The liabilities of a physician, which may
LEGAL MEDICINE FORENSIC
MEDICINE
CHAPTER 1
LEGAL MEDICINE – Philippine Term
FORENSIC MEDICINE – US, England, and
other countries
Father of Legal Medicine: Dr. Pedro P. Solis
Father of Forensic Medicine: Dr. Paolo
Zacchia
Legal Medicine: Is that branch of medicine
that applies scientific knowledge and skills,
specifically, medical and surgical principles to
medico-legal issues in order to assist the trier
of facts in dispensing justice properly.
CHAPTER 2
Medical Jurisprudence: The study of the
medical law and is applicable jurisprudence
that governs, regulates and defines the
practice of medicine. It includes the rights,
duties, obligations and liabilities of both
physician and patient to each other in a
physician patient professional contract.
The following constitute the practice of
Medicine: (1-4 PE) (POTS-DF)
1. To physically examine and Diagnose
a patient
2. To physically examine and Treat a
patient perform Surgery
3. To physically examine and perform S
urgery
4. To physically examine and Prescribe
any remedy to a patient
5. To Offer/undertake by any means or
method to diagnose, treat, operate or
prescribe any remedy for any human
disease, injury, deformity, physical,
mental condition; or
6. To Falsely use the title M.D. after
one’s name
Rights inherent in the practice of Medicine
are the following: (CAR- LD)
1. Right to Choose his patients
2. Right to Limit the practice of his
profession
3. Right to Determine appropriate
treatment procedures in the discretion
and judgment of the physician
4. Right to Avail of hospital privileges
after being qualified
5. Right to Receive just and fair
compensation from his patients
arise from his negligent or wrongful acts or
omissions, may be classified in the
following:
• Administrative Liability – Reprimand,
suspension, revocation, or termination of license
of the practice of medicine
• Criminal Liability – Can be imprisoned,
fined, or both
• Civil Liability – Aggrieved party can be
awarded monetary damages
*Mere refusal of a physician to attend to a patient in
danger of death is not a sufficient ground for
revocation or suspension of his registration
certificate.
CHAPTER 3
DEATH – Irreversible and persistent loss of
Heart and Lung function or Brainstem function.
• Is the complete cessation of all vital
functions of the body without the
possibility of resuscitation
Four (4) Kinds of Death:
1. Clinical/ Somatic Death – “Clinical
Eye”, Body’s vital signs of life cease to
exist continuously and permanently.
Patient no longer has a heartbeat,
pulse rate, spontaneous breathing and
movement, with pupils of the eyes
widely dilated and not reactive to light
and accommodation.
2. Brain Death – The human brain
cannot survive loss of oxygen for more
that six
(6) to ten (10) minutes.
o Brain Death may occur in the:
▪ Cerebral Cortex – Supply of oxygen and
blood to the brain (Results to Cortical
Death)
▪ Cerebellum – Older part of development. It
deals with the function of equilibrium.
▪ Brainstem and vital centers – these
centers controlling the respiration, heart
rate and blood pressure, ultimately die.
o Criteria for diagnosing Brain stem
death: (DADi-2)
▪ The patient must be in deep coma
▪
 The patient must be on artificial
respirator
▪ A defensable diagnosis must be
available and due to irremediable
brain damage
▪ Diagnostic test for brain stem
damage must be unequivocally
positive as determined by two (2)
doctors
• HARVARD CRITERIA OF WHOLE
BRAIN DEATH (FURS)
o No Reflexes
• No Spontaneous movements/breathing
o Flat EEG of confirmatory value
o Unreceptivity and
unresponsiveness
3. Biological Death – In this kind of
death, all the components of the
brain are dead. It is Cardio
respiratory and Brain death
altogether with permanent cessation
of all the anatomic and physiological
functions of the body organs. It is so
clear and manifest to the naked eye
of an ordinary layman.
4. Cellular Death – The basic unit of
life is the cell and when it
permanently ceases to function,
cellular death occurs.
SIGNS OF DEATH (HR-AMSSE or HAMS2-
ER)
1. Cessation of Heart action and
circulation
2. Cessation of Respiration
3. Cooling of the Body (Algor Mortis)
4. Loss of Motor Power (Motion)
5. Loss of Sensory Power (Reflex/pain)
6. Changes in the Skin
7. Changes in and about the Eye
Death Certificate – Is a legal document
necessary for the burial of the dead, as it
certifies the occurrence of death. It is a
document from the office of the civil registrar
general, listing the particulars of an
individual’s death.
Manner of Death – is the explanation as to how
the cause of death arose, and maybe either
natural death or violent death. Manner of
violent death must be classified as either
murder, homicide, accident, suicide or
undetermined. If manner of death is natural,
if it is caused by solely by one or
more natural disease processes.
Mechanism of Death – Is the physiologic
reason for a person’s death.
Lazarus Syndrome – The spontaneous return
of circulation after failed attempts at
resuscitation.
Implications of Lazarus Syndrome –
Raises ethical and legal issues for doctors, who
must determine when medical death has
occurred, when resuscitation efforts should
end, and post mortem procedures such as
autopsies and organ harvesting may take
place.
Lazarus Sign – Or Lazarus Reflex, is a
reflex movement in brain-dead patients, which
causes them to briefly raise their arms and drop
them crossed on their chests.
Euthanasia – from the Greek “Good death”,
refers to the practice of ending a life in a
painless manner.
Classification of Euthanasia: (VIPA)
▪ Voluntary – conducted with consent
▪ Involuntary – conducted without
consent. Conducted where an individual
makes a decision for another person
incapable of doing so. It is also known as
physician-assisted death, physician
assisted suicide, or mercy killing.
▪ Passive – entails the withholding of
common treatments, such as antibiotics,
necessary for the continuance of life.
▪ Active – entails the use of lethal
substances or forces, to end life and is the
most controversial means.
CHAPTER 4
TRAUMA – (External Violence) The leading
cause of death in the first four decades of life
and the third leading cause of death in all age
groups today.
Death from Trauma has a trimodal distribution:
1.Seconds to minutes injury – Due to injury
to the brain, high spinal cord, heart,
aorta and other large vessels. Can
rarely be salvaged.
 2. Minutes to few hours of injury – iii. Massive Hemothorax – loss of 1.5
(The golden hour) due to subdural and liters of blood into the chest cavity
epidural hematomas, results into compression and collapse
pneumohemathorax, ruptured spleen, of the ipsilateral lung, and also
liver, lacerations, pelvic or femur hypoxia.
fractures or multiple injuries with
significant blood loss. It is in this period
that Advanced life support techniques
are important.
3. Several days to weeks of injury – due
to sepsis and organ failure

