Berry v Cypost to the worst and from the most to the least experienced, but the reasonable
average merit among the ordinarily good physicians. Here, the doctors did not
FACTS: Cypost assigned all its rights, title and interest to an action to its creditor,
Roundtable, under and Assignment Agreement. As a result, Roundtable sought an
order deleting Cypost as the defendant in the action and Roundtable to be
substituted instead. Plaintiifs opposed the same claiming that the assignment is
champertous.
ISSUE: WON the assignment is champertous?
HELD: No. Champerty is an agreement between a stranger to a lawsuit and a
litigant by which the stranger pursues the litigant’s claim as consideration for
receiving part of any judgment proceeds.
An assignment of a cause of action for non-personal tort is generally valid if the
assignee has a sufficient pre-existing interest in the litigation to negate any taint of
champerty or maintenance. In determining whether this test is met, the court
should look at the totality of the transaction. A general pre-existing commercial
interest would suffice. Such must exist before the assignment. Here, said
requirement has been met since Roundtable has a commercial interest being a
creditor of Cypost.
Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital
FACTS: Petitioner, Leah Alesna Reyes, is the wife of the deceased patient, Jorge
Reyes. Five days before the latter’s death, Jorge has been suffering from recurring
fever with chills. The doctors confirmed through the Widal test that Jorge has
typhoid fever. However, he did not respond to the treatment and died. The cause
of his death was “Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid
fever.” Consequently, petitioner filed the instant case for damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which dismissed the case and was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
The contention was that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever. Instead, his
death was due to the wrongful administration of chloromycetin. They contended
that had respondent doctors exercised due care and diligence, they would not
have recommended and rushed the performance of the Widal Test, hastily
concluded that Jorge was suffering from typhoid fever, and administered
chloromycetin without first conducting sufficient tests on the patient’s compatibility
with said drug.
ISSUE: WON Sisters of Mercy Hospital is liable for the death of Jorge Reyes.
HELD: NO. There is no showing that the attending physician in this case deviated
from the usual course of treatment with respect to typhoid fever. Jorge was given
antibiotic choloromycetin and some dose of triglobe after compatibility test was
made by the doctor and found that no adverse reactions manifested which would
necessitate replacement of the medicines. Indeed, the standard contemplated is
not what is actually the average merit among all known practitioners from the best
depart from the reasonable standard recommended by the experts as they in fact
observed the due care required under the circumstances.
In Medical Negligence cases, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish that the
usual procedure in treating the illness is not followed by the doctor. Failure to
prove this, the doctor is not liable. Physicians are not insurers of the success of
every procedure undertaken and if the procedure was shown to be properly done
but did not work, they cannot be faulted for such result.
A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent.
FACTS: This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan of the
Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino
for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. Complainant
alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced
his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial
assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his
services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Tolentino's act of solicitation constitutes malpractice. YES.
RULING: Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a
profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as
merchants advertise their wares. To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is
to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s
estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to
which every member of the bar is called.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment.
A.C. No. 10196 September 9, 2014
MELODY R. NERY, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA,
Respondent.
FACTS: Nery engaged the services of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage
and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was
eventually granted, and Nery paid ₱200,000.00 to Sampana. Nery paid additional
₱100,000.00 to Sampana as his legal fees for the petition for adoption. Nery
inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the status of the petition for
adoption and discovered that there was no such petition filed in the court. Nery
sought the reimbursement of the ₱100,000.00 paid to Sampana but the demands
were left unheeded.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Sampana is guilty of malpractice for failing to file the petition
despite receiving his legal fees.
RULING: YES. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Every case
accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence,
regardless of importance. A lawyer also owes it to the court, their clients, and other
lawyers to be candid and fair.
A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal
profession
ZARSONA MEDICAL CLINIC VS PHIC
FACTS: ZMC filed a claim from Phil Health for the confinement of Lorna Alestre.
The claim was denied on the ground of “extended confinement” which is penalized
under RA7875 or the National Health Insurance Act of 1995. Apparently, Alestre
was confined from August 6-12, 2003. In Alestre’s Salaysay, it was revealed that
her confinement was August 10-11, 2003. Alestre reported back to work on August
12, 2003.
