People vs Austria

FACTS:

It appears from the records that in the morning of August 10, 1975, the police dug out of the ground in a
sugarcane field in sitio Palanas, Sagay, Negros Occidental, the lifeless body of Tomas Azuelo. Found
near his grave were the traces of blood and a bloodstained piece of wood. Post mortem examination
showed that Tomas Azuelo's skull was fractured and his body sustained eighteen (18) stab wounds,
fifteen (15) of which were fatal. The payroll, together with the sum of P771.40 intended for the wages of
laborers of Hacienda Austria, of which Azuelo was the overseer, was missing.

Four suspects for the death of Tomas Azuelo were picked up by the police working together with the
Philippine Constabulary. One of the suspects, Pablo Austria, was the last person who was seen with
Tomas Azuelo. They boarded a tricycle together, on August 9, 1975 at about 3:30 p.m., from the
poblacion of Sagay and alighted at about 4:00 p.m. at crossing Tupas.

The other suspects were implicated based on the sworn statement dated September 17, 1975 of Pablo
Austria, who imputed to his son Eduardo, his brother-in-law Jaime de la Torre and Leopoldo Abanilla,
the commission of the crime.

On September 17, 1975, Gregorio Eras, Deputy Chief of Police, Sagay, Negros Occidental, filed a
complaint for robbery with homicide against Eduardo Austria, Pablo Austria, Jaime de la Torre and
Leopoldo Abanilla, After preliminary examination, Judge Emilio Ignalaga, Acting Municipal Judge,
Sagay, Negros Occidental, issued a warrant of arrest against herein appellants. All the accused pleaded
not guilty to the charge.

Pablo Austria testified that Tomas Azuelo was his second degree cousin. On August 9, 1975, he was
summoned by the wife of Tomas Azuelo to fetch water. He was in Azuelo's house from 11:00 o'clock in
the morning, took his lunch thereat upon invitation of Azuelo's wife and waited for Tomas Azuelo up to
7:00 o'clock in the evening for his compensation in plowing their farm. On August 14, 1975, he was
picked up without a warrant of arrest by a policeman and a PC soldier while working on the concrete
cover of the deceased's tomb. He was investigated without informing him of his right to remain silent and
to counsel. After six (6) days in detention he was released upon the intercession of Iluminada, wife of the
deceased. On September 17, 1975 he was again picked up by Voltaire Yee at about 7:00 o'clock in the
evening. Jaime de la Torre, who was with him in the PC stockade, struck him in the head with a revolver
on orders of a certain Torenas, a PC soldier. Later, he was brought out of the PC stockade and Torenas
kicked and boxed him. The following day, Alberto Olario, the commanding officer, again maltreated him
as he refused to admit participation in the killing of Tomas Azuelo. On orders of the commanding officer,
Voltaire Yee prepared an affidavit. He did not read the affidavit, as he does not know how to read, nor
was it read to him. Voltaire Yee forced him to affix his thumbmark in the affidavit inside the office of
Judge Ignalaga. (TSN, December 4, 1978, pp. 171-200)

In his testimony, Jaime de la Torre disowned the statements attributed to him during the investigation
conducted by Sgt. Vicente Aquino and instead declared that it was not Eduardo Austria but Carlos
Capitle, Jr. who borrowed his hoe in the afternoon of August 9, 1975. He also contradicted the statements
contained in the affidavit that he saw Pablo Austria, Eduardo Austria and another person standing near
the body of the deceased. Instead, he testified that in the sugarcane field that day (August 14, 1975), he
saw Carlos Capitle, Jr. and Celestino Capitle with another person looking at the dead body of Azuelo. He
helped cover the dead with grass on orders of Carlos Capitle with warning not to tell his family or
anybody, otherwise his family will be killed. He admitted ownership of the hoe but denied any
participation in the killing. He also claimed that he was arrested without warrant and detained for more
than a month in the PC headquarters, at Sagay, Negros Occidental. During said detention he was
investigated and allegedly maltreated by Captain Olario (TSN, January 22, 1980, pp. 149-170, 210-221,
393-404).

On March 18, 1980, the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellants of the imputed crime
ISSUE:
W/N the appellant’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the circumstantial evidence of the
prosecution.
 DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This resolves a contempt charge1 against respondent Amado A.P. Macasaet (Macasaet), a newspaper
columnist, for authoring publications imputing bribery to a member of this Court.

The Facts

Macasaet writes a daily column, "Business Circuit," in Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation. In the
18-21 September 2007 issues of Malaya, Macasaet ran a story, based on information obtained from
confidential sources, of an alleged bribery in the Court committed as follows: on separate occasions in
the second week of September 2007, 2 five3 boxes containing cash worth P10 million were delivered to
the Court and received by a certain "Cecilia," a staff of an unnamed lady Justice, who opened one of the
boxes and saw its contents. Forthwith, the Justice terminated "Cecilia’s" employment. The payoff was
made allegedly in connection with a decision rendered by the Justice "acquitting" a Filipino-Chinese
businessman. Macasaet’s story, which carried commentaries on the state of the judiciary and
reputation of judges,4 exhorted "Cecilia" to divulge everything she knows about the alleged bribery and
the Court to investigate the matter.

Subsequently, Newsbreak, an online magazine, posted on its website 5 a news report that the Court is
investigating a bribery incident based on facts substantially similar 6 to what Macasaet wrote. Written by
Marites Danguilan Vitug (Vitug), Newsbreak editor, and Aries Rufo (Rufo), Newsbreak reporter, the
news report named Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago as the member of the Court involved in the
alleged bribery and one Cecilia Delis (Delis)7 as her staff whose employment she terminated.

On 24 September 2007, Justice Santiago issued a statement denying the "accusations and insinuations"
published in Malaya and Newsbreak. Justice Santiago also asked the Court to investigate the matter.

In a Resolution dated 25 September 2007, the Court en banc required Macasaet to explain "why no
sanction should be impose[d] on him for indirect contempt of court" under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.8 After Macasaet submitted his compliance and Delis her affidavit, the
Court, in the Resolution of 16 October 2007, created a Committee, composed of former members of the
Court,9 to "receive evidence from all parties concerned" and submit its report and recommendation
within 30 days from the start of its hearing. Macasaet, Vitug, Rufo, Delis and other Court employees 10
appeared and testified before the Committee.

Macasaet, Vitug and Rufo uniformly testified that they obtained the information on the alleged bribery
from their respective confidential sources. Delis denied having received or opened any box containing
cash intended for Justice Santiago. While admitting that she was a staff of Justice Santiago, Delis denied
having been fired from service and claimed that she resigned effective 15 March 2007. Danilo Pablo of
the Court’s Security Division testified that while visitors to the Court are listed in the logbook at the
Court’s gate, the security personnel, as a matter of policy, do not open gifts or boxes intended for
members of the Court.

It was determined during the hearings conducted by the Committee that the case referred to in
Macasaet and Newsbreak’s11 publications is G.R. No. 172602 (Henry T. Go v. The Fifth Division,
Sandiganbayan). The petition in G.R. No. 172602 sought the nullification of the Sandiganbayan’s ruling
denying quashal of the Information filed against petitioner Henry T. Go (Go) for violation of Section 3(g),
Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). In a Decision dated 13 April 2007, penned
by Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Third Division, by a divided vote, 12 dismissed the petition in G.R. No.
172602. Go sought reconsideration and while his motion was pending, Justice Callejo retired from the
Court. In the Resolution dated 3 September 2007, penned by Justice Santiago, a Special Third Division,
again by a divided vote,13 granted Go’s motion, reversed the Decision of 13 April 2007, and dismissed
the Information filed against Go. The respondent sought reconsideration which awaits resolution.

In its Report and Recommendation dated 10 March 2008 (Report), the Committee found that "there
exist valid grounds x x x to cite x x x Macasaet for indirect contempt x x x." The Report found that (1)
Macasaet’s publications were false, baseless,14 unbelievable,15 and malicious16 and (2) Macasaet was
negligent in failing to ascertain the veracity of his story. 17 The Committee concluded that Macasaet’s
publications generated public distrust in the administration of justice and thus, contumacious. The
majority finds the Report’s findings and conclusion well-taken and accordingly imposes a punitive fine
on Macasaet.

I agree with the majority that Macasaet failed to substantiate his story. However, I disagree with the
majority’s conclusion that this suffices to hold Macasaet guilty of contempt of court.

Preliminary Observations

On the Nature of this Proceeding

As stated, this is a proceeding to determine Macasaet’s liability for criminal contempt 18 under Section
3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 19 Thus, its scope is narrow and its purpose specific: to
determine, using applicable standards, whether Macasaet’s publications tend to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice. Care must be taken that, in undertaking this task, we do not tread
beyond the limited confines of this proceeding and enter into the larger determination of whether
bribery, as defined in our criminal statutes, 20 did or did not take place to remove a member of this Court
from office. The Constitution has vested such power only on Congress 21 which, upon proper complaint
and after due proceedings, determines whether a member of this Court can be impeached for, among
others, bribery.22 Observance of this jurisdictional delineation has a practical consequence: this
proceeding terminates either in Macasaet’s citation or non-citation for indirect contempt of court
depending on whether his publications are deemed contumacious.

On Whether this Case Should be Decided

by the Court En Banc or by the Special Third
Division in G.R. No. 172602

While there may have been confusion at the start as to which case was involved in the reported
bribery,23 it is now settled that the case is G.R. No. 172602 pending with the Special Third Division
(awaiting resolution of respondent's motion for reconsideration). Hence, it is but proper and logical that
the Special Third Division resolve this matter which, after all, is but an incident to G.R. No. 172602.
While this Court is a collegiate court, it is no less a court of law when it sits in a division than when it sits
en banc, to resolve judicial matters, or, as here, a contempt charge. At any rate, whether it is the Court
en banc or the Special Third Division in G.R. No. 172602 which resolves this matter, Macasaet’s conduct
is not contumacious.

The Committee Proceedings were Fatally Defective

The Resolution dated 16 October 2007 created the Committee to:

[R]eceive x x x evidence from all the parties concerned [and] x x x, on its own, call such persons
who can shed light on the matter. It shall be endowed with all the powers necessary to discharge
its duty.
The Committee read this Resolution as having granted it mere "fact-finding" powers. 24 Accordingly,
when the witnesses the Committee summoned testified, the Committee monopolized the right to
propound questions to the witnesses, denying to Macasaet such right.

This procedure is fatally defective for patent denial of due process, rendering the testimonies in
question inadmissible.

A proceeding for criminal contempt, as here, is adversarial. 25 At the heart of such adversarial process is
the parties’ right to test the veracity of the testimonies of adverse witnesses through cross-examination.
With the procedure the Committee adopted, Macasaet was reduced to a passive participant, unable to
subject the testimonies of adverse witnesses to rigorous probing under cross-examination. As matters
stand, Macasaet will be subjected to punitive sanctions based on evidence he had no opportunity to
scrutinize.

True, the Committee solicited the views of the parties, and the counsels for the Newsbreak staff26 and
Delis27 agreed with the Committee's characterization of the proceedings as mere fact-finding. 28
However, this acquiescence is no more binding on the Court than the Committee's view. It is an
erroneous conclusion of law which cannot transform the nature of a contempt proceeding from
adversarial to non-adversarial.

Nor can it be said, as the ponencia holds, that Macasaet waived his right to conduct cross-examination
for his failure to "timely assert" such right. This conclusion erroneously presupposes that Macasaet
should have asserted such right at that point. The Committee stated at the outset that its investigation
was merely "fact-finding," making Macasaet believe that there would be another occasion for a cross-
examination of the witnesses. Thus, Macasaet did not insist on his right to cross-examine at that point.
Having been denied the right to cross-examine from the start, there was nothing which Macasaet could
have "timely asserted."

The Applicable Standard in Contempt-by-Publication

Proceedings

At any rate, the evidence at hand fails to meet the applicable standard in contempt-by-publication
proceedings.

This matter comes on the heels of a small but growing line of jurisprudence on contempt-by-
publication;29 however, this is only the second incident to involve this Court on reports of corruption. 30
These cases implicate two competing but equally vital State interests: on the one hand, the right of
journalists to be protected from contempt of court under the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and of the press and, on the other hand, the right of the courts to maintain order, impartiality and
dignity in the administration of justice. In resolving the matter, we are called upon to perform a task
more commonly done in constitutional adjudication – the balancing of constitutional values using
applicable standards. As ever, the result of this delicate task hinges on the liberality or stringency of the
test used against which the two interests are weighed.

In concluding that "there exist valid grounds x x x to cite x x x Macasaet for indirect contempt x x x," the
Report implicitly used two parameters, first applied in In Re: Emil P. Jurado31 (Jurado test), against which
Macasaet’s publications were measured: (1) whether Macasaet’s story was false and (2) whether
Macasaet could have prevented the publication of the false story by exercising diligence in verifying its
veracity.32 As stated, the Report found Macasaet’s publications wanting on both counts.

