II.
Due Process
A. Person, Life, Liberty and Property
1. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676,       September 12, 2008
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her
name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from
female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is sufferingfrom
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where
afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer
Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her
petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing
that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is
issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of
the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that
“Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male
hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of
both male and female.” The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of
the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the
same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the
said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be
changed.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in
deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not
be subject to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the availale
evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks
of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that
Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which
is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of
nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out.
That is, the Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital condition and
his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the
consequences that will follow.
1.1 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER CAGANDAHAN
GR No. 166676,       September 12, 2008
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate[In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981
and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while
growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed
to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where
persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She
further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her
early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered
that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian
structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or
menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person.
Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender
be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer
to Jeff.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on
the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from
Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
 
RULING:
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be
what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with
good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a
male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as
being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the
gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent
could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did
not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in
respondents development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle
preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to
reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider
respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to
become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to
undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female,
as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species.
Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to
him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take
along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of
evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to
show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms
as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of
being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and
(2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words,
we respect respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a
male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect
how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life
easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a
change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will
follow. The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to
Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes his
preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a
change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.
2. QUIAO V. QUIAO 
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G.R. No 176556,  [July 04, 2012]
FACTS:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner
Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal
separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of
Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the
spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of
the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership
is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending
spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the
period 270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of
the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,
asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of
the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each
[of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common
children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of
the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the
Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129
of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article
102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which
defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
ISSUES:
 1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. – Art 129
will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights over½of the
properties in the conjugal partnership– NO.
3. Is the computation of “net profits” earned in the conjugal partnership of
gains the same with the computation of “net profits” earned in the absolute
community? NO.
RATIO:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the
current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage
settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the
property relations between husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses’ marriage the
operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case
and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation
to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the
spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the
Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the properties of
the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code,
which provides: “All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in
common by the husband and wife.”
While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if
there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and
jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First,
he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the
conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner
prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the
petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after
the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties.
Second, when the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the
petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling forfeiting what the trial
court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.
Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband
and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage.
Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired
during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family
Code) form the common mass of the couple’s properties. And when the
couple’s marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided
between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion
the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been
established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided
equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And since the legal
separation½share decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be
awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal
partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and
the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution
of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing
provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law
does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties
between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the
spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them.
The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be
divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However,
since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the
net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be
confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to
the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no
separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.
2.1 BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner,
vs.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO,
represented by their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.
G.R. No 176556               July 4, 2012
REYES, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Brigido Quiao was married to respondent Rita Quiao in 1977 and
got four children. They had no separate properties prior to their marriage.
In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for
cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in
2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55,
thereby awarding the custody of their three minor children in favor of Rita,
who is the innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them
subject to the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigido’s share
of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor
of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the Family Code.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted
by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier
decision; the writ was partially executed.
After more than nine months, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking
the RTC to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held that the
phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting
the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.”
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Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision
stating that net profit earned shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of
Article 102 of the Family Code. However, it later reverted to its original Order,
setting aside the last ruling.
Issue:
Whether or not the offending spouse acquired vested rights over ½ of the
properties in the conjugal partnership.
Held:
In the case at bar, since it was already established by the trial court that the
spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them.
The listed properties are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus,
ordinarily, what remains in the listed properties should be divided equally
between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial
court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to
Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
So, as not to be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will
be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because
there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s
favor.
3. LAUSAN AYOG, ET.AL., vs. JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI
G.R. No. L-46729
November 19, 1982
FACTS:
On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after bidding, awarded to Biñ an
Development Co., Inc. a parcel of land with an area of about two hundred fifty
hectares. The occupants of said land, herein petitioners, were ordered to
vacate the same. Upon the refusal of the occupants of the said, the corporation
filed an ejectment suit. After an investigation, the Director of Lands found out
that the occupants entered the land only after it was awarded to the
corporation. Thus, they could not be regarded as bona fide occupants. On July
18, 1961, the corporation fully paid the purchase price for the land. More than
thirteen years later, the Sales Patent was issued to the corporation with a
reduced area of 175.3 hectares.
The petitioners contested that the adoption of the Constitution which took
effect on January 17, 1973, was a supervening fact which render it legally
impossible to execute the trial court’s judgment of awarding the land in
question to the corporation. They invoked the constitutional prohibition,
already mentioned, that "no private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one
thousand hectares in area."
The Director of Lands pointed out that the corporation had complied with the
said requirements long before the effectivity of the Constitution and that the
applicant had acquired a vested right to its issuance.
ISSUE:
Whether the 1973 Constitution is an obstacle to the implementation of the
trial court’s 1964 judgment ejecting the petitioners.
RULING:
NO; The Constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales
application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a
vested right to the land applied at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
Moreover, the corporation’s compliance with the requirements of the Public
Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said
land from the public domain.
4. TEFASCO vs PPA Case Digest
TERMINAL FACILITIES vs. PPA 
378 SCRA 82 
FACTS: Before us are two (2) consolidated petitions for review, one filed by
the Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation (TEFASCO) and the other by
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). TEFASCO is a domestic corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal place
of business at Barrio Ilang, Davao City. It is engaged in the business of
providing port and terminal facilities as well as arrastre, stevedoring and
other port-related services at its own private port at Barrio Ilang. 
Sometime in 1975 TEFASCO submitted to PPA a proposal for the construction
of a specialized terminal complex with port facilities and a provision for port
services in Davao City. To ease the acute congestion in the government ports
at Sasa and Sta. Ana, Davao City, PPA welcomed the proposal and organized an
inter-agency committee to study the plan. The committee recommended
approval. 
On April 21, 1976 the PPA Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 7
accepting and approving TEFASCO's project proposal. 
Long after TEFASCO broke round with massive infrastructure work, the PPA
Board curiously passed on October 1, 1976 Resolution No. 50 under which
TEFASCO, without asking for one, was compelled to submit an application for
construction permit. Without the consent of TEFASCO, the application
imposed additional significant conditions. 
The series of PPA impositions did not stop there. Two (2) years after the
completion of the port facilities and the commencement of TEFASCO's port
operations, or on June 10, 1978, PPA again issued to TEFASCO another permit,
under which more onerous conditions were foisted on TEFASCO's port
operations. In the purported permit appeared for the first time the
contentious provisions for ten percent (10%) government share out of
arrastre and stevedoring gross income and one hundred percent (100%)
wharfage and berthing charges. 
On February 10, 1984 TEFASCO and PPA executed a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) providing among others for (a) acknowledgment of
TEFASCO's arrears in government share at Three Million Eight Hundred
Seven Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-Three Pesos and Seventy-Five Centavos
(P3,807,563.75) payable monthly, with default penalized by automatic
withdrawal of its commercial private port permit and permit to operate cargo
handling services; (b) reduction of government share from ten percent (10%)
to six percent (6%) on all cargo handling and related revenue (or arrastre and
stevedoring gross income); (c) opening of its pier facilities to all commercial
and third-party cargoes and vessels for a period coterminous with its
foreshore lease contract with the National Government; and, (d) tenure of five
(5) years extendible by five (5) more years for TEFASCO's permit to operate
cargo handling in its private port facilities. In return PPA promised to issue
the necessary permits for TEFASCO's port activities. TEFASCO complied with
the MOA and paid the accrued and current government share. 
On August 30, 1988 TEFASCO sued PPA and PPA Port Manager, and Port
Officer in Davao City for refund of government share it had paid and for
damages as a result of alleged illegal exaction from its clients of one hundred
percent (100%) berthing and wharfage fees. The complaint also sought to
nullify the February 10, 1984 MOA and all other PPA issuances modifying the
terms and conditions of the April 21, 1976 Resolution No. 7 above-
mentioned. 
PPA appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court in its original decision recognized the validity of the
3
impositions and reversed in toto the decision of the trial court. TEFASCO
moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals found partly
meritorious. Thus the Court of Appeals in its Amended Decision partially
affirmed the RTC decision only in the sense that PPA was directed to pay
TEFASCO (1) the amounts of Fifteen Million Eight Hundred Ten Thousand
Thirty-Two Pesos and Seven Centavos (P15,810,032.07) representing fifty
percent (50%) wharfage fees and Three Million Nine Hundred Sixty-One
Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty-Four Pesos and Six Centavos (P3,961,964.06)
representing thirty percent (30%) berthing fees which TEFASCO could have
earned as private port usage fee from 1977 to 1991. The Court of Appeals held
that the one hundred percent (100%) berthing and wharfage fees were
unenforceable because they had not been approved by the President under
P.D. No. 857, and discriminatory since much lower rates were charged in
other private ports as shown by PPA issuances effective 1995 to 1997. Both
PPA and TEFASCO were unsatisfied with this disposition hence these
petitions.  Board to regulate and control the practice of medicine is discretionary and not
ISSUE: Whether or not the collection by PPA of one hundred percent (100%)
wharfage fees and berthing charges; (c) the propriety of the award of fifty
percent (50%) wharfage fees and thirty percent (30%) berthing charges as
actual damages in favor of TEFASCO for the period from 1977 to 1991 is
valid. 
RULING: The imposition by PPA of ten percent (10%), later reduced to six
percent (6%), government share out of arrastre and stevedoring gross income
of TEFASCO is void. This exaction was never mentioned in the contract, much
less is it a binding prestation, between TEFASCO and PPA. What was clearly
stated in the terms and conditions appended to PPA Resolution No. 7 was for
TEFASCO to pay and/or secure from the proper authorities "all fees and/or
permits pertinent to the construction and operation of the proposed project."
The government share demanded and collected from the gross income of
TEFASCO from its arrastre and stevedoring activities in TEFASCO's wholly
owned port is certainly not a fee or in any event a proper condition in a
regulatory permit. Rather it is an onerous "contractual stipulation" which
finds no root or basis or reference even in the contract aforementioned.
5. BOARD OF MEDICINE v. YASUYUKI OTA, GR No. 166097, 2008-07-14
Facts:
Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national, married to a Filipina, who
has continuously resided in the Philippines for more than 10 years. He
graduated from Bicol Christian College of Medicine on April 21, 1991 with a
degree of Doctor of Medicine.[5]  After successfully completing a one-year
post graduate internship training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center,
he filed an application to take the medical board examinations in order to
obtain a medical license.  He was required by the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) to submit an affidavit of
undertaking, stating among others that should he successfully pass the same,
he would not practice medicine until he submits proof that reciprocity exists
between Japan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners... into the practice
of medicine.[6]
Respondent submitted a duly notarized English translation of the Medical
Practitioners Law of Japan duly authenticated by the Consul General of the
Philippine Embassy to Japan, Jesus I. Yabes; [7] thus, he was allowed to take
the Medical Board Examinations... in August 1992, which he subsequently
passed.[8]
Board of Medicine (Board) of the PRC, in a letter dated March 8, 1993, denied
respondent's request for a license to practice medicine in the Philippines on
the ground that the Board "believes that no genuine reciprocity can be found
in the law of Japan... as there is no Filipino or foreigner who can possibly
practice there." [9]
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against the
Board before the RTC of Manila on June 24, 1993, which petition was
amended on February 14, 1994 to implead the PRC through its Chairman.
On October 19, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision finding that respondent
had adequately proved that the medical laws of Japan allow foreigners like
Filipinos to be granted license and be admitted into the practice of medicine
under the principle of reciprocity; and that the
Board had a ministerial duty of issuing the Certificate of Registration and
license to respondent, as it was shown that he had substantially complied
with the requirements under the law.[12]  The RTC then ordered the Board to
issue in favor of... respondent the corresponding Certificate of Registration
and/or license to practice medicine in the Philippines.[13]
The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the case to the CA, stating that
while respondent submitted documents showing that foreigners are allowed
to practice medicine in Japan, it was not shown that the conditions for the
practice of medicine there are practical and... attainable by a foreign applicant,
hence, reciprocity was not established; also, the power of the PRC and the
ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ of mandamus.[14]
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.[15]
Hence, herein petition
Issues:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAD ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF
RECIPROCITY IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES
AND JAPAN.
Ruling:
The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.
R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be candidates for the medical board
examinations, merely requires a foreign citizen to submit competent and
conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA), showing that his country's existing laws... permit citizens of the
Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules and regulations
governing citizens thereof.
Section (j) of P.D. No. 223 also defines the extent of PRC's power to grant
licenses, i.e., it may, upon recommendation of the board, approve the
registration and authorize the issuance of a certificate of registration with or
without examination to a foreigner who is... registered under the laws of his
country, provided the following conditions are met: (1) that the requirement
for the registration or licensing in said foreign state or country are
substantially the same as those required and contemplated by the laws of the
Philippines; (2) that... the laws of such foreign state or country allow the
citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession on the same basis and
grant the same privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign state or
country; and (3) that the applicant shall submit competent and... conclusive
documentary evidence, confirmed by the DFA, showing that his country's
existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession
under the rules and regulations governing citizens thereof.
The said provision further states that the PRC is authorized to prescribe
additional requirements or grant certain privileges to foreigners seeking
registration in the Philippines if the same privileges are granted to or some
additional requirements are required of... citizens of the Philippines in
acquiring the same certificates in his country.
Nowhere in said statutes is it stated that the foreign applicant must show that
the conditions for the practice of medicine in said country are practical and
attainable by Filipinos.  Neither is it stated that it must first be proven that a
Filipino has been... granted license and allowed to practice his profession in
said country before a foreign applicant may be given license to practice in the
Philippines.
Principles:
D. Hierarchy of Rights and Standards of review or level of scrutiny
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6. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION,
NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS
MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
Facts:  Philippines.
Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a
mass demonstration in front of Malacañ ang to express their grievances
against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming
Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the
meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was
stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but
was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to
freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for
redress of grievances.  investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt
the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue.
This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would
lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.  issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that
while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and
regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they
would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took
place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation
