!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3.

"4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
LEGAL MEDICINE FORENSIC MEDICINE
Philippine Term US, England, and other countries
Father of Legal Medicine: Dr. Pedro P. Father of Forensic Medicine: Dr. Paolo
Solis Zacchia

Legal Medicine: Is that branch of medicine that applies scientific knowledge and skills,
specifically, medical and surgical principles to medico-legal issues in order to assist the
trier of facts in dispensing justice properly.

Medical Jurisprudence: The study of the medical law and is applicable jurisprudence
that governs, regulates and defines the practice of medicine. It includes the rights,
duties, obligations and liabilities of both physician and patient to each other in a
physician patient professional contract.

The following constitute the practice of Medicine: (1-4 PE) (POTS-DF)

(POTS-DF)
1. To physically examine and Diagnose a patient
2. To physically examine and Treat a patient perform Surgery
3. To physically examine and perform Surgery
4. To physically examine and Prescribe any remedy to a patient
5. To Offer/undertake by any means or method to diagnose, treat, operate or
prescribe any remedy for any human disease, injury, deformity, physical, mental
condition; or
6. To Falsely use the title M.D. after one’s name

Rights inherent in the practice of Medicine are the following: (CAR- LD)
1. Right to Choose his patients
2. Right to Limit the practice of his profession
3. Right to Determine appropriate treatment procedures in the discretion and
 judgment
 judgmen t of the physician
4. Right to Avail of hospital privileges after being qualified
5. Right to Receive just and fair compensation from his patients

The liabilities of a physician, which may arise from his negligent or wrongful acts
or omissions, may be classified in the following:

• Administrative
Administrative Liability – Reprimand, suspension, revocation, or termination of license of the
 practice of medicine

• Criminal Liability – Can be imprisoned, fined, or both

• Civil Liability –  Aggrieved party can be awarded monetary damages

*Mere refusal of a physician to attend to a patient in danger of death is not a sufficient ground for
revocation or suspension of his registration certificate.

DEATH  – Irreversible and persistent

persisten t loss of Heart and Lung function or Brainstem
Brainste m
function.

• Is the complete cessation

cessation of all vital
vital functions
functions of the body without the possibility
of resuscitation
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
Four (4) Kinds of Death:

1. Clinical/ Somatic Death – “Clinical Eye”, Body’s vital signs of life cease to exist
continuously and permanently. Patient no longer has a heartbeat, pulse rate,
spontaneous breathing and movement, with pupils of the eyes widely dilated and
not reactive to light and accommodation.

2. Brain Death – The human brain cannot survive loss of oxygen for more that six
(6) to ten (10) minutes.
o Brain Death may occur in the:
! Cerebral Cortex – Supply of oxygen and blood to the brain
(Results to Cortical Death)
! Cerebellum – Older part of development. It deals with the function
of equilibrium.
! Brainstem and vital centers –  –  these centers controlling the
respiration, heart rate and blood pressure, ultimately die.
o Criteria for diagnosing Brain stem death: (DADi-2)
! The patient must be in deep coma
! The patient must be on artificial respirator
! A defensable diagnosis must be available and due to irremediable
brain damage
! Diagnostic test for brain stem
stem damage must be unequivocally
positive as determined by two (2) doctors
(2) doctors

o HARVARD CRITERIA OF WHOLE BRAIN DEATH (FURS)

! Flat EEG of confirmatory value
! Unreceptivity and unresponsiveness
! No Reflexes
! No Spontaneous movements/breathing

3. Biological Death – In In this kind of death, all the components of the brain are
dead. It is Cardio respiratory and Brain death altogether with permanent
cessation of all the anatomic and physiological functions of the body organs. It is
so clear and manifest to the naked eye of an ordinary layman.

4. Cellular Death – The basic unit of life is the cell and when it permanently ceases
to function, cellular death occurs.

SIGNS OF DEATH ( HR-AMSSE or HAMS 2- ER)

1. Cessation of Heart action and circulation
2. Cessation of Respiration
3. Cooling of the Body (Algor Mortis)
4. Loss of Motor Power (Motion)
5. Loss of Sensory Power (Reflex/pain)
6. Changes in the Skin
7. Changes in and about the Eye

Death Certificate 
Certificate  – Is a legal document necessary for the burial of the dead, as it
certifies the occurrence of death. It is a document from the office of the civil registrar
general, listing the particulars of an individual’s death.
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
Manner of Death – is the explanation as to how the cause of death arose, and maybe
either natural death or violent death. Manner of violent death must be classified as either
murder, homicide, accident, suicide or undetermined. If manner of death is natural, if it is
caused by solely by one or more natural disease processes.

Mechanism of Death – Is the physiologic reason for a person’s death.

Lazarus Syndrome  – The spontaneous return of circulation after failed attempts at

resuscitation.

Implications of Lazarus Syndrome – Raises ethical and legal issues for doctors,
who must determine when medical death has occurred, when resuscitation efforts
should end, and post mortem procedures such as autopsies and organ harvesting may
take place.

Lazarus Sign – Or Lazarus Reflex, is a reflex movement in brain-dead patients,

which causes them to briefly raise their arms and drop them crossed on their chests.