However, long before we adopted the Jurado test, this Court already laid down the two "theoretical
formulas" to serve as the judicial scales upon which the competing interests in this proceeding are
weighed. We held in Cabansag v. Fernandez:33
 Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights of similar
import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between freedom of
expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the [1] "clear and present danger" rule
and the [2] "dangerous tendency" rule. The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means that
the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded
against is the "substantive evil" sought to be prevented. And this evil is primarily the "disorderly
and unfair administration of justice." This test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It
provides the criterion as to what words may be published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas
cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such advocacy
will harm the administration of justice.

xxxx

Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of [the first] rule, the Supreme Court of
the United States said "Clear and present danger of substantive evils as a result of indiscriminate
publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an impairment of the constitutional right of
freedom of speech and press only if the evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high. . . . A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional
protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still
pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case it must necessarily tend to obstruct the
orderly and fair administration of justice.["] x x x x

xxxx

The "dangerous tendency" rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases where extreme
difficulty is confronted in determining where the freedom of expression ends and the right of
courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the
basic principle of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to
petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They are
subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against
contempt (Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325.)

This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which
the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some
definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that
such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably
calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural
tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the
legislative body seeks to prevent. (Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U.S. 652.)

Thus, in this jurisdiction, we have long ago applied the clear and present danger test in contempt
cases.34 We must scrutinize Macasaet's publications through the lens of the clear and present danger
test guided by these queries: (1) is the evil consequence of Macasaet’s publications extremely serious?
and (2) is the degree of its imminence extremely high? The facts of this case do not meet either
criterion.

Although the majority, in adopting the Report’s findings, did not expressly so state, it appears that the
substantive evil allegedly brought about by Macasaet’s publications is two-fold: (1) disrespect for the
Court and (2) unfair administration of justice. To determine to what extent the substantive evil is likely
to occur, we must turn to the particular utterances and the circumstances of their publication. 35 On the
question of disrespect for the Court, the Report seemed to have cherry-picked words from Macasaet's
publications describing the Court’s reputation ("sagging" and "soiled"), the state of the courts ("dirty"),
and the public’s appraisal of judges ("thieves") and separated them from their context to arrive at its
conclusion. Adopting the same approach, the majority holds that "[Macasaet] has absolutely no basis to
call the Supreme Court a court of 'thieves' and a 'basket of rotten apples.'" 36

A simple resort to the publications in question belies these findings. Macasaet used these terms to bring
home his point that (1) the alleged bribery "proves" the less than a desirable state of affairs in the
judiciary (that is, the courts are "dirty"); (2) which reflects on the entire judiciary (similar to a basket of
apples where, if "there are a few which are rotten[;] [t]hat makes the whole basket rotten"); and (3)
that the Court must investigate the reported bribery with Delis’ aid to save the other members of the
Court from "suspicions they are thieves." 37 Thus, taken in context of their actual use as they appeared in
Macasaet's publications, the words the majority finds contumacious are no more disrespectful of courts
than when a publication states that a reported pay-off "proves" that the judiciary is populated by
"hoodlums in robes."38

On Macasaet’s statement that the Justice in question "shamed her court" and that she should resign or
be impeached, it needs no further elaboration that this statement is not directed at the Court but at
one of its members. Without passing judgment on the nature of this statement, it is obvious that the
remedy for any injury this may have caused lies not in this Court’s exercise of its contempt power but in
the resort by the Justice concerned to remedies available under our civil and criminal statutes to
vindicate her rights.39

On the question of unfair administration of justice, neither has it been claimed nor suggested that this
matter has or will adversely affect the disposition of the pending incident in G.R. No. 172602. If there is
any party which stands to be directly prejudiced by the alleged bribery, it is the government whose case
against Go was ordered dismissed in the Resolution of 3 September 2007. However, the government
has not asked for Justice Santiago's inhibition from that case, indicating its continuing trust and
confidence in her impartiality. With this backdrop, the Report's conclusion that Macasaet’s publications
"generate[d] public distrust in the administration of justice" and wrought "damage and injury" to the
"institutional integrity, dignity, and honor" 40 of this Court rings hollow, rooted on assumptions bereft of
factual basis. As well observed by then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in Jurado
which also involved a journalist who authored false reports of corruption in the Court:

There is nothing in the record, however, showing the degree how respondent's false report
degraded the administration of justice. The evidence from which this conclusion can be deduced is
nil. The standing of respondent as a journalist is not shown. The extent of readership of respondent
is not known. His credibility has not been proved. Indeed, nothing in the record shows that any
person lost faith in our system of justice because of his said report. Even the losing party x x x does
not appear to have given any credence to the said false report.41 (Emphasis supplied)

These observations are consistent with the rule that the clear and present danger test is deemed met
only upon showing that "the material would tend to cause the unfair disposition of pending cases" 42 or
create an imminent and serious threat to the ability of the Court to decide the issues before it. 43 In sum,
the facts of this case fall short of the stringent standard under the clear and present danger test that the
substantive evil brought about by the publications be extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high.44

The clear and present danger test, which this Court has been applying in contempt cases, 45 is most
protective of free speech and of free press, basic rights which are necessary for the exercise of almost
every other fundamental right.46 That this case is a criminal contempt proceeding gives added
protection to Macasaet who invokes freedom of the press. Indeed, Macasaet is afforded the basic rights
granted to the accused47 in a criminal case and as precondition for citing him in contempt, intent to
commit contempt of court must be shown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Good faith or absence
of intent to harm the courts is a valid defense. 48 Macasaet did invoke good faith but the Report brushed
it aside as "tongue in cheek protestation[]." 49
The clear and present danger test is the most exacting and protective test in favor of free press. Before
a journalist can be punished in a criminal contempt case, as in this case, there must be proof beyond
reasonable doubt that his publication tends to obstruct the administration of justice, and such
obstruction must be extremely serious, likely resulting in an unfair decision, and the degree of
imminence of the obstruction actually happening extremely high.

Macasaet and Newsbreak based their reports on the alleged bribery from information obtained from
their respective confidential sources. In short, it was a professional call on the part of Macasaet and
Newsbreak to run the story. This Court should be the last to attribute negative motives for this
judgment call.50 Admittedly, Macasaet has failed to substantiate his story – spread over four issues of
Malaya, divulging bits and pieces of vague information. This, however, does not serve to lessen the
protection afforded to the publications which carried them under the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and of free press. Journalists, "agents of the people" 51 who play a vital role in our polity by
bringing to the public fora issues of common concern such as corruption, must be accorded the same
"breathing space" for erroneous statements necessary for free expression to thrive in a democratic
society.52

Further, failure to substantiate a story, or even the mere falsity of publications, had long ceased to
suffice to hold journalists in contempt of court (unless there is a clear and present danger that such
false reports will impair the administration of justice) 53 just as it had long ceased to suffice to hold
journalists liable for libel for criticism of public officials under the actual malice standard. 54 Chief Justice
Puno’s discussion of this point in Jurado is most illuminating:

[R]espondent [is punished] for publishing "stories shown to be false . . . stories that he made no
effort whatsoever to verify and which, after being denounced as lies, he has refused, or is unable
to substantiate." The undue weight given to the falsity alone of respondent's columns is
unsettling. For after finding respondent's columns as false, the majority did not go any further to
determine whether these falsehoods constitute a clear and present danger to the administration
of justice.

xxxx

[T]he majority cites in support of its non-too-liberal stance the cases of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan and Garrison v. Louisiana. These cases, however, are ground breaking in importance for
they expanded the protection given to freedom of speech and of the press. New York Times
restricted the award of damages in favor of public officials in civil suits for damages arising out of
libel precisely because of their chilling effects on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the
press. To be entitled to damages, the public official concerned was imposed a very difficult, if not
impossible, burden of proof. He was required to prove that the defamatory statement was not
only false but was made with "actual malice." This means he has to prove that the defamatory
statement was made with the "knowing falsity or with a reckless disregard for the truth." On the
other hand, Garrison did not only reiterate but even extended the New York Times rule to apply to
criminal cases. x x x x

xxxx

The majority opinion in the case at bench certainly did not follow the New York Times rule which
was reiterated and even expanded in Garrison. The majority halted after finding that the
respondent's columns are false or slanted. 55 (Boldfacing supplied)

To support its conclusion finding Macasaet guilty of contempt of this Court, the majority made a
selective survey of contempt of court jurisprudence and sought to apply them here. However, of the
cases the majority cites, only three involved contempt by publication proceedings, two of which, In re
Kelly[56] and In re Sotto57 were decided long before we laid down the parameters of the clear and
present danger test in Cabansag.58 As for the third case of People v. Godoy, 59 the Court in fact applied
the clear and present danger test in that case, thus:

Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily assume that level of contumely which is
actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Neither do we believe that the publication in
question was intended to influence this Court for it could not conceivably be capable of doing so.
The article has not transcended the legal limits for editorial comment and criticism. Besides, it has
not been shown that there exists a substantive evil which is extremely serious and that the
degree of its imminence is so exceptionally high as to warrant punishment for contempt and
sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, while ostensibly using relevant jurisprudence to arrive at its conclusion, the majority actually
relied on the liberal parameters of the "falsity and negligence test" used in Jurado. The "falsity and
negligence test" is a sharp dagger aimed at the heart of free speech and of free press. Applied for the
first time in Jurado and nowhere else on this planet, this test does not consider the seriousness or
imminence of the substantive evil sought to be prevented. Any kind of unflattering publication to a
judge or court, whether or not putting at risk a fair trial or decision, becomes punishable for contempt if
false and the journalist could have prevented the publication by exercising diligence to verify its
veracity. Good faith is not a defense.

The "falsity and negligence test" compels the journalist to guarantee the veracity of what he writes on
pain of criminal contempt of court. Obviously, this has a chilling effect on free speech and free press.
This will lead to self-censorship, suppressing the publication of not only what is false but also of what is
true. Critics of judges or the courts will be forced into silence, unless they are willing to face
imprisonment or fine for criminal contempt. The "falsity and negligence test" is a dangerous throwback
to the Dark Ages in the history of free speech and of free press.

By approving the Report’s reliance on the Jurado test, the majority perpetuates a double-standard vis-a-
vis publications critical of public officials. On the one hand, the majority applies the liberal "falsity and
negligence test" in lieu of the exacting clear and present danger test to scrutinize publications critical of
judges in contempt cases, and on the other hand, applies the stringent "actual malice test" for
publications critical of all other public officials.

This Court has extended the constitutional protection of free speech to publications critical of a
barangay official,60 provincial governor (and concurrently a cabinet official), 61 and other public figures,62
for lack of proof of knowledge that the publication was false or of reckless disregard of whether the
publication was false or not. However, the Court today is imposing punitive sanctions on a journalist for
authoring publications imputing malfeasance on a member of the Court because the journalist failed to
substantiate his story, despite incontrovertible proof that he acted in good faith as shown by the
parallel publication of the same story by another media outlet based on its own confidential sources
(which, significantly, was never made to justify its conduct).

Supreme Court Justices, as public officials, and the Supreme Court, as an institution, are entitled to no
greater immunity from criticism than other public officials and institutions. 63 Indeed, the dual-treatment
that the majority tolerates turns on its head the purpose of the contempt power: instead of
"protect[ing] immediate litigants and the public from the mischievous danger of an unfree or coerced
tribunal" it "protects the court as a mystical entity or the judges x x x as anointed priests set apart from
the community and spared the criticism to which in a democracy other public servants are exposed." 64
As the Highest Court of the land, the Court should be the first to resist the temptation to privilege its
members with the shield of lese-majeste, through the liberal "falsity and negligence test," at the
expense of diluting the essence of the free press guarantee indispensable in a democratic society. This
Court diminishes itself if it diminishes the free press guarantee, for an independent judiciary needs a
free press as much as a free press needs an independent judiciary. 65
Courts must, as a matter of self-preservation, be able to defend themselves. But it is not against all
attacks that they can employ the preservative 66 power of contempt. As this Court recognized more than
half a century ago in Cabansag, it is only when the evil brought about by the attack is "extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high" so as to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration
of justice that courts must act. To apply this exacting test is not to deny a right inherent in courts but to
recognize their place in a free society always accountable to the public whom they serve and for whom
they exist. More than a decade ago, this Court was given the chance in Jurado, as the Court is again
now, of applying to itself this rigorous test to an unsubstantiated publication imputing corruption to a
member of this Court. The eloquent words of Chief Justice Puno explaining why a step towards such a
direction serves the cause of press freedom and good government remain true today as they did then:

[I]t is not every falsehood that should incur the Court’s ire, lest it runs out of righteous indignation.
Indeed, gross falsehoods, vicious lies, and prevarications of paid hacks cannot deceive the public
any more than can they cause this Court to crumble. If we adopt the dangerous rule that we
should curtail speech to stop every falsehood we might as well abolish freedom of speech for
there is yet to come a man whose tongue tells only the truth. In any event, we should take
comfort in the thought that falsehoods cannot destroy — only truth does but only to set us free.

xxxx

[T]he columns of respondent dealt with the sensitive subject of corruption in courts. It cannot be
gainsaid that corruption in government is a matter of highest concern to our citizenry. Yet it is a
problem that defies solution primarily because it is a subject where people in the know maintain
the countenance of a claim. Thus, the prosecution of corruption in government has not hit a high
note and that what now appears as the most effective restraint against corruption in government is
the fear of the light of print. If the light of print continues to be a strong deterrent against
government misdeeds, it is mainly because newsmen have an unimpeded access to information.
On many an occasion, these confidential sources of information are the only leads to government
malfeasance. To fashion a rule derogatory of the confidentiality of newsmen's sources will result in
tremendous loss in the flow of this rare and valuable information to the press and will prejudice
the State's policy to eliminate corruption in government. In the absence of clear and convincing
evidence that respondent knowingly foisted a falsehood to degrade our administration of justice,
we should be slow in citing him for contempt. The New York Times rule correctly warned us that
occasional erroneous statements are "inevitable in free debate . . . and must be protected if the
freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need, to survive.'"

xxxx

[T]he abuses of some newsmen cannot justify an overarching rule eroding the freedom of all of
them. Indeed, the framers of the Constitution knew that these abuses will be committed by some
newsmen but still, they explicitly crafted section 4, Article III of the Constitution to read: "[No law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press . . . " Madison
stressed that "some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything, and in no
instance is this more true than in that of the press." There is an appropriate remedy against abusive
newsmen. I submit, however, that the remedy is not to be too quick in wielding the power of
contempt for that will certainly chain the hands of many newsmen. Abusive newsmen are bad but
laundered news is worse.

xxxx

[T]he Constitution did not conceive the press to act as the cheer leader of government, including
the judiciary. Rather, the press is the agent of the people when it gathers news, especially news
derogatory to those who hold the reins of government. The agency is necessary because the
people must have all available information before they exercise their sovereign judgment. As well
observed: "The newspapers, magazines, and other journals of the country, it is safe to say, have
 shed and continue to shed, more light on the public and business affairs of the nation than any
other instrument of publicity; and since informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints
upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press
cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern." As agent of the people, the most
important function of the press in a free society is to inform and it cannot inform if it is
uninformed. We should be wary when the independent sources of information of the press dry
up, for then the press will end up printing "praise" releases and that is no way for the people to
know the truth.67 (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, I vote NOT to hold Macasaet in contempt of court.

