[G.R. No. 84240. March 25, 1992.

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, Petitioners, v. ESPERANZA C.

PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C.
PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR.,
INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES
PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-
FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA
PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA
of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children

of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don
Andres Pascual. Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,
legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by Adela
Soldevilla de Pascual assurviving spouse, children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of
the full blood of the deceased, children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the
deceased, acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood of the
deceased and te intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased
and represented by his heirs. Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late
Don Andres Pascual, filed for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. all
the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the
vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be  interpreted to exclude
recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD:

No. The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, (150 SCRA
645) where this Court ruled that: "Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron
curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child
and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.
They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of
Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product
of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life the law does no more than recognize
this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment." Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child
but petitioners are his illegitimate children. Clearly the term “illegitimate” refers to both
natural and spurious.
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the
legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the
latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product
of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize
this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but
petitioners are his illegitimate children. Clearly the term “illegitimate” refers to both natural
and spurious.

"Article 902, 98, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be
legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the
persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are very
clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued as
done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to
represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that ‘the grandchildren
and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation.’ Such a conclusion is
erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate
parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of
Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to the instant case because Article 982 prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother. It May not be amiss to state Article 982 is the
general rule and Article 992 the exception. "The rules laid down in Article 982 that
‘grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation’ and in Article
902 that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their death to their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by
Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother." (Amicus Curiae’s Opinion by
former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 182
SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).

G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY,

Respondent.
PEREZ, J.:

Facts:
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990.  Cristina
was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three
legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate...
grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico's and Cristina's only child,
Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the
spouses Federico and Cristina.  Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings,
Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation...
of Isabel's parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco.  Isabel's parents, along with her paternal
grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed
by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I.  Emilio I was eventually... acquitted.
In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her
among others with infidelity.  The trial court declared as null and void and of no effect the
marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco
Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and Isabel filed a
complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the
same special lower court.  The Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-
QC)... granted their prayer for one hour a month of visitation rights which was subsequently
reduced to thirty minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabel's testimony
in court that her grandparents' visits caused her and her siblings stress and anxiety.
On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina's death, Federico adopted his
illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina's estate
Federico, opposed the petition
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel's petition for letters of administration on the
ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an
illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel's parents' marriage being declared
null... and void.  However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that
Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void
marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate children of
Emilio I,... who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the
decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent's
estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision
appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina's intestate estate
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the
Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of
the subject estate
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of
the appellate court.  We decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina's
estate, giving weight to his interest in Federico's estate.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on
the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and
that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed.  Isabel further asserts that Emilio
III had demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not
deserve to become a co-administrator thereof.
ISSUE : Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as
administrator of the decedent's estate.

HELD:
The Court cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling excluding Emilio III in the
administration of the decedent’s undivided estate. The underlying philosophy of our
law on intestate succession is to give preference to the wishes and presumed will of
the decedent, absent a valid and effective will.
The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, is
quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship
between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III. Both spouses
acknowledged Emilio III as their grandchild. Cristina’s properties forming part of her
estate are still commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because her share in
the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her death, remains undetermined
and unliquidated. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in
the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not
simply representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
It is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration
of the decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate
of Cristina is as much as the interest therein of Isabel. Considering that the CA even
declared that "under the law, Federico, being the surviving spouse, would have the
right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside
from his share in the conjugal partnership."
However, the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate
found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances of each case.
Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound
discretion of the trial court. In this case, the attendant facts and circumstances of
this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and
Emilio III of their grandmother’s, Cristina’s, estate.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in
the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estates, a situation which obtains here.
a. The subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs,
including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico,
NenitaTañedo.

Other issue:
1. Petitioner argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the
legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance
where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary – Emilio III, an illegitimate
grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as
their own son.
 a. Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of
intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did
not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither
did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III
from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child.
b. The peculiar circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel
for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code
that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate
descendants of a deceased. It must be pointed out that judicial restraint
impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and
distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina
and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the
properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.

[G.R. No. L-51263. February 28, 1983.]

CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA CAILLES,

JAMES BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK OF PARAÑAQUE, INC., Respondents.

FACTS:

Francisca Reyes died intestate on July 12, 1942 and was survived by two daughters, Maria
and Silvestra Cailles and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, Pascuala
Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in
1949 without any issue. On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to
be the son of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of
money and accounting in the Court of First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be
declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share
in the estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private respondent herein, Maria
Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the complaint,
partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all
the income derived from said properties from the time defendants took possession thereof
until said accounting shall have been made, delivering to him his share therein with legal
interest. Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive
ownership over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who
cannot succeed by right of representation. For his part, the other defendant, private
respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said properties are now his by virtue of a valid
and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently executed in his favor. These
properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Paranaque, Inc. sometime
in September 1963.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner, as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes, has legal right to
inherit by representation.

HELD:
No. Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he cannot, by right
of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes
considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as
shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative
father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father’s first
marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the
deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)

NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and
ANUNCIANO FELIANO

G.R. No. 162421, August 31, 2007

FACTS:

Sometime in 1964, Rurfino Cabales died leaving behind a parcel of land in Southern Leyte to
his wife, Saturnina and six children, namely, Bonifacio, Francisco, Alberto, Albino, Lenora,
and Rito. On 1971, the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Alberto and Albino sold the
property to Dr. Corrompido with a right to repurchase within eight (8) years. On 1972, prior
to the redemption of the property, Alberto died leaving behind his wife and son, Nelson,
herein petitioner.

Sometime later and within the redemption period, the said brothers and their mother, in lieu
of Alberto, tendered their payment to Dr. Corrompido. Subsequently, Saturnina, and her
four children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the said land to Spouses Feliano.
It was provided in the deed of sale that the shares of Nelson and Rito, being minor at the
time of the sale, will be held in trust by the vendee and will paid upon them reaching the
age of 21.

In 1986, Rito received the sum of 1,143 pesos from the Spouses Feliano representing his
share from the proceeds of the sale of the property. It was only in 1988, that Nelson
learned of the sale from his uncle, Rito. He signified his intention to redeem the property in
1993 but it was only in 1995 that he filed a complaint for redemption against the Spouses
Feliano. The respondent Spouses averred that the petitioners are estopped from denying
the sale since: (1) Rito already received his share; and (2) Nelson, failed to tender the total
amount of the redemption price.

The Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of Spouses Feliano on the ground that Nelson was
no longer entitled to the property since, his right was subrogated by Saturnina upon the
death of his father, Alberto. It also alleged that Rito had no more right to redeem since
Saturnina, being his legal guardian at the time of the sale was properly vested with the right
to alienate the same.

The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court stating that the sale made by
Saturnina in behalf of Rito and Nelson were unenforceable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale made by a legal guardian (Saturnina) in behalf of the minors were
binding upon them.
HELD:

With regard to the share of Rito, the contract of sale was valid. Under Section 1, Rule 96 “A
guardian shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of
his estate, or the management of the estate only. x x x” Indeed, the legal guardian only has
the plenary power of administration of the minor’s property. It does not include the power
of alienation which needs judicial authority. Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of
petitioner Rito, sold the latter’s pro indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal
authority to do so. Accordingly, the contract as to the share of Rito was unenforceable.
However, when he received the proceeds of the sale, he effectively ratified it. This act of
ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.

With respect to petitioner Nelson, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time
of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians;
rather it was his mother who if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his share in
the property. Consequently, petitioner Nelson retained ownership over their undivided share
in the said property. However, Nelson can no longer redeem the property since the thirty
day redemption period has expired and thus he remains as co-owner of the property with
the Spouses Feliano.