Aids to Construction Cases
The squatting complained of involves pasture
“Whereas” Clause as Aid
PEOPLE V. ECHAVEZ
G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980
FACTS: On Oct. 25, 1977, Fiscal Abundo Ello filed with the
lower court separate Informations against sixteen (16)
persons charging them with squatting (unlawfully occupying
public and private lands belonging to the affluent class), as
penalized by PD No. 772, section 1, which provides that “any
person who, with the use of force, intimidation, or threat, or
taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property
of the latter against his will for residential, commercial, or any
other purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment
ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than
one thousand nor more than five hundred pesos at the
discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.”
It was alleged that the accused, with stealth and strategy,
entered into, occupied, and cultivated a portion of grazing
land physically occupied, possessed, and claimed by Atty.
Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as a successor to the pasture applicant
Celestino de la Serna. Informations of the five accused were
raffled to Judge Vicente Echavez, Jr.
Judge Echavez, motu propio, dismissed the five informations
on the following grounds:
1) That it was alleged that the accused entered the land
through “stealth and strategy”, whereas under the
decree, the entry should be effected “with the use of
force, intimidation, or threat, or taking advantage of
the absence or tolerance of the landowner”; and
2) That under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree
does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
As a result of such order, the fiscal amended the informations
by using in lieu of “stealth and strategy” the expression “with
threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the ranch
owner and/or tolerance of the said ranch owner.” The lower
court denied the motion for reconsideration of the fiscal.
The fiscal appealed to the Court under RA No. 5440 but the
appeal was considered devoid of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting
and similar acts applies to agricultural lands
HELD: No. The decree does not apply to pasture lands
because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to
squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal
constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do
individuals.
lands in rural areas.
The preamble of the decree is quoted below:
“WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the
issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2,
1972, directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public
Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare and the Director
of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential
Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors,
City and Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers,
"to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on and
along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and
those built without permits on public and private property."
squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all
over the country;
WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been
unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the
affluent class;
WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the
government's drive against this illegal and nefarious
practice.”
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species)
invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here,
the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to
apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal
constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of
statutory construction which is resorted to when the
legislative intent is uncertain.
It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers
to illegal constructions on public and private property. It is
complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which
provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of
public health, safety and peace and order.
On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on
public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this
case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it
unlawful for any person, corporation or association to forcibly
enter or occupy public agricultural lands.
RICARDO LLAMADO V. CA
G.R. No. 84850 June 29, 1989
FACTS: Ricardo Llamado (Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corp)
was prosecuted for violation of BP Blg. 22. He had co-signed
with the President a post-dated check payable to private
respondent Leon Gaw in the amount of 186,500.00 which was
dishonored for lack of sufficient funds.
Llamado was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of 1
year and to pay a fine of 200,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is also required to
reimburse to respondent the amount 186,500 plus costs of
suit. After the decision of the trial court was read to him,
Llamado, through his counsel, orally manifested that he was
taking an appeal. The trial court forwarded his records of the
case to the CA.
Llamado, through his counsel, received from CA a notice to
file his Appellant’s Brief within 30 days. He managed to
secure several extensions of time with which to file his brief,
the last expansion expiring on November 18, 1987.
Llamado, even while his Appellant’s Brief was being finalized
by his then counsel of record, sought advice from another
counselor. Llamado, with the assistance of a new counsel,
filed in RTC a Petition for Probation invoking PD No. 968
(Establishing a Probation System, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and For Other Purposes” as amended.
The petition was not accepted by the lower court since the
records of the case had already been forwarded to the CA.
Llamado then filed with the CA a Manifestation and Petition
for Probation dated November 16, 1987, enclosing a copy of
the Petition for Probation that he submitted to the trial court.
He asked the CA to grant his Petition for Probation or to
remand the Petition back to the trial court.
was deemed to constitute automatic withdrawal of a pending
appeal.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a
term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for
probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the
appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the
sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic
withdrawal of a pending appeal.
It will be noted that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, the trial
court could grant an application for probation "at any time"
"after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant" and
certainly after "an appeal has been taken from the sentence
of conviction." Thus, the filing of the application for probation
was "deemed .
"Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant but before he begins to serve his
sentence and upon his application, suspend the execution of
said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem
best.
An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court,
with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken
from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application
shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the
automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of
conviction.

The CA denied the Petition for Probation.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s application for probation

in this situation is barred under PD 968

HELD: Yes. The application for probation is already barred.

There were two amendments that happened to the law, and
the present law allows applications for probation “after the
TC shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and
within the period of perfecting an appeal. It prohibits the
grant of an application for probation if the defendant has
perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Original Law: Under Section 4 of PD 968, the trial court could

grant an application for probation “at any time” after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant and certainly
“after an appeal has been taken from the sentence of
conviction.” Thus, the filing of the application for probation
Headings
EXEQUIEL KARE V. SERVILIANO PLATON
G.R. No. 35902 October 28, 1931
FACTS: Petitioner Exequiel Kare filed a motion of protest
contesting the election of the respondent Francisco Perfecto,
upon the grounds that the respondent Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Albay entered an order requiring petitioner
to give a personal bond for 3,000 and a cash bond of 2,000 to
be deposited with the provincial treasurer of Albay in order
that proper proceedings might be taken on his motion of
protest. These sums were later changed so that the cash
bond was for 1,500 and the personal bond for 3,500.
The petitioner invoked Section 482 of the Election Law in
support of his contention. The respondent judge bases his
action upon the same section and also upon section 479 as
lately amended by Act No. 3699. Section 482 provides:
Bond or cash deposits required of contestants. –
Before the court shall entertain any such contest or
counter-contest or admit an appeal, the party filing
the contest, counter-contest, or appeal shall give
bond in an amount fixed by the court with two
sureties satisfactory to it, conditioned that he will
pay all expenses and costs incident to such motion or
appeal, or shall deposit cash in court in lieu of such
bond.
Applying this rule, it will be seen that the present section
provides that before the court entertain any contest or
counter-contest or admits an appeal, the party filing the
contest, counter-contest, or appeal shall give bond with two
sureties to the satisfaction of the court, or deposit cash in
court in lieu of such bond. The Court holds that the court may
only require a personal bond and that the contestant may
make a cash deposit in lieu thereof.
There is no question as to the court’s discretionary power to
demand of a contestant a certain sum of money in advance to
meet the initial expenses arising from the contest, such as the
production of ballot boxes in court, etc. It is true that the bond
obliges the contestant or his sureties to pay all the costs arising
from the contest, should he be defeated, but the bond is not
to be executed until the final determination of the protest. And
it is well known that certain services are required in the course
of election contests which must be paid for immediately,
because it would be unjust to delay their payment until the
termination of the contest.
The court ruled that although it does not adhere strictly to
legal technical phraseology, there is in it no excess of
jurisdiction or abuse of judicial discretion to be rectified by
means of the writ applied for. Hence the petition was
dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may require the petitioner

to either a bond or a cash deposit

RULING: Yes. Said section is preceded by the heading, “Bond

or cash deposit required of contestants,’ which apparently
indicates that the court taking cognizance of the election
contest may require the contestant either to give a bond or to
make a cash deposit.

