What were the real reasons surrounding the Maimonides controversy in the 13th Century?

The burning of Mamonides’ Guide of the Perplexed and Sefer Ha Madah by the Dominicans

in Montpellier in 1232 sent shock waves throughout the Jewish communities of Spain,

Germany and France. A strong assumption existed that it had been carried out on upon

denunciation from the anti-Maimonist camp who had banned the works and put them into

herem. The episode lived long in collective Jewish memory as being the cause of the burning

of the Talmud in Paris in 1240.1 The Maimonides controversy, as it became known, is widely

understood as bringing to a head several conflicts within Jewish thought such as reason and

philosophy in their relation to faith and tradition and what components are permitted and

prohibited in the education of an individual following the Torah.2 Maimonides was a revered

yet controversial figure; even within his lifetime, Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah had attracted

criticism for its claim to have definitively codified the tradition of rabbinic law. However, by

the first few decades of the thirteenth Century it was his philosophical works that were met

with the greatest resistance. This paper will largely concern itself with exploring the

dynamics of the late twelfth and early thirteenth century leading to the ban in Montpellier. It

is important to emphasise that this controversy was largely rabbinic in making and as such

the prioritisation of rabbinic source material is entirely justified. Whilst fighting broke out

between different factions in the 1230s, the attack on the legitimacy of Maimonides’ works

was instigated and supported by rabbinic leaders. In fact, few of the bans or attempted bans

on Maimonides’ works ever received significant popular support. Most of the studies which

focus on the controversies surrounding Maimonides were written between the late 19th

century and the 1970s and there has been little recent scholarship in this particular area. In

1
Hillel of Girona, writing in 1290, made the association between the two.
2
Haim Hillel Ben Sasson, ‘The Maimonides Controversy’ in Encyclopedia Judaica (1972),
vol.11, 747.

1
terms of historiography, whereas accounts by Graetz and Baer discuss how the controversy

came to be defined in terms of its theoretical issues and Joseph Sarachek’s study focuses on

the tension between classical rabbinic thought and philosophy, Daniel Silver’s work is the

most systematic in analysing the context and issues affecting the controversy directly

between 1180 and 1240. In this paper I will argue, however, that Silver’s conclusions do not

to correspond to his research in determining the ‘real issues’ behind the controversy. Silver

contests that the controversy had very little to do with Maimonides himself or his approach

towards religion. It was a controversy borne of fear. As Christian persecution increased so did

the threat of apostasy and it is this that led to the extreme response of the herem. Yet in

analysing the correspondence between R. Meir Abulafia and the rabbis of Lunel, the

contextual sociological factors and the discussions of the anti-Maimonists in the 1230s I will

argue that whilst fear of apostasy was an important issue in the initial exchanges of the early

thirteenth century, by the time of the burnings it had been largely supplanted by fundamental

questions of Jewish thought. The anti-Maimonist camp rejected Maimonides’ works not for

their potential pitfalls but rather for their non-Jewish nature. It was not a question of the

legitimacy of studying of philosophy per se but whether it could be legitimately synthesised

into Jewish thought. The contextual factors of persecution in Christian Spain and France

forced a more detailed examination of the religious boundaries of Jewish thought and for

many, Maimonidean rationalism with its universalistic elements was found wanting. I would

like to present this analysis by showing how Silver’s thesis is convincing if contextual and

historiographical factors are given priority as evidence, but not if close attention is paid to the

correspondence of the protagonists. Silver’s ‘de-personalised’ approach will be explored

thoroughly before I suggest my own counter thesis; Having analysed Silver’s source material

I will justify my own position, with particular attention to the compilation of R. Meir

2
Abulafia’s correspondence and how the halakhist attitude evolved into a fundamental esoteric

objection to Maimonides’ approach.

