G.R. No.

84240 March 25, 1992

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,
vs.
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-
BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T.
PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER,
NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE
PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.
 
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the decision of the
Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S.
Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista,
Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed
the decision of the trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the late
Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo,
petition, p. 17).
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged
natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:
(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Manuel C. Pascual
Jose C. Pascual
Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:
Avelino Pascual
Isoceles Pascual
Loida Pascual-Martinez
Virginia Pascual-Ner
Nona Pascual-Fernando
Octavio Pascual
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the deceased, to wit:
Olivia S. Pascual
Hermes S. Pascual
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased and represented by the
following:
Dominga M. Pascual
Mamerta P. Fugoso
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Domiga P. San Diego
Nelia P. Marquez
Silvestre M. Pascual
Eleuterio M. Pascual
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for
administration of the intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the Petition for
letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among
the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the effect that of her
own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual,
to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the
deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the
vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although
paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides, to wit:
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the above-entitled
proceedings until the final determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise agreement, as
regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres
Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation/Motion of the
petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate
of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 113-114)
and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an
order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby resolved to Deny this motion
reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-526). and such
motion was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision the dispositive part
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988, the Court of
Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the
deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and of the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC
(150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the
subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must be strictly
construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the prohibition of
Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where this Court ruled
that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession
ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law
for the purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed
to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down
upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in
life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that petitioners
herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate
of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and 989 of the Civil
Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the intestate estate of Don Andres
Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated the
successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions raised by the
petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are
transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who
may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves
illegitimate. The three named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not
available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate
grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate
child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion is
erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his
father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is
inapplicable to the instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato
between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may
not be amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation" and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their
death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by
Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister
Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what is says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233
[1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of
who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42).
And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but
reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is
established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson
v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed under one
category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children
should be treated differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. L-22301             August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O.
C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the
appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a
sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold
that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962
reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section
878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the
13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully
and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver
(Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured
the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the
counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun
involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit
the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit
issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would
not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be
submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not
required to get a license for his firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their
authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22
revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession on
August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit
thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes,
Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel
Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the
accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon.
Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962; 1 another document likewise issued by
Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on
a confidential mission;2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent, 3 a certificate dated March
11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste. 4 Counsel for the accused then
stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question
of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt
from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were
given time to file their respective memoranda.1äwphï1.ñët
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and
one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited
in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person
to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." 5
The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers,
soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards
in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors,
provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and
jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use
in the performance of their official duties." 6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our
task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal
on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of
peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace
officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such
reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of
a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v.
Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
Angeles, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Exhibit 1.
2
Exhibit 2.
3
Exhibit 3.
4
Exhibit 4.
5
Sec. 878 as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.
6
Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.
7
Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, (1913) 24 Phil. 504, 513.
8
L-12088, December 23, 1959.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. 116719             January 18, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PATRICIO AMIGO alias "BEBOT", accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder in an Information reading as follows:
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER, under Art.
248, in relation to Art. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident
premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stab with
said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting injuries upon the latter, the following injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS-LEFT ARM, LEFT CHEST, ABDOMEN AND LEFT THIGH WITH
PENETRATION TO LEFT PLEURAL CAVITY, DIAPHRAGM STOMACH, DUODENUM,
PANCREAS AND MIDTRANVERSE COLON.
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is,
because of the timely and able medical assistance immediately rendered to the said Benito Ng Suy.
(p. 1, Rollo.)
to which he pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, due to the death of the victim, an amended Information was filed charging now the crime
of murder, to wit:
That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife, with treachery and evident
premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed
with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple wounds which caused his
death and the consequent loss and damage to the heirs of the victim.
(p. 3, Rollo.)
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no modifying circumstance
present, the accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is the medium period
of the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum to death and to pay the cost; to indemnify the
offended party the amount of P93,214.70 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as compensatory damages
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
(p. 32, Rollo.)
Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant arguing that error was committed by the trial
court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19
(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed.
The facts of the case, as briefly summarized in the brief submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General
and as borne out by the evidence, are as follows:
On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having spent half-day at their store, located at No. 166-
A, Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City, Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford Fiera back home,
situated at the back of Car Asia, Bajada, Davao City. With him during that time were his daughters,
Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one together with his two year old son, who were all seated at the front
seat beside him while a five year old boy was also seated at the back of the said vehicle. (TSN, April 29,
1991, pp. 3-5; TSN, March 31, 1992)
On their way home and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada, Davao City, an orange Toyota
Tamaraw driven by one Virgilio Abogada, suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional Hospital,
Bajada, Davao City, without noticing the Ford Fiera coming from the opposite direction. This Tamaraw
was heading for Sterlyn Kitchenette, which was situated at the comer of the said hospital. (TSN, April 29,
1991, p. 4; TSN, March 31, 1992, pp. 3 and 13)
With Virgilio was Patricio Amigo alias Bebot, a vulcanizer at Lingling's vulcanizing shop owned and
operated by a certain Galadua. He was also seated at the right front seat beside Virgilio.
Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an accidental head on collision occurred between the Fiera
and the Tamaraw, causing a slight damaged to the right bumper of the latter. (TSN, March 31, 1992, p. 4)
Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the driver's seat and confronted Virgilio
Abogada who also went down from his vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 5)
Benito, who was a big man with a loud voice told Virgilio, "You were not looking," to which Virgilio
retorted, I did not see you". (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 16)
While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio who was merely a passenger of
Virgilio also alighted from the front seat of the Tamaraw and instantaneously approached Benito and
advised the latter to leave since it was merely a small and minor accident. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 16-
18)
A bit irritated with the actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito rebuked the former and told him not to
interfere, since he had nothing to do with the accident. (ibid. p. 7)
Irked by the comment made by Benito, Patricio sarcastically asked; "You are Chinese, is it you?" With a
ready answer Benito said; "Yes, I am a Chinese and why?" Patricio in turn replied; So, you are a Chinese,
wait for a while," then left. (ibid. pp. 7 and 19)
Immediately thereafter, Benito ordered Jocelyn to call a policeman, but after a lapsed of about one
minute, Patricio returned and arrogantly approached Benito, asking the latter once again, "You are a
Chinese, is it not?" To this Benito calmly responded in the affirmative. (ibid. pp. 7, 19-20)
Upon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled "Ah, so you are a Chinese," and suddenly took a five inch
knife from his waist and simultaneously stabbed Benito hitting him twice on the chest. (Ibid. p. 20)
After being hit, Benito wounded and sensing that his life was in peril, tried to evade his assailant by
pushing Patricio away and run around the Tamaraw but Patricio wielding the same knife and not content
with the injuries he had already inflicted, still chased Benito and upon overtaking the latter embraced him
and thrusted his knife on the victim several times, the last of which hit Benito on the left side of his body.
(ibid. pp. 8, 10, 22)
It was at this juncture that Jocelyn who was still inside the Ford Fiera, pleading for mercy to spare her
father tried to get out of the vehicle but it was very unfortunate that she could not open its door. (Ibid. p.
10)
Knowing that Patricio was really determined to kill her father by refusing to heed her pleas, Joselyn
shouted for help, since there were already several people around witnessing that fatal incident, but to her
consternation nobody lifted a single finger to help them. (ibid. pp. 6, 10, 18, 21-22) Only after her father
lay seated on the floor of their Ford Fiera after being hit on the left side of his body that she was able to
open the door of the said vehicle. (Ibid. p 12)
After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing their father bathing with his own blood,
embraced him, causing Patricio to cease from his ferocious assault and noticing the presence of several
people, he fled. (Ibid. p. 22)
Thereafter, an enraged Jocelyn chased him, but since the assailant ran faster than her, she was not able to
overtake him, thus, she instead decided to go back to where her father was and carried him inside the
Tamaraw who bumped them and consequently brought him to San Pedro Hospital where he was attended
to at the Emergency Room. (ibid. p 13)
While at the Emergency Room, Benito who was on a very critical condition, due to multiple (13) stabbed
wounds, was operated by Dr. Rolando Chiu. After the operation, he was subsequently brought to the ICU
and stayed there for three (3) weeks. (July 12, 1991, pp. 3 and 4)
In a last ditch effort to save his life, having only 10 to 20 percent survival, Benito was airlifted to Manila
and was directly confined at the Chinese General Hospital. After three (3) weeks of confinement, Benito
expired. CAUSE OF DEATH — SEPSIS (an overwhelming infection). This means that the infection has
already circulated in the blood all over the body. (ibid. pp. 6-7)
(pp. 59-65, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of Republic
Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed
for the crime of murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of any modifying
circumstances, should be reclusion temporal in its medium period or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, to 20
years of reclusion temporal.
Reasons out accused-appellant:
. . . Since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable when the stabbing and killing
happened, the computation of the penalty should be regarded from reclusion perpetua down and not from
death penalty. Indeed, the appropriate penalty is deducible from reclusion perpetua down to reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Hence, there being no modifying circumstances present (p. 5 Decision,
ibid.), the correct penalty should be in the medium period (Art. 64, par. 1, Revised Penal Code) which is
17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
(p. 10, Appellant's Brief, ff. p. 50, Rollo.)
The question raised by accused-appellant was settled by this Court in People vs. Muñoz (170 SCRA 107
[1989]) thusly:
In People vs. Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the abolition of the
death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for
murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua," thereby eliminating death as
the original maximum period. Later, without categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice
Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera in People vs. Masangkay and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in
People vs. Atencio, divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were
specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People vs. Intino, as follows: the lower half of reclusion
temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and
reclusion perpetua as the maximum.
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the conclusion that
the doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III,
Section 19(1) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there is much to
be said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared by many of those now voting for its reversal. The
majority of the Court, however, is of the belief that the original interpretation should be restored as the
more acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question.
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and
thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium.
These should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by
the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19(1) merely prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the
remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that here is really nothing therein which
expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty
shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter
provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather
awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under
consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of
the constitutional convention, for its interpretation.
xxx       xxx       xxx
The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or merely to
prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is whether or not they also
meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against
the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in Article III, Section
19(1) of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It would have
been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no doubts as to its
meaning.
One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The writer of this opinion makes the
personal observation that this might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing and said
another or — strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere — did not say enough.
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases represented the
unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then constituted. All but two members at that time still sit on
the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed
before, it is not because of a change in the composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is
changing its mind after reflecting on the question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it
might, and can, for the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not petrified
rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change as all life is. While we are
told that the trodden path is best, this should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the
other side or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.
Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks," whatever that means, we
hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced
by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold that Article III, Section
19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua.
The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
The Court realizes that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not have arisen under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the
death penalty and another who committed the murder without the attendance of any modifying
circumstance will now be both punishable with the same medium period although the former is
concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough. But that is the will not of this Court but of the
Constitution. That is a question of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in
the Bible of the workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he had worked
longer than others hired later in the day also paid the same amount. When he complained because he felt
unjustly treated by the hoe jurisdiction of the court over the person. An appearance may be madt agree
with me for a penny?
The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties are prescribed by
statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them
and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as determined exclusively by the legislature.
We should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of
the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine
here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty we imposed on all the
accused-appellants for each of the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others. The
award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is hereby
increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.
(at pp. 120-125.)
The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parominog (203 SCRA 673 [1991]) and in People vs. De la
Cruz (216 SCRA 476 [1992]).
Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh a penalty
and pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply
the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED LEX. The remedy
is elsewhere — clemency from the executive or an amendment of the law by the legislative, but surely, at
this point, this Court can but apply the law.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.
 
ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with Delfin Saldivar
would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable
and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by petitioner as manager for
technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom private respondent was allegedly very
close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts
worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the
latter's activities. The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal auditor, Mr.
Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial
and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services
(Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar
had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without
authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner
was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar. 1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company
reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed
that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also
appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but
failed to inform her employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent Salazar
under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30)
days within which to, explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations three (3) days later or
on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which
she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay
and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was
considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove these findings. 2
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner company to
reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and
other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered
to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned resolution dated
December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement of private
respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral
damages. 4
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in ordering
her reinstatement with two (2) years' backwages.
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his
position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any employee
closely, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by th.e discovery of the
missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar.
Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to the
company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does, not signify that the
company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such
disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property pending investigation
any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. 5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due process when
she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when she ignored
petitioner's memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to the
Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for illegal
suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual
separation from employment was not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who has not
merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is not to be
deprived without due process, but also the compensation that should have accrued to her during the
period when she was unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of
an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor
Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employments, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when authorized by
existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages." 7 (Emphasis supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution has gone further
than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society,
including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole new Article emerged on Social Justice and
Human Rights designed, among other things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good." 8 Proof of the priority accorded to
labor is that it leads the other areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of
such topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and Housing, Health,
Women, Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and Human Rights. 9
The opening paragraphs on Labor states
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be
entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate
in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits is may be provided by law. 10
(Emphasis supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article an Declaration
of Principles and State Policies that provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between
workers and employers. The State shall ensure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
baegaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may provide for
compulsory arbitration. 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which the State is
mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of the present
Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full protection," at least
greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless of the geographical location of the
workers and whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially contributed to
the present formulation of the protection to labor provision and proposed that the same be
incorporated in the Article on Social Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of Principles and
State Policies "in the light of the special importance that we are giving now to social justice and the
necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in national development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our Constitution and the
Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from his job except for a
just or authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater importance under the 1987 Constitution
with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And this transcendent
policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or
unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other hand, the employer
whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal has failed to do so, then the
remedies provided in Article 279 should find, application. Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis
labor, the legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 2,
1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have
generated which watered down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection." 13
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause
for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but
ay well, to full backwages." 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of
backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, for
the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione positions etc. from
which one had been removed" 15 and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of
unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has not been
forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement under the
facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of
the long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it
would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or,
that it will not serve the best interests of the parties involved; 19 or that the company would be
prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; 20 or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as
when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score unjust or inequitable 21 or,
to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained
relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and separation pay
23
or solely separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of the Labor
Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory construction, if a
statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi
sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by,
the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it
differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. 27 Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does
the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds
for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when the
reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the
employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the
trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy
and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee
concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles: where the
employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top
management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is an
organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the workers in
commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose
primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and organizations to
the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey
reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between
the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right; otherwise
an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his
separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become strained. 34
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one that may
be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained
relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general
rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in transactions that
may have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of
company policy, it prohibits its employees from involving themselves with any company that has
business dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness to the
partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was
deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance did not create a
conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations
involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of systems and
analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of trust
relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and company assets.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we have
held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for terminations it
must rest an some basis which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee who not be dismissed
on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since Salazar and Saldivar lived
together in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with
Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was probably true, do not
pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither
should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous because the
bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as
technical operations' support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's special
relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities.
Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the records.
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already resigned
from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute management's
findings, the report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt
principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice his side in view
of his prior resignation, stringent examination should have been carried out to ascertain whether or not
there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her
dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been unlawfully dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated
December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent
Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2) years only.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., concurs in the result.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part.
 
 
 
Separate Opinions
 
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I believe there is just cause for dismissal per investigative findings. (See Decision, p. 2.)
Narvasa C.J., concurs
 
 
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I believe there is just cause for dismissal per investigative findings. (See Decision, p. 2.)
Narvasa C.J., concurs
 
