Pollo vs.

Chairperson Constantino-David

DOCTRINE: Scope

The right to privacy has been accorded in this jurisdiction however, the constitutional guarantee is not a
prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of "unreasonable" searches and seizures.

Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons to the case at bar, we now address
the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and
computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard
drive on petitioner’s computer reasonable in its inception and scope?

In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include "(1) the employee’s relationship to
the item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was seized; and
(3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item." These factors are relevant to
both the subjective and objective prongs of the reasonableness inquiry, and we consider the two questions
together. Thus, where the employee used a password on his computer, did not share his office with co-
workers and kept the same locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy and any search of that space and
items located therein must comply with the Fourth Amendment.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-
Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the "Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na"
program of the CSC.

On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC
Chairperson Karina Constantino-David which was marked "Confidential" and sent through a courier service
(LBC) from a certain "Alan San Pascual" of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated
Records Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. The aforesaid letter was given directly to the
addressee, Chairperson David. The letter alleged that an officer of the CSC has been lawyering for public
officials with pending cases in the CSC.

…”I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your attorny in the region 4 office. He is the chief
of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division. He have been helping many who have pending cases in
the Csc. The justice in our govt system will not be served if this will continue. Please investigate this anomaly
because our perception of your clean and good office is being tainted.”

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information technology
(IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically "to back up all the files in
the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions. The team proceeded at once to the
CSC-ROIV and backed up all files in the hard disk of computer the PALD and legal services division. The backing-
up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by
several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said activity. 

On the same day, the investigating team finished their task. They were able to find that most of the files copied
from the computer assigned and used by the petitioner contained draft pleadings or letters in connection with
administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. Chairperson David then issued a Show cause Order
requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within 5 days from notice.

Petitioner reiterated that he never aided any people with pending cases at the CSC and alleged that those files
found in his computer were prepared not by him but by certain persons whom he permitted, at one time or
another, to make use of his computer out of close association or friendship. 
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint
which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he "lawyering" for people with cases
in the CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a "fishing expedition" when they unlawfully copied and
printed personal files in his computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his
right against self-incrimination. He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done
while he was on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo that the
files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and
that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his
constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He
pointed out that though government property, the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued
under a Memorandum of Receipt (MR) is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership,
including its use for personal purposes. As to the anonymous letter, petitioner argued that it is not actionable
as it failed to comply with the requirements of a formal complaint under the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (URACC). In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer
without his consent is thus inadmissible as evidence, being "fruits of a poisonous tree."

ISSUES: Whether or not the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files
without his knowledge and consent is a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy. (Sec 2 Art III 1987
Constitution)

RULING:

The right to privacy has been accorded in this jurisdiction however, the constitutional guarantee is not a
prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of "unreasonable" searches and seizures.

Jurisprudence teaches us that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold
requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). The correct
analysis has two steps: first, because "some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the
public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable", a court must consider "the operational realities of the
workplace" in order to determine whether an employee’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated; and
next, where an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an employer’s intrusion on that expectation
"for non investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct,
should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances.

In the case at bar, Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in
his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he
had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and
not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means
to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. The CSC also implemented a policy which
implies on the spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such
legitimate business purposes. The searched conducted was reasonable since it was conducted in connection
with investigation of work-related misconduct. A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is
justified when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is
guilty of work related misconduct.

In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an employee’s
office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business
and would be unduly burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon supervisors, the
imposition of a warrant requirement would conflict with the "common-sense realization that government
offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.

Thus, The Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on computer assigned to Pollo was not,
in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the managerial prerogative of the
Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency by going after the
work-related misfeasance of its employees. Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned search
are deemed admissible and his other argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence
under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded
to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the
aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention that O’Connor and Simons are not relevant
because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the
search of petitioner’s computer was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored
therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as
government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls
under the exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative searches defined in O’Connor.

People vs. Dichoso

DOCTRINE: General search warrants

The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are
subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which
are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may
thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

 In Stonehill vs. Diokno, which condemned general warrants and barred the admission of any evidence
obtained by virtue thereof, that the articles seized from the nipa house could not be used as evidence
against him and be made the basis of his conviction.

While it is for "Violation of RA 6425 known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992 as amended," the body
thereof, which is controlling, particularizes the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and
specifies the offense involved; illegal possession of marijuana and shabu and paraphernalia in connection
therewith. These are evident from the clause, "are illegally in possession of undetermined quantity/amount
of dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of paraphernalias stored
inside the nipa hut within the compound of their residence at Farconville Sub., Phase II, San Pablo City."

