G.R. No.

179035             April 16, 2008

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166676
vs.
JESUS PAYCANA, JR., appellant.
Petitioner, Present:

- versus - Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Carpio Morales,

Respondent. Tinga,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

NO DIGEST Promulgated:

September 12, 2008

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REPUBLIC V
CAGANDAHAN (DIGEST)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JENNIFER B.
CAGANDAHAN (CASE DIGEST)
G.R. No. 166676
September 12, 2008
TOPIC: Change of Name, Change of Sex, Changes in
Birth Certificate, Intersex
FACTS:
Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC. She
alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and
was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live
Birth but while growing up, she developed
secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed
to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) – a
condition where persons afflicted possess both
male and female characteristics. She alleged that
for all interests and appearances as well as in mind
and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus,
she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected
such that her gender be changed from female to
male and her first name be changed from Jennifer
to Jeff.
Respondent testified and presented the testimony
of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine
General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical
certificate stating that respondent’s condition is
known as CAH. He testified that this condition is
very rare, that respondent’s uterus is not fully
developed because of lack of female hormones, and
that she has no monthly period. He further
testified that respondent’s condition is permanent
and recommended the change of gender because
respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her
chosen role as male, and the gender change would
be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondent’s petition.
Hence, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling. The OSG contends, among
others, that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex
or gender in the birth certificate and respondent’s
claimed medical condition known as CAH does not
make her a male.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the
petition on the ground of her medical condition.
RULING:
No.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in
his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes. Rule 108 now applies
only to substantial changes and corrections in
entries in the civil register.
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil
registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial
change for which the applicable procedure is Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil
Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and
408 of the Civil Code. The acts, events or factual
errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth.
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. It is one of the
many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. An
organism with intersex may have biological
characteristics of both male and female sexes.
In deciding this case, we consider the
compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations, which should not
be subject to outright denial. The current state of
Philippine statutes apparently compels that a
person be classified either as a male or as a female,
but this Court is not controlled by mere
appearances when nature itself fundamentally
negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to
be a female, then there is no basis for a change in
the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we
determine, based on medical testimony and
scientific development showing the respondent to
be other than female, then a change in the subject’s
birth certificate entry is in order.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the
person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here
thinks of himself as a male and considering that his
body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen) there is preponderant biological
support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes
the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is
at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its
course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest
or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that
of a male. Respondent could have undergone
treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication, to force his body into the categorical
mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do
so. Nature has instead taken its due course in
respondent’s development to reveal more fully his
male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will
not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so
innately private as one’s sexuality and
lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not
to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male
tendency due to CAH. To him belongs the human
right to the pursuit of happiness and of health.
Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice
of what courses of action to take along the path of
his sexual development and maturation. In the
absence of evidence that respondent is an
“incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to
show that classifying respondent as a male will
harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Court
affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s
position and his personal judgment of being a male.
We respect respondent’s congenital condition and
his mature decision to be a male.
As for respondent’s change of name under Rule
103, this Court has held that a change of name is
not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and
the consequences that will follow. The trial court’s
grant of respondent’s change of name from
Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name
to a masculine name. Considering the consequence
that respondent’s change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in
respondent’s change of name. Such a change will
conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.
The Republic’s petition is denied.

G.R. No. 121176 July 8, 1999

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARLON PARAZO Y FRANCISCO, accused-appellant.

PEOPLE VS. PARAZO

310 SCRA 147

FACTS:
1. Accused-appellant Marlon Parazo was charged and convicted by the RTC of
Cabanatuan City for rape and frustrated homicide.
2. The supreme penalty of death was imposed upon him.
3. On automatic review, the SC affirmed the case but modified the sentence as
to the frustrated homicide case.
4. Appellant interposed the Motion for Reconsideration under consideration,
bringing to the attention of the court facts and circumstances, such as the
absence of a sign language expert, which if true would warrant the setting aside
of his judgment of conviction.
5. Results of the medical examinations conducted on appellant indicate that
appellant is really a deaf-mute, a mental retardate, whose mental age is only 7
years and 9 months, and with a low IQ of 60.
ISSUE: Movant richly deserves a re-arraignment and re-trial, to the end that only upon
Was the conviction of accused-appellant proper? proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt may he be consigned to the lethal
injection chamber.
HELD:
Records on hand show that appellant was tried below without the benefit of a
sign language expert. The fact that he was “helped and assisted by a person
who has been known to him since 1983"” as noted by the trial court of origin
and appearing on page 6 of the transcript of stenographic notes for February 8,
1995, is of no moment, absent any clear showing that appellant was aided by a
competent sign language expert able to fully understand and interpret the
actions and muttering of appellant.

The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the
accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged
and who could also have communicate the accused’s own version of the
circumstance which led to his implication in the crime deprived the accused of a
full and fair trial and reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the
accused’s final plea of not guilty can excuse these inherently unjust
circumstances.