Specific Injuries:
1. Head
a. Epidural Hematoma – Usually due to
laceration of the middle meningeal
artery by fracture of the squamous of
the temporal bone, but can also be
produced by a dural sinus tear. Usually
a result of bleeding from an artery.
b. Subdural Hematoma – The source of
bleeding is usually venous
c. Hemorrhagic Contusions – most
commonly found in the temporal, frontal
and occipital lobes
d. Diffuse Axonal Injuries – this results
from shearing of the white matter tracts
from rotational forces at the time of the
impact
e. Skull Fractures – can be classified as
open, closed, linear, compound, or
depressed. “Raccoon’s eyes” “Battle’s
sign”
f. Subarachnoid Hemorrhage –
characterized by the sudden onset of
the “worst headache of life”
g. Intracerebral Hemorrhage –
This is hemorrhage within the
brain matter itself
h. Carotid dissection – often
seen in traumatic injuries, but
can be spontaneous
i. Vertebral dissection –
associated with cervical spine
fractures

2. Spine and Spinal Cord Injuries

o The spine is made up of 33
vertebraes
3. Chest
a. Life Threatening Injuries:
i. Tension Pneumothorax – one way
valve air leak from the lungs
ii. Open Pneumothorax – “Sucking
chest wound”
 iv. Flail Chest – There
is a paradoxical motion of the chest
wall.
v. Cardiac Tamponade – Fluid collect acutely
within the rigid tissue covering of the heart.
4. Abdomen
a. Penetrating Injury – Gunshot wounds of
the abdomen carry 95% probability with
significant visceral injury. “Blast effect”
may occur whether or not the abdominal
cavity is entered. Stab wounds of the
abdomen, only 2/3 penetrate the
peritoneal cavity
b. Blunt Injury – produced by compression of
the abdominal contents against the
vertebral column or the rib cage, by direct
transfer of kinetic energy to an organ by
rapid deceleration with resulting tears of
the structures.
5. Fractures and Dislocations – Latin word
“Fractura” which means break in the bone
continuity. It is also a combination of a break
in the bone and soft tissue injury.
a. Open Fractures – There is an open
communication from the fracture to the
outside environment, because of a break
in the skin. An open Fracture is a
contaminated wound (90% caused by
vehicular accidents).
b. Close Fracture – There is no break in the
skin over the fracture or near the fracture
site.
c. Compartment Syndrome – Usually found
in fractures and dislocations. There is
increase pressure within a close space
that causes irreversible ischemic damage
to the contents of that space.
d. Dislocations – Pure dislocations and
fracture dislocations represent an
orthopedic emergency owing to the
associated risk of neurovascular
compromise, acute compartment
syndrome, chondrolysis and development
of avascular necrosis.
e. Intra-articular Laceration – Associated
with open fractures and joint penetration
by foreign objects.
f. Pulseless extremity – Encountered
frequently by trauma patients with
vascular injuries and occasionally in those
with dislocations and complex fractures.
6. Urologic – All acceleration and
deceleration or flank trauma associated with
hypotension are suspects of urological injuries
a. Hematuria following trauma
b. Kidneys
c. Ureters
d. Bladder
e. Urethral trauma
f. Penile injury
7. Arterial Trauma
a. Blunt injury – injury to the vessels, as a
consequence of joint dislocations
b. Penetrating injury – direct injury to the
vessels by blasting, fractures,
dislocations of the knee, severe ligament
tears.
c. Iatrogenic
8. Burns
a. First degree – epidermal layer is
involved (pink in color, no blisters)
b. Second degree – partial skin
thickness. Partial dermal layer
involved, painful white to pink skin
color with blebs and blisters
present
c. Third degree – Full skin thickness.
The entire dermal layer is involved
with all dermal appendages
destroyed. Skin is insensate,
white, black or red in color, dry and
leathery in texture.
d. Fourth degree – The underlying
fascia, muscle, and or bone is also
burned.
CLASSIFICATION OF WOUNDS AS TO
LEGAL CLASSIFICATION (RPC)
DESTRUCTION OF LIFE
a. Parricide (Art. 246) – Any person who
shall kill his father, mother, or child
whether legitimate or illegitimate or any of
his ascendants or descendants, or his
spouse. Punished by the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua to death
b. Death or physical injuries inflicted
under exceptional circumstances
(Art.
247) – penalty of destierro.
c. Murder (Art. 248) – (attendant of certain
circumstances) Reclusion Perpetua to
Death
d. Homicide (Art. 249) – Reclusion
Temporal
 e. Death caused in a tumultuous affray
(Art. 251) – when, while several persons,
not composing groups organized for the
common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel
and assault each other in a confused and
tumultuous manner, and in the course of
the affray, someone is killed, and it cannot
be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased but the person or persons who
inflicted serious physical injuries can be
identified, such person or persons shall be
punished by Prison mayor
f. Physical injuries inflicted in a
tumultuous Affray (Art. 252) – Arresto
Mayor from five to fifteen days
g. Giving assistance to suicide – Prison
Mayor, however, if the suicide is not
consummated, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed.
h. Discharge of firearms (Art. 254) –
Prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods
i. Infanticide (Art. 255) – killing of any child
less than three days of age.
j. Intentional abortion (Art. 256)
k. Unintentional abortion
l. Abortion Practiced by the woman
herself or by her parents (Art. 258)
m. Abortion practiced by a physician or
midwife and dispensing of abortives
(Art. 259)
n. Responsibility of Participants in a
DUEL (Art. 260)
o. Challenging to a Duel (Art. 261)
PHYSICAL INJURIES
a. Mutilation (Art. 262) – Any person who
shall intentionally mutilate another by
depriving him, either totally or partially, of
some essential organ of reproduction.
b. Serious Physical Injuries (Art. 263)
i. Serious: >30
ii. Less: 10-30
iii. Slight: 1-9
c. Administering Injurious Substances or
beverages (Art. 264)
d. Less Serious Physical injuries (Art.
265)
e. Slight Physical Injuries and
Maltreatment (Art. 266)
Rape – Is included in chapter of physical
injuries, because of the means and manner of
commission which involves force or violence and
the consequential injuries sustained by the vitim.
(Art. 266-A)
CLASSIFICATION OF WOUNDS
AS TO THE DEPTH OF THE WOUND:
a. Superficial – when the wound involves
only the layers of the skin
b. Deep – beyond the layers of the skin
i. Penetrating – The wound enters the body
but does not come out. Punctured, stab
and gunshot wounds usually belong to this
type of wound.
ii. Perforating – There is a communication
between the outside, inner and the outside.
There is both a point of entry and exit.
AS TO MORTALITY:
a. Deadly wound – Death results
immediately, after the infliction of the
wound
b. Non-deadly wound – Does not result in
death immediately
AS TO THE WOUNDING INSTRUMENTS
USED:
Sharp instruments – A sharp edged
instrument produces an incised wound
a. Blunt instruments – a block of wood or
iron, etc. produces contusion,
hematoma, abrasions, lacerated
wound, when used to strike, attack,
wound, beat, or assault another.
AS TO THE CONSEQUENTIAL INJURY
AFTER THE APPLICATION OF FORCE:
1. Coup injury – the consequential
injury is found at the site of the application
of force
2. Coup Contre Coup injury – found at
the site of the application of force and also
opposite the site of application
3. Contre Coup injury – found at the
opposite the site of the application of force
4. Locus Minoris Resistencia – located
only at the site offering least resistance to
the force applied
5. Extensive Injury – involves a bigger
area of the body, than what was expected.
AS TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE SKIN:
Closed wounds – Presents no break in the • Victims’ wounds – wounds sustained
integrity or continuity of the skin. The following by the victim, from the assailant
are examples of closed wounds:
• Petechiae- circumscribed extravasation of
blood in the subcutaneous tissues due to
destruction or increased permeability of the
capillaries. A visible mosquito bite is a
petechiae.
• Contusion
• Hematoma
• Blunt injury
• Musculoskeletal injuries – these are closed
wounds, though located in the
musculoskeletal system; Sprain, Dislocation,
Fracture, Subluxation, Strain.
• Cerebral Concussion – brief loss of
consciousness and sometimes memory after
a head injury.
• Cerebral Contusion – bruises to the brain