The ‘real issue’ in the controversy, Silver argues, was the widespread rabbinic fear of

apostasy brought about by the increased interest in proselytising from the Catholic Church.3 It

is evident that Maimonides’ rationalist philosophy could be misused to justify religious

laxity. The first issue was one of integration: Symbiosis had been a key feature of twelfth

century Spain, which had not only tolerated but encouraged philosophical enquiry; the Jews

of Castille and Aragon had been at home with such speculations. The Jews of northern France

and Germany, however, were not given the time to integrate this new world into theirs. Their

world was dominated by Talmud study, and Greek systematics were unknown except through

occasional reflections based on Midrash and classical sources. The rabbis of Provence feared

that the doubts caused by philosophical speculation could lead many astray.4 Apologetically,

Silver suggests that philosophy was a volatile explosive and that Maimonides ‘could not

escape becoming the centre of this storm’.5

The letters between R. Meir Abulafia and the rabbis of Lunel show the rabbinic fears that

Maimonides’ works could lead to laxity in religious observance. The less than pious believed

that they had found some support in the Mishneh Torah for their denial of the traditional

assumption of resurrection. Whilst rabbinic tradition itself was open ended regarding the

reward of resurrection, a non-literal interpretation opened the door for deviation.6 What

concerned the rabbis associated with the anti-Maimonist camp was less the content of

Maimonides’ works and more their potential for misuse.

3
Daniel Silver, Maimonidean Criticism and the Maimonidean Controversy 1180-1240
(London, 1965), 3.
4
ibid, 2.
5
ibid, 5.
6
ibid, 196.
3
In terms of context, there is some evidence that indifference towards religious life, apostasy

and intermarriage had become an increasing issue during this period. According to Graetz,

among Jews of Southern Spain this indifference towards halakha went so far that

intermarriage was occurring with Christians and Muslims.7 The Guide was only translated

into Hebrew two weeks before Maimonides’ death,8 and upon its printing in 1211 it was

widely disseminated and quoted. The translations gave understanding of philosophical issues

as well as the plain meaning of the text and increased interest throughout Provence in secular

philosophies. Its audience was not the one that Maimonides had envisaged; whilst

Maimonides assumed an audience with a grounding in Aristotelian philosophy, the Guide

was generally read by literate non-experts. It never seemed to interest the intellectuals of

Northern French communities whose world was comprised solely of Talmudic study. It was

seized upon avidly by number of Aragonese, Catalan and Castilian sophisticates who lacked

the training to understand its depths but were eager to assume that Maimonides defence of

reason justified their rejection of laws that they had discarded out of simple disinclination.9

Over thirty years after his initial correspondence had failed to win the support of the Lunel

rabbis, R. Abulafia’s fears appears to have been confirmed, having before him an aristocracy

which cultivated philosophy not as a means to a higher spiritual life, but as a convenient

rationalisation for a life of pleasure.10 The physician Judah ben Joseph Alfakhar of Toledo,

7
H. Graetz, History of the Jews, vol.3 (London, 1892), 544.
8
J. Sarachek , Faith and Reason, the Conflict over the Rationalism of Maimonides
(Pennsylvania, 1935), 49.
9
ibid, 9.
10
ibid, 107.
4
responded to the visit of Maimonist R. David Kimhe: ‘You regard the Guide as your teacher

and guide; but among us it serves as a pretext for the wayward and defiant.’11

Silver argues that rabbinic fear of apostasy was increased by the fact that Jews had begun to

be seen as theological opponents rather than occasional targets of oppression during this

period. Increasingly hostile measures were taken against mixing between Christians and Jews

in the Lateran council of 1215 and in papal correspondence, including the introduction of the

Jewish badge and a gradual segregation of the Jewish inhabitants from the non-Jewish

community.12 Crucially, a shift had occurred in how Jews were perceived: Instead of being

seen as the remnants of an antiquated faith based on the Old Testament, the dynamic and

continuous nature of the rabbinic tradition had been recognised. The focus turned to

conversion, with attacks on the Talmud and the oral law in particular. Jewish apostates came

forward denouncing the Talmud as heretical and anti-Christian.13 It was not the new

scholasticism of the advanced philosophers that concerned the Christians but the old Judaism

of Talmud and tradition. Whilst traditional Judaism was under attack, Maimonides and his

works became controversial among Jews because he was accused of misleading other Jews

into heterodoxy and placing the integrity of the community in danger.14

What emerges from this context is that Maimonides was problematic as a symbol who

legitimised deviant lifestyles rather than for his particular views. He had written the Guide to

bolster the faith of pupils troubled by the incongruity of their religious and secular training,

but in Aragon, Castille and Provence many simply wished to abandon their religious faith.