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice

Footnotes

1
Initiated by the Court motu proprio under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

2
Macasaet’s column of 18 September 2007 stated that the bribery took place a "week" before 18
September 2007. Macasaet later changed the date to coincide with the "acquittal" of a Chinese-
Filipino litigant (subsequently identified as Henry Go in G.R. No. 172602 whose motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition was granted on 3 September 2007). When he
testified during the investigation of this case, Macasaet again changed the date of the pay-off, this
time to cover the period November 2006 - 15 March 2007.

3
Macasaet’s column of 18 September 2007 mentioned only a single box.

4
The relevant comments are: "the gift gives proof to the pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty"
(18 September 2007 issue); "[t]he court is like a basket of apples. There are a few which are
rotten[;] [t]hat makes the whole basket rotten" (18 September 2007 issue); "[t]he names and
reputations of highly-respected jurists must be saved from suspicions they are thieves" (18
September 2007 issue); "[t]he lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or be impeached"
(19 September 2007 issue); Cecilia has "a duty to save the sagging reputation of the Supreme
Court" (20 September 2007 issue); and the resignation or impeachment of the justice involved "is
the only way the soiled reputation of the Highest Court could be restored" (20 September 2007
issue).

5
www.Newsbreak.com.ph

6
The Newsbreak story mentioned only a "gift-wrapped box" containing cash "estimated" at P10
million.

7
Also referred to in other parts of the records as Daisy Cecilia Muñoz Delis.

8
The Resolution reads in full:

Upon evaluation of the columns "Business Circuit" of Amado P. Macasaet in the September 18, 19,
20, and 21, 2007 issues of the Malaya, it appears that x x x certain statements and innuendos
therein tend, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice,
within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 WHEREFORE, Amado P. Macasaet is ORDERED TO EXPLAIN why no sanction should be
impose[d] on him for indirect contempt of court in accordance with Section 3(d), (Rule 71) of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

9
Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, as Chairperson, with Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Romeo
Callejo, Sr. as members. However, Justices Mendoza and Callejo recused themselves from the
Committee and were replaced by Justices Jose C. Vitug (ret.) and Arturo Buena (ret.), respectively.
Justice Buena also recused himself from the Committee and was replaced by Justice Justo Torres
(ret.).

10
Danilo Pablo, Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division; Araceli Bayuga, Cashier; and Midas P.
Marquez, Public Information Officer and Chief of Staff, Office of the Chief Justice.

11
In its report, Newsbreak also mentioned a second case involving a "341-hectare prime property
in Quezon City."

12
Justices Alicia Austria-Martinez and Minita Chico-Nazario concurred in the ruling. Justice
Santiago, joined by Justice Antonio Eduardo Nachura, filed a dissenting opinion,

13
Justices Adolfo Azcuna and Cancio Garcia concurred in the ruling. Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez,
joined by Justice Minita Chico-Nazario, filed a dissenting opinion.

14
The Report states (pp. 16-18):

The following inconsistencies and assumptions of Macasaet prove that the alleged bribery story
lacks veracity:

1. For instance, he said that he could not get confirmation of the bribery story given to him by
his source. Later, he said that his sources "told me they had personal knowledge" but would
not reveal the name of the Lady Justice (65 tsn Jan. 10, 2008).

2. His allegation that the Lady Justice (later identified as Justice Santiago) did not report for
work "last week", i.e., the week before his first columns came out on September 18, 2007, was
refuted by the Court’s Public Information Officer (PIO) Atty. Midas Marquez, who testified that
no Lady Justice was absent that week.

3. The date when the gift-wrapped box of money was allegedly opened by Cecilia is also
uncertain because of Macasaet’s conflicting allegations about it. Macasaet’s first column of
September 18, 2007, stated that it happened "last week", i.e., sometime in the week of
September 10-14, 2007.

The next day, September 19, 2007, he however wrote in his column that "the five boxes (not
one) of money were delivered on the day (September 3, 2007) when the Lady Justice, acting as
ponente, acquitted" the accused Henry T. Go.

But again, because his story about Cecilia’s role in the discovery of the bribery in September
2007, was contradicted by the record of Cecilia's resignation from the Court on March 15,
2007 (Annexes "D" and "D-1", Cecilia Delis’ Letter of Resignation & Clearance), Macasaet, after
consulting his "source" again, changed his story when he testified on January 17, 2008. He said
that, according to his source, the boxes of money were delivered, not any one time in
September 2007, but on different dates in November 2006 up to March 2007, "before Cecilia
resigned or was fired from the office of Justice Santiago." (5-6 tsn Jan. 17, 2008)

That allegation is, however, refuted by the logbooks of the Security Services for the period of
November 2006 to March 2007 which contain no record of the alleged deliveries of boxes of
 money to the office of Justice Santiago. Danilo Pablo, head of the February 1, 2008, he denied
that said he that, --"I never said carnation boxes; I said milk boxes that should make a lot of
difference." (84 tsn Feb. 1, 2008).

Court’s Security Services affirmed that in his [sic] ten (10) years of service in the Court he has
not received any report of boxes of money being delivered to any of the Justices. (45-46 tsn
Jan. 22, 2008)

[4.] Which of the five (5) boxes was opened and yielded money? In his column of September
21, 2007, Macasaet alleged that Cecilia picked up the five boxes of money "several times in
March" ("not last week as I mistakenly reported"), and "she never opened the first four
boxes.... she opened the last and saw the money because the Lady Justice was absent on that
day."

But when he testified before the Committee on January 10, 2008, Macasaet alleged that it was
"the first one that was opened" according to his source (71, 89, 92, 125 tsn Jan. 10, 2008)

Contradicting his published story that five (5) boxes of money were delivered "on the day" the
Lady Justice acquitted Henry Go, Macasaet testified at the investigation that they were
delivered "on different occasions according to my source" (70 tsn Jan. 10, 2008)

But no sooner had he attributed that information "to my source" than he admitted that it was
only "my own conclusion x x x I assumed that the giver of the money is not so stupid as to
have them delivered all in one trip. As a matter of fact I even wondered why said boxes were
not delivered in the home of the Lady Justice." (72 tsn Jan. 10, 2008).

[5.] The amount of the bribe is also questionable. For while in his own column of September
18, 2007 Macasaet stated that the gift was "estimated at Php 10 million", he later testified on
January 10, 2008, that "the amount was my own calculation because I talked to people, I said
this kind of box how much money in One Thousand Pesos bills can it hold, he told me it is ten
(million). So that was a calculation" (77 tsn Jan. 10, 2008).

He also merely "assumed that the money was in one thousand peso bills (78 tsn Jan. 10, 2008).
No one really knows their denomination.

He said he was told that the size of the box where the money was placed was "this milk called
carnation in carton." x x x But in the final hearing on February 1, 2008 he denied [such and
stated] "I never said carnation boxes. I said milk boxes[.] [T]hat should make a lot of
difference" (84 tsn Feb. 1, 2008).

[6.] Since only one gift-wrapped box of money was opened, Macasaet admitted that he has
"no knowledge" of whether the four (4) other boxes were also opened, when and where they
were opened, and by whom they were opened (90 tsn Jan. 10, 2008). Therefore, no one
knows whether they also contained money.

That the five (5) boxes contained a total of ten million pesos, is just another assumption of
Macasaet’s. "It is a conclusion based on estimates obtained from friends and how much five
boxes can hold in one thousand peso bills, more or less ten million," he explained (91 tsn Jan.
10, 2008). (Emphasis in the original)

15
The Report states (p. 18):

In view of its tenuous underpinnings, we find the bribery story in Macasaet’s columns of
September 18-21, 2007, and in Ms. Vitug’s Newsbreak issue of September 25, 2007, unbelievable.
Why should five boxes supposedly containing a total of Php 10 million as bribe money be delivered
to the office of a Lady Justice in the Supreme Court, where it would have to pass examination by
the security guards and quizzical eyes of her own employees? Why not to her home? Or at some
agreed meeting place outside the Court and her home? Or why not quietly deposit it in her bank
account? And why was she absent from her office on the day of the presumably agreed date for
the payment of the bribe? If the bribe was for dismissing the information against Henry Go in the
Sandiganbayan, why was it paid prematurely in November 2006-March 2007 when the case of
Henry Go was still up in the air and in fact was decided against him on April 13, 2007? The
favorable resolution on his motion for reconsideration, penned by Justice Santiago, was
promulgated on September 3, 2007, almost one year after the pay-off, if there was such a pay-off?
(Emphasis in the original)

16
The Report states (p. 20):

If he had no malice toward the Court, if, as he professes, the purpose of his columns was to save
the integrity and honor of the Court, Macasaet should, and could, have reported the rumored
bribery directly to the Chief Justice and asked for its investigation. He should have refrained from
calling the Court names, before giving it a chance to act on his report and on his suggestion to
investigate the matter. Since he knew the name of the Court employee who allegedly discovered
the bribe money, the Court could have begun its investigation with her to ascertain the identity of
the nameless Lady Justice and the veracity of the rumored bribery. His disparaging remarks about
the Court and jurists in conjunction with his unverified report on the alleged bribery were totally
uncalled for and unjustified.

17
The Report states (p. 15):

The Committee observed that Macasaet’s tory about the bribery and of Cecilia’s role in supposedly
discovering it, is full of holes, inconsistencies, and contradictions, indicating that he did not exercise
due diligence, patience, and care in checking the veracity of the information fed to him, before
giving it publicity in his columns. Nor was he bothered by the damage that his columns would inflict
on the reputation of a member of the Highest Court and on the Court itself. In fact, he was "happy"
that he wrote the columns (103 tsn Jan. 10, 2008). Even if he failed to get confirmation of the
bribery," one day sooner or later, somebody would come up and admit or deny it. He did not care
that he smeared the whole judiciary to fish her out, because "after she is fished out, the suspicion
on the rest would be removed". (29-30 tsn Jan. 10, 2008).

18
As distinguished from "civil contempt," criminal contempt is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect; it is also an
offense against organized society and public. Civil contempt, on the other hand, consists in failing
to do something ordered by the court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party (People
v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977 [1995]).

19
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has
been filed and an opportunity to respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be
fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxxx

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice.

20
Article 210, Revised Penal Code.

21
Section 3, Article XI, Constitution.
22
Section 2, Article XI, Constitution.

23
In her statement dated 24 September 2007, Justice Santiago adverted to "a big land dispute in
Quezon City" as the possible reason for the bribery reports. See also note 11.

24
The Committee chair, Justice Griño-Aquino, stated during the Committee’s first hearing on 7
January 2008 (TSN, 7 January 2008, pp. 29-30):

It is clear from the Resolution of the Court that our task is fact finding[. W]e would like, the
Court is interested to know the facts supporting what it refers to as the innuendos which are
derogatory and degrading to the reputation of the Court itself, x x x. So, that is why the
Supreme Court is interested to know the facts x x x.

Although in the hearing of 7 January 2008, Committee member Justice Vitug stated that "the
Committee x x x would not be in a position to make any pre-judgment x x x on the scope of its
authority but x x x shall act in accordance with what it believes to be the mandate of the
Court" (TSN, 7 January 2008, p. 28), he later stated in the subsequent hearing of 24 January
2008 that "we are here only to make some findings and that’s it x x x" (TSN, 24 January 2008,
p. 90).

