Stat Con Case Digest Iv

STAT CON CASE DIGEST IV
.. cont. (Subjects of Construction: The Constitution)
PEOPLE v ECHAVES, G.R. NO. 47757-61 (1980)
DOCTRINES/PRINCIPLE INVOLVED:
Presidential Decree 772: PENALIZING SQUATTING AND OTHER SIMILAR ACT
Section 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner,
succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential commercial or any other purposes, shall be
punished by imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at
the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
If the offender is a corporation or association, the maximum penalty of five years and the fine of five thousand pesos shall be imposed upon
the president, director, manager or managing partners thereof.
Section 2. This decree shall take effect immediately.
RA 947: REPUBLIC ACT NO. 947 - AN ACT MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON, CORPORATION OR ASSOCIATION TO
FORCIBLY ENTER OR OCCUPY PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AND PENALIZING VIOLATIONS THEREOF
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, corporation or association to enter or occupy, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth, any public agricultural land including such public lands as are granted to private individuals under the provisions of the Public Land
Act or any other laws providing for the disposal of public agricultural lands in the Philippines, and are duly covered by the corresponding
applications required for the purpose notwithstanding the fact that title thereto still remains in the Government; or for any person, natural or
juridical, to instigate, induce or force another to commit such acts. Sec.
2. The criminal action for any violation of the provisions of this Act shall be instituted within one year from the time the cause of action
arises.
Sec. 3. Any violation of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand pesos or imprisonment for not
more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court. In case of insolvency, the offender shall suffer
subsidiary imprisonment to be computed in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. If the offender is a corporation or
association, the president, director, manager or managing partner thereof shall be held criminally liable therefor.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Ejusdem Genernis
- A rule of interpretation that where a class of things is followed by general wording that is not itself expansive, the general wording is usually
restricted things of the same type as the listed items.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Squatting; Presidential Decrees; Pres. Decree 772 on squatting; Decree does not apply to pasture lands but to squatting in urban
communities.—We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was
intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The
squatting complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
Same; Same; Same; Squatting on public agricultural lands punishable by Rep. Act 947.—On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on
public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act. No. 947 which makes it unlawful for any person,
corporation or association to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Rule of ejusdem generis merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is
uncertain; Rule does not apply to Pres. Decree 772 where intent of decree is unmistakable.— The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species)
invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities,
particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative
intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615, 618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).
FACTS:
● Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court against 16 persons charging them with squatting, as penalized in Presidential Decree 772.
● Respondent Echavez dismissed the case on the grounds that 1) the accused entered the land through stealth and strategy and not with the use
of force, intimidation, or threat or taking advantage of the absence of the owner (as described in the Presidential Decree); and 2) under the
rule of ejusdem genernis, the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Presidential Decree 772 penalizes squatting and similar acts also apply to agricultural lands
HELD:
NO. The preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas. The
complainant involves pasture lands in rural areas. The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind) does not apply to this case.
A preamble may restrict what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of a law.
PRIMICIAS v MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA, PANGASINAN, G.R. NO. L-26702 (1979)
RA 4136: AN ACT TO COMPILE THE LAWS RELATIVE TO LAND TRANSPORTATION AND TRAFFIC RULES, TO CREATE A LAND
TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
JURISPRUDENCE:
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; To be valid, an ordinance must not contravene the statute.—An essential requisite for
a valid ordinance is among others, that it “must not contravene . . . the statute,” for it is a “fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior
in status and subordinate to the laws of the state.” Following this general rule, whenever there is a conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the
ordinance “must give way.”
Same; Same; Same; Requisites necessary for a municipal to pass a valid ordinance regulating traffic in a highway.—A local legislative body
intending to control traffic in public highways is supposed to classify first, and then mark them with proper signs, all to be approved by the Land
Transportation Commissioner.
Same; Same; Same; Regulatory ordinances must be clear, definite and certain.—Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness,
definiteness and certainty are all the more important so that “an average man should be able with due care, after reading it, to understand and ascertain
whether he will incur a penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct.”
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Injunction; Can a writ of injunction restrain proceedings in a criminal case?—On the issue of whether a
writ of injunction can restrain the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 3140, the general rule is that “ordinarily, criminal prosecution may not be blocked
by court prohibition or injunction.” Exceptions however are allowed in the following instances: “1) for the orderly administration of justice; 2) to
prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an appressive and vindictive manner; 3) to avoid multiplicity of actions; 4) to afford adequate protection
to constitutional rights; 5) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid.” The local statute or ordinance at bar
being invalid, the exception just cited obtains in this case. Hence, the lower court did not err in issuing the writ of injunction against defendants.
Moreover, considering that “our law on municipal corporations is in principle patterned after that of the United States,” it would not be amiss for Us to
adopt in this instance the ruling that to enjoin the enforcement of a void ordinance, “injunction has frequently been sustained in order to prevent a
multiplicity of prosecutions under it.”
FACTS:
● On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he was found violating Municipal Order 3, Series
of 1964 for overtaking a truck.
● The Courts of First Instance decided that from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void and had been repealed
by Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void
2. Whether or not the Municipal Order is not definite in its terms or ambiguous.
HELD:
1. YES. Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general rule, the later law prevails over an earlier law
and any conflict between a municipal order and a national law must be ruled in favor of the statute.
2. YES. The terms of Municipal Order 3 was ambiguous and not definite. “Vehicular Traffic” is not defined and no distinctions were made between
cars, trucks, buses, etc.
Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.
CONTE v COA, G.R. NO. 116422 (1996)
RA 660: AN ACT TO AMEND COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SIX ENTITLED “AN ACT TO
CREATE AND ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, TO PROVIDE FOR ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND TO
APPROPRIATE THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFOR,” AND TO PROVIDE RETIREMENT INSURANCE AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
JURISPRUDENCE:
Retirement; Words and Phrases; “Retirement Benefits” and “Pensions,” Explained.—That the Res. 56 package is labelled “financial assistance” does
not change its essential nature. Retirement benefits are, after all, a form of reward for an employee’s loyalty and service to the employer, and are
intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of worrying about his financial support or upkeep. On the
other hand, a pensionpartakes of the nature of “retained wages” of the retiree for a dual purpose: to entice competent people to enter the government
service, and to permit them to retire from the service with relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor, but more so for those who
have been incapacitated by illness or accident.
Same; Statutes; Teves Retirement Law (R.A. 4968); Social Security System; Section 28(b) of CA 186 as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain
terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan—other than the GSIS—for government officers and employees, in order to prevent the
undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans; SSS Res. 56 contravenes Sec. 28(b) of CA 186 and is therefore invalid, void and of no effect.—We
answer in the affirmative. Said Sec. 28(b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan—other
than the GSIS—for government officers and employees, in order to prevent the undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. It is beyond cavil that
Res. 56 contravenes the said provision of law and is therefore invalid, void and of no effect. To ignore this and rule otherwise would be tantamount to
permitting every other government office or agency to put up its own supplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise of such “financial
assistance.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The SSS cannot, in the guise of rule-making, legislate or amend laws or worse, render them nugatory.—We are not
unmindful of the laudable purposes for promulgating Res. 56, and the positive results it must have had, not only in reducing costs and expenses on the
part of the SSS in connection with the pay-out of retirement benefits and gratuities, but also in improving the quality of life for scores of retirees. But it
is simply beyond dispute that the SSS had no authority to maintain and implement such retirement plan, particularly in the face of the statutory
prohibition. The SSS cannot, in the guise of rule-making, legislate or amend laws or worse, render them nugatory.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Delegation of Powers; The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated legislative
power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope
intended.—It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail. A rule or regulation must
conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. The rule-making power of a
public administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by the Congress or the
Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or
which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. Though well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of
the retiree, nevertheless, there is really nothing to interpret in either RA 4968 or Res. 56, and correspondingly, the absence of any doubt as to the
ultra-vires nature and illegality of the disputed resolution constrains us to rule against petitioners.
Same; Equity; Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has always held that equity, which has been aptly described as “justice outside legality,” is
applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.—We must admit we sympathize with petitioners in their
financial predicament as a result of their misplaced decision to avail of retirement benefits under RA 660, with the false expectation that “financial
assistance” under the disputed Res. 56 will also materialize. Nevertheless, this Court has always held that equity, which has been aptly described as
“justice outside legality,” is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. In this case, equity cannot be
applied to give validity and effect to Res. 56, which directly contravenes the clear mandate of the provisions of RA 4968.
Same; Same; Courts; Judicial hands cannot, on the pretext of showing concern for the welfare of government employees, bestow equity contrary
to the clear provisions of law.— Likewise, we cannot but be aware that the clear imbalance between the benefits available under RA 660 and those
under RA 1616 has created an unfair situation for it has shifted the burden of paying such benefits from the GSIS (the main insurance carrier of
government employees) to the SSS. Without the corrective effects of Res. 56, all retiring SSS employees without exception will be impelled to avail of
benefits under RA 1616. The cumulative effect of such availments on the financial standing and stability of the SSS is better left to actuarians. But the
solution or remedy for such a situation can be provided only by Congress. Judicial hands cannot, on the pretext of showing concern for the welfare of
government employees, bestow equity contrary to the clear provisions of law.
FACTS:
● Petitioners Avelina B. Conte and Leticia Boiser-Palma were former employees of the Social Security System (SSS) who retired from
government service. They availed of compulsory retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 660.
● In addition, petitioners also claimed benefits granted under SSS Resolution No. 56, series of 1971 that provides financial incentive and
inducement to SSS employees qualified to retire to avail of retirement benefits under RA 660 as amended, rather than the retirement benefits
under RA 1616 as amended, by giving them “financial assistance” equivalent in amount to the difference between what a retiree would have
received under RA 1616, less what he was entitled to under RA 660.
● Thereafter, COA issued a ruling disallowing in audit “all such claims for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56” for the reason
that it results in the increase of benefits beyond what is allowed under existing retirement laws.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not public respondent abused its discretion when it disallowed in audit petitioners’ claims for benefits under SSS Res. 56.
2. Whether or not SSS Resolution No. 56 is valid.
HELD:
1. NO. The Commission bears stress that the financial assistance contemplated under SSS Resolution No. 56 is granted to SSS employees who
opt to retire under R.A. No. 660. It is clear that petitioners applied for benefits under RA 660 only because of the incentives offered by Res.
56, and that absent such incentives, they would have without fail availed of RA 1616 instead. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit,
there having been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission.
2. NO. The said financial assistance partakes of the nature of a retirement benefit that has the effect of modifying existing retirement laws
particularly R.A. No. 660. It is simply beyond dispute that the SSS had no authority to maintain and implement such retirement plan and in
the guise of rule-making, legislate or amend laws or worse, render them nugatory. Hence, SSS Resolution No. 56 is hereby illegal, void and
no effect.
B. STATUTE
- Definition
- Types of Statute
- Distinction between Constitution and Statute - Parts of a Statute
- Single Subject Requirement for Enacting Laws - Rule on Headings
- How a Bill becomes a Law
- President’s VETO Power
- Publication of Laws
- Whether a Whereas Clause may be used in Statutory Construction
C. ORDINANCES
- Definition
- Ordinance v Statute
- Administrative Orders v Stature
VI. INTERPRETATION OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF STATUTE