of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement.  the Plunder Law which states that:
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the
PBMEO were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations
for being filed two days late.  nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination
Issue:
Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?
Held:  in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office
No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the
"threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property
and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential
to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such
priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and
women by whom we shall be governed.”
7. ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN                    G.R. No. 148560. November 19,
2001
FACTS:
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by
RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos
through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar
schemes or means thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under
The Revised Penal Code.
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate
Informations against petitioner.
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary
prove lack of probable cause but was denied.
Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558
finding that a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the
Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the
ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense
since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness and
that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one offense.
Same was denied.
The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 of
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business,
enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section
Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity
or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to
the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise
of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection
or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer
who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity
or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
5
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances
as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The
court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other
incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from
the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring
supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder,
it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the
accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate
or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
ISSUE:
WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?
HELD:
NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would
inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to
its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself
closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the
various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will
confuse petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory
definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions,
according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his
fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms
are used herein, or because of the employment of terms without defining
them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant
to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct  to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.  The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of
others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the
law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
8. SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN v. QUEZON CITY, GR
No. 225442, 2017-08-08
Facts:
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a
nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila
started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through
police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."[3]
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were
respondents:
Petitioners,[9] spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan
(SPARK)- an association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a
free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of
the youth and minors[10] - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness
doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to
liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d)
deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth
without substantive due process.
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are
unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to
travel without substantive due process;[16] and (b) fail to pass the strict
scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that
bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.
Issues:
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not
the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The petition is partly granted.
A. Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of
judicial power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of
settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable
and enforceable
They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against
minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of
penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave
abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the
law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily,
out of malice, ill will or personal bias."[31] In light of the foregoing, petitioners
correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these
governmental actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial
function.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be
made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a
higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While
this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional
Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set
out in the petition[.]"[32] This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of
constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is of
paramount importance and immediately affects the social, economic, and
moral well-being of the people,"[33] as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct
resort to the Court is justified.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review. "The prevailing rule in constitutional
litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law
or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case."[34] In this case,
respondents assail the existence of the first two (2) requisites.
1. Actual Case or Controversy.
there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
it
6
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable
controversy in this case given the evident clash of the parties' legal claims,
particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and
parents' constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes against
the provisions of RA 9344.
2. Legal Standing.
[Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and substantial interest in
the case, such that they have sustained or are in immediate danger of
sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the
challenged governmental act."
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas
(Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue affecting the minor's right to
travel,[43] because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition was filed
before this Court,[44] and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances;
and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after school
and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew
Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin
Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes
(Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal age, and
therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper
subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury
as a consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew
Ordinances violate the parents' right to rear their children as they have not
shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose
constitutional parental right has been infringed. I
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no
legal personality to bring an action in court.[45] Even assuming that it has the
capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was
authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e.,
the minors, to file this case on their behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal
interest in the controversy. More particularly, Clarissa has standing only on
the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on the
alleged violation of the parents' right.
Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound
discretion and take cognizance of the suit.
Accordingly, this case is of overarching significance to the public, which,
therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others,
the standing requirement.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not
containing sufficient enforcement parameters, which leaves the enforcing
authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim
that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the questioning
of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they were already of legal age.
They maintain that the enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected
curfew offenders based only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted
arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that the Quezon City
Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit
that nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for
proof or identification of the child to show his age.[
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle."[48]
They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances
prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement
guidelines
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in
any of the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of
detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus,
without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances
cannot be stricken down under the void for vagueness doctrine.
While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these
parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the prescribed
measures found in statutory law when implementing ordinances.
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew Ordinances
because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances
inconsistent with statutory law.[53] Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended by RA 10630,[54] minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances
are children at risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions.[
B. Right of Parents to Rear their Children. Petitioners submit that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their natural
and primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process.
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy
relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their children: Section 12. The
State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their
authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this
authority conscientiously.
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed
that "when actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare
or the well-being of the child, the [S]tate may act to promote these legitimate
interests."[66] Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental
health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is
demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents'
qualified right to control the upbringing of their children."[67]
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in
the moral development of their children,[70] and, thus, assumes a supporting
role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations.
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply
only when the minors are not - whether actually or constructively (as will be
later discussed) - accompanied by their parents.
This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary
nature of parental authority and the importance of parents' role in child-
rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their
children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them.
In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for
the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their
authority to influence or control their minors' activities.[74] As such, the
Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable -
infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based
on the minors' right to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is a
fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of the strict
scrutiny te
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth
doctrine, considering that petitioners have not claimed any transgression of
their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct. In
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council
(Southern Hemisphere),[80] this Court explained that "the application of the
overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the
given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases,"[81]
viz.:
7
In Virginia v. Hicks,[84] it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth
challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed
to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are
justified by the 'transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression."'[85]... transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression."'[85]
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth
analysis in this case, there being no claimed curtailment of free speech. On the
contrary, however, this Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations
under the strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right[88]
under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit: Section 6. The
liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from
the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.[89] It is a right
embraced within the general concept of liberty.[
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise
their other rights, such as the rights to education, free expression, assembly,
association, and religion
As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State[96] may impose limitations on
the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.[97]
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of
juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest
of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and activities within
the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the
curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming
victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the
second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal
system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special
protection to children,... Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD
603, which explicitly authorizes local government units, through their city or
municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are
likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes
that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights,[108] but the exercise
of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.[
In Bellotti,[117] the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for
the differential treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These are: first,
the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the importance of the
parental role in child rearing:[118]
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary
use of highways. But even in such use streets afford dangers for them not
affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other things, this
difference may be magnified.[12... i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to
determine the reasonableness of classifications.[122] The strict scrutiny test
applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.[123] The intermediate scrutiny
test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or
fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in
classifications based on gender and legitimacy.[124] Lastly, the rational basis
test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.[125]
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system
guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test[126] is the
applicable test.
Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classification (i) is
necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to
accomplish the interest.[132]... a. Compelling State Interest.
This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect
and care for them as parens patriae constitute compelling interests to justify
regulations by the State.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate
objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the
late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally
eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against
criminal pressure and influences which may even include themselves. A
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of
Quezon City and Manila presented statistical data in their respective pleadings
showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as
victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities.[139] Based on these
findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances
pursuant to their police power under the general welfare clause.[140] In this
light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have not only conveyed
but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare,
especially with respect to minors. A... b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly
Drawn.
When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn
to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly
drawn.[1
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this
Court finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed
requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the
curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by their parents, family members of
legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as buying of
medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and
the like; (c) night school students and those who, by virtue of their
employment, are required in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00
p.m.; and (d) those working at night.[146] For its part, the Navotas Ordinance
provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those
working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in
coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home
during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision of
their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them;
(f) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors
from the curfew during these specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas
day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the
day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday,
Black Saturday, and Easter Sunda
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that
their exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly
restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms.
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it
hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-school or non-church activities
in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their freedom of
association is effectively curtailed.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during
Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from
attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night
without accompanying adults,... Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not
accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend city
council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to
peaceably assemble and to free expression.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken
down since their exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope
and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of
the above-mentioned fundamental rights.
8
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the
Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the
minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably
assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions
guarantees the protection of these aforementioned rights. These items uphold
the right of association by enabling minors to attend both official and extra-
curricular activities not only of their school or church but also of other
legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free
expression are also covered by these items given that the minors' attendance
in the official activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed during
the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free
exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance
Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor
based on the age and frequency of violations, to wit: SEC. 4. Sanctions and
Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall be
sanctioned/punished as follows: (a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age
and below, the sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth offender
and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or person exercising
parental authority. (b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under
Eighteen (18) years of age, the sanction/penalty shall be: For the FIRST
OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition; For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand
and Admonition, and a warning about the legal impostitions in case of a third
and subsequent violation; and For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES,
Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND
PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That
the complaint shall be filed by the Punong Barangay with the office of the City
Prosecutor.[156] (Emphases and underscoring supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose
on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community service; (b) reprimand and
admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A
of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for
status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:... what they prohibit is the
imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations.
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid
form of intervention program that a local government (such as Navotas City in
this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of
minors.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise
consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way
of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor.
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and
admonition are clearly not penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and
are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be
clear, their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for
the latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his
future conduct.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute
penalties - as provided in our various criminal and administrative laws and
jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the
first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently
shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile
crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed
the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the
three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest.
In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions
that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the
prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's
purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their
parents or guardian", has also been construed to include parental permission
as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception
to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the
discretion of the local government unit. In fine, the Manila and Navotas
Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the
Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in
accordance with this Decision.
Principles:
i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic
liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.
E. Relativity of Due Process
9. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION
Doctrine of Incorporation
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The Department of Justice received a request from the Department of
Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The
Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting
documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges
include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with
the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they
found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for
copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to
be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on
the following grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion
of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of
evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the
relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-
US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting
Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a
preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal
prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of
the information in the documents.
3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings
in connection with an extradition request, as Philippines is bound
to Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC
presiding Judge Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to
issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further
proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar.
 
