G.R. No.

102377 July 5, 1996

ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITA SAJONAS, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO A. PILARES, SHERIFF ROBERTO GARCIA OF QUEZON CITY
and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA, respondents.
FACTS:
On September 22, 1983, spouses Uychocde agreed to sell a parcel of residential land located in
Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Sajonas on installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell
dated September 22, 1983. The property was registered in the names of the Uychocde spouses
under TCT No. N-79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal.
On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of an adverse claim based on
the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property, which was inscribed as Entry No.
116017. Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale
involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984. The
deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after, or on August 28, 1985.
Meanwhile, it appears that Pilares (defendant-appellant) filed a Civil Case for collection of sum
of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 1980, a Compromise Agreement was entered into
by the parties in the said case under which Uychocde acknowledged his monetary obligation to
Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed to pay the same in two years. When Uychocde failed
to comply with his undertaking in the compromise agreement, Pilares moved for the issuance
of a writ of execution to enforce the decision based on the compromise agreement, which the
court granted in its order dated August 3, 1982. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on
August 12, 1982 by the CFI of Quezon City. Pursuant to the order of execution a notice of levy
on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On the same date, defendant sheriff Garcia of
Quezon City presented said notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of
Marikina and the same was annotated at the back of the TCT of the subject land.
When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4, 1984 was registered on August 28, 1985,
TCT No. N-79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was issued in the name
of the Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was
carried over to the new title. On October 21, 1985, the Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim
with the sheriff of Quezon City, hence the auction sale of the subject property did not push
through as scheduled.
On January 1986, the Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on
execution upon Pilares, through a letter to their lawyer. Despite said demand, defendant-
appellant Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said annotation.
ISSUES:
 1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULE ON THE 30-DAY PERIOD FOR
ADVERSE CLAIM UNDER SECTION 70 OF P.D. NO. 1529 IS ABSOLUTE INASMUCH AS IT
FAILED TO READ OR CONSTRUE THE PROVISION IN ITS ENTIRETY AND TO RECONCILE
THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCY WITHIN THE PROVISION IN ORDER TO GIVE EFFECT TO
IT AS A WHOLE.

2. WEHTHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY
HELD:
1. YES
Sentence three, paragraph two of Section 70 of P.D. 1529 provides:
“The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration.”
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the adverse
claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated separately, but
should be read in relation to the sentence following, which reads:
“After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of
a verified petition therefor by the party in interest.”
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect after the
lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to
clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be cancelled. If it has been
automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would not have required the party in
interest to do a useless act.
Construing the provision as a whole would reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the
portions of the law such that the provision on cancellation of adverse claim by verified petition
would serve to qualify the provision on the effectivity period. The law, taken together, simply
means that the cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary to render it ineffective,
otherwise, the inscription will remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the property.
For if the adverse claim has already ceased to be effective upon the lapse of said period, its
cancellation is no longer necessary and the process of cancellation would be a useless
ceremony.
To interpret the effectivity period of the adverse claim as absolute and without qualification
limited to thirty days defeats the very purpose for which the statute provides for the remedy of
an inscription of adverse claim, as the annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to
protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property where the registration of such
interest or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act or Act 496 (now P.D.
1529 or the Property Registration Decree), and serves as a warning to third parties dealing with
said property that someone is claiming an interest or the same or a better right than the
registered owner thereof.
In sum, the disputed inscription of an adverse claim on the TCT No. N-79073 was still in effect
on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy on
execution thereto. Consequently, he is charged with knowledge that the property sought to be
levied upon the execution was encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of
the registered owner thereof. Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim
inscribed on the certificate of title in favor of the petitioners
2. YES
The claim of the private respondent that the sale executed by the spouses was made in fraud of
creditors has no basis in fact, there being no evidence that the petitioners had any knowledge
or notice of the debt of the Uychocdes in favor of the private respondent, nor of any claim by
the latter over the Uychocdes' properties or that the same was involved in any litigation
between said spouses and the private respondent. While it may be stated that good faith is
presumed, conversely, bad faith must be established by competent proof by the party alleging
the same. Sans such proof, the petitioners are deemed to be purchasers in good faith, and their
interest in the subject property must not be disturbed.\