25
See Soriano v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 128938, 4 June 2004, 431 SCRA 1, 7-8) where we held
that "[t]he modes of procedure and rules of evidence adopted in contempt proceedings are similar
in nature to those used in criminal proceedings."

26
Atty. Fulgencio Factoran.

27
Atty. Ricardo Pamintuan.

28
TSN, 7 January 2008, pp. 15, 27. The counsel for Macasaet did not make any manifestation.

29
For publications by journalists, see In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 (1930); In re Abistado,
57 Phil. 669 (1932); In Re Brillantes, 42 O.G. 59 (1945); Murillo v. Superable, 107 Phil. 322 (1960);
People v. Castelo, No. L-11816, 23 April 1962, 4 SCRA 947. For publications of letters written, or
interviews given, by citizens, see In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944 (1916); People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265
(1939); In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949); Zaldivar v. Gonzalez, Nos. L-79690-707, 7 October 1988, 166
SCRA 316.

30
The first is In Re: Emil P. Jurado, 313 Phil. 119 (1995).

31
Id.

32
While Jurado also mentioned other "postulates" to resolve the contempt charge in that case
(namely, whether the publication is violative of the Philippine Journalist Code of Ethics and
offensive to the dignity and reputation of a Court or a judge presiding over it), the Report made no
mention of these "postulates." However, the Report did refer to Newsbreak’s Guide to Ethical
Journalistic Conduct which Macasaet allegedly "violated" for making several false assumptions.

33
102 Phil. 152, 161-164 (1957).

34
See Cabansag v. Fernandez supra note 33 and People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977 (1995). This is also
the prevailing test in the U.S. jurisdiction in contempt-by-publication cases (see Pennekamp v.
State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331 [1946]; Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 [1947]; Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 [1941]). For a discussion on the evolution of this test in that jurisdiction as used in
contempt-by-publication cases, see Turkington v. Municipal Court, 85 Cal. App.2d 631, 193 P.2d
795 (1948). In this jurisdiction, the test has likewise been used to determine the constitutionality of
regulations and official pronouncements amounting to censorship (e.g. Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, 26 July 1996, 259 SCRA 529; Chavez v. Gonzalez, G.R. No.
168338, 15 February 2008). As used in First Amendment cases in the U.S. jurisdiction, this test has
been refined under the Brandenburg standard in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (see
separate and concurring Opinion, Carpio, J. in Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, 15 February
2008).

35
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941).

36
Majority Opinion, p. 39.

37
See note 4.

38
A term, made popular by a former Chief Executive, which has gained currency in public discourse
on corruption in the judiciary.

39
Significantly, in her statement dated 24 September 2007, Justice Santiago reserved "her right to
file the appropriate criminal charges."

40
Report, p. 19.

41
In Re: Emil P. Jurado supra note 30.

42
40 A.L.R.3d 1204.

43
See Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).

44
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).

45
See Cabansag v. Fernandez supra note 33; People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977 (1995).

46
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills, No. L-31195, 5
June 1973, 51 SCRA 189 (1973). For an extensive discussion of the vital role of free expression in a
democratic society, see Chavez v. Gonzalez, G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008, Carpio, J.,
concurring.

47
Such as the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt
(People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977 [1995]).

48
People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977 (1995).

49
The Report states (p. 19):

Macasaet's diatribes against the Court generates public distrust in the administration of justice
by the Supreme Court, instead of promoting respect for its integrity and honor. They derogate
his avowal of "highest respect for this Court" (100 tsn Jan. 10, 2008); his declaration that he
has "always upheld the majesty of the law as interpreted by the Court" (96 tsn Jan. 10, 2008);
that his opinion of the Court has actually been "elevated ten miles up" because of its decisions
in the cases involving Proclamation No. 1017, the CPR, EO 464, and the People's Initiative (97
tsn Jan. 10, 2008); that he has "done everything to preserve the integrity and majesty of the
Court and its jurists" (84-85 tsn Feb. 1, 2008); that he wants "the integrity of the Court
preserved because this is the last bastion of democracy" (32 tsn Jan. 10, 2008).
 These tongue-in-cheek protestations do not repair or erase the damage and injury that his
contemptuous remarks about the Court and the Justices have wrought upon the institutional
integrity, dignity, and honor of the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact nowhere in his columns
do we find a single word of respect for the Court or the integrity and honor of the Court. On
the contrary, what we find are allegations of "pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty",
suspicious that the jurists are "thieves"; that the Highest Court has a "soiled reputation", and
that the Supreme Court has a "sagging reputation". (Emphasis supplied)

This finding loses sight of the import of Newsbreak’s publication which, while substantially
echoing Macasaet’s, was indisputably based on information gathered from its own
independent sources.

50
Just as this Court should not tell Macasaet on what proper course of action to take vis-a-vis the
confidential information he received or worse, categorize his decision to print the story as proof of
malice as the Report does (Report, p. 20). To do so is to come dangerously close to telling
journalists how to do their work, a function this Court is least qualified to undertake outside of its
adjudicatory role.

51
In Re: Emil P. Jurado supra note 30 at 367, Puno, J., dissenting.

52
See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).

53
Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946). The rule is stated thus: "If a person, by false
charges against a court, does directly interfere with the administration of justice he may be
punished for a constructive contempt, and the constitutional guarantee will not protect him. But
before he can be so punished the false charges must be of such a nature that they not only have a
‘reasonable tendency’ to obstruct justice, but also must constitute ‘a clear and present danger’ to
the administration of justice. Intemperate language, false charges, and unfair criticism, no matter
how strongly expressed, may be in bad taste, but they do not constitute a constructive contempt
unless there is an immediate, clear and present danger imperiling the administration of justice."
(Turkington v. Municipal Court, 193 P.2d 795, 802 [1948]; emphasis supplied). Of course, it does
not follow that erring journalists and their publishers should not earn the public’s ire for sloppy
journalistic work. As a jurist in another jurisdiction well observed:

One can have no respect for a newspaper which is careless with facts and with insinuations
founded in its carelessness. Such a disregard for the truth not only flouts standards of
journalistic activity observed too often by breach, but in fact tends to bring the courts and
those who administer them into undeserved public obloquy.

But if every newspaper which prints critical comment about courts without justifiable basis in
fact, or withholds the full truth in reporting their proceedings or decisions, or goes even
further and misstates what they have done, were subject on these accounts to punishment for
contempt, there would be few not frequently involved in such proceedings. There is perhaps
no area of news more inaccurately reported factually, on the whole, though with some
notable exceptions, than legal news.

xxxx

Courts and judges therefore cannot be put altogether beyond the reach of misrepresentation
and misstatement. x x x The question, and the standard, must be one of degree and effects. It
cannot be placed at mere falsity, either in representation or in judgment. The statement,
whether of fact or of opinion, must be of such a character, whether true or false, as to
obstruct in some clear and substantial way the functioning of the judicial process in pending
matters. It is not enough that the judge’s sensibilities are affected or that in some way he is
brought generally into obloquy. After all, it is to be remembered that it is judges who apply the
 law of contempt, and the offender is their critic. (Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U.S. 331,
370-372 (1946), Rutledge, J., concurring; citations omitted).

54
As held in New York Times v. Sullivan (376 U.S. 254 [1964]), the actual malice standard is met
upon proof of knowledge that the publication was false or with reckless disregard of whether the
publication was false or not.

55
In Re: Emil P. Jurado supra note 30 at 362-365. The ponencia sought to blunt the impact of Chief
Justice Puno's observation by differentiating Jurado from this case, thus (Majority Opinion, p. 43):

"The critical issues [in Jurado] were the right of newsmen to refuse subpoenas, summons, or
'invitations' to appear in administrative investigations, and not to reveal their confidential
sources of information under R.A. No. 53, as amended. None of these are the issues at hand."

A perfunctory scanning of Jurado reveals exactly the opposite and that, as in this case, the
newsman in Jurado was cited for contempt for publishing false stories the veracity of which he
failed to confirm, thus (id, note 30 at 188-189):

The Actual Issue

The issue therefore had nothing to do with any failure of Jurado's to obey a subpoena, none
ever having been issued to him, and the Ad Hoc Committee having foreborne to take any
action at all as regards his failure to accept its invitations. The issue, as set out in the opening
sentence of this opinion, essentially concerns "(l)iability for published statements
demonstrably false or misleading, and derogatory of the courts and individual judges."

Jurado is not being called to account for declining to identify the sources of his news stories,
or for refusing to appear and give testimony before the Ad Hoc Committee. He is not being
compelled to guarantee the truth of what he publishes, but to exercise honest and reasonable
efforts to determine the truth of defamatory statements before publishing them. He is being
meted the punishment appropriate to the publication of stories shown to be false and
defamatory of the judiciary — stories that he made no effort whatsoever to verify and
which, after being denounced as lies, he has refused, or is unable, to substantiate. (Emphasis
supplied)

RULING:
NO.
In the first place, as stated in the appealed decision, the evidence of the prosecution against appellant
Eduardo Austria is merely circumstantial. Aside from the extra-judicial confessions of the deceased
appellants, there is neither direct evidence nor actual witness to the commission of the crime.

The series of circumstances proved must be consistent with each other and that each and every
circumstance must be consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. To
warrant conviction in criminal cases based upon circumstantial evidence, it must constitute an unbroken
chain of events so as to lead to a conviction that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In the
case at bar, the circumstantial evidence do not prove an unbroken link of events that could give rise to a
reasonable and fair conclusion that appellant committed the imputed offense.

As regards appellant Eduardo Austria, the only evidence against him is that he was seen at about 1:00
o'clock in the afternoon of August 9, 1975 along the road going to Hda Austria. This evidence even if
tied up with the testimony of Iluminada Azuelo that Austria harbored ill-feelings against the deceased
because he was dismissed from the hacienda by the deceased does not establish or support an inference,
much less a conclusion, that he participated in the commission of the offense charged. The conviction of
appellant Eduardo Austria on an inference based on another inference cannot be maintained.

37.Ilagan v. Enrile
G.R. No. 70748, October 21, 1985

FACTS:

Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were arrested by the PC-INP on the basis of a Preventive Detention Action
(PDA) issued by the late strongman Ferdinand Marcos on January 25, 1985. A PDA legitimizes a
warrantless arrest. First to be arrested and detained in Camp Catitipan, Davao City was Ilagan on May
10. Arellano, meanwhile, was arrested when he and 14 other lawyers from the Davao chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) visited Ilagan on the same day.  Risonar was arrested on May 13
when he visited Camp Catitipan to verify his arrest papers.

They were arrested, according to then Brig. Gen. Dionisio Tan-Gatue, PC-INP Region IX Commander, for
alleged “specific acts of rebellion and economic sabotage as well as for their leadership in the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)”. He cited as well the participation of the detained lawyers in
a Welgang Bayan (People’s Strike) in Davao City. Gen Tan-Gatue also accused the three of “using their
profession as lawyers as cover-up for their activities in furtherance of CPP goals and objectives”.

Lawyers for Enrile, Gen. Tan-Gatue, and then acting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) Lt. Gen. Fidel Ramos, named respondents in the case, justified the arrest and detention of the
lawyers by contending that it was conducted under a PDA; that the writ of habeas corpus was
suspended by virtue of Proclamation 2045-A; and that courts do not have the authority to inquire into
the cause and validity of detention of persons held pursuant to the suspension.

(Proclamation 2045-A stated that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended in the
two autonomous regions of Mindanao and in all other places with respect to persons detained or who
will be detained for insurrection, rebellion, subversion, economic sabotage, etc. It was an amendment
to Proclamation 2045 that supposedly lifted Martial Law on January 17, 1981.)

While justifying the arrest and detention of the lawyers as legitimate because of the PDA and
Proclamation 2045, the military’s lawyers filed an information for rebellion against the detained
attorneys before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City Branch X on May 27, 1985 or 17 days after Ilagan
was arrested, which then became the basis of a warrant of arrest.

No preliminary investigation was conducted. Lawyers of the military then asked the SC to dismiss the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus because it was supposedly already rendered moot and academic by
the said filing of information.

During the first hearing on the habeas corpus petition on May 23, 1985 the SC actually ordered the
immediate release of the detained lawyers on recognizance of their principal counsels – former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate Justice Jose B.L. Reyes. But the military refused to
honor the SC order to immediately release the detainees with military officials saying that it had to be
verified from higher authorities. Then, as already mentioned, a case was hastily filed before a trial court
in Davao City four days later.

Petitioners argued that the arrests were illegal; that the Welgang Bayans were in legitimate exercise of
the constitutional right of expression and assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievances; that the detained attorneys’ participation was limited to serving in the legal panel and the
negotiating panels; that Proclamation 2045 was unconstitutional because there exists no factual or legal
basis for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus as provided for in the 1973 Constitution; that the
evidence presented by respondents against the detained attorneys were of a doubtful and flimsy
nature; and that the PDA was unconstitutional because it violates the 1973 Constitution prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for habeas corpus should be granted in behalf of
persons arrested and detained without the basis of an arrest warrant.