ZMC Medical Director Dr. Bragat stated that its Midwife/Clerk Jennifer Acuram
made an honest mistake in writing August 6-12, 2003 as the date of confinement.
Dr. Bragat said that the hospital only claim only 2 days for Alestre’s confinement.
Acuram acknowledged her mistake in her Affidavit of Explanation.
Alestre also presented an Affidavit of Explanation clarifying that she and her son
were admitted at ZMC on August 10, 2003 and discharged morning of August 12,
2003. She sneaked out of the hospital and went to work (Rizal Elementary School)
after her attending physician checked on her, and went back to the hospital at
around 1:30pm to attend to her child and process her discharge papers. Dr. Ariel
dela Cruz, attending of Alestre, confirmed her discharge in the morning of August
12, 2003.
ZMC was found liable for the charges. ZMC appealed, but the PhilHealth Board of
Directors affirmed its decision. It gave more evidentiary weight to the Salaysay of
Alestre and to her signature in the school’s attendance logbook on August 12,
2003. ZMC filed a petition for review with the CA. CA denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner ZMC was liable for over confinement of
a patient
HELD: No. We are inclined to give more credence to Alestre’s Affidavit, which is
essentially a recantation of her previous Salaysay, for the following reasons: First,
Alestre has fully explained to our satisfaction why she initially misdeclared her
dates of confinement in ZMC. In her desire to report and be compensated for one
day of work, Alestre hied back and forth between school and the hospital. It is
difficult to believe that she would risk her reputation as a public school teacher, as
well as prosecution for violation of civil service rules, to be an abettor of ZMC.
Second, Alestre truly cannot be in two places at the same time. But her narration
clearly accounts for her whereabouts on 12 August 2003. She travelled at least 3
times to and from the hospital and school. She admitted that the school was a
mere ten-minute drive away from the hospital so she can easily traverse between
the two locations. Third, ZMC had in fact admitted to its error in indicating the
dates of Alestre’s confinement so there is no reason for ZMC to further conceal the
actual days of Alestre’s confinement. Fourth, the Salaysay is not notarized. While
recantation is frowned upon and hardly given much weight in the determination of
a case, the affidavit is still a notarized document which carries in its favor the
presumption of regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there must be
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence to contradict the
same. Based on the foregoing, we reverse the finding of Philhealth and hold that
ZMC is not guilty of extending the period of confinement.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES INC VS CA
FACTS: Natividad Agana was admitted at the Medical City General Hospital
(Medical City) because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge.
Dr. Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid." Dr. Ampil
assisted by the medical staff of Medical City, performed an anterior resection
surgery upon her. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to
her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Hysterectomy was
performed by Dr. Fuentes upon obtaining the consent of Natividad’s husband.
Afterwards, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the incision.
However, the operation appeared to be flawed.
After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal
region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that
the pain was the natural consequence of the surgical operation performed upon
her. Dr. Ampil recommended that Natividad consult an oncologist.
Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the United States to seek further
treatment. After four (4) months of consultations and laboratory examinations,
Natividad was told that she was free of cancer. Natividad flew back to the
Philippines, still suffering from pains. Two (2) weeks thereafter, her daughter found
a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Dr. Ampil was immediately informed.
He proceeded to Natividad's house where he managed to extract by hand a piece
of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width.
The pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic
General Hospital. While confined thereat, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the
presence of a foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5
inches in width. The gauze had badly infected her vaginal vault forced stool to
excrete through the vagina. Natividad underwent another surgery. Natividad and
her husband filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against PSI (owner of
Medical City), Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. On February 16, 1986, pending the
outcome of the above case, Natividad died. The trial court rendered judgment in
favor of spouses Agana. CA affirmed the judgment however the complaint against
Dr. Fuentes was dismissed.
ISSUE: WON respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for
petitioner's condition.
HELD: Yes. PSI's act of publicly displaying in the lobby of the Medical City the
names and specializations of its accredited physicians, including Dr. Ampil,
estopped it from denying the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between them under the doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppels.
