INDIA AND DISARMAMENT

THANKAM KRISHNAN

A3211117327

B.A.L.L.B. (H)

6TH Semester

Amity Law School, Noida

Amity University

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 CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the project work entitled “INDIA AND DISARMAMENT” has been
successfully completed, and is up to the standard both in respect of contents and language for
being referred to the examiner by Ms. Thankam Krishnan from BA LLB(H), semester 6 section
E under the guidance and supervision of Mr Afroz Khan or the requirement of BA LLB(H)
degree of Amity University, Noida(U.P).

Supervisor

(Mr Afroz Khan)

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INTRODUCTION

A decade after the end of the Cold War, we are witnessing a renewed surge in worldwide defense
spending, and the specter of nuclear catastrophe has again become headline news. Optimistic
notions of eliminating bloated military expenditures and nightmarish weapon systems that
accompanied the fall of the Soviet Union have given way to cynicism, doubt, and a reemphasis
on military prowess. However, alarm that has risen with the prospect of widespread development
of weapons of mass destruction (generally encompassing nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons) has led to many renewed calls for eliminating such armaments. Moreover, a realization
that the overwhelming majority of the tens of millions of casualties from post-World War II
conflicts have resulted not from advanced weaponry but from common and widely prevalent
weapons, such as landmines and guns, has also heightened efforts toward disarmament of
conventional weapons.

Disarmament is the act of reducing, limiting, or abolishing weapons. Disarmament generally

refers to a country's military or specific type of weaponry. Disarmament is often taken to mean
total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear arms. General and Complete
Disarmament was defined by the United Nations General Assembly as the elimination of all
WMD, coupled with the “balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments,
based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or
enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect
their security.

In March of 1946, less than a year after the first detonation of an atomic weapon, a group of U.S.
officials met at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C., to develop the first nuclear arms control
proposal, calling for comprehensive nuclear disarmament. This plan was introduced on June 14,
1946, at the inaugural session of the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission by U.S. Ambassador
Barnard Baruch. He proposed a complete transfer of all atomic weapons, facilities and know-
how to international oversight. The proposal was viewed with skepticism by the Soviet Union
and denounced as an attempt by the United States to maintain nuclear superiority. These fears
were reinforced when the U.S. Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act to establish the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission as sole manager of all nuclear materials and facilities in the United
States, and to prohibit all interstate exchanges of atomic information.

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It was not only disagreement between the Soviet Union and the United States that cut short this
attempt at nuclear disarmament. Britain and France were also unwilling to support the plan in
light of their own nuclear ambitions. As the East-West confrontation of the Cold War became
increasingly rigid, subsequent efforts toward disarmament were hardly given consideration. The
world missed an opportunity to avoid a costly and potentially devastating nuclear competition,
pointing to an intractable problem of distrust in the international system -- the security dilemma
-- that presents significant obstacles to disarming. By the end of the Cold War, there were over
50,000 nuclear warheads able to make the world uninhabitable many times over, keeping
tensions high and global security uncertain for nearly 50 years. Today, much of these arsenals
remain intact.

A decade after the end of the Cold War, we are witnessing a renewed surge in worldwide defense
spending, and the specter of nuclear catastrophe has again become headline news. Optimistic
notions of eliminating bloated military expenditures and nightmarish weapon systems that
accompanied the fall of the Soviet Union have given way to cynicism, doubt, and a reemphasis
on military prowess. However, alarm that has risen with the prospect of widespread development
of weapons of mass destruction (generally encompassing nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons) has led to many renewed calls for eliminating such armaments. Moreover, a realization
that the overwhelming majority of the tens of millions of casualties from post-World War II
conflicts have resulted not from advanced weaponry but from common and widely prevalent
weapons, such as landmines and guns, has also heightened efforts toward disarmament of
conventional weapons.

EXPLAINATION

In general, disarmament is the reduction in size or destructive capability of an actor's capacity for
violence. Despite pessimism that generally befalls discussions about disarmament (e.g., labeling
such proposals as unrealistic and euphoric), there is reason to believe that disarmament is a
viable tool for reducing the likelihood and dangers of conflict. Even during the Cold War,
President Nixon unilaterally declared that the United States would disassemble its biological
weapons program, encouraging others to join the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention and
helping pave the way for detente between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. More recently, as the Soviet
Union collapsed, the United States dramatically and unilaterally withdrew its tactical nuclear