The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means,
whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against
him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The
accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of
the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The accused could not be
said to have enjoyed to right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the
proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.
G.R. No. 128887 January 20, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDGARDO AQUINO Y PUMAWAN @ "EDDIE AQUINO," accused-appellant. G.R. No. 155800             March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

FACTS:
NO DIGEST
Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently
in church on December 8, 1990. A child was born in April 1991 but died
5 months later.  Antonio could no longer take her constant lying,
insecurities and jealousies over him so he separated from her in August
1991. He attempted reconciliation but since her behavior did not
change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Only after their
marriage that he learned about her child with another man.

He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
 corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, which amounts to
psychological incapacity.
The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared
the marriage null and void.

The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC,
owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision.  It held that the
facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently
totality of evidence presented was insufficient to establish Reyes'
lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality.
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the 1997
Her fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities
Molina case had not been satisfied.
enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for

declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and, generally, The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:
under the Molina guidelines.
First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his wife;

RULING: Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts,
Yes. The petitioner, aside  from his own testimony, presented a
and was clearly explained in the trial court's decision;
psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying
and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she
married him prove that her psychological incapacity was have existed
even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was
considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the
sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to
commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love,
trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration
the fact that the marriage was annulled by the Catholic Church.
However, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not of
the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this
Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to
reconcile with her but her behavior remains unchanged.
G.R. No. 135981             January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No. 135981,
January 15 2004.
People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic
Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived
happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel
and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her
husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her.
Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified
during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled
and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another
room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The
information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death
of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self
defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an
aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of
Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of
Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of
mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said
experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in
the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said
psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman
syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman
syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial
court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman
syndrome” as constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is
afflicted with the “battered woman syndrome”.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to
any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order
to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle
at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man
once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a
battered woman.”
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called
“cycle of violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the
acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant
and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the
killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual
fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to
use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must
have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the
accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the
latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-
defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these
elements were duly established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence”
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt
there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least
another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the
cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still
be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule
that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the
peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus,
the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must
concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes
actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life
or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of
Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression
of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from
his violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. During that time, he
apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of
the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that
presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were,
however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two
circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did
not arise from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery
inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a
period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an
illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of
consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state
of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of
passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so
powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following
requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce
such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover
her normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as
conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a
killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in
order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must
have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by
the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced
passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands
of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant
with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental
state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of
her unborn child.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However,
considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any
aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum
penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible
for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
 NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise
known as Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted.
Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by the courts
to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil
liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"

G.R. No. 172607               October 26, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
RUFINO UMANITO, Appellant.

FACTS:

The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino Umanito
was found by the RTC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape. The alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted
in her pregnancy and the birth of a child hereinafter identified as “BBB.” 

In view of that fact, as well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the
Court deemed uncovering whether or not Umanito is the father of BBB.

With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can
now be determined with reasonable certainty whether appellant is the father
of AAA’s child. 

The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to the parties in

Court. The [NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not to disclose to the parties in
advance the DNA test results. The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe
the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all results or other
information obtained from DNA testing and is hereby ordered to preserve
the evidence until such time as the accused has been acquitted or served his
sentence.
The DNA analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper
taken from [AAA], [BBB], and Umanito, to determine whether or not
Umanito is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a Complete
Match in allof the 15 loci tested between the alleles of Umanito and [BBB];
That based on the above findings, there is a 99.9999% probability of
paternity that Umanito is the biological father of BBB.  that the accused did not object to the admission of the results of the DNA
The defense admitted that if the value of the Probability of Paternity is
99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.
ISSUE:  to the rulings of the RTC and the Courtof Appeals finding him guilty of the
Whether Umanito is the biological father of [BBB].
RULING:
Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then recently
promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence (DNA Rules). The DNA testing
has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to by AAA, Umanito
had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after
the day she said she was raped by Umanito. 
Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be
contradicted andovercome by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3).
The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA
testing was not contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering
testing (Exhibits “A” and “B” inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented
evidence to rebut the same. 
By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Umanito is deemed to have acceded
crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and the indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of
P50,000.00.
Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the
conclusions of the lower courts, and that no cause is presented for us to
deviate from the penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to
deny Umanitos Motion to Withdraw Appeal.The instant case is now
CLOSED and TERMINATED.
G.R. No. L-15853             July 27, 1960

FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.

Aquino v. Delizo
G.R. No. L-15853, 27 July 1960

FACTS:

The trial court dismissed the complaint for Aquino did not show any birth
certificate to show the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between
the parties. Later on Aquino presented evidence to show proof of the child’s birth
but still his petition was denied. The CA denied Aquino’s appeal on the theory
that it was not impossible for the parties to have sex during their engagement so
that the child could be their own and finding it absurd for Aquino not to notice or
suspect that Delizo was pregnant when he married her. In a motion for
reconsideration filed by Aquino, Delizo and her counsel did not file an answer
thus the motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal of Aquino’s complaint is correct.

RULING:

No. The dismissal is not correct. Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the
wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other
than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage.

Concealment of the wife the fact that at the time of the marriage she was
pregnant by a man other than his husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for
annulment of marriage.

Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant
at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say
that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was “naturally
plump” or fat as alleged by plaintiff.

According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the

enlargement of a woman’s abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say,
the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly
noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower
part of the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the
enlargement of the woman’s abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus,
making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.