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of
the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
 
Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a
9
rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a
local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however,
where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a
rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of
incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing,
but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Ruling/s:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the
accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty
rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the
individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we
recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted
principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the
law of the land.
10. CUDIA v. SUPERINTENDENT OF PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY
G.R. No. 211362
February 24, 2015
FACTS:
Cadet 1CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the
PMA. On
 November 19, 2013, a Delinquency Report (DR) was issued alleging that
Cudia was late for his ENG412 class five days prior. Cudia claimed to have
been dismissed late from his prior OR432 class. However, Maj. Rommel
Dennis Hindang, Cudia’s CTO, found that the OR432 professor never
dismissed her class late. On January 7, 2014, Maj. Hindang reported that Cudia
had violated the PMA’s Honor Code for lying.
From January 20-21, 2014, the PMA Honor Committee (HC) held a hearing on
Cudia’s honor violation, the result of which was 8-1 in favor of a guilty verdict.
After a chambering session, Cadet 1CL Dalton John Lagura, the lone dissenter
among the voting members, changed his stance, resulting in a 9-0 guilty
verdict. On February 10, 2014, then PMA Supt. Vice Adm. Edgar Abogado
approved Cudia’s dismissal.
Later that month, new PMA Supt. Maj. Gen. Oscar Lopez referred Cudia’s
case to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) for review. On February
28, 2014, Cudia’s parents filed a complaint before the CHR-CAR alleging
human rights violations against him. While the CRAB upheld Cudia’s
dismissal, the CHR issued a resolution holding that Cudia’s human rights were
violated. However, on June 11, 2014, the Office of the President sustained the
former and the AFP Chief of Staff.
ISSUES:
Whether the PMA, HC, and CRAB, in dismissing Cudia, committed grave abuse
of discretion
 by holding that Cudia lied.
Whether the CHR investigation carries weight.
Whether the PMA's academic freedom authorizes it to impose suitable
disciplinary measures and punishment.
HELD:
NO.
Although Cudia was free to leave his OR432 class and proceed to ENG412, he
stayed behind to talk to his professor. Later, he deliberately manipulated the
words “class” and “dismiss” to defend his tardiness. Therefore, Cudia’s intent
to deceive in his excuse constitutes a clear honor violation.
NO.
The CHR’s constitutional mandate only extends to the investigation, and not
adjudication, of human rights cases. It can only present recommendations on
Cudia’s case, and not settle it.
YES.
As an academic institution, the PMA has the right to promulgate rules
necessary for the maintenance of school discipline, in accordance with Section
3(2), Article XIV of the Constitution. It is within the PMA’s academic freedom
to enforce its Honor Code to promote discipline
F. Procedural Due Process
11. Civil Service Commission vs. Jose Lucas
Facts:
On May 26, 1992, Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer at the
Agricultural Information Division, Department of Agriculture (DA for brevity),
filed with the office of the Secretary, DA, an affidavit-complaint against
respondent Jose J. Lucas, a photographer of the same agency, for misconduct.
Based on the description of the petitioner, while she was standing before a
mirror, near the office door of Jose Lucas, she noticed a chair at her right side
which Mr. Lucas sit at that very instant. Thereafter, Mr. Lucas bent to reach for
his shoe, and at that moment she felt Mr. Lucas hand touching her thigh and
running down his palm up to her ankle. She was shocked and suddenly faced
Mr. Lucas and admonished him not to do it again or she will kick him. But Mr.
Lucas touched her again and so she hit him. A verbal exchange then ensued;
she was thrown out of the door, and was told never to enter the office again.
On June 8, 1992, the Board of Personnel Inquiry of DA issued a summons
requiring the respondent to answer the complaint. According to Lucas, he did
not touch the thigh of the complainant and what happened was that he
accidentally brushed complainant’s leg while reaching for his shoe.
After a formal investigation, respondent was found guilty of simple
misconduct with a penalty of suspension for 1 month and 1 day.
In due time, respondent brought his case to the Civil Service Commission.
Thereafter, the CSC issued a resolution finding the respondent guilty of grave
misconduct and imposing on him a penalty of dismissal from the service.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied.
Then, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA set aside the
resolution of the CSC and reinstated the resolution of BOPI of DA. The CA
further assailed that the respondent was not given due process as he was not
informed of the modification of the charge against him, the distinctions of
simple and grave misconduct. He only came to know of the changes when he
received the notice of the resolution dismissing him from service.
Issues:
1. WON respondent Lucas was denied due process when the CSC
found him guilty of grave misconduct on a charge of simple
misconduct.
2. WON the act complained of constitutes grave misconduct.
Held:
1. The SC sustained the ruling of the CA that the basic requirement of
due process is that a person must be duly informed of the charges
against him, and that a person cannot be convicted of a crime which
he was not charged. Administrative proceedings are not exempt
from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right
to due process in investigations and hearings.
2. Under the circumstances, the act of the respondent is not
constitutive of grave misconduct, in the absence of proof that
respondent was maliciously motivated. It has also been noted that
the respondent has been in the service for 20 years and this is his
first offense.
12. Anonymous v. Radam
10
Facts:
Ma. Victoria Radam, utility worker in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City in Pangasinan, was charged with
immorality. The unnamed complainant alleged that respondent was
unmarried but got pregnant and gave birth outside wedlock. The complainant
claimed that respondent’s behavior tainted the image of the judiciary.
In connection with the complaint, Judge Abella conducted a discreet
investigation to verify the allegations against respondent. He find out that
truthfulness of the allegation. He was told by the respondent that they are
unable to marry because they plan to migrate to Canada.
In a further investigation it was revealed that the father of her son is
unknown, as shown by the child’s Certificate of Live Birth.
In this connection, Judge Abella recommends that respondent MA. VICTORIA
RADAM be accordingly found GUILTY of IMMORAL CONDUCT or ACT
UNBECOMING A COURT EMPLOYEE. A suspension of one (1) month or a fine
of Php5,000.00 is respectfully recommended, with warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
After reviewing the findings and recommendation of Judge Abella, the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that, respondent be absolved
of the charge of immorality because her alleged misconduct (that is, giving
birth out of wedlock) did not affect the character and nature of her position as
a utility worker. However, it proposed that she be held liable for conduct
unbecoming a court employee and imposed a fine ofP5,000 for stating in the
birth certificate of her child Christian Jeon that the father was "unknown" to
her.
Issue:
whether or not respondent may be held liable in relation to her entry in her
child’s birth certificate regarding her son’s father?
Held:
No. The essence of due process in an administrative proceeding is the
opportunity to explain one’s side, whether written or verbal. This
presupposes that one has been previously apprised of the accusation against
him or her. Here, respondent was deprived of both with regard to her alleged
unbecoming conduct in relation to a certain statement in the birth certificate
of her child. She was indicted only for alleged immorality for giving birth out
of wedlock. It was the only charge of which she was informed. Judge Abella’s
investigation focused solely on that matter. She was neither confronted with it
nor given the chance to explain it. To hold her liable for a totally different
charge of which she was totally unaware will violate her right to due process.
Case dismissed.
13. Case Digest #1-8 | GR No. L-68288 | Guzman Vs NU
FACTS:
Students Diosadado Guzman, Ulyses Urbiztondo, and Ariel Ramacula seeks
relief from what they describe as their school’s ” continued and persistent
refusal to allow them to enrol”
BACKGROUND:
August 7, 1984 Students prayed for preliminary mandatory injunction for the
refusal of the National Universty to let them enrol.
September 24, 1984 University president replied that the petitioners failure
to enrol for the first semester of SY 84-85 is due to their own fault because the
enrollment was already closed and that DeGuzman and Ramacula’s academic
showing was “poor” and they have failures in their records and are not of
good scholastic standing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a school or university have the right to deny acceptance of
students without due process.
HELD:
The 3 students were allowed by the court to enrol. The court declared illegal
the University’s act of imposing sanctions on students without due
investigation.
RULING:
Under the Education Act of 1982, the petitioners, have the right among others
“to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course up to graduation except in case of academic deficiency,
or violation of disciplinary regulations.”
Petitioners were being denied this right , or being disciplined without due
process, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools that ” no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for
cause as defined in the Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as
duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been
conducted.”
NOTES:
Minimun standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural
due process:
1. The Students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause
of any accusations against them.
2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with
the assistance of counsel, if desired.
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them.
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf.
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case.
13. 1 GUZMAN ET. AL V. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY - CASE DIGEST -
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
FACTS:
Diosdado Guzman and two others complained that the National University
(NU) barred them from enrolling in the said university.
NU argued that their failure to enroll was due to the students’ fault. It was
alleged that,
l Guzman et al spearheaded illegal mass actions within the university
premises;
l that such mass actions were violative of school policies; that due to their
mass actions, Guzman et al incurred bad grades;
l that Guzman et al hated NU anyway so why should they be allowed to enroll;
l that it is in the best interest of both parties for the students not to be
enrolled.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioners were denied due process by the school.
HELD:
YES. Guzman et al were deprived of due process. In the first place, NU never
showed which school policies or duly published rules did Guzman et al violate
upon which they may be expelled from. NU failed to show that it conducted
any sort of proceedings (not necessarily a trial-type one) to determine
Guzman et al’s liability or alleged participation in the said mass actions.
11
Under the Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as students, have the right
among others “to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula
and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in case of
academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations.” Guzman et al
were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without due process, in
violation of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools which provides that
“no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in
the Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated
and only after due investigation shall have been conducted.”
Therefore, in effect, NU, by barring the enrollment of Guzman et al imposed a
sanction upon the students without due investigation – such act is illegal.
The Supreme Court also emphasized the minimum standards which must be
met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process, and these are:
1. That the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them;
2. That they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired;
3. That they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. That they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. That the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee
or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
14. [A.M. No. RTJ-97-1375. October 16, 1997.]
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANGELITO C.
TEH, Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Complainant lawyer in this administrative case questioned the
actuation of respondent, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas, relative to Election Case No. R-95-001.
Respondent Judge issued a resolution adverse to the client of complainant.
The latter questioned the resolution via petition for certiorari, before the
Comelec. While the case was pending at the Comelec, respondent actively
participated in the proceedings by filing his comment on the petition and, still
later an urgent manifestation. Complainant filed a motion for respondent's
inhibition in the election case. Instead of acting on the motion, respondent
hired his own lawyer, filed his answer to the motion before his own court, and
forthwith denied the same, ordering, at the same time, the complainant to pay
P100,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and litigation expenses for compelling
the respondent Judge to engage the services of counsel.
The Supreme Court found respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the
law. Respondent's active participation in the certiorari proceedings, being
merely a nominal or formal party, is not called for. Respondent Judge acted
both as a party litigant and as a judge before his own court. Respondent's
gross deviation from the acceptable norm for judges is clearly manifest.
Respondent Judge is dismissed from the service. EaHcDS
SYLLABUS
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; THE
ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE, BEING MERELY A
NOMINAL PARTY OR FORMAL PARTY IN THE CERTIORARI PROCEEDINGS, IS
NOT CALLED FOR. — Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may
impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face,
would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct. The
active participation of respondent judge, being merely a nominal or formal
party in the certiorari proceedings, is not called for. In Turqueza vs. Hernando,
the Court has explained: . . . (U)nder Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
a judge whose order is challenged in an appellate court does not have to file
any answer or take active part in the proceeding unless expressly directed by
order of this Court. It is the duty of the private respondent to appear and
defend, both in his/her behalf and in behalf of the Court or judge whose order
of decision is at issue. The judge should maintain a detached attitude from the
case and should not waste his time by taking an active part in a proceeding
which relates to official actuations in a case but should apply himself to his
principal task of hearing and adjudicating the cases in his court. He is merely a
nominal party to the case and has no personal interest nor personality
therein."
2. ID.; ID., ID., RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED BOTH AS A PARTY
LITIGANT AND AS A JUDGE BEFORE HIS OWN COURT. — When complainant
filed a motion for respondent's inhibition in Election Case No. R-95-001, the
latter, instead of acting thereon in accordance with Section 2, Rule 137, of the
Rules of Court, hired his own lawyer, filed his answer to the motion and
forthwith denied the same, ordering, at the same time, Atty. Macalintal to pay
P100,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and litigation expenses "for compelling
the respondent Judge to engage the services of counsel who prepared the
Answer to the Motion for Inhibition." Respondent Judge, in fine, acted both as
a party litigant and as a judge before his own court.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; A MEMBER OF THE BENCH MUST CONTINUOUSLY
KEEP HIMSELF ABREAST OF LEGAL AND JURISPRUDENTIAL
DEVELOPMENTS AND SHOW ACQUAINTANCE WITH STATUTES,
PROCEDURAL RULES AND AUTHORITATIVE DOCTRINES; NOT FOR A
MOMENT DOES THE LEARNING PROCESS IN LAW CEASE. — Respondent
judge should be reminded that decisions of courts need not only be just but
must be perceived to be just and completely free from suspicion or doubt both
in its fairness and integrity. Judges, being the visible representation of the law
and, most importantly, of justice, should be the embodiment of independence,
competence, and integrity. Once again, the Court would also wish to say that a
member of the bench must continuously keep himself abreast of legal and
jurisprudential developments and show acquaintance with statutes,
procedural rules and authoritative doctrines. Not for a moment, indeed, does
the learning process in law cease. In the case before us, respondent's gross
deviation from the acceptable norm for judges is clearly manifest. In Castanos