A. PENAL STATUTES
- Definition
- Ordinance v Statute
- Administrative Orders v Statute
PEOPLE v PURISIMA, G.R. Nos. L-42050-66, etc. (1978)
PD No. 9: DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 AND NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972 AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972,
RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFOR.
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall, upon conviction suffer:lawphil.net
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a military court/tribunal/commission may direct, if the firearm
involved in the violation is unlicensed and is attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in authority or their agents in the performance
of their official functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or their agent; of if such unlicensed firearm is used in the commission
of crimes against persons, property or chastity causing the death of the victim, or used in violation of any other General Orders and/or Letters
of Instructions Promulgated under said Proclamation No. 1081;]
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life imprisonment as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, when
the violation is not attended by any of the circumstances enumerated under the preceding paragraph;
(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, members of the board of
directors or other responsible officers of any public or private firms, companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly
allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity concerned to be used in violation of said General Orders No. 6
and 7.
2. It is unlawful to possess deadly weapons, including hand-grenades, rifle grenades and other explosives, including, but not limited to, "pill
box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other incendiary device consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or
detonating agents containing combustible units or other ingredients in such proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by fire, by
friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of all or part of the compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden generation
of highly heated gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects on contiguous objects or of causing
injury or death of a person; and any person convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen years as a
Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fanknife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong,"
"barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being
sued in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a
Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the commission of or for the purpose of committing
any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided for the particular
offenses committed or intended to be committed.
Rules of Court: Rule 110 Prosecution of Offense
Sec. 3. Complaint defined. Complaint is a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any
peace officer or the republic officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated.
JURISPRUDENCE:
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; It is imperative under the Constitution and Rules of Court, that an information should designate or
mention the specific statute violated.—It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a complaint
or information to be sufficient it most, inter alia, state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts of omissions complained of as
constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. To
comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is imperative for the specific statute violated
to be designated or mentioned in the charge. In fact, another compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is essential in these
cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called “deadly weapons” is the subject of another penal statute and a
Manila City Ordinance.
Statutory Construction; Criminal Law; Local Governments; P.D. 9 did not repeal by implication Act No. 1780 and City Ordinance No. 3820, as
amended by Ordinance No. 3928 of Manila which punish the carrying, concealed in one’s body, of bladed or other deadly weapons.—We do not agree
with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). P.D. 9 (3) does not contain any repealing
clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not favored. This principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule
are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
Same; Same; To constitute a violation of P.D. 9, the two elements of carrying bladed or pointed weapons outside one’s residence and of carrying
such a weapon in furtherance of, or to abet, or in-connection with subversion, lawless violence, chaos and the like must be present.— We hold that the
offence carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one’s residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or
implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly
weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the
weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the
motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.
Same; It becomes a judicial task to interpret the meaning and scope of a statute when an ambiguity in its implementation presents itself.— That
there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its implementation. When ambiguity exists, it
becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be
construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure—a
presidential decree in these cases—the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling
factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the
statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions.
Same; The preamble of a statute may be referred to determine what acts fall within the purview of a penal statute.— Because of the problem of
determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found
among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff
sanctions stated therein.
Same; The results or effects of a presidential decree must be within its reason or intent.—From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in
P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and
therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9 (3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. x x x It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed
weapon with a motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9 (3), and
nothing else.
Same; It is to be presumed that undesirable consequences or oppressive results were never intended by a legislative measure.—It is a salutary
principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure,
and that a construction of the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and
injurious consequences. It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no intent to work a hardship
or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on.
Same; Reason why penal statutes are construed strictly against the state.— American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be “the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the
discretion of the court limited.” The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise
definition of forbidden acts.
Criminal Procedures; Where the facts stated in the information are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing thereof
is in order.— The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9 (3) must be alleged in the information in order that the latter may constitute a
sufficiently valid charge. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not
convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order. Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant
may move to quash the complaint or information when the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
Same; If an information is ordered quash the state may either file an amended information or file another information for a crime penalized by
another statute as the facts may warrant.—Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations in these cases, viz:
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended information to include the second element of the offense as defined
in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled that if the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a punishable offense, the case
should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be given an opportunity to amend the Information. Second, if the facts so justified, the People could
have filed a complaint either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780, quoted earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No.
3928, especially since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.
FACTS:
● These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of
Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they
involve one basic question of law.
● The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and XVIII and CFI of Samar Several informations were filed before the above
mentioned courts charging the accused of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon in violation of Presidential Decree #9.
● The counsel of the defense filed motions to quash the said informations after which the respondent-courts passed their own orders quashing
the said informations on common ground that the informations did not allege facts constituting an offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to
state an essential element of the crime, which is, that the carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is
in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with, or related to to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public
disorder.
● The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.1081 which seeks to maintain law and order in the country as
well as the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence.
● The non-inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be distinguished from other legislation related to the illegal possession of deadly
weapons.
● Judge Purisima, in particular, reasoned that the information must allege that the purpose of possession of the weapon was intended for the
purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder.
● The petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is not necessary in this regard because the prohibited act is basically a malum prohibitum
or is an action or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute.
● The City Fiscal also added in cases of statutory offenses, the intent is immaterial and that the commission of the act is voluntary is enough.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of “Illegal possession of deadly weapon”
penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9.
HELD:
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
2. 2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the designation of the offense by
the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford
him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.
3. 3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9 states that the intention of such decree is to penalize the acts which are related to
Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts, and the like. While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it
implies the intent and spirit of the decree. The preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts or events which justify the
promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions provided.
The petition is DISMISSED.
PEOPLE v GATCHALIAN, G.R. NO. L-12011-14 (1958)
JURISPRUDENCE:
(not avail on eSCRA)
FULL TEXT:
1. MINIMUM WAGE LAW; WILLFUL VIOLATION OF ANY PROVISION; CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY OF VIOLATOR. — While
Section 3 of the Minimum Wage Law under which appellee was charged does not state that it shall be unlawful for an employer to pay his employees
wages below the minimum wage but merely requires that the employer shall pay wages not below the minimum wage, however, Section 15 of the
same Act imposes both a criminal penalty for a willful violation of any of the provisions of the law and a civil liability for any underpayment of wages
due en employee. Thus, the intention of the law is clear: to slap not only a criminal liability upon an erring employer for any willful violation of the
acts sought to be enjoined but to attach concurrently a civil liability for any underpayment he may commit as a result thereof. The law speaks of a
willful violation of "any of the provisions of this Act", which is all-embracing, and the same must include what is enjoined in Section 3 thereof which
embodies the very fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS NOR INCLUDED IN THE PENALTY CLAUSE. — Officials of the government entrusted with the
enforcement of the law do not come under the penal clause embodied in Section 15 (a) of the Minimum Wage Law. The failure of these officials to
comply with their duties would subject them merely to administrative sanction (Sec. 18[c], Rep. Act No. 602).
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; SPECIFIC PROVISION WHICH PENALIZES ACT NEED NOT BE MENTIONED. — It is true
that the informations under which appellee was charged only mention Section 3 of the law as the one violated and this section does not contain a penal
clause, but this does not make the information defective. There is no law which requires that in order that an accused may be convicted the specific
provision which penalizes the act charged be mentioned in the information. The Rules of Court do not require such designation.
4. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PENAL LAW; STRICT CONSTRUCTION, WHEN MAY BE INVOKED. — The rule that penal statutes
should be strictly construed against the State may be invoked only where the law is ambiguous and there is doubt as to their interpretation. Where the
