G.R. No.

211356 September 29, 2014

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON. MAYOR JOHN P. YAP,
SANGGUNIANG BA YAN OF MALAY, AKLAN, represented by HON. EZEL FLORES, DANTE
PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE, WILBEC GELITO, JUPITER GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE
MUNICIPAL ENGINEER, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, BORACAY PNP CHIEF,
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC., represented by NENETTE GRAF, MUNICIPAL AUXILIARY
POLICE, and JOHN and JANE DOES, Respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines,
Inc.. On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning compliance with the municipal government of
Malay, Aklan. Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator
denied petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the "no build
zone". In due time, petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor on February 1, 2010.
Subsequently, on March 28, 2011, a Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining
the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO
10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel. Alleging that the order was issued and
executed with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief
with the CA.
ISSUE:
WON respondents committed grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
NO.
The hotel must be classified as a nuisance.
In establishing a no build zone through local legislation, the LGU effectively made a determination that
constructions therein, without first securing exemptions from the local council, qualify as nuisances for they
pose a threat to public safety.
As jurisprudence elucidates, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens. The first is
recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public
health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity. The
second is that which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of
fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing
does in law constitute a nuisance.
Here, it is merely the hotel’s particular incident––its location––and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a
nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have
secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, petitioner is correct that the hotel is not a nuisance per
se, but to Our mind, it is still a nuisance per accidens.
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, We still find in this case that the LGU
may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power and the
general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
fulfil the objectives of the government.
G.R. No. 148339 February 23, 2005
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
JAC LINER, INC., Respondent.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Ordinance prohibiting the maintenance of terminals within the City.
FACTS:

Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with the objective of
alleviating the traffic congestion said to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney
terminals within the city. City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal,
Inc. to construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility in
the City of Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the temporary
terminals in the City of Lucena the right to operate which as a result favors only the
Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City
Ordinance 1778 as null and void for being invalid. Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied. Lucena then elevated it to the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition and
affirmed the challenged orders of the trial court. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by
the CA, Lucena now comes to the Court via petition for review to assail the Decision and Resolution of
the CA.

ISSUE:
WON terminals are public nuisances.
RULING:
NO.
Their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property,
health, or comfort of the community. But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their alleged
indirect effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they are nuisance per accidens, not per se. Unless a thing is
nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings, as was done in
the case at bar.
That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and
may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so
proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement
without judicial intervention.
G.R. No. 175510 July 28, 2008
SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ AND JOCELYN VALDEZ, represented by their Attorney-In-Fact,
VIRGILIO VALDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO TABISULA AND CARIDAD TABISULA, Respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased from respondent-spouses Francisco Tabisula and
Caridad Tabisula a parcel of land. Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on the western side of the
subject property. Believing that that side is the intended road right of way mentioned in the deed, petitioners
filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against respondents before the RTC.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they purchased the subject property on the strength of respondents’
assurance of providing them a road right of way. They thus prayed that respondents be ordered to provide the
subject property with a 2½-meter wide easement and to remove the concrete wall blocking the same.
Respondents, in their Answer, averred that the 2½ meter easement should be taken from the western portion
of the subject property and not from theirs.
ISSUE:
WON an easement over the property of respondents should be granted to petitioners.
RULING:
NO.
To be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the following requisites must be complied
with: (1) the property is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2)
proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the isolation is not the result of the owner of the dominant estate’s own
acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent
consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
As found, however, by the trial court, petitioners and their family are also the owners of two properties
adjoining the subject property which have access to two public roads or highways. Since petitioners then have
more than adequate passage to two public roads, they have no right to demand the grant by respondents of an
easement on the western side of respondents’ lot.