Footnotes
1 Records, pp. 34-43.
2 Records, p. 22.
3 Ibid, p.121.
4 Rollo, p. 149.
5 Soriano v. NLRC, G.R. No. 75510, October 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 124.
6 Pres. Decree No. 442, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715.
7 LABOR CODE (1991), Book VI, Rule 1, Secs. 2 and 3.
8 CONST., Art. XIII, Sec. 1, par. (1).
9 CONST., Art. XIII.
10 CONST., Art. XIII, Sec. 3, pars. (1) and (2)
11 CONST. (1973), Art. II, Sec. 9.
12 CONCOM Record, Vol. 2, p. 681.
13 The following provision on security of tenure is embodied in Article 279, Labor Code, reproduced
herein but with the amendments inserted by Republic Act No. 6715 approved on March 2, 1989 in bold
type:
In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of-an employee except
for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights AND OTHER PRIVILEGES and to his FULL
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his ACTUAL reinstatement.
14 The application of Article 279 is illustrated in the following cases: Santos Salao v. NLRC, G.R. No.
9O786, September 21, 1991; Morales v. NLRC, G.R. 91501, August 2, 1990, 188 SCRA 295; Carandang v.
Dulay, G.R. 90492, July 30, 1990, 188 SCRA 792; and Santos v. NLRC, No. 76721, September 21, 1987,
154 SCRA 166.
15 Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary.
16 Balaquezon EWTU v. Zamora, Nos. L-46766-7, April 1, 1980, 97 SCRA 5.
17 San Miguel Corporation v. Deputy Minister of Labor and Employmet, No. 58927, October 27, 1986,
145 SCRA 204.
18 Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation v. Pagalibuan, G.R. 62909, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 404.
19 Century Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, No. 77859, May 25, 1988, 161 SCRA 528.
20 Gubac v. NLRC, G.R. No. 81946, July 13, 1990, 187 SCRA 412
21 Sealand Service, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90500, Occtober 5, 1990, 190 SCRA 347.
22 Commercial Motors Corporation v. Commissioners, G.R. No. 74762, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA
191; DeVera v. NLRC, G.R. No. 93212, November 22, 1990, 191 SCRA 632; Orcino v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 92864, October 18, 1990, 190 SCRA 815; Maglutac v. NLRC/ Conmart v. NLRC,G.R.
No. 78637, September 21, 1990,189 SCRA 767; Carandang v. Dulay, G.R. No. 90942, August 20, 1990,
188 SC RA 792; Esmalin v. NLRC, G.R. No. 67880, September 15,1989, 177 SCRA 537; Fernandez v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 84302, August 10, 1989, 176 SCRA 269; Quezon Electric Cooperative v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 79718-
22, April 12,1989, 172 SCRA 88, Bautista v. Inciong, No. 52824, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 665; Citytrust
Finance Corp. v. NLRC, No.75740, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 87; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v.
Ople No. 56398, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 219; and Divine Word High Schol v. NLRC, No. 72207, August 6,
1986, 143 SCRA 346
23 Chua Qua v. Clave, G.R.No. 49549, August 30,1990,189 SCRA 117; Gold City Integrated Port Services,
Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 86000, September 21, 1990 189 SCRA 881 ; ALU v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 83886-87,
September 20,1990, 189 SCRA 743; and Pizza Inn v. NLRC, No. 74531, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 773.
24 Maglutac v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78345, September 21, 1990, 189 SCRA 767; Conmart v. NLRC, G.R. No.
78637, 189 SCRA 767; De Vera v. NLRC, G.R. No. 93212, November 22, 1990, 191 SCRA 632; Commercial
Motors Corp. v. Commissioners, G.R. No. 74762, December 10, 1990, 192 SCRA 191; Sealand Service,
Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90500, October 5, 1990, 190 SRCA 347.
25 LABOR CODE, Art. 279.
26 R. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, p 94 (1990).
27 Aparri v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 30057, January 31, 1984 231 SCRA 241
28 Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, No. 569393, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 219
29 Citytrust Finance Corp. v. NLRC, No. 75740, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 87
30 Bautista v. Inciong, No. 52824, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 665.
31 Esmalin v. NLRC, G.R. No. 67880, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 537.
32 Maglutac v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78345, September 21, 1990, 189 SCRA 767.
33 Anscor Transport and Terminals v. NLRC, G.R. No. 85894, September 28, 1990, 190 SCRA 147.
34 Sibal v. Notre Dame of Greater Manila, G.R. No. 75093, February 23, 1990 182 SCRA 538.
35 Reyes v. Zamora, No. L-46732, May 5, 1979, 90 SCRA 92; De Vera v. NLRC and BPI, G.R. No. 93070,
August 9, 1991.
36 Rollo, pp. 29 and 35.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
 
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
1
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages,
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs,
interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case
was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The transcript reads
as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta
rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon —
ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m.,
kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka
sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union
kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own
makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko naman
kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito
kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-
ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok,
okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako.
Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.
3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging petitioner of
violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No.
4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized
by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and
thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3,
1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the
taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court,
which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19,
1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial
court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus
quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the
respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent
Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic
Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a
party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the
substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged
would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the
taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of
secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would
lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy
to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion
that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third
persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear to be
material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and
involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil
cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps
by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior,
simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose
there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of
this bill or outside?
Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be
used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the
authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of one
without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose;
Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the
observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors where a
tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people
whose remarks and observations are being made should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed that
whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in
spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain
any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without
him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be
used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a
party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is
public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the communication
between one person and another person — not between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent
court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law
makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the
same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A.
4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in
the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation,
as well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of
absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to
impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process
by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as
language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal,
written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the
privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and
"communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted
below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard. But
this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all,
civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social
desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, among
others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our
Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication
between individuals — free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping,
we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation
without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among
those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes
must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because
the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and
the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use
of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us
with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 88-403, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 64.
2 Rollo, p. 48.
3 Rollo, pp. 47-48.
4 Rollo, p. 9.
5 Rollo, p. 37.
6 Rollo, p. 99, Annex "H".
7 Rollo, p. 13.
8 Id.
9 Rollo, p. 14.
10 Rollo, p. 14-15.
11 Pacific Oxygen and Acytelene Co. vs. Central Bank 37 SCRA 685 (1971).
12 Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 (1970).
13 Rollo, p. 33.
14 Rollo, p. 67.
15 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 460 (1976).
16 Id.
17 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. III, No. 31, at 573 (March 10, 1964).
18 145 SCRA 112 (1986). See also, Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA 235 SCRA 111 (1994).
19 Id., at 120.
20 Id., at 121.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

 
G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993
JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.
Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.
Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.
 
CRUZ, J.:
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992,
dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post the
1
required appeal bond.
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended, providing that:
In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as follows:
Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to
decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed
recruiters for overseas employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of
the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a
surety bond of P50,000, thus:
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of P30,000. It shall also post a cash
bond of P100,000 and surety bond of P50,000 from a bonding company acceptable to the Administration
and duly accredited by the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims
arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation and
contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Code
and its implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment and placement, the Rules of the
Administration and relevant issuances of the Department and all liabilities which the Administration may
impose. The surety bonds shall include the condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the surety
and that any judgment against the principal in connection with matters falling under POEA's jurisdiction
shall be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds shall be co-terminus with the validity
period of license. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National
Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and
legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims."
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest that the
rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA.
Appeals from decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the following provisions of Rule V, Book
VII of the POEA Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as
provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee
and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof;
the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision
and/or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running
of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis
supplied)
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of P200,000
as required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its
appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash and surety bonds
and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to
perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure
the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the
NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to guarantee the
payment of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary
awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been violated. The POEA can go against
these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its license, the provisions of the Labor
Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the
settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to be
used only as a last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of recruited
workers that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount may not even be enough to cover such
claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about P170,000 to the
dismissed employee, the herein private respondent. The standby guarantees required by the POEA Rules
would be depleted if this award were to be enforced not against the appeal bond but against the bonds
and the escrow money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction of the other obligations the recruiter
may incur.
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of P350,000,
which is the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.
It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the petitioner observes,
but there is a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent
requirement because of the special risks to which our workers abroad are subjected by their foreign
employers, against whom there is usually no direct or effective recourse. The overseas recruiter is
solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and the escrow money are intended to insure more
care on the part of the local agent in its choice of the foreign principal to whom our overseas workers are
to be sent.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care
should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated
measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under
the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule
should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner
would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy; on the contrary,
we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would
render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in
Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same
Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA
Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to the mandate
of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a further protection to the
claimant employee, this Court affirms once again its commitment to the interest of labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J, is on leave.
 
# Footnotes
1 Order issued by NLRC Commissioner Domingo H. Zapanta, Second Division, dated October 30, 1992.
2 "That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed." Simonds v. Walker, 100 Mass. 113; National Pemberton Bank v. Lougee, 108
Mass. 373, 11 Am. Rep. 367. Charitable bequests are also governed by this maxim. Kieg v. Richardson, C.C.A. N.C., B6 F. 2d 849, 858.

G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994

FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, respondent.

Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.

MENDOZA, J.:

This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which among other things provides
compensation for persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and ordered released.

Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated
murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu,
Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner
and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled.

Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment, however, as the appeal of the other accused was
dismissed for failure to file his brief.

On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove
conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when
the latter barged into their hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner did nothing more,
petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.

Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to "any
1
person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal." The claim
was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground
that while petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of
a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that
he was "probably guilty."

On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary of Justice in
his resolution dated March 11, 1993:

It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused, convicted and
imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly
accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, thereby making him "a victim of
unjust imprisonment." In the instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be
deemed such a victim since a reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his
exculpation is not based on his innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable
doubt.

Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309, however,
provides for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the
importance of the question tendered, the Court resolved to treat the petition as a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under sec. 3(a) of the
law the claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted in the
trial court. Through counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and does not call for
interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a crime which he was subsequently
acquitted of is already unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his claim because he was not declared
innocent would be to say that his imprisonment for two years while his appeal was pending was justified.
Petitioner argues that there is only one requirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such proof, the presumption that the accused
is innocent stands and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he be declared innocent of the
crime before he can recover compensation for his imprisonment.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on appeal he
must be given compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a
reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that when the language of
the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the
qualifying word "unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The following may file claims for
compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused, convicted, imprisoned but
subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."

But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The fact that
his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was
"unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by the trial court may,
for any of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he may be acquitted not because he is innocent of
the crime charged but because of reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable to the
complainant, because while the evidence against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof required for
conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient to sustain a civil action for damages. 2 In one case the
accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the
offended parties who consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the accused was ordered to pay
moral and exemplary damages and ordered deported. 3 In such a case to pay the accused compensation
for having been "unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent with his liability to the
complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an accused would be entitled to compensation under
sec. 3(a).

The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of innocence of the
accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is not
synonymous with guilt," 4 so is the presumption of innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that
the accused is presumed to be innocent in order to place on the prosecution the burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and
if he is convicted that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:

Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we
emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an
airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not
exist. 5

To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of his conviction
rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the
crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an "unjust
conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while
erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that
under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.

The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" in
art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:

In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it
must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not
supported by the evidence, and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent
to do an injustice . . . .

To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to Groizard, that
although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty,
that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any
public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest
 injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake
only exists in the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that is to say, such
injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, even though there is
a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the contrary it results, logically and
reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the
legal precept.

Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly
imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in
consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to note this because if
from its inception the prosecution of the accused has been wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all
probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though
based on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily
unjust.

The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case in court is not
whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether "there is reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof." Hence, an
accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and a conviction based on such
degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for such
error is appeal.

In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by the trial court was
wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the
court had reason to believe that petitioner and his co-accused were in league, because petitioner is the
father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the victim a grudge because of a land
dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and his coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced
their way into it.

The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof that he did or say
anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.

Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to have
committed any act at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at
all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having committed anything in furtherance of a
conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the defendants. It seems to be a frail
and flimsy basis on which to conclude that conspiracy existed between actual killer
Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio to commit murder and two frustrated murders
on that night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked: where was the coming together of the
two defendants to an agreement to commit the crimes of murder and frustrated murder
on two counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the commission of the said crimes?
Basbacio was — as the record shows — nothing but part of the dark shadows of that
night. . . .

One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by concert of action and
other circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why did they apparently flee together? And
what about the fact that there was bad blood between petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These
questions may no longer be passed upon in view of the acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in
evaluating his claim that he had been unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was released
because of his acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of these circumstances respondent Secretary of
Justice and the Board of Claims did not commit a grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's
claim for compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

# Footnotes
 1 The statute in pertinent parts provide:

Sec. 3. Who may File Claims. — The following may file claims for compensation before the Board:

a) any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of
acquittal;

b) any person who was unjustly detained and released without being charged;

c) any victim of arbitrary or illegal detention by the authorities as defined in the Revised Penal Code under a final
judgment of the court; and

d) any person who is a victim of violent crimes. For purposes of this Act, violent crimes shall include rape and shall
likewise refer to offenses committed with malice which resulted in death or serious physical and/or psychological
injuries, permanent incapacity or disability, insanity, abortion, serious trauma, or committed with torture, cruelty or
barbarity.

Sec. 4. Award Ceiling. — For victims of unjust imprisonment or detention, the compensation shall be based on the
number of months of imprisonment or detention and every fraction thereof shall be considered one month: Provided,
however, That in no case shall such compensation exceed One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) per month.

In all other cases, the maximum amount for which the Board may approve a claim shall not exceed Ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) or the amount necessary to reimburse the claimant the expenses incurred for hospitalization,
medical treatment, loss of wage, loss of support or other expenses directly related to the injury, whichever is lower.
This is without prejudice to the right of the claimant to seek other remedies under existing laws.

2 The Civil Code provides in Art. 29: "When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

"If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is
due to that ground."

3 People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690 (1991).

4 People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59, 64 (1971).

5 Supra note 3 at 722.

6 55 SCRA 107, 119 (1974)

G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991

RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its assignee-in-insolvency VICENTE J. CUNA, petitioner,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. LEONARDO I. CRUZ, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch
No. LVI, EMILIO C. PATINO, as assignee-in-insolvency of CARLOS and TERESITA GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF OF ANGELES CITY,
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ANGELES CITY, SANYO MARKETING CORPORATION, S & T ENTERPRISES INC., REFRIGERATION
INDUSTRIES INC., and DELTA MOTOR CORPORATION, respondents.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.

Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:p

This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986 Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court * in A.C-G.R. SP No. 04160 entitled
"Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Leonardo I. Cruz, et al." denying the petition for certiorari and mandamus; and its Resolution of
July 1, 1986 denying the motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate Appellate Court, are as follows:

On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the involuntary insolvency of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita
Gatmaytan, the private respondents herein, the case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1548 of the then Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga and Angeles City.
On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order taking cognizance of the said petition and stating inter alia that:

. . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the delivery of any property owing and
belonging to said respondents-debtors from other persons, or, to any other persons for the use
and benefit of the same respondents-debtors and/or the transfer of any property by and for the
said respondents-debtors to another, upon petitioners' putting up a bond by way of certified and
reputable sureties. (Annex 1, Comment).

Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent sheriff Angeles City of the aforesaid order (Annex 2, Ibid) and
on March 26, 1981, also communicated with counsel for the petitioner herein regarding same order, apprising the latter
that "the personal and real property which have been levied upon and/or attached should be preserved till the final
determination of the petition aforementioned." (Annex 3, Ibid).

On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second urgent motion for issuance of insolvency order and resolution of
the case, alleging among other things, that in November, 1982, they filed an urgent motion to issue insolvency order;
on December 2, 1982, they presented a motion to prohibit the city sheriff of Angeles City from disposing the personal
and real properties of the insolvent debtors, Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983, they
(sic) appealed in the Bulletin Today issue of even date a news item to the effect that Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc. has
already shut down its factory, sometime in March 1983, through their representative, they caused to be investigated the
real properties in the names of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan and they were surprised to find out that
some of the aforesaid properties were already transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc.; and that in view of such
development, it is their submission that without an insolvency order and a resolution of the case which was ripe for
resolution as early as March 3, 1982, the rights and interest of petitioners-creditors would be injured and jeopardized.
(Annex "C").

On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion vis-a-vis the prayer that the insolvency order (which
has not been rendered yet by the court) be annotated on the transfer certificates of title already issued in its name
(Annex "D").

On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the insolvency of respondents-debtors Carlos Gatmaytan and
Teresita Gatmaytan.

On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the same second urgent motion and motion to direct
respondent sheriff to issue a final certificate of sale for the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 in its
favor (Annex "E").

On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion claiming that ownership of certain real properties of the insolvents
had passed to it by virtue of foreclosure proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, which properties were not redeemed within the period of redemption,
respondent court issued an order disposing, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the election of Mr. Emilio C. Patino, as assignee of all
the registered claimants in this case, and, in consequence thereof, the said assignee is hereby
directed to post a bond in the amount of P30,000.00 and to take his oath thereafter so as to be
able to perform his duties and discharge his functions, as such.

The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the creditors with the attendance, of course, of the
assignee, on March 9, 1984, at 8:30., as by that time the proposals, which the respective
representatives of the parties-claimants desire to clear with their principals, shall have already
been reported.

The assignee shall see to it that the properties of the insolvents which are now in the actual or
constructive custody and management of the receiver previously appointed by the Court on
petitioners' and claimants' proposals be placed under this actual or constructive custody and
management, such as he is able to do so, as the Court hereby dissolves the receivership
previously authorized, it having become a superfluity. (Annex "F").

On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII, Pasig, Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 35946, issued an order
directing respondent Sheriff of Angeles City, or whoever is acting in his behalf, to issue within seven (7) days from
notice thereof a final deed of sale over the two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 18905
and 40430 in favor of petitioner. (Annex "G").