law is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for the application of the rule.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Alfonso Gatchalian was charged before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga with a violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 602 in four
separate informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 2206, 2207, 2208 and 2209) committed as follows:jgc:
"That on or about August 4, 1951, up to and including December 31, 1953 and within the jurisdiction of this Court, viz, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, the above named accused, owner or manager of the New Life Drug Store, a business establishment in the City of Zamboanga and having
under his employ one Expedito Fernandez as salesman in the said establishment, did then and there willfully, and feloniously, pay and cause to be paid
to said Expedito Fernandez, a monthly salary of P60 to P90 for the period above-mentioned which is less than that provided for by law, thereby leaving
a difference of an unpaid salary to the latter in the total amount of P1,016.64 for the period above-mentioned."
When arraigned on June 19, 1956, he pleaded not guilty to the charge. On August 29, 1956, his counsel, in his behalf, filed a written motion to dismiss
based on two grounds which in substance merely consist in that the violation charged does not constitute a criminal offense but carries only a civil
liability, and even if it does, the section of the law alleged to have been violated does not carry any penalty penalizing it. On September 25, 1956, the
City Attorney of Zamboanga filed his answer to the motion to dismiss contending that the law which was violated by the accused carries with it both
civil and criminal liability, the latter being covered by Section 15 which provides for the penalty for all willful violations of any of the provisions of the
Minimum Wage Law. On December 3, 1956, the Court, after hearing the arguments of both parties, as well as some members of the local bar, issued
an order dismissing the informations with costs de oficio and cancelling the bail bond filed by the accused. The court in the same order directed the
Regional Representative of the Department of Labor to immediately institute a civil action against the erring employer for the collection of the alleged
underpayment of wages due the employees. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the Government took the present appeal.
The pertinent portion of Section 3 of Republic Act 602 under which appellee was prosecuted, reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Minimum wage. — (a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is employed by an enterprise other than in agriculture wages at
the rate of not less than —
(1) Four pesos a day on the effective date of this Act and thereafter for employees of an establishment located in Manila or its environs;
(2) Three pesos a day on the effective date of this Act and for one year after the effective date, and thereafter P4 a day, for employees of establishment
located outside of Manila or its environs: Provided, That this Act shall not apply to any retail or service enterprise that regularly employs not more then
five employees."
Section 15 of the same law, which treats of "penalties and recovery of wages due", likewise provides:
"SEC. 15. Penalties and recovery of wage due under this Act. —
(a) Any person who wilfully violates any of the provisions of this Act shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not more than two thousand
pesos, or, upon second conviction, to imprisonment of not more then one year, or to both fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
(b) If any violation of this Act is committed by a corporation, trust, partnership or association, the manager or in his default, the person acting as such
when the violation took place, shall be responsible. In the case of a government corporation, the managing head shall be made responsible, except
when shown that the violation was due to an act or commission of some other person, over whom he has no control, in which case the latter shall be
held responsible.
(c) The Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment of the unpaid minimum wages or the wages found owing to any employee under this Act.
(d) The Secretary may bring an action in any competent court to recover the wages owing to an employee under this Act, with legal interest. Any sum
thus recovered by the Secretary on behalf of an employee pursuant to this subsection shall be held in a special deposit account and shall be paid, on
order of the Secretary, directly to the employee or employees affected. Any such sums not paid to an employee because he cannot be located within a
period of three years shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.
(e) Any employer who underpays an employee in violation of this Act shall be liable to the employee effected in the amount of the unpaid wages with
legal interest. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any competent court by anyone or more employees on behalf of himself or
themselves. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee which
shall not exceed ten per cent of the amount awarded to the plaintiffs, unless the amount awarded is less than one hundred pesos, in which event the fee
may be ten pesos, but not in excess of that amount. Payment of the amount found due to the plaintiffs shall be made directly to the plaintiffs, in the
presence of a representative of the Secretary or the Court. In the event payment is witnessed by the court or its representative, the Secretary shall be
notified within ten days of payment that the payment has been made.
(f) No employer, attorney, or any other person, other than the employee to whom underpayment are found due, shall receive any part of the
underpayment due the employee; and no attorney shall receive any fee in excess of the maximum specified herein.
(g) In determining when an action is commenced under this section for the purpose of the statute of limitation, it shall be considered to be commenced
in the case of any individual claimant on the date when the complaint is filed if he is specifically named as a party plaintiff in the complaint, or if his
name did not so appear, on the subsequent date on which his name is added as a party plaintiff in such action."
It is clear from the above-quoted provisions that while Section 3 explicitly requires every owner of an establishment located outside of Manila or its
environs to pay each of its employees P3.00 a day on the effective date of the Act, and one year thereafter P4.00 a day, Section 15 imposes both a
criminal penalty for a willful violation of any of the above provisions and a civil liability for any underpayment of wages due an employee. The
intention of the law is clear: to slap not only a criminal liability upon an erring employer for any willful violation of the acts sought to be enjoined but
to attach concurrently a civil liability for any underpayment he may commit as a result thereof. The law speaks of a willful violation of "any of the
provisions of this Act", which is all-embracing, and the same must include what is enjoined in Section 3 thereof which embodies the very fundamental
purpose for which the law has been adopted. A study of the origin of our Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act 602) may be of help in arriving at an
enlightened and proper interpretation of the provisions under consideration. Our research shows that. this Act was patterned after the U. S. Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, as amended, and so a comparative study of the pertinent provisions of both would be enlightening.
The pertinent provisions of the U. S. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, follow:jgc:
"MINIMUM WAGES
SEC. 6. (a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce wages at the
following rates —
"(1) not less than 75 cents an hour;"
x x x
"PROHIBITED ACTS"
SEC. 15. (a) After the expiration of one hundred and twenty, days from the date of enactment of this Act, it shall be unlawful for any person —
"(1) to transport, offer for transportation, ship, deliver, or sell in commerce, or to ship, deliver; or sell with knowledge that shipment or delivery or sale
thereof in commerce is intended, any goods in the production of which any employee was employed in violation of section 6 or section 7, or in
violation of any regulation or order of the Administrator issued under section 14; . . .
"(2) to violate any of the provisions of section 6 or section 7, or any of the provisions of any regulation or order of the Administrator issued under
section 14;
"(3) to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or cause to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on
an industry committee;
"(4) to violate any of the provisions of section 11 (c) or any regulation or order made or continued in effect under the provisions of section 11 (d), or to
make any statement, report, or record filed or kept pursuant. to the provisions of such section or of any regulation or order thereunder, knowing such
statement, report, or record to be false in a material respect.
x x x
"PENALTIES
SEC. 16. (a) Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of section 15 shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a line of not more than
P10,000, or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. No person shall be imprisoned under this subsection except for an offense
committed after the conviction of such person for a prior offense under this subsection.
"(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or 7 of this Act shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their
unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Action to
recover such liability may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or
themselves and other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to
become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment
awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant costs of the action."
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act 602 read:
SEC. 3. Minimum wage. — (a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is employed by an enterprise other than in agriculture wages at
the rate of not less than —
"(2) Three pesos a day on the effective date of this Act and for one year after the effective date, and thereafter P4 a day, for employees of
establishments located outside of Manila or its environs: Provided, That this Act shall not apply to any retail or service enterprise that regularly
employs not more than five employees."
"SEC. 15. Penalties and recovery of wage due under this Act. — (a) Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this Act shall upon
conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not more than two thousand pesos, or, upon second conviction, to imprisonment of not more than one year, or
to both fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
x x x
"(e) Any employer who underpays an employee in violation of this Act shall be liable to the employee effected in the amount of the unpaid wages with
legal interest. Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any competent court by anyone or more employees on behalf of himself or
themselves. The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee which
shall not exceed ten per cent of the amount awarded to the plaintiffs, unless the amount awarded is less than one hundred pesos, in which event the fee
may be ten pesos, but not in excess of that amount. Payment of the amount found due to the plaintiffs shall be made directly to the plaintiffs, in the
presence of a representative of the Secretary or of the Court. In the event payment is witnessed by the court or its representative, the Secretary shall be
notified within ten days of payment that the payment has been made."cralaw virtua1aw library
An examination of the above-quoted provisions of the two Acts will show that while in substance they are similar, they however contain some
differences in their phraseology and in the apportionment of their provisions. Thus, while Section 15 (a), paragraph 2, of the Fair Labor Standards Act
makes it unlawful for an employer not to pay the minimum wage prescribed therein, our Minimum Wage Law does not contain a similar provision.
Again, the Fair Labor Standards Act enumerates in one single section all those acts which are declared unlawful and are not spread out in different
sections as done in our law. Thus, the acts that are declared unlawful by the former law as enumerated in Section 15(a) are: (1) to transport or deliver
any goods in the production of which any employee was employed in violation of Section 6 or Section 7, or in violation of any regulation or order of
the Administrator; (2) failure to pay the minimum wage; (3) to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against an employee who has filed a
complaint against the employer in relation to the Act; and (4) failure to keep the record or report required by law or to make a false record or report. On
the other hand, our law declares unlawful the following acts, to wit: (1) to pay wages in the form of promissory notes, vouchers, coupons, tokens or any
other form alleged to represent legal tender [Section 10 (a) (1)]; (2) to make any deduction or withhold any amount from the wages of an employee, or
induce any employee to give part of his wages by force or intimidation [Section 10(g)]; (3) to commit any act of discrimination against an employee
because of certain complaint he has filed or caused to be filed against the employer (Section 13); and (4) to make any false statement, report or record
to subvert the purpose of the Act (Section 14), which acts are contained in separate sections mentioned therein. The failure to pay the prescribed
minimum wage is not declared unlawful in our law.
It should also be noted that while Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act which provides for the penalties to be imposed for any willful violation of
the provisions of the Act; specifically states that those penalties refer to acts declared unlawful under Section 15 of the same Act, our law does not
contain such specification. It merely provides in Section 15 (a) that "Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this Act shall upon