G.R. No. 126996           February 15, 2000

HEIRS OF CESARIO VELASQUEZ, namely: ANASTACIA VELASQUEZ, SOFIA VELASQUEZ, ELISEO

VELASQUEZ, JOSE VELASQUEZ, CORAZON VELASQUEZ, LEONORA VELASQUEZ, and NIEVES
VELASQUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF ANATALIA DE GUZMAN, namely: SANTIAGO MENESES,
ANDRES MENESES, FELICIDAD MENESES, and APOLONIO MENESES, respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Leoncia de Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate sometime in 1945 and 1947,
respectively and were childless. Leoncia de Guzman was survived by her sisters Anatalia de
Guzman (mother of the plaintiffs) and Tranquilina deGuzman (grandmother of the defendants).
During the existence of their marriage, spouses Aquino were able to acquire real properties.
The plaintiffs alleged that Leoncia de Guzman, before her death, had a talk with the plaintiffs’
mother, Anatalia de Guzman, with plaintiff Santiago Meneses and Tranquilina de Guzman and
his son Cesario Velasquez in attendance; that in the conference Leoncia told Anatalia de
Guzman, Tranquilina de Guzman and Cesario Velaquez that the documents of donation and
partition which she and her husband earlier executed were not signed by them as it was not
their intention to give away all the properties to Cesario Velasquez because Anatalia de
Guzman who is one of her sisters had several children to support; Cesario Velasquez together
with his mother allegedly promised to divide the properties equally and to give the plaintiffs
one-half (1/2) thereof; that they are entitled to ½ of each of all the properties in question being
the children of Anatalia de Guzman, full blood sister of Leoncia de Guzman.
Plaintiffs alsio claim that after the death of Leoncia, defendants forcibly took possession of all
the properties and despite plaintiffs’ repeated demands for partition, defendants refused.
Plaintiffs pray for the nullity of any documents covering the properties in question since they do
not bear the genuine signatures of the Aquino spouses, to order the partition of the properties
between plaintiffs and defendants in equal shares and to order the defendants to render an
accounting of the produce of the land in question from the time defendants forcibly took
possession until partition shall have been effected.
ISSUES:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT CASE IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA AND BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPERTIES MENTIONED IN THE COMPLAINT FORM PART OF THE
ESTATE OF THE SPOUSES CORNELIO AQUINO AND LEONCIA DE GUZMAN.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE ACQUIRED ABSOLUTE AND EXCLUSIVE
OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION.
V. WHETHER OR NOT PARTITION IS THE PROPER ACTION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
HELD
1. Yes, the allegations contained in both complaints are the same, and that there is identity of
parties, subject matter and cause of action. Thus the requisites of res judicata are present,
namely (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) it must be a judgment or order on
the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; and (d) there must be between the first and the second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. Since the dismissal of the third case did not
contain any condition at all, it has the effect of an adjudication on the merits as it is understood
to be with prejudice. However, considering that this case had already reached this Court by way
of a petition for review on certiorari, it would be more in keeping with substantial justice if the
controversy between the parties were to be resolved on the merits rather than on a procedural
technicality in the light of the express mandate of the rules that they be "liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding."

2. No. The Aquino spouses had disposed the four parcels of land during their lifetime and the
documents were duly notarized so that these documents enjoy the presumption of validity.
Such presumption has not been overcome by private respondent Santiago Meneses with clear
and convincing evidence. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence. Petitioners were able to establish that these four parcels
of land were validly conveyed to them by the Aquino spouses hence they no longer formed part
of the conjugal properties of the spouses at the time of their deaths. As regards the fourth and
fifth parcels, petitioners alleged that these were also conveyed to third persons and they do not
claim any right thereto.

3. Yes. A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title

over the property from the donor to the donee25 and the donation is perfected from the
moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the done and once a donation is accepted, the
donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. The donation of the first parcel
made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez who were then
nineteen (19) and ten (10) years old respectively was accepted through their father Cesario
Velasquez, and the acceptance was incorporated in the body of the same deed of donation and
made part of it, and was signed by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was
delivery and acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The
donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765
of the Civil Code. The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de
Guzman over the third and sixth parcels including a portion of the second parcel became the
properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919. The deed of donation propter nuptias can be
revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the other causes mentioned in article 86
of the Family Code. The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e., that the Aquino
spouses did not intend to give away all their properties since Anatalia (Leoncia's sister) had
several children to support is not one of the grounds for revocation of donation either inter
vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious.