PSI's failure to supervise Dr. Ampil and its resident physicians and nurses and to
take an active step in order to remedy their negligence rendered it directly liable
under the doctrine of corporate negligence.
A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997 PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES,
complainant, vs. JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.
FACTS: Complainant narrated that she got married to respondent in a civil
wedding (Jan. 7, 1994) After their reception, they reached the condominium unit of
the respondent whereby, hours later, complainant answered the phone and at the
other end of the line was a woman offending her with insulting remarks. This
ensued in a fight which made the respondent utter statements such as “Ayaw ko
nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa babae,, ‘yong sumusunod sa bawa’t gusto ko. Get
that marriage contract and have it burned.” This made the complainant leave in
haste. Since then, the complainant and respondent have been living separately
because as complainant rationalized, contrary to her expectation respondent never
got in touch with her and did not even bother to apologize for what happened.
Several months after, the complainant learned that Villaluz married a certain Lydia
Geraldez. Complainant filed the instant Complaint for Disbarment against the
respondent. In one of the evidences presented by the petitioner, it showed that
respondent immorally and bigamously entered into a marriage, and to show that
the respondent distorted the truth by stating his civil status as SINGLE, when he
married Lydia Geraldez.
Respondent alleged that what he and Mijares had was a “sham marriage” to help
Judge Mijares in the administrative case for immorality filed against her by her
Legal Researcher. Additionally, respondent theorized that when his marriage with
complainant took place, his marriage with Librada Peña, his first wife, was
subsisting because the Decision declaring the annulment of such marriage had not
yet become final and executor.
ISSUE: WON Ret. Justice Onofre A. Villaluz be suspended from his practice of
law.
Ruling: Yes. former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is GUILTY of immoral conduct in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof,
with the specific WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he
commit the same or a similar offense hereafter.
What complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is borne out by
law and the evidence. To be sure, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid
marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code, were satisfied and complied
with. A “sham” marriage is does not negate the existence of a contracted marriage.
Herein respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. He
has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity. He himself asserts that at the time of his marriage to herein
complainant, the decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife,
Librada Peña, had not yet attained finality. Worse, four months after his marriage
to petitioner, respondent married another woman, Lydia Geraldez, in Cavite, after
making a false statement in his application for marriage license that hisprevious
marriage had been annulled.
It is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for
continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of an
attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law;
its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.
Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission of
grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of
lawyers.
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic A.C. No. L-533
Topics: “A lawyer, making known his legal services shall only use true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.”—Canon 3, Code of
Professional Responsibility
“A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications for legal services.”—Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility
Facts: In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim,
according to Nogales, was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients
who cannot afford the services of big law firms.
Atty. Ulep files a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of its advertisements
which states undignified phrases like-- “Secret Marriage? P560.00 for a valid
marriage. Information on DIVORCE, ANNULMENT, ABSENCE, VISA. The Legal
Clinic, Inc. Please call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041 8:30am to 6:00pm 7th Floor
Victoria Bldg. UN Avenue, Manila.”
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal
Problems in The Philippine Star because it is composed of specialists that can
take care of a client’s situation no matter how complicated it is, especially on
marriage problems like the Sharon and Gabby situation. Citing John Bates vs. The
State Bar of Arizona, Atty. Nogales said that it should be allowed based on this
American Jurisprudence. According to him, there is nothing wrong with making
known the legal services his Legal Clinic has to offer.
Issue: Whether or not such advertisement may be allowed.
Ruling: The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals, which is undoubtedly
beyond the domain of the paralegals. As stated in a previous jurisprudence,
practice of law is only reserved for the members of the Philippine bar, and not to
paralegals. As with the Legal Clinic’s advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “a lawyer in making known his legal services must use
only honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
A lawyer cannot advertise his talents in a manner that a merchant advertise his
goods. The Legal Clinic promotes divorce, secret marriages, bigamous marriages
which are undoubtedly contrary to law.
The canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is
a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must
be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to
a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching
public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a
normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
The only allowed form of advertisements would be: (1.) Citing your involvement in
a reputable law list, (2.) An ordinary professional card (3.) Phone directory listing
without designation to a lawyer’s specialization.