In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum of money covering the proceeds of television sets and other
appliances, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila, issued a writ of preliminary
attachment on February 15, 1980 upon application of the petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a bond of P350,000.00.
On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M., levy on attachment was done in favor of petitioner on the real properties registered in the
names of spouses Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan under TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 of the Registry of
Deeds of Angeles City, per Entry No. 7216 on said titles. (Annex "A" and "B").

On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in favor of petitioner, ordering private respondents and their co-
defendant Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to pay petitioner, jointly and severally, the sum of P721,825.91 plus interest
thereon of 14% per annum from October 12, 1979 until fully paid; P20,000.00, for and attorney's fees; and the costs of
suit (Annex "5", Comment). After the said decision in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946 became final and
executory, a writ of execution for the satisfaction thereof issued on March 18, 1981; and on May 4, 1981, respondent
sheriff of Angeles City sold at auction sale the attached properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430, to petitioner
as the highest bidder, and the certificate of sale was accordingly issued in its favor.

On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the consolidation of ownership of petitioner over said properties; but
respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue a final certificate of sale in favor of petitioner.

On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their opposition, stating among other things, that subject motion is
improper and premature because it treats of matters foreign to the insolvency proceedings; and premature, for the
 reason that the properties covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430-Angeles City were brought to the jurisdiction of the
insolvency court for the determination of the assets of the insolvents available for distribution to the approved
credits/liabilities of the insolvents. Petitioners-creditors theorized that the insolvency court is devoid of jurisdiction to
grant the motion referring to matters involved in a case pending before a coordinate court in another jurisdiction (Annex
"l").

Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, respondent court came out with its assailed extended order with the
following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in the aforequoted order issued in pursuance of a
similar motion of the movant, the Court denies, as it is hereby denied the motion of Radiola-
Toshiba, dated May 28, 1984 and directs the latter to participate in the supposed meeting of all
the creditors/claimants presided by the duly elected assignee. (Annex "J").

On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc. (RTPI, for short) filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.

The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on March 31, 1986, denied petitioner's aforesaid petition. On April 19,
1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated July 1, 1986.

Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two issues —

1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY DESIGNATED FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION ONLY; and

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE THE LIEN OF PETITIONER ARISING FROM A LEVY OF
ATTACHMENT NOT MADE WITHIN ONE MONTH NEXT PRECEDING THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING IS
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the insolvency proceedings
against respondent spouses commenced four months after said attachment.

On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended), provides:

Sec. 32 — As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified, the clerk of the court shall, by an instrument
under his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to the assignee all the real and personal property, estate, and
effects of the debtor with all his deeds, books, and papers relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate back to the
commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon the adjudication was founded,
and by operation of law shall vest the title to all such property, estate, and effects in the assignee, although the same is
then attached on mesne process, as the property of the debtor. Such assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee
all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. It shall dissolve any attachment levied within
one month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings and vacate and set aside any judgment
entered in any action commenced within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings
and shall set aside any judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor within thirty days immediately prior to the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)

Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate Appellate Court are undisputed that the levy on attachment against the subject
properties of the Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court of First Instance of Pasig in Civil Case No. 35946, was on March 4, 1980 while the
insolvency proceeding in the then Court of First Instance of Angeles City, Special Proceeding No. 1548, was commenced only on July 2,
1980, or more than four (4) months after the issuance of the said attachment. Under the circumstances, petitioner contends that its lien on
the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.

Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said law, which reads:

Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in
insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit was
commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove the legal costs and disbursements of the
suit, and of the keeping of the property, and the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.

and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the proceedings in the insolvent case, argue that the subsequent
Certificate of Sale on August 3, 1981, issued in favor of petitioner over the subject properties, was issued in bad faith, in violation of the law
and is not equitable for the creditors of the insolvent debtors; and pursuant to the above quoted Section 79, petitioner should not be entitled
to the transfer of the subject properties in its name.

Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit. The provision of the above-quoted Section 32, of the Insolvency Law is very clear — that
attachments dissolved are those levied within one (1) month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings and
judgments vacated and set aside are judgments entered in any action, including judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor, where
the action was filed within thirty (30) days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. In short, there is a cut off
period — one (1) month in attachment cases and thirty (30) days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency
proceedings. Section 79, on the other hand, relied upon by private respondents, provides for the right of the plaintiff if the attachment is not
dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim
upon which the attachment suit was commenced is proved against the estate of the debtor. Therefore, there is no conflict between the two
provisions.

But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give effect
to every part of a statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut maqis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be
sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute — its every word. Hence, where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation,
the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and
harmonious with each other (Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042 [1962]; Statutory Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, p. 182).

Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment in favor of the petitioner be considered as a fraudulent transfer or preference by
the insolvent debtors, which constitute a violation of Sec. 70 of the Insolvency Law. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines (100
Phil. 187, [1956]), this Court ruled that Sections 32 and 70 contemplate only acts and transactions occurring within 30 days prior to the
commencement of the proceedings in insolvency and, consequently, all other acts outside of the 30-day period cannot possibly be
considered as coming within the orbit of their operation.

Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were never placed under the jurisdiction of respondent insolvency court so
as to be made available for the payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans in the insolvency proceedings.

Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the attachment and execution of Civil Case No. 35946 of the CFI of
Rizal constitutes a freezing of the disposition of subject properties by the former which were not within its jurisdiction; undeniably, a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction, correctable by certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby Reversed and SET ASIDE. The attachment
and execution sale in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given due course and petitioner's ownership of subject properties
covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered consolidated.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Penned by Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima and concurred in by Associate Justices Carolina C. Griño-Aquino,
Jose F. Racela, Jr., and Jorge S. Imperial

G.R. No. 104712 May 6, 1992

MANUEL T. DE GUIA, in his capacity as Councilor of the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and the enforcement by respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
of its RESOLUTION NO. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila
Area for the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars (Annex "A",
Petition), RESOLUTION NO. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313 (Annex "B",
Petition), and RESOLUTION UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply
to the May 11, 1992 elections (Annex "C", Petition).

Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, having
been elected in the January 1988 local elections. He prays, more particularly, for reversal of the position of respondent insofar as it affects
the municipality of Parañaque and all the other municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. He claims that the second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3
of R.A. 7166, which requires the apportionment into districts of said municipalities does not specify when the members of their Sangguniang
Bayan will be elected by district. He would consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which immediately succeeds par. (c), to support his view
that the elected members of these municipalities mentioned in par. (c) should continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992 elections.

Paragraph (d) states that "[F]or purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the Sangguniang Panlunsod and
Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they
shall be elected by district." Petitioner therefore insists that the elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque fall under this
category so that they should continue to be elected at large until the 1995 regular elections.

Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court observes that petitioner does not allege that he is running for reelection, much less,
that he is prejudiced by the election, by district, in Parañaque. As such, he does
1
not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, personal or substantial interest. He does not also allege any legal right
that has been violated by respondent. If for this alone, petitioner does not appear to have any cause of
action.

However, considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political exercise of
qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of
the Constitution by respondent, We resolve to brush aside the question of procedural infirmity, even as
We perceive the petition to be one of declaratory relief. We so held similarly through Mr. Justice Edgardo
L. Paras in Osmeña v. Commission on Elections. 2

Now on the meat of the dispute.

On November 18, 1991, Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26,
1991. It is "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms,
Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes." At issue in this case is the proper
interpretation of Sec. 3 thereof which provides:

Sec. 3. Elections of Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang

Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan. — The elective members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected as
follows:

(a) For provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts, the elective
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be elected by
legislative districts . . .

(b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the Commission
shall divide them into two (2) districts for purposes of electing the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan . . .

(c) The number and election of elective members of the Sangguniang

Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the Metro Manila Area, City of
Cebu, City of Davao and any other city with two (2) or more legislative
districts shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Sections 2
and 3 of Republic Act No. 6636 . . . Provided, further, That, the
Commission shall divide each of the municipalities in Metro Manila Area
into two (2) districts by barangay for purposes of representation in the
Sangguniang Bayan
. . . . and,

(d) For purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall
be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. However, beginning
with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district . . . .

On November 20, 1991, respondent COMELEC, invoking authority of the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code, R.A. 6636, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 7166, 3 issued Resolution No. 2313 and the subsequent
resolutions in question.

On February 20, 1992, in view of the perceived ambiguity in the meaning of par. (d), particularly in relation
to par. (c), Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, petitioner filed with COMELEC a Motion for Clarification of its Resolution
No. 2313 inquiring whether the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque and the other
municipalities of Metro Manila enumerated therein, which are all single-district municipalities, would be
elected by district in May 11, 1992 or in the 1995 regular elections.

