CATALAN VS BASA GR.

159567 JANUARY 2011

Facts:
On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was discharged from active military service. The
Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military
service due to his "schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which... incapacitates him because of flattening
of mood and affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and sparce (sic) and pointless speech."[1]
On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo.[On June 16, 1951, a document was executed,
titled "Absolute Deed of Donation,"[3] wherein Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES
CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the real property
The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue then cancelled
Tax Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu thereof, issued Tax Declaration No. 18080[4] to Mercedes for the
400.50 square meters donated to her. The remaining... half of the property remained in Feliciano's name
under Tax Declaration No. 18081.[5]
On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1 and 3 of their property, registered
under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 18920, to their son Eulogio Catalan.[9]
On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa.[10]
The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on February 20, 1992,
and Tax Declaration No. 12911 was issued in the... name of respondents.
On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the aforementioned property registered
under OCT No. 18920 to their children Alex Catalan, Librada Catalan and Zenaida Catalan. On February
14, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956) of... the same OCT No. 18920 to
Eulogio and Florida Catalan.[12]

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A WAY
PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE
COURT IN HOLDING THAT "THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DISPOSING THAT
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (PETITIONERS) FAILED TO PROVE THE INSANITY OR MENTAL INCAPACITY OF
THE LATE FELICIANO CATALAN AT THE PRECISE MOMENT WHEN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE WAS
DONATED";

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and denied the
petition.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of
another, who accepts it.[22] Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in
contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the
matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous. [23] The parties' intention
must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable. [24]

In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor's capacity to give consent at the
time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely
given.[25] However, the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if no
sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed. [26]
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence presented by the
petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated
the property in question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much a do of the fact that, as early as 1948,
Feliciano had been found to be suffering from schizophrenia by the Board of Medical Officers of the
Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the allegation cannot prove the incompetence of
Feliciano.
From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from schizophrenia does not
necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of
schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951,
Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that
Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the
contrary was adduced.[30] Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give consent to contracts was only established
when the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared him an incompetent on December 22, 1953. [31]
It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Feliciano's capacity at the time he donated the
property, yet did not see fit to question his mental competence when he entered into a contract of
marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of donation of his other properties in their
favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts, despite his illness, is
bolstered by the existence of these other contracts. Competency and freedom from undue influence,
shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the
contrary is shown.[32]

Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to sell the property to whomever
she chose.[33] Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove the claim that Mercedes' sale of the
property to her children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. It is of little bearing that the Deed of Sale
was registered only after the death of Mercedes. What is material is that the sale of the property to Delia
and Jesus Basa was legal and binding at the time of its execution. Thus, the property in question belongs
to Delia and Jesus Basa.

Arcaba vs Tabancura GR No. 146683, November 22, 2001

FACTS:

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located
at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956. Zosima died in
1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of
rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property in favor of Francisco. Since
Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece,
Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of
Francisco’s house as well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the other
hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his
mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the master’s
bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual
intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started
working for Francisco who was 75 year old widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper
though her family was provided with food and lodging. Francisco’s health deteriorated and became
bedridden. Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from his lot near
the public streets.

In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where
he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted
the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was made in consideration of
the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya notarized the deed and was later registered
by Cirila as its absolute owner.

In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of P57,105 and
assessed value of P28,550. The decedent’s nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession
alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcaba’s favor was valid.
HELD:
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation is not
valid.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and
may no longer be interested in sex·at the very least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a
woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to
the public as such, and secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do
not constitute such kind of cohabitation.·In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held that the term „cohabitation‰ or
„living together as husband and wife‰ means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated

Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of
the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.·Respondents having proven by a preponderance of
evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code. Based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of “Cirila
Comille” such as application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco.
Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver –
employee.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus - LEON SILIM and ILDEFONSA MANGUBAT,
Respondents. G.R. No. 140487, FIRST DIVISION, April 2, 2001, KAPUNAN, J.

In this case, The written acceptance of the donation having been considered by the trial court in arriving
at its decision, there is the presumption that this exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the court.
With regard to the respondents' submission that the done violated the condition in the donation that the
lot be exclusively used for school purposes only, the condition for the donation was not in any way
violated when the lot donated was exchanged with another one.