PEOPLE v LIKIRAN
FACTS: The witnesses testified that during a town fiesta, the accused' brother
punched the friend of the victim (Sareno) . Hearing the commotion, Sareno and
another witness went inside the plaza but the accused shot Sareno Several times.
With the victim fallen, the accused stabbed him on the back. The victim was
brought to the hospital after the accused left but he was already dead at that point.
He suffered multiple gunshot wounds and a stab wound at the left scapular area.
The RTC found him guilty of murder. The CA sustained its findings except that only
treachery existed to qualify the crime to murder.  petitioner Romeo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) operating a drug store located at San
ISSUE: whether the accused is guilty of the crime of murder?  issued by the RTC, Branch 57, Angeles City. The raiding team seized several
HELD: No. He is only guilty of homicide. The accused claimed that evidence in
record shows that the victim was shot by someone else. However, the cause of
death was not made an issue in the court a quo and the Certificate of Death was
admitted during the pre-trial conference as proof of the fact and cause of death.
Moreover, a death certificate issued by a municipal health officer in the regular
performance of his duty is prima facie evidence of the cause of death of the victim.
The accused, therefore, is bound by his admission of Sareno’s cause of death.
Also, the accused is criminally liable for the natural and logical consequence
resulting from his act of stabbing Sareno. He may not be the shooter, but the stab
wound he inflicted on Sareno contributed to the latter’s death.
However, no treachery exists. 
The shooting and stabbing of Sareno was actually a spur of the moment incident, a
result of a brawl. The prosecution failed to show that the accused and his brother
deliberately planned the means by which they would harm Sareno. Consequently,
the accused-appellant should be liable only for the lesser crime of Homicide.
Dela Cruz v PEOPLE
FACTS: It was alleged that a certain Ariel Escobedo was picked up by several
unknown male persons believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs.
Complainants were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Station. They met
“James” at the Police Station, who demanded from them P100,000 which was later
lowered to P40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. 
The accused was nabbed after an entrapment operation was conducted. The
accused was later brought to the forensic laboratory where he was required to
submit his urine for drug testing. The test yielded a positive result for presence of
dangerous drugs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal?
HELD: No. The drug test in Section 15 of RA 9165 does not cover persons
apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed
under Article II of the law. The drug test was in violation of the petitioner’s right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination. It is incontrovertible that petitioner
refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs.
G.R. No. 149907 (April 16, 2009)
ROMA DRUG vs. RTC
Facts: On 14 August 2000, a team composed of NBI and inspectors of BFAD
conducted a raid on petitioner Roma Drug, a duly registered sole proprietorship of
Matias, Guagua, Pampanga. The raid was conducted pursuant to a search warrant
imported medicines, including Augmentin (375mg.) tablets, Orbenin (500mg.)
capsules, Amoxil (250mg.) capsules and Ampiclox (500mg.). It appears that Roma
Drug is one of six drug stores which were raided on or around the same time upon
the request of SmithKline Beecham Research Limited (SmithKline), a duly
registered corporation which is the local distributor of pharmaceutical products
manufactured by its parent London-based corporation. The seized medicines,
which were manufactured by SmithKline, were imported directly from abroad and
not purchased through the local SmithKline, the authorized Philippine distributor of
these products.
The NBI subsequently filed a complaint against Rodriguez for violation of Section 4
(in relation to Sections 3 and 5) of Republic Act No. 8203, also known as the
Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs (SLCD), with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor in San Fernando, Pampanga. The section prohibits the sale of
counterfeit drugs, which under Section 3(b)(3), includes "an unregistered imported
drug product." The term "unregistered" signifies the lack of registration with the
Bureau of Patent, Trademark and Technology Transfer of a trademark, tradename
or other identification mark of a drug in the name of a natural or juridical person,
the process of which is governed under Part III of the Intellectual Property Code.
In this case, there is no doubt that the subject seized drugs are identical in content
with their Philippine-registered counterparts. There is no claim that they were
adulterated in any way or mislabeled at least. Their classification as "counterfeit" is
based solely on the fact that they were imported from abroad and not purchased
from the Philippine-registered owner of the patent or trademark of the drugs.