Meanwhile, on March 3, 1992 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379 approving the guidelines submitted
by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Municipal Election Registrars concerned pursuant to
Resolution No. 2313, and stating therein its purpose in recommending to Congress the
districting/apportionment of Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan seats, i.e., to reduce the
number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. In this Project of
Apportionment, Parañaque together with the other twelve (12) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area
was divided into two (2) districts with six (6) elective councilors for each district.

On March 10, 1992, COMELEC resolved petitioner's Motion for Clarification by interpreting Sec. 3, R.A.
7166, to mean that the election of elective members of the Sangguniang Bayan, by district, of the thirteen
(13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area shall apply in the May 11, 1992 elections (Resolution UND.
92-010, prom. March 10, 1992). Petitioner says that he received copy of Resolution UND. 92-010 on
March 13, 1992.

On April 7, 1992, apparently not satisfied with this third Resolution of COMELEC, petitioner filed the
instant petition asserting that under par. (d), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 the elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Sangguniang Bayan, for purposes of the May 11, 1992 regular
elections, shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. He would include in this class of
sanggunian members to be elected at large those of the municipality of Parañaque.

Petitioner therefore imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating Resolution No. 2313,
Resolution No. 2379 and Resolution UND. 92-010 which clarifies, contrary to his view, that the district
apportionment of the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area is applicable to the May 11, 1992 regular
elections.

We have carefully examined pars. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, and its precursor bills on
synchronized elections, Senate Bill No. 1861 and House Bill No. 34811, and We realize the web of
confusion generated by the seeming abstruseness in the language of the law. Some framers of the law
were even fazed at the empirical implications of some of its provisions, particularly Sec. 3 thereof, and
they admitted in fact that said provisions were susceptible of varied interpretations, as borne by the
sponsorship and explanatory speeches now spread in the Journals of Congress. Hence, We can
understand why petitioner would interpret Sec. 3 as he would. But if we pursue his course, we may
conclude in absurdity because then there would have been no reason for R.A. 7166 to single out the
single-district provinces referred to in par. (b), and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area mentioned
in the second proviso of par. (c), to be apportioned at once into two (2) districts each if the members of
their respective sanggunian after all would still be elected at large as they were in the 1988 elections.

No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must therefore, as far as
we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open
the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its
purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute. If the statute needs construction, as it does in
the present case, the most dominant in that process is the purpose of the act. 4 Statutes should be
construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, 5 and they
should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the
benefits intended. 6 A construction should be rejected that gives to the language used in a statute a
meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that tends to
defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the enactment. 7

The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861
which states in part:

This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11, 1992, and provide for
the necessary implementing details. It also endorses reforms and measures to ensure
the conduct of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Specifically, it seeks
to: (1) Reduce the number of positions to be voted for by providing therein that the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
Bayan be elected not at large, but by district . . . .

That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent of R.A. 7166 is reflected in the
"WHEREAS" clauses constituting the preamble to Resolution No. 2379. Thus —

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order to reduce the number of candidates to

be voted for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections recommended, among others, to
the Congress of the Philippines, the districting/apportionment of sangguniang panlungsod
and sangguniang bayan seats;

WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act 7166, and approved by
the President of the Philippines on November 26, 1991, adopting among others, the
recommendation of the Commission on Elections aforestated;

WHEREAS, pursuant to, and in implementation of Republic Act 7166, particularly Section
3 thereof, the Commission promulgated Resolution No. 2313, directing the Provincial
Election Supervisors and Election Registrars concerned to submit, after consultation,
public hearings, and consensus-taking with the different sectors in the community, the
Project of District Apportionment of single legislative-district provinces and municipalities
in the Metro Manila area;

WHEREAS, the established criteria/guidelines in the determination of the district

apportionment are as follows: a. compactness, contiguity and adjacentness of territory; b.
apportionment shall be based on the 1990 census of population; c. no municipality, in the
case of provinces, and no barangay, in the case of cities and municipalities, shall be
fragmented or apportioned into different districts.

This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by district is also manifest from the four
corners of Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. 8 Thus, a careful analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3 shows that the purpose of
districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is to reduce the number of positions to be voted for in the May 11, 1992, synchronized
elections and ensure the efficiency of electoral process. Considering that the single-district provinces and the municipalities in the Metro
Manila Area, which are all single-districts, and under pars. (b) and (c) have already been apportioned into two (2) districts, they will
henceforth be electing the members of their Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in the coming May 11, 1992,
elections, although under par. (d), the single-district cities and all the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all likewise
single-districts, will have to continue electing at large the members of their Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan as they have
yet to be apportioned. But beginning the regular elections of 1995, they will all have to be elected by district. By then, COMELEC would have
had enough time to apportion the single-district cities and the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area.

As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of local government units for purposes of election under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, it
is clear that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts contemplated in par. (a), they shall continue to be elected by district; (2)
for provinces with single legislative districts, as they have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under par. (b), they shall
henceforth be elected likewise by district; (3) for cities with two (2) or more legislative districts, e.g., the cities of Manila, Cebu and Davao,
they shall also continue to be elected by district under the first part of par. (c); and (4) for the thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila
Area, which have already been apportioned into two (2) districts each under the second proviso of par. (c), they shall likewise be elected by
district in the regular elections of May 11, 1992.

Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside
Metro Manila, which remain single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. They will have to continue to be
elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the full implementation of
the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166. That is the true import of par. (d). Consequently, as We view it, where he stands, petitioner must fall.

WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, on the part of respondent, and for lack of merit, the instant petition is
DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333; Municipality of Malabang
v. Benito, G.R. No. L-28113, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 533.

2 G.R. No. 100318, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750.

3 R.A. 7166 was approved only on November 26, 1991, when the President signed it into law, although it was passed
by Congress on November 18, 1991, or before COMELEC promulgated its Resolution No. 2313.

4 De Jesus v. City of Manila, 29 Phil. 73 [1914]; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas De Seguros; 107 Phil.
1055 [1960]; Garcia v. Ambler, 4 Phil. 81 [1904]; McMicking v. Lichauco, 27 Phil. 386 [1914].

5 LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Phil. Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725 [1961]; People v. Purisima, G.R. No. 52050, November 20,
1978, 86 SCRA 542; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipina Compania De Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055 [1960].

6 Rivera v. Campbell, 34 Phil. 348 [1916].

7 Muñoz & Co. v. Hord, 12 Phil. 624 [1909]; Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 Phil. 485 [1909]; Sarcos v. Castillo, G.R. No. 29755,
January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 853; Republic Flour Mills. Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. L-28463, May 31,
1971, 39 SCRA 269; People v. Gatchalian, 104 Phil. 664 [1958]).

8 Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41001, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 162.

G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all
surnamed ABISTO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case mandatory or directory?

Statement of the Case

The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its
1
authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision promulgated
on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent Resolution 2 promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent
Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads: 4

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set
aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado,
Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and
substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado,
represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.

The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby
dismissed for want of evidence.

Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an
order for the issuance of a decree be issued.

The Facts

On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his
title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. 5 The application was
docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court
of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. 6 However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence,
his heirs — Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado — represented by
their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.

The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition "for want of
jurisdiction." However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.

In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned: 7

. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1)
of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in the Official
Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has
not legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the
mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation.

The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its pertinent portion
provides: 8

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold
purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to
publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in
the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette
but also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is
dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because
without it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration
case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general
circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise,
any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier explained,
set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro
Abistado.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dared November
19, 1991.

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to us. This Court
notes that the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should
be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall
treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65. 9
 The Issue

Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of discretion" 10 in holding —

. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be
published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want
of such publication.

Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be "published
both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation." According to petitioner, publication
in the Official Gazette is "necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper
of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process." 11

Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement of publication
in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere "procedural defect." They add that publication in the
Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 12

In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled: 13

. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with
equal force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court.

Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity "to explain matters
fully and present their side." Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise: 14

. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in any
way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by
mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these are
sufficient to notify any party who is minded to make any objection of the application for
registration.

The Court's Ruling

We find for petitioner.

Newspaper Publication Mandatory

The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of
initial hearing reads as follows:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall, within five days from filing of
the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be
earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means
of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

1. By publication. —

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of
Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official
Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however,
that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved
including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice
shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show
cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

xxx xxx xxx

Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in the Official
Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question boils down
to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can
validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.

