II. NATURAL LAW: THE CLASSIC,
99327 May 27, 1993
SCHOLASTIC, ENLIGHTENMENT &
POSTMODERN PHILISOPHERS
G.R. No. 104768               July 21, 2003
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and
ELIZABETH DIMAANO, Respondents.
G.R. No.
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.
J., DEAN CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO, JUDGE RUPERTO
KAPUNAN, JR., JUSTICE VENICIO ESCOLIN, FISCAL MIGUEL
ALBAR, ATTYS. MARCOS HERRAS, FERDINAND CASIS, JOSE
CLARO TESORO, RAMON CAGUIOA, and RAMON ERENETA.
petitioners,
vs.
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the RTC-Makati,
Br. 134, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, JR. ERNEST MONTECILLO, ADEL
ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO AMADO SABBAN, DALMACIO LIM JR.,
MANUEL ESCONA and JUDE FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University,
died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the
initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized
at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the
serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion.
Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-
Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate
and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the
death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to
submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from
receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written
notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on
preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and
hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case
against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School
Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required
to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created
a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The
Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the
Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in
hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the
members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the
imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr.
Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students.
Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently
enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners
from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the
temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to
investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and
Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and
argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the
original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and
reinstatement of the students was ordered.
Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.
Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural
due process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required
respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident.
Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their
counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation
were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin
elements of notice and hearing.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the
instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion
for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the
latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case
involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or
not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior
to their dismissal from Petitioner University.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein,
thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with
the assistance of counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee
or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.
G.R. No. L-129              December 19, 1945
TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA, petitioner,
vs.
WILHELM D. STYER, Commanding General, United States Army
Forces, Western Pacific, respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Tomoyuki Yamashita, the commanding general of the 14th army
group of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, after his surrender
became a prisoner of war of the United States of America but was later
removed from such status and placed in confinement as an accused war
criminal charged before an American Military Commission constituted by
respondent Lieutenant General Styer, Commanding General of the United
States Army Forces, Western Pacific.
Filing for habeas corpus and prohibition against respondent, he asks that
he be reinstated to his former status as prisoner of war, and that the
Military Commission be prohibited from further trying him. He questions,
among others, the jurisdiction of said Military Commission.
Issue/s:
1. Should the petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition be granted in this
case?
2. Was the Military Commission validly constituted by respondent,
therefore having jurisdiction over the war crimes?
Ruling: 1. NO. 2. YES.
1. A petition for habeas corpus is improper when release of petitioner is
not sought. It seeks no discharge of petitioner from confinement but
merely his restoration to his former status as a prisoner of war, to be
interned, not confined. The relative difference as to the degree of
confinement in such cases is a matter of military measure, disciplinary in
character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts. Prohibition cannot issue
against one not made party respondent. Neither may the petition for
prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The Military
Commission is not made party respondent in this case, and although it
may be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in
these case proceedings requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.
The Court further ruled that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition
even if the commission be joined as respondent. As it has said, in Raquiza
vs. Bradford (pp. 50, 61, ante), “. . . an attempt of our civil courts to
exercise jurisdiction over the United States Army before such period (state
of war) expires, would be considered as a violation of this country’s faith,
which this Court should not be the last to keep and uphold.”
2. Under the laws of war, a military commander has an implied power to
appoint and convene a military commission. This is upon the theory that
since the power to create a military commission is an aspect of waging
war, military commanders have that power unless expressly withdrawn
from them.
By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, the Congress of the
United States has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do
so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses
against the laws of war in appropriate cases.
G.R. No. L-442             May 23, 1946 G.R. No. 161434             March 3, 2004

JOSE CARAOS, petitioner, MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO,

vs. JR., petitioners,
IÑIGO S. DAZA, Judge of First Instance of Batangas, JOSE A. vs.
ALANO, Provincial Fiscal of Batangas, and THE DIRECTOR OF The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE
PRISONS, respondents. (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER, respondents.

x-----------------------------x

G.R. No. 161634             March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner,

vs.
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE,
JR., respondent.

x-----------------------------x

G. R. No. 161824             March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY
POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential
elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s)
certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite
his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding
that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the
Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic
issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.)   The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding
“qualification of a candidate” for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
“Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal”  in connection with Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the “President” or “Vice-President”, of
the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of
“candidates” for President or Vice-President before the elections.
2.)   Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a
Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on
respondent’s birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are
“those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.”
Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced
by the latter’s death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His
citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at
the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any
other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954 was
presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have
extended to his son, Allan—respondent’s father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an
American citizen,  was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as
evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on
citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that
respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on
respondent’s citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation
evidenced by the public documents presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code.