vs. Escañ o, Jr., the Court had occasion to state: "When the inefficiency springs
from a failure to consider so discharge of his duties, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too
vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and
in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is
in order. After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every
party-litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused
of deficiency in their grasp of legal principle." cHESAD
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
Through a letter, Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal related to the Court the
actuations of Judge Angelito C. Teh, Executive Judge and the Presiding Judge of
RTC Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas, relative to Election Case No. R-95-001.
It would appear that Judge Teh issued a resolution adverse to the
client of Atty. Macalintal in the aforenumbered election case. Macalintal
questioned the resolution, via a petition for certiorari, before the COMELEC.
While the case was pending at the COMELEC, Judge Teh actively participated
in the proceedings by filing his comment on the petition and, still later, an
urgent manifestation. Complainant lawyer forthwith filed a motion to prevent
respondent Judge from further acting on Election Case No. R-95-001. Instead
of acting on the motion for inhibition, Judge Teh hired his own lawyer and
filed his answer before his own court, with the prayer:
"1. That Judgment be rendered dismissing the Motion for
Inhibition for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis;
"2. Ordering the movant to pay the undersigned respondent
in the amount of P100,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses for litigation;
"3. Cost of this suit.
12
 "Respondent respectfully prays for such other reliefs and remedies
as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises." 1
In its resolution of 19 August 1996, the Court required respondent to
comment on the letter-complaint.
In his comment, dated 20 September 1996, respondent Judge
admitted that he had filed his own pleadings with the COMELEC out of respect
and in deference to the order of 16 November 1995 of the COMELEC En Banc
requiring respondents to comment on the petition. The urgent manifestation
he filed was meant to rectify the assertion of complainant that he had
erroneously cited Section 8, Rule 35, of the Omnibus Election Code. Attached
to his comment before this Court was his resolution, dated 31 July 1996,
where respondent Judge, ruling on the motion for inhibition, held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court hereby
rendered this resolution on the pending incidents to wit:
"1. The protestee's unverified Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike
Out Opposition are hereby DENIED for lack of sufficient legal and factual
basis;
"2. The Motion for Inhibition is likewise DENIED for lack of sufficient
legal and factual basis;
"3. And for compelling the respondent Judge to engage the services of
counsel who prepared the Answer to the Motion for Inhibition, the Protestee's
counsel, Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal is hereby ordered to pay P100,000.00 as
Attorney's Fees and litigation expenses incident to his Motion for Inhibition.
"SO ORDERED." 2
In its resolution, dated 12 March 1997, the Court resolved to:
"(a) DIRECT Judge Angelito Teh to ACT on the motion for inhibition in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 2, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court;
"(b) TREAT the letter dated April 1, 1996 of complainant as an
administrative complaint against Judge Angelito Teh and docket accordingly;
"(c) CONSIDER the comment dated September 20, 1996 of Judge Teh
filed in compliance with the resolution of August 19, 1996 as comment on the
complaint; and
"(d) require the parties to MANIFEST within fifteen (15) days from
notice hereof whether they are willing to submit this case for resolution on
the basis of the pleadings already filed herein." 3
In his manifestation, dated 29 April 1997, respondent Judge
expressed his willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis of his
comment which he repleaded and reproduced. He also made his observation
that the complaint of Atty. Macalintal had not been under oath.
In his compliance, dated 24 April 1997, complainant informed the
Court that his letter of 01 April 1996 was not intended as an administrative
complaint but that he was leaving the matter of treating it as such to the
discretion of this Court in the exercise of its administrative control and
supervision over the members of the judiciary. He likewise manifested his
willingness to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings
already filed. He, in passing, informed the Court that the resolution of 31 July
1996 issued by respondent judge was found by the COMELEC to be
"irrational."
While Rule 140 of the Rules of Court requires that complaints
against Judges should be sworn to, the Court deems it proper to dispense with
the requirement since the letter of Atty. Macalintal, upon the recommendation
of the Office of the Court Administrator, has heretofore been treated as an
administrative complaint and considering, further, that respondent Judge, in
his comment, practically admitted all pertinent allegations of complainant.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority
upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross
incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct. 4
Section 5, Rule 65, of the Rules of Court 5 provides:
"Sec. 5. Defendants and costs in certain cases. — When the
petition filed related to the acts or omissions of a court or judge, the petitioner
shall join, as parties defendant with such court or judge, the person or persons
interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty
of such person or persons to appear and defend, both in his or their own
behalf and in behalf of the court or judge affected by the proceedings, and
costs awarded in such proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against
the person or persons in interest only, and not against the court or judge."
Evidently, the active participation of respondent judge, being merely a
nominal or formal party 6 in the certiorari proceedings, is not called for. In
Turqueza vs. Hernando, 7 the Court has explained:
". . . (U)nder Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a judge
whose order is challenged in an appellate court does not have to file any
answer or take active part in the proceeding unless expressly directed by
order of this Court. It is the duty of the private respondent to appear and
defend, both in his/her behalf and in behalf of the Court or judge whose order
or decision is at issue. The judge should maintain a detached attitude from the
case and should not waste his time by taking an active part in a proceeding
which relates to official actuations in a case but should apply himself to his
principal task of hearing and adjudicating the cases in his court. He is merely a
nominal party to the case and has no personal interest nor personality
therein." 8 cda
Respondent's folly did not stop there. When complainant filed a
motion for respondent's inhibition in Election Case No. R-95-001, the latter,
instead of acting thereon in accordance with Section 2, Rule 137, of the Rules
of Court, hired his own lawyer, filed his answer to the motion and forthwith
denied the same, ordering, at the same time, Atty. Macalintal to pay
P100,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and litigation expenses for "compelling
the respondent Judge to engage the services of counsel who prepared the
Answer to the Motion for Inhibition." Respondent Judge, in fine, acted both as
a party litigant and as a judge before his own court.
In the Court's resolution of 12 March 1997, respondent was
directed to act on the motion for inhibition in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in Section 2, Rule 137, 9 of the Rules of Court. Respondent Judge
either misunderstood or chose to misunderstand the directive for, in his
order, dated 17 April 1997, he granted the motion for inhibition "in
compliance with the resolution" of the Court. Clearly, the Court, in its
resolution of 12 March 1997, merely required respondent Judge to act on the
motion for inhibition in accordance with the Rules, i.e., "to either proceed with
the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the
question of his disqualification." Certainly, he was not directed by the Court
either to grant or deny the motion.
Respondent judge should be reminded that decisions of courts need
not only be just but must be perceived to be just and completely free from
suspicion or doubt both in its fairness and integrity. 10 Judges, being the
visible representation of the law and, most importantly, of justice, 11 should
be the embodiment of independence, competence, and integrity. 12 Once
again, the Court would also wish to say that a member of the bench must
continuously keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments
and show acquaintance with statutes, procedural rules and authoritative
doctrines. 13 Not for a moment, indeed, does the learning process in law
cease.
13
 In the case before us, respondent's gross deviation from the
acceptable norm for judges is clearly manifest. In Castañ os vs. Escañ o, Jr., 14
the Court has had occasion to state:
"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic
and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge
is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or
he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad
faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's
dismissal is in order. After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only
if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be
accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles." 15
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge Angelito C. Teh guilty of gross
ignorance of the law, the Court hereby dismisses him from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any other
branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-
owned and controlled corporations.
Judge C. Teh is hereby enjoined upon his receipt hereof to cease and desist
from performing any and all acts pertaining to his office.
This decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to the records of Judge Angelito C. Teh
with this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Regalado, J ., on leave.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 11.
2. Rollo, p. 62.
3. Rollo, p. 81.
4. Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Capistrano, 159 SCRA
47.
5. The amended rule states:
"SEC. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. — When the petition filed
relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency,
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as
private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or
respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings
in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and
defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public respondent
or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such
proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents
only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or
respondents.
"Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is
pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or
comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a
higher court by either party, the public respondents shall be included therein
as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed by the
court, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings therein."
6. Republic vs. CFI of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, 53 SCRA 317;
Taroma vs. Sayo, 67 SCRA 508.
7. 97 SCRA 483.
8. At pp. 490-491.
9. "SEC. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect.
— If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above
provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the
official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall
thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw, therefrom in accordance with
his determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be
forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no
appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of
his own competency, until after final judgment in the case."
10. See Query of Executive Judge Estrella T. Estrada, 155 SCRA 72.
11. Gil vs. Son, 241 SCRA 467.
12. Wingarts vs. Mejia, 242 SCRA 436.
13. Chin vs. Gustilo, 247 SCRA 175.
14. 251 SCRA 174.
15. At p. 199.
15. OCA v Judge Floro
RTJ-99-1460
FACTS:
It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for
judgeship. A pre-requisite psychological evaluation on him then by the SC
Clinic revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration" and "developing psychotic
process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June 1998,
when he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed
problems with self-esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal
deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both
1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge. But
because of his impressive academic standing, the JBC allowed Atty. Floro to
seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion
appeared favorable thus paving the way to atty. Floro's appointment as RTC
judge.
An administrative complaint was filed against him by court
administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo. Then he recommended as well that Judge
Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the duration of the
investigation against him. In a Resolution dated 20 July 1999, the Court en
banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA, docketing the complaint as
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission of the acts or omissions as
reported by the audit team.
One of those reported is for his alleged partiality in criminal cases
where he declares that he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule
2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct or Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members
thereof that in criminal cases, he is always "pro-accused" particularly
concerning detention prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually
pay for the premiums on their bonds during the pendency of their cases.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did
impart upon Atty. Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his
predicament of having 40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused
whose cases could not be tried due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor
assigned to his sala. At any rate, Judge Floro submits that there is no single
evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or private complainant that he
sided with the accused. Atty. Dizon, Judge Floro’s Clerk of Court, on the other
hand, categorically stated under oath that Judge Floro, during a staff meeting,
admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his PAO
lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated with them
especially those under detention as he, himself, had been accused by his
brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded offenses.
Issue:
W/n Judge Floro violated Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
Held:
Yes. Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to apply
the law and dispense justice "should not only be impartial, independent and
honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and
14
honest" as well. Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer
that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his
impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate that a judge should
reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir up
suspicions of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct
of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is
objectivity if an independent judiciary is to be realized. And by professing his
bias for the accused, Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct as his
capacity for objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding the public’s
trust in his ability to render justice.
16. ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING CO. VS. CA
AQUINO, November 7, 1979
NATURE
APPEAL from the decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS
-In Mines Administrative Case No. V-227, Director Gozon issued an order
dated October 5, 1960 wherein he dismissed the case filed by the petitioners.
In that case, they sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and
possessors of 69 mining claims located in Santa Cruz, Zambales. Director
Gozon found that the petitioners did not discover any mineral nor staked and
located mining claims in accordance with law. Also in the order, Director
Gozon ruled that the mining claims of the groups of Gregorio Martinez and
Pablo Pabiloñ a, now the private respondents-appellees, were duly located and
registered.
-The petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. While the appeal was pending, Director Gozon was
appointed Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and therefore he
was the one who decided the appeal, DANR Case No. 2151, on August 16,
1963.
-He ruled that the petitioners had abandoned the disputed mining claims,
while, on the other hand, the Martinez and Pabiloñ a groups had validly
located the said claims. Hence, be dismissed the appeal from his own decision.
-On September 20, 1963, the petitioners filed a complaint in the CFI Zambales,
assailing Secretary Gozon's decision and praying that they be declared the
prior locators and possessors of the 69 mineral claims in question. Impleaded
as defendants in the case were the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. the Director of Mines and the members of the Martinez and
Pabiloñ a groups.
-CFI: dismissed complaint, held that disqualification of a judge to review his
own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to
administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law,
disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from
deciding an appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines;
that delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the petitioners did not
seasonably seek to disqualify Secretary Gozon from deciding their appeal, and
that there was no evidence that the Secretary acted arbitrarily and with bias,
prejudice, animosity or hostility to the petitioners.
-Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (6th Division). CA reversed the
judgment of the trial court, declared that the petitioners were the rightful
locators and possessors of the said 69 mining claims, held as invalid the
mining claims overlapping the same; that the petitioners (Nava group) had
discovered minerals and had validly located the said 69mining claims, that
there was no sufficient basis for Secretary Gozon's finding that the mining
claims of the Martinez and Pabiloñ a groups were validly located.
-The defendants (private respondents-appellees) filed a motion for
reconsideration based on the ground that CA should have respected the
factual findings of the Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources on the theory that the facts found in administrative
decisions cannot be disturbed on appeal to the courts, citing Republic Act No.
4388 which amended section 61 of the Mining Law effective June 19, 1965;
and several other cases. They also prayed that the appeal be dismissed,
meaning that the decisions of the lower court and of Director and Secretary
Gozon be affirmed.
-Petitioners opposed that motion for reconsideration. In their opposition, they
reiterated the contention that Secretary Gozon's decision was void and
therefore, the factual findings therein are not binding on the courts.
-same CA 6th Division in second decision of October 13, 1978 set aside its first
decision and granted the motion for reconsideration on the ground raised in
petitioners' opposition, namely, that Secretary Gozon's decision was void
because he was disqualified to review his own decision as Director of
Mines.So CA in its second decision remanded the case to the Minister of
Natural Resources for another review of Director Gozon's decision. This was
the prayer of the petitioners in their brief but in their opposition to the
motion for reconsideration, they prayed that the 1st CA decision be reinstated.
-The parties filed motions for reconsideration. The petitioners in their motion
reiterated their prayer that the first decision be reinstated. On the other hand,
the private respondents in their motion insisted that the trial court's decision
be affirmed on the basis of the factual findings of the Director of Mines and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. CA denied both motions.
-Only the petitioners appealed from the 2nd CA decision. While the petitioners
(Nava group) in their appellants' brief in the CA they prayed that Secretary
Gozon's decision be declared void and that the case be returned to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for another review of Director
Gozon's order, in their appellants' brief in SC, they now pray that the 2 nd CA
decision, referring this case to the Minister of Natural Resources for another
review, be declared void and that its first decision be affirmed.
In contrast, the private respondents, pray for the affirmance of the trial
court's judgment, sustaining the decisions of Director and Secretary Gozon.
ISSUE:
WON Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse of discretion
HELD: YES
Ratio In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might
not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must perforce be other than
the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no
different view or there would be no real review of the case.
Reasoning The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a
mockery of administrative justice. The Mining Law, Commonwealth Act No.
137, Section 611 provides that the decision of the Director of Mines may be
appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It
contemplates that the Secretary should be different from the Director of
mines.
-Secretary Gozon should have asked his undersecretary to preside over the
case
-Petitioners-appellants were deprived of due process, meaning fundamental
fairness, when Secretary Gozon reviewed his own decision as Director of
Mines.
Dispositive WHEREFORE, we set aside the order of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources dated August 16, 1963 as affirmed by the
trial court as well as the first decision of the Court of Appeals.
We affirm its second decision, returning the case to the Minister of Natural
Resources, with the directive that petitioners' appeal to the Minister be
resolved de novo with the least delay as provided for in Presidential Decree
No. 309. "establishing rules and procedures for the speedy disposition or
settlement of conflicting mining claims".
1
15
We reverse the second part of that second decision stating that "thereafter,
further proceedings will be taken in the trial court". That portion is
unwarranted because the trial court does not retain any jurisdiction over the
case once it is remanded to the Minister of Natural Resources. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Votes Barredo, J., concur but wish to add that the reason why the
undersecretary could ask is because when the secretary is disqualified, he
should be deemed as absent or incapacitated to ask, hence the undersecretary
should be correspondingly deemed as the secretary for the purposes of the
case in question. Needless to say, the undersecretary should ask in such a way
as to avoid any indication that he has been dictated upon actually by the
secretary.
Antonio, Santos and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., did not took part.
17. C009Tejano vs. Ombudsman
,GR 159190, 30 June 2005; Second Division, Chico-Nazario [J]
FACTS:
On 08 November 1994, Aniano A. Desierto, thenthe Special Prosecutor, concurred intheapproval
of his subordinates on the filing of theproper information for violation of Section3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 against petitioner Cayetano A.Tejano, Jr., Juana dela Cruz andVicente dela Cruz
of V&G. Afterwards, the case was filed with the Sandiganbayan, petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan anUrgent Motion for a Period of Time to File Motion
for Reinvestigation. Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation and ordered
the Officeof the Special Prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. Upon reinvestigation,
convinced thatno probable cause existed to indict petitioner Tejano, and spouses Juana and Vicente
delaCruz, Special Prosecutor Micael, recommended the dismissal of the case. On
10 December 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in
the initial preliminaryinvestigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation
for the dismissal of the
case with the marginal note “
assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute thecase aggressively.
”  transferred to the Second Division of this Court.
ISSUE:
WON THE OMBUDSMAN ISJUSTIFIED IN DISAPPROVEDING THERECOMMENDATION FOR
THE DISMISSAL OFTHE CASE.
HELD.
NO. Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not review hisdecision
on appeal. Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the
instant caseand having recommended the filing of anappropriate information, it behooved
OmbudsmanDesierto to recuse himself from participating in the review of the
same during thereinvestigation.
17.1 Tejano v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 159190, June 30, 2005
FactS:
The report of Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan implicated petitioner as
persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds. The
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas ordered petitioner to file
their respective counter-affidavits. Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G.
Canton recommended the filing of the proper information against petitioner
and was thereafter referred for review to the Office of the Special Prosecutor
who affirmed the resolution of Graft Investigation Officer, Deputy Special
Prosecutor recommended the approval of the memorandum of Special
Prosecution Officer.Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor, concurred
in the approval. Ombudsman concurred thereto. Subsequently, on 24
November 1994, an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019, as amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayanpetitioner filed with
the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a Period of Time to File Motion
for Reinvestigation.The Sandiganbayan granted the motion for
reinvestigation. Petitioner filed his motion for reinvestigation in the Office of
the Special Prosecutor. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. The reinvestigation was assigned
to Special Prosecution Officer. Convinced that no probable cause existed to
indict petitioner Special Prosecutor Micael recommended the dismissal of the
case. The recommendation was approved by Deputy Special Prosecutor Kallos
and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Tamayo. Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation as
Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of the
case with the marginal note “assign the case to another prosecutor to
prosecute the case aggressively.” Special Prosecutor Micael filed a
Manifestation, to which was attached a copy of his memorandum, informing
the Sandiganbayan of the disapproval by Ombudsman Desierto of his
recommendation to dismiss the case. On 10 February 2000, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the disapproval by Ombudsman Desierto of the
recommendation of Micael. Apparently, petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was not resolved on the merits because on 27 June 2000,
Special Prosecution Officer III Joselito R. Ferrer filed a Motion to Set the Case
for Arraignment alleging therein that the prosecution did not give due course
to the motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was the second motion
which is prohibited under the Ombudsman Act of 1989. He added that the
results of the reinvestigation were already submitted to the respondent court
before receiving the motion for reconsideration.Petitioner manifested before
the Sandiganbayan the Office of the Special Prosecutor’s failure to resolve his
motion for reconsideration. Thus, in a resolution13 dated 24 March 2003, the
respondent court directed the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve the
said motion.In a memorandum14 dated 09 June 2003, Special Prosecutor
Joselito R. Ferrer recommended the denial of the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner. Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos changed his
previous position and recommended that the memorandum for the dismissal
of the motion for reconsideration be approved, with Special Prosecutor
Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio concurring in the denial. Ombudsman Simeon V.
Marcelo, who succeeded Ombudsman Desierto when he retired, approved
Joselito Ferrer’s memorandum recommending the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner thus filed the instant petition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
taking further action in Criminal Case.  The First Division of this Court issued
the temporary restraining order prayed for.The instant petition was
Issue:
where Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion?
Held:
Yes, attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having
participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that he
earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when
he was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the
filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan. Having participated in the
initial preliminary investigation of the instant case and having recommended
the filing of appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto to
recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during the
reinvestigation. He should have delegated the review to his Deputies
18. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. PRUDENCIO C. QUIMBO G.R. No.
173277, 25 February 2015, SECOND DIVISION, (Mendoza, J.)
Even if the Ombudsman is not impleaded as a party in the
proceedings, part of its broad powers include defending its decisions before the
Court of Appeals.
Gilda D. Daradal, a clerk in the Provincial Engineering Office of
Catbalogan, Samar filed a complaint for Sexual Harassment and Oppression
against Engr. Prudencio C. Quimbo (Quimbo), Provincial Engineer of Samar
16
with the Office of the Ombudsman -Visayas alleging that, Quimbo asked her to
massage his forehead and nape and, in the course thereof, he said, “You had
been lying to me you have already seen my manhood. When shall I have to see
yours?” Also, Quimbo ordered her detail to the Civil Service Commission in
Catbalogan, Samar, to perform the tasks of a male utility personnel. Her name
was removed from the payroll of the personnel of the Provincial Engineering
Office because of her refusal to submit to his sexual advances.
Daradal filed a motion for withdrawal of the complaint but was
denied by the Ombudsman-Visayas. The Ombudsman- Visayas dismissed the
case of sexual harassment against Quimbo but finding him guilty of
oppression. When the case reached the Court of Appeals, it reversed the ruling
of the Ombudsman-Visayas and denied the motion for intervention of the
latter.
ISSUE:
Does the Ombudsman possess the requisite legal interest to
intervene in the proceedings where its decision is in question?
RULING:
Yes. Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the
Ombudsman may validly intervene in the said proceedings as its legal interest
on the matter is beyond cavil. The Court elucidated inOmbudsman v. De
Chavez, thus:
The Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal
interest in the inquiry into whether respondent
committed acts constituting grave misconduct, an
offense punishable under the Uniform Rules in
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It was in
keeping with its duty to act as a champion of the people
and preserve the integrity of public service that
petitioner had to be given the opportunity to act fully
within the parameters of its authority.
The Office of the Ombudsman cannot be detached, disinterested and neutral
specially when defending its decisions. Moreover, in administrative cases
against government personnel, the offense is committed against the
government and public interest. What further proof of a direct constitutional
and legal interest in the
accountability of public officers is necessary? (Italics
supplied. Citations omitted.)
As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, the CA, in the present case,
gravely erred in disallowing the Ombudsman’s motion to intervene. It failed to
consider the essence of the Ombudsman’s constitutionally and statutorily
conferred powers establishing its clear legal interest in ensuring that its
directive be implemented
19. G.R. No. 159110 : December 10, 2013
VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, Petitioner, v. CITY OF CEBU, T.C. (TITO) SAYSON
AND RICARDO HAPITAN,Respondents.
FACTS:
On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted
Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to
immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and
prohibitions defined in the Traffic Code of Cebu City.
On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty.
Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.) brought suit in the RTC
against the City of Cebu, then represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding Officer, Hon.
Renato V. Osme, and the chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic
Operations Management (CITOM),seeking the declaration of Ordinance No.
1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process and for being
contrary to law, and damages.
Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked
his car in a paying parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain
records and documents from his office and after less than 10 minutes, he had
found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp. His car was impounded for
three days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to
pay P4,200.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his
car but such imposition the fine was without any court hearing and without
due process of law. He was also compelled to payP1,500.00 (itemized as
P500.00 for the clamping andP1,000.00 for the violation) without any court
hearing and final judgment;
That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where
there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM
operative and that he was compelled to pay the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the
release of his car without a court hearing and a final judgment rendered by a
court of justice.
On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the
City of Cebu, demanded the delivery of personal property, declaration of
nullity of theTraffic Code of Cebu City, and damages.
He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying
a portion of the sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make
way for the vehicle of theanayexterminator, upon returning outside, his car
was towed by the group even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic.
The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision declaring
Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void
The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA. The CA reversed
the decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance No. 1664 valid.
Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration the Jabans
and Legaspi came to the Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari.
The appeals were consolidated.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 1664 is valid and constitutional.
HELD: The Court of Appeals decision is sustained.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Tests for a valid ordinance
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005the Court
restates the tests of a valid ordinance thusly:
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to
the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
17