We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory construction
and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement.

The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land
Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word
denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. 15 While concededly such
literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its
context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal
mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan, 16 the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2)
mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If the intention of the law were otherwise,
said section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named
in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants
of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a
newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its
detailed provision.

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. 17 Being in rem, such proceeding
requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or
interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This being so,
the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights
may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge
of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court
must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the
same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty. 18 He must
prove his title against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved
when all persons concerned — nay, "the whole world" — who have rights to or interests in the subject
property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application should
not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken
from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and
opportunity to oppose.

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory
when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and
posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and
the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes
delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on
time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not
own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the
notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.

Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. Private
respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered because the statute
itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory
requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that
where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or
equivocation; there is room only for application. 19 There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land
registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future,
after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

Footnotes
 1 Rollo, pp. 29-36.

2 Ibid., p. 37.

3 Seventh Division composed of Justice Celso L. Magsino, ponente; and Justices Serafin
E. Camilon, Chairman; and Artemon D. Luna, concurring.

4 Ibid., p. 35.

5 Known as the Property Registration Decree.

6 Presided by Judge Niovady M. Martin.

7 Rollo, p. 41.

8 Ibid., pp. 41-42.

9 The Solicitor General asked for and was granted an extension of 30 days within which
to file a "petition for review on certiorari." It is thus strange why the OSG described its
petition as one "for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court." In any event, the
Court, in its Resolution dated March 9, 1992 admitted the OSG's "petition for review on
certiorari," clearly ruling that the petition was one for review, and not one for certiorari.

10 Ibid., p. 21. This should really read "reversible error" since as already explained, the
petition should be treated as one for review under Rule 45.

11 Ibid., pp. 22-23.

12 Ibid., pp. 56-57.

13 Ibid., p. 34; Decision, p. 6.

14 Ibid.

15 Bersabal vs. Salvador, 84 SCRA 176, 179-180, July 21, 1978, citing Dizon vs.
Encarnacion, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717, December 24, 1963.

16 198 SCRA 219, 227-228, June 6, 1991.

17 Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, September 16, 1910.

18 Archbishop of Manila vs. Arnedo, 30 Phil. 593, March 31, 1915.

19 Cebu Portland Cement Company vs. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, 24 SCRA 708, 712,
August 22, 1968 citing Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. 504, 1913; People vs.
Mapa, L-22301, August 30, 1967; Pacific Oxygen and Acetylene Co. vs. Central Bank, L-
21881, March 1, 1968; Dequito vs. Lopez, L-27757, March 28, 1968.

G.R. No. 160172             February 13, 2008

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus
they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994.
They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex
thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had
already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they
executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe,
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless,
after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live
together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the
child’s birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist
and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City (trial court.3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner
and that the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her "as his wife
and Reinna Tricia as his child."4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the
marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to
sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due
to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got
married. He also averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen
nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared
petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support. Petitioner elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on
the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is
not, and could not have been, his own child.
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the
child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties’ marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioner’s refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as
well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying
that petitioner’s "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and
reward him of his being irresponsible."6 Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April
1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the
child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial
court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There
was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no
collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a
marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter
that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings. The
proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support
the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner
and respondent.7 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and
the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee
valid until properly annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose. Costs
against the appellant.8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. 9 Hence
this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent
because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a
marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license, contained a
false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as husband and
wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a
marriage license.10 Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the appearance of a
prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for
annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial
court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an
affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing several authorities, 11 petitioner claims that a
void marriage can be the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another
independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling
of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented
would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would
increase the burden of the courts. 12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of his marriage
with respondent and his vigorous denial of the child’s paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition. 13
In her Comment,14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the
finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court,
she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but can only be
repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation
of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was
uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds that
despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected
to DNA testing to prove paternity and filiation. 15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial
court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing
the case of Niñal v. Bayadog,16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage in an action
for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage.
Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, and that their affidavit
(of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for
at least five years) was false. Thus, it concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is not valid.17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court
that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support. 18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine
the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support and second,
whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked.19 Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be
obtained only for purpose of remarriage. 20
Likewise, in Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño,21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to
pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for death benefits.
Reiterating Niñal, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. 22
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable.23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did
not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit
stating that they had been living together for more than five years. 24 However, respondent herself in
effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination, thus—
ATTY. CARPIO:
Q     But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the last
five years on or before March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
A     Yes, sir.25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of
persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage
license.26 In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no
cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push
through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt
from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders
their marriage void ab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner’s illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled
to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence
as legitimate children.27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.28
The Certificate of Live Birth29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an
affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the
child, thus stating:
1. I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at
Better Living, Parañaque, Metro Manila;30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the
testimony of the latter, but also by respondent’s own admission in the course of his testimony wherein
he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used to visit
petitioner at the latter’s house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As a result of
their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though
invalid, as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage
ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and
"C-2," "D," "D-1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-2" and "H," "H-
1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and "D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding
ring on petitioner’s finger and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in the
act of kissing the petitioner.31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of
Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 31-41.
2
Captioned Annabelle Assidao–De Castro v. Reinel Anthony B. De Castro.
3
The case was eventually raffled to Branch 70 of the Pasig RTC, presided by Judge Pablito M. Rojas.
4
Records, p. 3, Complaint.
5
Rollo, pp. 92-94.
6
Id. at 37.
7
Id. at 40.
8
Rollo, p. 41.
9
Id. at 43-44; Resolution dated 1 October 2003.
10
Id. at 15-20.
11
Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661 (2000). TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. I, 1990 Ed.
and SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE, 1991 Ed.
12
Rollo, pp. 25-26.
13
Id. at 135.
14
Id. at 119-126.
15
Id. at 139-144.
16
384 Phil. 661, 673 (2000).
17
Rollo, pp. 174-182.
18
Id. at 183-185.
19
Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 704 (1999), citing TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES:COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 265.
20
Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 675 (2000).
21
Cariño v. Cariño, 403 Phil. 861 (2001).
22
Id. at 132.
23
Family Code, Art. 4.
24
Purportedly complying with Art. 34 of the Family Code, which provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
25
TSN, 18 February 2000, p. 20.
26
Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 669 (2000), citing THE REPORT OF THE CODE COMMISSION, p. 80.
27
Family Code, Art. 175.
28
Family Code, Art. 172.
In the book Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines by Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, p. 246 (1988), the
following were given as examples of "other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws:" (a)
the baptismal certificate of the child ; (b) a judicial admission; (c) the family bible wherein the name of
the child is entered; (d) common reputation respecting pedigree; (e) admission by silence; (f)
testimonies of witnesses; and (g) other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130.
29
Records, p.6.
30
Id. at 160.
31
Rollo, pp. 93-94

Rep. v. Nolasco GR# 94053 / MAR. 17, 1993 220 SCRA 20 On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio
Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition
prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage
be declared null and void. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition that Nolasco did not
possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead,” and second, Nolasco's
attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent
the law on marriage. Issue: Whether or not there is a reason to declare Janet presumptively dead.
Ruling: No, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code: 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a
well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. The Court believes that
respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a
"well-founded belief" that she is dead. The investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his
attempt to ascertain Janet MonicaParker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable
or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of
Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he
secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to
look for her there.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-8492.  February 29, 1956.]
In the Matter of the Declaration of the Civil Status of: LOURDES G. LUKBAN, Petitioner-
Appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellee.
 
