EN BANC representing party litigants in other cases before four (4)
[ A.C. No. 12457 (Formerly CBD Case No. 16-5128),
April 02, 2019 ]
REV. FR. JOSE P. ZAFRA III, COMPLAINANT, V.
ATTY. RENATO B. PAGATPATAN, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative complaint arose from a criminal suit
for estafa filed by complainant Reverend Father Jose P.
Zafra III (Fr. Zafra) against Jojo R. Buniel (Buniel) and
Anna Liza M. Guirnalda (Guirnalda) docketed as Criminal
Case No. 6538 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tandag City, Surigao Del Sur, Branch 40. Attorney
Renato B. Pagatpatan (Atty. Pagatpatan) is the counsel
on record of Buniel and Guirnalda.
While the criminal case was pending against Atty.
Pagatpatan's clients, said lawyer wrote a letter to the
Bishop of the Diocese of Tandag, Surigao Del
Sur[1] requesting an investigation of Fr. Zafra for his
activities, particularly, concocting stories against his
clients, Buniel and Guirnalda, who were charged by Fr.
Zafra of estafa; that such action "was not only a sin but a
MORTAL SIN."
Fr. Zafra was embarrassed because of the "malicious"
letter sent by Atty. Pagatpatan. He was eventually
investigated by the Board of Consultors with the Bishop,
where he was able to clear his name.
Thereafter, Fr. Zafra filed a complaint against Atty.
Pagatpatan with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). He posits that Atty. Pagatpatan's action is a clear
violation of Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "(a) lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system." Fr. Zafra
claims that instead of Atty. Pagatpatan defending his
clients' case in court, the latter instigated them to stir
controversies by making libelous and untruthful
accusations. Fr. Zafra asserts that Atty. Pagatpatan's act
of writing and sending out the letter to the Bishop of the
Diocese of Tandag, Surigao Del Sur "was not from a
sense of duty x x x but to certainly gratify the personal
vendetta and animosity of his clients, who were arrested
for the crime Estafa x x x" that Fr. Zafra filed with the
RTC. Atty. Pagatpatan "failed to live up to the standard of
his profession as a lawyer who should be a mediator for
concord and a conciliator for compromise rather than an
instigator of controversy x x x."
Fr. Zafra also argues that Atty. Pagatpatan is engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law. He learned that, in
2005, Atty. Pagatpatan had been suspended by this
Court from the practice of law for two (2) years in a
decided case entitled Daniel Mortera, et al. v. Atty.
Renato B. Pagatpatan with docket number A.C. No.
4562.[2] Upon further inquiry on said case from the
Supreme Court-Public Information Office, he also learned
that the order of suspension of Pagatpatan in the
foregoing case had not yet been lifted by the Court.
[3]
 Notwithstanding the failure to lift the order of
suspension, Pagatpatan continued to practice law by
branches of RTC Davao.[4]
Atty. Pagatpatan, for his part, asserts that there was
nothing unethical in writing a letter for the investigation of
Fr. Zafra. As the lawyer of Buniel and Guirnalda, he
merely aided his clients in bringing to the attention of the
Bishop the actuations of Fr. Zafra in filing the complaint
for estafa. The letter was for purposes of convincing Fr.
Zafra to settle "silently" and "not go to the extent of
having the estafa charges ventilated in a full-blown trial x
x x."[5] He reiterates that the letter was not intended to
malign the reputation of Fr. Zafra.
Atty. Pagatpatan does not deny in engaging in the
practice of law despite this Court's order of suspension in
2005. He reasoned out that he needed to continue
working in order to maintain and sustain the needs of his
family, especially since his wife was ill and eventually
passed away in December 12, 2010. Pagatpatan claims
that he has no intention to defy the order of suspension,
and manifests withdrawing his appearances in the cases
that he is handling, including the estafa case against
Buniel and Guirnalda.
Proceedings before the IBP ensued. In the Report and
Recommendation dated June 13, 2018,[6] the IBP,
through the investigating commissioner, did not find
Pagatpatan administratively liable in writing the letter-
complaint against Fr. Zafra. The investigating
commissioner held that there was no prohibition for
lawyers to write a letter to the Bishop of the Diocese of
Tandag, Surigao Del Sur concerning priests in its
jurisdiction; and that lawyers are not precluded from
writing a letter to the bishop on matters pending before
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutors or the courts. The
letter was merely requesting for an investigation on the
conduct of Fr. Zafra. No malice or bad faith on the part of
Atty. Pagatpatan could be attributed from writing the
letter-complaint.
Anent Atty. Pagatpatan's continuous practice of law
despite his suspension, the IBP held that Atty.
Pagatpatan "has no discretion, no option and can neither
run or hide from the harsh effects of being suspended
from the practice of law." Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court provides that a member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney for
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court. In this case, Atty. Pagatpatan was ordered