Open Wounds – There is a break in the

continuity of the skin
i. Abrasion
ii. Bruise
iii. Incised wound
iv. Stab wound
v. Punctured – result of a thrust by a
sharp pointed instrument
vi. Perforating wound – blunt instrument
vii. Bites
viii. Gunshot wounds

GUNSHOT WOUNDS
1. Firm contact fire
2. Loose contact fire
3. Short Range (1-15cm. Distance)
4. Medium range (16-60cm Distance)
5. Far Distance Fire (more than 60cm)

Test for the presence of Gun Powder

residues:
1. Paraffin test of Dermal Nitrate Test –
Present on the skin of the hand dorsum
or site of the wound of entrance.
2. Use of Scanning Electron
Microscope with a linked X-ray
analyzer.

Special Types of Wounds:

• Assailant’s wounds – Sustained by
the assailant from the victim.
• Defense’ wounds – In the process of
defending himself from the attacks,
assault
– usually in the upper extremities
 • Self-inflicted wounds – usually doctor and found that no adverse reactions
found on the accessible parts of the manifested which would necessitate
body, usually with no intention to kill replacement of the medicines. Indeed, the
himself.
• Homicidal wounds – serious wounds
sustained by the victim resulting to his
death, from the criminal assailant.
• Accidental wounds
• Suicidal wounds – usually seen on the
temple, the roof of the mouth, and other
fatal body areas, accessible to the hand
of the victim.

CASES:

Reyes vs. Sisters of Mercy Hospital G.R No.

130547 (October 3, 2000)

Facts:
Petitioner, Leah Alesna Reyes, is the wife of the
deceased patient, Jorge Reyes. Five days
before the latter’s
death, Jorge has been suffering from recurring
fever with chills. The doctors confirmed through
the Widal test that Jorge has typhoid fever.
However, he did not respond to the treatment
and died. The cause of his death was
“Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to
Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.”

Consequently, petitioner filed the instant case

for damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, which dismissed the case and was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The
contention was that Jorge did not die of typhoid
fever. Instead, his death was due to the
wrongful administration of chloromycetin. They
contended that had respondent doctors
exercised due care and diligence, they would
not have recommended and rushed the
performance of the Widal Test, hastily co
ncluded that Jorge was suffering from typhoid
fever, and administered chloromycetin without
first conducting sufficient tests on the patient’s
compatibility with said drug.

Legal Issue: Whether or not Sisters of Mercy

Hospital is liable for the death of Jorge Reyes.

Ruling: Sisters of Mercy Hospital is not liable for

the death of Jorge Reyes.

