EN BANC Challenged in this petition is the validity

of petitioner's removal from service as

 
G.R. No. 112745 October 16, 1997
AQUILINO T. LARIN, petitioner,  Memorandum Order No. 164 issued by
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU
OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND THE
COMMITTEE CREATED TO
INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT
AGAINST AQUILINO T. LARIN,
COMPOSED OF FRUMENCIO A.
LAGUSTAN, JOSE B.
ALEJANDRINO AND JAIME M.
MAZA,respondents.
Assistant Commissioner of the Excise
Tax Service of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. Incidentally, he questions
the Office of the President, which
provides for the creation of "A
Committee to Investigate the
Administrative Complaint Against
Aquilino T. Larin, Assistant
Commissioner, Bureau of Internal
Revenue" as well as the investigation
made in pursuance thereto, and
Administrative Order No. 101 dated
December 2, 1993 which found him
guilty of grave misconduct in the
administrative charge and imposed
upon him the penalty of dismissal from
office.

TORRES, JR., J.: Likewise, petitioner seeks to assail the

legality of Executive Order No. 132,
issued by President Ramos on October
26, 1993, which provides for the
"Streamlining of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue," and of its implementing
rules issued by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, namely: a) Administrative
Order No. 4-93, which provides for the
"Organizational Structure and
Statement of General Functions of
Offices in the National Office" and b)
Administrative Order No. 5-93, which
provides for "Redefining the Areas of
Jurisdiction and Renumbering of
Regional And District Offices."
The antecedent facts of the instant
case as succinctly related by the
Solicitor General are as follows:
On September 18, 1992,1 a decision
was rendered by the Sandiganbayan
convicting herein petitioner Aquilino T.
Larin, Revenue Specific Tax Officer,
then Assistant Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and his co-
accused (except Justino E. Galban, Jr.)
of the crimes of violation of Section 268
(4) of the National Internal Revenue
Code and Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 14208-14209,
entitled "People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff vs. Aquilino T. Larin, Teodoro
T. Pareno, Justino E. Galban, Jr. and
Potenciana N. Evangelista, Accused,"
the dispositive portion of the judgment
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is
now rendered in Criminal
Cases Nos. 14208 and 14209
convicting accused Assistant
Commissioner for Specific
Tax AQUILINO T. LARIN,
Chief of the Alcohol Tax
Division TEODORO P.
PARENO, and Chief of the
 Revenue Accounting Division
POTENCIANA M.
EVANGELISTA:
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED.
The fact of petitioner's conviction was
reported to the President of the
Philippines by the then Acting Finance
Secretary Leong through a
memorandum dated June 4, 1993. The
memorandum states, inter alia:
This is a report in the case of
Assistant Commissioner
AQUILINO T. LARIN of the
Excise Tax Service, Bureau
of Internal Revenue, a
presidential appointee, one of
those convicted in Criminal
Case Nos. 14208-14209,
entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Aquilino T.
Larin, et. al." referred to the
Department of Finance by the
Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
The cases against Pareno
and Evangelista are being
acted upon by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue as they are
non-presidential appointees.
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear from the foregoing
that Mr. Larin has been found
beyond reasonable doubt to
have committed acts
constituting grave
misconduct. Under the Civil
Service Laws and Rules
which require only
preponderance of evidence,
 grave misconduct is Assistant Executive
punishable by dismissal. Secretary for
Legislation
Acting by authority of the President, Sr.
Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo Mr. Jose B.
A. Quisumbing issued Memorandum Alejandro —
Order No. 164 dated August 25, 1993 Member
which provides for the creation of an Presidential
Executive Committee to investigate the Assistant
administrative charge against herein
petitioner Aquilino T. Larin. It states Atty. Jaime M. Maza
thus: — Member
Assistant
A Committee is hereby Commissioner for
created to investigate the Inspector Services
administrative complaint filed Bureau of Internal
against Aquilino T. Larin, Revenue
Assistant Commissioner,
Bureau of Internal Revenue, The Committee shall have all
to be composed of: the powers and prerogatives
of (an) investigating
Atty. Frumencio A. committee under the
Lagustan — Administrative Code of 1987
Chairman including the power to
 summon witnesses,
administer oath or take
testimony or evidence
relevant to the investigation
by subpoena ad testificandum
and subpoena duces tecum.
xxx xxx xxx
The Committee shall convene
immediately, conduct the
investigation in the most
expeditious manner, and
terminate the same as soon
as practicable from its first
scheduled date of hearing.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Consequently, the Committee directed
the petitioner to respond to the
administrative charge leveled against
him through a letter dated September
17, 1993, thus:
Presidential Memorandum
Order No. 164 dated August
25, 1993, a xerox copy of
which is hereto attached for
your ready reference, created
an Investigation Committee to
look into the charges against
you which are also the
subject of the Criminal Cases
No. 14208 and 14209
entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Aquilino
T .Larin, et. al.
The Committee has in its
possession a certified true
copy of the Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in the above-
mentioned cases.
Pursuant to Presidential
Memorandum Order No. 164,
you are hereby directed to file
 your position paper on the
aforementioned charges
within seven (7) days from
receipt hereof . . . .
Failure to file the required
position paper shall be
considered as a waiver on
your part to submit such
paper or to be heard, in which
case, the Committee shall
deem the case submitted on
the basis of the documents
and records at hand.
In compliance, petitioner submitted a
letter dated September 30, 1993 which
was addressed to Atty. Frumencio A.
Lagustan, the Chairman of the
Investigating Committee. In said latter,
he asserts that,
The case being sub-judice, I
may not, therefore, comment
on the merits of the issues
involved for fear of being cited
in contempt of Court. This
position paper is thus limited
to furnishing the Committee
pertinent documents
submitted with the Supreme
Court and other tribunal which
took cognizance of the case
in the past, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing documents
readily show that am not
administratively liable or
criminally culpable of the
charges leveled against me,
and that the aforesaid cases
are mere persecutions
caused to be filed and are
being orchestrated by
taxpayers who were
 prejudiced by multi-million
peso assessments I caused
to be issued against them in
my official capacity as
Assistant Commissioner,
Excise Tax Office of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue.
In the same letter, petitioner claims that
the administrative complaint against
him is already barred: a) on
jurisdictional ground as the Office of
the Ombudsman had already taken
cognizance of the case and had
caused the filing only of the criminal
charges against him, b) by res judicata,
c) by double jeopardy, and d) because
to proceed with the case would be
redundant, oppressive and a plain
persecution against him.
Meanwhile, the President issued the
challenged Executive Order No. 132
dated October 26, 1993 which
mandates for the streamlining of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. Under
said order, some positions and
functions are either abolished,
renamed, decentralized or transferred
to other offices, while other offices are
also created. The Excise Tax Service
or the Specific Tax Service, of which
petitioner was the Assistant
Commissioner, was one of those
offices that was abolished by said
executive order.
The corresponding implementing rules
of Executive Order No. 132, namely,
Revenue Administrative Orders Nos. 4-
93 and 5-93, were subsequently issued
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
On October 27, 1993, or one day after
the promulgation of Executive Order
No. 132, the President appointed the
following as BIR Assistant 9. Melchor S.
Commissioners: Ramos
10. Joel L. Tan-
1. Bernardo A. Torres
Frianeza Consequently, the President, in the
2. Dominador L. assailed Administrative Order No. 101
Galura dated December 2, 1993, found
petitioner guilty of grave misconduct in
3. Jaime D. the administrative charge and imposed
Gonzales upon him the penalty of dismissal with
forfeiture of his leave credits and
4. Lilia C. Guillermo retirement benefits including
disqualification for reappointment in the
5. Rizalina S.
government service.
Magalona
Aggrieved, petitioner filed directly with
6. Victorino C.
this Court the instant petition on
Mamalateo
December 13, 1993 to question
7. Jaime M. Maza basically his alleged unlawful removal
from office.
8. Antonio N.
Pangilinan
On April 17, 1996 and while the instant
petition is pending, this Court set aside
the conviction of petitioner in Criminal
Case Nos. 14208 and 14209.
In his petition, petitioner challenged the
authority of the President to dismiss
him from office. He argued that in so
far as presidential appointees who are
Career Executive Service Officers are
concerned, the President exercises
only the power of control not the power
to remove. He also averred that the
administrative investigation conducted
under Memorandum Order No. 164 is
void as it violated his right to due
process. According to him, the letter of
the Committee dated September 17,
1993 and his position paper dated
September 30, 1993 are not sufficient
for purposes of complying with the
requirements of due process. He
alleged that he was not informed of the
administrative charges leveled against
him nor was he given official notice of
his dismissal.
Petitioner likewise claimed that he was
removed as a result of the
reorganization made by the Executive
Department in the BIR pursuant to
Executive Order No. 132. Thus, he
assailed said Executive Order No. 132
and its implementing rules, namely,
Revenue Administrative Orders 4-93
and 5-93 for being ultra vires. He
claimed that there is yet no law
enacted by Congress which authorizes
the reorganization by the Executive
Department of executive agencies,
particularly the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. He said that the
reorganization sought to be effected by
the Executive Department on the basis
of E.O. No. 132 is tainted with bad faith
in apparent violation of Section 2 of
R.A. 6656, otherwise known as the Act
Protecting the Security of Tenure of
Civil Service Officers and Employees in
the Implementation of Government
Reorganization.
On the other hand. respondents
contended that since petitioner is a
presidential appointee, he falls under
the disciplining authority of the
President. They also contended that
E.O. No. 132 and its implementing
rules were validly issued pursuant to
Sections 48 and 62 of Republic Act No.
7645. Apart from this, the other legal
bases of E.O. No. 132 as stated in its
preamble are Section 63 of E.O. No.
127 (Reorganizing the Ministry of
Finance), and Section 20, Book III of
E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987. In
addition, it is clear that in Section 11 of
R.A. No. 6656 future reorganization is
expressly contemplated and nothing in
said law that prohibits subsequent
reorganization through an executive
order. Significantly, respondents
clarified that petitioner was not
dismissed by virtue of EO 132.
Respondents claimed that he was
removed from office because he was
found guilty of grave misconduct in the
administrative cases filed against him.
The ultimate issue to be resolved in the
instant case falls on the determination
of the validity of petitioner's dismissal
from office. Incidentally, in order to
resolve this matter, it is imperative that
We consider these questions: a) Who
has the power to discipline the
petitioner?, b) Were the proceedings
taken pursuant to Memorandum Order
No. 164 in accord with due process?,
c) What is the effect of petitioner's
acquittal in the criminal case to his
administrative charge?, d) Does the
President have the power to reorganize
the BIR or to issue the questioned E.O.
NO. 132?, and e) Is the reorganization
of BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132 tainted
with bad faith?
At the outset, it is worthy to note that
the position of Assistant Commissioner
of the BIR is part of the Career
Executive Service.  Under the
2
law,  Career Executive Service officers,
3
namely, Undersecretary, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant
Bureau Director, Regional Director,
Assistant Regional Director, Chief of
Department Service and other officers
of equivalent rank as may be identified
by the Career Executive Service
Board, are all appointed by the
President. Concededly, petitioner was
appointed as Assistant Commissioner
in January, 1987 by then President
Aquino. Thus, petitioner is a
presidential appointee who belongs to
career service of the Civil Service.
Being a presidential appointee, he
comes under the direct disciplining
authority of the President. This is in line
with the well settled principle that the
"power to remove is inherent in the
power to appoint" conferred to the
President by Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution. Thus, it is ineluctably
clear that Memorandum Order No. 164,
which created a committee to
investigate the administrative charge
against petitioner, was issued pursuant
to the power of removal of the
President. This power of removal,
however, is not an absolute one which
accepts no reservation. It must be
pointed out that petitioner is a career
service officer. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, career
service is characterized by the
existence of security of tenure, as
contra-distinguished from non-career
service whose tenure is co-terminus
with that of the appointing authority or
subject to his pleasure, or limited to a
period specified by law or to the
duration of a particular project for
which purpose the employment was
made. As a career service officer,
petitioner enjoys the right to security of
tenure. No less than the 1987
Constitution guarantees the right of
security of tenure of the employees of
the civil service. Specifically, Section
36 of P.D. No. 807, as amended,
otherwise known as Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines, is emphatic
that career service officers and
employees who enjoy security of
tenure may be removed only for any of
the causes enumerated in said law. In
other words, the fact that petitioner is a
presidential appointee does not give
the appointing authority the license to
remove him at will or at his pleasure for
it is an admitted fact that he is likewise
a career service officer who under the
law is the recipient of tenurial
protection, thus, may only be removed
for a cause and in accordance with
procedural due process.
Was petitioner then removed from
office for a legal cause under a valid
proceeding?
Although the proceedings taken
complied with the requirements of
procedural due process, this Court,
however, considers that petitioner was
not dismissed for a valid cause.
It should be noted that what
precipitated the creation of the
investigative committee to look into the
administrative charge against petitioner
is his conviction by the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case Nos. 14208 and
14209. As admitted by the
respondents, the administrative case
against petitioner is based on the
Sandiganbayan Decision of September
18, 1992. Thus, in the Administrative
Order No. 101 issued by Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary Quisumbing which
found petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct, it clearly states that:
This pertains to the
administrative charge against
Assistant Commissioner
Aquilino T. Larin of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue,
for grave misconduct by virtue
of a Memorandum signed by
Acting Secretary Leong of the
Department of Finance, on
the basis of a
decision handed down by the
Hon. Sandiganbayan
convicting Larin, et. al. in
Criminal Case Nos. 14208
and 14209. 4
In a nutshell, the criminal cases against
petitioner refer to his alleged violation
of Section 268 (4) of the National
Internal Revenue Code and of Section
3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 as a
consequence of his act of favorably
recommending the grant of tax credit to
Tanduay Distillery, Inc.. The pertinent
portion of the judgment of the
Sandiganbayan reads:
As above pointed out, the
accused had conspired in
knowingly preparing false
memoranda and certification
in order to effect a fraud upon
taxes due to the government.
By their separate acts which
had resulted in an appropriate
tax credit of P180,701,682.00
in favor of Tanduay. The
government had been
defrauded of a tax revenue —
for the full amount, if one is to
look at the availments or
utilization thereof (Exhibits
"AA" to "AA- 31-a"), or for a
substantial portion thereof
(P73,000,000.00) if we are to
rely on the letter of Deputy
Commissioner Eufracio D.
Santos (Exhibits "21" for all
the accused).
As pointed out above, the
confluence of acts and