But the petitioner contends that the right to choose between

giving a personal bond and depositing a sum of money in lieu
thereof is granted only to the contestant or appellant. If there
be any conflict between the heading of the section under
question and the body, it must be settled according to the
canons of statutory construction. Black on Interpretation of
Laws, page 181, says: Headings prefixed to the titles,
chapters, and sections of a statute or code may be consulted
in aid of the interpretation, in case of doubt and ambiguity;
but inferences drawn from such headings are entitled to very
little weight, and they can never control the plain terms of
the enacting clauses.” The rule accepted by most of the
authorities is that if the chapter or section heading has been
inserted merely for convenience of reference, and not as an
integral part of the statute, it should not be allowed to
control the interpretation.
Arrangement and ordering
DE CASTRO V. JBC
G.R. No. 191002 March 17, 2010
FACTS: This case is based on multiple cases filed which dealt
with the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17,
2010 or seven (7) days after the Presidential Election. On
December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex
officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC,
requesting that the process for nominations to the office of
the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a
resolution which stated that they have unanimously agreed
to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to
be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the
incumbent Chief Justice.
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for
application or recommendation and published for that
purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and
the Philippine Star.
In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to
proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the
following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn
complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than
February 22, 2010.
Although it has already begun the process for the filing of the
position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the
JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its
list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this
case being unresolved.
The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of
intervenors called for either the prohibition of the JBC to pass
the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or
that the act appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a
midnight appointment.
A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re
Appointments, dated March 30, 1998, of the Hon. Mateo
Villanueva and Hon. Placido V. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC
of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabantuan City,
respectively, shortly referred to here as the Valenzuela case
by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited
exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial
positions during the period therein fixed.
ISSUES: Whether or not the prohibition under Section 15,
Article VII apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the SC
and other appointments to the judiciary
HELD: No. Two provisions are seemingly in conflict:
Section 15, Article VII. Two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
Section 4 (1), Article VIII. The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices.
IT may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five,
or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days from the occurrence thereof.
Justification of the Supreme Court:
First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to
meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution.
Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and
arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not
arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely
made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of
what the Constitution should contain.
The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which
embody the allocation of the awesome powers of
government among the three great departments, the
Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the
Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a
true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that
underlies the political structure.
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive
Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by
the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of
appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the
Article.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII
as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members
of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in
Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition
covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed
that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word
shall – an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be
enforced – should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1)
imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an
appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90
days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the
President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the
Constitution.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the
President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was
undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite
mandate for the President as the appointing power, and
cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in
Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed
because it was “couched in stronger negative language.”
Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all
other appointments in the Judiciary.
There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the
adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate
midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing
Chief Executive. Given the background and rationale for the
prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that
the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to
appointments made in the Executive Department. The
framers did not need to extend the prohibition to
appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of
the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of
candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and
deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would
no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. Indeed,
the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize
the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the
Commission on Appointments.
Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15,
Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by
then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when
it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by
some sectors about the “constitutionality of xxx
appointments” to the Court of Appeals in light of the
forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that “on the
basis of the (Constitutional) Commission’s records, the
election ban had no application to appointments to the Court
of Appeals.” This confirmation was accepted by the JBC,
which then submitted to the President for consideration the
nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals.
Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14,
Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of
the President.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the
same character, in that they affect the power of the President
to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only
to appointments within the Executive Department renders
conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference
to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment.
Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15
extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines
the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence
of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative
Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the
Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political
leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election.
Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President,
instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next
Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial
independence, because the appointee can also become
beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the
appointment by the incumbent President does not run the
same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely
because her term will end by June 30, 2010.
Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there
will be no need for the incumbent President to appoint during
the prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno
within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because
anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days
mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining.
The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the
coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Puno’s
retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply
Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme
Court.
Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be
held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall
on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the
regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of
the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May
14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of
the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day
period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is
that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference
between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days
and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which
the outgoing President would be in no position to comply
with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the
Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the
Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity.
Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even
raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the
President – any President – to appoint a Chief Justice if the
appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of
the Supreme Court.
Sec. 9, Article VIII says:
xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx
The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the
Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of
the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for
the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or
sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been
vetted by the JBC.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
No compelling reason exists for the Court to deny a
reconsideration of the assailed Decision. The various motions
for reconsideration raise hollering substantial arguments and
legitimately nagging questions which the Court must meet
head on.
If this Court is to deserve or preserve its revered place not
just in the hierarchy but also in history, passion for reason
demands the issuance of an extended and extensive
resolution that confronts the ramifications and repercussions
of its assailed Decision. Only then can it offer an illumination
that any self-respecting student of the law clamors and any
adherent of the law deserves. Otherwise, it takes the risk of
reeking of an objectionable air of supreme judicial arrogance.
It is thus imperative to settle the following issues and
concerns:
Whether the incumbent President is constitutionally
proscribed from appointing the successor of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 until
the ban ends at 12:00 noon of June 30, 2010
1. In interpreting the subject constitutional
provisions, the Decision disregarded established
canons of statutory construction. Without explaining
the inapplicability of each of the relevant rules, the
Decision immediately placed premium on the
arrangement and ordering of provisions, one of the
weakest tools of construction, to arrive at its
conclusion.
2. In reversing Valenzuela, the Decision held that
the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on ConCom
deliberations, yet it did not offer to cite a material
ConCom deliberation. It instead opted to rely on the
memory of Justice Florenz Regalado which
incidentally mentioned only the "Court of Appeals."
The Decision’s conclusion must rest on the strength
of its own favorable Concom deliberation, none of
which to date has been cited.
3. Instead of choosing which constitutional provision
carves out an exception from the other provision,
the most legally feasible interpretation (in
the limited cases of temporary physical or legal
impossibility of compliance, as expounded in my
Dissenting Opinion) is to consider the appointments
ban or other substantial obstacle as a temporary
impossibility which excuses or releases the
constitutional obligation of the Office of the
President for the duration of the ban or obstacle.
In view of the temporary nature of the circumstance causing
the impossibility of performance, the outgoing President is
released from non-fulfillment of the obligation to appoint,
and the duty devolves upon the new President. The delay in
the fulfillment of the obligation becomes excusable, since the
law cannot exact compliance with what is impossible. The 90-
day period within which to appoint a member of the Court is
thus suspended and the period could only start or resume to
run when the temporary obstacle disappears (i.e., after the
period of the appointments ban; when there is already a
quorum in the JBC; or when there is already at least three
applicants).
Whether the Judicial and Bar Council is obliged to submit to
the President the shortlist of nominees for the position of
Chief Justice (or Justice of this Court) on or before the
occurrence of the vacancy.
1. The ruling in the Decision that obligates the JBC to
submit the shortlist to the President on or before the
occurrence of the vacancy in the Court runs counter
to the Concom deliberations which explain that the
90-day period is allotted for both the nomination by
the JBC and the appointment by the President. In the
move to increase the period to 90 days,
Commissioner Romulo stated that "[t]he sense of
the Committee is that 60 days is awfully short and
that the [Judicial and Bar] Council, as well as the
President, may have difficulties with that."
2. To require the JBC to submit to the President a
shortlist of nominees on or before the occurrence of
vacancy in the Court leads to preposterous results. It
bears reiterating that the requirement is absurd
when, inter alia, the vacancy is occasioned by the
death of a member of the Court, in which case the
JBC could never anticipate the death of a Justice, and
could never submit a list to the President on or
before the occurrence of vacancy.
3. The express allowance in the Constitution of a 90-
day period of vacancy in the membership of the
Court rebuts any public policy argument on avoiding
a vacuum of even a single day without a duly
 appointed Chief Justice. Moreover, as pointed out in
my Dissenting Opinion, the practice of having an
acting Chief Justice in the interregnum is provided
for by law, confirmed by tradition, and settled by
jurisprudence to be an internal matter.

The Resolution of the majority, in denying the present

Motions for Reconsideration, failed to rebut the foregoing
crucial matters.

I, therefore, maintain my dissent and vote to GRANT the

Motions for Reconsideration of the Decision of March 17,
2010 insofar as it holds that the incumbent President is not
constitutionally proscribed from appointing the successor of
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno upon his retirement on May 17,
2010 until the ban ends at 12:00 noon of June 30, 2010 and
that the Judicial and Bar Council is obliged to submit to the
President the shortlist of nominees for the position of Chief
Justice on or before May 17, 2010.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Legislative History / Origin of Statute
U.S. V. JOSE SERAPIO
G.R. L-7557 December 7, 1912
The doctrine of prescription or the limitation of time within
which an action may be brought, is of purely statutory origin.
Both under the common and the civil law a right of action
never died by mere lapse of time. The court, in the absence of
express law, has no authority to fix a period of prescription or
limitation.
FACTS: On or about the month of December, 1907, in the
municipality of Santa Maria, Province of Bulacan, the said
accused, Jose S. Serapio, did willfully and criminally, with the
intentions of attacking, reviling, and exposing to public hatred
and scorn the good name, virtue, and reputation of Bonifacio
Morales, write, publish, and send by mail addressed to the
Executive Secretary, an anonymous communication, the
pertinent portion whereof is as follows:
"II. Bonifacio Morales is the murderer of 12 peaceful and
honest men, who are: Mariano Ramirez, municipal president
of Bocaue; the teacher of the primary school of Mariano,
Emigdio Perez, Candido del Rosario, Juan de Vera, Manuel
Valderrama, a boy 13 years old of the barrio of Alangalang, one
Budio, musician, Mariano Mendoza, all of Santa Maria, an old
man of the barrio of Sapang-palay of San Jose and two
brothers, sons of Francisco Pascual of Norzagaray. He has
committed various assaults and robberies, which are: The
robbery of Captain Ciano Caluloa of Meycauayan, the robbery
of Simeona of Angat, whereby a girl 12 or 13 years old was
killed, the robbery of P420 from Juana Reyes of Bocaue, all in
the year 1899.’
"‘12. Bonifacio Morales is known in the Secret Service
Department of Manila as a criminal, whose crimes the
detective Manuel Arbona discovered in the year 1903 . . .’
"‘15. Bonifacio Morales is an inveterate gambler and to get
money he uses diabolical methods, as in the case of the
General Santa Ana in 1903, who surrendered voluntarily in
order to get within the pale of the law, but Morales tried to
demonstrate to the Government that he was caught by him in
order to secure the reward offered by the Government.”
The defendant contended that the facts alleged in the
complaint do not constitute a crime. It appears from the
allegation in the complaint that if there were a crime it has
prescribed. After hearing the arguments of the respective
parties, the Honorable Alberto Barretto, judge, in a very
interesting opinion, decided that the first ground of said
demurrer was not well founded, but sustained the second, and
ordered the prosecuting attorney of the province to present a
new complaint.
After carefully considering the case, the courts finds that while
the crime of libel differs from that of calumny, defined and
penalized in article 452, it is not so with respect to the crimes
of insults provided for and penalized in articles 456 et seq. of
the Penal Code.
Under said articles and the first paragraph of article 277, the
court does not understand to exist the same essential
difference between the crime of insults in writing and that of
libel. In both the object of the perpetrator of the crime is to
attack the honesty, virtue, or the reputation of a person,
exposing him to public hatred, scorn, or ridicule, characteristic
elements that are likewise found in the crime of insults in
writing, defined and penalized in article 456 of the Penal Code,
in connection with 458 thereof.
It is certain that Act No. 277 has not in any way fixed the
prescription for the penal action in the crimes of libel. There is
no provision in said Act that fixes the time within which the
action arising from a libelous imputation may prescribe, but it
is not less certain that by applying the rule that a criminal act
is not prescriptible unless the law expressly fixes such
prescription, the crime of libel and others could be prosecuted
at any time, which would naturally make the provisions of the
Act absurd, for a case might arise where a penal action might
be exercised even after the person concerned in the crime or
responsible therefor had died.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime has prescribed in accordance
with the third paragraph of article 131 of the Penal Code of the
Philippines.
HELD: The crime under consideration consists of the violation
of a special law as referred to in article 7 of the Penal Code,
and subsequently the provisions of said code and the
clarification of the crimes comprised therein are not applicable
in the present case. The crime must be punished under the
provisions of the Act (No. 1761) which the sovereign power, by
virtue of its authority, saw fit to enact for the good of the
country and its inhabitants. Wherefore, inasmuch as it is an act
which the lawmaker has declared to be invested with the
attributed of a crime, the overruling of the demurrer and the
prosecution of the case are in accordance with the law.
This court has refused in many cases to apply some of the
general provisions of the Penal Code to the laws of the United
States Commission, or to special decrees of the Kingdom of
Spain applicable to the Philippine Islands, thereby holding, in
effect, that such laws, when they provided a penalty for their
violation, were "leyes especiales," as that phrase is used in the
Penal Code.
This court has uniformly, through a long line of decisions
refused to apply some of the provisions of the Penal Code to
leyes especiales, as that phrase is used in article 7; or, in other
words, the court has refused to apply some provisions of the
Penal Code to any general law of the Philippine Commission,
which, within itself, defined the punishment of a crime.
The Honorable Alberto Barretto, judge, in his decision in the
court below, very correctly says, among other things: But it is
no less certain that by applying the rule that a criminal act is
not prescriptible unless the law expressly fixes such
prescription." In our opinion this is the correct rule.