suspended from the practice of law on June 15, 2005,
and there is no order to lift the suspension of Atty.
Pagatpatan. Yet despite this he has continued practicing
law for over thirteen (13) years, which tantamounts to
willful disobedience. Thus, the IBP recommended Atty.
Pagatpatan's suspension for three (3) years with a
warning that a repetition of the same will warrant a more
severe penalty.
In a resolution dated July 12, 2018, [7] the Board of
Governors of the IBP modified the recommended penalty
to suspension from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) years, after serving his previous suspension
from the practice of law for two (2) years.
Ruling of the Court
This Court cannot subscribe to Atty. Pagatpatan's claims
that he is merely espousing his clients' cause in writing
the letter-request for investigation of Fr. Zafra. On record,
We find that Atty. Pagatpatan admits to writing the letter
to the Bishop of the Diocese of Tandag, Surigao Del Sur
in order to resolve the estafa case since settlement
proceedings with the regular courts proved to be futile.
[8]
 To Our mind, Atty. Pagatpatan's letter-request was not
based on a sincere purpose to discipline Fr. Zafra for his
actions, but mainly to bring threat to Fr. Zafra and force
him to settle the estafa case filed against his clients. Atty.
Pagatpatan did not want the estafa case to proceed to a
full-blown trial. On many occasions, this Court has
reminded that lawyers are duty-bound "to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged."[9] This is in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession. It is of no consequence that the letter of Atty.
Pagatpatan is filed with the Bishop of Diocese of Tandag,
Surigao Del Sur. Pagatpatan, as a member of the bar, is
an "oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not
to his client but to the administration of justice
and whose conduct ought to be and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics."
This Court finds that Atty. Pagatpatan was motivated
by malice in writing said letter. However, disbarment,
as prayed for by Fr. Zafra, is a penalty too severe for
said action considering the facts show that Atty.
Pagatpatan is only guilty of simple misconduct.
The more pressing issue to be tackled in this case is the
fact that Atty. Pagatpatan has been practicing law
despite the issuance of a suspension order by this Court
on June 15, 2005. There were no records showing that
he served said suspension or moved to lift said order
because Atty. Pagatpatan, himself, admits that he
continued practicing the legal profession notwithstanding
said order.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefore. - A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis Ours)
On record,[10] Atty. Pagatpatan had been representing
party litigants in court from 2005 until the instant case
was filed before the IBP in 2016. Atty. Pagatpatan has
made a mockery of this Court's authority by defying this
Court's suspension order for over eleven (11) years. If Fr.
Zafra had not filed the instant case, Atty. Pagatpatan
would have continued disregarding the suspension order
of this Court. His actions clearly constitute gross
misconduct as defined under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, which is a sufficient cause for suspension
or disbarment.
This Court emphasizes that the practice of law is not a
right but a mere privilege and, as such, must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
[11]
Whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no
longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients
and of the public, it becomes not only the right but also
the duty of the Supreme Court, which made him one of
its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering
within its Bar, to withdraw that privilege.[12]
The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court. Atty. Pagatpatan's acts in wantonly disobeying his
duties as an officer of the court show utter disrespect for
the Court and the legal profession. Therefore, his
disbarment is warranted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent
Attorney Renato B. Pagatpatan is:
[1] GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and FINED
P5,000.00 for his unethical behavior in writing a letter to
the Bishop of the Diocese of Tandag, Surigao Del Sur
against complainant Reverend Father Jose P. Zafra III;
and
[2] DISBARRED from the practice of law effective
immediately upon receipt of this Resolution.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal
records of respondent as a member of the Bar, and
copies be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin (C.J.), Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perlas-
Bernabe, Leonen, Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo,
Carandang, and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur. 
Jardeleza, J., on official business. 
J. Reyes, Jr., J., on official leave.
Hernando, J., on leave. 
 Republic of the Philippines The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that
SUPREME COURT Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla,13 which
Manila allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that
Atty. Santos drafted.14 Hence, Atty. Santos represented
SECOND DIVISION clients with conflicting interests.15