FACTS: On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses Leon Silim and Ildefonsa Mangubat, donated a
parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur
(BPS). Respondents imposed the condition that the said property should "be used exclusively and forever
for school purposes only." This donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS.
Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the Parent-Teachers Association of Barangay
Kauswagan, a school building was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan school
building that was supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land in Barangay Kauswagan could
not be released since the government required that it be built upon a 1 hectare parcel of land. To remedy
this predicament, Assistant School Division Superintendent authorized District Supervisor Buendia to
officially transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2) hectare old school site of Kauswagan Elementary
School to a new and suitable location which would fit the specifications of the government. The donated
lot was exchanged with the bigger lot. When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that Vice-Mayor
Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated land, he asked the latter why he was building a
house on the property he donated to BPS. Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that he is already the owner
of the said property. Respondents filed a Complaint for Revocation and Cancellation of Conditional
Donation, Annulment of Deed of Exchange and Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Property
with damages against Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma, Teresita Palma, District Supervisor Buendia and the BPS
before the RTC. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the donation null and void on
the grounds that the donation was not properly accepted and the condition imposed on the donation was
violated. Hence, the present case
ISSUE: 1. Whether donation is null and void due to an invalid acceptance by the donee. 2. Whether the
donation is null and void due to an alleged violation of a condition in the donation.

RULING:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in declaring the donation null and void for the reason that the acceptance
was not allegedly done in accordance with Articles 745[6] and 749[7] of the New Civil Code. An onerous
donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is the
kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the thing
donated. Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be
governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as
regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed. ‘The donation involved in the present
controversy is one which is onerous since there is a burden imposed upon the donee to build a school on
the donated property. There was a valid acceptance of the donation. Private respondents admit that in the
offer of exhibits by the defendants in the trial court, an affidavit of acceptance and/or confirmation of the
donation, marked as Exhibit "8," was offered in evidence. The written acceptance of the donation having
been considered by the trial court in arriving at its decision, there is the presumption that this exhibit was
properly offered and admitted by the court. Moreover, this issue was never raised in the Court of Appeals.
Nowhere in their brief did respondents question the validity of the donation on the basis of the alleged
defect in the acceptance thereof. The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to
ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, a school building was
immediately constructed after the donation was executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of
the school building put up on the donated lot through the efforts of the Parents-Teachers Association of
Barangay Kauswagan. It was when the school building was being dismantled and transferred to the new
site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property that
respondents came to know of the Deed of Exchange. The actual knowledge by respondents of the
construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the
donation by the donee be communicated to the donor.

2. With regard to the respondents' submission that the done violated the condition in the donation that
the lot be exclusively used for school purposes only, the condition for the donation was not in any way
violated when the lot donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose for the donation remains the
same, which is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or
affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of
the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for
the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area
of the donated lot.

Heirs of Salud Dizon Salamat vs Tamayo GR No. 110644. October 30, 1998

Facts:

Agustin Dizon died intestate on May 15, 1942 leaving behind his five children Eduardo, Gaudencio, Salud,
Valenta and Natividad as surviving heirs. Among the properties left by the decedent was a parcel of land
with an area of 2,188 sqm covered by OCT 10384.

O In 1944, Eduardo sold his hereditary rights in the sum of P3 000 to his sister Salud Dizon
Salamat. The sale was evidenced by a private document bearing the signatures of his sisters Valenta and
Natividad as witnesses.

In 1949, Gaudencio likewise sold his hereditary rights for the sum of P4 000 to his sister Salud.
The sale was evidenced by a notarized document bearing the signature of Eduardo Dizon and a certain
Angela Ramos as witnesses. On May 30, 1951, Gaudencio died, leaving his daughters.
 In 1987, petitioner instituted an action for compulsory judicial partition of real properties
registered in the name of Agustin Dizon with the RTC. The action was prompted by the refusal of herein
respondent Natividad Dizon Tamayo to agree to the formal distribution of the properties of deceased
Agustin among his heirs. Respondent’s refusal stemmed from her desire to keep for herself the parcel of
land covered by OCT 10384 where she presently resides, claiming that her father donated it to her in
1936 with the conformity of the other heirs. The subject property is also declared for taxation purposes
under Tax Declaration No. 10376 in the name of respondent.

The trial court noted that the alleged endowment which was made orally by the deceased
Agustin to herein respondent partook of the nature of donation which required the observance of certain
formalities set by law. Nevertheless, the trial court rendered judgment in favour of respondent. The CA
affirmed the decision of RTC that there was an oral donation.

Issue:

WON the donation of land to respondent is valid.

Ruling.

No.

Art. 749 of the Civil Code provides

In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a

public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the done
must satisfy.

It is clear from Art. 749 that a transfer of real property from one person to another cannot take
effect as a donation unless embodied in a public document.