The doctrine of prescription or the limitation of time within

which an action may be brought, is of purely statutory origin.
Both under the common and the civil law a right of action
never died by mere lapse of time. The court, in the absence of
express law, has no authority to fix a period of prescription or
limitation.

These statutes (of prescription or limitation) did not destroy

the right. They simply prescribed by law, the defendant might
object, if he desired, to being sued. If the defendant failed, in
some proper way, to object, or, in other words, interpose the
statutory defense, the action could be maintained. The
statute provided a special defense simply. Our conclusions,
then, following the rule heretofore adopted by this court,
are:

First. That by reason of article 7 of the Penal Code, some of the

general provisions of said code do not apply to the penal laws
of the United States Commission, unless, by express provision
of law, they are made applicable.

Second. That there is no general or special provision of law

making any of the provisions of the Penal Code applicable to
the Libel Law of the United States Commission (Act No. 277),
except the provision as to subsidiary imprisonment when a
fine is imposed. (Act No. 1732.)

Third. That the period of prescription fixed by article 131 of the

Penal Code for calumny and insults, does not apply to the
crime of libel as defined and published under Act No. 277 of
the United States Commission.

Fourth. That unless a period of prescription or limitation is

fixed by law for a particular offense or crime, the action for
such offense or crime is not barred by lapse of time.

Fifth. That the law defining and punishing the crime of libel
(Act No. 277) has not fixed a period of prescription or
limitation within which an action for such crime shall be
instituted.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower

court, sustaining the second ground of demurrer, is hereby
reversed, and it is hereby ordered that the cause be remanded
to the lower court from which it came, with direction that the
defendant Jose S. Serapio be ordered to appear and plead to
the complaint presented in this cause.
U.S. V. VENANCIO DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. L-9144 March 27, 1915
PRINCIPLES:
Extrinsic Aids – Legislative History/ Origin of Statute
CONSTRUCTION WITH REFERENCE TO THEIR HISTORY. —
In construing the statutes which the courts are called upon to
administer and apply, judicial notice may be taken of their
origin and history, and of the facts which affect their
derivation, validity and operation.
CONSTRUCTION WITH REFERENCE TO AMERICAN AND
ENGLISH LEGISLATION. —
For the proper construction and application of the terms and
provisions of legislative enactments which have been
borrowed from or modelled upon Anglo-American precedents,
it is proper and oftentimes essential to review the legislative
history of such enactments and to find an authoritative guide
for their interpretation and application in the decisions of
American and English courts of last resort construing and
applying similar legislation in those countries.
FACTS: Defendant Venancio De Guzman, along with Pedro
and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of asesinato (murder)
and sentenced to life imprisonment.
The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, on the
day and at place mentioned in the information, De Guzman
who was walking through a field with Pedro and Serapio
Macarling and Rufino Garin, deceased, struck the latter on
the head, knocked him down and held him on the ground
while Pedro Macarling stabbed him to death.
Information was duly filed charging De Guzman, jointly with
the two Macarlings, with the murder of Garin. Guzman
entered into an agreement with the fiscal under the terms of
which he promised to appear and testify as a witness for the
Government at the trial of his co-accused, and to tell the
truth as to all that occurred, provided the information was
dismissed as to him and he himself was not brought to trial.
With the consent of the court, and in pursuance of this
agreement, he was not arraigned nor brought to trial, and the
information was dismissed as to him.
One of his co-accused pleaded guilty and the other not guilty,
and thereafter the case came on for trial.
After several witnesses had been called, De Guzman was
placed on the witness stand, and denied all knowledge of the
murder. He denied that he had ever said anything implicating
his co-accused, and swore that a statement made by him
before a justice of the peace was false, and that it had been
made through fear of certain police officers.
Consequently, De Guzman was convicted in the court below.
The only question raised on his appeal was his right to
exemption from prosecution for the crime committed, on the
ground that a former information, charging the same offense,
had been dismissed as to him in order that he might testify as
a witness for the prosecution.
The Solicitor General relying on provisions of General orders
recommends the discharge of the appellant.
Section 34, 35, and 36 of General orders No. 58, upon which
counsel for defense and the Solicitor General rely, are as
follows:
SEC. 34. When two or more persons shall be included in the
same charge, the court, at any time before the defendants
have entered upon their defense or upon the application of
the counsel of the Government, may direct any defendant to
be discharged, that he may be a witness for the United
States.
SEC. 35. When two or more persons shall be included in the
same charge, and the court shall be of opinion in respect to a
particular defendant that there is not sufficient evidence to
put him on his defense, it must order him to be discharged
before the evidence is closed, that he may be a witness for his
codefendant.
SEC. 36. The order indicated in sections thirtyfour and thirty-
five shall amount to an acquittal of the defendant discharged,
and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense.
The question raised on this appeal being his right to
exemption from prosecution for the crime thus committed,
on the ground that a former information, charging the same
offense, had been dismissed as to him in order that he might
testify as a witness for the prosecution.
ISSUE: Should the defendant be discharged from prosecution
even if he did not faithfully comply as to the sworn
agreement made prior the trial which entitled him immunity
as witness for the States
HELD: No, the defendant should not be discharged. In the case
at bar, it can be concluded that the appellant failed to carry out
his agreement with the fiscal and had knowingly and falsely
testified during the trial of his co-accused, and that he
fraudulently secured the dismissal of the former information.
The state absolutely has the right to bring him to trial, convict
him, and sentence him for the crime with which he was initially
charged in the former information.

For the proper construction and application of the terms and

provisions of legislative enactments which have been
borrowed from or modelled upon Anglo-American precedents,
it is proper and essential to review the legislative history of
such enactments and to find an authoritative guide for their
interpretation and application in the decisions of American and
English courts of last resort construing and applying similar
legislation in those countries.

General rule of statutory construction that courts may take

judicial notice of the original and history of the statutes which
they are called upon to construe and administer, and of the
facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation.
Looking at the legislative history of the statute under the old
system of criminal procedure with a system borrowed on
large part from English and American precedents, it can be
gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to avail of the
bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in the
case at bar to faithfully and honestly carry out his undertaking
to appear as witness and to tell the truth at the trial of his co-
accused deprived him of the right to plead his formal
dismissal as a bar to his prosecution.