conviction" be subject to the penalty therein prescribed. This distinction is very revealing. It clearly indicates that while the Fair Labor Standards Act
intends to subject to criminal action only acts that are declared unlawful, our law by legislative fiat intends to punish not only those expressly declared
unlawful but even those not so declared but are clearly enjoined to be observed to carry out the fundamental purpose of the law. One such provision is
undoubtedly that which refers to the payment of the minimum wage embodied in Section 3. This is the only rational interpretation that can be drawn
from the attitude of our Congress in framing our law in a manner different from that appearing in the mother law.
Indeed, the main objective of the law is to provide for a rock-bottom wage to be observed and followed by all employers of an agricultural and
industrial establishment. This objective would be defeated were we to adopt a restrictive interpretation of the above penal clause, for an employer who
knows that he cannot be amenable to a criminal action would be prone to subvert the law because if he is detected it would be easy for him to pay the
underpayment and the corresponding interest as would be the case were he to assume merely a civil liability. This would be a mockery and a decision
of the law not contemplated by our lawmaker which would certainly render it nugatory and abortive. We are not prepared to adopt an interpretation
which would give such adverse result to a legislation conceived in the lofty purpose of protecting labor and giving it a living wage. If the law is to
survive, it must be real, militant and effective.
"The establishment of the maximum wage benefits directly the low-paid employees, who now receive inadequate wages on which to support
themselves and their families. It benefits all wage earners indirectly by setting a floor below which their remuneration cannot fail. It raises the
standards of competition among employers, since it would protect the fair-minded employer who voluntarily pays a wage that supports the wage earner
from the competition of the employer, who operates at lower cost by reasons of paying his workers a wage below subsistence. If, in fact, the employer
cannot pay a subsistence wage. then he should not continue his operation unless he improves his methods and equipment so as to make the payment of
the minimum wage feasible for him; otherwise the employer is wasting the toil of the worker and the material resources used in the employment.
Second methods of operation, progressive and fair-minded management, and an adequate minimum wage go hand in hand." (Explanatory Note to H.B.
No. 1476)
Counsel for appellee however entertains a different interpretation. He contends that if Section 15(a) should be interpreted in a manner that would
embrace a wilful violation of any of the provisions of the law we would have a situation where even the officials entrusted with its enforcement may be
held criminally liable which is not contemplated in the law. Thus, he contends, the Secretary of Labor may be criminally prosecuted for willfully not
using all available devices for investigation [Section 4(c)], for not presenting to the Wage Board all the evidence in his possession relating to the wages
in the industries for which the Wage Board is appointed and other information relevant to the establishment of the minimum wage [Section 5(p)], and
for not doing all other acts which the law requires him to do under Section 6. This, he emphasizes, is absurd and should not be entertained.
To begin with, the Minimum Wage Law is a social legislation which has been adopted for the benefit of labor and as such it contains provisions that
are enjoined to be observed by the employer. These provisions are substantive in nature and had been adopted for common observance by the persons
affected. They cannot be eluded nor subverted lest the erring employer runs into the sanction of the law. On the other hand, the provisions adverted to
by counsel are merely administrative in character which had been adopted to set the machinery by which the law is to be enforced. They are provisions
established for observance by the officials entrusted with its enforcement. Failure to comply with them would therefore subject them merely to
administrative sanction. They do not come under the penal clause embodied in Section 15(a). This is clearly inferred from Section 18(c), of Republic
Act No. 602, which provides: "Any official of the Government to whom responsibility in administration and enforcement has been delegated under this
Act shall be removable on the sustaining of charges of malfeasance or non-feasance in office." This specific provision should be interpreted as
qualifying the penal clause provided for in Section 15(a).
It is true that Section 3 under which appellee was charged does not state that it shall be unlawfull for an employer to pay his employees wages below
the minimum wage but merely requires that the employer shall pay wages not below the minimum wage. But failure of such declaration does not make
the non-observance of the provisions less unlawful than otherwise, for such provision embodies precisely the raison d’etre of the law itself. Indeed,
Section 3 is the very provision on which all the other provisions of the law are built. Thus, the prohibition against discriminating against any employee
because he has filed a complaint or caused to be instituted one against the employer is just a means to insure the effective enforcement of that provision
(Section 13); and so the prohibition against the making of a false statement, report or record required to be filed or kept by the law (Section 13); the
prohibition against the payment of wages in the form of promissory notes, vouchers, coupons, tokens, or any other form to represent legal tender
(Section 10, par. a, sub-paragraph 1); and the prohibition against making deductions or withholding any amount from the wages of an employee
(Section 10, par. g). These are acts which were declared unlawful because they may be resorted to by unscrupulous employers with the evident purpose
of subverting or defeating the payment of the minimum wage. If these supplementary provisions are mere safeguards established by the lawmaker to
close every avenue to trickery or subversion on the part of the employer, they cannot be more important and imperative as the central provision fixing
the minimum wage without which the law will have no reason to exist. We cannot therefore entertain the claim that because said provision was not
declared unlawful it cannot be subject to the penal sanction embodied in Section 15.
It is likewise true that the informations under which the accused was charged only mention Section 3 of the law as the one violated and this section
does not contain a penal clause, but this does not make the informations defective. There is no law which requires that in order that an accused may be
convicted the specific provision which penalizes that act charged be mentioned in the information. The Rules of Court do not require such designation.
In fact, the rule provides that an information, to be sufficient, should state only the name of the defendant, the designation of the offense by the statute,
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate time of the commission of the offense,
and the place wherein the offense was committed (Rule 106, Section 5). The rule does not require that it should mention the particular penal provision
penalizing the offense.
The final claim of appellee is that inasmuch as the provisions of the law under which he was prosecuted are ambiguous and there is doubt as to their
interpretation, that doubt should be resolved in his favor because a penal statute should be strictly construed against the State. This contention must also
fail if we are to be consistent with our interpretation of the provisions of Section 15 (a) of the law. We have stated that section is clear and
unambiguous and covers the provisions embodied in Section 3 of the law, and if such is the case then there is no room for the application of the
principle invoked by appellee.
We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the court a quo erred in dismissing the informations filed against the appellee and, consequently, its order
of December 3, 1956, subject of this appeal should be set aside.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby set aside. It is ordered that these cases be remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings, with costs
against appellee.
Paras, C.J. Padilla and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CONCEPCION, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I concur in the foregoing opinion, as well as in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reyes (J. B. L.) . REYES, J. B. L., concurring:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Felix Bautista Angelo, particularly in view of the provisions of Sec. 10, paragraph g of the Minimum Wage Act
which reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 10 (g). It shall be unlawful for any person, including but not restricted to, any employer . . . to make any deductions or withhold any amount from
the wages of an employee . . . by force, intimidation, threat, or procuring dismissal or in any manner whatsoever."
If the act declares unlawful to withhold in any manner whatsoever any amount from the wages of an employee it must necessarily be unlawful not to
pay him the wage called for by the Minimum Wage Act. What is the difference between not paying the minimum wage and withholding part of the
wage so the balance is below the minimum wage? To underpay is to withhold part of the wage.
The act complained of, therefore, is an offense penalized under the Act. Our duty being to interpret the Act in consonance with its primary purpose to
benefit the laborer, we should consider that the only sanction for not paying the minimum wage were to be the payment of interest on the unpaid salary,
the situation of the wage earner would have been in no way advanced and the Minimum Wage Act would be practically nullified, for a laborer is in no
position to engage in protracted litigation with his employer. As pointed in the opinion of Justice Bautista Angelo the criminal liability is the only
effective sanction under the circumstances. The rejection of the Tañada amendment merely proves that the Legislature was against heavier penalties at
the start, not that it desired to shield anyone from prosecution.
It is not for us to speculate upon the secondary effects of the Act on industry. To foresee them is the task of the Legislature. If it desired to immunize
employers against criminal prosecution, as an exception to the general penalty, it could have clearly so stated. On the other hand if it wished to be
ambiguous in order to content both Capital and Labor, I think the Court would be advancing the cause of good government by driving home the
necessity that laws be carefully framed and clearly worded.
The function of statutory interpretation, in my opinion, is to cure involuntary mistakes and supply inadvertences; not to ferret out of ambiguities a
policy that legislators may be afraid or unwilling to express. If it is unconstitutional for the Judiciary to invade the sphere of the Legislature, it is just as
unlawful for the legislators to shirk their own duty and divert to the Judges the odium of unpopular measures. Que cada palo aguante su vela — each
mast should bear its own sail.
BENGZON, J., dissenting:
Concurring in the dissent of Mr. Justice Montemayor, I wish to emphasize that as applied to this case, Sec. 15, subsections (a) and (e) should be read
together substantially as follows:
Any person who violates any provision of this Act shall be punished with fines, etc. . . . except that where the violation consists in paying the employee
less than the minimum wage, she employer shall be punished by requiring him to satisfy the difference, plus attorney’s fees.
I believe subsection (e) punishes the particular "violation" of paying less than the minimum wage. It is a special provision, which under well-known
rules of construction, should prevail over the general provision in subsection (a). In other words, although the Act does not expressly say so, subsection
(e) is an exception 1 to subsection (a).
I think it is a mistake to suppose that this interpretation fails to punish the employer who disregards the Act; because the liability imposed by
subsection (e) is unquestionably a sanction, penal in nature, which except for the the law, would not be demandable. If Juan de la Cruz, by contract,
employs Pedro at P3.00 per day in Manila where the law fixes a minimum daily wage of P4.00, Pedro could not recover P4.00 instead of P3.00 (except
for this law) because Pedro agreed to the 3-peso wage. Nevertheless, this subsection (e) says, despite such agreement with Pedro, Juan must pay him at
the rate of P4.00 a day, plus attorney’s fees. He is required to pay what he did not contract to pay, or could not afford to pay. Is not this a punishment
imposed on Juan? Remember that fine, which is also a punishment consists in the disbursement of money.
But such payment is insufficient penalty, I hear others argue. This case will easily disprove such argument. Under subsection (e) this appellee would
have to pay necessarily P1,016.00, plus attorney’s fees; whereas under subsection (a) he might be fined P200.00 only. 2
However, the majority will counter, we hold that the employer, is liable under subsection (e) in addition to his liability under subsection (a).
Therein lies the trouble; the words "in addition" or words of similar import, were not inserted in subsection (e), as they could have been inserted.
Additional liability, is their prevailing idea. And yet, why should the law impose on the employer (who pays in accordance with a contract freely
entered into), additional burdens not imposed on the other employers will fully violating other fundamental provisions of the Act.
It may be argued that subsection (e) is not really a sanction independent of subsection (a), or additional thereto, because it merely repeats the