FACTS:

Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag together with his wife was accuesed of keeping, selling and using an undetermined
quantity of shabu and marijuana, a violation of Section 15, Article III and Section 4, Article II, respectively, of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425).

In addition, Accused Jaime Pagtakhan was charged with illegally possessing a regulated drug (shabu) and, thus,
violating Section 16, Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, in an information which was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 6710-SP (91) in the court a quo.

Accused Sonia Dichoso y Vinerable (wife of Redentor) could not be arrested because, in the words of the trial
court, she "cannot be located." 4 The records do not show that the trial court took further steps to have her
arrested. The 3 cases were consolidated for a joint trial.

Appellant contends that Search Warrant No. 028, obtained and executed by the NARCOM agents, is a general
warrant because it was issued for "Violation of RA 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as
amended" and did not specify the particular offense which he violated under the said law, contrary to the
requirements prescribed by the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that it was issued in violation of
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense." It was, he asserts, issued for three (3) possible offenses, viz.: (a) illegal possession of
marijuana dried leaves, (b) illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and (c) illegal possession of
opium pipe and other paraphernalia for prohibited drug. He then argues, following this Court's ruling
in Stonehill vs. Diokno  which condemned general warrants and barred the admission of any evidence obtained
by virtue thereof, that the articles seized from the nipa house could not be used as evidence against him and
be made the basis of his conviction.

Appellant further claims that he was framed by the police officers. He states that a certain Jun planted the
deck of shabu found on the table where he and his companions were gathered around he further contends
that (1) Exhibit "B" (a "Pagpapatunay" attesting to the result of the search conducted by the NARCOM team
and listing the items confiscated), (2) Exhibit "C" (a "Pagpapatunay" attesting to the lawful manner of the
search), and (3) Exhibit "D" (the Receipt for Property Seized) are inadmissible in evidence since he signed them
while under police custody without having been accorded his Constitutional rights to remain silent and to
counsel. These exhibits, he argues, constitute uncounselled extrajudicial confessions.

ISSUES:

1.Whether or not the evidence obtained is inadmissible and the search warrant against them is valid
RULING:

No,  the search warrant cannot be assailed as a general search warrant.

 In Stonehill vs. Diokno, which condemned general warrants and barred the admission of any evidence
obtained by virtue thereof, that the articles seized from the nipa house could not be used as evidence
against him and be made the basis of his conviction.

While it is for "Violation of RA 6425 known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992 as amended," the body
thereof, which is controlling, particularizes the place to be searched and the things to be seized, and
specifies the offense involved; illegal possession of marijuana and shabu and paraphernalia in connection
therewith. These are evident from the clause, "are illegally in possession of undetermined quantity/amount
of dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of paraphernalias stored
inside the nipa hut within the compound of their residence at Farconville Sub., Phase II, San Pablo City."

Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than one (1) offense, hence, in
violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by
suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search
warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been
three (3) separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of
marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into
"prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are closely
related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly
issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

In Harris, the Federal Supreme Court of the United States of America ruled that it has long been settled that
objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.

It is contended by the appellant that the brown notebook containing the entries of names and figures, should
not have been admitted in evidence because it was not one of those specifically mentioned in the warrant,
hence, its seizure was unjustified. This so-called warrant rule — that only those listed in the search warrant
may be seized — which the appellant claims to have been enunciated in 1920 in Uy Khetin vs. Villareal.  and
which he now summons to his rescue, is not without exceptions. Among such exceptions is the plain view
doctrine enunciated in Harris vs. United States  and Coolidge vs. New Hampshirewhich has been adopted in
our jurisdiction.

The view of the appellant that the search was illegal and the articles seized thereby cannot be used against him
in evidence since he does not own the nipa house searched or the lot wherein it was built, is unmeritorious. It
is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the
search warrant is issued; it is sufficient that the property is under his control or possession.  It was established,
even by the defense's own evidence, that the appellant and his spouse have been using the said nipa house.
He admitted that the nipa house is actually part of and adjacent to the big or main house in the Dichoso
residential compound, and that he and his family have been using the nipa house as a resting place even
before the search. 

Any doubt as to the appellant's control over the nipa house where the seized articles were recovered is wiped
out by the testimony of the defense's own witness, Francisco Calabia, who affirmed that the appellant and his
wife Sonia Dichoso actually reside therein while Redentor's parents and brother reside in the big house.
 Prof. David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo

DOCTRINE: Steps in the conduct of search and seizure

All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid formula are necessary. Superior
strength – the use of force – cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in
safeguarding the constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their liberty.

Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant. He said: " In cases involving
liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and in favor of the poor, the
oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak." Laws and actions that restrict fundamental
rights come to the courts "with a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity.

Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any
other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the
absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property
is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be
served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
FACTS:

ON February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article
7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may
call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-
Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion
and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.

During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion,
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.

At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune perceived
as Anti-Arroyo. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of
the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and
business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police District were stationed outside the
building.

ISSUES:

1.  Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2.   Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

RULING:

The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable,  and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized."142 The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests
are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the
fundamental protection given by this provision is that between person and police must stand the protective
authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;

In the Brief Accountsubmitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he was arrested without
warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought at Camp
Karingal, Quezon City where he was fingerprinted, photographed and booked like a criminal suspect;  fourth,he
was treated brusquely by policemen who "held his head and tried to push him" inside an unmarked
car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang No. 880 and Inciting to Sedition;  sixth, he
was detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh,he was eventually released for insufficiency of evidence.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner David’s
warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that
the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
invective “Oust Gloria Now” and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the
rally. Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it,
such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.

2. The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct
of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a
house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of
his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in
the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a
direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the
CIDG operatives.

While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We
Forum" newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their
enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the
vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain
censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak
only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment
should he be so rash as to disobey. Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary
intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a
constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is
essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should always
be obsta principiis.
 Veridiano vs. People

DOCTRINE: Warrantless arrest and search and seizure warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest
People v. Cogaed clarified that there are exceptional circumstances "when searches are reasonable even when
warrantless." The following are recognized instances of permissible warrantless searches laid down in
jurisprudence: (1) a "warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest," (2) search of "evidence in 'plain view,'"
(3) "search of a moving vehicle," (4) "consented warrantless search[es]," (5) "customs search," (6) "stop and
frisk," and (7) "exigent and emergency circumstances." There is no hard and fast rule in determining when a
search and seizure is reasonable. In any given situation, "[w]hat constitutes a reasonable search is purely a
judicial question," the resolution of which depends upon the unique and distinct factual circumstances. This
may involve an inquiry into "the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause,
the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this warrantless
arrest requires compliance with the overt act tests as explained in Cogaed; For a warrantless arrest of in
flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." Failure to
comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm.

FACTS:

Mario Veridiano y Sapi (Veridiano) assails the Decisiondated November 18, 2011 and Resolution ated January
25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33588, which affirmed his conviction for violation of Article
II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165.

Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

On January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain PO3 Esteves informing him that Veridiano, was on the
way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs

Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay,
Nagcarlan, Laguna.The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano and around 10:00 a.m.,
they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna.

The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana. PO1
Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his
constitutional rights. He was then brought to the police station. PO1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to
PO1 Solano, who also placed his initials. PO1 Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he
personally brought with the seized tea bag to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory. The contents of
the tea bag tested positive for marijuana

For his defense, Veridiano testified Two (2) armed men boarded the jeepney and frisked Veridiano. However,
they found nothing on his person. Still, Veridiano was accosted and brought to the police station where he was
informed that "illegal drug was found in his possession Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court
asserting that "he was illegally arrested." He argued that the tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in
evidence [for] being the 'fruit of a poisonous tree.'" On the other hand, the prosecution asserted that by
entering his plea, Veridiano waived his right to question any irregularity in his arrest. the prosecution argued
that Veridiano's "submissive deportment at the time of the search" indicated that he consented to the
warrantless search.

ISSUES:

1. whether or not there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner

RULING:

1. The Constitutional guarantee does not prohibit all forms of searches and seizures. It is only directed
against those that are unreasonable. Conversely, reasonable searches and seizures fall outside the
scope of the prohibition and are not forbidden.

There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this warrantless
arrest requires compliance with the overt act tests as explained in Cogaed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibra

For a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer." Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest
constitutionally infirm. In Cogaed, the warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest
because the accused did not exhibit an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in
possession of illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended.

In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section
5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger
who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In
effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information
alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested
indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed. The
warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner
had just committed an offense. A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must
have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just
committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule
113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Furthermore, In Cogaed, the police officers received information that a certain Marvin Buya would be
transporting marijuana. A passenger jeepney passed through the checkpoint set up by the police officers.
The driver then disembarked and signaled that two (2) male passengers were carrying marijuana. The police
officers approached the two (2) men, who were later identified as Victor Cogaed (Cogaed) and Santiago
Dayao, and inquired about the contents of their bags.