As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether
the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and
whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law),
and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the
ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well
as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with
public policy).
InMetropolitan Manila Development Authorityv. Bel-Air Village
Association,Inc., G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000the Court cogently observed
that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative
power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the
President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents
can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body. (emphasis supplied)
In the present case, delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the
City of Cebu.
The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with
the legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly done
through Section 458 of the LGC, and also generally by virtue of the General
Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised
with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily
or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or
restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the
fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights.
Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest
or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in
interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process
of law, the contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under
strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of
validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the
Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and
reason, and its consistency with public policy.
The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular
traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all times".
To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and
reasonable way to enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise,
the transgressors would evade liability by simply driving away. DENIED.
G. Substantive Due Process
20. VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, et. al., petitioners, vs. The Honorable EDGARDO
PARAS, et. al., respondents
G.R. No. & Date:
L-42571-72. July 25, 1983
Doctrine/Topic:
Legislative Process Requirements as to Titles of Bills; Subject shall be
expressed in the title
Facts of the Case:
1. Vicente De La Cruz, one of the petitioners, is an owner of clubs and
cabarets in Bulacan.
2. Jointly, de la Cruz and the other club owner-petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84 (series of 1975) known as a
prohibition and closure ordinance which was based on Republic Act No.
938 as amended (but was originally enacted on June 20, 1953).
3. The said RA is entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY
BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN
PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS."
4. Its first section reads: "The municipal or city board or council of each
chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the
establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets… and
other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction.”
5. Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not
merely the power to regulate, but likewise "prohibit."
6. The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as Republic
Act No. 938.
7. On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary
injunction were filed on the grounds that (1) Ordinance No. 84 is null
and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business,
occupation or calling; (2) Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners'
right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as the license
previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial
hearing; and (3)That under Presidential Decree No. 189 (as amended, by
Presidential Decree No. 259 the power to license and regulate tourist-
oriented businesses including night clubs, has been transferred to the
Department of Tourism.
8. The respondent Judge issued a restraining order on November 7,
1975. Then came on January 15, 1976 the decision upholding the
constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissing
the cases. Hence, this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not a municipal corporation, can prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such
clubs employing hostesses
HELD
A. Decision:
 The SC held that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of
night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on
their business.
 The writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court
dated January 15, 1976 reversed, set aside, and nullified.
 Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is
declared void and unconstitutional.
B. Rationale:
 Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not
prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by
the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited.
 A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally
open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the
legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night
clubs subject to appropriate regulations.
 It is to be admitted that as thus amended, if only the above portion of the
Act were considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the
operation of night clubs. If that were all, then the appealed decision is
not devoid of support in law. Additionally, the title was not in any way
18
 altered, as the exact wording was followed. The power granted remains
that of regulation, not prohibition.
 There is thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to
construe Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the
operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The
Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof."
21. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, et al . v .
VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., et al . 530 SCRA 341 (2007)
To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem in Metro Manila the
President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 179, ―Providing for the
Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transportation System. As determined
in E.O. 179, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been
the numerous buses plying the streets that impede the flow of vehicles and
commuters and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes.
To decongest traffic, petitioner Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) came up with a recommendation, proposing
the elimination of bus terminals located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares, and the construction of mass transport terminal facilties to
provide a more convenient access to mass transport system to the commuting
public. The project provided for under this E.O. was called ―Greater Manila
Transport System‖ (Project) wherein the MMDA was designated as the
implementing agency. Accordingly, the Metro Manila Council the
governing board of the MMDA issued a resolution, expressing full support of
the project. The respondents, which are engaged in the business of public
transportation with a provincial bus operation, Viron Transport Co., Inc. and
Mencorp Transportation System, Inc., assailed the constitutionality of E.O. 179
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. They alleged that the E.O., insofar as
it permitted the closure of existing bus terminal, constituted a deprivation of
property without due process; that it contravened the Public Service Act
which mandates public utilities to provide and maintain their own terminals
as a requisite for the privilege of operating as common carriers; and that
Republic Act 7924, which created MMDA, did not authorize the latter to order
the closure of bus terminals. The trial court declared the E.O. unconstitutional.
The MMDA argued before the Court that there was no justiciable controversy
in the case for declaratory relief filed by the respondents; that E.O. 179 was
only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with
the MMDA, and as such did not bind third persons; that the President has
the authority to implement the Project pursuant to E.O. 125; and that E.O. 179
was a valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O, 179 is constitutional.
HELD:
By designating the MMDA as implementing agency of the “Greater Manila
Transport System,” the President clearly overstepped the limits of
the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. Executive
Order 125, invoked by the MMDA, was issued by former President Aquino in
her exercise of legislative powers. This executive order reorganized the
Ministry (now Department) of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
and defined its powers and functions. It mandated the DOTC to be the primary
policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and
administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks of
transportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC
includes the power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated
programs for transportation and communications. Accordingly, it is the DOTC
Secretary who is authorized to issue such orders, rules, regulations and other
issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the
law. The President may also exercise the same power and authority to order
the implementation of the mass transport system project, which admittedly is
one for transportation. Such authority springs from the President‘s power of
control over all executive departments as well as for the faithful execution of
the laws under the Constitution. Thus, the President, although authorized to
establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise
the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC, which, by law, is the
primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion,
development and regulation of networks of transportation. It is the DOTC, and
not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such
as the mass transport system. By designating the MMDA as implementing
agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of
the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. 179 ultra vires. In the absence
of a specific grant of authority to it under R.A. 7924, MMDA cannot issue order
for the closure of existing bus terminals Republic Act (R.A.) 7924 authorizes
the MMDA to perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in
the process exercises regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery
of metro-wide services, including transport and traffic management. While
traffic decongestion has been recognized as a valid ground in the exercise of
police power, MMDA is not granted police power, let alone legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or the Metro Manila Council
to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. In light of the
administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid
of authority to implement the Greater Manila Transport System as envisioned
by E.O. 179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President
to undertake the project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order
the elimination of respondents‘ terminals. Even assuming arguendo that
police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not
satisfy the two sets of a valid police power measure: (1) the interest of the
public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its
exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In various cases, the Court has recognized that traffic congestion is a public,
not merely a private concern. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need
to address the worsening traffic congestion in Metro Manila which, the MMDA
so determined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major
thoroughfares and the inefficient connectivity of existing transport system.
With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila the E.O.
seeks to eliminate the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila
thoroughfares and provide more convenient access to the mass transport
system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport
terminal facilities. Common carriers with terminals along the major
thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their
existing bus terminals and use the MMDA-designated common parking areas.
The Court fails to see how the prohibition against respondents‘ terminals can
be considered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the
metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination of respondents‘ bus
terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing
reality of traffic congestion in the common parking areas, a case of
transference from one site to another. Moreover, an order for the closure
of bus terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. The
establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or
passenger terminals, is generally considered a necessary service by provincial
bus operators, hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition
or lease of suitable terminal sites.
22. Dycaico v. SSSG.R. No. 161357November 30, 2005
FACTS:
Bonifacio S. Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980. In his
self-employed data, he named the petitioner, Elena P. Dycaico, and their 8
children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his
monthly pension from the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension
until he passed away on June 19, 1997. A few months prior to his death,
however, Bonifacio married the petitioner on January 6, 1997.
19
Shortly after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application
for survivors pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground
that under the Social Security Law she could not be considered a primary
beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement.  not rest on real and substantial distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory.
The petitioner filed with the SSC a petition alleging that the denial of her
survivors pension was unjustified. She contended that Bonifacio designated
her and their children as primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1 and that
it was not indicated therein that only legitimate family members could be
made beneficiaries.  relationships or were contracted solely for the purpose of acquiring benefits
The SSC promulgated its Resolution affirming the denial of the petitioners
claim. The SSC refuted the petitioner’s contention that primary beneficiaries
need not be legitimate family members by citing the definitions of primary
beneficiaries and dependents.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review of the
SSCs February 6, 2002 Resolution. In the assailed Decision, the appellate court
dismissed the petition. The CA declared that since the petitioner was merely
the common-law wife of Bonifacio at the time of his retirement, his
designation of the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries in the SSS Form RS-1
in 1980 is void. The CA further observed that Bonifacios children with the
petitioner could no longer qualify as primary beneficiaries because they have
all reached 21 years of age. 
ISSUE:
WON Dycaico can be considered as a beneficiary.
WON there is a violation to equal protection clause of the Constitution.
HELD:
Classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to
survivor’s pension based on whether the marriage was contracted before or
after the retirement of the other spouse bears no relation to the achievement
of the policy objective of the law.
Indeed, the SC does not find substantial distinction between spouses whose
assignment as a beneficiary was made after the marriage and spouses whose
assignment as a beneficiary was made before the marriage. The statute
violates equal protection clause when it grants surviving pensions only to the
spouses belonging to the former case and not to than the latter.
A statute, to be valid and reasonable, must satisfy the following requirements:
must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
As illustrated by the petitioners case, the proviso as of the date of his
retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 which qualifies the term
primary beneficiaries results in the classification of dependent spouses as
primary beneficiaries into two groups:
 