Reasoning of the Court: There is no showing

that the attending physician in this case
deviated from the usual course of treatment with
respect to typhoid fever. Jorge was given
antibiotic choloromycetin and some dose of
triglobe after compatibility test was made by the
standard contemplated is not what is
actually the average merit among
all known practitioners from the best to
the worst and from the most to the least
experienced, but the reasonable average merit
among the ordinarily good physicians. Here, the
doctors did not depart from the reasonable
standard recommended by the experts as they
in fact observed the due care required under the
circumstances.
Policy: In Medical Negligence cases, it is
incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish that the
usual procedure in treating the illness is not
followed by the doctor. Failure to prove this, the
doctor is not liable. Physicians are not insurers
of the success of every procedure
undertaken and if the procedure was
shown to be properly done but did not work,
they cannot be faulted to such result.
LINSANGAN vs. TOLENTINO
Facts: A complaint for disbarment was filed by
Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes
Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services.
Complaint alleged that respondent, with the
help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced
his clients to transfer legal representation.
Respondent promised them financial
assistance and expeditious collection on their
claims. To induce them to hire hisservices, he
persistently called them and sent them text
amessages. To support his allegations,
complainant presented the sworn affidavit of
James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to
prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client
relations with complainant and utilize
respondent’s services instead, in exchange for
aloan of P50, complainant also attached
“respondent’s” calling card. Respondent, in his
defense, denied knowing Labiano and
authorizing the printing and circulation of the
said calling card.
Issue: Whether or not Tolentino’s actions
warrant disbarment.
Held: Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that
lwayer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designated primarily to solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting
cases for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers. Such
actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment. Rule 2.03 should be read in
connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR
which provides that lawyer, shall not for any
corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause. This rule
proscribes “ambulance chasing” (the solicitation
of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in
order to gain employment) as a measure to
protect the community from barratry and
champerty.
In the case at bar, complainant presented
substantial evidence (consisting of the sworn
statements of the very same persons coaxed by
Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to
prove that respondent indeed solicited legal
business as well as profited from referrals’ suits.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s
law practice was benefited. Haplessseamen
were enticed to transfer representation on the
strength of Labiano’s word that respondent
could produce a more favorable result. Based
on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicit ed
employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03
and Canon 3 of the CPR and section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules ofCourt. Any act of
solicitation constitutes malpractice which calls
for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary
powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statues
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact
with a prospective client for the purpose of
obtaining employment. Thus in this jurisdiction,
the Court adheres to the rule to protect the
public from the Machiavellian machinations of
unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility
of the legal profession.
C anon 2: A lawyer shall make his legal services
available in an efficient manner compatible with
the independence, integrity and effectiveness of
the profession. Rule 2.03: A lawyer shall not do
or permit to be done any act designed primarily
to solicit legal business.
NERY vs ATTY. SAMPANA
FACTS: Melody alleged in her complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Glicerio Sampana that
he engaged the services of the latter to file the
case for annulment of her marriage and for her
adoption by an alien adopter. After the
annulment case was granted, she gave him the
amount of P200,000.00. To the adoption case,
Modesto asked her if she had an aunt who will
act as the wife of the alien adopter. She then
gave money on various dates to Modesto, and
did not bother to ask for receipts since she
trusted him. Thru text message, she learned
from Modesto that the petition for adoption was
already filed and published, and they needed to
rehearse for the hearing. Later, he informed
her that the hearing was reset to March 12,
2009. When she asked why she received no
notice from the court, he informed her that her
presence was not needed as it was only a
jurisdictional hearing. When she verified with
the court on March 11, she discovered that no
such petition for adoption was filed. Thus she
met Modesto and asked for reimbursement of
her P100,000.00; the latter agreed, but
demanded that his legal fees of P12,000.00 be
deducted, to which she did not agree, as the
petition for adoption was not filed. Despite
several demands for reimbursement, Modesto
failed to do the same. In his defense, he
admitted receiving a “package fee” from the
complainant; but he had reservations about the
petition for adoption because of the old age, civil
status, and nationality of the alien adopter. Thus
he suggested that the aunt be made to appear
as married to the alien adopter, and requested
for a copy of the marriage certificate between
the aunt and the adopter, and the certification
that the alien is qualified to adopt from the
Japanese embassy. He received the marriage
certificate but not the certification, hence he did
not file the petition. The complainant could have
have mistaken the adoption case for the
annulment case, but he did not misled Melody
on the petition for admission. He promised to
refund the amount paid by Melody, less his legal
services and actual expenses. The IBP Board
modified the recommended penalty by the
Investigating Commissioner, to suspension
from the practice of law for three months, and
reimbursement of the amount paid by Melody.
The Court’s ruling: The recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors is well-taken, except as
to the penalty. Acceptance of money from a
client establishes an attorney- client relationship
and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the client’s
cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer
deserves full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of importance. A
lawyer also owes it to the court, their clients,
and other lawyers to be candid and fair. Thus,
the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly
states:
CANON 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds
and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.
CANON 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he
received “one package fee” for both cases of
annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this
fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for
adoption and fell short of his duty of due
diligence and candor to his client. Sampana’s
proffered excuse of waiting for the certification
before filing the petition for adoption is
disingenuous and flimsy. In his position paper,
he suggested to Nery that if the alien adopter
would be married to her close relative, the
intended adoption could be possible. Under the
Domestic Adoption Act provision, which
Sampana suggested, the alien adopter can
jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree
of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino
spouse, and the certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt is waived.
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for
adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the