Finally, exemption cannot be an acquittal since the order

discharging the defendant was made prior to his trial.
RODOLF SCHNECKENBURHER v. MANUEL MORAN
G.R. L-44896 July 31, 1936
FACTS: The petitioner, an honorary consul of Uruguay in the
Philippines, was charged with the crime of falsification of a
private document before the CFI of Manila. He objected to
the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under
the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of
the Philippines, the court below had no jurisdiction to try him,
for the reason that (1) under Article III, section 2, of the
Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court of the
United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such
jurisdiction excludes the courts of the Philippines and (2) that
even under the Constitution of the Philippines original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the
Supreme Court of the Philippines.
His objection was overruled, thus, he filed a petition for a writ
of prohibition to prevent the CFI from taking cognizance of
the criminal action filed against him.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the US Supreme Court has Original
Jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls and such jurisdiction excludes courts of
the Philippines.
(2) Whether or not original jurisdiction over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls are
conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the
Philippines
RULING: This case involves NO question of diplomatic
immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not entitled to the
privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but
is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which
he is accredited. A consul is not exempt from criminal
prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he
resides.
In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is
bound by the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution
provides that the original jurisdiction of this court “shall
include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls.” In deciding the instant case this court
cannot go beyond this constitutional provision.
It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus
conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is
exclusive.
The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this
court “shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls.”
It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised
by the Supreme Court at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of
the CFI. Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction
vested in this court by the Constitution and made to include
all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this court over such
cases is not exclusive. Indeed, the CFI of Manila has
jurisdiction to try the petitioner. Hence, the petition for a writ
of prohibition must be denied.
(1) No. First of all, a consul is not entitled to the privilege of
diplomatic immunity. A consul is not exempt from criminal
prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he
resides. The inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on
November 15, 1935, has brought about a fundamental change
in the political and legal status of the Philippines. This
Constitution is the supreme law of the land. This Constitution
provides that the original jurisdiction of this court “shall
include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers,
and consuls.”
(2) The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the
Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution was derived from section 17 of
Act No. 136, which reads as follows: “The Supreme Court shall
have original jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in the
Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and determine the
controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases
provided by law."
Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo
warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas
corpus was also conferred on the Courts of First Instance by
the Code of Civil Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs. 197, 217, 222,
226, and 525.)
As a result, the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution was not exclusive of, but
concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance. Inasmuch
as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in this court by
the Constitution and made to include all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, it follows
that the jurisdiction of this court over such cases is not
exclusive.
The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case
finds support in the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States. The Constitution of the United States
provides that the Supreme Court shall have "original
jurisdiction" in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls. In construing this constitutional
provision, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
the "original jurisdiction thus conferred upon the Supreme
Court by the Constitution was not exclusive jurisdiction, and
that such grant of original jurisdiction did not prevent Congress
from conferring original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls
on the subordinate courts of the Union. (U.
S. vs. Ravara, supra; Bors vs. Preston, 111 U. S., 252; 28 Law.
ed., 419.)
Therefore, the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction
to try the petitioner, and that the petition for a writ of
prohibition must be denied.
Realities existing at the time of adoption

BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., TRINIDAD HERRERA, BISHOP

FRANCISCO CLAVER, S.J., BISHOP ANTONIO NEPOMUCENO,
BISHOP JESUS VALERA, BISHOP FELIX ZAFRA, BISHOP
TEOTIMO PACIS, EUGENIO LOPEZ, JR., SERGIO OSMEÑA, III,
ANTONIO ARANETA, ANTONIO MIRANDA, RAUL GONZALES,
JOKER ARROYO, and EMILIO DE PERALTA vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and NATIONAL TREASURER

G.R. No. L-40004 January 31, 1975

FACTS:

Petitioners filed this petition in order to nullify Presidential

Decree Nos. 1366, 1366-A (calling a referendum for February
27, 1975), Presidential Decree Nos. 629 and 630 (appropriating
funds therefor), and Presidential Decree Nos. 637 and 637-A
and other presidential decrees, orders and instructions relative
to the said referendum on the ground that President Marcos
does not hold any legal office nor possess any lawful authority
under either the 1935 Constitution and 1973 Constitution, and
therefore has no authority to issue the questioned
proclamations, decrees, and orders.

ISSUE: Whether or not President Marcos has the authority to

issue such proclamations, decrees, and orders

RULING: Through the referendum held on July 27-28, 1973,

the sovereign people authorized him to continue in office even
beyond 1973 under the 1973 Constitution; thus, President
Marcos is the de jure President of the Philippines.
Furthermore, when the 1973 Constitution was enacted,
Section 3 (2) Article XVII of the new Constitution, provides that
“all proclamation, orders, decrees, instructions issued by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and
shall remain valid and legal even after lifting Martial Law or the
ratification of this Constitution”—the Constitutional
Convention refers to the “incumbent President” as President
Marcos. Thus, the Court ruled that President Marcos can
promulgate proclamations, orders and decrees even during
Martial Law or even after lifting the Martial Law, making the
assailed Presidential Decrees valid. The issuance of such
decrees during Martial Law is essential to the security and
preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political and
social liberties of the people, and to the institution or reforms
to prevent the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or
secession or the threat thereof. In the Philippines, military
engagements between the government forces and the rebels
and secessionists are going on, emphasizing the immediacy of
the peril to the safety of the Republic itself. There is therefore
greater reason to affirm this law-making authority in favor of
the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR No. 838962 February 22, 1991
Aids to Construction; Extrinsic Aids; Realities Existing at the
time of adoption.
Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Executive Order
No. 284; The Court in construing a constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption and
the
evils if any sought to be prevented or remedied; A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times and the condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was formed.
FACTS: The consolidated petitions seek a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of EO 284 issued by President Corazon
Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the
assailed EO read:
“SECTION 1. Even if allowed by law or by the
ordinary functions of his position, a member of the
Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or
other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may, in addition to his primary
position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and
receive the corresponding compensation therefor;
Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad
hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or
bodies of which the President is the Chairman.
“SECTION 2. If a member of the cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive official of the Executive Department
holds more positions than what is allowed in Section
1 hereof, they (sic) must relinquish the excess
position in favor of the subordinate official who is
next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold
more than two positions other than bis primary
position.
“SECTION 3. In order to fully protect the interest of
the government in government-owned or
controlled corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of
the members of the boards of such corporation
should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or
assistant secretary.”
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect,
allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or
positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject
to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,2 which provides as follows:
“ Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.”
ISSUE: Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies
or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions
made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par
(2), Article IX-B?
RULING: The Court said no.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the
intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus,
it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution
should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by
its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of
the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.
The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants as members of the governing bodies or
boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities,
including government-owned and controlled corporations,
became prevalent during the time legislative powers in this
country were exercised by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos pursuant to his martial law authority. There was a
proliferation of newly-created agencies, instrumentalities and
government-owned and controlled corporations created by
presidential decrees and other modes of presidential issuances
where Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants were
designated to head or sit as members of the board with the
corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances
and other perquisites of office. Most of these instrumentalities
have remained up to the present time.
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the
government soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public
officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of
self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of multiple offices in qualifying phrase as respondents would have us do, would
government was strongly denounced on the floor of the render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and
Batasang Pambansa. purpose of the

The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on
serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the deputies and assistants with respect to holding other
overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986
offices or employment in the government during their tenure.
Constitutional Commission, convened as it was after the
Respondents’ interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII
people successfully unseated former President Marcos, should admits of the exceptions found in Section 7, par. (2) of Article
draft into its proposed Constitution the provisions under IX-B would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the
consideration which are envisioned to remedy, if not correct, framers of the Constitution as to when
the evils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental
the high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the
offices and employment. In fact, as keenly
President to Assistant Secretary, on
observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz during the deliberations
the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank
in these cases, one of the strongest selling points of the 1987
immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the
Constitution during the campaign for its ratification was the
other, may hold any other office or position in the government
assurance given by its proponents that the scandalous practice
during their tenure.
of Cabinet members holding multiple positions in the
government and collecting unconscionably excessive It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that
compensation therefrom would be discontinued. no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all
the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section
bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of
the holding of multiple offices or employment in the
the instrument.17 Sections bearing on a particular subject
government subsuming both elective and appointive public
should be considered and interpreted together as to
officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution18 and one
formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically
section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other
together.19 In other words, the court must harmonize them, if
office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise
practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will
provided in the Constitution itself.
render every word operative, rather than one which may make
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different the words idle and nugatory.
phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987
intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a
Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
far as holding other offices or employment in the government
deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices
or elsewhere is concerned. Thus, while all other appointive
or employment in the government during their tenure, the
officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity.
employment in the government during their tenure when such
On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory
is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do
unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the
other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal
officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant
negation.21 The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
Constitution”
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants. must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those’
particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the
This being the case, the qualifying phrase “unless otherwise
Vice-Presi-dent being appointed as a member of the Cabinet
provided in this Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII cannot
under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in
possibly refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section
those instances provided under Section 7,
7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. To construe said
pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being
ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of
Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
POE-LLAMANZARES v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 221697 March 8, 2016
FACTS: Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church
of Jaro, Iloilo on Sept. 3, 1968. After passing the parental care
and custody over petitioner by Edgardo Militar to Emiliano
Militar and his wife, she has been reported and registered as a
foundling and issued a Foundling Certificate and Certificate of
Live Birth, thus was given the name, Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar.
When the petitioner reached the age of five (5), celebrity
spouses Ronal Allan Kelley (aka Fernando Poe, Jr) and Jesusa
Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces) filed a petition foe her adoption.
The trial court granted their petition and ordered that her
name be changed to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan City at the age of
18 in 1986; in 1988, she applied and was issued Philippine
Passport by the DFA; in 1993 and 1998, she renewed her
passport.
She left for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to continue her
studies after enrolling and pursuing a degree in Development
Studies at the University of the Philippines. She graduated in
1991 from Boston College where she earned her Bachelor of
Arts degree in Political Studies.
She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of
both the Philippines and the U.S., in San Juan City and decided
to flew back to the U.S. after their wedding. She gave birth to
her eldest child while in the U.S.; and her two daughters in the
Philippines.
She became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. She came
back to the Philippines to support her father’s candidacy for
president in the May 2004 elections and gave birth to her
youngest daughter. They then returned to the U.S. in 2004 but
after few months, she rushed back to the Philippines to attend
to her ailing father. After her father’s death, the petitioner and
her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines in 2005 and immediately secured a TIN, then her
children followed suit; acquired property where she and her
children resided.
In 2006, She took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to RA No. 9225 or the Citizenship
retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003; she filed a sworn
petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with
petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three
children which was granted. She registered as a voter; secured
Philippine passport; appointed and took her oath as
Chairperson of the MTRCB after executing an affidavit of
Renunciation of American citizenship before the Vice Consul of
the USA and was issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of
the USA in 2011.
In 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein
she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question “Period
of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.”
Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was
proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the
Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, the
petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that
her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May
2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted
from 24 May 2005. The petitioner attached to her COC an
“Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship”
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City
on 14 October 2015.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her
candidacy on the ground particularly, among others, that she
cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she
cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them
were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy
on the ground that she was in want of citizenship and
residence requirements, and that she committed material
misrepresentations in her COC.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and held
(9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for
Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on
the natural-born citizenship issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-
Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
HELD: Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be
considered a natural-born Filipino.
It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines as there is no restrictive language which would
definitely exclude foundlings as they are already impliedly so
recognized.
There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or
language permitting discrimination against foundlings as the
three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws.
Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is
supported by some treaties, adhering to the customary rule to
presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the
foundling is found.

YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino

Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that only
natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency.

(1) There is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos,

as being shown in her physical features which are typical of
Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant
in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability
that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99%
chance that Poe’s biological parents are Filipinos. Said
probability and circumstantial evidence are admissible under
Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class,

natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the
1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be
natural born citizens.

(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the

natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are
being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention
Law.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year

residency because she satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS
MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled
with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to
US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting
May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe
presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and
intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US,
coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino
Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for
Presidency was granted by the SC.
Legislative Debates
LUZ FARMS v. SECRETARY OF DAR
G.R. No. 86889 December 14, 1990
FACTS: Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation
engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together
with others in the same business allegedly stands to be
adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b),
Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of
R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No.
6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated
by the DAR on January 9, 1989.:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and
poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural
Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as
"private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock,
poultry and swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a
production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of
Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the
just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan
mentioned in Section 13
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the
production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days
of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and
other farmworkers in such lands over and above the
compensation they currently receive xxx
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines
and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also
prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining
order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing
the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and
other livestock and poultry raisers.
ISSUE:
The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of
Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the
said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in
its coverage
RULING: The question raised is one of constitutional
construction. The primary task in constitutional construction
is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution
(J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA
413 [1970]).
Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of
Constitution begins with the language of the document itself.
The words used in the Constitution are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure
Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).
It is generally held that, in construing constitutional
provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the
courts may consider the debates in the constitutional
convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of
the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is
not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary
to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the
understanding of the convention as to what was meant by
the terms of the constitutional provision which was the
subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining
the understanding of the people when they ratified it
(Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]).
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word
"agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of
the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and
poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land"
as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to
any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds,
fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM,
August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).
The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of
the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to
insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of
agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial
lands and residential properties because all of them fall under
the general classification of the word "agricultural". This
proposal, however, was not considered because the
Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited
to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not
include commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record,
CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).
In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a
Supreme Court Justice), posed several questions, among
others, quoted as follows:
x x x
"Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the
primary right of farmers and farmworkers. I wonder if it
means that leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed under
this provision because it speaks of the primary right of
farmers and farmworkers to own directly or collectively the
lands they till. As also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo,
farmworkers include those who work in piggeries and poultry
projects.

I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that

if somebody puts up a piggery or a poultry project and for
that purpose hires farmworkers therein, these farmworkers
will automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or
ultimately or collectively, the land on which the piggeries and
poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM, August
2, 1986, p. 618).

x x x

The questions were answered and explained in the statement

of then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:

x x x

"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami

nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado na
hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang
kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang
inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang
piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM,
August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of

R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted
to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the
definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that
the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be
covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is
simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the
coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21).
CIRILO ROY G. MONTEJO v. COMELEC power. Regarding the first elections after the enactment of the
1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the
reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the
G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995
subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress.

Principle: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered
to make minor adjustments to the reapportionment herein
made
FACTS:
1. The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc
is composed of five (5) legislative districts. Biliran, located in
the third district of Leyte, was made its sub-province by virtue
of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 of the law spelled out
enacted on April 8, 1959.
2. On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect.
Pursuant to its Section 462, the sub-province of Biliran became
a regular province. As a consequence of the conversion, eight
(8) municipalities of the Third District composed the new
province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval. A further consequence
was to reduce the Third District to five (5) municipalities with
a total population of 145,067 as per the 1990 census.
3. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of
inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte,
respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the
incumbent representatives of the province and other
interested parties.
4. On December 29, 1994, it promulgated Resolution No. 2736
where, among others, it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of
Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
The composition of the First District which includes the
municipality of Tolosa and the composition of the Fifth District
were not disturbed.
Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended
to the 1987 constitution as the source of its power of
redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the
power to make laws. Said ordinance states that:
Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered
to make minor adjustments to the reapportionment herein
made.”
Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be created…The
number of Members apportioned to the province out of which
such new province was created or where the city, whose
population has so increases, is geographically located shall be
correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but
such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and
twenty days before the election.
Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations
per district. Examples include error in the correct name of a
particular municipality or when a municipality in between
which is still in the territory of one assigned district is
forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make
minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give
the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to another district.
The power granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust
the number of members (not municipalities.)

5. Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling

the attention of respondent COMELEC, among others, to the
inequitable distribution of inhabitants and voters between the
First and Second Districts with a difference of 22,226
registered voters.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer

municipalities from one legislative district to another
legislative district

HELD: Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set

aside.

The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional

Commission shows that COMELEC was denied the major
power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the
CHINA BANK v. HON. WENCESLAO ORTEGA Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into
cash and depositing the same in a bank.
G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973
Thus, it is apparent that the Court, in the interpretation and
FACTS: This case involves a garnishment of bank deposits in application of laws, can use different aids of construction. Like
relation to a judgment decision. in the case the bar, the Court used an extrinsic aid, in the form
of legislative debates, in arriving at a decision.
Here, Bautista Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development
Corporation and Marino Bautista defaulted in a complaint filed
against them by Vicente Acaban. To satisfy the judgment,
Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B & B
Corporation with China Bank. However, the cashier of China
Bank, Tan Kim Liong, invoked the provisions of RA 1405 that
prohibits the disclosure of any information relative to bank
deposits.

China Bank argued that hat the disclosure of the information

required by the court does not fall within any of the four (4)
exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that if the questioned
orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally
liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible
damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation.

In order for the Court to arrive at a decision in this case, the

Court used the discussion of the conference committee of the
two (2) Houses of Congress in relation to the prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the discussion of the conference

committee can be used as an aid to construction.

RULING: The Court said YES.

The Court held that the lower court did not order an
examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest
Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It
merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or
not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had
a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes
of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold
the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further
order. It will be noted from the discussion of the conference
committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No.
3977, which later became Republic Act 1405, that it was not
the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond
the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment.