well-known principle that "every person criminally liable is also civily liable." My answer is twofold: first, attorney’s fees are not usually included in
such principle a robber is not required to pay attorney’s fees; second, the employee is not really the injured party because he accepted the employment
under a contract: "Scienti et volenti nulla fit injuria." There is no violation of any right of the employee for which reparation is due. In the example
given, Pedro had no right to require Juan to employ him at P4.00. There is only a breach of the statute, for which the Government can choose, and did
choose the proper sanction, namely, payment of the salary differential under subsection (e). The Congress did not choose more than that; contrary to
what it did in analogous situations. Take the Usury Law, for instance; it provides "without prejudice to the proper civil action for the recovery of
usurious interest paid, violations of this Act shall be subject to criminal prosecution and the guilty person, etc." (Sec. (10).
In the absence of a clear, unmistakable statute, we should not approve two punishments for one and the same misconduct.
MONTEMAYOR, J., dissenting:
To my knowledge, this is the first time that the Minimum Wage Law is being interpreted by this Tribunal, as regards the compass and scope of the
penalty provided in Section 15 of said law, so that on this subject matter, this will be the first case and a leading one. The trial court in its order
dismissing the information said that it had carefully considered its ruling or order because "it believes that any resolution, one way or another, would be
precedent-setting, because until now, the Supreme Court has not directly ruled upon the point."
Under the interpretation given by the majority, any employer who underpays his employees in violation of the Minimum Wage Law (Section 3) would
be subject to criminal prosecution. I am afraid that if that is the law, the prosecuting attorneys and fiscals would have on their hands not only the
prosecution of thousands of private employers who may be paving their employees and laborers amounts less than the minimum wage, however small
the deficiency, but also hundreds and thousands of provincial and municipal officials, particularly the latter, who are paying their employees, not
excluding peace officers like municipal policemen and patrolmen, salaries which are way below the minimum wage of P4.00 a day. It is a well known
fact that in this respect, the Government is the first and worst offender. Even first class municipalities cannot afford and naturally do not pay their
employees and peace officers the minimum wage; with more reason cannot second class and third class municipalities do so.
The majority opinion will have such far-reaching and to me, unforeseen consequences, at once baneful, undesirable, and hurtful to industry, and
disastrous to local government officials who, strictly speaking, are not to blame, that I am constrained to voice my dissent and explain the reasons
therefor.
For a better understanding of the adoption of the minimum wage in this jurisdiction, it is well to remember that it was not of the initiative, idea or
volition of this country. It was recommended by the Bell Mission which made an economic survey here and in its report, recommended its
establishment. Not only this, but it would appear that the enactment of this Minimum Wage Law was made a condition precedent to economic aid to be
given to us by the United States of America. 1
In connection with the discussion and enactment of this piece of legislation, not only our economists but also our legislators expressed their fears,
doubts and misgivings, fully realizing that the country was not perhaps prepared economically for its adoption and operation. But because of our
commitment with America, 2 and possibly realizing also the necessity of establishing a fair minimum standard of wages for laborers and employees,
the Legislature enacted this law in the nature of an experiment, carefully watching and observing in its operation, execution and observance, its good
points and its shortcomings as well, with the idea of later making the necessary changes and amendment. The Legislature was, as it were, venturing out
on an uncharted sea; so it had to be conservative and move with measured steps. Since the law was merely being tried out as an experiment, its
provisions could not have been made and intended to be strict and severe, in the sense that because of their severity and strictness, compliance there
with would be difficult, if not impossible, and would result in their nonobservance, and the consequent punishment by fine and prison sentence of those
defined as employers who are unable to comply with said provisions. The net result would be the unjust punishment of innocent government officials
and the discouragement and destruction of infant and small industries.
From the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 202, we may have an idea of the attitude of the Legislature on this particular point:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"One thing to be remembered is that the country has not yet attained that degree of industrialization where wages can be set at fully satisfactory levels
from the viewpoints of human values. Compromises must still. be made until this full industrial status is attained. Another thing is that hasty and
unjudicious action in passing minimum wags laws may be deterrent to private capital which, on the contrary needs to be encouraged to invest in local
industries if the industrialization of our country must someday be a fact." (Emphasis supplied).
As the majority opinion correctly observes, our Minimum Wage Law is patterned after that of the United States Fair Labor Standards Act (F. L. S. A.)
of 1938, as amended. As I have already stated, the establishment of this minimum wage in this country being a sort of experiment, it being the first
time that it was being tried out, and not knowing whether or not it would be a success, it is to be presumed that the Legislature acted cautiously and
warily, and even while adopting as a pattern the United States F.L.S.A., it did not wish or intend to make our law more stern and strict in its
enforcement and application, particularly as regards its penalties. But the majority opinion would make our law more rigorous and severe, more
comprehensive and more devastating in the application of its penal provisions. For instance, while the F.L.S.A. in Section 16(a) penalizes only specific
violations of its provisions expressly enumerated, our law as interpreted by the majority opinion, would punish any violation whatsoever, whether
enumerated specifically or not. Moreover, while Section 15(a) of the F. L. S. A. makes it unlawful for an employer not to pay the minimum wage
prescribed by it, our Minimum Wage Law does not contain a similar provision. What our law declares unlawful are certain positive and affirmative
acts, such as, paying wages in the form of promissory notes, vouchers, etc.; making deductions or withholding any amount from the wages of an
employee, or inducing any employee to give part of his wages by force or intimidation; committing any act of discrimination against an employee
because of a certain complaint he had filed against the employer, or making any false statement in any report or record to subvert the purposes of the
Act. These acts must have been regarded by the Legislature as serious and so expressly declared them unlawful. However, the mere failure to pay the
prescribed minimum wage is not, in our law, declared unlawful. I believe that what the Legislature intended to penalize with fine and prison sentence
were only those acts which it enumerated and declared unlawful, not the mere failure to follow and comply with the obligations imposed upon an
employer, such as, the nonpayment of the minimum wage.
It will be noticed that our law expressly provides that any employer underpaying an employee in violation of the Act shall be liable to said employee in
the amount of the underpayment, with legal interest, plus a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees. This amount may be recovered not only by the
employee himself, but by the Secretary of Labor on his behalf. In my opinion, this civil responsibility to be enforced with the aid of the Department of
Labor, was regarded as sufficient punishment and deterrent on the employer. Being a civil action, the employee only needs preponderance of evidence
to win his suit. The Legislature may have been of the belief that application of the penal sanction in the form of fine and prison sentence would be too
radical a measure, would scare and discourage new and infant industries, besides inducing violators to resort to underhanded but effective measures to
hide and conceal infringement of the law, to say nothing of the added difficulty in securing conviction, which requires not only preponderance of
evidence, but proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
To show that the Legislature did not intend to be too severe and stern in the application of this new law which was merely being tried out, while House
Bill No. 1732 was being discussed in the Senate, Senator Tañada believing that the bill was too lenient for those who violated its provisions by
providing for a fine of only not more than P1,000.00 or imprisonment of not more than six months, he proposed that the fine be increased to not more
than P10,000.00 — half the amount of the fine provided in Section 16 (a) of the U.S. Fair Labor Standards Act; but the committee sponsoring the bill,
through Senator Torres, objected to the proposed amendment as being too excessive and severe, specially at the beginning of the operation of the law,
upon which Senator Tañada withdrew his amendment, with the understanding that in a year or so after the promulgation of the law, it will be
amended:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SENATE
"December 22, 1950
‘ENMIENDA TAÑADA’
"SENATOR TAÑADA. Mr. President for another amendment, on page 18, Section 15 provides for penalties. Mr. President, I believe that the bill is too
lenient for those who violate the provisions of this measure. It only provides for a fine of not more than one thousand pesos or imprisonment of not
more than six months, or both. In order to really protect labor we must make the penalty stiffer than what is provided in this bill. So I propose the
following amendment: In line 22, delete the word ‘one’ between the words ‘than’ and ‘thousand’, and insert in its place the word ‘ten’ — not more
than ten thousand pesos’.
"EL PRESIDENTE. Que dice el comite?
"EL SENADOR TORRES. Señor Presidente, el Comite siente no poder aceptar la enmienda, en viata de que considera demasiada excesiva la pena,
sobre todo, en los comienzos de la vigencia de la ley.
"SENATOR TAÑADA. I then, Mr. President, withdraw my amendment with the understanding that in a year or so after this Law has been in force, we
shall amend it."
"EL PRESIDENTE. Se da por retirada." (Senate Journal, Jan. 5, 1951, pp. 5-6). (Emphasis supplied).
Going back to the violation of this Minimum Wage Law by the Government itself, it is a matter of public knowledge that employees like clerks in the
office of the Municipal Treasurer, and municipal policemen receive as low as P40.00 or P50.00 a month, way below the minimum wage prescribed by
the law. Under the interpretation given by the majority, since the word "employer" in the law includes the Government 3 and government corporations,
then the municipal mayor, the municipal councilors and the municipal treasurer who knowingly and wilfully pay to their employees and policemen
salaries way below the minimum wage, would all be subject to criminal prosecution. Multiply this number of municipal officials by the number of such
towns and municipalities in the Philippines which do not and cannot pay the minimum wage to their employees and municipal policemen, which towns
and municipalities can be counted by the hundreds, and we shall have an idea of the number of government violators of the law which we have and
must prosecute criminally under the majority opinion. Could such mass and wholesale prosecution have been contemplated and intended by the
Legislature? And let it not be said that with respect to said Government officials, the only punishment is by administrative action and removal, as
provided in Section 18, paragraphs (c) and (d), which read as follows:
"(c) Any official of the Government to whom responsibility in administration and enforcement has been delegated under this Act shall be removable on
the sustaining of charges of malfeasance or nonfeasance in office.
"(d) Any person engaged in the administration and enforcement of this Act who is found to have accepted any bribe from or on behalf of any party in
interest under this Act shall be summarily dismissed, and criminal action shall be instituted against such person." (Italics supplied).
because those provisions clearly refer only to those government officials entrusted with the administration and enforcement of the law, such as, the
Secretary of Labor, the members of the Wage Administration Service, and others.
But the majority opinion says that not to apply the penal sanction to an employer underpaying his laborers or employees —
". . . would be a mockery and a derision of the law not contemplated by our lawmaker which would certainly render it nugatory and abortive. We are
not prepared to adopt an interpretation which would give such adverse result to a legislation conceived in the lofty purpose of protecting labor and
giving it a living wage. If the law is to survive, it must be real, militant and effective." (Emphasis supplied).
In other words, the majority of this Tribunal on its own initiative would make the Minimum Wage Law militant and effective by a blanket and
indiscriminate application of Section 15 (a) to all violators of its provisions, whether or not such violation is expressly or specifically declared unlawful
by the law itself. Stated otherwise, this Tribunal steps in, nay, rushes in to put teeth in a legislation which it considers toothless and would make
effective and militant what it regards would otherwise be ineffectual and inadequate. This Tribunal would, like one unlicensed to practice medicine,