omissions committed by
accused Larin, Pareno and
Evangelista adequately prove
conspiracy among them for
no other purpose than to
bring about a tax credit which
Tanduay did not deserve.
These misrepresentations as
to how much Tanduay had
paid in ad valorem taxes
obviously constituted a fraud
of tax revenue of the
government . . . .5
However, it must be stressed at this
juncture that the conviction of petitioner
by the Sandiganbayan was set
aside by this Court in our decision
promulgated on April 17, 1996 in G.R.
Nos. 108037-38 and 107119-20. We
specifically ruled in no uncertain terms
that: a) petitioner can not be held
negligent in relying on the certification
of a co-equal unit in the BIR, b) it is not
incumbent upon Larin to go beyond the
certification made by the Revenue
Accounting Division that Tanduay
Distillery, Inc. had paid the ad valorem
taxes, c) there is nothing irregular or
anything false in Larin's marginal note
on the memorandum addressed to
Pareno, the Chief of Alcohol Tax
Division who was also one of the
accused, but eventually acquitted, in
the said criminal cases, and d) there is
no proof of actual agreement between
the accused, including petitioner, to
commit the illegal acts charged. We
are emphatic in our resolution in said
cases that there is nothing "illegal with
the acts committed by the
petitioner(s)." We also declare that
"there is no showing that petitioner(s)
had acted irregularly, or performed acts
outside of his (their) official functions."
Significantly, these acts which. We
categorically declare to be not unlawful
and improper in G.R. Nos. 108037-38
and G.R. Nos. 107119-20 are the very
same acts for which petitioner is held
to be administratively responsible. Any
charge of malfeasance or misfeasance
on the part of the petitioner is clearly
belied by our conclusion in said cases.
In the light of this decisive
pronouncement, We see no reason for
the administrative charge to continue
— it must, thus, be dismissed.
We are not unaware of the rule that
since administrative cases are
independent from criminal actions for
the same act or omission, the dismissal
or acquittal of the criminal charge does
not foreclose the institution of
administrative action nor carry with it
the relief from administrative
liability.  However, the circumstantial
6
setting of the instant case sets it miles
apart from the foregoing rule and
placed it well within the exception.
Corollarily, where the very basis of the
administrative case against petitioner is
his conviction in the criminal action
which was later on set aside by this
Court upon a categorical and clear
finding that the acts for which he was
administratively held liable are not
unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of
the petitioner in the criminal case
necessarily entails the dismissal of the
administrative action against him,
because in such a case, there is no
more basis nor justifiable reason to
maintain the administrative suit.
On the aspect of procedural due
process, suffice it to say that petitioner
was given every chance to present his
side. The rule is well settled that the
essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is that a
party be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit
any evidence he may have in support
of his defense.  The records clearly
7 office of Excise Tax Services of which
show that on October 1, 1993
petitioner submitted his letter-response
dated September 30, 1993 to the
administrative charge filed against him.
Aside from his letter, he also submitted
various documents attached as
annexes to his letter, all of which are
evidences supporting his defense.
Prior to this, he received a letter dated
September 17, 1993 from the
Investigation Committee requiring him
to explain his side concerning the
charge. It can not therefore be argued
that petitioner was denied of due
process.
Let us now examine Executive Order
No. 132.
As stated earlier, with the issuance of
Executive Order No. 132, some of the
positions and offices, including the
petitioner was the Assistant
Commissioner, were abolished or
otherwise decentralized. Consequently,
the President released the list of
appointed Assistant Commissioners of
the BIR. Apparently, petitioner was not
included.
We do not agree.
Under its preamble, E.O. No. 132 lays
down the legal bases of its issuance,
namely: a) Section 48 and 62 of R.A.
No. 7645, b) Section 63 of E.O. No.
127, and c) Section 20, Book III of E.O.
No. 292.
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
Sec. 48. Scaling Down and
Phase Out of Activities of
Agencies Within the
Executive Branch. — The
heads of departments,
bureaus and offices and
agencies are hereby directed
to identify their respective
activities which are no longer
essential in the delivery of
public services and which
may be scaled down, phased
out or abolished, subject to
civil service rules and
regulations. . . . Actual scaling
down, phasing out or
abolition of the activities shall
be effected pursuant to
Circulars or Orders issued for
the purpose by the Office of
the President. (emphasis
ours)
Said provision clearly mentions the
acts of "scaling down, phasing out and
abolition" of offices only and does not
cover the creation of offices or transfer
of functions. Nevertheless, the act of
creating and decentralizing is included
in the subsequent provision of Section
62, which provides that:
Sec. 62. Unauthorized
organizational charges. —
Unless otherwise created by
law or directed by the
President of the Philippines,
no organizational unit of
charges in key positions in
any department or agency
shall be authorized in their
respective organization
structures and be funded from
appropriations by this Act.
(emphasis ours)
The foregoing provision evidently
shows that the President is authorized
to effect organizational charges
including the creation of offices in the
department or agency concerned.
The contention of petitioner that the
two provisions are riders deserves
scant consideration. Well settled is the
rule that every law has in its favor the
presumption of
constitutionality.  Unless and until a
8
specific provision of the law is declared
invalid and unconstitutional, the same
is valid and biding for all intents and
purposes.
Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is
Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292
which states:
Sec. 20. Residual Powers. —
Unless Congress provides
otherwise, the President shall
exercise such other powers
and functions vested in the
President which are provided
for under the laws and which
are not specifically
 enumerated above or which
are not delegated by the
President in accordance with
law. (emphasis ours)
This provision speaks of such other
powers vested in the President under
the law. What law then which gives him
the power to reorganize? It is
Presidential Decree No. 1772  which
9
amended Presidential Decree No.
1416. These decrees expressly grant
the President of the Philippines the
continuing authority to reorganize the
national government, which includes
the power to group, consolidate
bureaus and agencies, to abolish
offices, to transfer functions, to create
and classify functions, services and
activities and to standardize salaries
and materials. The validity of these two
decrees are unquestionable. The 1987
Constitution clearly provides that "all
laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions
and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended,
repealed or revoked."  So far, there is
10
yet no law amending or repealing said
decrees. Significantly, the Constitution
itself recognizes future reorganizations
in the government as what is revealed
in Section 16 of Article XVIII, thus:
Sec. 16. Career civil service
employees separated from
service not for cause but as a
result of the . . .
reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution
shall be entitled to
appropriate separation
pay . . .
However, We can not consider E.O.
No. 127 signed on January 30, 1987 as
a legal basis for the reorganization of
the BIR. E.O. No. 127 should be
related to the second paragraph of
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6656.
Section 11 provides inter alia:
xxx xxx xxx
In the case of the 1987
reorganization of the
executive branch, all
departments and agencies
which are authorized by
executive orders promulgated
by the President to reorganize
shall have ninety days from
the approval of this act within
which to implement their
respective reorganization
plans in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
(emphasis ours)
Executive Order No. 127 was part of
the 1987 reorganization contemplated
under said provision. Obviously, it had
become stale by virtue of the expiration
of the ninety day deadline period. It can
not thus be used as a proper basis for
the reorganization of the BIR.
Nevertheless, as shown earlier, there
are other legal bases to sustain the
authority of the President to issue the
questioned E.O. NO. 132.
While the President's power to
reorganize can not be denied, this
does not mean however that the
reorganization itself is properly made in
accordance with law. Well-settled is the
rule that reorganization is regarded as
valid provided it is pursued in good
faith. Thus, in Dario vs. Mison, this
Court has had the occasion to clarify
that:
As a general rule, a
reorganization is carried out
in "good faith" if it is for the
purpose of economy or to
make bureaucracy more
efficient. In that event no
dismissal or separation
actually occurs because the
position itself ceases to exist.
And in that case the security
of tenure would not be a
Chinese wall. Be that as it
may, if the abolition which is
nothing else but a separation
or removal, is done for
political reasons or purposely
to defeat security of tenure, or
otherwise not in good faith, no
valid abolition takes place and
whatever abolition is done is
void ab initio. There is an
invalid abolition as where
there is merely a change of
nomenclature of positions or
where claims of economy are
belied by the existence of
ample funds. 11
In this regard, it is worth mentioning
that Section 2 of R. A. No. 6656 lists
down the circumstances evidencing
bad faith in the removal of employees
as a result of the reorganization, thus:
Sec. 2. No officer or
employee in the career
service shall be removed
except for a valid cause and
after due notice and hearing.
A valid cause for removal
exists when, pursuant to a
bona fide reorganization, a
position has been abolished
or rendered redundant or
there is a need to merge,
divide, or consolidate
positions in order to meet the
exigencies of the service, or
other lawful causes allowed
by the Civil Service Law. The
existence of any or some of
the following circumstances
may be considered as
evidence of bad faith in the
removals made as a result of
the reorganization, giving rise
to a claim for reinstatement or
reappointment by an
aggrieved party:
a) Where there is a significant
increase in the number of
positions in the new staffing
pattern of the department or
agency concerned;
b) Where an office is
abolished and another
performing substantially the
same functions is created;
c) Where incumbents are
replaced by those less
qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance
and merit;
d) Where there is a
reclassification of offices in
the department or agency
concerned and the
reclassified offices perform
substantially the same
functions as the original
offices;
e) Where the removal violates
the order of separation
provided in Section 3 hereof.
A reading of some of the provisions of
the questioned E.O. No. 132 clearly
leads us to an inescapable conclusion
that there are circumstances
considered as evidences of bad faith in
the reorganization of the BIR.
Section 1.1.2 of said executive order
provides that:
1.1.2 The Intelligence and
Investigation Office and the
Inspection Service are
abolished. An Intelligence and
Investigation Service is
hereby created to absorb
the same functions of the
abolished office and service. .
. . (emphasis ours)
This provision is a clear illustration of
the circumstance mentioned in Section
2 (b) of R.A. No. 6656 that an office is
abolished and another one performing
substantially the same function is
created.
Another circumstance is the creation of
services and divisions in the BIR
resulting to a significant increase in the
number of positions in the said bureau
as contemplated in paragraph (a) of
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656. Under
Section 1.3 of E.O. No. 132, the
Information Systems Group has two
newly created Systems Services. Aside
from this, six new divisions are also
created. Under Section 1.2.1, three
more divisions of the Assessment
Service are formed. With these newly
created offices, there is no doubt that a
significant increase of positions will
correspondingly follow.
Furthermore, it is perceivable that the
non-reappointment of the petitioner as
Assistant Commissioner violates
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656. Under said
provision, officers holding permanent
appointments are given preference for
appointment to the new positions in the
approved staffing pattern comparable
to their former positions or in case
there are not enough comparable
positions to positions next lower in
rank. It is undeniable that petitioner is a
career executive officer who is holding
a permanent position. Hence, he
should have been given preference for
appointment in the position of Assistant
Commissioner. As claimed by
petitioner, Antonio Pangilinan who was
one of those appointed as Assistant
Commissioner, "is an outsider of sorts
to the Bureau, not having been an
incumbent officer of the Bureau at the
time of the reorganization." We should
not lose sight of the second paragraph
of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6656 which
explicitly states that no new employees
shall be taken in until all permanent
officers shall have been appointed for
permanent position.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
petition is granted, and petitioner is
hereby reinstated to his position as
Assistant Commissioner without loss of
seniority rights and shall be entitled to
full backwages from the time of his
separation from service until actual
reinstatement unless, in the
meanwhile, he would have reached the
compulsory retirement age of sixty-five
years in which case, he shall be
deemed to have retired at such age
and entitled thereafter to the
corresponding retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
LARIN VS. EXECUTVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
Petitioner Aquilino Larin is the Assistant Commissioner
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and he also appears to
be a co- accused in two criminal cases for violating
Section 268(4) of the National Internal Revenue Code
and Section 3 of R.A. 3019. Subsequently petitioner was
convicted and this was reported to the President, the then
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary by the authority of the
president issued Memo order 164 creating an executive
committee to investigate the administrative charges.
The committee required that petitioner filed a position
paper with regard to the charges against him, the
petitioner complied, and however his statement was that
he cannot comment on the merits of the case for fear of
being cited in contempt by the court. Petitioner also
alleged that the committee doesn’t have any jurisdiction
over his person, that the case cannot be validly filed
without violating res judicata, his rights against double
jeopardy and lastly to proceed with the investigation
would be redundant and oppressive against him. While
all this is pending, the president issued an order for the
streamlining of BIR, in which case the office of the
petitioner was abolished by the order. His office being
abolished, the petitioner was not reinstated as an
assistant commissioner of BIR, instead another
Administrative order was issued in which it stated that he
is being dismissed for being guilty of grave misconduct
in connection to the criminal cases filed against him.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the dismissal of the petitioner was valid or
not. a. Who has the power to discipline the petitioner b.
Was due process observed c. What is the effect of the
petitioners acquittal in the criminal case d. Does the
president have the power to reorganize BIR e. Was the
reorganization done in bad faith.
HELD:
The court ruled that the office of the petitioner falls under
the category of Career Executive Service, which is
appointed by the president and being a presidential
appointee, it follows that the president have the power to
discipline the petitioner. Despite the fact that the
constitution grants the president the power to appoint
and the inherent power to remove, such power is not
without limit. Under the Administrative code of
1987, career services are characterized to have security of
tenure, therefore the petitioner is protected from being
willfully removed by the president, the only way that the
petitioner can be validly removed is for a valid cause and when the E.O. abolished the intelligence and
in accordance with the procedural due process. According investigation office and at the same time creating
to the Court it found that, although the procedural due Intelligence and Investigation service to do the same
process was followed and complied with the petitioner functions of the abolished office. Most importantly is the
was not removed for a valid cause, since to start with the non reappointment of the petitioner, the petitioner being