status of the petition. He then conceded that the
annulment case overshadowed the petition for
adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal
matter entrusted to him. He even kept the
money given him, in violation of the Code’s
mandate to deliver the client’s funds upon
demand. A lawyer’s failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same
for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed
in him by his client and of the public confidence
in the legal profession.
This is not the first administrative case filed
against Sampana. In Lising v. Sampana, we
already found Sampana guilty of violating
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for his unethical and illegal act
relative to his double sale of a parcel of land.
We imposed upon him the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year and warned him that a repetition of a
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
In Rollon v. Naraval, we imposed upon the
respondent therein the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for two (2) years for
failing to render any legal service after receiving
the filing and partial service fee. Considering the
serious consequence of disbarment and the
previous rulings of this Court, we deem it proper
to increase the penalty for Sampana’s
malpractice and violation of the Code of
Professional
Responsibility to suspension from the practice
of law for three (3) years.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Glicerio A.
Sampana from the practice of law for THREE
(3) YEARS with a stern warning that a repetition
of a similar act shall be dealt with more
severely. We also ORDER Atty. Glicerio A.
Sampana to RETURN to complainant Melody
R. Nery the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00), with 12% interest per
annum from the time of his receipt of the full
amount of money on 17 November 2008 until 30
June 2013, then 6% interest per annum from 1
July 2013 until fully paid.
ZARSONA MEDICAL CLINIC VS PHIC
Facts: Zarsona Medical Center (ZMC) filed a
claim for confinement of NHIP member Lorna
(Alestra) from August 10-12, 2003 with the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(Philhealth). However, the claim was denied for
“extended confinement”; the claim form stated
that Lorna was confined from August 6 to
August 12, 2003; however, the Salaysay of
Lorna stated she was confined only from August
10-12, 2003; she reported for work as a teacher
on August 12, 2003. Because of this, a
complaint for violation of Section 149 of the
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
of Republic Act 7875 was filed against ZMC. In
its defense, ZMC alleged that its Midwife/Clerk,
Jennifer Acuram committed an honest mistake
when she wrote in the claim form that Lorna was
confined from August 6-August 12, when if fact
the hospital was only claiming two days. It also
attached the Affidavit of Explanation of Lorna
recanting her previous Salaysay, where she
stated that she was protecting herself when she
logged in at the school’s time record on August
12, 2003 when she was still supposedly
confined. She stated that and her son were
admitted at ZMC on August 10, and discharged
on August 12, 2003. She was able to slip out of
the hospital on August 12 after she was
attended to by the physician, reported for work
and came back around noon to take her
medicines and look after her child. She was
discharged around 2PM.
The Health Insurance Arbiter refused
to give credence to Lorna’s claim, and instead
relied on the school record which stated she
reported for work on August 12, 2003, as shown
in the attendance logbook. Thus, ZMC was
found liable for violation of Section 149 of the
Rules. Their appeal to the Philhealth Board
denied, they filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals. On September 4, 2008, the
CA issued a Resolution requiring ZMC to
correct certain deficiencies in its petition for
review such as: (1) failure to attach the Special
Power of Attorney executed by the petitioner
Zarsona Medical Clinic in favor of Ma. Irene M.
Hao, authorizing the latter to execute the
verification and certification of non-forum
shopping; (2) failure of the petitioner to attach
the certified true copy of the assailed decision of
the Board of Directors of the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation as required under Rule
43, Section 6(c) of the Revised Rules of Court;
(3) failure of the petitioner’s counsel, Atty. John
Tracy F. Cagas, to indicate the dates and
places of issuance of his IBP and PTR Receipts
as well as his Roll of Attorneys Number. In
compliance therewith. ZMC attached the
Special Power of Attorney executed by Dr.
Leandro Zarsona, Jr. (Dr. Zarsona) in favor of
Dr. Bragat and William Bragat, as well as other
required documents. Nevetheless, the CA
dismissed the petition for failure of ZMC to
attach a valid SPA, since the SPA it attached
showed that it pertained only to administrative
matters, not for filing cases or to sigh and
execute the required verification or certification
of non-forum shopping. Its motion for
reconsideration denied, it filed a petition for
review with the Supreme Court.
The Issue/s: Whether the Special Power of
Attorney executed by the hospital was sufficient
compliance with the rules, and the whether the
dismissal of the case on technical grounds was
valid.
The Court’s ruling: At the outset, the issues
revolve on the sufficiency of the SPA
authorizing Dr. Bragat to sign the verification
and certification of non-forum shopping in the
petition filed before the Court of Appeals.
Verification of a pleading is a formal,
not jurisdictional, requirement intended to
secure the assurance that the matters alleged in
a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court
may simply order the correction of unverified
pleadings or act on them and waive strict
compliance with the rules. It is deemed
substantially complied with when one who has
ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
verification, and when matters alleged in the
petition have been made in good faith or are
true and correct.
As to certification against forum shopping, non-
compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike
in verification, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof,
unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the
ground of “substantial compliance” or presence
of “special circumstances or compelling
reasons.1” Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of the
Court, requires that the certification should be
signed by the “petitioner or principal party”
himself. The rationale behind this is “because
only the petitioner himself has actual knowledge
of whether or not he has initiated similar actions
or proceedings in different courts or agencies.”
In Lim v. The Court of Appeals, Mindanao
Station, we reiterated that the requirements of
verification and certification against forum
shopping are not jurisdictional. Verification is
required to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct, and not
merely speculative. Non-compliance with the
verification requirement does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective, and is
substantially complied with when signed by one
who has ample knowledge of the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition, and
when matters alleged in the petition have been
made in good faith or are true and correct. On
the other hand, the certification against forum
shopping is required based on the principle that
a party-litigant should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in different fora. While
the certification requirement is obligatory, non-
compliance or a defect in the certificate could be
cured by its subsequent correction or
submission under special circumstances or
compelling reasons, or on the ground of
“substantial compliance.”
In both cases, the submission of an SPA
authorizing an attorney-in-fact to sign the
verification and certification against forum-
shopping in behalf of the principal party is
considered as substantial compliance with the
Rules.
In this case, Philhealth found the SPA defective.
The SPA granted by Dr. Zarsona to his
attorneys-in-fact, Dr. Bragat and William Bragat,
authorizes the latter to do the following:
To represent(,) process, follow up, transact and
facilitate all claims, benefits and privileges