Euthanasia – from the Greek “Good death”, refers to the practice of ending a life in a
painless manner.
Classification of Euthanasia: (VIPA)
! Voluntary – conducted with consent
! Involuntary  – conducted without consent. Conducted where an
individual makes a decision for another person incapable of doing
so. It is also known as physician-assisted death, physician
assisted suicide, or mercy killing.
! Passive – entails the withholding of common treatments, such as
antibiotics, necessary for the continuance of life.
! Active  – entails the use of lethal substances or forces, to end life
and is the most controversial means.

TRAUMA – (External Violence) The leading cause of death in the first four decades of
life and the third leading cause of death in all age groups today.

Death from Trauma has a trimodal distribution:

1. Seconds to minutes injury – Due to injury to the brain, high spinal cord, heart,
aorta and other large vessels. Can rarely be salvaged.
2. Minutes to few hours of injury – (The golden hour) due to subdural and
epidural hematomas, pneumohemathorax, ruptured spleen, liver, lacerations,
pelvic or femur fractures or multiple injuries with significant blood loss. It is in this
period that Advanced life support techniques are important.
3. Several days to weeks of injury – due to sepsis and organ failure

Specific Injuries:
1. Head
a. Epidural Hematoma – Usually due to laceration of the middle meningeal
artery by fracture of the squamous of the temporal bone, but can also be
produced by a dural sinus tear. Usually a result of bleeding from an
artery.
b. Subdural Hematoma – The source of bleeding is usually venous
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
c. Hemorrhagic Contusions –  most commonly found in the temporal,
frontal and occipital lobes
d. Diffuse Axonal Injuries – this results from shearing of the white matter
tracts from rotational forces at the time of the impact
e. Skull Fractures – can be classified as open, closed, linear, compound, or
depressed. “Raccoon’s eyes” “Battle’s sign”
f. Subarachnoid Hemorrhage – characterized by the sudden onset of the
“worst headache of life”
g. Intracerebral Hemorrhage  – This is hemorrhage within the brain matter
itself
h. Carotid dissection  – often seen in traumatic injuries, but can be
spontaneous
i. Vertebral dissection – associated with cervical spine fractures

2. Spine and Spinal Cord Injuries

o The spine is made up of 33 vertebraes
3. Chest
a. Life Threatening Injuries:
i. Tension Pneumothorax – one way valve air leak from the lungs
ii. Open Pneumothorax – “Sucking chest wound”
iii. Massive Hemothorax – loss of 1.5 liters of blood into the chest
cavity results into compression and collapse of the ipsilateral lung,
and also hypoxia.
iv. Flail Chest – There is a paradoxical motion of the chest wall.
v. Cardiac Tamponade – Fluid collect acutely within the rigid tissue
covering of the heart.
4. Abdomen
a. Penetrating Injury – Gunshot wounds of the abdomen carry 95%
probability with significant visceral injury. “Blast effect” may occur whether
or not the abdominal cavity is entered. Stab wounds of the abdomen,
only 2/3 penetrate the peritoneal cavity
b. Blunt Injury – produced by compression of the abdominal contents
against the vertebral column or the rib cage, by direct transfer of kinetic
energy to an organ by rapid deceleration with resulting tears of the
structures.
5. Fractures and Dislocations – Latin word “Fractura” which means break in the
bone continuity. It is also a combination of a break in the bone and soft tissue
injury.
a. Open Fractures – There is an open communication from the fracture to
the outside environment, because of a break in the skin. An open
Fracture is a contaminated wound (90% caused by vehicular accidents).
b. Close Fracture – There is no break in the skin over the fracture or near
the fracture site.
c. Compartment Syndrome – Usually found in fractures and dislocations.
There is increase pressure within a close space that causes irreversible
ischemic damage to the contents of that space.
d. Dislocations – Pure dislocations and fracture dislocations represent an
orthopedic emergency owing to the associated risk of neurovascular
compromise, acute compartment syndrome, chondrolysis and
development of avascular necrosis.
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
e. Intra-articular Laceration – Associated with open fractures and joint
penetration by foreign objects.
f. Pulseless extremity – Encountered frequently by trauma patients with
vascular injuries and occasionally in those with dislocations and complex
fractures.
6. Urologic –  All acceleration and deceleration or flank trauma associated with
hypotension are suspects of urological injuries
a. Hematuria following trauma
b. Kidneys
c. Ureters
d. Bladder
e. Urethral trauma
f. Penile injury
7. Arterial Trauma
a. Blunt injury – injury to the vessels, as a consequence of joint dislocations
b. Penetrating injury – direct injury to the vessels by blasting, fractures,
dislocations of the knee, severe ligament tears.
c. Iatrogenic
8. Burns
a. First degree – epidermal layer is involved (pink in color, no blisters)
b. Second degree – partial skin thickness. Partial dermal layer involved,
painful white to pink skin color with blebs and blisters present
c. Third degree – Full skin thickness. The entire dermal layer is involved
with all dermal appendages destroyed. Skin is insensate, white, black or
red in color, dry and leathery in texture.
d. Fourth degree – The underlying fascia, muscle, and or bone is also
burned.