committee was created to investigate the administrative aholder of a career service, should have been prioritized
aspect of the criminal cases being faced by the petitioner or preferred in appointing people to new offices created
at that time. Now taking into consideration that the by the reorganization, but in this case the petitioner was
petitioner was acquitted from thecriminal cases, the court never reappointed instead he was dismissed
believes that there is no ground for the administrative from servicewithout any separation benefits at all. The
case to continue. It is admitted that criminal cases and court ruled that the petitioner is reinstated as an assistant
administrative cases usually progress independently, commissioner and is entitled to back wages.
however in this case it was proven in thecriminal
case that the petitioner never committed any of the
alleged acts, therefore the case for the administrative case
was also terminated, and therefore there is no longer any
valid cause for the removal of the petitioner.
As for the validity of E.O. 132 which reorganized the BIR,
the court ruled that the president has the authority to do
so, as seen in the preamble of the E.O. which stated the
legal basis of its issuance. Though it is admitted that the
president had the power to reorganize the BIR, the court
stated that such power is not limitless, the reorganization
to be valid must be done in good faith. In the instant case
the court found that the reorganization was done in bad
faith or at least there are indications of bad faith, such as
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 81954             August 8,
1989
CESAR Z. DARIO, petitioner,  1989
vs.
HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON.
VICENTE JAYME and HON.
CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in their
respective capacities as
Commissioner of Customs,
Secretary of Finance, and Executive
Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 81967             August 8,
1989
VICENTE A. FERIA JR., petitioner,  NAPA, PABLO B. SANTOS, FERMIN
vs.
HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON.
VICENTE JAYME, and HON.
CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in their
respective capacities as
Commissioner of Customs,
Secretary of Finance, and Executive
Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 82023             August 8,
ADOLFO CASARENO, PACIFICO
LAGLEVA, JULIAN C. ESPIRITU,
DENNIS A. AZARRAGA, RENATO
DE JESUS, NICASIO C. GAMBOA,
CORAZON RALLOS NIEVES,
FELICITACION R. GELUZ,
LEODEGARIO H. FLORESCA,
SUBAER PACASUM, ZENAIDA
LANARIA, JOSE B. ORTIZ,
GLICERIO R. DOLAR, CORNELIO
RODRIGUEZ, DALISAY BAUTISTA,
LEONARDO JOSE, ALBERTO
LONTOK, PORFIRIO TABINO, JOSE
BARREDO, ROBERTO ARNALDO,
ESTER TAN, PEDRO BAKAL,
ROSARIO DAVID, RODOLFO
AFUANG, LORENZO CATRE,
LEONCIA CATRE, ROBERTO
ABADA, petitioners,  vs.
vs.
COMMISSIONER SALVADOR M.
MISON, COMMISSIONER, BUREAU
OF CUSTOMS, respondent.
G.R. No. 83737             August 8,
1989
BENEDICTO L. AMASA and
WILLIAM S. DIONISIO, petitioners,  AGUSTIN, BONIFACIO T., ALANO,
vs.
PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her
capacity as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission and
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity
as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs, respondents.
G.R. No. 85310             August 8,
1989
SALVADOR M. MISON, in his
capacity as Commissioner of
Customs, petitioner, 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
ABACA, SISINIO T., ABAD,
ROGELIO C., ABADIANO, JOSE P.,
ABCEDE, NEMECIO C., ABIOG, ELY
F., ABLAZA, AURORA M.,
AGBAYANI, NELSON I., AGRES
ANICETO, AGUILAR, FLOR,
AGUILUCHO MA. TERESA R.,
ALEX P., ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR.,
ALBANO, ROBERT B., ALCANTARA,
JOSE G., ALMARIO, RODOLFO F.,
ALVEZ, ROMUALDO R., AMISTAD
RUDY M., AMOS, FRANCIS F.,
ANDRES, RODRIGO V., ANGELES,
RICARDO S., ANOLIN, MILAGROS
H., AQUINO, PASCASIO E., ARABE,
MELINDA M., ARCANGEL, AGUSTIN
S., JR., ARPON, ULPLIANO U., JR.,
ARREZA, ARTEMIO M., JR.,
ARROJO, ANTONIO P., ARVISU,
ALEXANDER S., ASCAÑ;O,
ANTONIO T., ASLAHON, JULAHON
P., ASUNCION, VICTOR R.,
ATANGAN, LORNA S., ATIENZA,
ALEXANDER R., BACAL, URSULINO
C., BAÑ;AGA, MARLOWE, Z.,
BANTA, ALBERTO T., BARREDO,
JOSE B., BARROS, VICTOR C.,
BARTOLOME, FELIPE A., BAYSAC,
REYNALDO S., BELENO, ANTONIO
B., BERNARDO, ROMEO D.,
BERNAS, MARCIANO S., BOHOL,
AUXILIADOR G., BRAVO, VICTOR
M., BULEG, BALILIS R., CALNEA,
MERCEDES M., CALVO, HONESTO
G., CAMACHO, CARLOS V.,
CAMPOS, RODOLFO C.,
CAPULONG, RODRIGO G.,
CARINGAL, GRACIA Z., CARLOS,
LORENZO B., CARRANTO, FIDEL U.,
CARUNGCONG, ALFREDO M.,
CASTRO, PATRICIA J., CATELO,
ROGELIO B., CATURLA, MANUEL
B., CENIZAL, JOSEFINA F., CINCO,
LUISITO, CONDE0, JOSE C., JR.,
CORCUERA, FIDEL S., CORNETA,
VICENTE S., CORONADO, RICARDO
S., CRUZ, EDUARDO S., CRUZ,
EDILBERTO A., CRUZ, EFIGENIA B.,
CRUZADO, MARCIAL C.,
CUSTODIO, RODOLFO M., DABON,
NORMA M., DALINDIN, EDNA MAE
D., DANDAL, EDEN F.,
DATUHARON, SATA A., DAZO,
GODOFREDO L., DE CASTRO,
LEOPAPA, DE GUZMAN, ANTONIO
A., DE GUZMAN, RENATO E., DE LA
CRUZ, AMADO A., JR., DE LA CRUZ,
FRANCISCO C., DE LA PEÑ;A,
LEONARDO, DEL CAMPO,
ORLANDO, DEL RIO, MAMERTO P.,
JR., DEMESA, WILHELMINA T.,
DIMAKUTA, SALIC L., DIZON,
FELICITAS A., DOCTOR, HEIDY M.,
DOLAR, GLICERIO R., DOMINGO,
NICANOR J., DOMINGO, PERFECTO
V., JR., DUAY, JUANA G.,
DYSANGCO, RENATO F., EDILLOR,
ALFREDO P., ELEVAZO,
LEONARDO A., ESCUYOS, MANUEL
M., JR., ESMERIA, ANTONIO E.,
ESPALDON, MA. LOURDES H.,
ESPINA, FRANCO A., ESTURCO,
RODOLFO C., EVANGELINO,
FERMIN I., FELIX, ERNESTO G.,
FERNANDEZ, ANDREW M.,
FERRAREN, ANTONIO C.,
FERRERA, WENCESLAO A.,
FRANCISCO, PELAGIO S., JR.,
FUENTES, RUDY L., GAGALANG,
RENATO V., GALANG, EDGARDO
R., GAMBOA, ANTONIO C., GAN,
ALBERTO R., GARCIA, GILBERT M.,
GARCIA, EDNA V., GARCIA, JUAN
L., GAVIOLA, LILIAN V., GEMPARO,
SEGUNDINA G., GOBENCIONG,
FLORDELIZ B., GRATE, FREDERICK
R., GREGORIO, LAURO P.,
GUARTICO, AMMON H., GUIANG,
MYRNA N., GUINTO, DELFIN C.,
HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A.,
HONRALES, LORETO N., HUERTO,
LEOPOLDO H., HULAR ,
LANNYROSS E., IBAÑ;EZ, ESTER
C., ILAGAN, HONORATO C.,
INFANTE, REYNALDO C., ISAIS,
RAY C., ISMAEL, HADJI AKRAM B.,
JANOLO, VIRGILIO M., JAVIER,
AMADOR L., JAVIER, ROBERTO S.,
JAVIER, WILLIAM R., JOVEN,
MEMIA A., JULIAN, REYNALDO V.,
JUMAMOY, ABUNDIO A.,
JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO F.,
KAINDOY, PASCUAL B., JR., KOH,
NANIE G., LABILLES, ERNESTO S.,
LABRADOR, WILFREDO M., LAGA,
BIENVENIDO M., LAGLEVA,
PACIFICO Z., LAGMAN,
EVANGELINE G., LAMPONG,
WILFREDO G., LANDICHO,
RESTITUTO A., LAPITAN, CAMILO
M., LAURENTE, REYNALDO A.,
LICARTE, EVARISTO R., LIPIO,
VICTOR O., LITTAUA, FRANKLIN Z.,
LOPEZ, MELENCIO L., LUMBA,
OLIVIA., MACAISA, BENITO T.,
MACAISA, ERLINDA C., MAGAT,
ELPIDIO, MAGLAYA, FERNANDO P.,
MALABANAN, ALFREDO C.,
MALIBIRAN, ROSITA D., MALIJAN,
LAZARO V., MALLI, JAVIER M.,
MANAHAN, RAMON S., MANUEL,
ELPIDIO R., MARAVILLA, GIL B.,
MARCELO, GIL C., MARIÑ;AS,
RODOLFO V., MAROKET, JESUS C.,
MARTIN, NEMENCIO A., MARTINEZ,
ROMEO M., MARTINEZ, ROSELINA
M., MATIBAG, ANGELINA G.,
MATUGAS, ERNESTO T.,
MATUGAS, FRANCISCO T.,
MAYUGA, PORTIA E., MEDINA,
NESTOR M., MEDINA, ROLANDO S.,
MENDAVIA, AVELINO I., MENDOZA,
POTENCIANO G., MIL, RAY M.,
MIRAVALLES, ANASTACIA L.,
MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR., G.,
MONTANO, ERNESTO F.,
MONTERO, JUAN M. III., MORALDE,
ESMERALDO B., JR., MORALES,
CONCHITA D.L., MORALES,
NESTOR P., MORALES, SHIRLEY S.,
MUNAR, JUANITA L., MUÑ;OZ,
VICENTE R., MURILLO, MANUEL M.,
NACION, PEDRO R., NAGAL,
HENRY N., NAPA, CORNELIO B.,
NAVARRO, HENRY L., NEJAL,
FREDRICK E., NICOLAS,
REYNALDO S., NIEVES, RUFINO A.,
OLAIVAR, SEBASTIAN T.,
OLEGARIO, LEO Q., ORTEGA,
ARLENE R., ORTEGA, JESUS R.,
OSORIO, ABNER S., PAPIO,
FLORENTINO T. II, PASCUA,
ARNULFO A., PASTOR, ROSARIO,
PELAYO, ROSARIO L., PEÑ;A, AIDA
C., PEREZ, ESPERIDION B., PEREZ,
JESUS BAYANI M., PRE, ISIDRO A.,
PRUDENCIADO, EULOGIA S.,
PUNZALAN, LAMBERTO N., PURA,
ARNOLD T., QUINONES, EDGARDO
I., QUINTOS, AMADEO C., JR.,
QUIRAY, NICOLAS C., RAMIREZ,
ROBERTO P., RAÑ;ADA, RODRIGO
C., RARAS, ANTONIO A., RAVAL,
VIOLETA V., RAZAL, BETTY R.,
REGALA, PONCE F., REYES,
LIBERATO R., REYES, MANUEL E.,
REYES, NORMA Z., REYES,
TELESFORO F., RIVERA, ROSITA L.,
ROCES, ROBERTO V., ROQUE,
TERESITA S., ROSANES, MARILOU
M., ROSETE, ADAN I., RUANTO,
REY, CRISTO C., JR., SABLADA,
PASCASIO G., SALAZAR, SILVERIA
S., SALAZAR, VICTORIA A.,
SALIMBACOD, PERLITA C.,
SALMINGO, LOURDES M.,
SANTIAGO, EMELITA B., SATINA,
PORFIRIO C., SEKITO, COSME B.,
JR., SIMON, RAMON P., SINGSON,
MELECIO C., SORIANO, ANGELO L.,
SORIANO, MAGDALENA R.,
SUMULONG, ISIDRO L., JR.,
SUNICO, ABELARDO T., TABIJE,
EMMA B., TAN, RUDY, GOROSPE,
TAN, ESTER S., TAN, JULITA S.,
TECSON, BEATRIZ B., TOLENTINO,
BENIGNO A., TURINGAN, ENRICO
T., JR., UMPA, ALI A., VALIC, LUCIO
E., VASQUEZ, NICANOR B.,
VELARDE, EDGARDO C., VERA,
AVELINO A., VERAME, OSCAR E.,
VIADO, LILIAN T., VIERNES,
NAPOLEON K., VILLALON, DENNIS
A., VILLAR, LUZ L., VILLALUZ,
EMELITO V., ZATA, ANGEL A., JR.,
ACHARON, CRISTETO, ALBA,
RENATO B., AMON, JULITA C.,
AUSTRIA, ERNESTO C., CALO,
RAYMUNDO M., CENTENO,
BENJAMIN R., DE CASTRO,
LEOPAPA C ., DONATO, ESTELITA
P., DONATO, FELIPE S., FLORES,
PEDRITO S., GALAROSA, RENATO,
MALAWI, MAUYAG, MONTENEGRO,
FRANCISCO M., OMEGA,
PETRONILO T., SANTOS,
GUILLERMO F., TEMPLO, CELSO,
VALDERAMA, JAIME B., and
VALDEZ, NORA M., respondents.
G.R. No. 85335             August 8,
1989
FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, ADAN I.
ROSETE, FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS,
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG,
LEODEGARDIO H. FLORESCA,
LEONARDO A. DELA PEÑ;A,
ABELARDO T. SUNICO, MELENCIO
L. LOPEZ, NEMENCIO A. MARTIN,
RUDY M. AMISTAD, ERNESTO T.
MATUGAS, SILVERIA S. SALAZAR,
LILLIAN V. GAVIOLA, MILAGROS
ANOLIN, JOSE B. ORTIZ, ARTEMIO
ARREZA, JR., GILVERTO M.
GARCIA, ANTONIO A. RARAS,
FLORDELINA B. GOBENCIONG,
ANICETO AGRES, EDGAR Y.
QUINONES, MANUEL B. CATURLA,
ELY F. ABIOG, RODRIGO C.
RANADA, LAURO GREGORIO,
ALBERTO I. GAN, EDGARDO
GALANG, RAY C. ISAIS, NICANOR
B. VASQUEZ, MANUEL ESCUYOS,
JR., ANTONIO B. BELENO, ELPIO R.
MANUEL, AUXILIADOR C. BOHOL,
LEONARDO ELEVAZO, VICENTE S.
CORNETA, petitioners, 
vs.
COM. SALVADOR M.
MISON/BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and
the CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, respondents.
G.R. No. 86241             August 8,
1989
SALVADOR M. MISON, in his
capacity as Commissioner of
Customs, petitioner,  apprehensive that unless the final word
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
SENEN S. DIMAGUILA, ROMEO P.
ARABE BERNARDO S. QUINTONG,
GREGORIO P. REYES, and ROMULO
C. BADILLO respondents
SARMIENTO, J.:
The Court writes finis to this
contreversy that has raged bitterly for
the several months. It does so out of
ligitimate presentement of more suits
reaching it as a consequence of the
government reorganization and the
instability it has wrought on the
performance and efficiency of the
bureaucracy. The Court is
is given and the ground rules are
settled, the issue will fester, and likely
foment on the constitutional crisis for
the nation, itself biset with grave and
serious problems.
The facts are not in dispute.
On March 25, 1986, President Corazon
Aquino promulgated Proclamation No.
3, "DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY
TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS
MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE,
PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS,
ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL
CONSTITUTION, AND PROVIDING
FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO
A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW
CONSTITUTION." Among other things,
Proclamation No. 3 provided:
 SECTION 1. ...
The President shall give priority to
measures to achieve the mandate
of the people to:
(a) Completely reorganize the
government, eradicate unjust
and oppressive structures,
and all iniquitous vestiges of
the previous regime; 1
...
Pursuant thereto, it was also provided:
SECTION 1. In the reorganization
of the government, priority shall be
given to measures to promote
economy, efficiency, and the
eradication of graft and corruption.
SECTION 2. All elective and
appointive officials and employees
under the 1973 Constitution shall
continue in office until otherwise
provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the
appointment and qualification of
their successors, if such is made
within a period of one year from
February 25, 1986.
SECTION 3. Any public officer or
employee separated from the
service as a result of the
organization effected under this
Proclamation shall, if entitled
under the laws then in force,
receive the retirement and other
benefits accruing thereunder.
SECTION 4. The records,
equipment, buildings, facilities and
other properties of all government
offices shall be carefully
preserved. In case any office or
body is abolished or reorganized
 pursuant to this Proclamation, its
FUNDS and properties shall be
transferred to the office or body to
which its powers, functions and
responsibilities substantially
pertain. 2
Actually, the reorganization process
started as early as February 25, 1986,
when the President, in her first act in
office, called upon "all appointive public
officials to submit their courtesy
resignation(s) beginning with the
members of the Supreme Court."3 Later
on, she abolished the Batasang
Pambansa4 and the positions of Prime
Minister and Cabinet 5under the 1973
Constitution.
Since then, the President has issued a
number of executive orders and
directives reorganizing various other
government offices, a number of which,
with respect to elected local officials,
has been challenged in this
Court, 6 and two of which, with respect
to appointed functionaries, have
likewise been questioned herein. 7
On May 28, 1986, the President
enacted Executive Order No. 17,
"PRESCRIBING RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2,
ARTICLE III OF THE FREEDOM
CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No.
17 recognized the "unnecessary
anxiety and demoralization among the
deserving officials and employees" the
ongoing government reorganization
had generated, and prescribed as
"grounds for the
separation/replacement of personnel,"
the following:
SECTION 3. The following shall
be the grounds for separation
replacement of personnel:
1) Existence of a case for
summary dismissal pursuant
to Section 40 of the Civil
Service Law;
2) Existence of a probable
cause for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act as determined by the
Mnistry Head concerned;
3) Gross incompetence or
inefficiency in the discharge
of functions;
4) Misuse of public office for
partisan political purposes;
5) Any other analogous
ground showing that the
incumbent is unfit to remain in
the service or his
separation/replacement is in
the interest of the service.8
On January 30, 1987, the President
promulgated Executive Order No. 127,
"REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF
FINANCE." 9 Among other offices,
Executive Order No. 127 provided for
the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs 10and prescribed a new
staffing pattern therefor.
Three days later, on February 2,
1987, 11 the Filipino people adopted the
new Constitution.
On January 6, 1988, incumbent
Commissioner of Customs Salvador
Mison issued a Memorandum, in the
nature of "Guidelines on the
Implementation of Reorganization
Executive Orders," 12 prescribing the
procedure in personnel placement. It
also provided:
1. By February 28, 1988, the
employees covered by
Executive Order 127 and the
grace period extended to the
Bureau of Customs by the
President of the Philippines
on reorganization shall be:
a) informed of their re-
appointment, or
b) offered another
position in the same
department or agency or
c) informed of their
termination. 13
On the same date, Commissioner
Mison constituted a Reorganization
Appeals Board charged with
adjudicating appeals from removals
under the above Memorandum. 14 On
January 26, 1988, Commissioner
Mison addressed several notices to
various Customs officials, in the tenor
as follows:
Sir:
Please be informed that the
Bureau is now in the process of
implementing the Reorganization
Program under Executive Order
No. 127.
Pursuant to Section 59 of the
same Executive Order, all officers
and employees of the Department
of Finance, or the Bureau of
Customs in particular, shall
continue to perform their
respective duties and
responsibilities in a hold-over
capacity, and that those
incumbents whose positions are
not carried in the new
reorganization pattern, or who are
not re- appointed, shall be
deemed separated from the
service.
In this connection, we regret to
inform you that your services are
hereby terminated as of February
28, 1988. Subject to the normal
clearances, you may receive the
retirement benefits to which you
may be entitled under existing
laws, rules and regulations.
In the meantime, your name will
be included in the consolidated list
compiled by the Civil Service
Commission so that you may be
given priority for future
employment with the Government
as the need arises.
Sincerely yours,
(Sgd) SALVADOR M. MISON
Commissioner
As far as the records will yield, the
following were recipients of these
notices:
1. CESAR DARIO
2. VICENTE FERIA, JR.
3. ADOLFO CASARENO
4. PACIFICO LAGLEVA
5. JULIAN C. ESPIRITU
6. DENNIS A. AZARRAGA
7. RENATO DE JESUS
8. NICASIO C. GAMBOA
9. CORAZON RALLOS NIEVES
10. FELICITACION R. GELUZ 27. ROSARIO DAVID