belonging to or owing to Zarsona Medical Clinic
in the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation,
Department of Health and in other agencies,
may it be private or
government;
To receive, withdraw, and encash any check or
checks belonging to or in the name of Zarsona
Medical Clinic;
To make, execute, and sign any contract,
documents or all other writings of whatever kind
and nature which are necessary to the
foregoing powers.
Indeed, a reading of the SPA reveals that the
powers conferred by Dr. Zarsona to his
attorneys-in-fact pertain to administrative
matters. The phrase “claims, benefits and
privileges belonging to or owing to Zarsona
Medical Clinic” clearly does not include the filing
of cases before the courts or any quasi-judicial
agencies. The term “claims” in particular refers
to those claims for payment of services
rendered by the hospital during a Philhealth
member’s confinement. These claims are filed
by the hospital with Philhealth. Furthermore, the
SPA makes no mention of any court, judicial or
quasi- judicial bodies. The enumeration of
agencies in the first paragraph of the SPA, such
as Philhealth and Department of Health, refers
to those agencies which are health-related.
There is no explicit authorization for Dr. Bragat
to sign and execute the requirement verification
and certification in this case. At the very least,
the SPA should have granted the attorneys-in-
fact the power and authority to institute civil and
criminal actions which would necessarily
include the signing of the verification and
certification against forum- shopping.
The defects in the SPA notwithstanding, we rule
in favor of ZMC. We agree with the Dissent
registered by Associate Justice Ruben Ayson
when he suggested that ZMC should be given
the opportunity to rectify the defects in the
petition. We are aware that the Court of Appeals
in its Resolution dated 28 January 2009 had
directed ZMC to submit an SPA. ZMC had in
good faith complied by submitting an SPA which
it thought was sufficient and encompasses the
filing of the instant suit. Time and again, we had
espoused the doctrine that provisions of the
Rules of Court should be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding. Otherwise put, the
rule requiring a certification of forum shopping
to accompany every initiatory pleading, or the
verification for that matter “should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective
or the goal of all rules of procedure – which is to
achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible.” While it is true that the rules of
procedure are intended to promote rather than
frustrate the ends of justice, and the swift
unclogging of court docket is a laudable
objective, it nevertheless must not be met at the
expense of substantial justice. This Court has
time and again reiterated the doctrine that the
rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at
facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than
its frustration. A strict and rigid application of the
rules must always be eschewed when it would
subvert the primary objective of the rules, that
is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice.
Technicalities should never be used to defeat
the substantive rights of the other party. Every
party-litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities.8 We choose to
apply liberality because of the substantial merit
of the petition.
The petition was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals purely on a procedural ground.
Ordinarily, procedure dictates that the Court of
Appeals should be tasked with properly
disposing the petition, a second time around, on
the merits. However, when there is enough
basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits
of petitioner’s case may be had, the Court may
dispense with the time-consuming procedure of
remand in order to prevent further delays in the
disposition of the case. Clearly, a remand of the
instant case to the Court of Appeals would only
unnecessarily prolong its resolution which had
been pending for a decade. It is already an
accepted rule of procedure for us to strive to
settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear
the seeds of future litigation. If, based on the
records, the pleadings, and other evidence, the
dispute can be resolved by us, we will do so to
serve the ends of justice instead of remanding
the case to the lower court for further
proceedings.
Thus, we find the petition meritorious.
ZMC was charged with extending the period of
confinement punishable under Section
149 of the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 7875, which
provides:
Section 149. Extending Period of Confinement.
— This is committed by any health care provider
who, for the purpose of claiming payment from
the NHIP, files a claim with extended period of
confinement by:
Increasing the actual confinement of any
patient;
Continuously charting entries in the Doctor’s
Order, Nurse’s Notes and Observation despite
actual discharge or absence of the patients;
Using such other machinations that would result
in the unnecessary extension of confinement.
The foregoing offenses shall be penalized by
revocation of accreditation. In addition, a
recommendation shall be submitted to the DOH
for cancellation of its license, or accreditation, or
clearance to operate, as appropriate.
The Philhealth Arbiter and the Board did not
give weight to the Affidavit of Explanation
submitted by the patient herself recanting her
previous statement and categorically stating
that she was discharged only on 12 August
2003.
It is an oft-repeated rule that findings of
administrative agencies are generally accorded
not only respect but also finality when the
decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. The
findings of facts must be respected, so long as
they are supported by substantial evidence
even if not overwhelming or preponderant.
After an exhaustive review of the records, we
find that this case warrants a departure from
said rule.
We are inclined to give more credence to
Alestre’s Affidavit, which is essentially a
recantation of her previous Salaysay, for the
following reasons: First, Alestre has fully
explained to our satisfaction why she initially
misdeclared her dates of confinement in ZMC.
In her desire to report and be compensated for
one day of work, Alestre hied back and forth
between school and the hospital. It is difficult to
believe that she would risk her reputation as a
public school teacher, as well as prosecution for
violation of civil service rules, to be an abettor of
ZMC. Second, Alestre truly cannot be in two
places at the same time. But her narration
clearly accounts for her whereabouts on 12
August 2003. She travelled at least 3 times to
and from the hospital and school. She admitted
that the school was a mere ten-minute drive
away from the hospital so she can easily
traverse between the two locations. Third, ZMC
had in fact admitted to its error in indicating the
dates of Alestre’s confinement so there is no
reason for ZMC to further conceal the actual
days of Alestre’s confinement. Fourth, the
Salaysay is not notarized. While recantation is
frowned upon and hardly given much weight in
the determination of a case, the affidavit is still a
notarized document which carries in its favor
the presumption of regularity with respect to its
due execution, and that there must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant
evidence to contradict the same.
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the finding
of Philhealth and hold that ZMC is not guilty of
extending the period of confinement.
ULEP vs THE LEGAL CLINIC
Facts: In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by
Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to
Nogales was to move toward specialization and
to cater to clients who cannot afford the services
of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a
complaint against The Legal Clinic because of
the latter’s advertisement’s which contain the
following:
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT.
VISA. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am – 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila GUAM
DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on
Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage.
Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-