The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and the Deed of
conveyance dated July 14, 1939 in favor of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the remaining
portion of the second parcel is also valid. In fact in the deed of sale dated July 14, 1939, the
Aquino spouses ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario Velasquez and Camila
de Guzman including the previous deeds of conveyance executed by the Aquino spouses over
the second parcel in the complaint and such deed of sale became the basis for the issuance of
TCT No. 15129 in the names of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman on July 25, 1939. The
best proof of the ownership of the land is the certificate of title30 and it requires more than a
bare allegation to defeat the face value of TCT No. 15129 which enjoys a legal presumption of
regularity of issuance.31 Notably, during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez, he entered into
contracts of mortgage and lease over the property as annotated at the back of the certificate of
title which clearly established that he exercised full ownership and control over the property. It
is quite surprising that it was only after more than fifty years that private respondents asserted
co-ownership claim over the subject property.
4. NO. In actions for partition, the Court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property
unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. In view of the
foregoing, the Court conclude that this action of partition cannot be maintained. The properties
sought to be partitioned by private respondents have already been delivered to petitioners and
therefore no longer part of the hereditary estate which could be partitioned. After finding that
no co-ownership exist between private respondents and petitioners, we find no reason to
discuss the other arguments raised by the petitioners in support of their petition.

G.R. No. 187056               September 20, 2010

JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner,

vs.
ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR.,
all surnamed G. FERRER, and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA, Respondents.
Facts:
On August 27, 1968 the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document
entitled "Donation Mortis Causa"1 in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and
their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the spouses’
126-square meter lot and the house on it in Pandacan, Manila2 in equal shares.
Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the equivalent of a will, the
deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only two persons. The named donees,
however, signified their acceptance of the donation on the face of the document.
Guadalupe and Leopoldo died in September 1968 and in June 1972, respectively.
Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe’s donation to Asuncion, Emiliano, and
Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in fact a donation inter vivos.
Held:
No. It was donation inter vivos. That the document in question in this case was captioned
"Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling.
Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be
irrevocable and shall be respected by the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation
irrevocable becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the
irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos.
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed
required. This Court has held that an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter
vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis
causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donor’s
lifetime.
In case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis
causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.

G.R. No. 112796 March 5, 1998

TITO R. LAGAZO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO CABANLIT, respondents.
Facts:
Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a widow and grandmother of plaintiff-appellee, was awarded a
60.10-square meter lot which is a portion of the Monserrat Estate located in Old Sta. Mesa,
Manila. The Monserrat Estate is a public land owned by the City of Manila and distributed for
sale to bona fide tenants under its land-for-the-landless program. Catalina Jacob constructed a
house on the lot.
Shortly before she left for Canada where she is now a permanent resident, Catalina Jacob
executed a special power of attorney in favor of her son-in-law Eduardo B. Español authorizing
him to execute all documents necessary for the final adjudication of her claim as awardee of
the lot.
Due to the failure of Eduardo B. Español to accomplish the purpose of the power of attorney
granted to him, Catalina Jacob revoked said authority in an instrument executed in Canada.
Simultaneous with the revocation, Catalina Jacob executed another power of attorney of the
same tenor in favor plaintiff-appellee.
Catalina Jacob executed in Canada a Deed of Donation over the subject lot in favor of plaintiff-
appellee. Following the donation, plaintiff-appellee checked with the Register of Deeds and
found out that the property was in the delinquent list, so that he paid the installments in
arrears and the remaining balance on the lot and declared the said property in the name of
Catalina Jacob.
Plaintiff-appellee thereafter sent a demand letter to defendant-appellant asking him to vacate
the premises. A similar letter was sent by plaintiff-appellee’s counsel to defendant. However,
defendant-appellant refused to vacate the premises claiming ownership thereof. Hence,
plaintiff-appellee instituted the complaint for recovery of possession and damages against
defendant-appellant.
Petitioner contends that the burdens, charges or conditions imposed upon a donation need not
be stated on the deed of donation itself. Thus, although the deed did not categorically impose
any charge, burden or condition to be satisfied by him, the donation was onerous since he in
fact and in reality paid for the installments in arrears and for the remaining balance of the lot in
question. Being an onerous donation, his acceptance thereof may be express or implied, as
provided under Art. 1320 of the Civil Code, and need not comply with the formalities required
by Art. 749 of the same code. His payment of the arrearages and balance and his assertion of
his right of possession against private respondent clearly indicate his acceptance of the
donation.
ISSUES:
1. Where the deed of donation did not expressly impose any burden — the expressed
consideration being purely one of liberality and generosity — but the recipient actually paid
charges imposed on the property like land taxes and installment arrearages, may the donation
be deemed onerous and thus governed by the law on ordinary contracts?
2. Where the acceptance of a donation was made in a separate instrument but not formally
communicated to the donor, may the donation be nonetheless considered complete, valid and
subsisting?
HELD:
1. NO. At the outset, let us differentiate between a simple donation and an onerous one. A
simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while
an onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or
more in value than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an
onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a
valid simple donation are not applicable.
We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even conceding that petitioner’s full
payment of the purchase price of the lot might have been a burden to him, such payment was
not however imposed by the donor as a condition for the donation.
It is clear that the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as the
donee. The words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. We agree with
Respondent Court that the payments made by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts. This
much can be gathered from his testimony in court, in which he never even claimed that a
burden or charge had been imposed by his grandmother.
The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of attorney executed by
Catalina Reyes in favor of petitioner, her grandson, authorizing him to execute acts necessary
for the fulfillment of her obligations. Nothing in the records shows that such acts were meant
to be a burden in the donation.
2. NO. As a pure or simple donation, the provisions of the civil code apply. The donation,
following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment
the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.” Furthermore, “[i]f the acceptance is made
in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step
shall be noted in both instruments.”
Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore, indispensable; its absence makes the
donation null and void.