11. LEODEGARIO H. FLORESCA 28. RODOLFO AFUANG

12. SUBAER PACASUM 29. LORENZO CATRE

13. ZENAIDA LANARIA 30. LEONCIA CATRE

14. JOSE B. ORTIZ 31. ROBERTO ABADA

15. GLICERIO R. DOLAR 32. ABACA, SISINIO T.

16. CORNELIO NAPA 33. ABAD, ROGELIO C.

17. PABLO B. SANTOS 34. ABADIANO, JOSE P

18. FERMIN RODRIGUEZ 35. ABCEDE, NEMECIO C.

19. DALISAY BAUTISTA 36. ABIOG, ELY F.

20. LEONARDO JOSE 37. ABLAZA, AURORA M.

21. ALBERTO LONTOK 38. AGBAYANI, NELSON I.

22. PORFIRIO TABINO 39. AGRES, ANICETO

23. JOSE BARREDO 40. AGUILAR, FLOR

24. ROBERTO ARNALDO 41. AGUILUCHO, MA. TERESA R.

25. ESTER TAN 42. AGUSTIN, BONIFACIO T.

26. PEDRO BAKAL 43. ALANO, ALEX P.

44. ALBA, MAXIMO F. JR. 61. ASCAÑ;O, ANTONIO T.

45. ALBANO, ROBERT B. 62. ASLAHON, JULAHON P.

46. ALCANTARA, JOSE G. 63. ASUNCION, VICTOR R.

47. ALMARIO, RODOLFO F. 64. ATANGAN, LORNA S.

48. ALVEZ, ROMUALDO R. 65. ANTIENZA, ALEXANDER R.

49. AMISTAD, RUDY M. 66. BACAL URSULINO C.

50. AMOS, FRANCIS F. 67. BAÑ;AGA, MARLOWE Z.

51. ANDRES, RODRIGO V. 68. BANTA, ALBERTO T.

52. ANGELES, RICARDO S. 69. BARROS, VICTOR C.

53. ANOLIN, MILAGROS H. 70. BARTOLOME, FELIPE A.

54. AQUINO, PASCASIO E. L. 71. BAYSAC, REYNALDO S.

55. ARABE, MELINDA M. 72. BELENO, ANTONIO B.

56. ARCANGEL, AGUSTIN S, JR. 73. BERNARDO, ROMEO D.

57. ARPON, ULPIANO U., JR. 74. BERNAS, MARCIANO S.

58. ARREZA, ARTEMIO M, JR. 75. BOHOL, AUXILIADOR G.

59. ARROJO, ANTONIO P. 76. BRAVO, VICTOR M.

60. ARVISU, ALEXANDER S. 77. BULEG, BALILIS R.

78. CALNEA, MERCEDES M. 95. CORONADO, RICARDO S.

79. CALVO, HONESTO G. 96. CRUZ, EDUARDO S.

80. CAMACHO, CARLOS V. 97. CRUZ, EDILBERTO A,

81. CAMPOS, RODOLFO C. 98. CRUZ, EFIGENIA B.

82. CAPULONG, RODRIGO G. 99. CRUZADO,NORMA M.

83. CARINGAL, GRACIA Z. 100. CUSTODIO, RODOLFO M.

84. CARLOS, LORENZO B. 101. DABON, NORMA M.

85. CARRANTO, FIDEL U. 102. DALINDIN, EDNA MAE D.

86. CARUNGCONG, ALFREDO M. 103. DANDAL, EDEN F.

87. CASTRO, PATRICIA J. 104. DATUHARON, SATA A.

88. CATELO, ROGELIO B. 105. DAZO, GODOFREDO L.

89. CATURLA, MANUEL B. 106. DE CASTRO, LEOPAPA

90. CENIZAL, JOSEFINA F. 107. DE GUZMAN, ANTONIO A.

91. CINCO, LUISITO 108. DE GUZMAN, RENATO E.

92. CONDE, JOSE C., JR. 109. DE LA CRUZ, AMADO A., JR.

93. CORCUERA, FIDEL S. 110. DE LA CRUZ, FRANCISCO C.

94. CORNETA, VICENTE S. 111. DE LA PEÑ;A, LEONARDO

112. DEL CAMPO, ORLANDO 129. EVANGELINO, FERMIN I.

113. DEL RIO, MAMERTO P., JR. 130. FELIX, ERNESTO G.

114. DEMESA, WILHELMINA T. 131. FERNANDEZ, ANDREW M.

115. DIMAKUTA, SALIC L. 132. FERRAREN, ANTONIO C.

116. DIZON, FELICITAS A. 133. FERRERA, WENCESLAO A.

117. DOCTOR, HEIDY M. 134. FRANCISCO, PELAGIO S, JR.

118. DOMINGO, NICANOR J. 135. FUENTES, RUDY L.

119. DOMINGO, PERFECTO V., JR. 136. GAGALANG, RENATO V.

120. DUAY, JUANA G. 137. GALANG, EDGARDO R.

121. DYSANGCO, RENATO F. 138. GAMBOA, ANTONIO C.

122. EDILLOR, ALFREDO P. 139. GAN, ALBERTO P

123. ELEVAZO, LEONARDO A 140. GARCIA, GILBERT M.

124. ESCUYOS, MANUEL M., JR. 141. GARCIA, EDNA V.

125. ESMERIA, ANTONIO E. 142. GARCIA, JUAN L.

126. ESPALDON, MA. LOURDES H. 143. GAVIOIA, LILIAN V.

127. ESPINA, FRANCO A. 144. GEMPARO, SEGUNDINA G.

128. ESTURCO, RODOLFO C. 145. GOBENCIONG, FLORDELIZ B.

146. GRATE, FREDERICK R. 163. JAVIER, WILLIAM R.

147. GREGORIO, LAURO P. 164. JOVEN, MEMIA A.

148. GUARTICO, AMMON H. 165. JULIAN, REYNALDO V.

149. GUIANG, MYRNA N. 166. JUMAMOY, ABUNDIO A.

150. GUINTO, DELFIN C. 167. JUMAQUIAO, DOMINGO F.

151. HERNANDEZ, LUCAS A. 168. KAINDOY, PASCUAL B., JR.

152. HONRALES, LORETO N. 169. KOH, NANIE G.

153. HUERTO, LEOPOLDO H. 170. LABILLES, ERNESTO S.

154. HULAR, LANNYROSS E. 171. LABRADOR, WILFREDO M.

155. IBAÑ;EZ, ESTER C. 172. LAGA, BIENVENIDO M.

156. ILAGAN, HONORATO C. 173. LAGMAN, EVANGELINE G.

157. INFANTE, REYNALDO C. 174. LAMPONG, WILFREDO G.

158. ISAIS, RAY C. 175. LANDICHO, RESTITUTO A.

159. ISMAEL, HADJI AKRAM B. 176. LAPITAN, CAMILO M.

160. JANOLO, VIRGILIO M. 177. LAURENTE, REYNALDO A.

161. JAVIER, AMADOR L. 178. LICARTE, EVARISTO R.

162. JAVIER, ROBERTO S. 179. LIPIO, VICTOR O.

180. LITTAUA, FRANKLIN Z. 197. MARTIN, NEMENCIO A.

181. LOPEZ, MELENCIO L. 198. MARTINEZ, ROMEO M.

182. LUMBA, OLIVIA R. 199. MARTINEZ, ROSELINA M.

183. MACAISA, BENITO T. 200. MATIBAG, ANGELINA G.

184. MACAISA, ERLINDA C. 201. MATUGAS, ERNESTO T.

185. MAGAT, ELPIDIO 202. MATUGAS, FRANCISCO T.

186. MAGLAYA, FERNANDO P. 203. MAYUGA, PORTIA E.

187. MALABANAN, ALFREDO C. 204. MEDINA, NESTOR M.

188. MALIBIRAN, ROSITA D. 205. MEDINA, ROLANDO S.

189. MALIJAN, LAZARO V. 206. MENDAVIA, AVELINO

190. MALLI, JAVIER M. 207. MENDOZA, POTENCIANO G.

191. MANAHAN, RAMON S. 208. MIL, RAY M.

192. MANUEL, ELPIDIO R. 209. MIRAVALLES, ANASTACIA L.

193. MARAVILLA, GIL B. 210. MONFORTE, EUGENIO, JR. G.

194. MARCELO, GIL C. 211. MONTANO, ERNESTO F.

195. MARIÑ;AS, RODOLFO V. 212. MONTERO, JUAN M. III

196. MAROKET ,JESUS C. 213. MORALDE, ESMERALDO B., JR.

214. MORALES, CONCHITA D. L 231. PAPIO FLORENTINO T. II

215. MORALES, NESTOR P. 232. PASCUA, ARNULFO A.

216. MORALES, SHIRLEY S. 233. PASTOR, ROSARIO

217. MUNAR, JUANITA L. 234. PELAYO, ROSARIO L.

218. MUÑ;OZ, VICENTE R. 235. PEÑ;A, AIDA C.

219. MURILLO, MANUEL M. 236. PEREZ, ESPERIDION B.

220. NACION, PEDRO R. 237. PEREZ, JESUS BAYANI M.

221. NAGAL, HENRY N. 238. PRE, ISIDRO A.

222. NAVARRO, HENRY L. 239. PRUDENCIADO, EULOGIA S.

223. NEJAL FREDRICK E. 240. PUNZALAN, LAMBERTO N.

224. NICOLAS, REYNALDO S. 241. PURA, ARNOLD T.

225. NIEVES, RUFINO A. 242. QUINONES, EDGARDO I.

226. OLAIVAR, SEBASTIAN T. 243. QUINTOS, AMADEO C., JR.

227. OLEGARIO, LEO Q. 244. QUIRAY, NICOLAS C.

228. ORTEGA, ARLENE R. 245. RAMIREZ, ROBERTO P.

229. ORTEGA, JESUS R. 246. RANADA, RODRIGO C.

230. OSORIO, ABNER S. 247. RARAS, ANTONIO A.

248. RAVAL, VIOLETA V. 265. SALMINGO, LOURDES M.

249. RAZAL, BETTY R. 266. SANTIAGO, EMELITA B.

250. REGALA, PONCE F. 267. SATINA, PORFIRIO C.

251. REYES, LIBERATO R. 268. SEKITO, COSME B JR.

252. REYES, MANUEL E. 269. SIMON, RAMON P.

253. REYES, NORMA Z. 270. SINGSON, MELENCIO C.

254. REYES, TELESPORO F. 271. SORIANO, ANGELO L.

255. RIVERA, ROSITA L. 272. SORIANO, MAGDALENA R.

256. ROCES, ROBERTO V. 273. SUNICO, ABELARDO T .

257. ROQUE, TERESITA S. 274. TABIJE, EMMA B.

258. ROSANES, MARILOU M. 275. TAN, RUDY GOROSPE

259. ROSETE, ADAN I. 276. TAN, ESTER S.

260. RUANTO, REY CRISTO C., JR. 277. TAN, JULITA S.

261. SABLADA, PASCASIO G. 278. TECSON, BEATRIZ B.

262. SALAZAR, SILVERIA S. 279. TOLENTINO, BENIGNO A.

263. SALAZAR, VICTORIA A. 280. TURINGAN, ENRICO T JR.

264. SALIMBACOD, PERLITA C. 281. UMPA, ALI A.

282. VALIC, LUCIO E. 299. CENTENO, BENJAMIN R.

283. VASQUEZ, NICANOR B. 300. DONATO, ESTELITA P.

284. VELARDE, EDGARDO C. 301. DONATO, FELIPE S

285. VERA, AVELINO A. 302. FLORES, PEDRITO S.

286. VERAME, OSCAR E. 303. GALAROSA, RENATO

287. VIADO, LILIAN T. 304. MALAWI, MAUYAG

288. VIERNES, NAPOLEON K 305. MONTENEGRO, FRANSISCO M.

289. VILLALON, DENNIS A. 306. OMEGA, PETRONILO T.

290. VILLAR, LUZ L. 307. SANTOS, GUILLERMO P.

291. VILLALUZ, EMELITO V. 308. TEMPLO, CELSO

292. VILLAR, LUZ L. 309. VALDERAMA, JAIME B.

293. ZATA, ANGELA JR. 310. VALDEZ, NORA M.

294. ACHARON, CRISTETO

295. ALBA, RENATO B.

Cesar Dario is the petitioner in G.R.
296. AMON, JULITA C. No. 81954; Vicente Feria, Jr., is the
297. AUSTRIA, ERNESTO C. petitioner in G.R. No. 81967; Messrs.
Adolfo Caserano Pacifico Lagleva
298. CALO, RAYMUNDO M.
Julian C. Espiritu, Dennis A. Azarraga
Renato de Jesus, Nicasio C. Gamboa,
Mesdames Corazon Rallos Nieves and
Felicitacion R. Geluz Messrs.
Leodegario H. Floresca, Subaer
Pacasum Ms. Zenaida Lanaria Mr.
Jose B. Ortiz, Ms. Gliceria R. Dolar,
Ms. Cornelia Napa, Pablo B. Santos,
Fermin Rodriguez, Ms. Daligay
Bautista, Messrs. Leonardo Jose,
Alberto Lontok, Porfirio Tabino Jose
Barredo, Roberto Arnaldo, Ms. Ester
Tan, Messrs. Pedro Bakal, Rosario
David, Rodolfo Afuang, Lorenzo Catre,,
Ms. Leoncia Catre, and Roberto
Abaca, are the petitioners in G.R. No.
82023; the last 279 16 individuals
mentioned are the private respondents
in G.R. No. 85310.
As far as the records will likewise
reveal, 17 a total of 394 officials and
employees of the Bureau of Customs
were given individual notices of
separation. A number supposedly
sought reinstatement with the
Reorganization Appeals Board while
others went to the Civil Service
Commission. The first thirty-one
mentioned above came directly to this
Court.
On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service
Commission promulgated its ruling
ordering the reinstatement of the 279
employees, the 279 private
respondents in G.R. No. 85310, the
dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ordered that:
1. Appellants be immediately
reappointed to positions of
comparable or equivalent
rank in the Bureau of
 Customs without loss of
seniority rights;
2. Appellants be paid their
back salaries reckoned from
the dates of their illegal
termination based on the
rates under the approved new
staffing pattern but not lower
than their former salaries.
This action of the Commission
should not, however, be
interpreted as an exoneration of
the appellants from any
accusation of wrongdoing and,
therefore, their reappointments are
without prejudice to:
1. Proceeding with
investigation of appellants
with pending administrative
cases, and where
investigations have been
finished, to promptly, render
the appropriate decisions;
2. The filing of appropriate
administrative complaints
against appellants with
derogatory reports or
information if evidence so
warrants.
SO ORDERED. 18
On July 15, 1988, Commissioner
Mison, represented by the Solicitor
General, filed a motion for
reconsideration Acting on the motion,
the Civil Service Commission, on
September 20, 1988, denied
reconsideration. 19
On October 20, 1988, Commissioner
Mison instituted certiorari proceedings
with this Court, docketed, as above-
stated, as G.R. No. 85310 of this
Court.
On November 16,1988, the Civil
Service Commission further disposed
the appeal (from the resolution of the
Reorganization Appeals Board) of five
more employees, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ordered that:
1. Appellants be immediately
reappointed to positions of
comparable or equivalent
rank in the Bureau of
Customs without loss of
seniority rights; and
2. Appellants be paid their
back salaries to be reckoned
from the date of their illegal
termination based on the
rates under the approved new
staffing pattern but not lower
than their former salaries.
This action of the Commission
should not, however, be
interpreted as an exoneration of
the herein appellants from any
accusation of any wrongdoing and
therefore, their reappointments are
without prejudice to:
1. Proceeding with
investigation of appellants
with pending administrative
cases, if any, and where
investigations have been
finished, to promptly, render
the appropriate decisions;
and
2. The filing of appropriate
administrative complaints
against appellant with
derogatory reports or
 information, if any, and if
evidence so warrants.
SO ORDERED. 20
On January 6, 1989, Commissioner
Mison challenged the Civil Service
Commission's Resolution in this Court;
his petitioner has been docketed herein
as G.R. No. 86241. The employees
ordered to be reinstated are Senen
Dimaguila, Romeo Arabe, Bemardo
Quintong,Gregorio Reyes, and Romulo
Badillo. 21
On June 10, 1988, Republic Act No.
6656, "AN ACT TO PROTECT THE
SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL
SERVICE OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF
GOVERNMENT
REORGANIZATION," 22 was signed
into law. Under Section 7, thereof:
Sec. 9. All officers and employees
who are found by the Civil Service
Commission to have been
separated in violation of the
provisions of this Act, shall be
ordered reinstated or reappointed
as the case may be without loss of
seniority and shall be entitled to
full pay for the period of
separation. Unless also separated
for cause, all officers and
employees, including casuals and
temporary employees, who have
been separated pursuant to
reorganization shall, if entitled
thereto, be paid the appropriate
separation pay and retirement and
other benefits under existing laws
within ninety (90) days from the
date of the effectivity of their
separation or from the date of the
receipt of the resolution of their
appeals as the case may be:
 Provided, That application for
clearance has been filed and no
action thereon has been made by
the corresponding department or
agency. Those who are not
entitled to said benefits shall be
paid a separation gratuity in the
amount equivalent to one (1)
month salary for every year of
service. Such separation pay and
retirement benefits shall have
priority of payment out of the
savings of the department or
agency concerned. 23
On June 23, 1988, Benedicto Amasa
and William Dionisio, customs
examiners appointed by Commissioner
Mison pursuant to the ostensible
reorganization subject of this
controversy, petitioned the Court to
contest the validity of the statute. The
petition is docketed as G.R. No. 83737.
On October 21, 1988, thirty-five more
Customs officials whom the Civil
Service Commission had ordered
reinstated by its June 30,1988
Resolution filed their own petition to
compel the Commissioner of Customs
to comply with the said Resolution. The
petition is docketed as G.R. No. 85335.
On November 29, 1988, we resolved to
consolidate all seven petitions.
On the same date, we resolved to set
the matter for hearing on January 12,
1989. At the said hearing, the parties,
represented by their counsels (a)
retired Justice Ruperto Martin; (b)
retired Justice Lino Patajo. (c) former
Dean Froilan Bacungan (d) Atty. Lester
Escobar (e) Atty. Faustino Tugade and
(f) Atty. Alexander Padilla, presented
their arguments. Solicitor General
Francisco Chavez argued on behalf of
the Commissioner of Customs (except
in G.R. 85335, in which he represented
the Bureau of Customs and the Civil
Service Commission). Former Senator
lâwphî1.ñèt   certain conditions. 24
Ambrosio Padilla also appeared and
argued as amicus curiae Thereafter,
we resolved to require the parties to
submit their respective memoranda
which they did in due time.
There is no question that the
administration may validly carry out a
government reorganization — insofar
as these cases are concerned, the
reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs — by mandate not only of the
Provisional Constitution, supra, but
also of the various Executive Orders
decreed by the Chief Executive in her
capacity as sole lawmaking authority
under the 1986-1987 revolutionary
government. It should also be noted
that under the present Constitution,
there is a recognition, albeit implied,
that a government reorganization may
be legitimately undertaken, subject to
The Court understands that the parties
are agreed on the validity of a
reorganization per se the only question
being, as shall be later seen: What is
the nature and extent of this
government reorganization?
The Court disregards the questions
raised as to procedure, failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, the
standing of certain parties to
sue, 25 and other technical objections,
for two reasons, "[b]ecause of the
demands of public interest, including
the need for stability in the public
service,"26 and because of the serious
implications of these cases on the
administration of the Philippine civil
service and the rights of public
servants.
The urgings in G.R. Nos. 85335 and
85310, that the Civil Service
Commission's Resolution dated June
30, 1988 had attained a character of
finality for failure of Commissioner
Mison to apply for judicial review or ask
for reconsideration seasonalbly under
Presidential Decree No. 807, 27 or
under Republic Act No. 6656, 28 or
under the Constitution, 29 are likewise
rejected. The records show that the
Bureau of Customs had until July 15,
1988 to ask for reconsideration or
come to this Court pursuant to Section
39 of Presidential Decree No. 807. The
records likewise show that the Solicitor
General filed a motion for
reconsideration on July 15, 1988.30 The
Civil Service Commission issued its
Resolution denying reconsideration on
September 20, 1988; a copy of this
Resolution was received by the Bureau
on September 23, 1988.31Hence the
Bureau had until October 23, 1988 to
elevate the matter on certiorari to this
Court.32 Since the Bureau's petition was
filed on October 20, 1988, it was filed
on time.
We reject, finally, contentions that the
Bureau's petition (in G.R. 85310) raises
no jurisdictional questions, and is
therefore bereft of any basis as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. 33 We find that the
questions raised in Commissioner
Mison's petition (in G.R. 85310) are,
indeed, proper for certiorari, if by
"jurisdictional questions" we mean
questions having to do with "an
indifferent disregard of the law,
arbitrariness and caprice, or omission
to weigh pertinent considerations, a
decision arrived at without rational
deliberation, 34 as distinguished from
questions that require "digging into the
merits and unearthing errors of
judgment 35 which is the office, on the
other hand, of review under Rule 45 of
the said Rules. What cannot be denied
is the fact that the act of the Civil
Service Commission of reinstating
hundreds of Customs employees
Commissioner Mison had separated,
has implications not only on the entire
reorganization process decreed no less
than by the Provisional Constitution,
but on the Philippine bureaucracy in
general; these implications are of such
a magnitude that it cannot be said that
— assuming that the Civil Service
Commission erred — the Commission
committed a plain "error of judgment"
that Aratuc says cannot be corrected
by the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari or any special civil action.
We reaffirm the teaching of Aratuc —
as regards recourse to this Court with
respect to rulings of the Civil Service
Commission — which is that judgments
of the Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court
throughcertiorari alone, under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
In Aratuc we declared:
It is once evident from these
constitutional and statutory
modifications that there is a
definite tendency to enhance and
invigorate the role of the
Commission on Elections as the
independent constitutional body
charged with the safeguarding of
free, peaceful and honest
elections. The framers of the new
Constitution must be presumed to
have definite knowledge of what it
 means to make the decisions,
orders and rulings of the
Commission "subject to review by
the Supreme Court'. And since
instead of maintaining that
provision intact, it ordained that
the Commission's actuations be
instead 'brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari", We cannot
insist that there was no intent to
change the nature of the remedy,
considering that the limited scope
of certiorari, compared to a review,
is well known in remedial law.36
We observe no fundamental difference
between the Commission on Elections
and the Civil Service Commission (or
the Commission on Audit for that
matter) in terms of the constitutional
intent to leave the constitutional bodies
alone in the enforcement of laws
relative to elections, with respect to the
former, and the civil service, with
respect to the latter (or the audit of
government accounts, with respect to
the Commission on Audit). As the poll
body is the "sole judge" 37 of all election
cases, so is the Civil Service
Commission the single arbiter of all
controversies pertaining to the civil
service.
It should also be noted that under the
new Constitution, as under the 1973
Charter, "any decision, order, or ruling
of each Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court
on certiorari," 38 which, as Aratuc tells
us, "technically connotes something
less than saying that the same 'shall be
subject to review by the Supreme
Court,' " 39 which in turn suggests an
appeal by petition for review under
Rule 45. Therefore, our jurisdiction
over cases emanating from the Civil
Service Commission is limited to
complaints of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, complaints that
justify certiorari under Rule 65.
While Republic Act No. 6656 states
that judgments of the Commission are
"final and executory"40 and hence,
unappealable, under Rule
65, certiorari precisely lies in the
absence of an appeal. 41
Accordingly, we accept Commissioner
Mison petition (G.R. No. 85310) which
clearly charges the Civil Service
Commission with grave abuse of
discretion, a proper subject
of certiorari, although it may not have
so stated in explicit terms.
As to charges that the said petition has
been filed out of time, we reiterate that
it has been filed seasonably. It is to be
stressed that the Solicitor General had
thirty days from September 23, 1988
(the date the Resolution, dated
September 20,1988, of the Civil
Service Commission, denying
reconsideration, was received) to
commence the
instant certiorariproceedings. As we
stated, under the Constitution, an
aggrieved party has thirty days within
which to challenge "any decision,
order, or ruling" 42 of the Commission.
To say that the period should be
counted from the Solicitor's receipt of
the main Resolution, dated June 30,
1988, is to say that he should not have
asked for reconsideration But to say
that is to deny him the right to contest
(by a motion for reconsideration) any
ruling, other than the main decision,
when, precisely, the Constitution gives
him such a right. That is also to place
him at a "no-win" situation because if
he did not move for a reconsideration,
he would have been faulted for
demanding certiorari too early, under
the general rule that a motion for
reconsideration should preface a resort
to a special civil action. 43 Hence, we
must reckon the thirty-day period from
receipt of the order of denial.
We come to the merits of these cases.
G.R. Nos. 81954, 81967, 82023, and
85335:
The Case for the Employees
The petitioner in G.R. No. 81954,
Cesar Dario was one of the Deputy
Commissioners of the Bureau of
Customs until his relief on orders of
Commissioner Mison on January 26,
1988. In essence, he questions the
legality of his dismiss, which he alleges
was upon the authority of Section 59 of
Executive Order No. 127, supra,