G.R. No. L-12462       December 20, 1917

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, G.R. No. 12779           September 10, 1917

vs.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
SIMEON GUENDIA, defendant-appellant. vs.
DIONISIO SANTOS, defendant-appellant.

PEOPLE v. POMAR

November 3, 1924, G.R. No. L-22008, Johnson, J.

FACTS:

Julio Pomar is the manager and person  in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a tobacco
factory pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation
duly authorized to transact business in the City of Manila. under his employ is
Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave by reason of her pregnancy.
However, Pomar did not pay her the wages she is entitled to corresponding to 30 days
before and 30 days after her delivery and confinement. Despite demands made by her,
Pomar still refused to pay Fajardo.
The CFI found Pomar guilty of violating section 13 in connection with section 15 of
Act No. 3071. POmar appealed questioning the constitutionality of the Act.
Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the
exercise of its supposed police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of safeguarding
the health of pregnant women laborers in “factory, shop or place of labor of any
description,” and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one
month before and one month after their delivery.
of the people’s law – the constitution. If the people desire to have the police power
extended and applied to conditions and things prohibited by the organic law, they
must first amend that law.
It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no account
of contracts for the employment of women by the day nor by the piece. The law is
equally applicable to each case. It will hardly be contended that the person, firm or
corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor, who employs
women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under the law to pay for sixty
days during which no services were rendered.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and the law,
that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine Legislature, are
unconstitutional and void.

ISSUE:  Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is hereby
dismissed.
Whether  or not Act 3071 has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise of
the police power of the state.

RULING:

The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As civilization
develops and public conscience becomes awakened, the police power may be
extended, as has been demonstrated in the growth of public sentiment with reference
to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that power cannot grow faster
than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition
A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC             August 8, 2008
RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE
COLUMNS OF MR. AMADO A.P. MACASAET PUBLISHED
IN MALAYA DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 2007
G.R. No. 127444               September 13, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TIRSO D. C. VELASCO in his capacity as the Presiding
Judge, RTC-Br. 88, Quezon City, and HONORATO
GALVEZ, respondents.
FACTS
G.R. No. 127444 September 13, 2000
Finality-of-acquittal Rule
Acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double
jeopardy. The protection is not against the peril of second
punishment, but against being tried again for the same
offense.
A. Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper
remedy to challenge the acquittal of Honorato Galvez without
prejudicing the principle of double jeopardy. (Criminal
Procedure)
B. Whether a reviewed by the Supreme Court of a judgment
of acquittal interdict against double jeopardy clause.
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a
criminal case unless there is a finding of mistrial or “sham
trial”, or an error on the jurisdiction of the court a quo.
ISSUE
Requisites for invoking double jeopardy:
(a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) before a competent court before which the same is filed;
(c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and,
(d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
HELD
No person shall be twice put in Jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the same act
[Section 21, Art III of the Constitution]
The Court held that the petition shall be dismissed on two
grounds:

(1) Honorato Galvez is already dead so the petition become

moot and academic, and

(2) petitioner has failed to show that public respondent had

acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Rule 65: Review on errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of

discretion

Rule 45: Review on evaluation of evidence and factual
findings
The acquittal must be valid in order for the judgment to end
the case and could not be appealed or reopened without
being put in double jeopardy.
G.R. No. L-409             January 30, 1947
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus, asserting that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during
the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason
defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the
reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens
thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a change of independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own
sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide.
Republic.
Change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does
Issue: not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason
Whether or not enemy occupation has the effect of suspending the committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the
allegiance of a Filipino citizen during the period of said occupation same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our
Constitution provides that “The government established by this constitution
Ruling: shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final
NO. A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the
absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of proclamation of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the
fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign. Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines.”
As decided by the court in cases, the absolute and permanent allegiance
of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de
jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier.

Adoption of the petitioner’s theory of suspended allegiance would lead to

disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would
be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public
conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the G.R. No. L-12306             October 22, 1918
Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own
government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for SIMONA MANZANARES, plaintiff-appelle,
treason, and even compel those who are not aid them in their military
vs.
operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue
RAFAEL MORETA, defendant-appellant.
and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own
independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action of
invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party
in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and