The alleged donation was done orally and not executed in a public document. Moreover, the
document which was presented by respondent in support of her claim that her father donated the subject
parcel of land to her was a mere private document of conformity which was executed by her elder brother,
Eduardo in 1956. It should be pointed out that the brothers Eduardo and Gaudencio had already ceded
their herediatary interests to petitioner Salud Dizon Salamat even before 1950.

In any case, assuming that Agustin really made the donation to respondent, orally, respondent
cannot still claim ownership over the property. While it is true that a void donation may be the basis of
ownership which may ripen into title by prescription, it is well settled that possession, to constitute the
foundation of a prescriptive right, must adverse and under claim of title.

Respondent was never in adverse and continuous possession of the property. It is undeniable
that petitioners and respondent, being heirs of the deceased, are co-owners of the properties left by the
latter. A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other and possession of
a co-owner shall not be regarded as adverse to other co-owners but in fact is beneficial to them.

The elements in order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que
trust or the co-owner are:

1. That he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to ouster of the cestui que trust
or the co-owners;

2. That such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-
owners; and

3. That the evidence must be clear and convincing.

None of the aforesaid requirements is present.

The fact that the subject property is declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent who pays
realty taxes under Tax Declaration No. 14376 is of no moment. It is well settled that tax declarations or
realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership.

As regards the improvements introduced by the respondent on the questioned lot, the parties
should be guided by Article 500 of the Civil Code which states that: “Upon partition, there shall be a
mutual accounting for the benefits received and reimbursements for expenses made.

Judgment reversed and Lot 2557 covered by OCT 10384 is hereby declared to belong to the estate of
Agustin Dizon.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus- DAVID REY GUZMAN, represented by his
Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA G. ABELA, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN
BRANCH, Respondents. G.R. No. 132964. SECOND DIVISION, February 18, 2000, BELLOSILLO,
J.

There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b)
the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus
donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the donation
be made in a public document and that there should be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of
donation or in a separate public document.7 In cases where the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in
both instruments. Not all the elements of a donation of an immovable property are present in the instant
case.

FACTS

David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman
(naturalized American) and Helen Meyers Guzman (American citizen). In 1968, Simeon died leaving to his
heirs, Helen and David, an estate consisting of several parcels of land in Bulacan. In 1970, Helen and
David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and adjudicating to themselves
all of the property, and registered it to the RD a year after. In 1981, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim,
assigning, transferring and conveying her ½ share of the properties to David. But since it was not
registered, she executed another Deed of Quitclaim to confirm the first. In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote
the OSG and furnished it with documents showing that David’s ownership of ½ of the estate was
defective. He argued that Art. XII of the Constitution only allows Filipinos to acquire private lands in the
country. The only instances when a foreigner may acquire private property are by hereditary succession
and if he was formerly a natural-born citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship. Moreover, it contends that
the Deeds of Quitclaim executed by Helen were really donations inter vivos. Republic filed with RTC a
Petition for Escheat praying that ½ of David’s interest be forfeited in its favor. RTC dismissed. CA affirmed.

ISSUE Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos

HELD

(NO)

There are three (3) essential elements of a donation: (a) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b)
the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and, (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus
donandi. When applied to a donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the donation
be made in a public document and that there should be an acceptance thereof made in the same deed of
donation or in a separate public document.7 In cases where the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, it is mandated that the donor should be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in
both instruments. Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer of the properties by virtue
of a Deed of Quitclaim resulted in the (1) reduction of her patrimony as donor and the (2) consequent
increase in the patrimony of David as donee. However, Helen’s (3) intention to perform an act of liberality
in favor of David was not sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims reveal that Helen intended to convey to
her son certain parcels of land and to re-affirm it, she executed a waiver and renunciation of her rights
over these properties. It is clear that Helen merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, title, interest over
the lands in favor of David, not a donation. She was also aware that donation was not possible. Moreover,
the essential element of acceptance in the proper form and registration to make the donation valid is
lacking. The SPA executed by David in favor of Atty. Abela was not his acceptance, but an
acknowledgment that David owns the property referred to and that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the
same in his name. Further, there was nothing in the SPA to show that he indeed accept the donation.
However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the repudiation of Helen in favor David valid. There
is NO valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of the inheritance when
she, together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and
adjudicating between them all the properties. By virtue of that settlement, the properties were registered
in their names and for 11 years, they possessed the land in the concept of owner. Thus, the 2 Quitclaims
have no legal force and effect. Helen still owns ½ of the property.