HELD:
On October 21, 1985, the SC ruled that the petition for habeas corpus was already moot
and academic since Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were detained by virtue of a warrant of
arrest by Regional Trial Court of Davao City in relation to a criminal case of rebellion
filed against them before the said court. It argued that the function of a special
proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention. But because
the detained lawyers’ incarceration was already by virtue of a judicial action in relation
to a criminal case (no matter if such case was filed more than two weeks after the arrests
were made), the remedy of habeas corpus supposedly no longer applies. The SC added
that questions to the legality of the arrest or lack of preliminary investigation should be
addressed to the Davao City trial court.

6. Dela Cruz Vs. People

FACTS:

Complainants alleged that a certain Ariel Escobedo was picked up by several unknown male persons
believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. Complainants were instructed to proceed to the
Gorordo Police Station. They met “James” at the Police Station, who demanded from them P100,000.00
which was later lowered to P40,000.00, in exchange for the release of Ariel.

The accused was nabbed after an entrapment operation was conducted. The accused was later brought
to the forensic laboratory where he was required to submit his urine for drug testing. The test yielded a
positive result for presence of dangerous drugs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal. (NO)

HELD:

The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but
only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.

The drug test was in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. It is
incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs.

Immunity from Statutes

1. Mapa vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

Petitioner herein was charged with violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices.However he was
granted an immunity from suit by the PCGG related to the previous charges against him, provided that
he will testify as witness against the Marcoses in criminal proceedings in the United States Vs Ferdinand
Marcos, during the RICO, where Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, Imelda Marcos were being tried for
charges of corruption. All the expenses of Mapa were shouldered by the PCCG when they flew to New
York to testify against the Marcoses. During the trial, Ferdinand Marcos died and La Bella, the American
prosecutor dispensed the testimony of Mapa and thereby acquitted Imelda Marcos. Since Mapa, was
not able to testify, it was contended that the immunity from suit of Mapa took without force and effect.
However, the record shows that the petitioners provided information to the PCGG relating to the
prosecution of the RICO cases against the Marcoses in New York. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the immunity given by the PCGG to Mapa is still in effect and force.

HELD:

Yes. Under Sec. 5, EO 14, the PCGG has the separate power to grant immunity to any person from being
prosecuted provided they will meet the conditions provided by the PCGG.

In the case at bar, Mapa was granted immunity from the prosecution or criminal case where he is being
tried, and the PCGG even shouldered all the expenses of Mapa when they flew to New York to testify
implying that Mapa was able to meet the conditions and the PCGG accepted the information given by
him (MAPA) to testify against the Marcoses during the RICO trial. Failure of the petitioner to testify on
the RICO can not nullify the immunity given to him by the PCGG since the petitioner was able to satisfy
the requirements both of the law and the parties’ implementing agreements. Though the petitioners
were not able to testify against the Marcoses in RICO, it can be said that it not their own fault.

Wherefore, the petitioner must be acquitted on the basis of the immunity granted by the PCGG, which
under the law has the power to grant immunity.

TWO KINDS OF IMMUNITY CAN BE GRANTED:

1. Transactional Immunity - is broader aint he scope of its protection. By its grant the witness can
no longer be prosecuted for any offence whatsoever arising out of the act or transaction.

2. Used-and-derivative-use - a witnessed is only assured that his or her particular testimony and
evidence derived from it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution.

2. Disini vs. Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

On 16 February 1989, the Republic of the Philippines and Disini entered into an Immunity Agreement
under which Disini undertook to testify for the Republic and provide its lawyers with the information,
affidavits, and documents they needed in its case against Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the
United States District Court of New Jersey and in the arbitration case that Westinghouse International
Projects Company and others filed against the Republic before the International Chamber of Commerce
Court of Arbitration. Disini worked for his second cousin, Herminio, as an executive in the latter's
companies from 1971 to 1984.

The Republic believed that the Westinghouse contract for the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power
Plant, brokered by one of Herminios companies, had been attended by anomalies. In the Immunity
Agreement, the Republic guaranteed that, apart from the two Westinghouse cases, it would not compel
Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign proceeding brought by the Republic against Herminio.
Disini complied with his undertaking but 18 years later, upon the Republic's application, the
Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena against Disini, commanding him to testify and produce documents
before that court in an action that the Republic filed against Herminio. Disini moved to quash the
subpoena, invoking the Immunity Agreement.

The Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and issued a new subpoena directing him to testify before it.
Subsequently, the PCGG revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement insofar as it prohibited the
Republic from requiring Disini to testify against Herminio. Later on, the Sandiganbayan denied Disinis
motion to quash the subpoena. Disini, thus, brought the matter to the Supreme Court. The Republic
maintained that the PCGGs power to grant immunity under Section 5 of Executive Order 14 covered
only immunity from civil or criminal prosecution and did not cover immunity from providing evidence in
court.

The Republic argued that Disini's immunity from testifying against Herminio contravened the state's
policy to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired under the regime of former President Marcos. The Republic
further argued that under the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement which reads:
Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disini's obligation to provide truthful information or testimony,
Disini, despite the immunity given him against being compelled to testify in other cases, was to provide
truthful information or testimony in such other cases.

For his part, Disini argued that the Republic, through the PCGG, was estopped from revoking the
questioned immunity as it had made him believe that it had the authority to provide such guarantee.
The Republic countered by invoking Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
(t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees from
them or from their nominees, or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.

ISSUE:

Did the PCGG act within its authority when it revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement?

HELD:

No. PCGG needs to fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini did. More than anyone, the government
should be fair. The language of Section 5, Executive Order 14 affords latitude to the PCGG in
determining the extent of the criminal immunity it may grant. It has discretion to grant appropriate
levels of criminal immunity depending on the situation of the witness and his relative importance to the
prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this case, to conditions expressed by the
witness as sufficient to induce cooperation. Trusting in the Government's honesty and fidelity, Disini
agreed and fulfilled his part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due
process, should hold the Republic on to its promise.

A contract is the law between the parties; it cannot be withdrawn except by their mutual consent.
This applies with more reason in this case where Disini already complied with the terms of the Immunity
Agreement. To allow the Republic to revoke the Immunity Agreement at a late stage would run afoul of
the rule that a party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it had enjoyed its benefits. The
Court should not allow the Republic, to put it bluntly, to double cross Disini. The Immunity Agreement
was the result of a long drawn out process of negotiations with each party trying to get the best
concessions out of it.

The Republic did not have to enter into that agreement; it was free not to. But when it did, it needed to
fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini did. More than anyone, the government should be fair.
It has been a settled rule that by seeking affirmative relief, voluntary appearance or submission to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan constitute waiver on the objection regarding lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner. Jurisprudence holds that an objection based on lack of jurisdiction over the
person is waived when the defendant files a motion or pleading which seeks affirmative relief other
than the dismissal of the case.

PCGG's revocation of the questioned immunity and Sandiganbayan's denial of Disini's motion to quash
the subpoena were both annulled.

Excessive Fines and Cruel and Inhuman Punishments

1. Corpuz vs. People

FACTS

 Facts according to private complainant:

o According to private complainant Danilo Tongcoy, he and the petitioner (Corpuz) met at
the Admiral Royale Casino is Olongapo City sometime in 1990.
o Private complainant (Tongcoy) was then engaged in a business of lending money to
casino players and petitioner (Corpuz) heared that Tongcoy had some jewelries for sale.
o Corpuz approached Tongcoy on May 2, 1991 and offered to sell the said jewelries on a
commission basis.
o Tongcoy agreed and turned over to the petitioner the following items with a total value
of 98,000 pesos:
 18k diamond ring for men (45,000 pesos)
 woman’s bracelet (12,000 pesos)
 1 men’s necklace (*price not indicated in case but it’s 16,000 pesos)
 men’s bracelet (25,000 pesos)
o According to Tongcoy, Corpuz signed a receipt. And they both agreed that the
petitioner shall remit the proceed of the sale and/or, if unsold to return the same items,
within a period of 60 days.
o The period expired without the petitioner remitting the proceeds of sale or returning
the unsold jewelries.
o Private complainant was able to meet the petitioner, and the latter promised that he
will pay for the value of items entrusted to him. (But to no avail)
o Private complainant then filed against petitioner the crime of estafa.
 Petitioner Corpuz entered a plea of not guilty. Trial in the merits ensued.
 Defense presented the lone testimony of the petitioner.
o Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is
engaged in loaning business
o Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant.
 o Petitioner admitted of obtaining a loan from Balajadia for which he signed a black
receipt.
o Petitioner claimed that the same receipt then dated May 2, 1991 was used as evidence
against him for the supposed agreement to sell the jewelries, which he never saw.
 RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
1, subparagraph b of the RPC. (ruling: 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional in it’s
medium period as minimum to 14 years and 8 months of reclkusion temporal in its minimum
period as the maximum. To indemnify the amount of 98,000 as actual damage and to pay for
the cost of suit.)
 Case was elevated to the court of appeals. Petition was also denied. CA affirmed with
modification (indeterminate penalty of 4 years 2 months of prison correccional, as minimum, to
8 years of prison mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional 10,000 pesos or a total of
7 years)
o According to the petitioner, CA erred in affirming the rules of trial court, admitting the
evidence of receipt, although it was merely a photocopy, thus violating the rule of
evidence.
 Records show that the petitioner never objected the admissibility of the said
evidence at the time it was identified.
 Established doctrine is when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to
evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection is
considered waived.
o Another procedural issue raised by the petitioner that there was a formally defective
information filed against him. The information does not contain the period when the
jewelries were to be returned and that the date of the crime was different from the one
testified by the private complainant (Tongcoy)
 According to CA, objections as to the matter of form and substance in
information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
 Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of
the owner (time of the occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime.)
 Exclusion of the period and wrong date of occurrence of the crime do not make
the information fatally defective.
o Moreoever, according to the petitioner the last element of estafa, which is, that there is
a demand by the offended party on the offender, was not proven.
 Court disagrees.
 No specific type of proof is required to show there was demand.
 Demand need not be formal; it maybe verbal. (should a written demand be
necessary, the law should have stated so)
o k

 The prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the elements of the crime.
 The credibility of prosecution’s sole witness was also questioned by the petitioner.
o SC gived great respected to the evaluation of the RTC for it has a unique opportunity to
observe the witness (specially when affirmed by the CA), an opportunity denied by the
appellate court

 QUESTION OF THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF IMPOSING ON PERSONS CONVICTED OF CRIMED

INVOLVING PROPERTIES CAME UP.
 Members of the division reached no unanimity on the question above, they referred the case to
the Court en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae (an impartial
adviser to a court of law in a particular case) were invited. (Senate president and speaker of the
house was invited)
 Legislature pegged these penalties to the value of money and property in 1932 when the RPC
was enacted.
 There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the court
continues to impose on crime against property committed today, based on the amount of
damage measured by the value of money 80 years ago in 1932.
 The court however cannot modify the range of penalties because that would constitute juridical
legislation.
 However, this does not render the whole situation without remedy. The framers of the RPC
anticipated this matter by including Art. 5
o “Art. 5 – duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which
are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties”
o If not punishable by law – court shall render the proper decision and shall report to
Chief Executive thru DOJ and the reasons why the act should be made subject of penal
legislation
o In case of excessive penalties – where the act is already punishable by law, the only
remedy is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief
Executive thru DOJ the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-
commensurate with the act. (why the penalty is excessive)
 Some of the justices feels that the penalties imposed in the RPC is excessive, based on my
understanding. However, they could not change these penalties since it is the Legislation’s job
to do so.
 An argument raised by Dean Jose Manula Diokno, one the esteemed amici curiae, that the
incremental penalty (IPR – incremental penalty rule) provided under Art 315 (Estafa) of the RPC
violated the Equal Protection Clause and is a cruel and unusal punishement. The equal
protection clause require equality among equals, which is tested by 4 requisites:
o Classification rest on substantial distinctions
 IPR does not rest on substantial distinctions as 10k may be substancial in the
past, but not today. (violates first requisite)
o Germane to the purpose of law
 IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher amounts
would receive heavier penalties, however this is no longer achieved cause a
person who steals 142k would receive the same penalty as someone who steals
100M. (violates second requisite)
o Not limited to existing conditions only
 The IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated,
conditions that no longer exist today. (violated 3 rd req.)
o Applies equally to all members of the same class (not violated )
 Assuming the court submits the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental penalty
in Art 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, then this proposition poses
more questions than answers. According to the court, the only remedy it to refer these matters
to Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.
 Dean Diokno’s was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the
remedy if to go to Congress
 Changing the penalty through court decision may not be legal and constitutionally feasible. The
duty of the Court is merely to apply the laws in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative
power by judicial legislation. The Court should shy away from encroaching the primary function
of the Legislative Body; otherwise this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
 Justice Antonio Caprio’s opinion also states that the incremental penalty provisions should be
declared unconstitutional. He also suggested that until the law is amended by the Congress, all
crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate penalties. HOWEVER, drastic
twist in the application of law has no legal basis and directly counter to what the law provides.
 According to case, death penalty was reintroduced, however the court did not impede the
imposition of the death penalty on the grounds that it is a “cruel punishment”. So even if the
 imposed penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the court cannot declare the provisions of the
law where the penalty emanates to be unconstitutional. The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.
 Even if they find the penalties imposed cruel, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt
it in our modern time.

ISSUE

Whether or not there is a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties (excessive fines)
that the courts continue to impose against property committed today – specially in estafa.