quota Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US
Embassy Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041,
521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published
an article entitled “Rx for Legal Problems” in
Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales
stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of
specialists that can take care of a client’s
problem no matter how complicated it is even if
it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he
and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are
“specialists” in various fields, can take care of it.
The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation
and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor,
litigation and family law. These specialists are
backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should
be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the
US which now allows it (John Bates vs The
State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the
advertisement is merely making known to the
public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is
engaged in the practice of law; whether such is
allowed; whether or not its advertisement may
be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the
practice of law however, such practice is not
allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of
paralegals. The services it offered include
various legal problems wherein a client may
avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services
are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under
Philippine jurisdiction however, the services
being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information
or statement of facts. The standards of the legal
profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement
of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents
or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. Further, the
advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote
divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage,
and other circumventions of law which their
experts can facilitate. Such is highly
reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of
advertisement are allowed. The best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust,
which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching
public attention. That publicity is a normal by-
product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify
his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service
and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
The Supreme Court also enumerated the
following as allowed forms of advertisement:
Advertisement in a reputable law list
Use of ordinary simple professional card
Listing in a phone directory but without
designation as to his specialization
TERRY SHIAVO CASE (Death)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JENNY
LIKIRAN ALIAS LOLOY (Trauma)
Jenny Likiran (accused-appellant) was
convicted of the crime of Murder by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City,
Branch 8, for the death of Rolando Sareno,
Sr.(Sareno). In its Decision[1] dated July 17,
2006, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Loloy
Likiran guilty of the crime of Murder and
imposes upon him the penalty of Reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the
sum of [P]50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
[P]50,000.00 moral damages; [P]30,000.00
actual damages, and [P]10,000.00 attorney's
fee and to pay the costs. This court has no
jurisdiction over Jerome alias Caro Likiran as he
is not impleaded in the information.
SO ORDERED.[2]
The incident that led to the death of Sareno
happened on the wee hour of March 19, 2000 in
Barangay Bugca-on, Lantapon, Bukidnon. It
was the eve of the town fiesta and a dance was
being held at the basketball court. Prosecution
witnesses Celso Dagangon (Dagangon),
Prescado Mercado (Mercado) and Constancio
Goloceno (Goloceno) testified that on said
night, they were at the dance together with
Sareno at around 8:00
p.m. After a few hours, while Mercado and
Goloceno were inside the dance area, Jerome
Likiran[3] (Jerome), the accused-appellant's
brother, punched Mercado on the mouth.
Goloceno was about to assist Mercado when he
saw that Jerome was armed with a short firearm
while the accused-appellant was holding a
hunting knife, so he backed off. Dagangon and
Sareno, who were outside the dance area,
heard the commotion. Afterwards, Jerome
approached Sareno and shot him several times.
With Sareno fallen, the accused-appellant
stabbed him on the back. It was Dagangon who
saw the incident first-hand as he was only three
meters from where Sareno was. Dagangon was
able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after
Jerome and the accused- appellant left, but
Sareno was already dead at that point. Sareno
suffered
multiple gunshot wounds and a stab
wound at the left scapular area.[4]
The accused-appellant, however, denied any
involvement in the crime. While he admitted that
he was at the dance, he did not go outside when
the commotion happened. He and Jerome
stayed within the area where the sound
machine was located and they only heard the
gunshots outside. Other witnesses testified in
the accused- appellant's defense, with Edgar
Indanon testifying that he saw the stabbing
incident and that it was some other unknown
person, and not the accused-appellant, who
was the culprit; and Eleuterio Quiñopa stating
that he was with the accused-appellant and
Jerome inside the dance hall at the
time the commotion occurred.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to
establish the accused-appellant's culpability.[5]
Prosecution witness Dagangon's positive
identification of the accused- appellant was held
sufficient by the RTC to convict the latter of
the crime of murder.[6] The RTC also rejected
the accused-appellant's defense of denial as it
was not supported by evidence. It also ruled
that alibi cannot favor the accused-appellant
since he failed to prove that it was impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime on the
night of March 19, 2000.[7]
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC
decision in toto per assailed Decision[8] dated
July 27, 2011, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appealed Decision dated July 17, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Malaybalay
City, in Criminal Case No. 10439-00 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The CA sustained the findings of the RTC as
regards the identity of the accused- appellant as
one of the perpetrators of the crime. The CA,
nevertheless, deviated from the RTC's
conclusion that there was conspiracy between
Jerome and the accused- appellant, and that
abuse of superior strength attended the
commission of the crime. According to the CA,
the information failed to contain the allegation of
conspiracy, and the evidence for the
prosecution failed to establish that Jerome and
the accused- appellant ganged up on the
victim.[10]The CA, however, sustained the
RTC's finding of treachery.[11]
The accused-appellant protested his
conviction.[12] According to him, the
prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Specifically, the accused-
appellant argued that the prosecution failed to
prove the identity of the assailant and his
culpability.[13]
Upon review, the Court finds no cogent reason
to disturb the findings and conclusions of the
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, including their
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.
Factual findings of the trial court are, except for
compelling or exceptional reasons, conclusive
to the Court especially when fully supported by
evidence and affirmed by the CA.[14]
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove
the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal.[15] In this case, the identity of the
accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of
the crime has been adequately established by
the prosecution, more particularly by the
testimony of Dagangon. The Court cannot
sustain the accused-appellant's argument that it
was impossible for Dagangon to see the
assailant considering that there was no
evidence to show that the place where the crime
occurred was lighted. As found by the CA,
Dagangon was only three meters away from the