prescribe a cure for a supposed legislational malady. I am afraid that is not and has never been the province, much less, the prerogative of the Judiciary.
Otherwise, the courts would be indulging in judicial legislation.
If the Minimum Wage Law is found to be inadequate and ineffective, let the Legislature make the necessary changes and amendments. In fact, that was
the legislative plan from the beginning — observe the operation and working of the law and then make changes, if deemed necessary. But evidently,
the Legislature is satisfied with the operation and mode of application of the law, because although approved on April 6, 1951, and made effective 120
days thereafter, in other words, after a seven-year operation, it (Legislature) has not seen fit to introduce any major changes,4 specially in the
application of the penalty.
Anyway, after all is said and done, the least that could be said about the applicability of Section 15(a) of the Minimum Wage law to violations of
Section 3 is doubtful. Even brushing aside and not considering the grave doubts entertained by the undersigned as to the applicability of said Section 15
(a) to violations of Section 3, we have in evidence the opinion of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and according to it, the opinion of the major
sector of the Zamboanga bar, sustaining the view that Section 15 (a) is not applicable to violations of Sections 3 of the Minimum Wage Law. We have
the well settled principle in the interpretation of penal laws that in case of doubt, the interpretation favorable to the accused should be adopted.
Authorities in support of this principle are not wanting.
"Laws creating, defining, or punishing crimes, and those imposing penalties and forfeitures, are to be construed strictly against the state or the party
seeking to enforce them, and liberally in favor of the party sought to be charged. They are not to be enlarged by implications, nor extended to persons
or cases not plainly within the meaning of the language employed." (Black on Interpretation of Laws, p. 451).
Said this Court in U. S. v. Abad Santos, 35 Phil. 243:
"Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly; no person should be brought within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made
clearly so."
In view of the foregoing, I hold that the penal sanction of the Minimum Wage Law applies only to certain violations of its provisions, that is to say,
those acts which are expressly declared by the law itself as unlawful; and that mere nonpayment of the minimum wage is not included in the said penal
sanction, the Legislature evidently believing that the civil responsibility of the employer for the amount of the underpayment with legal interest and
attorney’s fees to be enforced with the aid of the Department of Labor, is enough punishment and deterrent on employers.
REYES, A., J.
As the majority opinion itself says, "failure to pay the prescribed minimum wage is not declared unlawful in our law" (Rep. Act No. 602). On the other
hand, it is doubtful if the penal sanction prescribed in section 15(a) of that Act — presumably for the acts and practices therein declared unlawful —
could be rightfully applied to the act of underpaying an employee, since paragraph (e) of that same section already provides a specific remedy therefor.
Considering that penal statutes are strictly construed against the state and in case of doubt courts must adopt the construction favorable to the accused, I
vote for the affirmance of the order below and also say that courts should not presume to legislate by putting into the law more teeth than the
Legislature has already put into it.
PEOPLE v MANANTAN, G.R. NO. L-14129 (1962)
Casus Omissus Pro Omisso Habendus Est
JURISPRUDENCE:
Electioneering; Officers prohibited from engaging in politics; Justices of the peace.— A justice of peace is included among the officers enjoined from
active political participation by Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. There was no need of including justices of the peace in the enumeration in
said Section 54 because the Legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term "judge".
Same; Same; "Judge" construed.—The term "judge" not modified by any word or phrase, is intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like
judges of the courts of first instance, judges of the Courts of Agrarian Relations, and justices of the peace.
Statutory Construction; Rule of "casus omisus" when applicable.— The rule of "casus omissus pro omisso habendus est" can operate and apply
only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar, the Legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term—"judges." The rule,
therefore, has no applicability to the instant case.
Same; Penal Statutes; Rule of Strict Construction.—The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling
the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of
penal laws. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56). The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where
a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would feat the clear purpose of the lawmakers (Crawford, Interpetation of Laws,
Sec. 78, p. 294).
Same;Same; Rule of Exclusion.— Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by
enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will
follow by not so including them, the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius,should not be invoked. (Blevins vs. Mullally, 135 P. 307, 22 Cal. App.
519).
FACTS:
● Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, Manantan claims that as "justice of
peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the said section.
● The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the purview of Section 54.
● Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the
national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert
any influence in any manner in an election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer.".
● Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administration Code wherein, "No judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or
any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part
therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice of peace" was omitted revealed the intention of
Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its operation.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised Election Code.
HELD:
YES, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds
of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to
include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge.", which
includes all kinds of judges.
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. This term includes all
officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges
of facts.
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357
and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words
"justice of the peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in RA 180, it did not intend to exempt
the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing
omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly
established. In the case at bar, the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in
partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just called "judges". Also, the application of this rule does not proceed from the
mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely
serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.
Also, the purpose of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges,
such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under
the old statute, are now within its encompass.
The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and lower courts because they were not able to give reasons for
the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of peace".
PEOPLE v MANABA, G.R. NO. 38725 (1933)
JURISPRUDENCE:
1. RAPE; VALIDITY OF COMPLAINT; JURISDICTION ; JEOPARDY.—Whether the defendant was placed in jeopardy for the second time
or not when he was tried for rape in the present case depends on whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. The first
complaint filed against the defendant was signed and sworn to by the chief of police of Dumaguete. As it was not the complaint of the
offended party, it was not a valid complaint in accordance with the law. The judgment of the court was therefore void for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, and the defendant was never in jeopardy.
2. ID ; REVISED PENAL CODE; ENGLISH AND SPANISH TEXT OF PARAGRAPH 3, ARTICLE 344, COMPARED.—The Spanish
equivalent of the word "filed" is not found in the Spanish text of the third paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. The Spanish
text of said Code is controlling as this was the text approved by the Legislature.
FULL TEXT:
This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Eulalio Garcia in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros in criminal case No. 1827 dated November
15, 1932, finding the defendant guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal, and the accessory
penalties of the law, to indemnify the offended party, Celestina Adapon, in the amount of P500, to maintain the offspring, if any, at P5 a month until
said offspring should become of age, and to pay the costs.
The defendant appealed to this court, and his attorney de oficio now makes the following assignments of error:
"1. El Juzgado a quo erro al no estimar en favor del acusado apelante la defensa de double jeopardy o legal jeopardy que ha interpuesto.
"2. El Juzgado a quo erro al no declarar insuficientes las pruebas de identificacion del acusado apelante.
"3. El Juzgado a quo tambien erro al pasar por alto las incoherencias de los testigos de la acusacion y al no declarar que no se ha establecido fuera de
toda duda la responsabilidad del apelante.
"4. El Juzgado a quo erro al condenar al acusado apelante por el delito de violacion y al no acceder a su mocion de nueva vista."
It appears that on May 10, 1932, the chief of police of Dumaguete subscribed and swore to a criminal complaint wherein he charged Pedro Manaba
with the crime of rape, committed on the person of Celestina Adapon. This complaint was filed with the justice of the peace of Dumaguete on June 1,
1932, and in due course the case reached the Court of First Instance. The accused was tried and convicted, but on motion of the attorney for the
defendant the judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the
subject matter of the action, because the complaint had not been filed by the offended party, but by the chief of police (criminal case No. 1801).
On August 17, 1932, the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the defendant with the crime of rape. This complaint was filed in
the Court of First Instance (criminal case No. 1827), but was referred to the justice of the peace of Dumaguete for preliminary investigation. The
defendant waived his right to the preliminary investigation, but asked for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that he had previously been
placed in jeopardy for the same offense. This motion was denied by the justice of the peace, and the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance,
where the provincial fiscal in an information charged the defendant with having committed the crime of rape as follows:
"Que en o hacia la noche del dia 9 de mayo de 1932, en el Municipio de Dumaguete, Provincia de Negros Oriental, Islas Filipinas, y dentro de la
jurisdiccion de este Juzgado. el referido acusado Pedro Manaba, aprovechandose de la oscuridad de la noche y mediante fuerza, violencia e
intimidacion, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente yacio y tuvo acceso carnal con una niña llamada Celestina Adapon, contra la voluntad de esta. El
acusado Pedro Manaba ya ha sido convicto por Juzgado competente y en sentencia firme por este mismo delito de violacion.
"Hecho cometido con infraccion de la ley."
The defendant renewed his motion for dismissal in the case on the ground of double jeopardy, but his motion was denied; and upon the termination of
the trial the defendant was found guilty and sentenced as hereinabove stated.
Whether the defendant was placed in jeopardy for the second time or not when he was tried in the present case depends on whether or not he was tried
on a valid complaint in the first case. The offense in question was committed on May 9, 1932, or subsequent to the date when the Revised Penal Code
became effective.
The third paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, which relates to the prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness reads as follows:
"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be."
The Spanish text of this paragraph is as follows:
"Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o abusos deshonestos, sino en virtud de denuncia de la parte agraviada, o de sus
padres, o abuelos o tutor, ni despues de haberse otorgado al ofensor, perdon expreso por dichas partes, segun los casos."
It will be observed that the Spanish equivalent of the word "filed" is not found in the Spanish text, which is controlling, as it was the Spanish text of the
Revised Penal Code that was approved by the Legislature.
The first complaint filed against the defendant was signed and sworn to by the chief of police of Dumaguete. As it was not the complaint of the
offended party, it was not a valid complaint in accordance with the law. The judgment of the court was therefore void for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, and the defendant was never in jeopardy.
It might be observed in this connection that the judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on the motion of defendant's attorney, who subsequently
set up the plea of double jeopardy in the present case.
The other assignments of error relate to the sufficiency of the evidence, which in our opinion fully sustains the findings of the trial judge.
The recommendation of the Solicitor-General is erroneous in several respects, chiefly due to the fact that it is based on the decision of July 30, 1932