They read the Guide not as an apologetic for Judaism but as an apologetic for their spiritual

11
ibid, 107.
12
ibid, 13.
13
Ibid, 9.
14
ibid, 15.
5
and religious disinterest.15 Inadvertently, in the words of Yitzhak Baer, Maimonides ‘started

out to save Judaism from the undermining effects of philosophic rationalism, and wound up

by giving reason primacy over tradition.'16 Silver removes Maimonides entirely from the

controversy and presents him as tenuously linked to those who had been led astray by their

own religious apathy.

I contend that Silver is far too apologetic on Maimonides’ behalf; it is true that apostasy was

considered an issue in the minds of several rabbinic leaders during this period. It is

nevertheless unconvincing to claim that this was the sole or even the dominant cause of

rabbinic animosity towards Maimonides. Firstly, the use of polemics and counter polemics

surrounding the religiosity of the Maimonist group is unreliable to use as convincing

historical evidence once tensions had erupted. R. David Kimhe furiously attacked accusations

of the lack of observance within the Maimonist camp and the extreme response of the herem

was not accepted uniformly by either communities or rabbinic colleagues. If applied,

excommunication was the most potent tool at rabbinic disposal and would almost certainly

lead to destitution and possible death. The ‘sword of apostasy’ may well have been felt in

some circles but it is hard to imagine that this was conceived of as a good solution to the

problem, particularly with the lack of other support. Additionally, the link between the

increased Christian interest in attacking the Jewish religion and the risk of apostasy is

unclear. Whilst it is plausible that Maimonidean rationalism might diminish the loyalty of

particular individuals, it is hard to know how much impact the papal decrees actually had in

this period: according Silver’s own analysis, Christian missionary activity seems to have

increased in intensity after not before 1240, and peaked in the 1250s and 1260s. Book

burning was a relative novelty of the thirteenth century, and whilst the Dominicans burned

15
Silver, Maimonides Controversy, 196.
16
Yitzhak Baer, History of the Jews in Christian Spain, vol.1 (New York, 1961), 96.
6
some of Aristotle’s works in 1210 for heresy, the concentration of anti-Jewish book burnings

peaked from 1247 onwards by this time the internal controversies had died down, probably as

a result.17

Therefore, to argue that fear of apostasy was the dominant issue of the controversy is to

unnecessarily minimise a conflict that had become far more fundamental. The controversy

came to be about the legitimacy of the synthesis between religion and philosophy. This is not

a simplistic appraisal of the situation; fear of apostasy and social implications certainly

triggered a deeper investigation into what could be considered legitimate within Jewish

thought, catalysed by the increased Christian persecution which seemed to trivialise

Maimonidean universalism. Baer’s statement that philosophic rationalism ‘negated the very

meaning and purpose of the Galut by denying the value of the nation's suffering in exile and

of its survival in spite of its tribulations’ is particularly apt.18 What I will seek to demonstrate

is that it was this problem that proved to be the most significant for the anti-Maimonideans in

the thirteenth century. Fear gave way to fundamental self-examination.

One of the first problems that arose amongst prominent halakhists was Maimonides’ singular

authority. Renouned throughout the Jewish world, his philosophical works carried far more

authority and political weight than more far-reaching and controversial studies such as that of

R. Avraham ben Daud. The rabbis of Montpellier and Lunel commissioned his works sight

unseen because of his multifaceted brilliance. In R. Abulafia’s compilation of

correspondence, Maimonides is referred to as by R. Avraham b. Natan ha Yarhi in the

following way: ‘I saw the Ram trampling north south and west, and no wild animals would

stand before him, no one would stand up to him.’19 Revered and also feared, Abulafia was
17
Silver, Maimonides Controversy, 13.
18
ibid, 100.
19
Meir Abulafia, Kitab Alrasʾayil (1871), 103.
7
heavily reprimanded for his attempts to criticise Maimonides and R. Aharon of Lunel spends

six pages reprimanding him. 20 Maimonides’ insistence on true Aggadic understanding being

based upon Aristotelian philosophy was particularly problematic. Others accused him,

furthermore, of ignoring accepted custom and Talmudic methodology in presenting his

Mishneh Torah as definitve. The Provencal scholar Rabad of Posquierres wrote critical

glosses on the Mishneh Torah; whilst many of them deal with halakhic issues alone, he

consistently disapproves of Maimonides’ prioritisation of philosophy in halakhic issues e.g.