And upon review of the Court of the said discussion, the Court
held that it is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of
the conference committee report of the two houses of
Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry
into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude
its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment.
Indeed, there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the
existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely
incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that
it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors
to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the
Changes in phraseology
AURELIO M. UMALI v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 203974 April 22, 2014
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Conversion to a highly-urbanized city is
substantial alteration of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art.
X and resultantly, said provision applies, governs and prevails
over Sec. 453 of the LGC.
FACTS: On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-2011, requesting
the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City
from a component city of the Province of Nueva Ecija into a
highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the
President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of
2012, proclaiming the City of Cabantuan as an HUC subject to
“ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as
provided in Section 453 of the LGC of 1991.” COMELEC then
issued a resolution requiring a plebiscite to convert the city to
a HUC and that only those registered residents of Cabanatuan
City should participate in the said plebiscite. The COMELEC
based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the LGC of 1991.
Thus, petitioner argues that maintaining that the proposed
conversion in question will necessarily and directly affect the
mother province of Nueva Ecija and according to Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution, it calls for the people of the local
government unit directly affected to vote in a plebiscite
whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. The phrase “qualified voters therein” used in
Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the
qualified voters of the units directly affected by the
conversion and not just those in the component city
proposed to be upgraded.
Private respondent Julius Cesar Vergara, City Mayor of
Cabantuan, interposed an opposition on the ground that Sec.
10, Art. X does not apply to conversions, which is the meat of
the matter. HE likewise argues that a specific provision of the
LGC, Sec. 453, as couched allows only the qualified voters of
Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite. Lastly, private
respondent pointed out that when Santiago City was
converted in 1994 from a municipality to an independent
component city pursuant to RA 7720, the plebiscite held was
limited to the registered voters of then municipality of
Santiago.
COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of the private respondent
and orders to schedule to conduct of the plebiscite.
ISSUE: Whether or not the qualified registered voters of the
entire province of Nueva Ecija can participate in the plebiscite
called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a
component city into an HUC
HELD: Yes. The Court ruled that Sec. 453 of the LGC should be
interpreted in accordance with Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution. Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution should
be the basis for determining the qualified voters who will
participate in the plebiscite to resolve the issue.
Sec. 10, Art. X reads:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
And the statement “directly affected” does not include the
City of Cabanatuan but also the entire Nueva Ecija.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish, or substantially
alter boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities or
barangays, which is pertinent in the case at bar, is essentially
legislative in nature. The framers of the 1987 Constitution
have, however, allowed for the delegation of such power in
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution as long as (1) the criteria
prescribed in the LGC is met and (2) the creation, division,
merger, abolition, or the substantial alteration of the
boundaries is subject to the approval by a majority vote in a
plebiscite.
With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite satisfied in
the case at bar, the delegation of the LGUs of the power to
create, divide, merge, abolish, or substantially alter has
become a recognized exception to the doctrine of non-
delegation of legislative powers.
This means that it should be the entire Nueva Ecija that
should be included in the plebiscite as they are also directly
affected when Cabanatuan is converted into an HUC.
LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION, INC. V. V. O.
RAMOS
G.R. No. 127882 December 1, 2004
FACTS: The constitutional provision allowing the President to
enter into FTAA is an exception to the rule that participation in
the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to
Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their
enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9,
1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995,
the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under
Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in
South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North
Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary
Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which
was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40,
adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and
the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared
unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned
corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop
Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII
Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and
exploration company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to
Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while
40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian
company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the
FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed
the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court
of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987,
authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate
proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign
investors for contracts or agreements involving wither
technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals which upon
appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the
President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP
likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would
violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which
provides for the protection of Australian investments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional
for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the
Philippine mineral resources.
2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and
WMCP is a ―service contract that permits fully foreign owned
companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is
unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the
Regalian Doctrine which states that ―All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. The
same section also states that, ―the exploration and
development and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935
and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses,
concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation,
development, or utilization of natural resources. By such
omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public
domain through license, concession or lease is no longer
allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a
direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a
particular natural resource within a given area. The concession
amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the
country‘s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary
rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase
―management or other forms of assistance in the 1973
Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical
and financial assistance. The management and the operation
of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary
feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil the
drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter
into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the
nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos.
Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against
their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid
insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although
the statute employs the phrase ―financial and
technical agreements in accordance with the 1987
Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat
these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial
ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental
law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that
the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just like
the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign
contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining
operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial
ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these
contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title
thereto.
March 30, 1995 by the government with Western Mining
Corporation Inc.
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it
is a service contract and is antithetical to the principle of
sovereignty over our national resources because they allowed
foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources
to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

The same provisions, whether by design or
inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally
ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations
or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and
utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and
connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or
compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are
unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent,
conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned
corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial
assistance to the State for large scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other
mineral oils.
SECOND ISSUE: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service
Contract
Issue: What is the proper interpretation of the phrase
“Agreements involving Either Technical or Financial
Assistance” contained in par. 4, Sec. 2, Article XII of the
Constitution?
Held: The SC upheld the constitutionality of the Law, its
Implementing Rules and Regulations – insofar as they relate
to financial and technical agreements as well as the subject
FTAA. Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day
management by the contractor, provided that the State
retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside,
reverse, or modify plans and actions of the contractor. The
idea of full control is similar to that which is exercised by the
board of directors of a private corporation, the performance
of managerial, operational, financial, marketing, and other
functions may be delegated to subordinate officers or given
to contractual entities, but the board retains full residual
control of the business.

The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government

is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a
service contract.

Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned

corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and
dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced
from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement
provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology,
management, and personnel necessary for the Mining
Operations.

These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the

FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over
natural resources that properly belong to the State and are
intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations
are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the
vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it
aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they
spring must be struck down.

SIMPLIFIED VERSION

Facts: The petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges

the constitutionality of RA No. 7942 (The Philippine Mining
Act of 1995), its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTTA) dated
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION INC v. CLEOFE S. JANIOLA The elements of a prejudicial question are:

G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009

FACTS: This case is a petition for the reversal of the decision
on the suspension of the criminal proceeding filed by the
petitioner in the MTC for the ground that there is a presence
of prejudicial question with respect to the civil case belatedly
filed by the respondent.
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.

The petitioner appealed to RTC but denied Dreamwork,
through its President, and Vice-President, filed a Complaint
Affidavit against Janiola for violation of BP 22 at the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City.
Correspondingly, the former also filed a criminal information
for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the
MTC, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola. On
September 20, 2006, Janiola instituted a civil complaint
against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction
agreement between the parties, as well as for damages.
Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings in the Criminal Case for the ground that private
respondent claim that the civil case posed a prejudicial
question against the criminal case. Petitioner opposed the
Respondent’s Motion to Suspend criminal proceeding based
on juridical question for the following grounds:
(1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the
rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks
were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of
whether private respondent violated BP 22; and
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood
in law as that which must precede the criminal action and
which requires a decision before a final judgment can be
rendered in the criminal action. The civil action must be
instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.
In this case, the Information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case filed by
the State with the RTC. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the
Prosecution of the Criminal Action. Even if the trial court in
the civil case declares that the construction agreement
between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this
would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the
criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private
respondent issued checks that were subsequently dishonored
for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of
prosecution under BP 22. Therefore, it is clear that the
second element required for the existence of a prejudicial
question, is absent. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.

(2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of
the elements of a prejudicial question is that “the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action”;
thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case
having preceded the civil case.

The MTC granted the Respondents Motion to Suspend

Proceedings. Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC but
denied the petition. Hence, this petition raised.

ISSUE: Whether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in its

discretion to suspend proceedings in Criminal Case on the
basis of “Prejudicial Question,“ with respect to the Civil Case
belatedly filed.

HELD: This petition must be granted, pursuant to SEC. 7.

Elements of prejudicial question.
Usage In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute,
unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary written document,
MANILA JOCKEY CLUB V. GAMES AND AMUSEMENT BOARD it is not enough to obtain information to the intention or
DIGEST meaning of the author or authors, but also to see whether
the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as
G.R. No. L-12727 February 29, 1960 to give it legal effect and validity. In short, the purpose of the
inquiry, is not only to know what the author meant by the
language he used, but also to see that the language used
FACTS: The authorized racing days specifically designated and
sufficiently expresses that meaning.
distributed in Section 4 of RA 309 the basic law on horse
The language of Republic Act No. 1502 in authorizing the
racing in the Philippines amended by RA 983 are as follows:
increase, clearly speaks of regular sweepstakes draws and
(1) Philippine Anti-TB Society for 12 Sundays, (2) PCSO - 6
races. If the intention of Congress were to authorize
Sundays (3) White Cross - 4 Sundays (4) Grand Derby Race
additional sweepstakes draws only which could, admittedly,
of PATS - 1 Sunday (5) Private Individuals and entities - 29
be inserted in the club races, the law would not have
Sundays.
included regular races; and since regular sweepstakes races
However, RA 1502 increased the sweepstakes draw and races
were specifically authorized, and it would be confusing,
of the PCSO from 6 to 12 Sundays, but without specifying the
inconvenient, if not impossible to mix these sweepstakes
days on which they are to be run. To accommodate these
races with the regular club races all on the same day (and it
additional races, GAB resolved to reduce the number of
has never been done before), the conclusion seems inevitable
Sundays assigned to private individuals and entities by six.
that the additional sweepstakes draws and races were
Appellants protested that the said increase should be taken
intended to be held on a whole day, separate and apart from
from the 12 Saturdays reserved to the President,
the club races.
for charitable relief OR should be assigned to any day of the
week besides Sunday, Saturday and Legal Holiday.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner has a vested right to the
unreserved Sundays.
(2) Whether or not the additional sweepstakes races must be
inserted in club races as debated in the House of
Representatives in the voting of HB 5732/RA1502.