RULING

Petition to review on Certiorati petitioned by Lito Corpuz is DENIED.

The Court affirmed with modification the decision of RTC and Court of Appeals finding the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b)
of the RPC. The Court affirmed with Modification that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment ranging from 3 years, 2 months and 11 days of prison correccional, as minimum, and
15 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

2. Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998

Facts:

The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old
daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the said
crime.

He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied both motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY
LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7659.

The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the
grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being violative of due process, a
violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, an undue delegation of
legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate,
and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.

In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.

The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the
Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or
unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the
questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more
economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty; R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A.
No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary
of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.

The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as
Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae. They alleged
similarly with Echegaray’s arguments.

The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the petition.

Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional
muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of
legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.

Issue:

1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment?

2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?

3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?

4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?

Held:

No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.

Ratio:

1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out
lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said
drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the
execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause
the greatest pain and suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or
mistakes in administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.

Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.

Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death;
but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It
implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of
life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection
render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons discussed, the
implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and
expertise of administrative officials.

Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time and
date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner
already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the
accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10
days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment
for execution. Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification.
As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the
last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out
"not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing
the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his
executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18)
months from the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he
can seek executive clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.

Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in the
intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person insofar as the
choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading
and inhuman punishment. This is unsubstantiated.

First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the expertise
only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or
ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection
allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, without any other evidence
whatsoever.

Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all
personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such
task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death
penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.

Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death
penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since
punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But
of course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty
against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of
punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."

2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:

2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for
the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime
and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final
judgment rendered by a competent court."

The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".

Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly
on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.

3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map
out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the
death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the
lethal injection as well as during the proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient
to cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel
involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task."
The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question
raised is not the definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the
penalty already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the
exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned is, canalized within banks that keep it
from overflowing.

However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could
not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing
rules which provides a manual for the execution procedure. It was supposed to be confidential.

The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a vacuum. The Secretary
of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and approval. Being a
mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a
manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as
the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental
responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.

4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary.
Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended,
without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of
R.A. No. 7659.

"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall
not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while
she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death
penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided
in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."

Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an
invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17
amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death
sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery,
nor upon any person over seventy years of age.

While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659,
suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year
after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as
an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no
longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve
after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based
discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of the
applicable law.

Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain
consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.

1. People vs. Velasco

FACTS:

There was a shooting in San Ildefonso, Bulacan. The shooting claimed the life of Alex Vinculado and
seriously injured his twin brother Levi. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. Three (3)
criminal Informations - one (1) for homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide were initially filed
against Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, the alleged bodyguard of the
mayor. However, the charges were withdrawn and a new set was filed against the same accused
upgrading the crimes to murder and frustrated murder. Mayor Galvez was charged, in addition, with
violation of PD 1866 for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence.

The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
murder and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same
charges due to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from the charge of illegal carrying of
firearm upon its finding that the act was not a violation of law.

The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez was challenged by the Government before this Court in a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Allegedly, in holding in favor of Galvez, the
judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously
considered, would have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner
proposes that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-
examination of the evidence by the Court upon a determination that a review of the case will not
transgress the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that this is necessary
because the judgment of acquittal should be nullified and substituted with a verdict of guilt.

Petitioner invokes the constitutional doctrine in the United States that the Double Jeopardy Clause
permits a review of acquittals decreed by US trial magistrates where, as in this case, no retrial is
required should judgment be overturned. Since Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have been
sourced from American constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly the case of
Kepner v. United States and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event an
acquittal on appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should also be allowed to take the same directional
course.

ISSUES

- Whether a review by the Supreme Court of a judgment of acquittal in light of the constitutional
interdict against double jeopardy is permissible

HELD/RATIO

NO. It must be explained that under existing American law and jurisprudence, appeals may be had not
only from criminal convictions but also, in some limited instances, from dismissals of criminal charges,
sometimes loosely termed "acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments of dismissals do not
involve determination of evidence. It must involve questions of law or matters unrelated to a factual
resolution of the case which consequently, on appeal, will not involve a review of evidence.

United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was based on an appreciation of the
evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. In the case at bar, the records show that respondent trial judge
based his finding of acquittal, no matter how erroneous it might seem to petitioner, upon the evidence
presented by both parties. The judgment here was no less than a factual resolution of the case.

The doctrine that an appeal of a judgment after the defendant had been acquitted by the court in a
bench trial is a new trial, is applicable in this case.

Requisites for invoking double jeopardy:

(a) a valid complaint or information;

(b) before a competent court before which the same is filed;

(c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and,

(d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.

It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at
the level of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the
finality-of-acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our laws and jurisprudence, an
acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial
court level or before the Court of Appeals.

In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the
Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial. The doctrine that
"double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the “criminal
trial was a sham” because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was
denied due process. The "remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower
courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a
second jeopardy.

FACTS:
This is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade agreement ratified by the President with
Japan, concerning trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in
services, investment, etc.
Prior to President’s signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners – non-government
organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers – sought via petition for mandamus and
prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the JPEPA, including the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and
annexes thereto. Particularly, Congress through the House Committee are calling for an inquiry
into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive is refusing to give them the said copies until
the negotiation is completed.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
Whether or not the Philippine and Japanese offers during the negotiation process are privileged
Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising its power of inquiry and
power to concur in treaties, from the negotiation process
RULING:
Standing
In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,
which is a public right by its very nature, petitioners need not show that they have any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part
of the general public which possesses the right. As the present petition is anchored on the right
to information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity as citizens and groups of citizens
including petitioners-members of the House of Representatives who additionally are suing in
their capacity as such, the standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in
jurisprudence.
JPEPA, A Matter of Public Concern
To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold
requirement that it be a matter of public concern xxx
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the
Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are
matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic
negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to
the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
Privileged Character of Diplomatic Negotiations Recognized
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In
discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that
“information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.”
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the
JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be “ample opportunity for
discussion before [a treaty] is approved” – the offers exchanged by the parties during the
negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to
conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that
“historic confidentiality” would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability
of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future
negotiations.
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should not be open to public scrutiny would
discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during
negotiations. While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from
entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that
matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be
willing to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable
terms in an area of greater national interest.
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only
presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does
not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the
context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for
the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged
status.
Does the exception apply even though JPEPA is primarily economic and does not involve
national security?
While there are certainly privileges grounded on the necessity of safeguarding national security
such as those involving military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One example is the
“informer’s privilege,” or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a person
or persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement
of that law. The suspect involved need not be so notorious as to be a threat to national security
for this privilege to apply in any given instance. Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable
in all but the most high-profile cases, in which case not only would this be contrary to long-
standing practice. It would also be highly prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in general.
Also illustrative is the privileged accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed
privileged without distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and
those which do not, the rationale for the privilege being that a frank exchange of exploratory
ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is
essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential,
Legislative and Judicial power.
In the same way that the privilege for judicial deliberations does not depend on the nature of the
case deliberated upon, so presidential communications are privileged whether they involve
matters of national security.
It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not
absolute, one significant qualification being that “the Executive cannot, any more than the other
branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and
employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal
wrongdoing.” This qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of
a judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation.
Closely related to the “presidential communications” privilege is the deliberative process
privilege recognized in the United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co, deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such documents rests, not
on the need to protect national security but, on the “obvious realization that officials will not
communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and
front page news,” the objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions.
The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and
presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the
confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential
communications is similar, if not identical.
The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus shows that the privilege for diplomatic
negotiations is meant to encourage a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between the
negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations from public view. Similar to the privilege for
presidential communications, the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks, through the same
means, to protect the independence in decision-making of the President, particularly in its
capacity as “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations.” And, as with the deliberative process privilege, the privilege accorded to
diplomatic negotiations arises, not on account of the content of the information per se, but
because the information is part of a process of deliberation which, in pursuit of the public
interest, must be presumed confidential.
Clearly, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from
the privileged character of the deliberative process.
Does diplomatic privilege only apply to certain stages of the negotiation process?
In Chavez v. PEA and Chavez v. PCGG, the Court held that with regard to the duty to disclose
“definite propositions of the government,” such duty does not include recognized exceptions like
privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.
Treaty-making power of the President
xxx they (petitioners) argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA
negotiations since whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate international
trade agreements is derived only by delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section
28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential Decree No. 1464.
The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to negotiate treaties
and international agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and
other taxes xxx.
As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII
– the article on the Executive Department.
xxx
While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is
exercised by the President only be delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the
power to enter into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the
concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty.
In this light, the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations
provided under P.D. 1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent
in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives accountable
to Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for
the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must still enure that all treaties will
substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution.
It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers,
may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for
Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to
the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a
while that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making
power of the President, but only the Senate.
Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members
of the House of Representatives fail to present a “sufficient showing of need” that the
information sought is critical to the performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do
not include treaty-negotiation.
Did the respondent’s alleged failure to timely claim executive privilege constitute waiver of such
privilege?
That respondent invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present
petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited. Petitioner’s position
presupposes that an assertion of the privilege should have been made during the House
Committee investigations, failing which respondents are deemed to have waived it.
xxx (but) Respondent’s failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may
not, however, be construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive branch. xxx what respondents
received from the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for
information. And as priorly stated, the House Committee itself refrained from pursuing its
earlier resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecia’s
alleged request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance.
The privilege is an exemption to Congress’ power of inquiry. So long as Congress itself finds no
cause to enforce such power, there is no strict necessity to assert the privilege. In this light,
respondent’s failure to invoke the privilege during the House Committee investigations did not
amount to waiver thereof.
“Showing of Need” Test
In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a “sufficient showing of
need” only means, in substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure
sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages
in a balancing of interests. Such a balancing of interests is certainly not new in constitutional
adjudication involving fundamental rights.
xxx However, when the Executive has – as in this case – invoked the privilege, and it has been
established that the subject information is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a
party overcome the same by merely asserting that the information being demanded is a matter of
public concern, without any further showing required? Certainly not, for that would render the
doctrine of executive privilege of no force and effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to
information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be whether an information is
a matter of public concern.
Right to information vis-a-vis Executive Privilege
xxx the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to
information, a specific “showing of need” for such information is not a relevant consideration,
but only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has
claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the
same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that
information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to
effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.
Right to Information
1. Chavez vs. Presidential Commission of Good Governance, 299 SCRA 744 (1998)
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated
the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the
public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the countrys economy, alleges that what
impelled him to bring this action were several news reports[2] bannered in a number of
broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged
discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss
banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through
PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
A provision in the compromise agreement provides:
xxx the FIRST PARTY shall determine which shall be ceded to the FIRST PARTY, and which
shall be assigned to/retained by the PRIVATE PARTY. The assets of the PRIVATE PARTY
shall be net of, and exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines. Xxx
ISSUE:
Whether or not such provision in the compromise agreement exempting the Marcoses from the
taxes due to the government in valid
6. Genuino vs. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930, April 12, 2018
FACTS:
These consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Orders (TRO) and/or Writs of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court assail the constitutionality of Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 41,
series of 2010, otherwise known as the Consolidated Rules and Regulations Governing Issuance
and Implementation of Hold Departure Orders, Watchlist Orders and Allow Departure Orders,
on the ground that it infringes on the constitutional right to travel.
On May 25, 2010, then Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued the assailed DOJ Circular
No. 41, consolidating DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18, which govern the issuance and
implementation of HDOs, WLOs, and ADOs.
After the expiration of GMA’s term as President of the Republic of the Philippines an her
subsequent election as Pampanga representative, criminal complaints were filed against her
before the DOJ particularly plunder, malversation and/or illegal use of OWWA funds, illegal use
of public funds, graft and corruption, violation of the OEC, violation of the Code of Conduct on
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and qualified theft. In view of the foregoing criminal
complaints, De Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-422 against GMA pursuant to her authority
under DOJ Circular No. 41. She also ordered for the inclusion of GMA’s name in the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) watchlist.
On October 20, 2011, two criminal complaints for Electoral Sabotage and Violation of the OEC
were filed against GMA and her husband, Jose Miguel Arroyo. Following the filing of criminal
complaints, De Lima issued DOJ WLO No. 2011-573 against GMA and Miguel Arroyo with a
validity period of 60 days, unless sooner terminated or otherwise extended.
Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 197930, HDO No. 2011-64 was issued against Genuinos, among others,
after criminal complaints for Malversation and Violation of Sections 3(e), (g), (h) an (i) of R.A.
No. 3019. The petitioners therein seek to annul and set aside the following orders issued by the
former Secretary Leila De Lima, pursuant to the said circular.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the DOJ has the authority to issue Circular No. 41; and
2) Whether there is ground to hold the former DOJ Secretary guilty of contempt of Court.