Maimonides' barring of excessive fasting due to the inability to understand or research the

sciences rather than cessation from Torah study.21 Rabad was suspicious of philosophy and its

validity, but only expressed outrage when Maimonides referred to an anthropomorphic

conception of God as heretical. Maimonides had decided something conclusively based on

something that did not appear to be self-evident to great halakhic scholars. He is particularly

critical of Maimonides for not citing sources and argues that halakhic decision-making is

based on living legal decision-makers rather than a code.22 Any decisions on Jewish law or

thought had to be based on chapter and verse in the Talmud. Rabad and other rabbinic figures

in the French centres of Torah study felt that halakhic decision-making relied on proofs based

on a clear understanding of Talmudic passages and Maimonides’ great work seemed to

threaten this procedure.

Importantly, this contextualises the correspondence between R. Meir Abulafia and the other

communal leaders of Lunel in 1203-04 as it gives an insight into the mind of the halakhist

when approaching classical texts. It emerges, I will suggest, that amongst several concerns

was the fear that Maimonides’ authority subverted the halakhic process. Abulafia’s

correspondence begins as a critique of Maimonides’ responses to the questions of the rabbis

20
ibid, 30.
21
Silver, Maimonides Controversy, 87.
22
ibid, 87-88.
8
of Lunel, the most significant for this study being the response pertaining to the world to

come and the resurrection.

It is true that the topic of apostasy prefaces the correspondence; Abulafia feared that

Maimonides’ views of both the resurrection and the world to come could lead to apostasy and

calls for his philosophical writings to be banned.23 He felt that Maimonides’ insistence on

non-corporeal understandings of resurrection and the world to come undermined a

fundamental part of the covenant between God and Israel. Maimonides is accused of

undermining the hope and faith of the people of Israel: the land of Israel had been promised

to the resurrected in the future and what sense did this make if there were no bodies to return

to? However, Maimonides is equally attacked for misinterpreting and misconstruing

Talmudic texts in the manner that seemed to concern Rabad. Abulafia is particular to cite

evidence that this non-corporeal representation did not correspond with many Talmudic

sources, and that Maimonides’ objections to a literal understanding of the resurrection were

absurd objections for the infinite God. In going on to forthrightly discuss his other objections

to Maimonides’ legal positions, Abulafia demonstrates his priorities as a halakhist, thinking

along the same lines as Rabad;24 Maimonides was a great scholar but no different to any other

halakhic authority; he could and should be challenged on his positions in the classical manner

using classical Talmudic methodology. Maimonides’ very authority meant that in order to

uphold this position the points needed to be made in the most strident terms.

The question of Maimonides’ Aggadic interpretation became paramount for Abulafia. In

reference to Maimonides’ insistence on using allegory in Aggadic interpretation, Abulafia

remarks that ‘there is no positive mitzvah to complicate the simple meaning,’ and uses

Talmudic logic to argue that the burden of proof is on those who claim that Aggadah must be
23
Abulafia, Kitab, 6.
24
ibid, 14.
9
understood metaphorically.25 He questions an attempt to prove the need for allegory with a

fascinating insight into conflicting attitudes towards this world:

‘How can you judge the life of the world to come, whose life has no death, whose light has

no shade, and whose good has not evil…to this life which ends in death, and whose light is

engulfed by shadow.’26 The world to come is a place of miraculous existence in complete

contradistinction to this world. Whilst rationalism and Maimonides’ whole world view is

predicated on the glory of God manifest in this world, Abulafia’s description assumes

axiomatically that this world is one of confusion and darkness. With increasing passion,