HELD:
(1) No, the appellant has no vested right to the unreserved
Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except holidays)
because their holding on races for these days are merely
permissive, subject to the licensing and determination
by the GAB. When, therefore, RA 1502 was enacted
increasing by 6 the sweepstakes draw and races but without
specifying the days for holding them, the GAB had no
alternative except to make room for the additional races, as it
did, form among the only available racing days unreserved by
any law - the Sundays on which the private individuals
and entities have been permitted to hold their races, subject
to licensing and determination by GAB.
(2) No. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 1502, as it was
finally enacted, which would indicate that such an
understanding on the part of these two members of the
Lower House of Congress were received the sanction or
conformity of their colleagues, for the law is absolutely
devoid of any such indication.
Contemporaneous Acts of Legislature
DAVID v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127116 April 8, 1997
FACTS: David, in his capacity as barangay chairman and as
president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, filed a
petition to prohibit the holding of the barangay election
scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997. Meanwhile,
Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter also filed a
petition to seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare as
unconstitutional: (1) Section 43 (c) of RA 7160; (2) COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 288 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of
the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities
related thereto; and (3) the budgetary appropriation of 400M
contained in RA 8250 (General Appropriations Act of 1997)
intended to defray the costs and expenses in holding the
1997 barangay elections.
Petitioners contend that under RA 6679, the term of office of
barangay officials is 5 years. Although the LGC reduced the
term of office of all local elective officials to three years, such
reduction does not apply to barangay officials.
As amicus curiae, former Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. urges
the Court to deny the petitions.
ISSUES:
1. Which law governs the term of office of barangay
officials: RA 7160 or RA 6679? (RA 7160 – 3 years)
2. Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only
three years constitutional? (YES)
3. Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other
than that provided under RA 7160? (YES)
RATIO:
Clear Legislative Intent and Design to Limit Term to Three
Years
• RA 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic
that in case of an irreconcilable conflict between two
laws, the later enactment prevails. (Legis posteriores
priores contrarias abrogant.)
• During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994
(second Monday), the voters actually and directly
elected one punong barangay and seven kagawads
(as in the Code).
• In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997,
Congress appropriated the amount of P400 million to
cover expenses for the holding of barangay elections
this year. Likewise, under Sec. 7 of RA 8189, Congress
ordained that a general registration of voters shall be
held “immediately after the barangay elections in
1997.” These are clear and express contemporaneous
statements of Congress that barangay officials shall
be elected this May, in accordance with Sec. 43-c of
RA 7160.
• In Paras vs. Comelec, this Court said that “the next
regular election involving the barangay office
concerned is barely 7 months away, the same having
been scheduled in May, 1997.” This judicial decision
is “part of the legal system of the Philippines (NCC 8).”
• RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically
applies to local government units. It specifically and
definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that “the term of
office of barangay officials shall be for three years.” It
is a special provision that applies only to the term of
barangay officials who were elected on the second
Monday of May 1994. With such particularity, the
provision cannot be deemed a general law.
Three-Year Term Not Repugnant to Constitution
• The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress
from fixing any term of office for barangay officials. It
merely left the determination of such term to the
lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or
prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full
discretion to fix such term in accordance with the
exigencies of public service. It must be remembered
that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. The petitioners have miserably
failed to discharge this burden and to show clearly the
unconstitutionality they aver.
• Constitutional Commission on how long the term of
barangay officials is: “As may be determined by law”;
more precisely, “as provided for in the Local
Autonomy Code (Sec 43-c limits their term to 3
years).”
Petitioners Estopped From Challenging Their Three-Year
Terms
• Barangay officials are estopped from asking for any
term other than that which they ran for and were
elected to, under the law governing their very claim
to such offices: namely, the LGC. Petitioners’ belated
claim of ignorance as to what law governed their
election to office in 1994 is unacceptable because
under NCC 3, “ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith.”
DAVID V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127116 April 8, 1997
Sec. 8 Art. X of the Constitution: The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law. (term of office of barangay officials)
FACTS: This case involves the consolidation of 2 petitions that
tackle the common question of how long the term of office of
barangay chairmen and other barangay officials who were
elected to their respective office on the second of May 1994.
7160 is a general law since the particular provision on the
term of office of barangay officials is a specific provision
which supersedes the provision in RA 6653.
2. No, The Court held that RA 7160 sec 43(c) is not
unconstitutional. Since under Sec 8 Art X of the Constitution
the term of office of barangay officials shall be as determined
by law. There is nothing in the Constitution or in the record of
the constitutional commission which would support the view
that the term of office of barangay officials could not be for 3
years.

Petitioner in his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay

77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as president of the Liga ng mga
Barangay sa Pilipinas filed before this Court on December 2,
1996 a petition for prohibition , under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, to prohibit the holding of the barangay election
scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997. On January
29, 1997, the Solicitor General filed his four-page Comment
siding with petitioner and praying that "the election
scheduled on May 12, 1997 be held in abeyance."

Respondent Commission on Elections filed a separate

Comment, dated February 1, 1997 opposing the petition. On
February 11, 1997, the Court issued a Resolution giving due
course to the petition and requiring the parties to file
simultaneous memoranda within a non-extendible period of
twenty days from notice. It also requested former Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. 1 to act as amicus curiae and to file a
memorandum also within a non-extendible period of twenty
days. It noted but did not grant petitioner's Urgent Motion
for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated January 31, 1997.

Accordingly, the parties filed their respective memoranda. In

a separate case filed before this court Petitioner Liga ng mga
Barangay Quezon City Chapter represented by its president
Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No.
128039, "to seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare as
unconstitutional: Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which prescribed
the term of barangay officials to be for 3 years which shall
begin on the regular election to be held on the second
Monday of May 1994. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and
2887 fixing the date of the holding of the barangay elections
on May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto;

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the term of office of barangay officials shall

be for 3 years as prescribed by RA 7160

2. Whether or not RA 7160 sec 43(c) is unconstitutional

HELD:

1. Yes, The Court held that term of office of barangay officials

shall be for 3 years as prescribed by RA 7160. Since RA 7160 is
a newer law than RA 6653, notwithstanding the fact that RA
Executive Construction
ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC. V. COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS
G.R. L-19337 September 30, 1969
FACTS: Asturias Sugar Central Inc. produces and mills
centrifugal sugar, the sugar they produce are placed in
containers known as jute bags. In 1957, they made 2
importations of jute bags, free of customs duties and special
import tax upon the petitioner's filing of Re-exportation and
Special Import Tax Bond no. 1 in the amounts of P25,088 and
P2,464.50, conditioned upon the exportation of the jute bags
within one year from the date of importation.
In the first shipment, only 8, 647 out of 44,800 imported jute
bags were exported; only 25,000 out of 75,200 imported jute
bags were exported for the second shipment. So, out of all the
imported jute bags, only 33,647 bags were exported within the
one-year period, the remaining 86,353 bags were exported
after the one-year period but within three years from their
importation.
On February 6, 1958 the petitioner requested the
Commissioner of Customs for a week’s extension of Re-
exportation and Special Import Tax Bond no. 6 which was
expiring the next day. Mentioning reasons for the failure to
export the remaining jute bags within one year. However, the
request was denied by the Commissioner.
Due to petitioner’s failure to show proof of the exportation of
the balance of 86,353 jute bags within one year from their
importation; The Petitioner is now required to pay p28,629.42
representing the customs duties and special import tax due
thereon, which amount the petitioner paid under protest and
soon demanded the refund a refund of the amount they paid.
ISSUES:
a.) Whether or not the Commissioner of Customs is vested with
discretion to extend the period of one year provided for in
section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909.
b.) Whether or not interpretation or construction of an
ambiguous or uncertain statute by the Executive Department
or other Administrative Agencies be given consideration? In
the case at bar, the Bureau of Customs.
RULING:
a. Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and
the prevailing sec. 105(x) of the tariff and customs
code, while fixing at one year the period within
which the containers therein mentioned must be
exported, are silent as to whether the period may be
extended. Because of this, the Bureau of Customs
Issued Administrative Orders 389 and 66 to
eliminate confusion and provide a guide on how to
apply the law, and to make officially knows its policy
to consider the one-year period as non-extendible
b. Considering that the statutory provision in question
(Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff act of 1909 and
Sec 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code) have not
been the subject of previous judicial interpretation,
then the application of the doctrine of “judicial
respect for administrative construction,” would,
initially be in order.
Only when the court of last resort had not previously
interpreted the stature is the rule applicable that courts will
give consideration to construction by administrative or
executive departments of the state.
The formal or informal interpretation or practical
construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute or law by
the executive department or other agency charged with its
administration or enforcement is entitled to consideration
and the highest respect from the courts, and must be
accorded appropriate weight in determining the meaning of
the law, especially when the construction or interpretation is
long continued and uniform or is contemporaneous with the
first workings of the statute, or when the enactment of the
statute was suggested by such agency.
Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged
with implementing and enforcing the provisions of our Tariff
and Customs Code, the construction placed by it thereon
should be given controlling weight.
In applying the doctrine or principle of respect for
administrative or practical construction, the courts often
refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases of
the principle, as factors leading the courts to give the
principle controlling weight in particular instances, or as
independent rules in themselves. These factors are the
respect due the governmental agencies charged with
administration, their competence, expertness, experience,
and informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are
the drafters of the law they interpret; that the agency is the
one on which the legislature must rely to advise it as to the
practical working out of the statute, and practical application
of the statute presents the agency with unique opportunity
and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies, or
improvements in the statute.
THE CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION vs. permanent statute which would have the most beneficial
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as the Incumbent effect that its language permits.
Secretary of Labor, and THE CHARTERED BANK
The Secretary (Minister) of Labor had exceeded his statutory
G.R. L-44717 August 28, 1985 authority granted by Article 5 of the Labor Code authorizing
him to promulgate the necessary implementing rules and
FACTS: On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees
regulations.
Association instituted a complaint with the Department of
Labor against private respondent Chartered Bank, for the Any slight doubts, however, must be resolved in favor of the
payment of ten (10) unworked legal holidays, as well as for workers.
premium and overtime differentials for worked legal holidays
This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate of
from November 1, 1974.
promoting social justice and affording protection to labor
Both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations (Sections 6 and 9, Article II, Constitution).
Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of the petitioners ordering
the respondent bank to pay its monthly paid employees,
holiday pay for the ten (10) legal holidays effective November
1, 1974 and to pay premium or overtime pay differentials to
all employees who rendered work during said legal holidays.