that was set aside, and not on the decision now under consideration. The accused should not be ordered to acknowledge the offspring, if should there be
any, because the record shows that the accused is a married man.
It appears that the lower court should have taken into consideration the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity. The defendant is therefore sentenced to
suffer seventeen years, four months, and one day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the offended party, Celestina Adapon, in the sum of P500, and to
support the offspring, if any. As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of both instances against the appellant.
LA CARLOTA v JIMENEZ, G.R. NO. L-12436 (1961)
JURISPRUDENCE:
Taxation; Excise Tax; Tax Exemption; Fertilizers imported by farmer through agent not exempted.—An importation of fertilizers made by a farmer or
planter through an agent, other than his cooperative, is not imported directly as required by the exemption; hence, the same is taxable.
Statutory Construction; Tax Exemption; Exempting provision construed strictly against taxpayer.—Exempting provisions are to be construed liberally
in favor of the taxing authority and strictly against exemption from tax liability. As a result, statutory provisions governing the refund of taxes are
strictly construed in favor of the State and against the taxpayer (82 C.J.S. pp. 957-958; Helvering vs. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, 311 US 46, 85 L.
ed. 29 S. Ct., 51 Am. Jur. p. 526).
FULL TEXT:
DIZON, J.:
Sometime in September, 1955 La Carlota Sugar Central, a domestic corporation hereinafter referred to as the Central, managed, controlled and
operated by Elizalde & Co., Inc., referred to hereinafter as Elizalde, imported 500 short tons of ammonium sulphate and 350 short tons of ammonium
phosphate. The corresponding letter of credit in the sum of $60,930.00, U.S. currency, was opened through the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation in the name of the.Central and in favor of the Overseas Central Enterprises, Inc., 141 Battery St., San Francisco 11, California, U.S.A. The
invoices, bill of lading, and all other papers incident to said importation were also in the name of the Central.
When the fertilizers arrived in the Philippines, the Central Bank imposed on, and demanded from the Central 17% exchange tax in accordance with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 601, as amended, and the Central paid in that connection the total sum of P20,872.09 (Annexes B and C attached to the
Petition for Review).
On November 18, 1955 the Central filed, through the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, a petition for the refund of the P20,872.09 paid as
above stated, claiming that it had imported the fertilizers mentioned heretofore upon request and for the exclusive use of five haciendas known as
"Esperanza", "Mahalin", "Valencia" owned by Elizalde "Consuelo" and "Maayon", these last two managed by the same company, and therefore the
importation was exempt from the 17% exchange tax law in accordance with Sec. 2, Rep. Act 601, as amended by Act 1375. The Auditor of the Central
Bank, however, denied the petition on July 2, 1956. The Central requested the Auditor to reconsider his ruling, but after a re-examination of all
pertinent papers the reconsideration was denied. The Central then appealed to the Auditor General of the Philippines, who on January 18, 1957,
affirmed the ruling of the Auditor of the Central Bank upon the ground that "the importation of the fertilizers here in question does not fall within the
scope of the exempting provisions of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 601, as amended by Republic Act No, 1375. Accordingly, the decision of the
Auditor, Central Bank of the Philippines, denying the aforementioned request for refund of 17% exchange tax, is hereby affirmed". In view of this
result, the Central and Elizalde filed the present petition for review.
The only question to be resolved is whether upon the undisputed facts of the case the importation of the fertilizers mentioned heretofore is covered by
the exemption provided by Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 601, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 1175, 1197 and 1375, which read as follows:
"SECTION 1. Except as herein otherwise provided, there shall be assessed, collected and paid a special excise tax of seventeen per centum on the value
in Philippine peso of foreign exchange sold by the Central Bank of the Philippines, or any of its agents until June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and
fifty-six.
"SEC. 2. The tax provided for in section one of this Act shall not be collected on foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation
and/or other charges of canned milk, canned beef, cattle, canned fish, cocoa beans, malt, stabilizer and flavors, vitamin concentrate; supplies and
equipment purchased directly by the Government or any of its instrumentalities for its own exclusive use; machinery, equipment, accessories, and spare
parts, for the use of industries, miners, mining enterprises, planters and farmers; and fertilizers when imported by planters or farmers directly or
through their cooperatives; * * *."
The law is, therefore, clear that imported fertilizers are exempt from the payment of the 17% tax only if the same were imported by planters or farmers
directly or through their cooperatives. In the present case, as appellants admit that the Central "is not the planter ultimately benefited by the fertilizers,
much less a cooperative within the purview of Rep. Act No. 601, as amended", the only possible conclusion is that the imported fertilizers in question
are not entitled to the exemption provided by law.
It is, however, argued that the Central imported the fertilizers for the exclusive purpose of accommodating the haciendas mentioned heretofore, who
were to use the fertilizers; that the Central acted merely as an agent of the aforesaid haciendas; that considering the relationship and corporate tie-up
between the Central, on the one hand, and Elizalde, on the other, the act of the Central in importing the fertilizers should be considered as an act of
Elizalde and, therefore, the act of the haciendas themselves, three of which were owned and two managed by Elizalde. We find these contentions to be
without merit.
As already stated, the exemption covers exclusively fertilizers imported by planters or farmers directly or through their cooperatives. The word
"directly" has been interpreted to mean "without anything intervening" (Words and Phrases, Vol. 12A, p.140 citing Gulf Atlantic Warehouse, etc. vs.
Bennet, 51 So 2nd 544, 546, 36 Ala. App. 33); "proximately or without intervening agency or person" (Idem, p. 142 citing Employers' Casualty Co. vs.
Underwood, 286 p. 7, 10; 142 Okl. 208). Consequently, an importation of fertilizers made by a farmer or planter through an agent, other than his
cooperative, is not imported directly as required by the exemption. This conclusion acquires added force upon consideration of the fact that the legal
provision in question has already established an exception from the meaning or scope of the term "directly" by providing coverage for fertilizers
imported by planters or farmers through their cooperatives. The latter, therefore, is the only agent of planters or farmers recognized by the exception,
and we can not recognize any other.
On the other hand, that the agent acted simply to accommodate the planter or farmer and without any idea of making any profit from the transaction
would seem to be immaterial considering the language employed in the statute under consideration.
In connection with what has been stated heretofore, we have to bear in mind likewise that when the issue is whether or not the exemption from a tax
imposed by law is applicable, the rule is that the exempting provision is to be construed liberally in favor of the taxing authority and strictly against
exemption from tax liability, the result being that statutory provisions for the refund of taxes are strictly construed in favor of the State and against the
taxpayer (82 C.J.S. pp. 957-958; Helvering vs. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills, 311 US 46, 85 L. ed. 29 S. Ct., 51 Am. Jur. p. 526). Indeed, were we to
adopt appellants' construction of the law by exempting from the 17% tax all fertilizers imported by planters or farmers through any agent other than
their cooperatives, we would be rendering useless the only exception expressly established in the case of fertilizers imported by planters or farmers
through their cooperatives.
In view of the foregoing, the ruling appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
ABS-CBN v CTA, G.R NO. L-52306 (1981)
JURISPRUDENCE:
Taxation; Statutory Construction, Retroactivity; BIR circulars or rulings have no retroactive effect where their application would be prejudicial
to taxpayers.—It is clear from the foregoing that rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no retroactive
application where to so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. The prejudice to petitioner of the retroactive application of Memorandum
Circular No. 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes under
General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was also made three years after 1968
for a period of time commencing in 1965. Petitioner was no longer in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations because it had already
remitted all film rentals and no longer had any control over them when the new Circular was issued. And in so far as the enumerated exceptions are
concerned, admittedly, petitioner does not fall under any of them.
Same; Same; Principle of legislative approval of administrative interpretation by re-enactment; Case at bar.—T he principle of legislative
approval of administrative interpretation by re-enactment clearly obtains in this case. It provides that “the re-enactment of a statute substantially
unchanged is persuasive indication of the adoption by Congress of a prior executive construction.” Note should be taken of the fact that this case
involves not a mere opinion of the Commissioner or ruling rendered on a mere query, but a Circular formally issued to “all internal revenue officials”
by the then Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Same; Estoppel; Principle that Government never estopped from collecting taxes because of mistakes or errors of its agents; Exception; Interest
of justice and fair play. —This Court is not unaware of the well-entrenched principle that the Government is never estopped from collecting taxes
because of mistakes or errors on the part of its agents. In fact, utmost caution should be taken in this regard. But,like other principles of law, this also
admits of exceptions in the interest of justice and fairplay. The insertion of Sec. 338-A into the National Internal Revenue Code, as held in the case of
Tuason, Jr. vs. Lingad, is indicative of legislative intention to support the principle of good faith. In fact, in the United States, from where Sec. 24 (b)
was patterned, it has been held that the Commissioner or Collector is precluded from adopting a position inconsistent with one previously taken where
injustice would result therefrom or where there has been a misrepresentation to the taxpayer.
Same; Penalty; Interest and surcharge not imposable where taxpayer religiously complies with his duty under the BIR circular. —We have also
noted that in its Decision, the Court of Tax Appeals further required the petitioner to pay interest and surcharge as provided for in Sec. 51 (e) of the
Tax Code in addition to the deficiency withholding tax of P525,897.06. This additional requirement is much less called for because the petitioner relied
in good faith and religiously complied with no less than a Circular issued “to all internal revenue of-ficials” by the highest official of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and approved by the then Secretary of Finance.
FACTS:
● During the period pertinent to this case, petitioner corporation was engaged in the business of telecasting local as well as foreign films
acquired from foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines. for which petitioner paid rentals after withholding
income tax of 30%of one-half of the film rentals. In implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax Code, the Commissioner issued General Circular
V-334.
● Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. dutifully withheld and turned over to the BIR 30% of ½ of the film rentals paid by it to
foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines.
● The last year that the company withheld taxes pursuant to the Circular was in 1968. On 27 June 1908, RA 5431 amended Section 24 (b) of
the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from 30% to 35% and revising the tax basis from “such amount” referring to rents, etc. to “gross
income.”
● In 1971, the Commissioner issued a letter of assessment and demand for deficiency withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968. The
company requested for reconsideration; where the Commissioner did not act upon.
ISSUE(S):
Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71, revoking General Circular V-334, may be retroactively applied.
HELD:
Rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner have no retroactive application where to so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers.
Herein ,the prejudice the company of the retroactive application of Memorandum Circular 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three
years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes under General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner to pay
deficiency withholding income tax was also made three years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. The company was no longer in a
position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations because it had already remitted all film rentals and had no longer control over them when the
new circular was issued. Insofar as the enumerated exceptions are concerned, the company does not fall under any of them.