CLASSIFICATION OF WOUNDS AS TO LEGAL CLASSIFICATION (RPC)

DESTRUCTION OF LIFE
a. Parricide (Art. 246)  – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child
whether legitimate or illegitimate or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his
spouse. Punished by the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to death
b. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances (Art.
247) – penalty of (despacito. Chos ") destierro.
c. Murder   (Art. 248) – (attendant of certain circumstances) Reclusion Perpetua to
Death
d. Homicide (Art. 249) – Reclusion Temporal
e. Death caused in a tumultuous affray (Art. 251) – when, while several persons,
not composing groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused
and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray, someone is killed, and it
cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased but the person or
persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or
persons shall be punished by Prison mayor
f. Physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous Affray (Art. 252) – Arresto Mayor
from five to fifteen days
g. Giving assistance to suicide  – Prison Mayor, however, if the suicide is not
consummated, the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods
shall be imposed.
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
h. Discharge of firearms (Art. 254) – Prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods
i. Infanticide (Art. 255) – killing of any child less than three days of a ge.
 j. Intentional abortion (Art. 256)
k. Unintentional abortion
l. Abortion Practiced by the woman herself or by her parents (Art. 258)
m. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of abortives
(Art. 259)
n. Responsibility of Participants in a DUEL (Art. 260)
o. Challenging to a Duel (Art. 261)

PHYSICAL INJURIES

a. Mutilation (Art. 262)  – Any person who shall intentionally mutilate

another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of some essential
organ of reproduction.
b. Serious Physical Injuries (Art. 263)
i. Serious: >30
ii. Less: 10-30
iii. Slight: 1-9
c. Administering Injurious Substances or beverages (Art. 264)
d. Less Serious Physical injuries (Art. 265)
e. Slight Physical Injuries and Maltreatment (Art. 266)

Rape – Is included in chapter of physical injuries, because of the means and manner of
commission which involves force or violence and the consequential injuries sustained by
the vitim. (Art. 266-A)

CLASSIFICATION OF WOUNDS

AS TO THE DEPTH OF THE W OUND:

a. Superficial – when the wound involves only the layers of the skin
b. Deep – beyond the layers of the skin
i. Penetrating – The wound enters the body but does not come out.
Punctured, stab and gunshot wounds u sually belong to this type of
wound.
ii. Perforating – There is a communication between the outside,
inner and the outside. There is both a point of entry and exit.

AS TO MORTALITY:

a. Deadly wound – Death results immediately, after the infliction of the wound
b. Non-deadly wound – Does not result in death immediately

AS TO THE WOUNDING INSTRUMENTS USED:

a. Sharp instruments – A sharp edged instrument produces an incised wound

b. Blunt instruments – a block of wood or iron, etc. produces contusion,
hematoma, abrasions, lacerated wound, when used to strike, attack, wound,
beat, or assault another.
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
AS TO THE CONSEQUENTIAL INJURY AFTER THE APPLICATION OF
FORCE:

1. Coup injury – the consequential injury is found at the site of the

application of force
2. Coup Contre Coup injury – found at the site of the application of force
and also opposite the site of application
3. Contre Coup injury – found at the opposite the site of the application of
force
4. Locus Minoris Resistencia – located only at the site offering least
resistance to the force applied
5. Extensive Injury – involves a bigger area of the body, than what was
expected.

AS TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE SKIN:

 A. Closed wounds – Presents no break in the integrity or continuity of the skin. The
following are examples of closed wounds:
i. Petechiae- circumscribed extravasation of blood in the
subcutaneous tissues due to destruction or increased permeability
of the capillaries. A visible mosquito bite is a petechiae.
ii. Contusion
iii. Hematoma
iv. Blunt injury
v. Musculoskeletal injuries – these are closed wounds, though
located in the musculoskeletal system; Sprain, Dislocation,
Fracture, Subluxation, Strain.
vi. Cerebral Concussion – brief loss of consciousness and
sometimes memory after a head injury
vii. Cerebral Contusion – bruises to the brain

B. Open Wounds – There is a b reak in the continuity of the skin

i. Abrasion
ii. Bruise
iii. Incised wound
iv. Stab wound
v. Punctured – result of a thrust by a sharp pointed instrument
vi. Perforating wound – blunt instrument
vii. Bites
viii. Gunshot wounds

GUNSHOT WOUNDS
1. Firm contact fire
2. Loose contact fire
3. Short Range (1-15cm. Distance)
4. Medium range (16-60cm Distance)
5. Far Distance Fire (more than 60cm)

Test for the presence of Gun Powder residues:

1. Paraffin test of Dermal Nitrate Test – Present on the skin of the hand dorsum
or site of the wound of entrance.
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
2. Use of Scanning Electron Microscope with a linked X-ray analyzer.

Special Types of Wounds:

• Assailant’s wounds – Sustained by the a ssailant from the victim.
• Defense’ wounds – In the process of defending himself from the attacks, assault
 – usually in the upper extremities
• Victims’ wounds – wounds sustained by the victim, from the assailant
• Self-inflicted wounds – usually found on the accessible parts of the body,
usually with no intention to kill himself.
• Homicidal wounds – serious wounds sustained by the victim resulting to his
death, from the criminal assailant.
• Accidental wounds
• Suicidal wounds – usually seen on the temple, the roof of the mouth, and other
fatal body areas, accessible to the hand of the victim.

CASES:

Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital G.R No. 130547 (October 3, 2000)

Facts:
Petitioner, Leah Alesna Reyes, is the wife of the deceased patient, Jorge Reyes. Five
days before the latter’s
death, Jorge has been suffering from recurring fever with chills. The doctors confirmed
through the Widal test that Jorge has typhoid fever. However, he did not respond to the
treatment and died. The cause of his death was “Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to
Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.”