During preliminary investigation, Rodriguez challenged the constitutionality of the
SLCD. However, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Celerina C. Pineda skirted the
challenge and issued a Resolution dated 17 August 2001 recommending that
Rodriguez be charged with violation of Section 4(a) of the SLCD.
Hence, the present Petition for Prohibition questing the RTC-Guagua Pampanga
and the Provincial Prosecutor to desist from further prosecuting Rodriguez, and
that Sections 3(b)(3), 4 and 5 of the SLCD be declared unconstitutional.
Rodriguez asserts that the challenged provisions contravene three provisions of
the Constitution. The first is the equal protection clause of the Bill of Rights. The
two other provisions are Section 11, Article XIII, which mandates that the State
make "essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people
at affordable cost;" and Section 15, Article II, which states that it is the policy of the
State "to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them."
Through its Resolution dated 15 October 2001, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the trial against
Rodriguez, and the BFAD, the NBI and Glaxo Smithkline from prosecuting the
petitioners
Issue: Whether or not the contention of Roma Drug is correct.
Held: Yes. The Court proceeded to directly confront the constitutionality of the
assailed provisions of the SLCD. As written, the law makes a criminal of any
person who imports an unregistered drug regardless of the purpose, even if the
medicine can spell life or death for someone in the Philippines. It does not
accommodate the situation where the drug is out of stock in the Philippines,
beyond the reach of a patient who urgently depends on it. It does not allow
husbands, wives, children, siblings, parents to import the drug in behalf of their
loved ones too physically ill to travel and avail of the meager personal use
exemption allotted by the law. It discriminates, at the expense of health, against
poor Filipinos without means to travel abroad to purchase less expensive
medicines in favor of their wealthier brethren able to do so. Less urgently perhaps,
but still within the range of constitutionally protected behavior, it deprives Filipinos
to choose a less expensive regime for their health care by denying them a
plausible and safe means of purchasing medicines at a cheaper cost.
Note that the SLCD is a special law, and the traditional treatment of penal
provisions of special laws is that of malum prohibitum–or punishable regardless of
motive or criminal intent. For a law that is intended to help save lives, the SLCD
has revealed itself as a heartless, soulless legislative piece.
It is laudable that with the passage of Rep. Act No. 9502, the State has reversed
course and allowed for a sensible and compassionate approach with respect to the
importation of pharmaceutical drugs urgently necessary for the people’s
constitutionally-recognized right to health.
A writ of prohibition is hereby ISSUED commanding respondents from prosecuting
petitioner Romeo Rodriguez for violation of Section 4 or Rep. Act No. 8203. The
Temporary Restraining Order dated 15 October 2001 is hereby made
PERMANENT.
G.R. No. 88582 March 5, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HEINRICH S. RITTER,
accused-appellant,
Facts: On October 10, 1986 about midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan Ritter
brought a boy and girl namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his
hotel room at MGM Hotel along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These two (2)
children were chosen from among a bunch of street children. Once inside the hotel
room accused told them to take a bath. Jessie Ramirez, alias "Egan", was the first
to take a bath and when he came out Rosario Baluyot went to the bathroom to do
the same. While Rosario Baluyot was inside the bathroom, accused Ritter took out
some pictures depicting dressed up young boys, and put them on top of the table.
Other things which were taken out and placed on top of a table were three (3)
other objects which he described as like that of a vicks inhaler. One of these
objects the accused played with his hands and placed it on his palms. The color of
which is grayish blue which turned out later to be the foreign object which was
inserted inside the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other objects were later
established to be anti-nasal inhalers against pollution purchased by the accused in
Bangkok when he went there as a tourist. While Rosario was in the bathroom,
accused told Ramirez to lay down on bed, and so did the accused. He then started
masturbating the young boy and also guided the boy's hand for him to be
masturbated, so that they masturbated each other, while they were both naked,
and he gave Jessie Ramirez an erection. When Rosario Baluyot came out of the
bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by accused and to join him in bed.
The accused then placed himself between the two (2) children and accused
started fingering Rosario.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched him to call his
attention. He looked, and he saw accused placing his penis against the vagina of
Rosario and that he was trying to penetrate the vagina but it would not fit. After
what he saw, Ramirez did not anymore bother to look because he was sleepy and
fell asleep.