(1)   Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members
were contracted prior to the latters retirement; and
(2)   Those dependent spouses whose respective marriages to SSS members
were contracted after the latters retirement.
Underlying these two classifications of dependent spouses is that their
respective marriages are valid. In other words, both groups are legitimate or
legal spouses. The distinction between them lies solely on the date the
marriage was contracted. The petitioner belongs to the second group of
dependent spouses, i.e., her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted after his
retirement. As such, she and those similarly situated do not qualify as primary
beneficiaries under Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 and, therefore, are
not entitled to survivors pension under the same provision by reason of the
subject proviso.
Further, the classification of dependent spouses on the basis of whether their
respective marriages to the SSS member were contracted prior to or after the
latters retirement for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension does
It is too sweeping because the proviso as of the date of his retirement, which
effectively disqualifies the dependent spouses whose respective marriages to
the retired SSS member were contracted after the latters retirement as
primary beneficiaries, unfairly lumps all these marriages as sham
accruing upon the death of the other spouse. 
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 15, 2003
and Resolution dated December 15, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 69632 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The proviso as of the date of his
retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282 is declared VOID for being
contrary to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
The Social Security System cannot deny the claim of petitioner Elena P.
Dycaico for survivors pension on the basis of this invalid proviso.
23. Case Digest Republic v Albios
G.R. No. 198780 : OCTOBER 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS,
Respondent.
FACTS:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married,
as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed
with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer,
alleging that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived
as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering
into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital
obligations.
Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion
to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After the pre-trial, only
Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that the parties
married each other for convenience only. Albios stated that she contracted
Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship
and that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00.
However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the latter never
processed her petition for citizenship
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which
found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring
American citizenship void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
HELD:
The marriage between the parties is valid
CIVIL LAW: validity of marriage
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud
in immigration cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if the bride and groom
did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.This
standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
20
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead
demonstrate that the marriage was not ntered into for the purpose of evading
the immigration laws of the United States.The focus, thus, shifted from
determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws. It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not
purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared as valid a
marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United
States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided erely because the
marriage was entered into for a limited purpose.The 1980 immigration case
of Matter of McKee, further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage
was intrinsically different from a nonsubsisting one.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1)
freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A reely
givenconsent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles
45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties
must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In
fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective
by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as
they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences
of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent
was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
24. WILFREDO MOSQUEDA ET AL vs PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS &
EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., DAV AO FRUITS CORPORATION, and
LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
And CITY GOVERNMENT OFDAVAO vs COURT OF APPEALS, PILIPINO
BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION
FACTS:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various
stakeholders, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance
No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an
agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City.
Aerial Spraying - refers to application of substances through the use of
aircraft of any form which dispenses the substances in the air.
Agricultural Practices - refer to the practices conducted by agricultural
entities in relation to their agricultural activities;
Agricultural Activities - refer to activities that include, but not limited to,
land preparation, seeding, planting, cultivatlo.n, harvesting and bagging;
Agricultural Entities - refer to persons, natural or juridical, involved in
agricultural activities
RTC
The ordinance was challenged by Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters
Association Incorporated after it took effect on March 23, 2007 – more than a
month after it was approved by then Mayor Rodrigo Duterte challenging the
constitutionality of the ordinance, and to seek the issuance of provisional
reliefs through a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. They alleged:
1. alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of
police power;
2. violated the equal protection clause;
3. amounted to· the confiscation of property without due process of
law; and lacked publication pursuant to Section 5116 of Republic
Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
RTC DECISION:
1. The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police
power under the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government
Code;
2. That the ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause;
3. That aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides
application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of
health risk caused by aerial drift; and that the ordinance enjoyed
the presumption of constitutionality, and could be invalidated only
upon a clear showing that it had violated the Constitution.
4. However, the RTC, recognizing the impracticability of the 3-month
transition period under Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07,
recommended the parties to agree on an extended transition
period.
RTC granted the prayer for a preliminary injunction, but later on declared
the ordinance as valid and constitutional.
CA
Petitioners Davao City, and Wilfredo Mosqueda et al, who intervened and
argued in favor of the ordinance, appealed to the CA and sought injunctive
relief. The CA issued a temporary restraining order.
CA DECISION:
The CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.
1. It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and
unconstitutional for being unreasonable and oppressive; found
the three-month transition period impractical and oppressive
in view of the engineering and technical requirements of switching
from aerial spraying to truck-mounted boom spraying;
2. Ban ran afoul with the Equal Protection Clause inasmuch as
Section 3(a) of the ordinance which defined the term aerial
spraying - did not make reasonable distinction between the
hazards, safety and beneficial effects of liquid substances that were
being applied aerially; the different classes of pesticides or
fungicides; and the levels of concentration of these substances that
could be beneficial and could enhance agricultural production.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL & INVALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
It is within the mandate and authority of the City of Davao to enact Ordinance
since it is a measure that has an ostensible LAWFUL SUBJECT: protection of
public health and the environment against the alleged harmful effects of aerial
spraying of pesticides or fungicides.
However, UNLAWFUL MEANS since unduly oppressive to individuals and the
three months period shift from aerial spraying to ground spraying
unreasonable, oppressive and impossible to comply with.
City of Davao lacked:
- Technical understanding on the intricacies of the engineering
works required for the efficient operation of banana plantations,
indifference to corporeal rights of banana planters to protect and
enhance their investments.
- To abandon aerial spraying without affording them enough time to
convert and adopt other spraying practices would preclude the
banana planters from being able to fertilize their plantations… Such
an apparent eventuality would prejudice the operation of the
21
 plantations and the economic repercussions thereof would just be
akin to shutting down the venture.
• Also, since SEPARABILITY CLAUSE IS NON-EXISTING, the whole ordinance is
unconstitutional.
• No scientific basis for banning aerial spraying. Testimonies in favor of City of
Davao did not prove that the aerial spraying of substances is the proximate
cause of the various ailments the victims allegedly suffered.
• EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE – it does NOT classify which substances are
prohibited from being applied aerially even as reasonable distinctions should
be made in terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial effects of liquid
substances to the public health, livelihood and the environment
• Ordinance is confiscation of property without due process of law, it deprives
plantation owners of the lawful and beneficial use of such areas to be ceded,
without just compensation (with regards to buffer zones required by the
ordinance)
The City of Davao and the intervenors filed their respective motions for
reconsideration, but the CA denied the motions on August 7, 2009
SC
Mosqueda, et al. state that the CA ignored well-established precepts
1. like the primacy of human rights over property rights and the
presumption of validity in favor of the ordinance;
2. that the CA preferred the preservation of the profits of respondents
PBGEA, et al. to the residents' right to life, health and ecology,
thereby disregarding the benevolent purpose of the ordinance;
3. that the CA assumed the functions of the lawmaker when it set
aside the wisdom behind the enactment of the ordinance;
4. that the CA failed to apply the precautionary principle, by which the
State was allowed to take positive actions to prevent harm to the
environment and to human health despite the lack of scientific
certainty;
5. that the CA erred in applying the "strict scrutiny method" in
holding that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause
because it only thereby applied in reviewing classifications that
affected fundamental rights;
6. that there was nothing wrong with prohibiting aerial spraying per
se considering that even the aerial spraying of water produced drift
that could affect unwilling neighbors whose constitutional right to a
clean and healthy environment might be impinged;
7. that as far as the three month period was concerned, the CA should
have considered that manual spraying could be conducted while
the PBGEA, et al. laid down the preparations for the conduct of
boorri spraying;
8. that 'reasonableness" could be more appropriately weighed by
balancing the interests of the parties against the protection of basic
rights, like the right to life, to health, and to a balanced and
healthful ecology;
9. that PBGEA, et al. did not substantiate their claim of potential profit
losses that would result from the shift;
10. that business profits should remain inferior and subordinate to
their fundamental rights as residents of Davao City, which were the
rights that the assailed ordinance has sought to protect;
11. that PBGEA, et al. did not explore other modes of pesticide
treatment either as a stop-gap or as a temporary measure while
shifting to truck mounted boom spraying;29 that the imposition of
the 30-meter buffer zone was a valid exercise of police power that
necessarily flowed from the protection afforded by the ordinance
from the unwanted effects of ground spraying; that the imposition
of the buffer zone did not constitute compensable taking under
police power
In G.R. No. 189185, petitioners Mosqueda, et al. rely on the following
grounds, namely:
I. The court of appeals ignored fundamental precepts and concepts of law
which, properly considered, necessarily lead to the conclusion that the davao
ordinance is constitutional and valid
II. The davao ordinance is consistent with the equal protection clause
III. The means employed by the davao ordinance is more than reasonably
related to the purpose it seeks to achieve
IV. The davao ordinance is valid, being demonstrably reasonable and fair
V The requirement relating to the 30-meter buffer zone are consistent with
due process of law, being av alid exercise of police power
In G.R. No. 189305, petitioner City of Davao submits the following as the
issues to be considered and resolved, to wit:
I. Whether or not the honorable court. Of appeals erred in holding that section
5 of ordinance no. 0309- 07, series of 2007 is oppressive and an unreasonable
exercise of delegated police power
II. Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in holding that
ordinance no. 0309-07 is violative of the equal protection clause of the
constitution;
III. Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in holding that
ordinance no. 0309-07 constitutes taking of property without compensation,
thus, violative of the due process clause of the constitution
IV. Whether or not aerial spraying of fungicides is safe to the people and the
environment
CITY OF DAVAO I
A. The City of Davao explains that it had the authority to enact the
assailed ordinance because it would thereby protect the
environment and regulate property and business in the interest of
the general welfare pursuant to Section 458 of the Local
Government Code;
B. that the ordinance was enacted to carry out its mandate of
promoting the public welfare under the General Welfare Clause
(Section 16 of the Local Government Code);
C. that the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protection Clause
because the distinction lies in aerial spray as a method of
application being more deleterious than other modes; that aerial
spraying produces more drift that causes discomfort, and an
extremely offensive and obnoxious experience on the part of the
residents; that spray drift cannot be controlled even with the use
by the respondents of highly advanced apparatus,
D. that because of the inherent toxicity of Mancozeb (the fungicide
aerially applied by the respondents), there is no need to provide for
a substantial distinction based on the level of concentration;
E. that as soon as fungicides are released in the air, they become air
pollutants pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8749
(Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999),38 and the activity thus falls
under the authority of the local government units to ban; and that
the ordinance does not only seek to protect and promote human
health but also serves as a measure against air pollution.
CITY OF DAVAO II
A. The City of Davao insists that it validly exercised police power
because it does not thereby oblige the shift from aerial to truck-
mounted boom spraying; that the respondents only choose boom
spraying to justify the alleged impracticability of the transition
period by erroneously adding the months required for each of the
stages without considering other steps that may be simultaneously
undertaken;
22
 B. that the Court should apply its ruling in Social Justice Society v.
Atienza, Jr., by which the six-month period for the folding-up of
business operations was declared a legitimate exercise of police
power;
C. that the respondents did not present any documentary evidence on
the feasibility of adopting other methods;
D. that only 1,800 hectares out of 5,200 hectares of plantations
owned and operated by PBGEA's members use aerial spraying,
hence, the perceived ominous consequence of imposing a ban on
aerial spray to the banana industry is entirely misleading;
E. that the urgency of prohibiting aerial spray justifies the three-
month transition period;
F. that the complaints of the community residents - ranging from skin
itchiness, contraction and/or tightening in the chest, nausea,
appetite loss and difficulty in breathing after exposure to spray
mist - only prove that aerial spraying brings discomfort and harm
to the residents;
G. that considering that the testimony of Dr. Lynn Crisanta R.
Panganiban, a pharmacologist and toxicologist, established that
fungicides could cause debilitating effects on the human body once
inhaled or digested, the CA erred in holding that there was no
correlation between aerial application and the complaints of the
residents;
H. that given that aerial spray produces more drift and is
uncontrollable compared to the other methods of applying
fungicides, the · ordinance becomes reasonable;
I. that the medical-related complaints of the residents need not be
proven by medical records considering that these were based on
personal knowledge.
CITY OF DAVAO III
The City of Davao contends that the imposition of the 30-meter buffer zone is
a valid exercise of police power, rendering the claim for just compensation
untenable;
- that the maintenance of the buffer zone does not require the
respondents to cede a portion of their landholdings; that the
planting of diversified trees within the buffer zone will serve to
insulate the residents from spray drift;
- that such buffer zone does not deprive the landowners of the lawful
and beneficial use of their property;
- that the buffer zone is consistent with the Constitution, which
reminds property owners that the use of property bears a social
function.
MAIN ISSUE:
The main issue is whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional
on due process and equal protection grounds for being unreasonable and
oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power:
(a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice
in Davao City under Section 5;
(b) in decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other
modes of pesticide application under Section 5;
(c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under
Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.
HELD: Petitioners then brought the issue to the SC, but the High Court
unanimously denied the consolidated petitions on certiorari for lack of merit.
The SC made 3 points on the question of "whether a prohibition against aerial
spraying is a lawfully permissible method that the city government can adopt
to prevent the effects of the so-called aerial drift":
1. The ordinance violates the due process clause - The High Court said Davao
City "must not act arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically regardless of the
ordinance's salutary purpose."
- On Section 5, the SC said 3 months would be inadequate time for
the city to shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying,
effectively depriving the city an efficient means to combat disease.
- But the High Court disagreed with PBGEA that the buffer zone
required by the ordinance is in violation of due process since the
purpose is to minimize the effects of aerial spraying.
2. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause - The SC said equal
protection was violated since the ordinance made no substantial distinctions
when it prohibited aerial spraying per se regardless of the substance or the
level of concentration of the chemicals to be applied, and when it imposed the
30-meter buffer zone in all agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the
size of landholdings.
3. The ordinance is an ultra vires act - According to the SC, the city
disregarded regulations implemented by the Fertilizer and Pesticides
Authority (FPA), including its identification and classification of safe
pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.
Regulation and control of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals, the SC
said, is a function lodged with the FPA and not with local government units.
Thus, when Davao City enacted the ordinance "without inherent and explicit
authority to do so" the SC said the local government performed an ultra vires
act.
H. Void-For Vagueness, Overbreadth And Facial Challenges
25. SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ,
petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY,
respondents.
G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Facts:
                Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for
violation of the OEC and RA 8189 or Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 for
making false information as to their residence in their applications as new
voters in Burauen, Leyte.
                The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary
investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants,
the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.
                Sps. Romualdez contend that they intend to reside in Burauen, Leyte
since 1989. On May 2000, they took actual residence in Burauen by leasing for
5 years the house of Renomeron.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation
be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the
corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.
Issue:
WON due process was violated.
Held:
No.
First, the Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC
is couched in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to support
the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189.
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that
the election offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely
different from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as
23
charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity
between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the
Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by
private respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by Section 261(y)
(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the
COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC,
were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.
In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court
is determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by
the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. Indeed, in Lacson, we
articulated that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from
the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law,
but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information.
Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack
of due process because, as we have said, the charges contained in private
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the
COMELEC to be filed are based on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of
the criminal charges in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that of
the charges contained in the Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the
COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that, petitioners cannot
claim that they were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence
against the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were
afforded due process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the
allegations in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in
opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-
Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC.
They similarly filed a Memorandum before the said body. Finding that due
process was not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar,
we agree with the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners
were reasonably apprised of the nature and description of the charges against
them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary investigations were
conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the
evidence submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to adduce
controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages, petitioners
actively participated.  "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a sterile
25.1 ROMUALDEZ VS. COMELEC
April 30, 2008 – Due Process
FACTS:
Petitoner Carlos Romualdez was running as a candidate for
Congress in the second district of Leyte in the 2001 elections. Prior to the
petitioner’s filing of candidacy, private respondent Dennis Garay filed a
complaint COMELEC thru the Office of the Election Officer in Burauen, Leyte,
charging petitioners with violation of Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)
(5)  of the Omnibus Election Code, and Section 12 of Republic Act No.
8189.
The private respondent deposed that the petitioner, together with
this wife Erlinda Romualdez are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa
Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City; that petitioners made false
and untruthful representations in violation of Section 12 of Republic Act
Nos. 8189 by indicating therein that they are residents of 935 San Jose Street,
Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of
113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City,
and registered voters there; and that knowing fully well said truth,
intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in said applications
corresponding to the length of time which they have resided in Burauen,
Leyte. On the other hand, the petitioners contended that they did not make
any false or untruthful statements in their application for registration, and
that they intended to reside in Burauen, Leyte and on May 2000, they took
actual residence in Burauen, Leyte for five (5) years.
The complaint contained therein that a preliminary investigation
be conducted by the COMELEC, and the corresponding Information against
petitioners be filed before the RTC. Subsequently, the COMELEC Investigating
Officer issued a Resolution for recommending to the COMELEC Law
Department of filing the appropriate Information against petitioners before
the RTC for  violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j)
of Republic Act 8189. The COMELEC En Banc agreed to the resolution and
ordered the Law Department to file the case with RTC Leyte against the
petitioners. However, petitioners counter that they are not afforded with due
process because they have not provided enough evidence to suffice their
arguments as the complaint filed by the private respondent is different from
the COMELEC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were denied of due process
RULING:
NO. The Court ruled that the nature of the offenses against to the petitioners
is just the same, notwithstanding that the COMELEC has charged them with a
violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of RA 8189.
The COMELEC argued that Section 45(j) of RA 8189, which states that an
election offense is “violation of any of this act” is couched in a language which
embraces all the allegations necessary to support the violations charged by
the private respondent. With this, the petitioners facially challenged Section
45(j) must be “void-for-vagueness” as it does not specifically provide which
election offenses on the said RA were violated which resulted them to be
denied of due process.
The Court demonstrated that the “void-for-vagueness” of facial
challenge test means that law is facially invalid if it lacks comprehensible
standards that the men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.
However, facial challenge is not applicable to penal statutes
involving crime because it will lead to mass acquittal of parties whose cases
may not have even reached the courts. Such application of facial challenge to
those cases would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of
abstract context having no factual concreteness. Therefore, void for vagueness
does not apply to Section 45(j) and it is not vague and they are not denied of
due process.
Moreover, petitioners posit that the COMELEC committed a grave
abuse of discretion for the misapprehension of facts and directing to file a
case against them with the RTC. The Court said that it is a settled rule that all
statutes are presumed constitutional except when there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful,
speculative or argumentative.
In this case the Court ruled that the task of the COMELEC is to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the case, and make a determination
of probable cause. It leaves all to the sound discretion of the COMELEC, and
the Court will only intervene when there is a grave abuse of discretion
committed by the former.
Lastly, the petitioners argue that they filed an application as new voters to
Buruan, Leyte and attested that they are not the residents Mariposa Loop
Quezon City anymore, but the findings show that although they filed a
cancellation of voter’s registration record from Quezon City, it still appears
that they are residents there because they did not file a proper procedure of
the change of residency prescribed by RA 8189. With this, the Court ruled that
they violated the Section 10 of RA 8189 in Mala Prohibitum for failure to
follow the procedures of the proper application of the new voter’s registration
at Buruan, Leyte.
DISSENTING OPINIONS:
JUSTICE CARPIO
24
  Meanwhile, Section 261 and 262 of the Omnibus Election Code are
 There are two grounds to test the constitutionality of the statute: not vague because they enumerate what are the specific
Facial Challenge and As Applied Challenge prohibited acts which constitute election offenses by specifying
the specific sections of the Code the violation of which also
LENGE FACIAL CHALLENGE constitutes election offenses. 