Consequently, petitioner filed the instant case for damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, which dismissed the case and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The contention was that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever. Instead, his death was due to
the wrongful administration of chloromycetin. They contended that had respondent
doctors exercised due care and diligence, they would not have recommended and
rushed the performance of the Widal Test, hastily concluded that Jorge was suffering
from typhoid fever, and administered chloromycetin without first conducting sufficient
tests on the pa tient’s compatibility with said drug.

Legal Issue:  Whether or not Sisters of Mercy Hospital is liable for the death of Jorge
Reyes.

Ruling: Sisters of Mercy Hospital is not liable for the death of Jorge Reyes.

Reasoning of the Court: There is no showing that the attending physician in this case
deviated from the usual course of treatment with respect to typhoid fever. Jorge was
given antibiotic choloromycetin and some dose of triglobe after compatibility test was
made by the doctor and found that no adverse reactions manifested which would
necessitate replacement of the medicines. Indeed, the standard contemplated is not
what is actually the average merit among all known practitioners from
the best to the worst and from the most to the least experienced, but the reasonable ave
rage merit among the ordinarily good physicians. Here, the doctors did not depart from
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
the reasonable standard recommended by the experts as they in fact observed the due
care required under the circumstances.

Policy: In Medical Negligence cases, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish that
the usual procedure in treating the illness is not followed by the doctor. Failure to
prove this, the doctor is not liable. Physicians are not insurers of the success of every
procedure undertaken and if
the procedure was shown to be properly done but did not work, they cannot be faulted to
such result.

LINSANGAN vs. TOLENTINO

Facts:  A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional
services. Complaint alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie
Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised
them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to
hire hisservices, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. To support
his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting
that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for aloan of P50,
000.00. Complainant also attached “respondent’s” calling card. Respondent, in his
defense,denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said
calling card.

Issue: Whether or not Tolentino’s actions warrant disbarment.

Held:  Y e s . R u l e 2 . 0 3 o f t h e C P R p r o v i d e s t h a t a l a w y e r s h a l l n o t d o
or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Hence,
lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers.
Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. Rule 2.03
should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides that lawyer, shall
not for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man’s cause. This rule proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation of almost any
kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order
to gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.
In the case at bar, complainant presented substantial evidence (consisting of the
sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to
respondent’s office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as
profited from referrals’ suits.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited.
Haplessseamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s
word that respondent
could produce a more favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicit
ed employment viola ting R ule 2 .03, and Rule 1 .03 a nd Ca non 3 of th e CPR
and section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of C o u r t . A n y a c t o f s o l i c i t a t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e s m a l p r a c t i c e w h i c h c a l l s
 f o r t h e e x e r c i s e o f t h e C o u r t ’ s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
statues warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for
the purpose of obtaining employment. Thus in this jurisdiction, the Court
adheres to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of
unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Canon 2: A lawyer shall make his
l e g a l s e r v i c e s a v a i l a b l e i n a n e f f i c i e n t a n d c o n v e n i e n t m a n n e r compa
tible with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession. Rule 2.03: A
lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

NERY vs ATTY. SAMPANA

FACTS: Melody alleged in her complaint for disbarment against Atty. Glicerio Sampana
that he engaged the services of the latter to file the case for annulment of her marriage
and for her adoption by an alien adopter. After the annulment case was granted, she
gave him the amount of P200,000.00. To the adoption case, Modesto asked her if she
had an aunt who will act as the wife of the alien adopter. She then gave money on
various dates to Modesto, and did not bother to ask for receipts since she trusted him.
Thru text message, she learned from Modesto that the petition for adoption was already
filed and published, and they needed to rehearse for the hearing. Later, he informed her
that the hearing was reset to March 12, 2009. When she asked why she received no
notice from the court, he informed her that her presence was not needed a s it was only a
 jurisdictional hearing. When she verified with the court on March 11, she discovered that
no such petition for adoption was filed. Thus she met Modesto and asked for
reimbursement of her P100,000.00; the latter agreed, but demanded that his legal fees
of P12,000.00 be deducted, to which she did not agree, as the petition for adoption was
not filed. Despite several demands for reimbursement, Modesto failed to do the same. In
his defense, he admitted receiving a “package fee” from the complainant; but he had
reservations about the petition for adoption because of the old age, civil status, and
nationality of the alien adopter. Thus he suggested that the aunt be made to appear as
married to the alien adopter, and requested for a copy of the marriage certificate
between the aunt and the adopter, and the certification that the alien is qualified to adopt
from the Japanese embassy. He received the marriage certificate but not the
certification, hence he did not file the petition. The complainant could have have
mistaken the adoption case for the annulment case, but he did not misled Melody on the
petition for admission. He promised to refund the amount paid by Melody, less his legal
services and actual expenses. The IBP Board modified the recommended penalty by the
Investigating Commissioner, to suspension from the practice of law for three months,
and reimbursement of the amount paid by Melody.