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weapons deployed abroad. Moscow responded in kind, helping alleviate the chance of a nuclear
exchange as the Soviet leadership lost command and control of its military forces. Disarmament
measures, however, have not solely been aimed at state-to-state relations. Domestic initiatives
have employed disarmament efforts toward reducing violence at the inter-group and local levels.
For instance, citywide gun exchange programs in Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and Chicago
have been successful in reducing the number of local firearms and arguably overall gun-related
injuries.1

There are three different ways of viewing disarmament -- unilateral or voluntary, through
bilateral or multilateral agreements, and forced disarmament. Unilateral and bi/multilateral
arrangements are often overlapping initiatives. As the preceding paragraph suggests, unilateral
disarmament is often an effort to encourage others to follow suit. For instance, during the 1990s,
South Africa voluntarily disclosed and dismantled its nuclear weapons and long-range missile
programs, which led to a region-wide moratorium on atomic weapons through the development
of an internationally recognized African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Additionally, actors in an
ongoing conflict sometimes seek to defuse tensions through disarmament measures. Recognizing
that one's own weapons generate fear among potential rivals that can feed uncertainty and
hostilities, an actor may choose to decrease such anxieties by voluntarily reducing the size or
destructiveness of its own arsenal in hopes of reciprocal behavior from others. This was the case
when the United States dismantled developments in its biological and tactical nuclear weapons.

Over the last century, several efforts have also been made toward global elimination of weapons
deemed too cruel or unnecessarily injurious. For instance, the Chemical Weapons Convention,
the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention and the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban are
international agreements that outlaw the development, sale, and use of such weapons. While not
universal, these arrangements often require many states to remove specified weapons from their
existing arsenals. The result is multilateral disarmament even while others in the international
system continue to possess the capability and potential willingness to use such weapons. This
suggests a strong inclination for some countries to risk disadvantage if confronted with such
weapons in the future, in favor of trying to establish norms for the conduct of war Moreover,

1
Also see, the World Council of Churches' Web site at http://www.cephasministry.com/world_wcc_disarm.html

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these efforts to stigmatize particular weapons have led to calls for meaningful verification and
enforcement of the agreements through global pressures in the form of sanctions and incentives.

Recent crises in the Persian Gulf demonstrate that forcible disarmament is also an approach that
is often taken on the grounds of lessening the potential for future conflict. In short, actors may
seek to disarm others who they deem irresponsible or belligerent. In 1991, international forces
expelled Iraq's military from Kuwait. The resulting ceasefire agreement between the United
Nations and Iraq stipulated the dismantlement of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs
and limited the mobility of its military within its own territory. Continued suspicions that Iraq
was undermining these agreements compelled other actors in the international community -- led
by the United States -- to again use military force, in an effort to see through the disarming
stipulations. This, however, is not the first time such actions have been taken. Rather, after every
war there is generally some type of disarmament imposed upon the loser. It is often, but not
always, the case that these arrangements are resented and create challenges on their own (e.g.,
Germany after World War I versus Germany after World War II).

WHY DISARMAMENT IS IMPORTANT?

It is generally difficult for actors to ensure that rivals will not attempt to gain undue influence
over them through the use of violence. Trust is often lacking in social relations, particularly
during times of uncertainty and hostilities. This often leads opponents to seek increasingly
greater capacity to inflict violence on others that can result in the stockpile of overly threatening
or pernicious weapons. This heightens mutual skepticism and significantly reduces the prospects
for resolving differences peacefully and through negotiation.

Unilateral disarmament can be used to reduce these fears and tensions and pave the way for
greater cooperation. In other words, disarming can defuse a dangerous situation because it is
generally seen as a gesture of benign intent and decreases the perceived threat that one poses to
others. Moreover, it can encourage reciprocal behavior among would-be adversaries. Bilateral or
multilateral agreements can be used to acknowledge mutually non-threatening intent and can
further cooperation that increases transparency and dialogue between potential rivals. However,
the very skepticism that characterizes adversarial relations makes initiation of such efforts
unlikely during times that they are most needed. Thus, much of the world has focused on

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banning weapons deemed inhumane prior to conflict situations in order to stigmatize and curtail
their use when hostilities do erupt. While forcible disarmament is an ancient practice, it has the
potential to generate social resentment that may foster aggressive behavior in the future. Yet, this
is not always the case, as shown by the current friendly relations between the victors of World
War II and Japan and Germany.

WORLD WAR-II (1939-1945)

Occupations, Agreements and Appeasement: Cause of World War-II

It has been often said that the Europe stumbled in to world war-I in 1914. Historians of the world
war-I often suggest the blame of outbreak of war was ought to be shared among a variety of
countries. Most of these historians do not accept the idea that one single country was entirely to
blame.