Abulafia exclaims that ‘Heaven forbid to deprive Midrash and Aggadah of its literal

meaning! Metaphorical interpretation is only valid when the sages permit it.’27 Abulafia

spends three pages providing textual sources for corporeal resurrection from Tanakh. It

becomes increasingly clear that the idea of the metaphor, such a crucial device in

Maimonidean thought, is seen as an inferior form of interpretation, particularly when

regarding rabbinic writings. Abulafia found an ally in R. Samson of Sens, who argued for the

need to bend human will to that of the sages, agreeing that Aggadah couldn’t be taken lightly

against its literal meaning, citing Hullin 90b that there were only three cases where the

Aggadah was to be taken non-literally.28 Faithfulness to the literal nature of rabbinic writings

was not merely a precautionary exercise but was indicative of faith to the Torah itself. By

insisting on the superiority of philosophical and allegorical interpretation, Maimonides’

authority seemed to be undermining trust in the sages and traditional piety. Whilst apostasy

remained a concern, it is clear that for many rabbinic thinkers in the early thirteenth century

Maimonides’ whole approach towards understanding the spiritual world deviated from

accepted tradition and was intrinsically problematic.

25
ibid, 55.
26
ibid, 56.
27
ibid, 56-57.
28
Silver, Maimonides Controversy, 128.
10
Whilst Abulafia’s correspondence warns against the danger of Maimonidean philosophy

overpowering halakhic norms and Talmudic Judaism, the second controversy repeatedly

attacks any attempt of a synthesis between religion and philosophy. I am careful to use the

word synthesis as this differs from Silver’s argument of a fear of the effects of philosophy. It

was not the fear of Maimonidean philosophy that worried the anti-Maimonists but rather its

synthesis into Jewish thought as a valid, authentic and desirable means of interpretation.

When the controversy reached its height in the 1230s it becomes evident that for the anti-

Maimonists, Maimonides’ philosophical interpretation of Jewish thought was completely

illegitimate. The increasingly aggressive Christian targeting of Judaism as a religion seems to

have increased the antipathy towards Maimonidean universalism. R. Solomon of Montpellier,

the main instigator of the ban in 1232, found Maimonides’ works to be heretical and un-

Jewish. Nahmanides initially supported this and requested that the religious leaders of Castile

and Aragon join hands in supporting the cause. The content of the ban is particularly

revealing; it was pronounced in 1232 against anyone who read Maimonides’ compositions,

and in particular the Guide and Sefer ha-Madah. It was also enacted against those who

occupied themselves with any studies except Bible and Talmud and anyone who explained

the bible according to its simple meaning other than Rashi’s understanding. It was generally

supported by the Tosafists, and Graetz describes it as a moment where ‘simple faith and

philosophical apprehension of religion came to a head’.29

Whilst anti-Maimonist protagonists such as Nahmanides and Joseph b. Todros spoke of

people who denied providence to God and insisted that the Bible was entirely allegorical,30 it

29
Graetz, History of the Jews, 548.
30
Silver, Maimonides Controversy, 146-147.
11
is mistaken to attribute this to simply misunderstanding the Guide. Maimonides had

constructed a system which many felt was alien to the spirit of Judaism. Sarachek

summarises this point as follows: 'Although Maimonides retained the old nomenclature of

Judaism, he seems to have understood the terms very differently'.31 To list a few examples,

Maimonides broke significantly with traditional thought on a number of crucial issues: his

Aristotelian concept of God; incorporation of philosophy into basic tenets of faith; concept of

providence; comparative research method and denial of the existence of demons and spirits,

as well as the aforementioned objection to the literal meaning of Midrash and Aggadot.