The Court’s ruling: The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is well-taken,

except as to the penalty. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-
client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Every case
accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless
of importance. A lawyer also owes it to the court, their clients, and other lawyers to be
candid and fair . Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:
CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.
CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received “one package fee” for both
cases of annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file
the petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to his
client. Sampana’s proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition
for adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. In his position paper, he suggested to Nery that
if the alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the intended adoption could
be possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the
alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
is waived.
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery
of the status of the petition. He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed
the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted to him.
He even kept the money given him, in violation of the Code’s mandate to deliver the
client’s funds upon demand. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by
him gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal
profession.
This is not the first administrative case filed against Sampana. In Lising v.
Sampana,  we already found Sampana guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for his unethical and illegal act relative to his double sale of a
parcel of land. We imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for one (1) year and warned him that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
In Rollon v. Naraval, we imposed upon the respondent therein the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for two (2) years for failing to render any legal service after
receiving the filing and partial service fee. Considering the serious consequence of
disbarment and the previous rulings of this Court, we deem it proper to increase the
penalty for Sampana’s malpractice and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility to suspension from the practice of law for three (3) years.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana from the practice of law for
THREE (3) YEARS with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt
with more severely. We also ORDER Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana to RETURN to
complainant Melody R. Nery the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00), with 12% interest per annum from the time of his receipt of the full
amount of money on 17 November 2008 until 30 June 2013, then 6% interest per annum
from 1 July 2013 until fully paid.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records
of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters;
and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the
country.

ZARSONA MEDICAL CLINIC VS PHIC

!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
The Facts: Zarsona Medical Center (ZMC) filed a claim for confinement of NHIP
member Lorna (Alestra) from August 10-12, 2003 with the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (Philhealth). However, the claim was denied for “extended confinement”;
the claim form stated that Lorna was confined from August 6 to August 12, 2003;
however, the Salaysay of Lorna stated she was confined only from August 10-12, 2003;
she reported for work as a teacher on August 12, 2003. Because of this, a complaint for
violation of Section 149 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic
 Act 7875 was filed against ZMC. In its defense, ZMC alleged that its Midwife/Clerk,
Jennifer Acuram committed an honest mistake when she wrote in the claim form that
Lorna was confined from August 6-August 12, when if fact the hospital was only claiming
two days. It also attached the Affidavit of Explanation of Lorna recanting her previous
Salaysay, where she stated that she was protecting herself when she logged in at the
school’s time record on August 12, 2003 when she was still supposedly confined. She
stated that and her son were admitted at ZMC on August 10, and discharged on August
12, 2003. She was able to slip out of the hospital on August 12 after she was attended
to by the physician, reported for work and came back around noon to take her medicines
and look after her child. She was discharged around 2PM.
The Health Insurance Arbiter refused to give credence to Lorna’s claim, and instead
relied on the school record which stated she reported for work on August 12, 2003, as
shown in the attendance logbook. Thus, ZMC was found liable for violation of Section
149 of the Rules. Their appeal to the Philhealth Board denied, they filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals. On September 4, 2008, the CA issued a Resolution
requiring ZMC to correct certain deficiencies in its petition for review such as: (1) failure
to attach the Special Power of Attorney executed by the petitioner Zarsona Medical
Clinic in favor of Ma. Irene M. Hao, authorizing the latter to execute the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping; (2) failure of the petitioner to attach the certified true
copy of the assailed decision of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation as required under Rule 43, Section 6(c) of the Revised Rules of Court; (3)
failure of the petitioner’s counsel, Atty. John Tracy F. Cagas, to indicate the dates and
places of issuance of his IBP and PTR Receipts as well as his Roll of Attorneys
Number. In compliance therewith. ZMC attached the Special Power of
 Attorney executed by Dr. Leandro Zarsona, Jr. (Dr. Zarsona) in favor of Dr. Bragat and
William Bragat, as well as other required documents. Nevetheless, the CA dismissed
the petition for failure of ZMC to attach a valid SPA, since the SPA it attached showed
that it pertained only to administrative matters, not for filing cases or to sigh and execute
the required verification or certification of non-forum shopping. Its motion for
reconsideration denied, it filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

The Issue/s: Whether the Special Power of Attorney executed by the hospital was
sufficient compliance with the rules, and the whether the dismissal of the case on
technical grounds was valid.

The Court’s ruling:  At the outset, the issues revolve on the sufficiency of the SPA
authorizing Dr. Bragat to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in
the petition filed before the Court of Appeals.

Verification of a pleading is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure

the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the
court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive
strict compliance with the rules. It is deemed substantially complied with when one who
has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct.
 As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,
unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of “substantial
compliance” or presence of “special circumstances or compelling reasons.1” Rule 7,
Section 5 of the Rules of the Court, requires that the certification should be signed by the
“petitioner or principal party” himself. The rationale behind this is “because only the
petitioner himself has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions
or proceedings in different courts or agencies.”
In Lim v. The Court of Appeals, Mindanao Station, we reiterated that the requirements of
verification and certification against forum shopping are not jurisdictional. Verification is
required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. Non-compliance with the
verification requirement does n ot necessarily render the pleading fatally defective, and is
substantially complied with when signed by one who has ample knowledge of the truth of
the allegations in the complaint or petition, and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct. On the other hand, the certification
against forum shopping is required based on the principle that a party-litigant should not
be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora. While the certification
requirement is obligatory, non-compliance or a defect in the certificate could be cured by
its subsequent correction or submission under special circumstances or compelling
reasons, or on the ground of “substantial compliance.”
In both cases, the submission of an SPA authorizing an attorney-in-fact to sign the
verification and certification against forum-shopping in behalf of the principal party is
considered as substantial compliance with the Rules.