World War-II was entirely different. Europe did not accidently stumble into this war. Instead, it
was brought about by the will of one man: Adolf Hitler. Hitler was to be blamed for the World
War-II. Fueled by fanatical anti-Semitism and a desire to see the German Reich expand, Hitler
started world war-II when he sent troops to invade Poland in September 1939.

INDIA AND DISARMAMENT

In South Asia, India and Pakistan are the two principal actors with reasonable amount of nuclear
capabilities. For both India and Pakistan, the acquisition of nuclear weapon technologies were
influenced by their respective external and internal compulsions. For both, military defeat at the
hands of a more powerful neighbor provided the principal impetus for exploring the weapon
potential of nuclear energy technology. This has created a kind of mutually reactive arms race in
the subcontinent. As a nation with significant scientific and technical capabilities and with
aspirations to play a major world role, India was interested in nuclear technology from the outset
of the nuclear era. On 10 August 1948 the Atomic Energy Commission was formed. Efforts were
made by the Indian scientists to develop wide range of nuclear capabilities for providing
infrastructure facility to the future nuclear development. In order to achieve self-sufficiency in
this field it was thought that the emphasis should be on nuclear research and development

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Events of the sixties, however, led the Indian planners to consider whether a military dimension
might also be warranted. India’s humiliation in the Sino-Indian conflict precipitated a fear of
China that dominates Indian strategic thinking even to this day. This fear was greatly heightened
when China detonated a nuclear bomb in 1964. Thus, it was the Chinese factor that compelled
India to keep her nuclear option open and also played a role in 1968 not to sign the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty (NPT).

India’s nuclear programme traditionally viewed by its leaders as the sine-qua non of sovereignty
and the essential component of security, has made her both more independent and more insecure
than ever before. The dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 followed by the Indian nuclear
explosion in 1974 characterized the emergence of India as a dominant force in South Asia which
had also a far reaching effect on Pakistan’s nuclear programme. It was felt that India’s nuclear
weapon programme was a response to military defeat at the hand of China. Nuclear option for
India and Pakistan were helplessly inter-locked, limiting maneuverability of decision making in
either country. Indian nuclear policy is based on a more explicit set of calculations about the
utility of nuclear weapon.

After nuclear proliferation the problem of ballistic missiles proliferation becomes important. The
spread of these weapons is not only a matter of grave concern but their potential coupling, into
long range weapons of mass destruction and enhanced capability by the actors of South Asia
(particularly India and Pakistan) will have greater impact on future conflicts in the region. It is
rather difficult to imagine how to check the proliferation that has already taken place. In a region
of unending conflict, the prospect is for increasingly unstable military balances. The
development of Indian and Pakistani missile programme and the possible threat to their security
and also to draw lesson from the Operation Desert Storm with a view to reorganize and re-equip
their entire defense system against the expected threat. Like Iraq, India’s entire war machinery,
specially the air force has been equipped with Soviet equipment. On the other hand, Pakistan, has
several types of latest hi-tech weapons in its arsenal. The experience of the Gulf War also clearly
shows that missile deterrent capability will be the only credible and cheaper defense against any
missile threat and also indicated that in the long run, missile system, will be more dependable
and credible defensive and offensive weapon than aircraft in any future war

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Another area which has escalated tension in the region is the piling of sophisticated conventional
weapons. While nuclear and ballistic missile are subject to some degree of international control
there are virtually no restraints on the international traffic in conventional weapons. Relations
between India and Pakistan are very complex in nature. The immediate military threat and
challenge to India is mainly from Pakistan and China. On the one hand, China has successfully
established a ring of client states around India by developing a military nexus with Pakistan,
Myanmar and Bangladesh. On the other hand, the changing threat from Pakistan needs careful
attention. Presently she is not only acquiring latest military hardware but also trying hard to
bleed India from within in order to gain strategic advantage. The conventional build up is also
closely linked with terrorism, insurgency, ethnic problem and drug trafficking. As a result, the
military expenditure flows from the specific dynamics of national policy, the security
environment in which it is operative and the capacity to generate and spare resources in keeping
with the socio-economic well-being of the state. At global level, the end of the cold war has
greatly reduced East-West military confrontation.

INDIA’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS

India has had a long standing commitment to multilateralism. This has further accentuated today
with the growing integration of our economy into global structures. We are increasingly engaged
in our region. The Indian Ocean Rim Initiative and our membership of the ARF are recent
developments that reflect acknowledgement of our constructive approach. In SAARC, we are
trying to promote effective structures to enhance prosperity which can ensure stability in the
region. India will remain engaged in pursuing her policies for promoting peace, prosperity and
stability and enhancing security in our region. We will also continue to work with other countries
to strive, for achieving a nuclear weapon-free world.