hereinbelow reproduced as follows:
SEC. 59. New Structure and
Pattern. Upon approval of this
Executive Order, the officers and
employees of the Ministry shall, in
a holdover capacity, continue to
perform their respective duties and
responsibilities and receive the
corresponding salaries and
benefits unless in the meantime
they are separated from
government service pursuant to
Executive Order No. 17 (1986) or
Article III of the Freedom
Constitution.
The new position structure and
staffing pattern of the Ministry
shall be approved and prescribed
by the Minister within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the
approval of this Executive Order
and the authorized positions
created hereunder shall be filled
with regular appointments by him
or by the President, as the case
may be. Those incumbents whose
positions are not included therein
or who are not reappointed shall
be deemed separated from the
service. Those separated from the
service shall receive the
retirement benefits to which they
may be entitled under existing
laws, rules and regulations.
Otherwise, they shall be paid the
equivalent of one month basic
salary for every year of service, or
the equivalent nearest fraction
thereof favorable to them on the
basis of highest salary received
but in no case shall such payment
exceed the equivalent of 12
months salary.
No court or administrative body
shall issue any writ of preliminary
injunction or restraining order to
enjoin the separation/replacement
of any officer or employee effected
under this Executive Order.44
a provision he claims the
Commissioner could not have legally
invoked. He avers that he could not
have been legally deemed to be an
"[incumbent] whose [position] [is] not
included therein or who [is] not
reappointed"45 to justify his separation
from the service. He contends that
neither the Executive Order (under the
second paragraph of the section) nor
the staffing pattern proposed by the
Secretary of Finance 46 abolished the
office of Deputy Commissioner of
Customs, but, rather, increased it to
three. 47 Nor can it be said, so he
further maintains, that he had not been
"reappointed" 48 (under the second
paragraph of the section) because
"[[r]eappointment therein presupposes
that the position to which it refers is a
new one in lieu of that which has been
abolished or although an existing one,
has absorbed that which has been
abolished." 49 He claims, finally, that
under the Provisional Constitution, the
power to dismiss public officials without
cause ended on February 25,
1987,50 and that thereafter, public
officials enjoyed security of tenure
under the provisions of the 1987
Constitution.51
Like Dario Vicente Feria, the petitioner
in G.R. No. 81967, was a Deputy
Commissioner at the Bureau until his
separation directed by Commissioner
Mison. And like Dario he claims that
under the 1987 Constitution, he has
acquired security of tenure and that he
cannot be said to be covered by
Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127,
having been appointed on April 22,
1986 — during the effectivity of the
Provisional Constitution. He adds that
under Executive Order No. 39,
"ENLARGING THE POWERS AND
FUNCTIONS OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS,"52 the Commissioner of
Customs has the power "[t]o appoint all
Bureau personnel, except those
appointed by the President," 53 and that
his position, which is that of a
Presidential appointee, is beyond the
control of Commissioner Mison for
purposes of reorganization.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 82023,
collectors and examiners in venous
ports of the Philippines, say, on the
other hand, that the purpose of
reorganization is to end corruption at
the Bureau of Customs and that since
there is no finding that they are guilty of
corruption, they cannot be validly
dismissed from the service.
The Case for Commissioner Mison
In his comments, the Commissioner
relies on this Court's resolution in Jose
v. Arroyo54 in which the following
statement appears in the last
paragraph thereof:
The contention of petitioner that
Executive Order No. 127 is
violative of the provision of the
1987 Constitution guaranteeing
career civil service employees
security of tenure overlooks the
provisions of Section 16, Article
XVIII (Transitory Provisions) which
explicitly authorize the removal of
career civil service employees "not
for cause but as a result of the
reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 dated March
25, 1986 and the reorganization
following the ratification of this
Constitution." By virtue of said
provision, the reorganization of the
Bureau of Customs under
Executive Order No. 127 may
continue even after the ratification
of the Constitution, and career civil
service employees may be
separated from the service without
cause as a result of such
reorganization.55
For this reason, Mison posits, claims of
violation of security of tenure are
allegedly no defense. He further states
that the deadline prescribed by the
Provisional Constitution (February 25,
1987) has been superseded by the
1987 Constitution, specifically, the
transitory provisions thereof, 56 which
allows a reorganization thereafter (after
February 25, 1987) as this very Court
has so declared in Jose v. Arroyo.
Mison submits that contrary to the
employees' argument, Section 59 of
Executive Order No. 127 is applicable
(in particular, to Dario and Feria in the
sense that retention in the Bureau,
under the Executive Order, depends on
either retention of the position in the
new staffing pattern or reappointment
of the incumbent, and since the
dismissed employees had not been
reappointed, they had been considered
legally separated. Moreover, Mison
proffers that under Section 59
incumbents are considered on
holdover status, "which means that all
those positions were considered
vacant." 57 The Solicitor General denies
the applicability of Palma-Fernandez v.
De la Paz 58 because that case
supposedly involved a mere transfer
and not a separation. He rejects,
finally, the force and effect of Executive
Order Nos. 17 and 39 for the reason
that Executive Order No. 17, which
was meant to implement the
Provisional Constitution, 59 had ceased
to have force and effect upon the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
and that, under Executive Order No.
39, the dismissals contemplated were
"for cause" while the separations now
under question were "not for cause"
and were a result of government
reorganize organization decreed by
Executive Order No. 127. Anent
Republic Act No. 6656, he expresses
doubts on the constitutionality of the
grant of retroactivity therein (as regards
the reinforcement of security of tenure)
since the new Constitution clearly
allows reorganization after its
effectivity.
G.R. Nos. 85310 and 86241
The Position of Commissioner Mison
Commissioner's twin petitions are
direct challenges to three rulings of the
Civil Service Commission: (1) the
Resolution, dated June 30, 1988,
reinstating the 265 customs employees
above-stated; (2) the Resolution, dated
September 20, 1988, denying
reconsideration; and (3) the
Resolution, dated November 16, 1988,
reinstating five employees. The
Commissioner's arguments are as
follows:
1. The ongoing government
reorganization is in the nature of a
"progressive" 60 reorganization
"impelled by the need to overhaul the
entire government
bureaucracy" 61 following the people
power revolution of 1986;
2. There was faithful compliance by the
Bureau of the various guidelines issued
by the President, in particular, as to
deliberation, and selection of personnel
for appointment under the new staffing
pattern;
3. The separated employees have
been, under Section 59 of Executive
Order No. 127, on mere holdover
standing, "which means that all
positions are declared vacant;" 62
4. Jose v. Arroyo has declared the
validity of Executive Order No. 127
under the transitory provisions of the
1987 Constitution;
5. Republic Act No. 6656 is of doubtful
constitutionality.
The Ruling of the Civil Service
Commission
The position of the Civil Service
Commission is as follows:
1. Reorganizations occur where there
has been a reduction in personnel or
redundancy of functions; there is no
showing that the reorganization in
question has been carried out for either
purpose — on the contrary, the
dismissals now disputed were carried
out by mere service of notices;
2. The current Customs reorganization
has not been made according to
Malacañ;ang guidelines; information on
file with the Commission shows that
Commissioner Mison has been
appointing unqualified personnel;
3. Jose v. Arroyo, in validating
Executive Order No. 127, did not
countenance illegal removals;
4. Republic Act No. 6656 protects
security of tenure in the course of
reorganizations.
The Court's ruling
Reorganization, Fundamental
Principles of. —
I.
The core provision of law involved is
Section 16 Article XVIII, of the 1987
Constitution. We quote:
Sec. 16. Career civil service
employees separated from the
service not for cause but as a
result of the reorganization
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3
dated March 25, 1986 and the
 reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution
shag be entitled to appropriate
separation pay and to retirement
and other benefits accruing to
them under the laws of general
application in force at the time of
their separation. In lieul thereof, at
the option of the employees, they
may be considered for
employment in the Government or
in any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries. This provision also
applies to career officers whose
resignation, tendered in line with
the existing policy, had been
accepted. 63
The Court considers the above
provision critical for two reasons: (1) It
is the only provision — in so far as it
mentions removals not for cause —
that would arguably support the
challenged dismissals by mere notice,
and (2) It is the single existing law on
reorganization after the ratification of
the 1987 Charter, except Republic Act
No. 6656, which came much later, on
June 10, 1988. [Nota been Executive
Orders No. 116 (covering the Ministry
of Agriculture & Food), 117 (Ministry of
Education, Culture & Sports), 119
(Health), 120 (Tourism), 123 (Social
Welfare & Development), 124 (Public
Works & Highways), 125 transportation
& Communications), 126 (Labor &
Employment), 127 (Finance), 128
(Science & Technology), 129 (Agrarian
Reform), 131 (Natural Resources), 132
(Foreign Affairs), and 133 (Trade &
Industry) were all promulgated on
January 30,1987, prior to the adoption
of the Constitution on February 2,
1987].64
It is also to be observed that unlike the
grants of power to effect
reorganizations under the past
Constitutions, the above provision
comes as a mere recognition of the
right of the Government to reorganize
its offices, bureaus, and
instrumentalities. Under Section 4,
Article XVI, of the 1935 Constitution:
Section 4. All officers and
employees in the existing
Government of the Philippine
Islands shall continue in office until
the Congress shall provide
otherwise, but all officers whose
appointments are by this
Constitution vested in the
President shall vacate their
respective office(s) upon the
appointment and qualification of
their successors, if such
appointment is made within a
period of one year from the date of
the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the
Philippines. 65
Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the
1973 Charter:
Section 9. All officials and
employees in the existing
Government of the Republic of the
Philippines shall continue in office
until otherwise provided by law or
decreed by the incumbent
President of the Philippines, but all
officials whose appointments are
by this Constitution vested in the
Prime Minister shall vacate their
respective offices upon the
 appointment and qualification of
their successors. 66
The Freedom Constitution is, as earlier
seen, couched in similar language:
SECTION 2. All elective and
appointive officials and employees
under the 1973 Constitution shall
continue in office until otherwise
provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the
appointment and qualification of
their successors, if such is made
within a period of one year from
February 25, 1986.67
Other than references to
"reorganization following the ratification
of this Constitution," there is no
provision for "automatic" vacancies
under the 1987 Constitution.
Invariably, transition periods are
characterized by provisions for
"automatic" vacancies. They are
dictated by the need to hasten the
passage from the old to the new
Constitution free from the "fetters" of
due process and security of tenure.
At this point, we must distinguish
removals from separations arising from
abolition of office (not by virtue of the
Constitution) as a result of
reorganization carried out by reason of
economy or to remove redundancy of
functions. In the latter case, the
Government is obliged to prove good
faith.68 In case of removals undertaken
to comply with clear and explicit
constitutional mandates, the
Government is not hard put to prove
anything, plainly and simply because
the Constitution allows it.
Evidently, the question is whether or
not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution is a grant of a
license upon the Government to
remove career public officials it could
have validly done under an "automatic"
vacancy-authority and to remove them
without rhyme or reason.
As we have seen, since 1935,
transition periods have been
characterized by provisions for
"automatic" vacancies. We take the
silence of the 1987 Constitution on this
matter as a restraint upon the
Government to dismiss public servants
at a moment's notice.
What is, indeed, apparent is the fact
that if the present Charter envisioned
an "automatic" vacancy, it should have
said so in clearer terms, as its 1935,
1973, and 1986 counterparts had so
stated.
The constitutional "lapse" means either
one of two things: (1) The Constitution
meant to continue the reorganization
under the prior Charter (of the
Revolutionary Government), in the
sense that the latter provides for
"automatic" vacancies, or (2) It meant
to put a stop to those 'automatic"
vacancies. By itself, however, it is
ambiguous, referring as it does to two
stages of reorganization — the first, to
its conferment or authorization under
Proclamation No. 3 (Freedom Charter)
and the second, to its implementation
on its effectivity date (February 2,
1987). But as we asserted, if the intent
lâwphî1.ñèt  
of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the
1987 Constitution were to extend the
effects of reorganize tion under the
Freedom Constitution, it should have
said so in clear terms. It is illogical why
it should talk of two phases of
reorganization when it could have
simply acknowledged the continuing
effect of the first reorganization.
Second, plainly the concern of Section
16 is to ensure compensation for
victims" of constitutional revamps —
whether under the Freedom or existing
Constitution — and only secondarily
and impliedly, to allow reorganization.
We turn to the records of the
Constitutional Commission:
INQUIRY OF MR. PADILLA
On the query of Mr. Padilla
whether there is a need for a
specific reference to Proclamation
No. 3 and not merely state "result
of the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution', Mr.
Suarez, on behalf of the
Committee, replied that it is
necessary, inasmuch as there are
two stages of reorganization
covered by the Section.
Mr. Padilla pointed out that since
the proposal of the Commission
on Government Reorganization
have not been implemented yet, it
would be better to use the phrase
"reorganization before or after the
ratification of the Constitution' to
simplify the Section. Mr. Suarez
instead suggested the phrase "as
a result of the reorganization
effected before or after the
ratification of the Constitution' on
the understanding that the
provision would apply to
employees terminated because of
the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 and even
those affected by the
 reorganization during the Marcos
regime. Additionally, Mr. Suarez
pointed out that it is also for this
reason that the Committee
specified the two Constitutions the
Freedom Constitution — and the
1986 [1987] Constitution. 69
Simply, the provision benefits career
civil service employees separated from
the service. And the separation
contemplated must be due to or the
result of (1) the reorganization
pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated
March 25, 1986, (2) the reorganization
from February 2, 1987, and (3) the
resignations of career officers tendered
in line with the existing policy and
which resignations have been
accepted. The phrase "not for cause" is
clearly and primarily exclusionary, to
exclude those career civil service
employees separated "for cause." In
other words, in order to be entitled to
the benefits granted under Section 16
of Article XVIII of the Constitution of
1987, two requisites, one negative and
the other positive, must concur, to wit:
1. the separation must not be
for cause, and
2. the separation must be due
to any of the three situations
mentioned above.
By its terms, the authority to remove
public officials under the Provisional
Constitution ended on February 25,
1987, advanced by jurisprudence to
February 2, 1987. 70 It Can only mean,
then, that whatever reorganization is
taking place is upon the authority of the
present Charter, and necessarily, upon
the mantle of its provisions and
safeguards. Hence, it can not be
legitimately stated that we are merely
continuing what the revolutionary
Constitution of the Revolutionary
Government had started. We are
through with reorganization under the
Freedom Constitution — the first stage.
We are on the second stage — that
inferred from the provisions of Section
16 of Article XVIII of the permanent
basic document.
This is confirmed not only by the
deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, supra, but is apparent
from the Charter's own words. It also
warrants our holding
in Esguerra and Palma-Fernandez, in
which we categorically declared that
after February 2, 1987, incumbent
officials and employees have acquired
security of tenure, which is not a
deterrent against separation by
reorganization under the quondam
fundamental law.
Finally, there is the concern of the
State to ensure that this reorganization
is no "purge" like the execrated
reorganizations under martial rule.
And, of course, we also have the
democratic character of the Charter
itself.
Commissioner Mison would have had a
point, insofar as he contends that the
reorganization is open-ended
("progressive"), had it been a
reorganization under the revolutionary
authority, specifically of the Provisional
Constitution. For then, the power to
remove government employees would
have been truly wide ranging and
limitless, not only because
Proclamation No. 3 permitted it, but
because of the nature of revolutionary
authority itself, its totalitarian
tendencies, and the monopoly of power
in the men and women who wield it.
What must be understood, however, is
that notwithstanding her immense
revolutionary powers, the President
was, nevertheless, magnanimous in
her rule. This is apparent from
Executive Order No. 17, which
established safeguards against the
strong arm and ruthless propensity that
accompanies reorganizations —
notwithstanding the fact that removals
arising therefrom were "not for cause,"
and in spite of the fact that such
removals would have been valid and
unquestionable. Despite that, the Chief
Executive saw, as we said, the
"unnecessary anxiety and
demoralization" in the government rank
and file that reorganization was
causing, and prescribed guidelines for
personnel action. Specifically, she said
on May 28, 1986:
WHEREAS, in order to obviate
unnecessary anxiety and
demoralization among the
deserving officials and employees,
particularly in the career civil
service, it is necessary to
prescribe the rules and regulations
for implementing the said
constitutional provision to protect
career civil servants whose
qualifications and performance
meet the standards of service
demanded by the New
Government, and to ensure that
only those found corrupt,
inefficient and undeserving are
separated from the government
service; 71
Noteworthy is the injunction embodied
in the Executive Order that dismissals
should be made on the basis of
findings of inefficiency, graft, and
unfitness to render public service.*
The President's Memorandum of
October 14, 1987 should furthermore
be considered. We quote, in part:
Further to the Memorandum dated
October 2, 1987 on the same
subject, I have ordered that there
will be no further layoffs this year
of personnel as a result of the
government reorganization. 72
Assuming, then, that this
reorganization allows removals "not for
cause" in a manner that would have
been permissible in a revolutionary
setting as Commissioner Mison so
purports, it would seem that the
Commissioner would have been
powerless, in any event, to order
dismissals at the Customs Bureau left
and right. Hence, even if we accepted
his "progressive" reorganization theory,
he would still have to come to terms
with the Chief Executive's subsequent
directives moderating the revolutionary
authority's plenary power to separate
government officials and employees.
Reorganization under the 1987
Constitution, Nature, Extent, and
Limitations of; Jose v. Arroyo, clarified.
—
The controversy seems to be that we
have, ourselves, supposedly extended
the effects of government
reorganization under the Provisional
Constitution to the regime of the 1987
Constitution. Jose v. Arroyo73 is said to
be the authority for this argument.
Evidently, if Arroyo indeed so ruled,
Arroyo would be inconsistent with the
earlier pronouncement ofEsguerra and
the later holding of Palma-
Fernandez. The question, however, is:
Did Arroyo, in fact, extend the effects
of reorganization under the
revolutionary Charter to the era of the
new Constitution?
There are a few points about Arroyo
that have to be explained. First, the
opinion expressed therein that "[b]y
virtue of said provision the
reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs under Executive Order No.
127 may continue even after the
ratification of this constitution and