In this case, Philhealth found the SPA defective.

The SPA granted by Dr. Zarsona to his attorneys-in-fact, Dr. Bragat and William Bragat,
authorizes the latter to do the following:

To represent(,) process, follow up, transact and facilitate all claims, benefits and

privileges belonging to or owing to Zarsona Medical Clinic in the Philippine Health

Insurance Corporation, Department of Health and in other agencies, may it be private or

 A) government;

To receive, withdraw, and encash any check or checks belonging to or in the name of

B) Zarsona Medical Clinic;

To make, execute, and sign any contract, documents or all other writings of
C) whatever kind and nature which are necessary to the foregoing powers.

Indeed, a reading of the SPA reveals that the powers conferred by Dr. Zarsona to his
attorneys-in-fact pertain to administrative matters. The phrase “claims, benefits and
privileges belonging to or owing to Zarsona Medical Clinic” clearly does not include the
filing of cases before the courts or any quasi-judicial agencies. The term “claims” in
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
particular refers to those claims for payment of services rendered by the hospital during
a Philhealth member’s confinement. These claims are filed by the hospital with
Philhealth. Furthermore, the SPA makes no mention of any court, judicial or quasi-
 judicial bodies. The enumeration of agencies in the first paragraph of the SPA, such as
Philhealth and Department of Health, refers to those agencies which are health-related.

There is no explicit authorization for Dr. Bragat to sign and execute the requirement
verification and certification in this case. At the very least, the SPA should have granted
the attorneys-in-fact the power and authority to institute civil and criminal actions which
would necessarily include the signing of the verification and certification against forum-
shopping.

The defects in the SPA notwithstanding, we rule in favor of ZMC. We agree with the
Dissent registered by Associate Justice Ruben Ayson when he suggested that ZMC
should be given the opportunity to rectify the defects in the petition. We are aware that
the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 28 January 2009 had directed ZMC to
submit an SPA. ZMC had in good faith complied by submitting an SPA which it thought
was sufficient and encompasses the filing of the instant suit. Time and again, we had
espoused the doctrine that provisions of the Rules of Court should be liberally construed
in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding. Otherwise put, the rule requiring a certification of forum
shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, or the verification for that matter
“should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure – which is to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.” While it is true that the rules of
procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, and the swift
unclogging of court docket is a laudable objective, it nevertheless must not be met at the
expense of substantial justice. This Court has time and again reiterated the doctrine that
the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of justice, rather
than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed
when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and
expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of
the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.8
We choose to apply liberality because of the substantial merit of the petition.

The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals purely on a procedural

ground. Ordinarily, procedure dictates that the Court of Appeals should be tasked with
properly disposing the petition, a second time around, on the merits. However, when
there is enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits of petitioner’s case may
be had, the Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of remand in order
to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case. Clearly, a remand of the instant
case to the Court of Appeals would only unnecessarily prolong its resolution which had
been pending for a decade. It is already an accepted rule of procedure for us to strive to
settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the
seeds of future litigation. If, based on the records, the pleadings, and other evidence, the
dispute can be resolved by us, we will do so to serve the ends of justice instead of
remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings.
Thus, we find the petition meritorious.
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
ZMC was charged with extending the period of confinement punishable under Section
149 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7875,
which provides:

Section 149. Extending Period of Confinement. — This is committed by any health care
provider who, for the purpose of claiming payment from the NHIP, files a claim with
extended period of confinement by:

a. Increasing the actual confinement of any patient;

b. Continuously charting entries in the Doctor’s Order, Nurse’s Notes and Observation
despite actual discharge or absence of the patients;

c. Using such other machinations that would result in the unnecessary extension of
confinement.

The foregoing offenses shall be penalized by revocation of accreditation. In addition, a

recommendation shall be submitted to the DOH for cancellation of its license, or
accreditation, or clearance to operate, as appropriate.

The Philhealth Arbiter and the Board did not give weight to the Affidavit of Explanation
submitted by the patient herself recanting her previous statement and categorically
stating that she was discharged only on 12 August 2 003.

It is an oft-repeated rule that findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded

not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to abuse of discretion or lack of
 jurisdiction. The findings of facts must be respected, so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or preponderant.
 After an exhaustive review of the records, we find that this case warrants a departure
from said rule.

We are inclined to give more credence to Alestre’s Affidavit, which is essentially a

recantation of her previous Salaysay, for the following reasons: First, Alestre has fully
explained to our satisfaction why she initially misdeclared her dates of confinement in
ZMC. In her desire to report and be compensated for one day of work, Alestre hied back
and forth between school and the hospital. It is difficult to believe that she would risk her
reputation as a public school teacher, as well as prosecution for violation of civil service
rules, to be an abettor of ZMC. Second, Alestre truly cannot be in two places at the
same time. But her narration clearly accounts for her whereabouts on 12 August
2003. She travelled at least 3 times to and from the hospital and school. She admitted
that the school was a mere ten-minute drive away from the hospital so she can easily
traverse between the two locations. Third, ZMC had in fact admitted to its error in
indicating the dates of Alestre’s confinement so there is no reason for ZMC to further
conceal the actual days of Alestre’s confinement. Fourth, the Salaysay is not
notarized. While recantation is frowned upon and hardly given much weight in the
determination of a case, the affidavit is still a notarized document which carries in its
favor the presumption of regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there must
be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence to contradict the
same.
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the finding of Philhealth and hold that ZMC is not
guilty of extending the period of confinement.
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 02489-MIN dismissing the petition is REVERSED and SET
 ASIDE. Philhealth Board Resolution No. 1151, Series of 2008 is SET ASIDE.