G.R. No. 132964           February 18, 2000

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
DAVID REY GUZMAN, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA G. ABELA, and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH, respondents.

Facts:

David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman
(naturalized American) and Helen Meyers Guzman (American citizen). In 1968, Simeon died
leaving to his heirs, Helen and David, an estate consisting of several parcels of land in Bulacan.

In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and
adjudicating to themselves all of the property, and registered it to the RD a year after.

In 1981, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and conveying her ½ share
of the properties to David. But since it was not registered, she executed another Deed of
Quitclaim to confirm the first.

Issues:

1. Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos

2. Whether or not Helen validly repudiated her right to inherit from the decedent

Held:

1. No. Three essential elements of a donation:

1. Reduction in the patrimony of the donor

2. Increase in the patrimony of the done
3. Intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi
It is also required that the donation be made in a public document and that its acceptance be
made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, which has to be recorded
as well.

Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer of the properties by virtue of a
Deed of Quitclaim resulted in the (1) reduction of her patrimony as donor and the (2)
consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee. However, Helen’s (3) intention to
perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims
reveal that Helen intended to convey to her son certain parcels of land and to re-affirm it, she
executed a waiver and renunciation of her rights over these properties. It is clear that Helen
merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, title, interest over the lands in favor of David, not a
donation. She was also aware that donation was not possible.

Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper form and registration to make the
donation valid is lacking. The SPA executed by David in favor of Atty. Abela was not his
acceptance, but an acknowledgment that David owns the property referred to and that he
authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name. Further, there was nothing in the SPA to
show that he indeed accept the donation.

2. No. The inexistence of a donation does not make the repudiation of Helen in favor David
valid. There is NO valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of
the inheritance when she, together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
the Estate, dividing and adjudicating between them all the properties. By virtue of that
settlement, the properties were registered in their names and for 11 years, they possessed the
land in the concept of owner. Thus, the 2 Quitclaims have no legal force and effect. Helen still
owns ½ of the property.

G.R. No. 132681            December 3, 2001

RICKY Q. QUILALA, petitioner,
vs.
GLICERIA ALCANTARA, LEONORA ALCANTARA, INES REYES and JOSE REYES, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts:
On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in
favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land. The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos"
consists of two pages. The first page contains the deed of donation itself, and is signed on the
bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor, Violeta Quilala as donee, and two instrumental
witnesses. The second page contains the Acknowledgment, which states merely that Catalina
Quilala personally appeared before the notary public and acknowledged that the donation was
her free and voluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of the second page
the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the
signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other witness.
Issue:
Whether or not the donation the donation executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta is valid.
Held:
Yes. Under Article 749 of the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made in a
public instrument in order to be valid, specifying therein the property donated and the value of
the charges which the donee must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results
in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee, and is perfected
from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee, provided the donee is not
disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it
is generally considered irrevocable and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property.
The acceptance, to be valid, must be made during the lifetime of both the donor and the
donee. It may be made in the same deed or in a separate public document, and the donor must
know the acceptance by the donee.
In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number of the certificate of title as well
as the technical description of the real property donated. It stipulated that the donation was
made for and in consideration of the "love and affection which the DONEE inspires in the
DONOR, and as an act of liberality and generosity." This was sufficient cause for a donation.
Indeed, donation is legally defined as "an act of liberality whereby a person disposes
gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it." The donee's acceptance of
the donation was explicitly manifested in the penultimate paragraph of the deed.
The specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that one of the
parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document. The purpose of
authenticating the page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted provision is
deemed substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does
not also render the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It
cannot be considered a private document in part and a public document in another part. The
fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its
entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the notary public in
the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be
acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page,
which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the
first page of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.