career civil service employees may be
separated from the service without
cause as a result of such
reorganization" 74 is in the nature of an
obiter dictum. We dismissed Jose's
petition 75 primarily because it was
"clearly premature, speculative, and
purely anticipatory, based merely on
newspaper reports which do not show
any direct or threatened injury," 76 it
appearing that the reorganization of the
Bureau of Customs had not been, then,
set in motion. Jose therefore had no
cause for complaint, which was enough
basis to dismiss the petition. The
remark anent separation "without
cause" was therefore not necessary for
the disposition of the case. In Morales
v. Parades,77 it was held that an obiter
dictum "lacks the force of an
adjudication and should not ordinarily
be regarded as such."78
Secondly, Arroyo is an unsigned
resolution while Palma Fernandez is a
full-blown decision, although both
are en banccases. While a resolution
of the Court is no less forceful than a
decision, the latter has a special
weight.
Thirdly, Palma-Fernandez v. De la
Paz comes as a later doctrine. (Jose v.
Arroyo was promulgated on August 11,
1987 while Palma-Fernandez was
decided on August 31, 1987.) It is well-
established that a later judgment
supersedes a prior one in case of an
inconsistency.
As we have suggested, the transitory
provisions of the 1987 Constitution
allude to two stages of the
reorganization, the first stage being the
reorganization under Proclamation No.
3 — which had already been
consummated — the second stage
being that adverted to in the transitory
provisions themselves — which is
underway. Hence, when we spoke,
in Arroyo, of reorganization after the
effectivity of the new Constitution, we
referred to the second stage of the
reorganization. Accordingly, we cannot
be said to have carried over
reorganization under the Freedom
Constitution to its 1987 counterpart.
Finally, Arroyo is not necessarily
incompatible with Palma-
Fernandez (or Esguerra).
As we have demonstrated,
reorganization under the aegis of the
1987 Constitution is not as stern as
reorganization under the prior Charter.
Whereas the latter, sans the
President's subsequently imposed
constraints, envisioned a purgation, the
same cannot be said of the
reorganization inferred under the new
Constitution because, precisely, the
new Constitution seeks to usher in a
democratic regime. But even if we
concede ex gratia argumenti that
Section 16 is an exception to due
process and no-removal-"except for
cause provided by law" principles
enshrined in the very same 1987
Constitution, 79which may possibly
justify removals "not for cause," there
is no contradiction in terms here
because, while the former Constitution
left the axe to fall where it might, the
present organic act requires that
removals "not for cause" must be as a
result of reorganization. As we
observed, the Constitution does not
provide for "automatic" vacancies. It
must also pass the test of good faith —
a test not obviously required under the
revolutionary government formerly
prevailing, but a test well-established in
democratic societies and in this
government under a democratic
Charter.
When, therefore, Arroyo permitted a
reorganization under Executive Order
No. 127 after the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, Arroyo permitted a
reorganization provided that it is done
in good faith. Otherwise, security of
tenure would be an insuperable
implement. 80
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction
have been regarded as valid provided
they are pursued in good faith. 81 As a
general rule, a reorganization is carried
out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose
of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient. In that event, no
dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or
separation actually occurs because the
position itself ceases to exist. And in
that case, security of tenure would not
be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if
the "abolition," which is nothing else
but a separation or removal, is done for
political reasons or purposely to defeat
sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good
faith, no valid "abolition' takes place
and whatever "abolition' is done, is
void ab initio. There is an invalid
"abolition" as where there is merely a
change of nomenclature of
positions, 82 or where claims of
economy are belied by the existence of
ample funds. 83
It is to be stressed that by predisposing
a reorganization to the yardstick of
good faith, we are not, as a
consequence, imposing a "cause" for
restructuring. Retrenchment in the
course of a reorganization in good faith
is still removal "not for cause," if by
"cause" we refer to "grounds" or
conditions that call for disciplinary
action.**
Good faith, as a component of a
reorganization under a constitutional
regime, is judged from the facts of
each case. However, under Republic
Act No. 6656, we are told:
SEC. 2. No officer or employee in
the career service shall be
removed except for a valid cause
and after due notice and hearing.
A valid cause for removal exists
when, pursuant to a bona
fide reorganization, a position has
been abolished or rendered
redundant or there is a need to
merge, divide, or consolidate
positions in order to meet the
exigencies of the service, or other
lawful causes allowed by the Civil
Service Law. The existence of any
or some of the following
circumstances may be considered
as evidence of bad faith in the
removals made as a result of
reorganization, giving rise to a
claim for reinstatement or
reappointment by an aggrieved
party: (a) Where there is a
significant increase in the number
of positions in the new staffing
pattern of the department or
agency concerned; (b) Where an
office is abolished and another
performing substantially the same
functions is created; (c) Where
incumbents are replaced by those
less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and
merit; (d) Where there is a
reclassification of offices in the
department or agency concerned
and the reclassified offices
perform substantially the same
functions as the original offices;
(e) Where the removal violates the
order of separation provided in
Section 3 hereof. 84
It is in light hereof that we take up
questions about Commissioner Mison's
good faith, or lack of it.
Reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs,
Lack of Good Faith in. —
The Court finds that after February 2,
1987 no perceptible restructuring of the
Customs hierarchy — except for the
change of personnel — has occurred,
which would have justified (an things
being equal) the contested dismisses.
The contention that the staffing pattern
at the Bureau (which would have
furnished a justification for a personnel
movement) is the same s pattern
prescribed by Section 34 of Executive
Order No. 127 already prevailing when
Commissioner Mison took over the
Customs helm, has not been
successfully contradicted 85 There is no
showing that legitimate structural
changes have been made — or a
reorganization actually undertaken, for
that matter — at the Bureau since
Commissioner Mison assumed office,
which would have validly prompted him
to hire and fire employees. There can
therefore be no actual reorganization to
speak of, in the sense, say, of
reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason
of economy or redundancy of
functions, but a revamp of personnel
pure and simple.
The records indeed show that
Commissioner Mison separated about
394 Customs personnel but replaced
them with 522 as of August 18,
1988. 86 This betrays a clear intent to
"pack" the Bureau of Customs. He did
so, furthermore, in defiance of the
President's directive to halt further
layoffs as a consequence of
reorganization. 87 Finally, he was aware
that layoffs should observe the
procedure laid down by Executive
Order No. 17.
We are not, of course, striking down
Executive Order No. 127 for
repugnancy to the Constitution. While
the act is valid, still and all, the means
with which it was implemented is not. 88
Executive Order No. 127, Specific
Case of. —
With respect to Executive Order No.
127, Commissioner Mison submits that
under Section 59 thereof, "[t]hose
incumbents whose positions are not
included therein or who are not
reappointed shall be deemed
separated from the service." He
submits that because the 394 removed
personnel have not been
"reappointed," they are considered
terminated. To begin with, the
Commissioner's appointing power is
subject to the provisions of Executive
Order No. 39. Under Executive Order
No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs
may "appoint all Bureau personnel,
except those appointed by the
President." 89
Accordingly, with respect to Deputy
Commissioners Cesar Dario and
Vicente Feria, Jr., Commissioner Mison
could not have validly terminated them,
they being Presidential appointees.
Secondly, and as we have asserted,
Section 59 has been rendered
inoperative according to our holding
in Palma-Fernandez.
That Customs employees, under
Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127
had been on a mere holdover status
cannot mean that the positions held by
them had become vacant. In Palma-
Fernandez, we said in no uncertain
terms:
The argument that, on the basis of
this provision, petitioner's term of
office ended on 30 January 1987
and that she continued in the
performance of her duties merely
in a hold over capacity and could
be transferred to another position
without violating any of her legal
rights, is untenable. The
occupancy of a position in a hold-
over capacity was conceived to
facilitate reorganization and would
have lapsed on 25 February 1987
(under the Provisional
Constitution), but advanced to
February 2, 1987 when the 1987
Constitution became effective (De
Leon. et al., vs. Hon. Benjamin B.
 Esquerra, et. al., G.R. No. 78059,
31 August 1987). After the said
date the provisions of the latter on
security of tenure govern. 90
It should be seen, finally, that we are
not barring Commissioner Mison from
carrying out a reorganization under the
transitory provisions of the 1987
Constitution. But such a reorganization
should be subject to the criterion of
good faith.
Resume. —
In resume, we restate as follows:
1. The President could have validly
removed government employees,
elected or appointed, without cause but
only before the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution on February 2, 1987 (De
Leon v. Esguerra, supra; Palma-
Fernandez vs. De la Paz,supra); in this
connection, Section 59 (on non-
reappointment of incumbents) of
Executive Order No. 127 cannot be a
basis for termination;
2. In such a case, dismissed
employees shall be paid separation
and retirement benefits or upon their
option be given reemployment
opportunities (CONST. [1987], art.
XVIII, sec. 16; Rep. Act No. 6656, sec.
9);
3. From February 2, 1987, the State
does not lose the right to reorganize
the Government resulting in the
separation of career civil service
employees [CONST. (1987), supra]
provided, that such a reorganization is
made in good faith. (Rep. Act No.
6656, supra.)
G.R. No. 83737
This disposition also resolves G.R. No.
83737. As we have indicated, G.R. No.
83737 is a challenge to the validity of
Republic Act No. 6656. In brief, it is
argued that the Act, insofar as it
strengthens security of tenure 91 and as
far as it provides for a retroactive
effect, 92 runs counter to the transitory
provisions of the new Constitution on
removals not for cause.
It can be seen that the Act, insofar as it
provides for reinstatament of
employees separated without "a valid
cause and after due notice and
hearing" 93 is not contrary to the
transitory provisions of the new
Constitution. The Court reiterates that
although the Charter's transitory
provisions mention separations "not for
cause," separations thereunder must
nevertheless be on account of a valid
reorganization and which do not come
about automatically. Otherwise,
security of tenure may be invoked.
Moreover, it can be seen that the
statute itself recognizes removals
without cause. However, it also
acknowledges the possibility of the
leadership using the artifice of
reorganization to frustrate security of
tenure. For this reason, it has installed
safeguards. There is nothing
unconstitutional about the Act.
We recognize the injury Commissioner
Mison's replacements would sustain.
We also commisserate with them. But
our concern is the greater wrong
inflicted on the dismissed employees
on account of their regal separation
from the civil service.
WHEREFORE, THE RESOLUTIONS
OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, DATED JUNE 30,
1988, SEPTEMBER 20, 1988,
NOVEMBER 16, 1988, INVOLVED IN
G.R. NOS. 85310, 85335, AND 86241,
AND MAY 8, 1989, INVOLVED IN G.R.
NO. 85310, ARE AFFIRMED.
THE PETITIONS IN G.R. NOS. 81954,
81967, 82023, AND 85335 ARE
GRANTED. THE PETITIONS IN G.R.
NOS. 83737, 85310 AND 86241 ARE
DISMISSED.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
IS ORDERED TO REINSTATE THE
EMPLOYEES SEPARATED AS A
RESULT OF HIS NOTICES DATED
JANUARY 26, 1988.
THE EMPLOYEES WHOM
COMMISSIONER MISON MAY HAVE
APPOINTED AS REPLACEMENTS
ARE ORDERED TO VACATE THEIR
POSTS SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT
OF WHATEVER BENEFITS THAT
MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.
NO COSTS.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DARIO vs MISON August 8, 1989
FACTS: Cory Aquino promulgated
Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING A
NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT
THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE
PEOPLE...â, the mandate of the
people to Completely reorganize the
government. In January 1987, she
promulgated EO 127,
"REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF
FINANCE". Among other offices,
Executive Order No. 127 provided for
the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs and prescribed a new staffing
pattern therefor. In February 1987, a
brand new constitution was adopted.
On January 1988, incumbent
Commissioner of Customs Salvador
Mison issued a Memorandum, in the
nature of "Guidelines on the
Implementation of Reorganization
Executive Orders," prescribing the
procedure in personnel placement. It
also provided that by February 1988,
all employees covered by EO 127 and
the grace period extended to the
Bureau of Customs by the President on
reorganization shall be: a) informed of
their re-appointment, or b) offered
another position in the same
department or agency, or c) informed
of their termination. A total of 394
officials and employees of the Bureau
of Customs were given individual
notices of separation. They filed
appeals with the CSC. CSC
promulgated its ruling for reinstatement
of the 279 employees. Mison, filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was
denied. Commissioner Mison instituted
certiorari proceedings. 
ISSUE: WON Section 16 of Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant
of a license upon the Government to
remove career public officials it could
have validly done under an
"automatic"-vacancy-authority and to
remove them without rhyme or reason
HELD: (NO) The State can still carry
out reorganizations provided that it is
done in good faith. Removal of career
officials without cause cannot be done
after the passing of the 1987
Constitution. Section 16 Article XVIII, of
the 1987 Constitution: âSec. 16.
Career civil service employees
separated from the service not for
cause but as a result of the
reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25,
1986 and the reorganization following
the ratification of this Constitution shall
be entitled to appropriate separation
pay and to retirement and other
benefits accruing to them under the
laws of general application in force at
the time of their separation. In lieu
thereof, at the option of the employees,
they may be considered for
employment in the Government or in
any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
This provision also applies to career
officers whose resignation, tendered in
line with the existing policy.â The
above is a mere recognition of the right
of the Government to reorganize its
offices, bureaus, and instrumentalities.
Under Section 4, Article XVI, of the
1935 Constitution. Transition periods
are characterized by provisions for
"automatic" vacancies. They are
dictated by the need to hasten the
passage from the old to the new
Constitution free from the "fetters" of
due process and security of tenure.
Since 1935, transition periods have
been characterized by provisions for
"automatic" vacancies. We take the
silence of the 1987 Constitution on this
matter as a restraint upon the
Government to dismiss public servants
at a moment's notice. If the present
Charter envisioned an "automatic"
vacancy, it should have said so in
clearer terms. Plainly the concern of
Section 16 is to ensure compensation
for "victims" of constitutional revamps -
whether under the Freedom or existing
Constitution - and only secondarily and
impliedly, to allow reorganization.
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 152845               August 5,
2003
DRIANITA BAGAOISAN, FELY
MADRIAGA, SHIRLY TAGABAN,
RICARDO SARANDI, SUSAN
IMPERIAL, BENJAMIN DEMDEM,
RODOLFO DAGA, EDGARDO
BACLIG, GREGORIO LABAYAN,
HILARIO JEREZ, and MARIA
CORAZON CUANANG, Petitioners,  staffing pattern was concerned, by
vs.
NATIONAL TOBACCO
ADMINISTRATION, represented by
ANTONIO DE GUZMAN and
PERLITA BAULA,Respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
President Joseph Estrada issued on 30
September 1998 Executive Order No.
29, entitled "Mandating the
Streamlining of the National Tobacco
Administration (NTA)," a government
agency under the Department of
Agriculture. The order was followed by
another issuance, on 27 October 1998,
by President Estrada of Executive
Order No. 36, amending Executive
Order No. 29, insofar as the new
increasing from four hundred (400) to
not exceeding seven hundred fifty
(750) the positions affected thereby. In
compliance therewith, the NTA
prepared and adopted a new
Organization Structure and Staffing
Pattern (OSSP) which, on 29 October
1998, was submitted to the Office of
the President.
On 11 November 1998, the rank and
file employees of NTA Batac, among
whom included herein petitioners, filed
a letter-appeal with the Civil Service
Commission and sought its assistance
in recalling the OSSP. On 04
December 1998, the OSSP was
approved by the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) subject to
certain revisions. On even date, the
NTA created a placement committee to
assist the appointing authority in the
selection and placement of permanent
personnel in the revised OSSP. The
results of the evaluation by the
committee on the individual
qualifications of applicants to the
positions in the new OSSP were then
disseminated and posted at the central
and provincial offices of the NTA.
On 10 June 1996, petitioners, all
occupying different positions at the
NTA office in Batac, Ilocos Norte,
received individual notices of
termination of their employment with
the NTA effective thirty (30) days from
receipt thereof. Finding themselves
without any immediate relief from their
dismissal from the service, petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
andmandamus, with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or temporary restraining order,
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Batac, Ilocos Norte, and prayed -
"1) that a restraining order be
immediately issued enjoining the
respondents from enforcing the
notice of termination addressed
individually to the petitioners
and/or from committing further
acts of dispossession and/or
ousting the petitioners from their
respective offices;
"2) that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued against the
respondents, commanding them to
maintain the status quo to protect
the rights of the petitioners
pending the determination of the
validity of the implementation of
their dismissal from the service;
and
"3) that, after trial on the merits,
judgment be rendered declaring
the notice of termination of the
petitioners illegal and the
reorganization null and void and
ordering their reinstatement with
backwages, if applicable,
commanding the respondents to
desist from further terminating
their services, and making the
injunction permanent." 1 herein petitioners, automatically
The RTC, on 09 September 2000,
ordered the NTA to appoint petitioners
in the new OSSP to positions similar or
comparable to their respective former
assignments. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the NTA was
denied by the trial court in its order of
28 February 2001. Thereupon, the
NTA filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals, raising the following issues:
"I. Whether or not respondents
submitted evidence as proof that
petitioners, individually, were not
the ‘best qualified and most
deserving’ among the incumbent
applicant-employees.
"II. Whether or not incumbent
permanent employees, including
enjoy a preferential right and the
right of first refusal to
 appointments/reappointments in
the new Organization Structure
And Staffing Pattern (OSSP) of
respondent NTA.
"III. Whether or not respondent
NTA in implementing the
mandated reorganization pursuant
to E.O. No. 29, as amended by
E.O. No. 36, strictly adhere to the
implementing rules on
reorganization, particularly RA
6656 and of the Civil Service
Commission – Rules on
Government Reorganization.
"IV. Whether or not the validity of
E.O. Nos. 29 and 36 can be put in
issue in the instant case/appeal."2
On 20 February 2002, the appellate
court rendered a decision reversing
and setting aside the assailed orders of
the trial court.
Petitioners went to this Court to assail
the decision of the Court of Appeals,
contending that -
"I. The Court of Appeals erred in
making a finding that went beyond
the issues of the case and which
are contrary to those of the trial
court and that it overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a
different conclusion;
"II. The Court of Appeals erred in
upholding Executive Order Nos.
29 and 36 of the Office of the
President which are mere
administrative issuances which do
not have the force and effect of a
law to warrant abolition of
