ADMISSIBILITY AND USE OF

CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE IN THE

CUSTOMARY COURT.

BY

HON. JUSTICE GEORGE CHIBUEZE

NNAMANI

JUDGE, CCA ENUGU STATE

INTRODUCTION  
 The   Customary   Court   is   an   inferior   court   of   record.1   It   contributes   to  
the  justice  system  an  intriguing  uniqueness  of  procedure  characterized  
by   a   loose   modus   operandi   uninhibited   by   the   rigid   procedural   niceties,  
strictures   and   censors   that   regulate   and   sometimes   bedevil   superior  
courts   of   record.2   Owing   to   its   unorthodox   nature,   proceedings   in   the  
                                                                                                                       
1
  The   term   “court   of   record”   connotes   the   duty   of   a   court   to   keep   record   of   its   proceedings.   This  
character,   as   appertain   to   the   Customary   Court   is   captured   in   Section   27   of   the   Customary   Courts   Law  
of   Enugu   State   2004   which   provides   that   evidence   given   in   any   proceedings   before   a   Customary   Court  
shall  be  recorded  in  writing  by  the  Chairman  or  in  his  absence,  a  member  presiding.  See  also,  Order  12  
Rule  6  of  the  Customary  Courts  (Civil  Procedure)  Rules  of  the  Federal  Capital  Territory,  2007,  as  well  as  
S.   32   of   the   Customary   Courts   Law   of   Lagos   state   2011.   The   Customary   Court   is   an   inferior   court   of  
record  by  virtue  of  its  exclusion  from  the  roster  of  courts  created  by  the  constitution  and  expressed  by  
Section  6  (3)  thereof  to  be  superior  courts  of  record.  
2
 Section  6  (3)  thereof  provides  that  the  Supreme  Court,  the  Court  of  Appeal,  the  Federal  High  Court,  
the   High   Court   of   the   Federal   Capital   Territory,   Abuja,   a   High   court   of   a   State,   the   Sharia   Court   of  
Appeal   of   the   Federal   Capital   Territory,   Abuja,   a   Sharia   Court   of   Appeal   of   a   State,   and   the   Customary  

1  
 
Customary   Court   have   been   declared   sui   generis.3   What   is   more,  
Section  2  (2)  ©  of  the  Evidence  Act4  excludes  the  Customary  Court  from  
the  courts  chained  to  or  governed  by  the  rules  of  evidence.  By  virtue  of  
this  express  exclusion,  judgments  or  proceedings  of  the  court  cannot  be  
impeached   on   appeal   on   the   basis   of   lack   of   adherence   to   the  
provisions  of  the  Evidence  Act.    

With  the  foregoing  as  a  premise,  can  I  not  be  said  to  be  rowing  against  
the  tide  or  standing  on  sinking  sand  in  this  discourse  since  admissibility  
and   use   of   circumstantial   evidence   is   about   the   provisions   of   the  
Evidence   Act?   Whatever   the   answer,   this  treatise   points   the   searchlight  
and  compels  intellectual  attention  to  a  tenebrous  or  dark  alley,  and  like  
all   adventurers   who   venture   into   strange   or   unfamiliar   terrains,   I   will  
either  emerge  with  a  shout  of  Eureka!,  as  did  Archimedes  of  Syracuse,  
the  ancient  Greek  scientist,5  or  a  bloody  nose.    

I   will   begin   with   a   reconnaissance   of   the   subject   and   then   see   if   the  
Customary   Court   system   has   a   helipad   on   which   the   essay   can,   like   a  
chopper,  land.  Before  then,  let  me  register  my  deep  appreciation  of  the  
Administrator  of  the  National  Judicial  Institute  (NJI),  His  Lordship,  Hon.  
Justice  R.P.I  Bozimo  (OFR),  the  Secretary  of  the  Institute,  the  Directors  
of   Studies   and   Research   for   finding   me   ‘admissible’   in   this   great  
institute   as   a   resource   person.   I   am   grateful.   To   amplify   my  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Court   of   Appeal   of   a   State   shall   be   superior   courts   of   record.   The   coast   of   Section   6   (3)   has   necessarily  
been  expanded  by  the  metamorphosis  of  the  National  Industrial  Court  into  a  superior  court  of  record  
by  virtue  of  s.  1  (2)  (a)  of  the  National  Industrial  Court  Act,  2006.    