These conceptions were particularly problematic to the new group of Kabbalistic scholars

who were particularly prominent in the controversy. They saw the Kabbalah as the authentic

esoteric tradition and felt that a synthesis with secular philosophy was an invalid way of

understanding Jewish tradition. Central to this group’s identity was an ideology of halakha,

the idea that the religious commandments were not allegories of a more or less profound idea

or pedagogic measure, but rather commands to perform secret rites or mysteries of cosmic

significance. Literalism was given greater prominence in the sense that the letters and words

of the biblical text were seen to have great esoteric significance; whilst some studied

philosophy and appreciated it to an extent, most saw it as dangerous. They saw philosophy as

reducing Torah to natural law.32

For example, in his poems describing the controversy, the poet Meshullam denounces the

Guide as heretical. He scoffs the Maimonidean idea of rational reasons behind laws. To

Meshullam, Maimonides’ explanation of the commandments not only led to an attenuation of

practice, but denied the esoteric value of revealed tradition.33 Maimonides denied God by
31
Sarachek, Faith, 14.
32
Silver, Maimonides Controversy, 183.
33
Ibid, 182.
12
denying His attributes. Meshullam claims that miracles are the greatest revelation of God,

and that there is nothing in the natural world which is causally controlled or operated

according to natural law. This theme had already been touched upon by Abulafia but the

kabbalists extended its scope. Nahmanides furthermore insisted that prophecy depends on

divine will exclusively and had little to do with the virtue of the prophet. The world as we

know it is illusionary and miraculous and anyone who believes otherwise is not part of the

people of Israel.34 Maimonides’ mechanical conception of Angelic power was similarly

condemned. Silver seems to think that this is an example of excessive condemnation in

response to increasing heresy as Maimonides had not violated any dogmatic prohibition. 35

This assumption of dogma being the axiom of Jewish faith is ironically Maimonidean; for it

appears that Nahmanides and Meshullam see Maimonides’ whole system as heretical not in

the technical sense of not conforming to theological precepts but rather as simply not

belonging to the realm of Jewish thought.

Similarly, in Toledo, Judah ibn Alfakhar’s response to R. David Kimhe’s attempt at securing

reconciliation between the opposing factions bitterly attacks Maimonides’ attempt to explain

away miracles and wondrous tales, combining Torah and Greek wisdom:

He imagined that one would live with the other like two loving twin deer. In reality this has
resulted in sorrow and dissension, for they cannot live together on the earth and be like two
sisters, for the Hebrew women are not like the Egyptian ones. 36

Like Nahmanides and Meshullam, ibn Alfakhar attacks Maimonides’ system as one which

was not only dangerous but which was built on false foundations.

R. Abraham Maimonides published a response to those who attacked his father. It is clear

that he felt that it was his father’s system and reputation at stake rather than its inherent

dangers. The elementary components of reason versus revelation are the core issues of this

34
Nahmanides, Commentary on the Torah, (Chavel ed. Jerusalem, 1959), Exodus, 13:16.
35
Silver, Maimonides Controversy, 196.
36
Letter to Kimhi, Iggerot Kenaot in Kovez Teshuvot ha-Rambam (1859), 2a in EJ, 747.
13
response. R. Abraham defends not only his father’s reputation but also his father’s method,

claiming that ‘Reason was implanted in each and every one of the seed of Israel before his

knowledge of Torah.’37 It seems that by 1240 when the Talmud was burned in Paris, the key

issues surrounding Maimonides were fundamental questions pertaining to his whole

theological system.

My study has assessed the issues surrounding the various controversies that erupted around

Maimonides and his works in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, arguing that they

became increasingly fundamental and personal. Silver’s research, I have argued, does not

support his conclusions. The key issue in the Maimonides controversy was that Maimonides’

philosophy appeared non-Jewish to many of his opponents. Both the Kabbalists and the more

orthodox halakhists of Germany and France could not tolerate a theology that seemed so alien

to the Jewish spirit. Yet Maimonides’ piety was never questioned nor was his halakhic

greatness. Solomon of Montpellier praises Maimonides greatly as a jurist and for the Mishneh

Torah: ‘At every lecture we refer to his decisions, we discuss his views and endeavour to

understand them.’38 One of legacies of the Maimonides controversy was that Maimonides’

reputation was recreated as a pure halakhist. Maimonides was therefore protected personally

whilst his religious ideology was marginalised. It is simply not accurate to argue that the