G.R. No. 166744 November 2, 2006

AC ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
FRABELLE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner, a corporation duly organized under domestic laws doing business in the Philippines, owns the 10-
storey Feliza Building located along Herrera Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. The building was subdivided
into commercial/office units which were leased to private persons and entities. There are 36 blowers from 18
air-cooled type airconditioning units in the building, four blowers on each floor, from the 2nd to the 10th
floors. Respondent is the developer of Frabella I Condominium, a 29-storey commercial/residential
condominium located at 109 Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. Rada and Herrera streets lie parallel to
each other such that Feliza Building is situated at the back of Frabella I. Feliza Building is at the back of
Frabella I and is separated by Rodriguez Street, a two-lane road approximately 12 meters wide. On April 11,
1995, respondent wrote petitioner demanding that the latter abate the daily continuous, intense and
''unbearable noise" and the hot air blast coming from the 36 blowers in the Feliza Building. Petitioner rejected
the demand in a letter dated May 15, 1995. As a result, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner with the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) for the abatement of noise and/or air pollution and damages with a plea
for injunctive relief.
ISSUE:
WON an abatement of nuisance is proper in the instant case.
RULING:
YES.
We agree with the ruling of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that as gleaned from the material averments of the
complaint as well as the character of the relief prayed for by respondent in its complaint before the RTC, the
petition is one for the judicial abatement of a private nuisance, more specifically the noise generated by the
blowers of the airconditioning system of the Feliza Building owned by petitioner, with a plea for a writ of
preliminary and permanent injunction, plus damages. Such action of respondent is incapable of pecuniary
estimation because the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money.
A private nuisance has been defined as one which violates only private rights and produces damages to but one
or a few persons. A nuisance is public when it interferes with the exercise of public right by directly
encroaching on public property or by causing a common injury.
The test is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question
that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the
condition of living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the
emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of
property of another owner who, though creating a noise, is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those
affected by it.
Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may become nuisances if they are so
offensive to the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable. The fact that the
cause of the complaint must be substantial has often led to expressions in the opinions that to be a nuisance the
noise must be deafening or loud or excessive and unreasonable. The determining factor when noise alone is the
cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual
physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less
comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be said to be substantial and unreasonable in
degree; and reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all the circumstances and conditions. There
can be no fixed standard as to what kind of noise constitutes a nuisance.

G.R. No. 150194 March 6, 2007

ROBERT TAYABAN y CALIPLIP, FRANCISCO MADDAWAT y TAYOBAN, ARTEMIO
BALANGUE* y LANGA, FRANCISCO MAYUMIS y BAHEL and QUIRINO PANA y CUYAHEN,
Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Robert Tayaban was the Municipal Mayor of Tinoc, Ifugao. His co-petitioners, namely: Francisco
Maddawat, Artemio Balangue, Francisco Mayumis, and Quirino Pana, were Municipal Councilors of the same
municipality. Sometime in 1988, then Mayor Tayaban submitted a project proposal to provincial governor
Benjamin Cappleman for the construction of the Tinoc Public Market. Upon its approval, a bidding was
conducted and private complainant Lopez Pugong won the contract for the construction of the said public
market. Actual construction of the public market was commenced in June 1989. However, on August 15, 1989,
Tayaban and his co-petitioners, together with some men, proceeded to the construction site and demolished
the structures and improvements introduced thereon. As a result, Pugong filed an Affidavit-Complaint against
herein petitioners.
ISSUE:
WON the demolition was proper.
RULING:
NO.
Neither can petitioners seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances
without judicial proceedings. This principle applies to nuisances per se, or those which affect the immediate
safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. Petitioners
claim that the public market would pose danger to the safety and health of schoolchildren if it were built on the
place being contested. However, petitioners never made known their supposed concerns either to the Governor
or to the CEB. Instead, they took the law into their own hands and precipitately demolished the subject
structures that were built without the benefit of any hearing or consultation with the proper authority, which in
this case is the CEB.

G.R. No. 148408 July 14, 2006

CONCEPCION PARAYNO, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE JOVELLANOS and the MUNICIPALITY OF CALASIAO, PANGASINAN, * respondents.
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of
Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to
another location. Later on, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of
location of petitioner's gasoline station. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the SB resolution but it was
denied. Hence, she filed a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON closure/transfer of petitioner’s gasoline was proper.
RULING:
NO.
petitioner's business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could summarily abate
in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is
possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate
safety of persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.