On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the

NLRC and dismissed the petitioner's claim for lack of merit
basing its decision on Section 2, Rule IV, Book Ill of the
Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor erred and acted

contrary to law in promulgating Sec 2, Rule IV, Book III of the
Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9

HELD: It maintains that while it is true that the respondent

Minister has the authority in the performance of his duty to
promulgate rules and regulations to implement, construe and
clarify the Labor Code, such power is limited by provisions of
the statute sought to be implemented, construed or clarified.

The decision in Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees'

Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong (132 SCRA 663) resolved a similar
issue.

It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that

when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the
law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at
bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to
the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit it provides
for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefit.

In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went

as far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally
intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly
states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday
pay.

This is flagrant violation of the mandatory directive of Article

4 of the Labor Code, which states that 'All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this
Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall
be resolved in favor of labor.' Moreover, it shall always be
presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid and
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 86738 November 13, 1991
FACTS: Sometime in February 1983, the authorized capital
stock of petitioner Nestle Philippines Inc. ("Nestle") was
increased from P300 million divided into 3 million shares with
a par value of P100.00 per share, to P600 million divided into
6 million shares with a par value of P100.00 per share. Nestle
underwent the necessary procedures involving Board and
stockholders approvals and effected the necessary filings to
secure the approval of the increase of authorized capital
stock by respondent Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"), which approval was in fact granted.
Nestle has only two (2) principal stockholders: San Miguel
Corporation and Nestle S.A.
On 16 December 1983, the Board of Directors and
stockholders of Nestle approved resolutions authorizing the
issuance of 344,500 shares out of the previously authorized
but unissued capital stock of Nestle, exclusively to San Miguel
Corporation and to Nestle S.A. San Miguel Corporation
subscribed to and completely paid up 168,800 shares, while
Nestle S.A. subscribed to and paid up the balance of 175,700
shares of stock.
stock to inform such public of the true financial conditions
and prospects of the corporation.
When capital stock is issued in the course of and in
compliance with the requirements of increasing its authorized
capital stock under Section 38 of the Corporation Code, the
SEC as a matter of course examines the financial condition of
the corporation, and hence there is no real need for exercise
of SEC authority under the Revised Securities Act.
In contrast, under the ruling issued by the SEC, an issuance of
previously authorized but still unissued capital stock may, in a
particular instance, be held to be an exempt transaction by
the SEC under Section 6(b) so long as the SEC finds that the
requirements of registration under the Revised Securities Act
are "not necessary in the public interest and for the
protection of the investors" by reason, inter alia, of the small
amount of stock that is proposed to be issued or because the
potential buyers are very limited in number and are in a
position to protect themselves.
The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a
statute by the executive officers of the government, whose
duty is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should
ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the
courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisdiction that no
authorities need be cited to support it.

On 28 March 1985, petitioner Nestle filed a letter signed by

its Corporate Secretary, M.L. Antonio, with the SEC seeking
exemption of its proposed issuance of additional shares to its
existing principal shareholders, from the registration
requirement of Section 4 of the Revised Securities Act and
from payment of the fee referred to in Section 6(c) of the
same Act.

The Commission then advised petitioner to file the

appropriate request for exemption and to pay the fee
required under Section 6 (c) of the statute, which provides:

(c) A fee equivalent to one-tenth of one per centum of the

maximum aggregate price or issued value of the securities
shall be collected by the Commission for granting a general or
particular exemption from the registration requirements of
this Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not that there is a need to file a petition

for exemption under Section 6(b) of the Revised Securities
Act with respect to the issuance of the said 344,600
additional shares to their existing stockholders out of their
unissued capital stock?

RULING: Yes. The reading by the SEC of the scope of

application of Section 6(a) (4) permits greater opportunity for
the SEC to implement the statutory objective of protecting
the investing public by requiring proposed issuers of capital
Alternative Center for Organizational Reforms and
Development, (ACORD) Inc. v. ZAMORA
G.R. No. 144256 June 8, 2005
FACTS: Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating
the Pres to submit to Congress a budget of expenditures
within 30 days before the opening of every regular session,
submitted the National Expenditures program for FY 2000.
The President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This
became RA 8760, “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-
ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” also
known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year
2000. It provides under the heading “ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS” that the IRA for local government units
shall amount to P111,778,000,000”.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading
“UNPROGRAMMED FUND,” it is provided that an amount of
P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the
P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund
the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the
original revenue targets submitted by the President to
Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to
be conducted by certain committees which the GAA specifies,
namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee,
the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as
Programmed Fund, it appropriates a separate amount of P10
Billion of IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund,
the latter amount to be released only upon the occurrence of
the condition stated in the GAA.
On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3
barangay officials filed with this Court the petition at bar, for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for
Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents then
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno,
then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the
Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of
provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A), and
LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of
the GAA (the GAA provisions) Petitioners contend that the
said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully
reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its
release by placing the same under “Unprogrammed funds”.
Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this
Court shall nonetheless proceed to resolve the issues raised
in the present case, it being impressed with public interest.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated the constitutional
mandate of automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its
release contingent on whether revenue collections could
meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the
President, rather than making the release automatic.
ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy
by not automatically releasing the whole amount of the
allotted IRA.
HELD: Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional
mandate when it made the release of IRA contingent on
whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets
originally submitted by the President, rather than making the
release automatic. Respondents counterargue that the above
constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but
to the executive, hence, the same does not prevent the
legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the
IRA.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional
provision merely prevents the executive branch of the
government from “unilaterally” withholding the IRA, but not
the legislature from authorizing the executive branch to
withhold the same. In the words of respondents, “This
essentially means that the President or any member of the
Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the
backing of statute, withhold the release of the IRA.”
As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to
automatically release the just share of local governments in
the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass
laws that might prevent the executive from performing this
duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard
constitutional provisions which define its duties, provided it
has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the
Constitution amendable by statute – a proposition which is
patently absurd. If indeed the framers intended to allow the
enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional
instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the
Constitution would have been worded differently.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the
just share of local governments is qualified by the words “as
determined by law,” and not the release thereof, the plain
implication is that Congress is not authorized by the
Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the
IRA.
In another case, the Court held that the only possible
exception to mandatory automatic release of the IRA is, as
held in Batangas: …if the national internal revenue collections
for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the
collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case
what should be automatically released shall be a
proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal
year. The adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis
depending on the actual collections of national internal
revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year.

This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions

by Congress was motivated by the laudable intent to “lower
the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal management.”
The pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must be echoed:
“[T]he rule of law requires that even the best intentions must
be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and
the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by
legal methods.”

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special

Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared
unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA,
in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED
FUND.
DE LOS SANTOS v. MALLARE & TORRES There are three specified classes of positions — policy-
determining, primarily confidential and highly technical — are
G.R. No. L-3881 August 31, 1950
excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of
Principle: Contemporaneous construction officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the
Constitution. None of these exceptions obtain in the present
FACTS: Eduardo de los Santos (petitioner) was appointed City case.
Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by the President. This
appointment was confirmed by the Commission on In this case, The Office of City Engineer is neither — policy-
Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he determining, primarily confidential nor highly technical. It is
qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of merely administrative in nature. Hence, the petitioner is
the position. entitled to remain in his office, and Mallare’s appointment be
ineffective.
On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim
appointment by the President to the same position, after
which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of
Public Works and Communications directed Santos to report
to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos
refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the
other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him
and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he
commenced these proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not the removal of the petitioner from his

present position for assignment to another position violates
Section 4, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides
that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."

RULING: Yes. Section 1, Article XI of the 1935 Constitution

provides that “A Civil Service embracing all branches and
subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law.
Appointments in the Civil Service, except as those which are
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in
nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to
be determined as far as practicable by competitive
examination."

Furthermore, as a contemporaneous construction, this act

affords an index to the meaning of Civil Service as conceived
by the framers of the Constitution. "The principle of
contemporaneous construction may be applied to the
construction given by the legislature to the constitutional
provisions dealing with legislative powers and procedure.
Though not conclusive, such interpretation is generally
conceded as being entitled to great weight.” Section 670 of the
Revised Administrative Code states that "Persons in the
Philippine civil service pertain either to the classified service,"
and went on to say that "The classified service embraces all not
expressly declared to be in the unclassified service." The rules
of construction inform us that the words used in the
constitution are to be given the sense they have in common
use. Thus, we must look to the history of the times, examine
the state of things existing when the Constitution was framed
and adopted.