Stat Con Case Digest Iv

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STAT CON CASE DIGEST IV

.. cont. ​(Subjects of Construction: The Constitution)

PEOPLE v ECHAVES, G.R. NO. 47757-61 (1980)

Section 2. This decree shall take effect immediately.

Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

A preamble may restrict what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of a law.

PRIMICIAS v MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA, PANGASINAN, G.R. NO. L-26702 (1979)

Appealed decision is therefore ​AFFIRMED​.

CONTE v COA, G.R. NO. 116422 (1996)

VI. INTERPRETATION OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF STATUTE

PEOPLE v PURISIMA, G.R. Nos. L-42050-66, etc. (1978)

The petition is ​DISMISSED​.

PEOPLE v GATCHALIAN, G.R. NO. L-12011-14 (1958)

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

"(1) not less than 75 cents an hour;"

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act 602 read:

Paras, C.J. Padilla and Endencia, JJ., concur.

CONCEPCION, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

BENGZON, J., dissenting:

MONTEMAYOR, J., dissenting:

"December 22, 1950

"EL PRESIDENTE. Que dice el comite?

Said this Court in U. S. v. Abad Santos, 35 Phil. 243:

PEOPLE v MANANTAN, G.R. NO. L-14129 (1962)

PEOPLE v MANABA, G.R. NO. 38725 (1933)

"Hecho cometido con infraccion de la ley."

The Spanish text of this paragraph is as follows:

LA CARLOTA v JIMENEZ, G.R. NO. L-12436 (1961)

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.. cont. (Subjects of Construction: The Constitution)

Appealed decision is therefore AFFIRMED.

The petition is DISMISSED.