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles described as an
"American, paid Ramirez alias "Egan" P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He then left
them in the hotel. After the American left, they went downstairs, and Rosario told
Egan that the American inserted something in her vagina. But they could not do
anything anymore, because the American had already left, and neither did they
report the matter to the police. Sometime the following day, Jessie saw Rosario
and he asked her whether the object was already removed from her body and
Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie Ramirez claimed that on the evening of that
same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her vagina and
when Egan asked her, she said that the foreign object was not yet removed.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, saw Rosario's skirt was
bloodied and she was unconscious and foul smelling. Since nobody helped
Rosario, he took pity on her condition and brought her to the Olongapo City
General Hospital in an unconscious condition, via jeepney. He went to the
Information desk and he was the one who gave the personal circumstances of
Rosario as to her name, age, her residence as Nagbakulaw, Lower Kalaklan, and
Gaspar Alcantara signed as "guardian" of Rosario, while Rosario was already in
the emergency room.
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City General Hospital,
nobody was attending to her since she is a street child, having stowed away from
the custody of her grandmother. Three (3) good samaritans who belong to
religious and civic organizations, in the persons of Jessica Herrera, Fe Israel and
Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their missions in the hospital chanced upon Rosario
Baluyot who was all alone with no relatives attending to her and after finding out
that she was only 12 years old decided to help her. After a short interview with
Rosario, regarding her name and age only because she clamped up about her
residence and her relatives, they decided to help her by providing her the medicine
she needed during her confinement in readiness for an operation.
Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital was loose bowel
movement and vomiting, which was first suspected as gastro-enteritis, but which
came out later as symptoms of peritonitis due to a massive infection in the
abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on May 17, 1987, after she was examined by the
physicians at the hospital, it was found out that there was a foreign object lodged
in her vaginal canal and she had vaginal discharge tinged with blood and foul
smelling odor emanating from her body. One of the doctors who attended to her
was Dr. Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr. Barcinal tried to extract the foreign object by
means of a forceps, but several attempts proved futile because said object was
deeply embedded in the vaginal canal and was covered by tissues. Her abdomen
was enlarged, tender and distended, symptoms of peritonitis. The patient was
feverish and incoherent when she was scheduled for operation on May 19, 1987,
after the first attempt for an operation on May 17 was aborted allegedly because
the consent of Dr. Reino Rosete, the hospital director was not obtained. The
surgeon who operated on her was Dr. Rosete himself. He testified that Rosario
had to be operated even in that condition in order to save her life. Her condition
was guarded. This was corroborated by Dr. Leo Cruz, the anesthesiologist during
Rosario's operation. It was in the evening of May 19 at about 7:00 p.m. when Dr.
Rosete opened her abdomen by making a 5 inch incision on her stomach. He
found out that the fallopian tubes were congested with pus and so with the
peritonieum, and the pelvic cavity, and patches of pus in the liver, although the
gallbladder and kidney appeared to have septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The
peritonitis and septicemia were traced to have been caused through infection by
the foreign object which has been lodged in the intra-vaginal canal of Rosario. The
foreign object which was already agreed upon by both parties that it is a portion of
a sexual vibrator was extracted from the vagina of Rosario while under anesthesia.
Said object was coated with tissues, pus and blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to the
assisting surgical nurse for safekeeping and gave instructions to release it to the
authorized person. This object was shown by the nurse to Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr.
Rosete considered the operation successful and the patient was alive when he left
her under Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said patient in the ward for about 30
minutes and thereafter he left. The following day, Rosario got serious and it was
Dr. Leo Cruz who pronounced her death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the afternoon of May 20,
1987.
Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction of Dr. Cruz which
was indicated therein that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest,
secondary to septicemia caused by the foreign object lodged in the intra uteral
vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion went to Gaspar
Alcantara to ask him in locating the relatives of Rosario. They were able to trace
Rosario's grandmother, Mrs. Maria Burgos Turla, and informed her that her
granddaughter was already dead and lying in state at St. Martin Funeral Parlor.