positions and/or effecting total
reorganization;
 "III. The Court of Appeals erred in
holding that petitioners’ removal
from the service is in accordance
with law;
"IV. The Court of Appeals erred in
holding that respondent NTA was
not guilty of bad faith in the
termination of the services of
petitioners; (and)
"V. The Court of Appeals erred in
ignoring case law/jurisprudence in
the abolition of an office."
3
In its resolution of 10 July 2002, the
Court required the NTA to file its
comment on the petition. On 18
November 2002, after the NTA had
filed its comment of 23 September
2002, the Court issued its resolution
denying the petition for failure of
petitioners to sufficiently show any
reversible error on the part of the
appellate court in its challenged
decision so as to warrant the exercise
by this Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction. A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners was
denied in the Court’s resolution of 20
January 2002.
On 21 February 2003, petitioners
submitted a "Motion to Admit Petition
For En Banc Resolution" of the case
allegedly to address a basic question,
i.e., "the legal and constitutional issue
on whether the NTA may be
reorganized by an executive fiat, not by
legislative action." In their "Petition for
4 
an En Banc Resolution" petitioners
would have it that -
"1. The Court of Appeals’ decision
upholding the reorganization of the
National Tobacco Administration
sets a dangerous precedent in
that:
"’a) A mere Executive Order
issued by the Office of the
President and procured by a
government functionary would
have the effect of a blanket
authority to reorganize a
bureau, office or agency
attached to the various
executive departments;
‘b) The President of the
Philippines would have the
plenary power to reorganize
the entire government
Bureaucracy through the
issuance of an Executive
Order, an administrative
issuance without the benefit
of due deliberation, debate
and discussion of members of
both chambers of the
Congress of the Philippines;
‘c) The right to security of
tenure to a career position
created by law or statute
would be defeated by the
mere adoption of an
Organizational Structure and
Staffing Pattern issued
pursuant to an Executive
Order which is not a law and
could thus not abolish an
office created by law;
"2. The case law on abolition of an
office would be disregarded,
ignored and abandoned if the
Court of Appeals decision subject
matter of this Petition would
remain undisturbed and
untouched. In other words,
previous doctrines and precedents
of this Highest Court would in
effect be reversed and/or modified
with the Court of Appeals
judgment, should it remain
unchallenged.
"3. Section 4 of Executive Order
No. 245 dated July 24, 1987
(Annex ‘D,’ Petition), issued by the
Revolutionary government of
former President Corazon Aquino,
and the law creating NTA, which
provides that the governing body
of NTA is the Board of Directors,
would be rendered meaningless,
ineffective and a dead letter law
because the challenged NTA
reorganization which was
erroneously upheld by the Court of
Appeals was adopted and
implemented by then NTA
Administrator Antonio de Guzman
without the corresponding
authority from the Board of
Directors as mandated therein. In
brief, the reorganization is an ultra
vires act of the NTA Administrator.
"4. The challenged Executive
Order No. 29 issued by former
President Joseph Estrada but
unsigned by then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora would
in effect be erroneously upheld
and given legal effect as to
supersede, amend and/or modify
Executive Order No. 245, a law
issued during the Freedom
Constitution of President Corazon
Aquino. In brief, a mere executive
order would amend, supersede
and/or render ineffective a law or
statute."5
In order to allow the parties a full
opportunity to ventilate their views on
the matter, the Court ultimately
resolved to hear the parties in oral
argument. Essentially, the core
question raised by them is whether or
not the President, through the issuance
of an executive order, can validly carry
out the reorganization of the NTA.
Notwithstanding the apparent
procedural lapse on the part of
petitioner to implead the Office of the
President as party respondent
pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3, of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure,  this Court resolved to rule
6 
on the merits of the petition.
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs.
Zamora ruled that the President, based
7 
on existing laws, had the authority to
carry out a reorganization in any
branch or agency of the executive
department. In said case, Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB challenged the
issuance, and sought the nullification,
of Executive Order No. 191
(Deactivation of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau)
and Executive Order No. 223
(Supplementary Executive Order No.
191 on the Deactivation of the
Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau and for Other
Matters) on the ground that they were
issued by the President with grave
abuse of discretion and in violation of
their constitutional right to security of
tenure. The Court explained:
"The general rule has always been that
the power to abolish a public office is
lodged with the legislature. This
proceeds from the legal precept that
the power to create includes the power
to destroy. A public office is either
created by the Constitution, by statute,
or by authority of law. Thus, except
where the office was created by the
Constitution itself, it may be abolished
by the same legislature that brought it
into existence.
"The exception, however, is that as far
as bureaus, agencies or offices in the
executive department are concerned,
the President’s power of control may
justify him to inactivate the functions of
a particular office, or certain laws may
grant him the broad authority to carry
out reorganization measures. The case
in point is Larin v. Executive
Secretary [280 SCRA 713]. In this
case, it was argued that there is no law
which empowers the President to
reorganize the BIR. In decreeing
otherwise, this Court sustained the
following legal basis, thus:
"`Initially, it is argued that there is no
law yet which empowers the President
to issue E.O. No. 132 or to reorganize
the BIR.
`We do not agree.
`x x x x x x
`Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
``Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase
Out of Activities of Agencies Within the
Executive Branch. – The heads of
departments, bureaus and offices and
agencies are hereby directed to identify
their respective activities which are no
longer essential in the delivery of public
services and which may be scaled
down, phased out or abolished, subject
to civil service rules and regulations. x
x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out
or abolition of the activities shall be
effected pursuant to Circulars or
Orders issued for the purpose by the
Office of the President.’
`Said provision clearly mentions the
acts of `scaling down, phasing out and
abolition’ of offices only and does not
cover the creation of offices or transfer
of functions. Nevertheless, the act of
creating and decentralizing is included
in the subsequent provision of Section
62 which provides that:
``Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational
changes. – Unless otherwise created
by law or directed by the President of
the Philippines, no organizational unit
or changes in key positions in any
department or agency shall be
authorized in their respective
organization structures and be funded
from appropriations by this Act.’
`The foregoing provision evidently
shows that the President is authorized
to effect organizational changes
including the creation of offices in the
department or agency concerned.
`x x x x x x
`Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is
Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292
which states:
``Sec. 20. Residual Powers. – Unless
Congress provides otherwise, the
President shall exercise such other
powers and functions vested in the
President which are provided for under
the laws and which are not specifically
enumerated above or which are not
delegated by the President in
accordance with law.’
`This provision speaks of such other
powers vested in the President under
the law. What law then gives him the
power to reorganize? It is Presidential
Decree No. 1772 which amended
Presidential Decree No. 1416. These
decrees expressly grant the President
of the Philippines the continuing
authority to reorganize the national
government, which includes the power
to group, consolidate bureaus and
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to
standardize salaries and materials. The
validity of these two decrees are
unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution
clearly provides that `all laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, letter
of instructions and other executive
issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked. So far,
there is yet no law amending or
repealing said decrees.’
"Now, let us take a look at the assailed
executive order.
"In the whereas clause of E.O. No.
191, former President Estrada
anchored his authority to deactivate
EIIB on Section 77 of Republic Act
8745 (FY 1999 General Appropriations
Act), a provision similar to Section 62
of R.A. 7645 quoted in Larin, thus:
"`Sec. 77. Organized
Changes. – Unless otherwise provided
by law or directed by the President of
the Philippines, no changes in key
positions or organizational units in any
department or agency shall be
authorized in their respective
organizational structures and funded
from appropriations provided by this
Act.’
"We adhere to the x x x ruling
in Larin that this provision recognizes
the authority of the President to effect
organizational changes in the
department or agency under the
executive structure. Such a ruling
further finds support in Section 78 of
Republic Act No. 8760. Under this law,
the heads of departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies and other entities
in the Executive Branch are directed
(a) to conduct a comprehensive review
of this respective mandates, missions,
objectives, functions, programs,
projects, activities and systems and
procedures; (b) identify activities which
are no longer essential in the delivery
of public services and which may be
scaled down, phased-out or abolished;
and (c) adopt measures that will result
in the streamlined organization and
improved overall performance of their
respective agencies. Section 78 ends
up with the mandate that the actual
streamlining and productivity
improvement in agency organization
and operation shall be effected
pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued
for the purpose by the Office of the
President. The law has spoken clearly.
We are left only with the duty to
sustain.
"But of course, the list of legal basis
authorizing the President to reorganize
any department or agency in the
executive branch does not have to end
here. We must not lose sight of the
very source of the power – that which
constitutes an express grant of power.
Under Section 31, Book III of Executive
Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987), ‘the
President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of
the President.’ For this purpose, he
may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office
of the President. In Canonizado vs.
Aguirre [323 SCRA 312], we ruled that
reorganization ‘involves the reduction
of personnel, consolidation of offices,
or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions.’ It
takes place when there is an alteration
of the existing structure of government
offices or units therein, including the
lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. The EIIB
is a bureau attached to the Department
of Finance. It falls under the Office of
the President. Hence, it is subject to
the President’s continuing authority to
reorganize.
"It having been duly established that
the President has the authority to carry
out reorganization in any branch or
agency of the executive department,
what is then left for us to resolve is
whether or not the reorganization is
valid. In this jurisdiction,
reorganizations have been regarded as
valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. Reorganization is carried
out in `good faith’ if it is for the purpose
of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act
No. 6656 provides for the
circumstances which may be
considered as evidence of bad faith in
the removal of civil service employees
made as a result of reorganization, to
wit: (a) where there is a significant
increase in the number of positions in
the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency
concerned; (b) where an office is
abolished and another performing
substantially the same functions is
created; (c) where incumbents are
replaced by those less qualified in
terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit; (d) where there
is a classification of offices in the
department or agency concerned and
the reclassified offices perform
substantially the same functions as the
original offices, and (e) where the
removal violates the order of
separation."8
The Court of Appeals, in its now
assailed decision, has found no
evidence of bad faith on the part of the
NTA; thus -
"In the case at bar, we find no evidence
that the respondents committed bad
faith in issuing the notices of non-
appointment to the petitioners.
"Firstly, the number of positions in
the new staffing pattern did not
increase. Rather, it decreased
from 1,125 positions to 750. It is
thus natural that one’s position
may be lost through the removal
or abolition of an office.
"Secondly, the petitioners failed to
specifically show which offices
were abolished and the new ones
that were created performing
substantially the same functions.
"Thirdly, the petitioners likewise
failed to prove that less qualified
employees were appointed to the
positions to which they applied.
"x x x           x x x          x x x
"Fourthly, the preference stated in
Section 4 of R.A. 6656, only
means that old employees should
be considered first, but it does not
necessarily follow that they should
 then automatically be appointed.
This is because the law does not
preclude the infusion of new
blood, younger dynamism, or
necessary talents into the
government service, provided that
the acts of the appointing power
are bonafide for the best interest
of the public service and the
person chosen has the needed
qualifications."
9
These findings of the appellate court
are basically factual which this Court
must respect and be held bound.
It is important to emphasize that the
questioned Executive Orders No. 29
and No. 36 have not abolished the
National Tobacco Administration
but merely mandated its
reorganization through the
streamlining or reduction of its
personnel. Article VII, Section 17, of
10 
the Constitution, expressly grants the
President control of all executive
departments, bureaus, agencies and
offices which may justify an executive
action to inactivate the functions of a
particular office or to carry out
reorganization measures under a
broad authority of law. Section 78 of
11 
the General Provisions of Republic Act
No. 8522 (General Appropriations Act
of FY 1998) has decreed that the
President may direct changes in the
organization and key positions in any
department, bureau or agency
pursuant to Article VI, Section 25, of
12 
the Constitution, which grants to the
Executive Department the authority to
recommend the budget necessary for
its operation. Evidently, this grant of
power includes the authority to
evaluate each and every government
agency, including the determination of
the most economical and efficient
staffing pattern, under the Executive
Department.
In the recent case of Rosa Ligaya C.
Domingo, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo D.
Zamora, in his capacity as the
Executive Secretary, et al., this Court
13 
has had occasion to also delve on the
President’s power to reorganize the
Office of the President under Section
31(2) and (3) of Executive Order No.
292 and the power to reorganize the
Office of the President Proper. The
Court has there observed:
"x x x. Under Section 31(1) of EO 292,
the President can reorganize the Office
of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units, or by
transferring functions from one unit to
another. In contrast, under Section
31(2) and (3) of EO 292, the
President’s power to reorganize offices
outside the Office of the President
Proper but still within the Office of the
President is limited to merely
transferring functions or agencies from
the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies, and vice
versa."
The provisions of Section 31, Book III,
Chapter 10, of Executive Order No.
292 (Administrative Code of 1987),
above-referred to, reads thusly:
"SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the
President to Reorganize his Office. –
The President, subject to the policy in
the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have continuing
authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of
the President. For this purpose, he
may take any of the following actions:
"(1) Restructure the internal
organization of the Office of the
President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the
Presidential Special
Assistants/Advisers System and
the Common Staff Support
System, by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units
thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another;
"(2) Transfer any function under
the Office of the President to any
other Department or Agency as
well as transfer functions to the
Office of the President from other
Departments and Agencies; and
"(3) Transfer any agency under
the Office of the President to any
other department or agency as
well as transfer agencies to the
Office of the President from other
departments and agencies."
The first sentence of the law is an
express grant to the President of a
continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of
the President. The succeeding
numbered paragraphs are not in the
nature of provisos that unduly limit the
aim and scope of the grant to the
President of the power to reorganize
but are to be viewed in consonance
therewith. Section 31(1) of Executive
Order No. 292 specifically refers to the
President’s power to restructure the
internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper, by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units hereof
or transferring functions from one unit
to another, while Section 31(2) and (3)
concern executive offices outside the
Office of the President Proper allowing
the President to transfer any function
under the Office of the President to any
other Department or Agency and vice-
versa, and the transfer of any agency
under the Office of the President to any
other department or agency and vice-
versa.14
In the present instance, involving
neither an abolition nor transfer of
offices, the assailed action is a mere
reorganization under the general
provisions of the law consisting mainly
of streamlining the NTA in the interest
of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It
is an act well within the authority of
President motivated and carried out,
according to the findings of the
appellate court, in good faith, a factual
assessment that this Court could only
but accept.15
In passing, relative to petitioners’
"Motion for an En Banc Resolution of
the Case," it may be well to remind
counsel, that the Court En Banc is not
an appellate tribunal to which appeals
from a Division of the Court may be
taken. A Division of the Court is the
Supreme Court as fully and veritably as
the Court En Banc itself and a decision
of its Division is as authoritative and
final as a decision of the Court En
Banc. Referrals of cases from a
Division to the Court En Banc do not
take place as just a matter of routine
but only on such specified grounds as
the Court in its discretion may allow.
16
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit
Petition for En Banc resolution and the
Petition for an En Banc Resolution are
DENIED for lack of merit. Let entry of
judgment be made in due course. No
costs.
SO ORDERED
Bagaoisan vs Nat'l Tobacco
Administration. G.R. No. 152845 : August
5, 2003. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE. BY C
Y.
FACTS:
1. The petitioner was terminated from there
position in the national tobacco administration as
a result of the executive order issued by
president Estradawhic
mandates for the stream lining of the national
tobacco administration, a government agency
under the department of agriculture.
2. The petitioners filed a letter of appeal to the
civil service commission to recall the ossp.
3. Petitioner all file a petition for certiorari with
prohibition an mandamus with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction and a
temporary restraining
order with the regional trial court of Batak to
prevent the respondent from enforcing the notice
of termination and from austing the petitioners
in there
respective offices.
4. The regional trial court issued an order
ordering the national tobacco administration to
appoint the petitioner to the osspto position
similar to the
one that they hold before.
5. The national tobacco administration appealed
to the court of appeals who reversed the decision
of the RTC.
6. Petitioner appealed to the supreme court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the reorganization of the
national tobacco administration is valid true
issuance of executive orderby the president.
HELD:
According to the supreme court,The president
has the power to reorganized an office to achieve
simplicity ,economy and efficiency as provided G.R. No. 106296 July 5, 1996
under executive
order 292 sec. 31 and section 48 of RA 7645 ISABELO T.
which provides that activities of executive CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, 
agencies may be scaled down if it is no longer vs.
essential for the THE COURT OF APPEALS and the
delivery of public service. PEOPLE OF THE
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
En Banc resolution and the Petition for an En
 