enge the constitutionality of ANY statute  JUSTINCE

only to parties affected
idate only the specific provisions of statute
Can only challenge statutes affecting free speechTINGA
and
freedom of religion  Section 45(j) is unconstitutional, violative as it is of the due process
clause, and thus should be voided
 Can claim violation of rights of third parties Petitioners claimed that the filing of the case was politically
motivated as petitioner Carlos Romualdez was a candidate for
 Can invalidate statue on its entirety Congress in the second district of Leyte in the 2001 elections

 Analytical tools:  The component of due process is the fair notice requirement
al tools (any of these): (1) Overbreadth enunciated under Article III Section 14 of the Constitution
ermination of the absence of due process (2) void for vagueness
k of fair notice, lack of ascertainable  Void for vagueness and overbreadth doctrines also justify facial
ndards challenges in cases under the Due Process and Equal Protection
erbreadth Clauses of the Constitution with respect to so-called fundamental
rights
d for vagueness

 Remedies for void for vagueness statutes in PH jurisprudence is the

judicial inquiry, namely:
 The void for vagueness doctrine expresses the rule that :
(1) for an act to constitute a crime, the law must expressly and  Actual case or controversy
clearly declare such act a crime  Locus Standi
 Earliest possible opportunity
(2) a penal statute must prescribe an ascertainable standard of  The constitutional question must be necessary to the
guilt to guide courts in adjudication determination of the case itself

 It is a well-settled rule that a statute should be construed whenever

(3) a penal statute must confine law enforcers within well-defined
boundaries to avoid arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement
of the law
 Applying the void for vagueness doctrine, Section 45(j) of RA No.
8189 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because of vagueness as it does not
specifically mention which election offenses have been violated
 Overbreadth doctrine expresses the rule that:
 The statute is invalid if it is overbroad
 Applies to statues affecting free speech or freedom of
religion
 This also applies to third parties
 It determines whether a statute gives a “chilling effect” to
third parties to assert their rights
 Overbreadth doctrine does not apply to this case
 The Court should have made reference to “as applied” doctrine and
not the “facial doctrine” for determining the constitutionality of
Section 45(j)
 Any invocation of the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness to
mount a "facial" challenge in the present case is grossly misplaced
because:
 First, petitioners assert a violation of their own constitutional
rights, not the rights of third-parties.
 Second, the challenged statute - Section 45(j) of RA No. 8189,
does not involve free speech.
possible in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution
 Partial Unconstitutionality: Where a statute is reasonably
susceptible of two constructions, one constitutional and the other
unconstitutional, that construction in favor of its constitutionality
shall be adopted while the construction that renders it invalid
rejected
 Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we
assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap
the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must
provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague
law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,
judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis,
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application
 Vague statutes can also be overbreadth statutes
 Virtually all of the 52 provisions of Rep. Act 8189 define an act,
establishes a policy, or imposes a duty or obligation on a voter,
election officer or a subdivision of government. Virtually all of these
provisions are susceptible to violation, the only qualifier being that
they incorporate a verb.
 The COMELEC did point out that an election offense under Section
45(j) is malum prohibitum, which is a correct restatement of
prevailing doctrine, yet a prospect that makes the provision even
more disturbing, especially to Section 14 which covers illiterate
persons

25
  The lis mota of the case is the constitutionality of the Section 45(j) 5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule
 The Court’s reliance on People v. Gatchalian is misplaced, because
the Minimum Wage Law on the latter case covers “Any person who  
willfully violates any of the provisions of this Act shall upon  
conviction thereof”. In this case, the RA 8189 merely provides “Any Issue/s:
person”
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
CRITIQUE
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the:
 I agree with the two dissenting opinions that RA 8189 section 45(j) 1. Right to life
is vague because it violates substantive due process
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
 RA 8189 section 45 (j) may be utilized by the candidates for the
purpose politically motivated purposes, and not for the purpose of 4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
the rule of law 5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
 That law should be amended 7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
Imbong vs Ochoa  
Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free Speech; Privacy; Due Process PROCEDURAL:
Clause; Equal Protection Clause Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the
Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus Standi; Declaratory Relief; controversy.
One Subject One Title Rule 1. Actual Case or Controversy
  2. Facial Challenge
  3. Locus Standi
26. IMBONG VS OCHOA 4. Declaratory Relief
G.R. No. 204819               April 8, 2014 5. One Subject/One Title Rule
JAMES M. IMBONG vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,   
  Discussions:
Facts: PROCEDURAL
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an
Congress on December 21, 2012. actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c)
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question
2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
against hazardous products. specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
servitude. requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech. something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence
clause of the Constitution. of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of
protected by the Constitution
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
  Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.
over the controversy. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the
1. Power of Judicial Review people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of
2. Actual Case or Controversy the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s
3. Facial Challenge freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are
4. Locus Standi externalized.

26
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule
on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance,
of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and
where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has
invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so
as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule
expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that
the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either
in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the
real subject or scope of the act.”   Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act
is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection;
it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon
the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds
it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and
determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence.
But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial
unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid
portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law;
and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.     upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy
 
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of
when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be
decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However,
they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on
this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother
and the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the
traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited
by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support
the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to
the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon
fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum
would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the
male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the
unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent
abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line
with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in
defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a
bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”.
Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or
the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a)
of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This
violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the
definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the
term “primarily”, must be struck down.
2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With
RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure
that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in
mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall
be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that
the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be
done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
“mandatory” only after these devices and materials have been tested,
evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.
3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of
contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is
moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to
one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to
determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated
or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution
or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State
can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.
4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures
even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the provision
(disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and
autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family
as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the
Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to
found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or
family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of
policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe
upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of
marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a
procedure is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH
Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution,
which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the
portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written
consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising
parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical
27
procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases
where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about
family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and
control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception
may be made in life-threatening procedures.
5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of
the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might
raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program,
the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of
Education has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate
reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of
parents in the development of their children with the use of the term
“primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of
the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of
the IRR supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents
in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and
other interest groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very
well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.
6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by the
petitioners are not vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in
relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a “public health service
provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should
be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include
providing of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus,
hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering
RH service and modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7
of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to
Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of
malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature
and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.
7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal protection
clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution,
which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the
underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it
shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number,
since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who
are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the
RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and
does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The
RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH
education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the
academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect
to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching
of reproductive health education
8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-
government health care service providers to render 48 hours of pro
bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second,
Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono  Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no
penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their
religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or
otherwise
 
 
PROCEDURAL
 
1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or
controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already
taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have
already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally
prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public
health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with
forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on
the matter now.
2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the
U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications.
While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is
simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a
proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged
that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist
no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch
of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed
through an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again
acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain
individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with
material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional
issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi
is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than
one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs,
such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the
public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition,
the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants
28
that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction
over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have
potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the
Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule
65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-
reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this
case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that
both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are
interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of
the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human
rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of
these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information,
and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with
their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of
achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the
Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive
the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
except with respect to the following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a)
require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-
parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods
of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or
her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar
as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar
as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical
procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service
provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another
health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to
support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the
rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
“primarily” in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra
vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law
and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
I. Constitutional And Statutory Due Process
27. VIRGILIO AGABON, et al. v. NLRC [G.R. No. 158693 November 17,
2004]
FACTS
Virgilio and Jenny Agabon worked for respondent Riviera Home
Improvements, Inc. as gypsum and cornice installers from January 1992 until
Feb 1999. Their employment was terminated when they were dismissed for
allegedly abandoning their work. Petitioners Agabon then filed a case of illegal
dismissal. /// The LA ruled in favor of the spouses and ordered Riviera to pay
them their money claims. The NLRC reversed the LA, finding that the
Agabons were indeed guilty of abandonment. The CA modified the LA by
ruling that there was abandonment but ordering Riviera to pay the Agabons’
money claims.///
The arguments of both parties are as follows:
The Agabons claim, among others that Riviera violated the requirements of
notice and hearing when the latter did not send written letters of termination
to their addresses.
Riviera admitted to not sending the Agabons letters of termination to their
last known addresses because the same would be futile, as the Agabons do not
reside there anymore. However, it also claims that the Agabons abandoned
their work. More than once, they subcontracted installation works for other
companies. They already were warned of termination if the same act was
repeated, still, they disregarded the warning.
ISSUES
1. Whether the Agabons were illegally dismissed
2. Whether Riviera violated the requirements of notice and hearing
3. Is the violation of the procedural requirements of notice and hearing for
termination of employees a violation of the Constitutional due process?
4. What are the consequences of violating the procedural requirements of
termination?
RULING: Valid dismissal but violation of statutory due process = payment
of nominal damages (P30,000) & balance of 13 th month pay, etc.
1. No. There was just cause for their dismissal, i.e., abandonment. Art. 282
specifies the grounds for just dismissal, to wit:
a. Serious misconduct or willful disobedience of the lawful orders of
the employer or his duly authorized representative in connection
with the employee’s work
b. Gross and habitual neglect of the by the employee of his duties
(includes abandonment)
c. Fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed by the employer or his
duly authorized representative to the employee
d. Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
person of the employer or any member of his immediate family or
his duly authorized representative
e. Any other causes analogous to the foregoing.
29
 To establish abandonment, two elements must be present:
a. The unjustified failure of the employee to report for work
b. A clear intention to sever e-e relationship, manifested by overt acts
Here, the Agabons were frequently absent from work for having
performed installation work for another company, despite prior warning
given by Riviera. This clearly establishes an intention to sever the e-e
relationship between them, and which constitutes abandonment.
2. Yes. While the employer has the right to expect good performance,
diligence, good conduct and loyalty from its employees, it also has the
duty to provide just compensation to his employees and to observe the
procedural requirements of notice and hearing in the termination of
his employees.
Procedure of termination (Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code):
a. A written notice to the employee specifying the grounds for
termination and giving the employee reasonable opportunity to be
heard
b. A hearing where the employee is given the opportunity to respond
to the charges against him and present evidence or rebut the
evidence presented against him (if he so requests)
c. A written notice of termination indicating that grounds have been
established to justify his termination upon due consideration of all
circumstances
In this case, Riviera failed to notify the Agabons of their termination to
their last known addresses. Hence, they violated the procedural
requirement laid down by the law in the termination of employees.
employee who became a criminal and threatened his co-workers’
lives, who fled and could not be faound
c. It could discourage investments that would generate employment in
the economy
Second, the payment of backwages is unjustified as only illegal
termination gives the employee the right to be paid full backwages. When
the dismissal is valid or upheld, the employee has no right to backwages.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
1. Dismissals based on just causes: acts or omissions attributable to
the employee; no right to claim backwages or to pay separation pay
(separation pay is subject to exception, ie if termination is not
based on serious misconduct or a conduct reflecting the moral
depravity of a person, separation pay may be granted by reason of
social justice)
Dismissals based on authorized causes: involve grounds
provided under the Labor Code; employee (and DOLE) is entitled
the payment of separation pay (redundancy and installation of
labor-saving devices: 1 month pay or 1 month/yr of service,
whichever is higher; retrenchment and closure or cessation of
business: 1 month pay or ½ month per year of service, whichever is
higher)
Illegal termination: employee is entitled to the payment of full
backwages as well as reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges, inclusive of allowances and other monetary
claims from the time compensation was withheld until
reinstatement; if reinstatement is not possible, separation pay shall
be given.

3. No. Constitutional due process is that provided under the Constitution,

which involves the protection of the individual against governmental
oppression and the assurance of his rights In civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings; statutory due process is that found in the
Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and protects the individual from
being unjustly terminated without just or authorized cause after notice
and hearing.

The two are similar in that they both have two aspects: substantive due
process and procedural due process. However, they differ in that under
the Labor Code, the first one refers to the valid and authorized causes of
employment termination, while the second one refers to the manner of
dismissal. A denial of statutory due process is not the same as a denial of
Constitutional due process for reasons enunciated in Serrano v. NLRC.

4. The dismissal is valid, but Riviera should pay nominal damages to the
Agabons in vindication of the latter for violating their right to notice and
hearing. The penalty is in the nature of a penalty or indemnification, the
amount dependent on the facts of each case, including the nature of
gravity of offense of the employer.

In this case, the Serrano doctrine was re-examined.

First, in the Serrano case, the dismissal was upheld, but it was held to be
ineffectual (without legal effect). Hence, Serrano was still entitled to the
payment of his backwages from the time of dismissal until the
promulgation of the court of the existence of an authorized cause.
Further, he was entitled to his separation pay as mandated under Art.
283. The ruling is unfair to employers and has the danger of the following
consequences:
a. The encouragement of filing frivolous suits even by notorious
employees who were justly dismissed but were deprived of
statutory due process; they are rewarded by invoking due process
b. It would create absurd situations where there is just or authorized
cause but a procedural infirmity invalidates the termination, ie an
30