Our stand on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has generated a great deal of debate. Many of
you would recall that India was among the first countries to demand a complete test ban since the
1950s. We welcomed the Partial Test Ban Treaty as a first step towards a comprehensive ban.
We have never departed from our goal which is to see a nuclear weapon-free world which, for
us, is an article of faith. In 1988, the then Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, presented to

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the United Nations a phased programme aimed at total universal nuclear disarmament by all
countries of the world. Such a programme must necessarily begin the nuclear power.

India has always followed a consistent, and principled policy on nuclear disarmament. It is based
on the conviction that these weapons are inherently destabilizing and the global elimination of all
nuclear weapons will enhance the security of all nations. We have rejected partial and
discriminatory approaches, as reflected in the NPT and the recently concluded CTBT, that are
dictated by the technological preference of the nuclear weapon states and enable them to
perpetuate their nuclear hegemony. India’s position is not merely an idealistic position but rooted
in our own national interests. With a declared nuclear weapon state to our north, another
undeclared nuclear weapon state to our west, and vessels carrying nuclear weapons sailing in the
Indian Ocean, India cannot afford to give up her nuclear option or accept any restraint on it,
unless there is genuine acceptance of the goal of nuclear disarmament and concrete movement
towards it in a step by step manner as part of a well-defined nuclear disarmament process. It has
been India’s consistent policy not to sign unequal, discriminatory treaties. That is why India was
not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) India undertook a peaceful nuclear test
as far back as 1974 but, as a mark of unparalleled restraint, has studiously refrained from
weaponisation. It has scrupulously observed the provisions of the NPT even while remaining out
of it. We have not exported nuclear know-how or material to foreign countries. Neither have we
openly nor in a clandestine manner helped the process of proliferation. Others have, including
some of the major nuclear powers. The NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. An openly
discriminatory treaty of great importance for the security of the world and the fate of humankind
was given an indefinite lease of life. We stood away from the treaty but we were not indifferent
to proliferation of nuclear weapons, vertical or horizontal. We were among those countries
responsible for inscribing nuclear disarmament on the UN agenda, and, since the mid 50s we
have been unwaveringly committed to a nuclear weapon-free world. Therefore, when the CTBT
came up for debate at the Disarmament conference in Geneva, we made it abundantly clear that
we would not go with a draft unless it contained a pledge by the nuclear powers that they would
proceed towards complete nuclear disarmament within a reasonable timeframe. Unfortunately,
our position was, not taken seriously by the world’s nuclear powers. While the reservations of
other states were entertained, out requests were studiously denied. In what was a clear violation
of international law, a clause was devised that made entry into force of the treaty contingent

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upon Indian ratification. This, after we had firmly expressed ourselves against the treaty And all
this was done without consultations with all the members of the Conference. There was no
consultation nor an effort to accommodate our principled objections, both to the treaty and mode
of its passage. Finally, we were left with no option but to block the treaty, which was then
hurriedly taken to a reconvened 50th session of the UN General Assembly and adopted by a
majority vote.

CONCLUSION

India’s approach to nuclear disarmament is going through a definite shift. India has been calling
for global nuclear disarmament since independence. Although, at present, India continues to
express its support for any initiative that can lead up to the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons, the factors that contributed to its strong support for nuclear disarmament are gradually
evolving. Consequentially, this will require India to reconsider its position on nuclear
disarmament, a task that New Delhi continues to evade for now. But this change of factors and
its consequential impact on India’s commitment to nuclear disarmament is not really a new
development. An examination of the development of India’s nuclear weapons programme
captures situations that question India’s commitment to nuclear disarmament.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY
 Ghatate, N.M., India’s Disarmament Policy, Ocean Book Pvt. Ltd. (2016)
 Myneni, S.R., Political Science, Allahabad Law Agency (2018)
 Centre for International Governance Innovation, India and the disarmament obligations
of Nuclear Weapon states, accessed on March 17, 2020
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/india-and-disarmament-obligations-nuclear-weapon-
states
 Smith, Gretchen, India’s Role in Global Disarmament Debate, Institute of Peace and
Conflict Studies, (2008), accessed on March 20,2020
http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=2628
 Sethi, Manpreet, India’s Pursuit of Nuclear Disarmament: Efforts must Continue,
Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, accessed on March 20, 2020
https://www.idsa-india.org/an-jun9-3.html

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