Banc Resolution are DENIED for lack of merit.
Let entry of judgment MENDOZA, J.:p
be made in due course. No costs.
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1992, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the present

petition is partially granted.
The questioned Orders and
writs directing (1)
"reinstatement" of respondent
Isabelo T. Crisostomo to the
position of "President of the
SECOND DIVISION Polytechnic University of the
Philippines", and (2) payment
 
 of "salaries and benefits"
which said respondent failed
to receive during his
suspension insofar as such
payment includes those
accruing after the abolition of
the PCC and its transfer to
the PUP, are hereby set
aside. Accordingly, further
proceedings consistent with
this decision may be taken by
the court a quo to determine
the correct amounts due and
payable to said respondent by
the said university.
The background of this case is as
follows:
Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was
President of the Philippine College of
Commerce (PCC), having been
appointed to that position by the
President of the Philippines on July 17,
1974.
During his incumbency as president of
the PCC, two administrative cases
were filed against petitioner for illegal
use of government vehicles,
misappropriation of construction
materials belonging to the college,
oppression and harassment, grave
misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty.
The administrative cases, which were
filed with the Office of the President,
were subsequently referred to the
Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation.
Charges of violations of R.A. No. 3019,
§3(e) and R.A. No. 992, §§20-21 and
R.A. No. 733, §14 were likewise filed
against him with the Office of
Tanodbayan.
On June 14, 1976, three (3)
informations for violation of Sec. 3(e) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (R.A. No. 3019, as amended) were
filed against him. The informations
alleged that he appropriated for himself
a bahay kubo, which was intended for
the College, and construction materials
worth P250,000.00, more or less.
Petitioner was also accused of using a
driver of the College as his personal
and family driver.1
On October 22, 1976, petitioner was
preventively suspended from office
pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, §13, as
amended. In his place Dr. Pablo T.
Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer-in-
charge on November 10, 1976, and
then as Acting President on May 13,
1977.
On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was
issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, CONVERTING THE
PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF
COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC
UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS
OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS, AND
EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR
OFFERINGS.
Mateo continued as the head of the
new University. On April 3, 1979, he
was appointed Acting President and on
March 28, 1980, as President for a
term of six (6) years.
On July 11, 1980, the Circuit Criminal
Court of Manila rendered judgment
acquitting petitioner of the charges
against him. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court
finds the accused, Isabelo T.
Crisostomo, not guilty of the
violations charged in all these
three cases and hereby
acquits him therefrom, with
costs de officio. The bail
bonds filed by said accused
for his provisional liberty are
hereby cancelled and
released.
Pursuant to the provisions of
Section 13, R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known
as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and under
which the accused has been
suspended by this Court in an
Order dated October 22,
1976, said accused is hereby
ordered reinstated to the
position of President of the
Philippine College of
Commerce, now known as
the Polytechnic University of
the Philippines, from which he
has been suspended. By
virtue of said reinstatement,
he is entitled to receive the
salaries and other benefits
which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in
the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed
against him.
The bail bonds filed by the
accused for his provisional
liberty in these cases are
hereby cancelled and
released.
SO ORDERED.
The cases filed before the Tanodbayan
(now the Ombudsman) were likewise
dismissed on August 8, 1991 on the
ground that they had become moot and
academic. On the other hand, the
administrative cases were dismissed
for failure of the complainants to
prosecute them.
On February 12, 1992, petitioner filed
with the Regional Trial Court a motion
for execution of the judgment,
particularly the part ordering his
reinstatement to the position of
president of the PUP and the payment
of his salaries and other benefits during
the period of suspension.
The motion was granted and a partial
writ of execution was issued by the trial
court on March 6, 1992. On March 26,
1992, however, President Corazon C.
Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as
acting president of the PUP, following
the expiration of the term of office of
Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who had
succeeded Dr. Mateo. Petitioner was
one of the five nominees considered by
the President of the Philippines for the
position.
On April 24, 1992, the Regional Trial
Court, through respondent Judge
Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, issued
another order, reiterating her earlier
order for the reinstatement of petitioner
to the position of PUP president. A writ
of execution, ordering the sheriff to
implement the order of reinstatement,
was issued.
In his return dated April 28, 1992, the
sheriff stated that he had executed the
writ by installing petitioner as President
of the PUP, although Dr. Gellor did not
vacate the office as he wanted to
consult with the President of the
Philippines first. This led to a contempt
citation against Dr. Gellor. A hearing
was set on May 7, 1992. On May 5,
1992, petitioner also moved to cite
Department of Education, Culture and
Sports Secretary Isidro Cariño in
contempt of court. Petitioner assumed
the office of president of the PUP.
On May 18, 1992, therefore, the
People of the Philippines filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition (CA G.R.
No. 27931), assailing the two orders
and the writs of execution issued by
the trial court. It also asked for a
temporary restraining order.
On June 25, 1992, the Court of
Appeals issued a temporary restraining
order, enjoining petitioner to cease and
desist from acting as president of the
PUP pursuant to the reinstatement
orders of the trial court, and enjoining
further proceedings in Criminal Cases
Nos. VI-2329-2331.
On July 15, 1992, the Seventh Division
of the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision,  the dispositive portion of
2
which is set forth at the beginning of
this opinion. Said decision set aside
the orders and writ of reinstatement
issued by the trial court. The payment
of salaries and benefits to petitioner
accruing after the conversion of the
PCC to the PUP was disallowed.
Recovery of salaries and benefits was
limited to those accruing from the time
of petitioner's suspension until the
conversion of the PCC to the PUP. The
case was remanded to the trial court
for a determination of the amounts due
and payable to petitioner.
Hence this petition. Petitioner argues
that P.D. No. 1341, which converted
the PCC into the PUP, did not abolish
the PCC. He contends that if the law
had intended the PCC to lose its
existence, it would have specified that
the PCC was being "abolished" rather
than "converted" and that if the PUP
was intended to be a new institution,
the law would have said it was being
"created." Petitioner claims that the
PUP is merely a continuation of the
existence of the PCC, and, hence, he
could be reinstated to his former
position as president.
In part the contention is well taken, but,
as will presently be explained,
reinstatement is no longer possible
because of the promulgation of P.D.
No. 1437 by the President of the
Philippines on June 10, 1978.
P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only
changed, the former Philippine College
of Commerce into what is now the
Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, in the same way that
earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had
converted what was then the Philippine
School of Commerce into the
Philippine College of Commerce. What
took place was a change in academic
status of the educational institution, not
in its corporate life. Hence the change
in its name, the expansion of its
curricular offerings, and the changes in
its structure and organization.
As petitioner correctly points out, when
the purpose is to abolish a department
or an office or an organization and to
replace it with another one, the
lawmaking authority says so. He cites
the following examples:
E.O. No. 709:
§1. There is hereby created a
Ministry of Trade and
Industry, hereinafter referred
to as the Ministry. The
existing Ministry of Trade
established pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 721
as amended, and the existing
Ministry established pursuant
to Presidential Decree No.
488 as amended, are
abolished together with their
services, bureaus and similar
agencies, regional offices,
and all other entities under
their supervision and control.
E.O. No. 710:
§1. There is hereby created a
Ministry of Public Works and
Highways, hereinafter
referred to as the Ministry.
The existing Ministry of Public
Works established pursuant
to Executive Order No. 546
as amended, and the existing
Ministry of Public Highways
established pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 458
as amended, are abolished
together with their services,
bureaus and similar agencies,
regional offices, and all other
entities within their
supervision and control. . . .
R.A. No. 6975:
§13. Creation and
Composition. -- A National
Police Commission,
hereinafter referred to as the
Commission, is hereby
created for the purpose of
effectively discharging the
functions prescribed in the
Constitution and provided in
this Act. The Commission
shall be a collegial body
within the Department. It shall
be composed of a Chairman
and four (4) regular
commissioners, one (1) of
whom shall be designated as
Vice-Chairman by the
President. The Secretary of
the Department shall be
the ex-officio Chairman of the
Commission, while the Vice-
Chairman shall act as the
executive officer of the
Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
§90. Status of Present
NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. - Upon
the effectivity of this Act, the
present National Police
Commission, and the
Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National Police
shall cease to exist. The
Philippine Constabulary,
which is the nucleus of the
integrated Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated
National Police, shall cease to
be a major service of the
Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The Integrated
National Police, which is the
civilian component of the
Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National Police,
shall cease to be the national
police force and in lieu
thereof, a new police force
shall be established and
constituted pursuant to this
Act.
In contrast, P.D. No. 1341, provides:
§1. The present Philippine
College of Commerce is
hereby converted into a
university to be known as the
"Polytechnic University of the
Philippines," hereinafter
referred to in this Decree as
the University.
As already noted, R.A. No. 778 earlier
provided:
§1. The present Philippine
School of Commerce, located
in the City of Manila,
Philippines, is hereby granted
full college status and
converted into the Philippine
College of Commerce, which
will offer not only its present
one-year and two-year
vocational commercial
curricula, the latter leading to
the titles of Associate in
Business Education and/or
Associate in Commerce, but
also four-year courses
leading to the degrees of
Bachelor of Science in
Business in Education and
Bachelor of Science in
Commerce, and five-year
courses leading to the
degrees of Master of Arts in
Business Education and
Master of Arts in Commerce,
respectively.
The appellate court ruled, however,
that the PUP and the PCC are not "one
and the same institution" but "two
different entities" and that since
petitioner Crisostomo's term was
coterminous with the legal existence of
the PCC, petitioner's term expired upon
the abolition of the PCC. In reaching
this conclusion, the Court of Appeals
took into account the following:
a) After respondent
Crisostomo's suspension,
P.D. No. 1341 (entitled
"CONVERTING THE
PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF
COMMERCE INTO A
POLYTECHNIC
UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS
OBJECTIVES,
ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTIONS, AND
EXPANDING ITS
CURRICULAR OFFERINGS")
was issued on April 1, 1978.
This decree explicitly provides
that PUP's objectives and
purposes cover not only
PCC's offering of programs
"in the field of commerce and
business administration" but
also "programs in other
polytechnic areas" and "in
other fields such as
agriculture, arts and trades
and fisheries . . ." (section 2).
Being a university, PUP was
conceived as a bigger
institution absorbing, merging
and integrating the entire
PCC and other "national
schools" as may be
"transferred" to this new state
university.
b) The manner of selection
and appointment of the
university head is
substantially different from
that provided by the PCC
Charter. The PUP President
"shall be appointed by the
President of the
Philippines upon
recommendation of the
Secretary of Education and
Culture after consultation with
the University Board of
Regents" (section 4, P.D.
1341). The President of PCC,
on the other hand, was
appointed "by the President of
the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Board
of Trustees" (Section 4, R.A.
778).
c) The composition of the new
university's Board of Regents
in likewise different from that
of the PCC Board of Trustees
(which included the chairman
of the Senate Committee on
Education and the chairman
of the House Committee on
Education, the President of
the PCC Alumni Association
as well as the President of the
Chamber of Commerce of the
Philippines). Whereas, among
others, the NEDA Director-
General, the Secretary of
Industry and the Secretary of
Labor are members of the
PUP Board of Regents.
(section 6, P.D. 1341)
d) The decree moreover
transferred to the new
university all the properties
including "equipment and
facilities:"
". . . owned by
the Philippine
College of
Commerce and such
other National
 Schools as may be
integrated . . .
including
their obligations and  §12. All parcels of land,
appropriations . . ."
(sec. 12; emphasis
supplied) 3
But these are hardly indicia of an intent
to abolish an existing institution and to
create a new one. New course
offerings can be added to the
curriculum of a school without affecting
its legal existence. Nor will changes in
its existing structure and organization
bring about its abolition and the
creation of a new one. Only an express
declaration to that effect by the
lawmaking authority will.
The Court of Appeals also cites the
provision of P.D. No. 1341 as allegedly
implying the abolition of the PCC and
the creation of a new one - the PUP -
in its stead:
buildings, equipment and
facilities owned by the
Philippine College of
Commerce and such other
national schools as may be
integrated by virtue of this
decree, including their
obligations and appropriations
thereof, shall stand
transferred to the Polytechnic
University of the
Philippines, provided,
however, that said national
schools shall continue to
receive their corresponding
shares from the special
education fund of the
municipal/provincial/city
government concerned as are
 now enjoyed by them in
accordance with existing laws
and/or decrees.
The law does not state that the lands,
buildings and equipment owned by the
PCC were being "transferred" to the
PUP but only that they "stand
transferred" to it. "Stand transferred"
simply means, for example, that lands
transferred to the PCC were to be
understood as transferred to the PUP
as the new name of the institution.
But the reinstatement of petitioner to
the position of president of the PUP
could not be ordered by the trial court
because on June 10, 1978, P.D. No.
1437 had been promulgated fixing the
term of office of presidents of state
universities and colleges at six (6)
years, renewable for another term of
six (6) years, and authorizing the
President of the Philippines to
terminate the terms of incumbents who
were not reappointed. P.D. No. 1437
provides:
§6. The head of the university
or college shall be known as
the President of the university
or college. He shall be
qualified for the position and
appointed for a term of six (6)
years by the President of the
Philippines upon
recommendation of the
Secretary of Education and
Culture after consulting with
the Board which may be
renewed for another term
upon recommendation of the
Secretary of Education and
Culture after consulting the
Board. In case of vacancy by
reason of death, absence or
resignation, the Secretary of
Education and Culture shall
have the authority to
designate an officer in charge
of the college or university
pending the appointment of
the President.
The powers and duties of the
President of the university or
college, in addition to those
specifically provided for in this
Decree shall be those usually
pertaining to the office of the
president of a university or
college.
§7. The incumbent president
of a chartered state college or
university whose term may be
terminated according to this
Decree, shall be entitled to
full retirement
benefits: provided that he has
served the government for at
least twenty (20) years;
and provided, further that in
case the number of years
served is less than 20 years,
he shall be entitled to one
month pay for every year of
service.
In this case, Dr. Pablo T. Mateo Jr.,
who had been acting president of the
university since April 3, 1979, was
appointed president of PUP for a term
of six (6) years on March 28, 1980,
with the result that petitioner's term
was cut short. In accordance with §7 of
the law, therefore, petitioner became
entitled only to retirement benefits or
the payment of separation pay.
Petitioner must have recognized this
fact, that is why in 1992 he asked then
President Aquino to consider him for
appointment to the same position after
it had become vacant in consequence
of the retirement of Dr. Prudente.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by
SETTING ASIDE the questioned
orders of the Regional Trial Court
directing the reinstatement of the
petitioner Isabelo T. Crisostomo to the
position of president of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines and the
payment to him of salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during his
suspension in so far as such payment
would include salaries accruing after
March 28, 1980 when petitioner
Crisostomo's term was terminated.
Further proceedings in accordance
with this decision may be taken by the
trial court to determine the amount due
and payable to petitioner by the
university up to March 28, 1980.
SO ORDERED.
 
Crisostomo vs. CA, 258 SCRA 134 (1996)
FACTS:Crisostomo was appointed the President of the
Philippine College of Commerce (PCC) by the
Presidentof the Philippines. During his incumbency, two
administrative charges were filed against him for
illegaluse of government vehicles, misappropriation of
construction materials, oppression and harassment,grave
misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty before the Office
of the President. Likewise, he was alsocharged with
violation of Anti-Grant and Corrupt Practices Act with
the Tanodbayan. As such, he waspreventively suspended
and Dr. Mateo was designated as the officer-in-charge in
his place. Meanwhile,Pres. Marcos passed PD 1341
converting PCC into PUP with Mateo as President.
Crisostomo was lateracquitted and his administrative
charges were dismissed
.ISSUE: Did PD 1314 abolish PCC?
HELD:PD 1314 did not abolish, but only changed the
PCC into what is now PUP. What took place was
a changein the academic status of the educational
institution, not in its corporate life. Hence, the change in
itsname, the expansion of its curriculum offerings and
changes in its structure and organization.As a general
rule, when the purpose of the lawmaking authority is to
abolish the office and create a newone, he says so. In the MERCELITA C. MARANAN, CRISTITUTO C.
instant case, PD 1314 merely states that PCC is converted LLOREN, HERNANDO M. EVANGELISTA,
into the PUP. Inaddition, the law does not state that the
lands, buildings and equipment owned by the PCC and CARLOS BACAY, JR., petitioners, 
were being vs.
“transferred” to the PUP but only that they “stand transferred” to it. HON. RONALDO D. ZAMORA, in his
“Stand transferred” simply means, capacity as the Executive Secretary, HON.
for example, that lands transferred to the PCC were to be ANDREW B. GONZALES, in his capacity
understood as transferred to the PUP as thenew name of
the institution.
as the Secretary of Education, and HON.
CARLOS D. TUASON, in his capacity as
the Chairman of the Philippine Sports
Commission, respondents.

FIRST DIVISION DECISION

G.R. No. 142283             February 6, 2003 CARPIO, J.:

ROSA LIGAYA C. DOMINGO, ROMEO M. The Case

FERNANDEZ, VICTORIA S. ESTRADA,
JULIETA C. FAJARDO, ADELAIDA B. This is a petition for certiorari and
GAWIRAN, MARCIANO M. SERVO, prohibition with prayer for temporary
1 

VICTORIA S. DAOANG, FELICIANO N. restraining order seeking to nullify Executive

TOLEDO III, JAYNELYN D. FLORES, MA. Order No. 81 and Memoranda Nos. 01592
LIZA B. LLOREN, ROMELIA A. and 01594. The assailed executive order
2 

CONTAPAY, MARIVIC B. TOLITOL, PAZ transferred the sports development programs

LEVITA G. VILLANUEVA, EDITHA C. and activities of the Department of Education,
HERNANDEZ, JOSE HERNANDEZ, JR., Culture and Sports ("DECS" for brevity) to the
VERONICA C. BELLES, AMELITA S. BUCE, Philippine Sports Commission ("PSC" for
brevity). The questioned memoranda ("DECS
Memoranda" for brevity), on the other hand,
reassigned all Bureau of Physical Education
and School Sports ("BPESS" for brevity)
personnel named in the DECS Memoranda to
various offices within the DECS.
The Facts
On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph
E. Estrada issued Executive Order No.
81 ("EO 81" for brevity) entitled "Transferring
3 
the Sports Programs and Activities of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports
to the Philippine Sports Commission and
Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based
Sports."
EO 81 provided thus:
"Section 1. Transferring the Sports Program
and Activities to the PSC. All the functions,
programs and activities of DECS related to
sports development as provided for in Sec. 16
of EO 117 (s. 1987) are hereby transferred to
PSC.
Section 2. Defining the Role of DECS in
School-Based Sports. The DECS shall have
jurisdiction and function over the
enhancement of Physical Education (P.E.)
curriculum and its application in whatever
form inside schools.
Section 3. The Role of PSC. As the primary
agency tasked to formulate policies and
oversee the national sports development
program, the management and
implementation of all school-based sports
competitions among schools at the district,
provincial, regional, national and international
levels, in coordination with concerned public
and private entities shall be transferred to the
PSC."
Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary
Andrew B. Gonzales ("Secretary Gonzales"
for brevity) issued Memorandum No. 01592
on January 10, 2000. Memorandum No.
01592 temporarily reassigned, in the exigency
of the service, all remaining BPESS Staff to
other divisions or bureaus of the DECS
effective March 15, 2000.
On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales
issued Memorandum No. 01594 reassigning
the BPESS staff named in the Memorandum
to various offices within the DECS effective
March 15, 2000. Petitioners were among the
BPESS personnel affected by Memorandum
No. 01594. Dissatisfied with their
reassignment, petitioners filed the instant
petition.
In their Petition, petitioners argue that EO 81
is void and unconstitutional for being an
undue legislation by President Estrada.
Petitioners maintain that the President’s
issuance of EO 81 violated the principle of
separation of powers. Petitioners also
challenge the DECS Memoranda for violating
their right to security of tenure.
Petitioners seek to nullify EO 81 and the
DECS Memoranda. Petitioners pray that this
Court prohibit the PSC from performing
functions related to school sports
development. Petitioners further pray that,
upon filing of the petition, this Court issue a
temporary restraining order against
respondents to desist from implementing EO
81.
During the pendency of the case, Republic
Act No. 9155 ("RA 9155" for brevity),
otherwise known as the "Governance of Basic
Education Act of 2001", was enacted on
August 11, 2001. RA 9155 expressly
abolished the BPESS and transferred the
functions, programs and activities of the
DECS relating to sports competition to the
PSC. The pertinent provision thereof reads:
"SEC. 9. Abolition of BPESS. – All functions,
programs and activities of the Department of
Education related to sports competition shall
be transferred to the Philippine Sports
Commission (PSC). The Program for school
sports and physical fitness shall remain part
of the basic education curriculum.
The Bureau of Physical Education and School
Sports (BPESS) is hereby abolished. The
personnel of the BPESS, presently detailed
with the PSC, are hereby transferred to the
PSC without loss of rank, including the
plantilla positions they occupy. All other
BPESS personnel shall be retained by the
Department."
The Issue
The issue to resolve is whether EO 81 and
the DECS Memoranda are valid.
The Court’s Ruling
We dismiss this petition for being moot and
academic.
As manifested by both petitioners and
4  Executive Office and in order to achieve
respondents, the subsequent enactment of
5  simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
RA 9155 has rendered the issues in the
present case moot and academic. Since RA
9155 abolished the BPESS and transferred
the DECS’ functions relating to sports
competition to the PSC, petitioners now admit
that "it is no longer plausible to raise any ultra
vires assumption by the PSC of the functions
of the BPESS." Moreover, since RA 9155
6 
Although the issue is already academic, its
significance constrains the Court to point out
that Executive Order No. 292 ("EO 292" for
brevity), otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, expressly grants
the President continuing authority to
reorganize the Office of the President.
Section 31 of EO 292 provides:
"SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the
President to Reorganize his Office. – The
President, subject to the policy in the
continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the
President. For this purpose, he may take any
of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization
of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate Offices, the

Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers

provides that BPESS personnel not
System and the Common Support
transferred to the PSC shall be retained by
System, by abolishing, consolidating or
the DECS, petitioners now accept that "the
merging units thereof or transferring
law explicitly protects and preserves" their
7 

functions from one unit to another;

right to security of tenure.
 (2) Transfer any function under the
Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as
transfer functions to the Office of the
President from other Departments and
Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the
Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as
transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other Departments or
Agencies." (Emphasis supplied.)
Since EO 81 is based on the President’s
continuing authority under Section 31 (2) and
(3) of EO 292, EO 81 is a valid exercise of the
8 
President’s delegated power to reorganize the
Office of the President. The law grants the
President this power in recognition of the
recurring need of every President to
reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency." The Office of the
President is the nerve center of the Executive
Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the
Office of the President must be capable of
being shaped and reshaped by the President
in the manner he deems fit to carry out his
directives and policies. After all, the Office of
the President is the command post of the
President. This is the rationale behind the
President’s continuing authority to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of
the President.
Petitioners’ contention that the DECS is not
part of the Office of the President is
immaterial.  Under EO 292, the DECS is
1awphi1.nét
indisputably a Department of the Executive
Branch. Even if the DECS is not part of the
Office of the President, Section 31 (2) and (3)
of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President to
transfer any function or agency of the DECS
to the Office of the President. Under its
charter, the PSC is attached to the Office of
the President. Therefore, the President has
9 
the authority to transfer the "functions,
programs and activities of DECS related to
sports development" to the PSC, making EO
10 
81 a valid presidential issuance.
However, the President’s power to reorganize
the Office of the President under Section 31
(2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished
from his power to reorganize the Office of the
President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO
292, the President can reorganize the Office
of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units, or by
transferring functions from one unit to
another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and
(3) of EO 292, the President’s power to
reorganize offices outside the Office of the
President Proper but still within the Office of
the President is limited to merely transferring
functions or agencies from the Office of the
President to Departments or Agencies, and
vice versa.
transferred to PSC were at first temporarily,
then later permanently reassigned to other
offices of the DECS, ensuring their continued
employment. At any rate, RA 9155 now
mandates that these employees "shall be
retained by the Department."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

This distinction is crucial as it affects the

security of tenure of employees. The abolition
of an office in good faith necessarily results in
the employee’s cessation in office, but in such
event there is no dismissal or separation
because the office itself ceases to exist. On
11 

the other hand, the transfer of functions or

agencies does not result in the employee’s
cessation in office because his office
continues to exist although in another
department, agency or office. In the instant
case, the BPESS employees who were not