A.C. No. 10583               February 18, 2015 In Civil Case No. 09-269, Atty. Santos testified during
[Formerly CBD 09-2555] cross-examination:

ROBERTO BERNARDINO, Complainant, CROSS-EXAMINATION BY:

vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent. ATTY. CARINGAL

x-----------------------x ....

A.C. No. 10584 Q : In your Judicial Affidavit[,] you mentioned that you
[Formerly CBD 10-2827] know Marilu C. Turla[,] the plaintiff[,] since she was about
four years old.
ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL, Complainant,
vs. A : Yes, sir.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.
Q : As a matter of fact[,] you know her very well[,]
RESOLUTION considering that you are a Ninong of the plaintiff, isn’t it?

LEONEN, J.: A : I was not a Ninong when I first knew Marilu Turla, I
was just recently married to one of her cousins.
These cases involve administrative Complaints1 against
Atty. Victor Rey Santos for violation of Canon 10, Rule ....
10.012 and Canon 15, Rule 15 .033 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Q : Now, the parents of Marilu Turla are Mariano C. Turla
and Rufina C. Turla?
In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino
(Bernardino) filed a Letter-Complaint4 against Atty. Victor THE WITNESS
Rey Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, praying that Atty. Santos be investigated
and subjected to disciplinary action.5 : Yes, sir. As per my study and as per my knowledge of
her relationship[s].
Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt,
Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty. Santos. THE COURT
Atty. Santos made it appear that Rufina Turla died in
1992, when in fact, she died in 1990.6 : What’s the name of the mother?

Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to ATTY. CARINGAL

-support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication7 executed by
Mariano Turla, husband of Rufina Turla.8 Paragraph 6 of
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication prepared by Atty. Santos : Rufina, your Honor. Rufina Turla.
states:
Q : And wife died ahead of Mariano, isn’t it?
Being her surviving spouse, I am. the sole legal heir
entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate of said THE WITNESS
deceased who did not leave any descendant or any other
heir entitled to her estate.9 (Emphasis in the original
underscoring supplied) : Yes, sir.

Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, Q : And of course, being the daughter of Rufina Turla,
daughter of Rufina and Mariano Turla,10 filed a Marilu is also an heir of Rufina Turla, isn’t it?
Complaint11 for sum of money with prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and temporary restraining order A : Of course.
against Bernardino, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-
269.12
Q : Now, we go by the ethics of the profession, Mr.
Witness.
You recall[,] of course[,] and admitted [sic] in court that
you drafted this document which you requested to be
marked as Exhibit B.
THE COURT
: Exhibit?
ATTY. CARINGAL
: "B", your Honor, in particular reference to the Affidavit of
Adjudication for the extra judicial settlement of the
intestate estate of the late Rufina De Castro Turla[,] and I
have just learned from you as you just testified. Rufina is
the mother of the plaintiff here[,] Marilu Turla.
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
Q : And as you admitted, you prepared you drafted [sic]
this Extra Judicial.
A : Yes, sir.
Q : Or this Affidavit of Adjudication.
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: At this point in time, your Honor, I would object to the
question regarding my legal ethics because it is not the
issue in this case.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL
....
Q : . . . In this document consisting of one, two, three,
four and appearing to have been duly notarized on or
about 29th [of] June 1994 with document number 28,
page number 7, book
number 23, series of 1994 before Notary Public
Hernando P. Angara. I call your attention to the
document[,] more particularly[,] paragraph 6 thereof and
marked as Exhibit 7-A for the defendants[.] I read into the
record and I quote, "Being her surviving spouse, I am the
sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the
estate of the said deceased who did not leave any
descendant, ascendant or any other heir entitled to her
estate."16 Mr. Witness, is this particular provision that
you have drafted into this document . . . true or false?
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: Your Honor, I would like to reiterate that any question
regarding the matter that would impugn the legitimacy of
the plaintiff, Marilu Turla[,]is impertinent and immaterial in
this case[.] [I]t was only the wife Rufina Turla [who] ha[s]
the right to impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff[,] and
that has been the subject of my continuing objection from
the very beginning.
THE COURT
: But then again[,] you have presented this document as
your Exhibit B[.] [Y]ou have practically opened the
floodgate to . . . questions on this document.
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: Only for the purposes [sic] of showing one or two . . .
properties owned by the late Mariano Turla, your Honor.
That is why that’s only [sic] portion I have referred to in
marking the said documents, your Honor.
THE COURT
: So, you now refused [sic] to answer the question?
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: No, I am not refusing to answer, I am just making a
manifestation.
ATTY. CARINGAL
: What is the answer, is it true or false, your Honor[?]
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: My answer regarding the same would be subject to my
objection on the materiality and impertinency and
relevancy of this question, your Honor[,] to this case.
THE COURT
: So anyway, the court has observed the continuing
objection before[,] and to be consistent with the ruling of
the court[,] I will allow you to answer the question[.] [I]s it
true or false?
THE WITNESS
: No, that is not true.
ATTY. CARINGAL
: That is not true. Mr. Witness, being a lawyer[,] you
admit before this court that you have drafted a document
that caused the transfer of the estate of the decease[d]
Rufina Turla.
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL
Q : This document, this particular provision that you said
was false, you did not tell anybody[,] ten or five years
later[,] that this is false, is it not?
THE WITNESS
: I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked
him what about Lulu17 she is entitled [sic] to a share of
properties and he . . . told me, "Ako na ang bahala kay
Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan". So, he asked me to
proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he
claimed the whole [sic]properties for himself.18
(Emphasis supplied)
Another Complaint19 was filed against Atty. Santos by
Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Atty. Caringal). This was
docketed as A.C. No. 10584.20 Similar to Bernardino’s
Complaint, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests.21 He also
alleged that in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos
would necessarily go against the claims of Mariano
Turla.22
Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was
allegedly violating the so-called "Dead Man’s Statute"23
because "he [would] be utilizing information or matters of
fact occurring before the death of his deceased client.
Similarly, he . . . [would] be unscrupulously utilizing
information acquired during his professional relation with
his said client . . . that [would] constitute a breach of
trust . . . or of privileged communication[.]"24
Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated
Canon 1225 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
when he filed several cases against the other claimants
of Mariano Turla’s estate.26 In other words, he engaged
in forum shopping.27
In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10,
Rule 10.0128 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
when he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication. The Affidavit states that Mariano Turla is
the sole heir of Rufina Turla, but Atty. Santos knew this to
be false.29 Atty. Santos’ wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano
Turla’s niece.30 As part of the family, Atty. Santos knew
that Rufina Turla had other heirs.31 Atty. Caringal further
alleged:
14.4 Being the lawyer of Mariano Turla in the drafting of
the document some fifteen years ago, he is fully aware of
all the circumstances therein recited. Moreover at that
time, the [sic] Lynn Batac Santos was then employed at
the BIR[sic] who arranged for the payment of the taxes
due. There is some peculiarity in the neat set up [sic] of a
husband and wife team where the lawyer makes the
document while the wife who is a BIIR [sic] employee
arranges for the payment of the taxes due the
government;
14.5 Respondent attorney could not have been mistaken
about the fact recited in the Affidavit of Adjudication, etc.
that said deceased (Rufina de Castro Turla) "did not
leave any descendant, xxx, or any other heir entitled to
her estate’ [sic] . . . [.]32 (Emphasis in the original)
Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the
statement in Mariano Turla’s affidavit that Rufina Turla
had no other heir.33
Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds
belonging to the heirs of Mariano Turla for his own
benefit. The funds involved were rental income from
Mariano Turla’s properties that were supposed to be
distributed to the heirs. Instead, Atty. Santos received the
rental income.34 Lastly, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty.
Santos cited the repealed Article 262 of the Civil Code in
his arguments.35
In his Answer,36 Atty. Santos denied having falsified the
death certificate.37 He explained that the death
certificate and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were
given to him by Mariano Turla and that he was not aware
that there was a falsified entry in the death certificate.38
As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty. Santos
argued that he did not represent and was not
representing conflicting interests since Mariano Turla
was already dead.39 Further, "he [was] representing
Marilu Turla against those who ha[d] an interest in her
father’s estate."40 Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication never stated that there was no other legal