HELD:
1) The issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 has no legal basis. Under Sec 6, Art. 3 of the 1987
Constitution provides three considerations that may permit a restriction on the right to travel:
national security, public safety or public health. As a further requirement, there must be an explicit
provision of statutory law or the Rules of Court providing for the impairment.[ FEU.LAWREV]
To begin with, there is no law particularly providing for the authority of the secretary of justice to
curtail the exercise of the right to travel. To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a
legislative enactment which underwent the scrutiny and concurrence of lawmakers, and submitted to
the President for approval. It is a mere administrative issuance apparently designed to carry out the
provisions of an enabling law which the former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987.
It is, however, important to stress that before there can even be a valid administrative issuance, there
must first be a showing that the delegation of legislative power is itself valid. It is valid only if there
is a law that (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
A painstaking examination of the provisions being relied upon by the former DOJ Secretary will
disclose that they do not particularly vest the DOJ the authority to issue DOJ Circular No. 41 which
effectively restricts the right to travel through the issuance of the WLOs and HDOs. Sections 1 and
3, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1 of E.O. No. 292 did not authorize the DOJ to issue WLOs and HDOs
to restrict the constitutional right to travel. There is even no mention of the exigencies stated in the
Constitution that will justify the impairment. The provision simply grants the DOJ the power to
investigate the commission of crimes and prosecute offenders, which are basically the functions of
the agency. However, it does not carry with it the power to indiscriminately devise all means it
deems proper in performing its functions without regard to constitutionally-protected rights. The
curtailment of fundamental right, which is what DOJ Circular No. 41 does, cannot be read into
mentioned provision of the law.
As such, it is compulsory requirement that there be an existing law, complete and sufficient in itself,
conferring the expressed authority to the concerned agency to promulgate rules. On its own, the DOJ
cannot make rules, its authority being confined to execution of laws. The DOJ is confined to filling
in the gaps and the necessary details in carrying into effect the law as enacted. Without a clear
mandate of an existing law, an administrative issuance is ultra vires.
To sum, DOJ Circular No. 41 does not have an enabling law where it could have derived its
authority to interfere with the exercise of the right to travel. Thus, the said circular is
unconstitutional.
2) In view of the complexity of the facts and corresponding full discussion that it rightfully deserves,
the Court finds it more fitting to address the same in a separate proceeding. It is in the interest of
fairness that there be a complete and exhaustive discussion on the matter since it entails the
imposition of penalty that bears upon the fitness of the respondent as a member of the legal
profession. The Court, therefore, finds it proper to deliberate and resolve the charge of contempt
against De Lima in a separate proceeding.
FACTS:
Rallies or the right to peaceably assemble to express freedom of expression, to petition for
redress of grievances hounding the government which was co-organized by various mass based
groups, and as Bayan and KMU sometime in September 26 and October 4-6 2005 has been
violently preempted and and forcibly dispersed causing injuries by police and peace keeping
authorities under the “no permit, no rally” policy whereby enforcing the Batasang Pambansa Blg
880, otherwise known as the “Public Assembly Act of 1985” and the Calibrated Preemptive
Response (CPR) Policy recently in force “in lieu of” maximum tolerance under the directive of
the office of the Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita.
ISSUE:
Is the “moot and academic” principle a magical formula that can immediately dissuade the
courts in resolving the case?

RULING:-
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to
petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. The Court holds that President Arroyo’s
issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.
The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there
is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved;third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation
of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.

Soriano vs. La Guardia G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009 Freedom of Speech

JANUARY 26, 2018

FACTS:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on
UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost
identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a
minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

ISSUE:

Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse and
within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

RULING:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of
petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his
duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for
three months.

Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of
his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. Aside from the
reasons given above (re the paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of a
broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that
indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive
language.

Facts:
On May 23, 2003, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of
other electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269 which are members of
petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). The other
petitioners, electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte (ANECO), Iloilo 1 (ILECO 1) and
Isabela 1 (ISELCO 1) are non-stock, non-profit electric cooperatives organized and existing
under PD 269, as amended, and registered with the National Electrification Administration
(NEA).
Under Sec. 39 of PD 269 electric cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all
National Government, local government, and municipal taxes and fee, including franchise,
fling recordation, license or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs involved in
any court or administrative proceedings in which it may be party.
From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269, as
amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic council (now
National Economic Development Authority) and the NEA, entered into six loan agreements
with the government of the United States of America, through the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives as beneficiaries. The loan
agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the loan and any
property or commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan.
Petitioners allege that with the passage of the Local Government Code their tax exemptions
have been validly withdrawn. Particularly, petitioners assail the validity of Sec. 193 and 234
of the said code. Sec. 193 provides for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to
all persons, whether natural or juridical, except cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938,
while Sec. 234 exempts the same cooperatives from payment of real property tax.
Issue:
(1) Does the Local Government Code (under Sec. 193 and 234) violate the equal protection
clause since the provisions unduly discriminate against petitioners who are duly registered
cooperatives under PD 269, as amended, and no under RA 6938 or the Cooperatives Code of
the Philippines?
(2) Is there an impairment of the obligations of contract under the loan entered into between
the Philippine and the US Governments?
Held:
(1) No. The guaranty of the equal protection clause is not violated by a law based on a
reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable must (a) rest on substantial
classifications; (b) germane to the purpose of the law; (c) not limited to the existing
conditions only; and (d) apply equally to all members of the same class. We hold that there is
 reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax
treatment between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 and electric cooperatives under
RA 6938.
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under PD 269 and those under RA
6938. In the former, the government is the one that funds those so-called electric
cooperatives, while in the latter, the members make equitable contribution as source of
funds.
a. Capital Contributions by Members – Nowhere in PD 269 doe sit require cooperatives to
make equitable contributions to capital. Petitioners themselves admit that to qualify as a
member of an electric cooperative under PD 269, only the payment of a P5.00 membership
fee is required which is even refundable the moment the member is no longer interested in
getting electric service from the cooperative or will transfer to another place outside the area
covered by the cooperative. However, under the Cooperative Code, the articles of
cooperation of a cooperative applying for registration must be accompanied with the bonds
of the accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the subscribers
showing that at least 25% of the authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least
25% of the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid-up share capital be
less than P2,000.00.
b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives – The extent of government control over
electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a
primary source of funds of these electric cooperatives. It is crystal clear that NEA incurred
loans from various sources to finance the development and operations of these electric
cooperatives. Consequently, amendments were primarily geared to expand the powers of
NEA over the electric cooperatives o ensure that loans granted to them would be repaid to
the government. In contrast, cooperatives under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient
and independent organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation.
Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is germane
to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that “every local government unit
shall enjoy local autonomy,” does not mean that the exercise of the power by the local
governments is beyond the regulation of Congress. Sec. 193 of the LGC is indicative of the
legislative intent to vet broad taxing powers upon the local government units and to limit
exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically provided therein.
Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable classification as these exemptions
are not limited to existing conditions and apply equally to all members of the same class.
(2) No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment
of the obligations of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within
the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but
the impairment must be substantial. Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect
a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with respect to non-
parties.
The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not purport to grant any tax exemption
in favor of any party to the contract, including the beneficiaries thereof. The provisions
simply shift the tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan agreements to the
borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, the withdrawal by the Local Government
Code under Sec. 193 and 234 of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners does
not impair the obligation of the borrower, the lender or the beneficiary under the loan
agreements as, in fact, no tax exemption is granted therein.
HELD:
1. NO. The petitioners are mistaken because they rely on the RTC’s Order granting their prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction. Since petitioners did not appeal from that order, the petitioners
presumed that the order became a final judgment on the issues.
The order granting the prayer is not an adjudication on the merits of the case that would trigger res
judicata.
A preliminary injunction does not serve as a final determination of the issues, it being a provisional
remedy.
2. YES. The petitioners claimed that DO 74, DO 215 and TRB’s rules and regulation issued under
them unduly expanded the power of the DPWH in sec. 4 of RA 2000 to regulate toll ways.
They contend that DPWH’s regulatory authority is limited to acts like redesigning curbings or
central dividing sections.
They claim that DPWH is only allowed to redesign the physical structure of toll ways and not to
determine “who or what can be qualifies as toll ways user”.
The court ruled that DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare
certain expressways as limited access facilities.
Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and
regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities.
Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to transportation, the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB) cannot derive its power from the DPWH to issue regulations governing
limited access facilities.
The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the first place.
3. NO. The Court emphasized that the secretary of the then Department of Public Works and
Communications had issued AO 1 in February 1968, as authorized under Section 3 of Republic Act
2000, prior to the splitting of the department and the eventual devolution of its powers to the DOTC.
Because administrative issuances had the force and effect of law, AO 1 enjoyed the presumption of
validity and constitutionality. The burden to prove its unconstitutionality rested on the party assailing
it, more so when police power was at issue and passed the test of reasonableness. The Administrative
Order was not oppressive, as it did not impose unreasonable restrictions or deprive petitioners of
their right to use the facilities. It merely set rules to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of
traffic within those limited-access facilities.
The right to travel did not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a tollway. Petitioners
were free to access the tollway as much as the rest of the public. However, the mode in which they
wished to travel, pertaining to their manner of using the tollway, was a subject that could validly be
limited by regulation. There was no absolute right to drive; on the contrary, this privilege was
heavily regulated.

1. Philippine Rural Electric Cooperation Assoc. vs. DILG Secretary, G.R. No. 143076,
June 10, 2003
Facts:
On May 23, 2003, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own behalf and in behalf of
other electric cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269 which are members of
petitioner Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). The other
petitioners, electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte (ANECO), Iloilo 1 (ILECO 1) and
Isabela 1 (ISELCO 1) are non-stock, non-profit electric cooperatives organized and existing
under PD 269, as amended, and registered with the National Electrification Administration
(NEA).
Under Sec. 39 of PD 269 electric cooperatives shall be exempt from the payment of all
National Government, local government, and municipal taxes and fee, including franchise,
fling recordation, license or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs involved in
any court or administrative proceedings in which it may be party.
From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects envisioned by PD 269, as
amended, the Philippine Government, acting through the National Economic council (now
National Economic Development Authority) and the NEA, entered into six loan agreements
with the government of the United States of America, through the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) with electric cooperatives as beneficiaries. The loan
agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application of the loan and any
property or commodity acquired through the proceeds of the loan.
Petitioners allege that with the passage of the Local Government Code their tax exemptions
have been validly withdrawn. Particularly, petitioners assail the validity of Sec. 193 and 234
of the said code. Sec. 193 provides for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to
all persons, whether natural or juridical, except cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938,
while Sec. 234 exempts the same cooperatives from payment of real property tax.
Issue:
(1) Does the Local Government Code (under Sec. 193 and 234) violate the equal protection
clause since the provisions unduly discriminate against petitioners who are duly registered
cooperatives under PD 269, as amended, and no under RA 6938 or the Cooperatives Code of
the Philippines?
(2) Is there an impairment of the obligations of contract under the loan entered into between
the Philippine and the US Governments?
Held:
(1) No. The guaranty of the equal protection clause is not violated by a law based on a
reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable must (a) rest on substantial
classifications; (b) germane to the purpose of the law; (c) not limited to the existing
conditions only; and (d) apply equally to all members of the same class. We hold that there is
reasonable classification under the Local Government Code to justify the different tax
treatment between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 and electric cooperatives under
RA 6938.
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under PD 269 and those under RA
6938. In the former, the government is the one that funds those so-called electric
cooperatives, while in the latter, the members make equitable contribution as source of
funds.
a. Capital Contributions by Members – Nowhere in PD 269 doe sit require cooperatives to
make equitable contributions to capital. Petitioners themselves admit that to qualify as a
member of an electric cooperative under PD 269, only the payment of a P5.00 membership
fee is required which is even refundable the moment the member is no longer interested in
 getting electric service from the cooperative or will transfer to another place outside the area
covered by the cooperative. However, under the Cooperative Code, the articles of
cooperation of a cooperative applying for registration must be accompanied with the bonds
of the accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer elected by the subscribers
showing that at least 25% of the authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least
25% of the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid-up share capital be
less than P2,000.00.
b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives – The extent of government control over
electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a
primary source of funds of these electric cooperatives. It is crystal clear that NEA incurred
loans from various sources to finance the development and operations of these electric
cooperatives. Consequently, amendments were primarily geared to expand the powers of
NEA over the electric cooperatives o ensure that loans granted to them would be repaid to
the government. In contrast, cooperatives under RA 6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient
and independent organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation.
Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local Government Code is germane
to the purpose of the law. The Constitutional mandate that “every local government unit
shall enjoy local autonomy,” does not mean that the exercise of the power by the local
governments is beyond the regulation of Congress. Sec. 193 of the LGC is indicative of the
legislative intent to vet broad taxing powers upon the local government units and to limit
exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically provided therein.
Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable classification as these exemptions
are not limited to existing conditions and apply equally to all members of the same class.
(2) No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional prohibition on the impairment
of the obligations of contracts does not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within
the prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the existing contract, but
the impairment must be substantial. Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect
a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not with respect to non-
parties.
The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not purport to grant any tax exemption
in favor of any party to the contract, including the beneficiaries thereof. The provisions
simply shift the tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan agreements to the
borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, the withdrawal by the Local Government
Code under Sec. 193 and 234 of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners does
not impair the obligation of the borrower, the lender or the beneficiary under the loan
agreements as, in fact, no tax exemption is granted therein.