Upon further investigation, the police officers discovered three (3) bricks of marijuana in Cogaed's bag. In
holding that the "stop and frisk" search was invalid, this Court reasoned that "[t]here was not a single
suspicious circumstance" that gave the police officers genuine reason to stop the two (2) men and search
their belongings. Cogaed did not exhibit any overt act indicating that he was in possession of marijuana.

Similar to Cogaed, petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that
would give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. Reasonable
persons will act in a nervous manner in any check point. There was no evidence to show that the police had
basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious.
 Caballes vs. CA

DOCTRINE: Warrantless arrest and search and seizure (search of moving vehicle, plain view doctrine and
consented search)
Search of moving vehicle

Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. The
search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply
looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car’s doors; (4) where the occupants are
not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual
search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

Plain view doctrine

Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight.
Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore
cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain
view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from
its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

Consented search

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person
had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 

In People v. Barros, appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton box, boarded a bus where two policemen
were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and found marijuana inside. When asked who owned the
box, appellant denied ownership of the box and failed to object to the search. The Court there struck down
the warrantless search as illegal and held that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful
search conducted simply because he failed to object, citing the ruling in the case of People v. Burgos,
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not
place the citizens in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent
or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law."cralaw

FACTS:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals dated September 15, 1998
which affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, finding herein
petitioner, Rudy Caballes y Taiño, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft, and the resolution 2
dated November 9, 1998 which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.chanrob1e

Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in a Barangay in Laguna, spotted a
passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled
goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. With appellant's alleged consent, the police officers
checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National
Power Corporation (NPC). Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to
the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires
which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant was incarcerated
for 7 days in the Municipal jail. In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. Thus, the court a quo
rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction.

Petitioner contends that the flagging down of his vehicle by police officers who were on routine patrol, merely
on "suspicion" that "it might contain smuggled goods," does not constitute probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure. He insists that, contrary to the findings of the trial court as adopted by the
appellate court, he did not give any consent, express or implied, to the search of the vehicle. Perforce, any
evidence obtained in violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure shall be deemed
inadmissible for they violates Section 2, Article III.

ISSUES: Whether or not the warrantless search was valid

RULING:

Search of moving vehicle

The rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving
vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could
be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing
judge — a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought. Searches without warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of
smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or ‘constructive borders’ like
checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.

The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of
probable cause. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless
search, which must still be present in such a case.

Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. The
search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply
looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car’s doors; 26 (4) where the occupants
are not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual
search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.

None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers did not merely conduct
a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner’s vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the
kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered
a simple routine check.

Plain view doctrine

Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight.
Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore
cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain
view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from
its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
It is clear from the records of this case that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were
placed in sacks 39 and covered with leaves. The articles were neither transparent nor immediately apparent to
the police authorities. They had no clue as to what was hidden underneath the leaves and branches. As a
matter of fact, they had to ask petitioner what was loaded in his vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that
the object is not in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search.

Consented search

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person
had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 

In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of
petitioner for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When petitioner’s vehicle was flagged
down, Sgt. Noceja approached petitioner and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he
answered in the positive." We are hard put to believe that by uttering those words, the police officers were
asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of petitioner. For all intents and
purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon herein petitioner that they will search his vehicle.

The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
constitutional guaranty. In addition, in cases where this Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be
noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be
searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. In the case of herein
petitioner, the statements of the police officers were not asking for his consent; they were declaring to him
that they will look inside his vehicle. Besides, it is doubtful whether permission was actually requested and
granted because when Sgt. Noceja was asked during his direct examination what he did when the vehicle of
petitioner stopped, he answered that he removed the cover of the vehicle and saw the aluminum wires. It was
only after he was asked a clarificatory question that he added that he told petitioner he will inspect the
vehicle. To our mind, this was more of an afterthought. Likewise, when Pat. de Castro was asked twice in his
direct examination what they did when they stopped the jeepney, his consistent answer was that they
searched the vehicle. He never testified that he asked petitioner for permission to conduct the search.

Neither can petitioner’s passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless
search. In People v. Barros, appellant Barros, who was carrying a carton box, boarded a bus where two
policemen were riding. The policemen inspected the carton and found marijuana inside. When asked who
owned the box, appellant denied ownership of the box and failed to object to the search. The Court there
struck down the warrantless search as illegal and held that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived
the unlawful search conducted simply because he failed to object, citing the ruling in the case of People v.
Burgos,
"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not
place the citizens in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent
or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain
petitioner’s conviction. His guilt can only be established without violating the constitutional right of the
accused against unreasonable search and seizure.