a dismissal may be raised as an affirmative defense pursuant to the provision. The only logical conclusion is
that Section 7 of the Rule does not apply to a motion to dismiss filed by the party who initiated the petition for the
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage
- Since petitioner is not the respondent in the petition for the annulment of the marriage, Section 7 of the Rule does
not apply to the motion to dismiss filed by her.
- However, when petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November 2004, the 30 March 2004 decision and the 17
May 2004 resolution of the trial court had long become final and executory upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary
period without any timely appeal having been filed by either party. The 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004
resolution may no longer be disturbed on account of the belated motion to dismiss filed by petitioner. The trial court
was correct in denying petitioners motion to dismiss.