1. Ho Wai Pang vs. People, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011
FACTS:
When Gilda Cinco search the bag of Ho Wai Pang in the Baggage Declaration at the arrival area, she
found boxes of chocolate which when she saw inside had white substance. They were then brought to the
PNP after the procedures in the airport.
The RTC found Pang guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The CA while affirming the RTC
decision took note that their right to counsel during custodial investigation was violated.
ISSUE: Whether the violation of the petitioner's right to counsel made the evidence taken from the
petitioner inadmissible.
RULING:
The SC held in the negative. The SC reiterated that infractions to the accused during the custodial
investigation render only extrajudicial confession or admissions of the suspect inadmissible as evidence.
Also, the guilt of Pang was based on the testimony of Cinco when she caught Pang in flagrante delicto
transporting shabu.

2. Gamboa vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-56291, June 27, 1988

FACTS:
Petitioner herein was arrested and was brought to the police station because of vagrancy. The
next day, the petitioner and with other 5 detainees were ask to line up. The complainant,
meanwhile, during the line up pointed to the petitioner herein as a suspect of robbery. After that,
he was asked to sit in front of the complainant while the latter is being investigated. An
information of robbery has been filed against the herein petitioner.
During the arraignment, the prosecution offered and presented its evidence. While on the other
hand, the petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, instead preparing for his evidence, file a
Motion to Acquit or Demurrer of evidence. The petitioner filed this motion on the ground that
the conduct of the line up, without notice, and in the absence of his counsel violated his
constitutional right to counsel and to due process.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s right to counsel and to due process was violated during the line
up.

HELD:
No. The Rights to counsel and to due process is protected by the constitution whether it be 1973
or 1987.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, or when the investigating
officers tries to elicit or ask information from the accuse,even though the questions appeases to
be innocent. At this point of stage, the assistance of the counsel is needed in order to avoid the
pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips fo the
person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
When the petitioner was asked to line up with other detainees, he was not asked any question nor
to answer. The police line up is not wart of custodial inquest, hence the petitioner was not
entitled to right to counsel.
Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, the right to counsel attaches at the start of the
investigation against the respondent, and even before the adversary judicial proceedings against
the accused begins.
While the court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police line
up, the moment there is a move to elicit admissions or confessions, even a plain information
which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there
be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in
the presence of the counsel.

Philippine Association of Services Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988
FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of
Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension
of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a
discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but
only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to
travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3
of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor
General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the
police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment
ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing
mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the
Filipino workers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.

RULING:- I’ll write this, I love you

“[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it
consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but
it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that
"equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights
among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not
confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on
substantial distinctions.

3. People vs. Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997

Facts:
Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide. The
offense was committed on February 19, 1994 in Baliuag, Bulacan; the victim being Marianne
Guevarra, 22 and a 2nd year student at the Fatima School of Nursing.
On said day, victim left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela. While on her
way, appellant invited her to his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's
grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to do so as the old woman was her distant
relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the
abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. By night time, Marianne, who was still
unconscious, was dragged by appellant to their backyard that was adjacent to a vacant lot.
Appellant was to transfer Marianne to the vacant lot when she moved, prompting appellant to hit
her head with a piece of concrete block. No longer moving, he dragged her to the lot and
abandoned her. At 11am her body was discovered. The autopsy revealed that she died of
"traumatic injuries."
 Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio
Trinidad to form an investigation team. The investigation pointed to the appellant. Appellant's
nearby house was searched but he was not there. On February 24, a police team led by Mayor
Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him and brought him to the police
headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, he denied any knowledge of Marianne's
death. However, when the police confronted him with evidence, appellant relented but
implicated two of his neighbours, and that he was merely a lookout. Larin and Dizon were
likewise brought there by the police. The following day a physical examination conducted on
the suspects revealed that appellant has multiple scratches on the neck, chest and back.
By that time, people and media representatives were already at the police headquarters
awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived. Upon seeing the mayor,
appellant approached him and whispered that they talk privately. The mayor led him to the
office of the Chief of Police and there, he broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I
will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the
room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession. Since no lawyer was
available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the
mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant
confessed his guilt. He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated
saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them. He also said that the devil entered his mind
because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. After his
confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help him. His confession
was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide.
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified that on
said date he was at his parent's house for the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and son
went home after 5pm, slept at 8pm, and woke up at 6am the next day. Appellant claimed that
after he was picked up by the police on February 24, he was coerced to confess that he raped and
killed Marianne. Fearing for his life, appellant did as he was told.
The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to death. He was found guilty
of the crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and penalized accordingly.
Hence, the automatic review.

Issue:
W/N the appellant’s confession not being assisted by a counsel is in violation of the
constitution, and is therefore inadmissible as evidence against him.

Held:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession
before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision
and control" over the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for
purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However,
appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter.
In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk
to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the
mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his
guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement
officer, his uncounseled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has
been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights
under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would
lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling
the truth. Hence we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the
trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions
were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other
investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news
reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.
The Court therefore held accused-appellant Pablito Andan guilty of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide.

GARCES VS ESTENZO

Facts:

Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:

a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided
for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for
the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiestawould be the caretaker of the image
of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the
election of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the
celebration of the saint’s feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was
temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father
Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’s
property since church funds were used in its acquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the
priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a
representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions.
The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and
Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

Issue:

Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.

Held:

No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over thecustody of the image. The image was
purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring
any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity
intended to facilitate the worship of the patronsaint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically,
the image was placed in a layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to any family
desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the council’s funds that
were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the determination ofcustody is their
right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since
private funds were used. Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds
and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of
church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

[A.M. NO. 02-2-10-SC December 14, 2005]

RE: REQUEST OF MUSLIM EMPLOYEES IN THE DIFFERENT COURTS IN ILIGAN CITY (RE: OFFICE HOURS)

In their Letter dated November 19, 2001 addressed to Executive Judge Valerio M. Salazar, Regional Trial
Court of Iligan City, several Muslim employees in the different courts in the said city request that they
be allowed to enjoy the following privileges:

1. to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or coffee breaks during the
month of Ramadan;

2. to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the
entire calendar year.

Judge Salazar forwarded the said letter-request to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Judge
Salazar expressed his conformity with the first request, i.e., allowing them to hold office from 7:30 a.m.
to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of Ramadan. However, he expressed some misgivings
about the second request, i.e., excusing them from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday
during the entire calendar year.

In support of their requests, the Muslim employees invoke Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 2911§ as
amended by P.D. No. 3222§ enacted by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The avowed purpose of
P.D. No. 291 was to reinforce national unity by recognizing Muslim holidays and making them part of
our national holidays. Section 2 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 322, provides that the following are
recognized Muslim holidays:

A. Eid-ul-Fitr (Hariraya Puasa) - which falls on the 1st day of the lunar month of Shawwal
commemorating the end of the fasting season;

b. Eid-ul-Adha (Hariraya Haj) - which falls on the 10th day of the 12th Lunar month of Zul Hajj;

c. Mauledan Nabi - Birthday of Prophet Mohammad (P.B.U.H), which falls on the 12th day of the 3rd
Lunar month of Rabbiol-Awwal;

d. Lailatul Isra Wal Miraj - (Ascension) which falls on the 27th day of the 8th Lunar month of Rajjab;

e. Muharram (Ashura) - which falls on the 10th Lunar month of Muharram; andcralawlibrary

f. Amon Jaded (New Year) - which falls on the 1st day of the 1st Lunar month of Muharram.

Muslims employees in the government are excused from reporting to office during these holidays in
order that they may be able to properly observe them.

Section 3 of the same law, as amended by P.D. No. 322, further provides that:

Sec. 3. (a) During the fasting season on the month of Ramadan, all Muslim employees in the national
government, government-owned or controlled corporations, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities shall observe office hours from seven-thirty in the morning (7:30 a.m.) to three-thirty
in the afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without lunch break or coffee breaks, and that there shall be no diminution
of salary or wages, provided, that the employee who is not fasting is not entitled to the benefit of this
provision.

(b) Regulations for the implementation of this section shall be issued together with the implementing
directives on Muslim holidays.

Pursuant thereto, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) promulgated Resolution No. 81-1277 dated
November 13, 1981 which states in part:

2. During "Ramadan" the Fasting month (30 days) of the Muslims, the Civil Service official time of 8
o'clock to 12 o'clock and 1 o'clock to 5 o'clock is hereby modified to 7:30 A.M. to 3:30 P.M. without
noon break and the difference of 2 hours is not counted as undertime;

3. During Friday, the Muslim pray day, Muslims are excused from work from 10 o'clock in the morning
to 2 o'clock in the afternoon.

Moreover, in its Resolution No. 00-0227 dated January 26, 2000, the CSC clarified that the term "Friday"
in the above resolution is not limited to the Fridays during the month of Ramadan, but refers to "all
Fridays of the calendar year." However, in order not to run afoul of Section 5, 3§ Rule XVII of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2924§ which enjoins civil servants to
render public service not less than eight hours a day or forty (40) hours a week, the CSC prescribes the
adoption of a flexible working schedule to accommodate the Muslims' Friday Prayer Day subject to
certain conditions, e.g., the flexible working hours shall not start earlier than 7:00 a.m. and end not later
than 7:00 p.m.5§

In the Resolution dated October 1, 2002, the Court required the Court Administrator to study the
matter. In compliance therewith, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. recommends that the
Muslim employees in the Judiciary be allowed to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.
without break during the month of Ramadan. Further, that they be excused from work from 10:00 a.m.
to 2:00 p.m. every Friday to allow them to attend the Muslim Prayer Day. However, to compensate for
the lost hours, they should be required to observe flexible working schedule which should start from
7:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. and from 2:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. every Friday. In that way, the working hours
mandated by the civil service rules is complied with.

The recommendation of the Court Administrator with respect to the matter of allowing the Muslim
employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without break during
the month of Ramadan is well taken. The same has statutory basis in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as
amended by P.D. No. 322, which categorically states that "[d]uring the fasting season in the month of
Ramadan, all Muslim employees in the national government, government-owned or controlled
corporations, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall observe office hours
from seven-thirty in the morning (7:30 a.m.) to three-thirty in the afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without lunch
break or coffee breaks, and that there shall be no diminution of salary or wages ..."

The Court, however, is constrained to deny for lack of statutory basis the request of the Muslim
employees to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday to allow them to attend
the Muslim Prayer Day. As correctly observed by Atty. Edna Diño, Chief, Office of the Court Attorney, in
her Report dated May 13, 2005, the CSC exceeded its authority insofar as it declared in Resolution No.
81-1277 and Resolution No. 00-0227 that Muslim employees are excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to
2:00 p.m. every Friday subject to certain conditions. CSC Resolution No. 81-1277 was purportedly issued
pursuant to Sections 2 and 5 of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No 322, but neither of the two
decrees mention "Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day" as one of the recognized holidays.

The Court is not unmindful that the subject requests are grounded on Section 5, Article III of the
Constitution:

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil and political rights.

This provision contains two aspects: (1) the non-establishment clause; and (2) the free exercise clause.
The subject requests are based on the latter and in interpreting this clause (the free exercise clause)
embodied in the Constitution, the Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine that:

The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe and
freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of
thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare.6§

Justice Isagani A. Cruz explained these two concepts in this wise:

(1) Freedom to Believe

The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may indulge
his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or reject
any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or
deny the immortality of his soul - in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit.
However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he
has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be
punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of faith. "Men may believe what they
cannot prove." Every one has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he
cannot prove what he believes.

(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs

But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his freedom
to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be, religious
freedom, like all other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard
for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate
the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be
exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are
pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable
requirements or prohibitions of the law.

Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated
disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence is
freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of religious
dogma.7§

The Court recognizes that the observance of Ramadan and the Friday Muslim Prayer Day is integral to
the Islamic faith. However, while the observance of Ramadan and allowing the Muslim employees in the
Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of
Ramadan finds support in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322, there is no such
basis to excuse them from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day,
during the entire calendar year.

On the other hand, the need of the State to prescribe government office hours as well as to enforce
them uniformly to all civil servants, Christians and Muslims alike, cannot be disregarded. Underlying
Section 5,8§ Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 is the interest of the
general public to be assured of continuous government service during office hours every Monday
through Friday. The said rule enjoins all civil servants, of whatever religious denomination, to render
public service of no less than eight hours a day or forty (40) hours a week.

To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year would mean a diminution of the
prescribed government working hours. For then, they would be rendering service twelve (12) hours less
than that required by the civil service rules for each month. Further, this would encourage other
religious denominations to request for similar treatment.

The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those belonging to other
religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the public. Indeed, the exercise of
religious freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with reasonable requirements of the law,
including civil service laws.

In fine, the remedy of the Muslim employees, with respect to their request to be excused from work
from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the entire calendar year, is legislative, which is to ask
Congress to enact a legislation expressly exempting them from compliance with the prescribed
government working hours.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to:

1. GRANT the request to allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold office hours from 7:30
a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without break during the month of Ramadan pursuant to Section 3 (a) of Presidential
Decree No. 291, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 322; andcralawlibrary

2. DENY for lack of legal basis the request that the Muslim employees in the Judiciary be excused from
work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day, during the entire calendar year.