Mrs. Turla went there with her son, who shouldered all the burial expenses for
Rosario.
Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came to her residence at
Sta. Rita and asked her if she was interested in filing a case against the person
who caused the death of her granddaughter. Of course she agreed. Hence, she
was brought to the Fiscal's (City) Office to file the same. On March 29, 1989, the
trial court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape
with homicide.
Issue: WON Ritter should be acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt or
acquitted on grounds of rape with homicide.
Held: Yes, on grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the
amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of
Rosario Baluyot.  Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery against his wife, Ruby Vera
Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her grandmother's house.
Circumstances forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate profession.
Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have certainly suffered mental
anguish, anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous death as
reflected in the records of the case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for the
crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is
innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and
the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction which saved
him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there is
the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario's
vaginal canal and that the vibrator may have caused her death. True, we cannot
convict on probabilities or possibilities but civil liability does not require proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of indemnity on the
facts found in the records of this case.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public
order or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the
appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them with money. We can not
overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults in the Philippines,
including the appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation committed
by the appellant should not and can not be condoned.  marry other persons and by filing complaint only about a year after discovering his
And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately
protect street children from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their
own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young bodies. The provisions
on statutory rape and other related offenses were never intended for the relatively
recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant poverty among the
forgotten segments of our society. Newspaper and magazine articles, media
exposes, college dissertations, and other studies deal at length with this serious
social problem but pedophiles like the appellant will continue to enter the
Philippines and foreign publications catering to them will continue to advertise the
availability of Filipino street children unless the Government acts and acts soon.
We have to acquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so.
We, however, express the Court's concern about the problem of street children
and the evils committed against them. Something must be done about it.
Arroyo v. CA
FACTS: Accused, Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri in the company of Mrs. Linda Sare and
witness Jabunan went to the condominium of the Neri spouses in Baguio. Later on,
accused Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the Neris' condominium. Witness opened the
door for Arroyo who entered, he went down to and knocked at the master's
bedroom where accused Ruby Vera Neri and her companion Linda Sare were. On
accused Ruby Vera Neri's request, Linda Sare left the master's bedroom and went
upstairs to the sala leaving the two accused. About forty-five minutes later, Arroyo
Jr. came up and told Linda Sare that she could already come down. Three of them,
thereafter, went up to the sala then left the condominium. 
Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo.
Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals'
Decision. Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for reconsideration or a new trial,
contending that a pardon had been extended by her husband, private complainant
Dr. Jorge B. Neri, and that her husband had later contracted marriage with another
woman with whom he is presently co-habiting. Both motions were denied by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: WON the Dr. Neri's alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from filing
the criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto. NO
HELD: We turn to the contention that pari-delicto "is a valid defense to a
prosecution for adultery and concubinage and that in such a case "it would be only
a hypocritical pretense for such spouse to appear in court as the offended
spouse." 
In the first place, the case cited does not support petitioner Neri's position. In
the Guinucud case, the Court found that the complaining husband, by entering into
an agreement with his wife that each of them were to live separately and could
wife's infidelity, had "consented to, and acquiesced in, the adulterous relations
existing between the accused, and he is, therefore, not authorized by law to
institute the criminal proceedings." In fine, the Guinucud case refers not to the
notion of pari delicto but to consent as a bar to the institution of the criminal
proceedings. In the present case, no such acquiescence can be implied: the
accused did not enter into any agreement with Dr. Neri allowing each other to
marry or cohabit with other persons; and Dr. Neri promptly filed his complaint after
discovering the illicit affair.
Moreover, the concept of pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code, but
only in Article 1411 of the Civil Code. The Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil
Code relates only to contracts with illegal consideration. The case at bar does not
involve any illegal contract which either of the contracting parties is now seeking to
enforce.
Ventura v. Samson
FACTS: Sometime in December 2001, at around midnight, the complainant, then
 13 years old, was sleeping in the maid’s room at respondent’s house when
respondent entered and went on top of her. Respondent kissed her lips, sucked
her breast, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She felt pain and
found blood stain in her panty.