heir but only "that Mariano Turla was the sole heir of
Rufina Turla."41
Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos
insisted that he did not commit forum shopping because
the various cases filed had different issues.42
As to the conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained that
the funds used were being held by his client as the
special administratrix of the estate of Mariano Turla.43
According to Atty. Santos, payment of attorney’s fees out
of the estate’s funds could be considered as "expenses
of administration."44 Also, payment of Atty. Santos’ legal
services was a matter which Atty. Caringal had no
standing to question.45
On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a repealed
provision of law, he discussed that Article 262 of the Civil
Code is applicable because it was in force when Marilu
Turla’s birth certificate was registered.46
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines recommended that Atty. Santos be
suspended for three (3) months.47
It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation that
Atty. Santos knew that the death certificate was falsified
and used it to support Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication.48 Likewise, Atty. Caringal failed to prove
that Atty. Santos converted funds from Mariano Turla’s
estate.49
With regard to the citation of a repealed provision, the
Commission on Bar Discipline stated that the evidence
presented did not prove that Atty. Santos "knowingly
cited a repealed law."50 Further, Atty. Santos did not
engage in forum shopping. The various cases filed
involved different parties and prayed for different
reliefs.51
However, the Commission on Bar Discipline agreed with
Bernardino and Atty. Caringal that Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests.52 The
Report and Recommendation53 of the Commission on
Bar Discipline stated:
. . . Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
particularly Rule 15.03 specifically proscribes members
of the bar from representing conflicting interests. The
Supreme Court has explained that "the proscription
against representation of conflicting interest finds
application where the conflicting interests arise with
respect to the same general matter and is applicable
however slight such adverse interest may be; the fact
that the conflict of interests is remote or merely probable
does not make the prohibition inoperative."
....
. . . In the case at bar, the fact that the respondent
represented Mariano Turla is no secret. The respondent
has in a number of pleadings/motions/documents and
evenon the witness stand admitted that he drafted
Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication which expressly
states that he was the sole heir of Rufina Turla.
And then he afterwards agreed to represent Marilu Turla
who claimed to be Mariano Turla’s daughter. To
substantiate her claim that she is Mariano Turla’s
daughter, the respondent admitted that he relied on the
birth certificate presented by Marilu Turla[,] which
indicates that she is not only the daughter of Mariano
Turla but also of Rufina Turla as evidenced by the Birth
Certificate presented stating that Rufina Turla is Marilu
Turla’s mother. This means that Marilu Turla was also a
rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s inheritance and was
deprived of the same because of the Affidavit of
Adjudication which he drafted for Mariano Turla[,] stating
that he is his wife’s sole heir.
. . . To further explain, the respondent[,] in agreeing to
represent Marilu Turla[,] placed himself in a position
where he is to refute the claim in Mariano Turla’s Affidavit
of Adjudication that he is the only heir of Rufina Turla.54
(Citations omitted)
In the Resolution55 dated May 10, 2013, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP
Board of Governors) adopted and approved the findings
and recommendations of the Commission on Bar
Discipline.
Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,56
which was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in the
Resolution57 dated March 22, 2014.
This administrative case was forwarded to this court
through a letter of transmittal dated July 15, 2014,58
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of
Court which provides:
RULE 139-B
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of
Governors.—
....
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total
membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record
of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action.
The issues in this case are: (1) whether respondent Atty.
Santos violated the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and (2) whether the penalty of suspension of three (3)
months from the practice of law is proper.
This court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the
IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution. However, this court
modifies the recommended penalty of suspension from
the practice of law from three (3) months to one (1) year.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness
and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his
client.
....
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary
obligation in a lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers must
treat all information received from their clients with
utmost confidentiality in order to encourage clients to fully
inform their counsels of the facts of their case.59 In
Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,60 this court explained what
conflict of interest means:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties.
The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his
duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues
for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when
he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require
the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect
his first client in any matter in which he represents him
and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to
his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.61 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest
exists, respondent would necessarily refute Mariano
Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he
agreed to represent Marilu Turla. Worse, he knew that
Mariano Turla was not the only heir. As stated in the
Report of the Commission on Bar Discipline:
Worse[,] the respondent himself on the witness stand
during his April 14, 2009 testimony in the Civil Case for
Sum of Money with Prayer of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order docketed as
Civil Case No. 09-269 filed with the RTC of Makati City
admitted as follows: "I called the attention of Mr. Mariano
Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu she is entitled
[sic] to a share of properties and he . . . told me, ‘Ako na
ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan.’ So he
asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication
wherein he claimed the whole [sic] properties for
himself." This very admission proves that the respondent
was privy to Marilu Turla’s standing as a legal and rightful
heir to Rufina Turla’s estate.62 (Citation omitted)
However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception,
specifically, "by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts."63 Respondent had the
duty to inform Mariano Turla and Marilu Turla that there
is a conflict of interest and to obtain their written consent.
Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009,64 while
respondent represented Marilu Turla in March 2009.65 It
is understandable why respondent was unable to obtain
Mariano Turla’s consent. Still, respondent did not present
evidence showing that he disclosed to Marilu Turla that
he previously represented Mariano Turla and assisted
him in executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Thus,
the allegation of conflict of interest against respondent
was sufficiently proven.
Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of
Governors’ finding that respondent violated Canon 10,
Rule10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which states:
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead
or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.
In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline
explained:
Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue of
the doctrine res ipsa loquitor[sic] finds that the
respondent’s act of failing to thwart his client Mariano
Turla from filing the Affidavit of Adjudication despite . . .
his knowledge of the existence of Marilu Turla as a
possible heir to the estate of Rufina Turla, the
respondent failed to uphold his obligation as a member of
the bar to be the stewards of justice and protectors of
what is just, legal and proper. Thus in failing to do his
duty and acting dishonestly[,] not only was he in
contravention of the Lawyer’s Oath but was also in
violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.66 (Emphasis in the original)
As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold
the rule of law. In doing so, lawyers are expected to be
honest in all their dealings.67 Unfortunately, respondent
was far from being honest. With full knowledge that
Rufina Turla had another heir, he acceded to Mariano
Turla’s request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication.68
This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of
Governors’ Resolutions dated May 10, 2013 and March
22, 2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines that has the authority to impose sanctions
on lawyers. This is wrong.
The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested
in this court under the 1987 Constitution: ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
....
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan69 elucidated on this court’s
"plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys"70 and
discussed:
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme
Court to discipline officers of the court and members of
the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court,
as regular and guardian of the legal profession, has
plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The
authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court’s
constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the
practice of law, which includes as well authority to
regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this
constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent
power incidental to the proper administration of justice
and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions.
...
. . . The disciplinary authority of the Court over members
of the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s exclusive power
of admission to the Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely a
professional but also an officer of the court and as such,
he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society.71
(Citations omitted)
This court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, specifically:
RULE 138
ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR
....
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo,72 this court
emphasized the authority of this court to impose
disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice of
law.
Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally
mandated duty to discipline lawyers.73 Under the current
rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the
Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory,
consistent with the constitutional powers of this court.
Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature,
recommendatory.74
The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, which provides that "[p]roceedings for the
disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be
taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines . . . upon the verified
complaint of any person." However, this authority is only
to assist this court with the investigation of the case, to
determine factual findings, and to recommend, at best,
the penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer.
We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso v. Atty.
Echanez:75
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice
of law is imbued with public interest and that "a lawyer
owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to
his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State—the administration of justice—as
an officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound
to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,
but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."76
(Citations omitted)
Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the
Bar.1âwphi1 This disciplinary authority is granted by the
Constitution and cannot be relinquished by this court.77
The Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
are, at best, recommendatory, and its findings and
recommendations should not be equated with Decisions
and Resolutions rendered by this court. WHEREFORE,
we find respondent Atty. Victor Rey Santos guilty of
violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
findings of fact and recommendations of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated
May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 are ACCEPTED and
ADOPTED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is
imposed upon Atty. Victor Rey Santos. He is warned that
a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s
personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator
for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for
their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991
Cayetano vs. Monsod
201 SCRA 210
September 1991
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by
President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman
of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not posses required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides
in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission
on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the
required qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs.
Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceeding, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services, contemplating
an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the
required qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s
past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both
rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC
chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of
the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
(21.) IN RE CUNANAN (94 Phil 534)
March 18, 1954
FACTS:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972,
commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” In
accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then
passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who
had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75
percent. After its approval, many of the unsuccessful
postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the
bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the
revision of their examination papers were still pending
also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground
for admission. There are also others who have sought
simply the reconsideration of their grades without,
however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice
to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the
motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or
not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 972 is constitutional.
HELD:
No. It is not constitutional.
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to
public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates
who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the
practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this
Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public
interest demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal
problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An
adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites
for the practice of law that should be developed
constantly and maintained firmly.
In the judicial system from which ours has been
evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession and their supervision have been disputably a
judicial function and responsibility. Even considering the
power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal,
alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court
regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our
judgment and proposition that the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the
attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function
requires (1) previously established rules and principles,
(2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting
determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether
these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in
effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it
becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative,
if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these
same individuals are attempted to be revoked or
modified.
Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that
what the law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in place
by the SC but the lack of will or the defect in judgement
of the court, and this power is not included in the power
granted by the Constitution to Congress, it lies
exclusively within the judiciary.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following
grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded
its powers; second, because they create or establish
arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects
violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has
already been seen, the contested law suffers from these
fatal defects.
Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and
therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the
following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810
candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-
1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately
prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this
Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to
the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the
opportunity to determine if they are at present already
prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the
Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in
an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on
the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking
the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
candidates, without having examined their respective
examination papers, and although it is admitted that this
Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for
justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may
revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly
Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded
its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or
amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to
regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should
tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this
Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms
towards that end in the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar,
inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a
worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary
and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render
the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may
continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended
classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and
does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students
inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is
arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not
embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the
provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of
that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953
to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the
examinations in those years, shall continue in force.
FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO v. ATTY. EDWIN
PASCUA, AC. NO. 5095, 2007-11-28
Facts:
In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty.
Pascua falsified two documents committed as follows:
(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the
"Affidavit-Complaint" of one Joseph B. Acorda entering
the same as "Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III,
Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998".
(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the
"Affidavit-Complaint" of one Remigio B. Domingo
entering the same as "Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III,
Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998.
Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July
26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above
entries appear in the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua;
that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200...
executed on December 28, 1998; and that, therefore, he
could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and
1214 on December 10, 1998.
Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two
documents on December 10, 1998, but they were not
entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of
his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit
was... attached to his comment.
On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued
its Report and Recommendation partly reproduced as
follows:
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must
observe the utmost care to comply with the formalities
and the basic requirement in the performance of their
duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87
revocation of notarial commission, the same should...
also be imposed upon him.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY
of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely. His notarial commission,... if still existing,
is ordered REVOKED.

SCRA 318). SO ORDERED.

Under the notarial law, "the notary public shall enter in

such register, in chronological order, the nature of each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
him, the person executing, swearing to, or
acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary shall
give to... each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the
one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument
the page or pages of his register on which the same is
recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries"

Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries

in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the
manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his
commission

In the instant case, there is no question that the subject

documents allegedly notarized by Atty. Pascua were not
recorded in his notarial register.

Issues:

Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of

his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register
the... affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and
Remigio B. Domingo.

Ruling:

His failure to enter into his notarial register the

documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of
duty on his... part as a notary public and he is bound by
the acts of his staff.

The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence

is far from true.

fter a close review of the records of this case, we resolve

to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the
Office of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of
misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to
register in his Notarial Register the... affidavit-complaints
of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.

In the present case, considering that this is Atty.

Pascua's first offense, we believe that the imposition of a
three-month suspension from the practice of law upon
him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for