‘real’ issue of the controversy can be reduced to a fear of apostasy. Caution is always

required when ascribing historical circumstance a direct causational role and I would suggest

that the effect of the increase in systematic Christian targeting of Jewish faith was as much to

create a mistrust of the Universalist tendencies of rationalism as it was to increase fear of

apostasy. The seeds of this fundamental objection to Maimonides’ religious worldview had

already been sown over thirty years earlier in the correspondence between Meir and the

37
Milhamot ha-Shem, ed R. Margalioth (1953) in EJ, 752.
38
Sarachek, Faith, 13.
14
rabbis of Lunel, although the overt fears were of dissention and apostasy. By the time of the

burning of the Guide in Montpellier, Maimonides and his works were viewed as dangerous

both for what they contained and for the lifestyles they appeared to legitimise.

Bibliography

Abulafia, Meir, Kitab Alrasʾayil, (1871).

Baer, Yitzhak, History of the Jews in Christian Spain, vol.1 (New York, 1961).
Ben Sasson, Haim Hillel, ‘The Maimonides Controversy’ in Encyclopedia Judaica (1972),
vol.11, 745-754.
Encyclopaedia Judaica, 16 Vols. (Keter Publishing House, Jerusalem 1972).
Graetz, H., History of the Jews, vol.3 (London, 1892).
Nahmanides, Commentary on the Torah, (Chavel ed. Jerusalem, 1959).

Sarachek, J. , Faith and Reason, the Conflict over the Rationalism of Maimonides
(Pennsylvania, 1935).
Silver, Daniel Jeremy. Maimonidean Criticism and the Maimonidean Controversy 1180-
1240 (London, 1965).

15
UCL
DEPARTMENT OF HEBREW AND JEWISH STUDIES

AGREED MARK
DEPARTMENTAL ESSAY MARKING SHEET

Student number:………917284……………………………………………..
Course code and title:……HEBREWG216……………………………………………
Essay number:…2…………………………..

All points should be referred to with a short comment (e.g. Y/N, N/A, etc.).Overall assessment,
specific comments, and suggestions for improvement should be made in the ‘general comments’ at the
end of the sheet.

ESSAY STRUCTURE

Introduction:
a) Does the essay have an a)
introduction?
b)
b) Does it explain the essay topic?
c)
c) Does it clearly state the structure

16
 and methodology of the essay?
Or: Short summary of the above

Body of essay:
a) Is it well structured and
transparent?

Conclusion:
a) Does the essay have a a)
conclusion?
b)
b) Does it adequately sum up the
points
made in the essay?
Or: Short summary of the above

CONTENTS: RELEVANCE, ACCURACY, AND SCOPE

a) Is the topic addressed directly? a)

b) Are the contents relevant?
b)
c) Is the essay accurate and well-
c)
informed?
d)
d) Is the essay comprehensive?
e)
e) What was particularly engaging
about the essay?
Or: Short summary of the above

APPROACH AND ARGUMENT

Approach:
a) Is it analytical and/or critical, or a)
merely descriptive?
b) Is the methodology appropriate? b)
Argument:
a) Is the argument clear? a)
b) Is the argument supported with b)
evidence? c)
c) Have different arguments been d)

17
 considered in a balanced way?
d) Is the argument convincing?
Or: Short summary of the above

RESEARCH AND SOURCES

Primary sources:
a) Are primary sources cited? a)
b) Are they used appropriately? b)
Secondary literature:
a) Is secondary literature referred to? a)
b) Is it up to date, scholarly, and b)
relevant? c)
c) Are scholarly debates/opinions
discussed in the essay?
Or: Short summary of the above

PRESENTATION

English: Clarity of expression;

vocabulary, spelling, and
grammar.
Presentation and layout: Does
it conform to the style-guide?
Bibliography: Is it correctly
presented and accurate?
Or: Short summary of the above

GENERAL COMMENTS:

18
First Marker:

Signature: ………………………… Date:…………………………….. Mark:………………………

Second marker /Moderator:

Signature: ………………………. Date:………………………………… Mark:

………………………….

AGREED PROVISIONAL MARK:

……………………………………………………………………

19