She stated that another incident happened on March 19, 2002 at respondent’s
poultry farm. Respondent asked her to go with him to the farm. He brought her to
an old shanty where he sexually abused her. Thereafter, respondent gave her five
hundred pesos and warned her not to tell anyone what had happened or he would
kill her and her mother.
Complainant filed a Complaint for Disbarment or Suspension before the Integrated
Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent Atty. Danilo S.
Samson for “grossly immoral conduct.”
IBP: SUSPENDED the respondent for five years from the practice of law.
ISSUE: WON the respondent should be disbarred on the ground of grossly
immoral conduct. YES
HELD: Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s
sense of decency.
From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of
respondent himself, we find that respondent’s act of engaging in sex with a young
lass, the daughter of his former employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that
warrants sanction. Respondent not only admitted he had sexual intercourse with
complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he asserted that he
did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money.
Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife
manifests his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own
marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he procured the act by enticing a
very young woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard
for the dignity of the human person and the ethics of his profession.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the
oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law. It bears to
stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a
privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can
be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer’s lack of the
essential qualifications required of lawyers.
G.R. No. 174689 October 22 2007
Silverio vs Republic
FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio having undergone a sex reassignment
surgery, sought to have his first name changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex
from male to female. Trial court granted his petition. CA, however, upon appeal
filed by the Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG, reversed the trial court
decision, holding that there is no law allowing the change of entries of either name
or sex in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground of
sex reassignment.
RULING: No. There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex and first
name through the intervention of sex reassignment surgery.
Article 376 of the Civil Code as amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law),
together with Article 412 of the same Code, change of name or sex in the birth
certificate is allowed by the courts so long as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. A change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA
9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared
purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public
interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might
suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician
or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at
the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
Thus, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry
as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his
petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
PEOPLE vs. JALOSJOS
Facts: The victim of rape in this case was a minor, named Maria Rosilyn, 11 years
of age, who herself narrated the shameful details of the dastardly act against her
virtue. The victim was peddled for commercial sex by her own guardian whom she
treated as a foster father name Simplicio Delantar. Simplicio, is a fifty-six year old
homosexual whose source of income was selling longganiza and tocino and Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
accepting boarders at his house. He, was also engaged in the skin trade as a the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the
pimp.  woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the
woman is under twelve years of age or is demented
As the complainant is a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by several
acts of lasciviousness on distinctly separate occasions. The accused was then
Congressman Romeo Jalosjos who, inspite of his having been charged and
convicted by the trial court for statutory rape, was still re-elected to his
congressional office. On December 16, 1996, 2 informations for the crime of
statutory rape and 12 for acts of lasciviousness, were filed against accused-
appellant. 

(In short, si victim dito lagi siyang dinadala nung tatay niya sa condo unit ni
Jalosjos Tapos dun siya ginagawan ng kababalaghan ni Jalosjos, Tapos every
time iniiwanan siya ng pera ni Jalosjos Tapos susunduin na siya ng tatay niya kasi
papasok na siya sa school.) Tapos Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of
Yamie Estreta, one of their boarders. Yamie accompanied Rosilyn to the Pasay
City Police, where she executed a sworn statement against Simplicio Delantar.
Rosilyn was thereafter taken to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD). The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted
an investigation, which eventually led to the filing of criminal charges against
accused-appellant.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in disregarding the significance of
private complainant’s failure to identify The accused-appellant
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in funding that tape was committed
against the private complainant.

Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the RTC Makati with
modification of penalty.

1. Contrary to the contentions of accused-appellant, the records reveal that

Rosilyn positively and unhesitatingly identified accused-appellant at the
courtroom. Such identification during the trial cannot be diminished by the
fact that in her sworn statement, Rosilyn referred to accused-appellant as
her abuser based on the name she heard from the person to whom she
was introduced and on the name she saw and read in accused-
appellant's office.
2. True, in People v. Campuhan, we explained that the phrase, "the mere
touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating
the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. The inevitable
contact between accused-appellant's penis, and at the very least, the
labia of the pudendum of Rosilyn, was confirmed when she felt pain
inside her vagina when the "idiniin" part of accused-appellant's sex ritual
was performed.