accused-appellant and Jerome and had a good
view of them. Moreover, there was no
distraction that could have disrupted
Dagangon's attention. He even immediately
identified the accused-appellant and Jerome
during police investigation, and there is no
showing that Dagangon was informed by the
police beforehand that the accused-appellant
was one of the suspects.[16] Positive
identification by a prosecution witness of the
accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime
is entitled to greater weight than alibi and
denial.[17] Such positive identification gains
further ground in the absence of any ill motive
on the part of a witness to falsely testify against
an accused.[18]
The accused-appellant also asserted that the
information charged him of murder committed
by attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting
Sareno, thereby causing his instantaneous
death.[19] The accused-appellant argued that
the evidence on record established that Sareno
was in fact shot by some other person.[20] At
this juncture, the Court notes that the testimony
of Dagangon, indeed, identified two assailants
the accused-appellant and his brother, Jerome;
however, it was only the accused-appellant who
was charged with the death of Sareno. Defense
witnesses also testified that Jerome died
on March 12, 2005.[21]
The CA disregarded the accused-appellant's
contention and ruled that "the cause of death
was not made an issue in the court a quo" and
the Certificate of Death was admitted during the
pre-trial conference as proof of the fact and
cause of death.[22] And even assuming that the
cause of death was an issue, the CA still held
the accused- appellant liable for the death of
Sareno on the basis of the Court's ruling in
People v. Pilola.[23]
The Court reviewed the records of this case and
finds sufficient basis for the CA's disregard
of the accused-appellant's
argument.
The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC
states that one of the matters stipulated upon
and admitted by the prosecution and the
defense was that the Certificate of Death issued
by Dr. Cidric Dael (Dr. Dael) of the Bukidnon
Provincial Hospital and reviewed by the Rural
Health Physician of Malaybalay City "is
admitted as proof of fact and cause of death due
to multiple stab wound scapular
area."[24]Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is
allowed by Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118,
meanwhile, prescribes that all agreements or
admissions made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be reduced in writing and
signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise,
they cannot be used against the accused.[25] In
this case, while it appears that the pre-trial
agreement was signed only by the prosecution
and defense counsel, the same may
nevertheless be admitted given that the defense
failed to object to its admission.[26] Moreover, a
death certificate issued by a municipal health
officer in the regular performance of his duty is
prima facieevidence of the cause of death of the
victim.[27] Note that the certificate of death
issued by Dr. Dael provides the following:
CAUSES OF DEATH
Immediate cause: DOA
Antecedent cause: Multiple GSW
Underlying cause: Stab wound scapular area
(L)[28]
The accused-appellant, therefore, is bound by
his admission of Sareno's cause of death.[29]
More importantly, the accused-appellant is
criminally liable for the natural and logical
consequence resulting from his act of stabbing
Sareno. It may be that he was not the shooter, it
is nevertheless true that the stab wound he
inflicted on Sareno contributed to the latter's
death. In Quinto v. Andres,[30] the Court stated
that:
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly
weapon in such a manner as to put life in
jeopardy and death follows as a consequence
of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature
or diminish its criminality to prove that other
causes cooperated in producing the factual
result. The offender is criminally liable for the
death of the victim if his delictual act caused,
accelerated or contributed to the death of the
victim. A different doctrine would tend to give i
mmunity to crime and to take away from human
life a salutary and essential safeguard. x x
x[.][31] (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
The Court, however, cannot agree with the RTC
and CA's conclusion that the killing of Sareno
was attended by treachery, qualifying
the crime to murder.
Treachery is appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance when the following elements are
shown: a) the malefactor employed means,
method, or manner of execution affording the
person attacked no opportunity for self-
defense or retaliation; and b) the means,
method, or manner of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender.[32] Treachery is not present when the
killing is not premeditated, or where the sudden
attack is not preconceived and deliberately
adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden
infuriation on the part of the accused as a result
of a provocative act of the victim, or when
the killing is done at the spur of the
moment.[33]
In this case, the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses all point to the fact that the shooting
and stabbing of Sareno was actually a spur of
the moment incident, a result of the brawl that
happened during the barrio dance. The
prosecution failed to show that the accused-
appellant and his brother Jerome deliberately
planned the means by which they would harm
Sareno. In fact, what was revealed by the
prosecution evidence was that Sareno was an
innocent bystander who unfortunately became
a target of the accused- appellant and
Jerome's rampage. Consequently, the accused-
appellant should be liable only for the
lesser crime of Homicide.
In convictions for homicide, Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) prescribes the
penalty of reclusion temporal, which ranges
from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years.[34] In the absence of any modifying
circumstances, the penalty should be imposed
in its medium period,[35] or from fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[36]
the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on
the accused-appellant shall be within the range
of reclusion temporal medium,[37] and the
minimum shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the
offense,[38] or prision mayor in any of its
periods, which ranges from six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years.[39]There being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
Court thereby sentences the accused-appellant
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum.
With regard to the damages awarded, the Court
affirms the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) moral damages, as these
are in accord with the Court's judicial policy on
the matter.[40] These, on top of the Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) actual damages
and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
attorney's fees awarded by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA. Further, the monetary
awards shall earn interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of
the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.[41]
The Court, moreover, deletes the attorney's
fees awarded by the RTC as there is nothing on
record proving that the heirs of Sareno actually
incurred such expense. Attorney's fees are in
the concept of actual or compensatory
damages allowed under the circumstances
provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code,[42] and absent any evidence supporting
its grant, the same must be deleted for
lack of factual basis.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 27,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00484 is MODIFIED in that accused-
appellant Jenny Likiran alias "Loloy" is hereby
found guilty of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE,
and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor
medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. Further,
the award of attorney's fees is
hereby DELETED. Interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all
the damages awarded, to earn from the date of
the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

In all other respects, the Court of Appeals

decision is AFFIRMED.