ULEP vs THE LEGAL CLINIC

Facts: In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim,
according to Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who
cannot afford the services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint
against The Legal Clinic because o f the latter’s advertisement’s which contain the
following:

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am – 6:00pm
7 th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
 An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa
for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7 th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal
Problems” in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal
Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter how
complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in
various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists
are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
 !"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
 As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence
in the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that
besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The
Legal Clinic offers.

ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such
is allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.

HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is
not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered
include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services
are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the
services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who
is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
 Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents.
 A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or
skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the
advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous
marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is
highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct.
Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as allowed forms of
advertisement:

1. Advertisement in a reputable law list

2. Use of ordinary simple professional card
3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

TERRY SHIAVO CASE (Death)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JENNY LIKIRAN ALIAS LOLOY (Trauma)

Jenny Likiran (accused-appellant) was convicted of the crime of Murder by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City, Branch 8, for the death of Rolando Sareno, Sr.
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
(Sareno). In its Decision[1] dated July 17, 2006, the RTC disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Loloy Likiran guilty of the crime of Murder and
imposes upon him the penalty of Reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim
the sum of [P]50,000.00 as civil indemnity; [P]50,000.00 moral damages; [P]30,000.00
actual damages, and [P]10,000.00 attorney's fee and to pay the costs. This court has no
 jurisdiction over Jerome alias Caro Likiran as he is not impleaded in the information.

SO ORDERED.[2]

The incident that led to the death of Sareno happened on the wee hour of March 19,
2000 in Barangay  Bugca-on, Lantapon, Bukidnon. It was the eve of the town fiesta and a
dance was being held at the basketball court. Prosecution witnesses Celso Dagangon
(Dagangon), Prescado Mercado (Mercado) and Constancio Goloceno (Goloceno)
testified that on said night, they were at the dance together with Sareno at around 8:00
p.m. After a few hours, while Mercado and Goloceno were inside the dance area,
Jerome Likiran[3]  (Jerome), the accused-appellant's brother, punched Mercado on the
mouth. Goloceno was about to assist Mercado when he saw that Jerome was armed
with a short firearm while the accused-appellant was holding a hunting knife, so he
backed off. Dagangon and Sareno, who were outside the dance area, heard the
commotion. Afterwards, Jerome approached Sareno and shot him several times. With
Sareno fallen, the accused-appellant stabbed him on the back. It was Dagangon who
saw the incident first-hand as he was only three meters from where Sareno was.
Dagangon was able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after Jerome and the accused-
appellant left, but Sareno was already dead at that point. Sareno suffered multiple
gunshot wounds and a stab wound at the left scapular area.[4]

The accused-appellant, however, denied any involvement in the crime. While he

admitted that he was at the dance, he did not go outside when the commotion
happened. He and Jerome stayed within the area where the sound machine was located
and they only heard the gunshots outside. Other witnesses testified in the accused-
appellant's defense, with Edgar Indanon testifying that he saw the stabbing incident and
that it was some other unknown person, and not the accused-appellant, who was the
culprit; and Eleuterio Quiñopa stating that he was with the accused-appellant and
Jerome inside the dance hall at the time the commotion occurred.

The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the accused-appellant's
culpability.[5] Prosecution witness Dagangon's positive identification of the accused-
appellant was held sufficient by the RTC to convict the latter of the crime of
murder.[6] The RTC also rejected the accused-appellant's defense of denial as it was not
supported by evidence. It also ruled that alibi   cannot favor the accused-appellant since
he failed to prove that it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime on the
night of March 19, 2000.[7]

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision in toto per assailed
Decision[8] dated July 27, 2011, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated July 17, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Malaybalay City, in Criminal Case No. 10439-00 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1

SO ORDERED.[9]

The CA sustained the findings of the RTC as regards the identity of the accused-
appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime. The CA, nevertheless, deviated from
the RTC's conclusion that there was conspiracy between Jerome and the accused-
appellant, and that abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime.
 According to the CA, the information failed to contain the allegation of conspiracy, and
the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish that Jerome and the accused-
appellant ganged up on the victim.[10]The CA, however, sustained the RTC's finding of
treachery.[11]

The accused-appellant protested his conviction.[12] According to him, the prosecution

failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the accused-appellant
argued that the prosecution failed to prove the identity of the assailant and his
culpability.[13]

Upon review, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of
the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, including their assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses. Factual findings of the trial court are, except for compelling or exceptional
reasons, conclusive to the Court especially when fully supported by evidence and
affirmed by the CA.[14]