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for a declaration that Petitioner is a
widow of her husband Francisco Chuidian who is presumed to be dead and has no legal
impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that the same is not authorized by law.
After Petitioner had presented her evidence, the court sustained the opposition and dismissed the
petition. Hence this appeal.
Lourdes G. Lukban, Petitioner herein, contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on
December 10, 1933 at the Paco Catholic Church, Manila. On December 27, of the same year,
Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then he has not been heard from despite
diligent search made by her. She also inquired about him from his parents and friends but no one
was able to indicate his whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he is still alive, his last known
address being Calle Merced, Paco, Manila. She believes that he is already dead because he had
been absent for more than twenty years, and because she intends to marry again, she desires that
her civil status be defined in order that she may be relieved of any liability under the law.
We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in the case of
Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st Sup., 243, wherein it was held that a petition for judicial
declaration that Petitioner’s husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is
not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot be made in a special proceeding similar to
the present, much less can the court determine the status of Petitioner as a widow since this
matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the husband. This the court can declare
upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he is merely presumed to be dead. (Nicolai
Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st sup. 243).
The philosophy behind the ruling that such judicial pronouncement cannot be made in a
proceeding of this nature is well expressed in the case above-cited. Thus, we there said that “A
judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie
presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a
judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or
upon which a competent court has to pass . It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a
 cralaw

person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or
become final.”
Appellant claims that the remedy she is seeking for can be granted in the present proceedings
because in the case of Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil., 880, it was declared that a special
proceeding is “an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact”; but, as already said, that remedy can be invoked if the purpose is to seek the
chan roblesvirtualawlibrary

declaration of death of the husband, and not, as in the present case, to establish a presumption of
death. If it can be satisfactorily proven that the husband is dead, the court would not certainly
deny a declaration to that effect as has been intimated in the case of Nicolas Szartraw, supra.
Appellant also claims that the present petition can be entertained because article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, in defining bigamy, provides that a person commits that crime if he
contracts a second marriage “before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings” and, it is claimed, the present petition
comes within the purview of this legal provision. The argument is untenable for the words
“proper proceedings” used in said article can only refer to those authorized by law such as those
which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person (Articles 390
and 391, new Civil Code). That such is the correct interpretation of the provision in question
finds support in the case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil., 179, wherein this Court made the
following comment: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his
or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the
spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2,
General Orders, No. 68).”
The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.
and Endencia, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14058             March 24, 1960

In the matter of the petition for the declaration of William Gue, presumptively dead.
ANGELINA L. GUE, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.

Virgilio V. David for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor E. M. Salva for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by Judge
Bonifacio Ysip, dismissing the petition of Angelina Gue. Involving as it does only question of
law, the appeal was taken directly to us.

On November 20, 1957, Angelina L. Gue filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Civil Case No. 34303, alleging that she was married to William Gue; that they had a child named
Anthony L. Gue; that January 5, 1946, her husband left Manila where they were residing and
went to Shanghai, China, but since then, he had not been heard of, neither had he written to her,
nor in anyway communicated with her as to his whereabouts; that despite her efforts and
diligence, she failed to locate him; and that they had not acquired any property during the
marriage. She asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of death of William Gue,
pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. After due
publication and hearing, the trial court issued the order of dismissal, which we reproduce below:

This is a petition filed by Angelina L. Gue to declare her husband. William Gue,
presumptively dead. During the hearing of this petition, it was established by the
testimony of the petitioner that she and her husband were married on October 11, 1944 in
the City of Manila before the parish priest of Tondo, Manila, as shows in Exhibit B, the
marriage contract. Her husband, who is a Chinese citizen, left the Philippines for
Shanghai on January, 1946. The petitioner joined him in Shanghai in August of the same
year. In January, 1949, the petitioner came back to the Philippines alone with her
children, on which occasion her husband promised to follow her. However, up to the
present time, said William Gue has not returned to the Philippines. From January, 1949,
the petitioner had sent letters to her husband in Shanghai, but she never received any
reply thereto. She made inquiries from the Bureau of Immigration in 1955 and 1958 as to
whether her husband had already returned to the Philippines and she received Exhibit D
and Exhibit E from said Office, which gave no information as to the whereabouts of her
husband. It was also established by petitioner's testimony that no properties have been
acquired by said spouses during their union, and during which they begot two children,
named Eugeni and Anthony, surnamed Gue.

With this evidence on record and considering the allegations in the petition, it is clear that
no right had been established by the petitioner upon which a judicial decree may be
predicated, and this action is not for the settlement of the estate of the absentee, as it is
clear that he did not leave any.

In the case of "Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw", 81 Phil., 461, a
case similar to the present, the Supreme Court held:

The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not
appear that he possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired
no property during his married life with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is
merely one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the
fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been established. This
presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, whether in an action or in a
 special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a special
proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for
by the petitioner for the final determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment
of a particular fact (Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil., 880), for the petition does not pray
for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration
that he be presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is
any pretense at securing a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, such a
pretension cannot be granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration
that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially
made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is
established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory,
would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason
that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only
question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The
latter must decide finally the controversy the right or status of a party or established
finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and
once such controversy is decided by a final judgment or such right or status is
determined, then the judgment on the subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the
right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata,
subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law.
It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead,
because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only,
subject to contrary proof cannot reach the state of finality or become final. Proof of actual
death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years,
would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had
not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the
lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such a
presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for
such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.
The Court should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and
meaningless act.

"Little effort is necessary to perceive that a declaration such as the one prayed for by the
petitioner, if granted, may make or lead her to believe that the marital bonds which binds
her to her husband are torn asunder, and that for that reason she is or may feel free to
enter into a new marriage contract. The framers of the rules of court, by the presumption
provided for in the rule of evidence in question, did not intend and mean that a judicial
declaration based solely upon that presumption may be made. A petition for a declaration
such as the one filed in this case may be made in collusion with the other spouse. If that
were the case, then a decree of divorce that cannot be obtained or granted under the
provisions of the Divorce Law (Act No. 2710) could easily be secured by means of a
judicial decree declaring a person unheard from in seven years to be presumptively dead.
This is another strong reason why a petition such as the one presented in this case should
not be countenanced and allowed. What cannot be obtained directly under the provisions
of the Divorce Law could indirectly be secured under the provisions of Rule 123, section
69 (x). Obviously, the latter must not be made to prevail over the former."

In view of the foregoing and the doctrine of the Supreme Court laid down in the case
above-cited, the Court hereby orders that this case be, as it is hereby dismissed, without
pronouncement as the costs.

In her appeal, Angelina invoked the provisions of the Article 390 of the New Civil Code, which
for purpose of reference, we reproduce below.

ART. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee
still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
 The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening this succession till
after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the of seventy-five years, an absence
of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

She contends that under Article 191 of the Old Civil Code, which reads:

After thirty years have elapsed since disappearance of the absentee, or since he was last
heard from, or ninety years from his birth, the judgment upon the petition of any party
lawfully interested, shall make an order declaring that such absentee is presumed to be
dead.

a person could be declared presumptively dead, but that said legal provision was repealed by the
Code of Civil Procedure and continued to be repealed by the Rules of Court. Consequently, only
a mere disputable presumption of death was available to any party, and that the case of Nicolai
Szatraw, cited by the trial court, was decided on the law then existing, namely, the Code of Civil
Procedure, and later the new Rules of Court. However, according to appellant, with the
promulgation of the New Civil Code in 1950, particularly, Article 390 thereof, the Courts are
now authorized to declare persons presumptively dead.

In answer to her contention, the Solicitor General, as appellee herein, correctly cites our decision
in the recent case of Lourdes G. Lukban vs. Republic of the Philippines, 98 Phil., 574; 52 Off.
Gaz., No. 3, 1441, decided long after the New Civil Code went into effect, wherein we reiterated
the doctrine laid own in Nicolai Szatraw, supra. We quote the pertinent portions of our decision
in that case:

This is a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for a declaration that
petitioner is a widow of her husband Francisco Chuidian who is presumed to be dead and
has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.

The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that the same is not authorized
by law. After petitioner had presented her evidence, the court sustained the opposition
and dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal.

Lourdes G. Lukban, petitioner herein, contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on

December 10, 1933 at the Paco Catholic Church, Manila. On December 27, of the same
year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then he has not been heard
from despite diligent search made by her. She also inquired about him from his parents
and friends but no one was able to indicate his whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he
is still alive, his last known address being Calle Merced, Paco, Manila. She believes that
he is already dead because he had been absent for more than twenty years, and because
she intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order that she
may be relieved of any liability under the law.

We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in the case of
Nicolai Szatraw, 46 Off. Gaz. 1st Sup. 243, wherein it was held that a petition for judicial
declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained
because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot be made in a special
proceedings similar to the present, much less can the court determine the status of
petitioner as a widow since this matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of
the husband. This the court can declare upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he is
merely presumed to be dead. (Nicolai Szatraw, 48 Off. Gaz., 1st Sup. 243).

The philosophy behind the ruling that such judicial pronouncement cannot be made in a
proceeding of this nature is well expressed in the case above-cited. Thus, we there said
that "A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a
prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be
the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter
 involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass .. It is, therefore, clear
that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary
proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final."

We deem it unnecessary to further discuss the merits of the case. The appealed order dismissing
the petition is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, and Gutierrez
David, JJ., concur