The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal. [15] In this case, the identity of the accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators
of the crime has been adequately established by the prosecution, more particularly by
the testimony of Dagangon. The Court cannot sustain the accused-appellant's argument
that it was impossible for Dagangon to see the assailant considering that there was no
evidence to show that the place where the crime occurred was lighted. As found by the
CA, Dagangon was only three meters away from the accused-appellant and Jerome and
had a good view of them. Moreover, there was no distraction that could have disrupted
Dagangon's attention. He even immediately identified the accused-appellant and Jerome
during police investigation, and there is no showing that Dagangon was informed by the
police beforehand that the accused-appellant was one of the suspects.[16] Positive
identification by a prosecution witness of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the
crime is entitled to greater weight than alibi   and denial.[17]  Such positive identification
gains further ground in the absence of any ill motive on the part of a witness to falsely
testify against an accused.[18]

The accused-appellant also asserted that the information charged him of murder
committed by attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting Sareno, thereby causing his
instantaneous death.[19] The accused-appellant argued that the evidence on record
established that Sareno was in fact shot by some other person.[20] At this juncture, the
Court notes that the testimony of Dagangon, indeed, identified two assailants the
accused-appellant and his brother, Jerome; however, it was only the accused-appellant
who was charged with the death of Sareno. Defense witnesses also testified that Jerome
died on March 12, 2005.[21]

The CA disregarded the accused-appellant's contention and ruled that "the cause of
death was not made an issue in the court a quo" and the Certificate of Death was
admitted during the pre-trial conference as proof of the fact and cause of death.[22] And
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
even assuming that the cause of death was an issue, the CA still held the accused-
appellant liable for the death of Sareno on the basis of the Court's ruling in People v.
Pilola.[23]

The Court reviewed the records of this case and finds sufficient basis for the CA's
disregard of the accused-appellant's argument.

The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters stipulated upon
and admitted by the prosecution and the defense was that the Certificate of Death
issued by Dr. Cidric Dael (Dr. Dael) of the Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and reviewed by
the Rural Health Physician of Malaybalay City "is admitted as proof of fact and cause of
death due to multiple stab wound scapular area."[24]Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is
allowed by Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118,
meanwhile, prescribes that all agreements or admissions made or entered during the
pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel,
otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused.[25] In this case, while it appears that
the pre-trial agreement was signed only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the
same may nevertheless be admitted given that the defense failed to object to its
admission.[26]  Moreover, a death certificate issued by a municipal health officer in the
regular performance of his duty is prima facieevidence of the cause of death of the
victim. [27] Note that the certificate of death issued by Dr. Dael provides the following:

CAUSES OF DEATH
Immediate cause: DOA
 Antecedent cause: Multiple GSW
Underlying cause: Stab wound scapular area (L)[28]

The accused-appellant, therefore, is bound by his admission of Sareno's cause of

death.[29]

More importantly, the accused-appellant is criminally liable for the natural and logical
consequence resulting from his act of stabbing Sareno. It may be that he was not the
shooter, it is nevertheless true that the stab wound he inflicted on Sareno contributed to
the latter's death. In Quinto v. Andres,[30] the Court stated that:

If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in
 jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its
nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the
factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his
delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. A
different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life
a salutary and essential safeguard. x x x[.][31] (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

The Court, however, cannot agree with the RTC and CA's conclusion that the killing of
Sareno was attended by treachery, qualifying the crime to murder.

Treachery is appreciated as a qualifying circumstance when the following elements are

shown: a) the malefactor employed means, method, or manner of execution affording
the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and b) the means,
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender .[32] Treachery is not present when the killing is not premeditated, or where the
sudden attack is not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by a
sudden infuriation on the part of the accused as a result of a provocative act of the
victim, or when the killing is done at the spur of the moment. [33]

In this case, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses all point to the fact that the
shooting and stabbing of Sareno was actually a spur of the moment incident, a result of
the brawl that happened during the barrio dance. The prosecution failed to show that the
accused-appellant and his brother Jerome deliberately planned the means by which they
would harm Sareno. In fact, what was revealed by the prosecution evidence was that
Sareno was an innocent bystander who unfortunately became a target of the accused-
appellant and Jerome's rampage. Consequently, the accused-appellant should be liable
only for the lesser crime of Homicide.

In convictions for homicide, Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) prescribes the
penalty of reclusion temporal , which ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years.[34] In the absence of any modifying circumstances, the penalty should
be imposed in its medium period,[35]  or from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law,[36] the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant
shall be within the range of reclusion temporal  medium,[37]  and the minimum shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the
offense,[38] or prision mayor   in any of its periods, which ranges from six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years. [39]There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the Court thereby sentences the accused-appellant to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal  medium, as
maximum.

With regard to the damages awarded, the Court affirms the award of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) moral
damages, as these are in accord with the Court's judicial policy on the matter. [40] These,
on top of the Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) actual damages and Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) attorney's fees awarded by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
Further, the monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%)  per
annum from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.[41]

The Court, moreover, deletes the attorney's fees awarded by the RTC as there is
nothing on record proving that the heirs of Sareno actually incurred such expense.
 Attorney's fees are in the concept of actual or compensatory damages allowed under the
circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code,[42] and absent any evidence
supporting its grant, the same must be deleted for lack of factual basis.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00484 is MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Jenny Likiran alias "Loloy" is
hereby found guilty of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE, and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal  medium, as
maximum. Further, the award of attorney's fees is hereby DELETED.
!"#$% '"()*)+" , -../0 !"1 20 2%$3."4 '050
6/7 89$/ :$3;)"+.1
Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages
awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

In all other respects, the Court of Appeals decision is AFFIRMED.