 
3
  See,   DAVID   UDE   &   ORS   v   PETER   OBIOHA   (Unreported)   judgment   of   the   Customary   Court   of   Appeal   Enugu  
th
delivered  on  27  September,  2012  in  CCAE/37/2010.    
4
 Cap.  E14,  Laws  of  the  Federation  of  Nigeria,  2004.    
5
  On   his   discovery   of   a   method   of   determining   the   ratio   of   weight   in   volume.   See,   The   New   International  
Webster’s  Comprehensive  Dictionary  of  the  English  Language,  Deluxe  Encyclopedic  Edition,  page  438.    

2  
 
gratefulness,   I   hereby   request,   in   the   tradition   of   Charles   Dickens’  
Oliver  Twist,  for  more,  for  a  repetition  of  this  gesture  in  no  distant  time.  
My  availability,  I  assure  you,  goes  without  saying.                

DEFINITION  

I   find   it   apt,   at   the   terminus   aquo,   to   preface   this   discourse   with   a  

workable  definition  of  evidence  as  a  necessary  foundation  to  make  for  
easy   comprehension   of   the   concept   of   circumstantial   evidence.  
Evidence  is  any  species  of  proof,  or  probative  matter,  legally  presented  
at   the   trial   of   an   issue,   by   the   act   of   the   parties   and   through   the  
medium   of   witnesses,   records,   documents,   exhibits,   concrete   objects  
etc,  for  the  purpose  of  inducing  belief  in  the  minds  of  the  court  or  jury  
as   to   their   contention.6   According   to   OPUTA,   JSC,   in   Chukwuogor   v  
Obuora7:   “In   its   broadest   sense,   evidence   encompasses   and   includes  
the  means  employed  for  the  purpose  of  proving  a  disputed  fact.”    

Put  in  another  way,  it  is  the  system  of  rules  and  standards  by  which  the  
admission  of  proof  at  the  trial  of  a  lawsuit  is  regulated.8  

Circumstantial  evidence,  on  the  other  hand,  is  testimony  not  based  on  
personal   knowledge   or   observation   of   the   facts   in   controversy,   but   of  
other   facts   from   which   deductions   are   drawn,   showing   indirectly   the  
facts   sought   to   be   proved.9   It   has   also   been   defined   as   “…evidence   of  

                                                                                                                       
6 th
 See  Black’s  Law  Dictionary,  6  Edition,  at  page  555.  See  also,  Compendium  of  Law  s  Under  the  Nigerian  Legal  
System  at  page  659.    
7
 (1987)  3  NWLR  (Pt  61)  454.  
8
 See,  McCormick  on  Evidence,  Edited  by  Edward  W.  Cleary,  at  page  1.    
9 th
 See  Black’s  Law  Dictionary,  6  Ed.  at  page  243.  

3  
 
surrounding   circumstances   which,   by   un-­‐designed   coincidence,   is  
capable  of  proving  a  proposition  with  the  accuracy  of  mathematics.”10  

SOURCES  OF  THE  LAW  OF  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE  

THE  COMMON  LAW  

The  Nigerian  legal  system  received  the  common  law  of  England  at  the  
dawn  of  the  20th  century  with  its  doctrine  of  circumstantial  evidence.11  
With   that,   the   doctrines   of   res   gestae,   res   ipsa   loquitor,   recent  
possession,   and   other   common   law   principles   became   operational   in  
Nigeria.   Though   the   Customary   law   courts   were   unaffected   by   this  
development,   the   English   type   colonial   courts   applied   such   principles   in  
the   resolution   of   criminal   and   civil   disputes   even   before   some   of   the    
principles   were   codified   later   in   the   Evidence   Ordinance   of   1945.12  
When  they  were,  some  of  the  common  law  principles  codified  as  S.  148  
came   into   force   as   statutory   provisions.   These   are   now   contained   in  
Section  149  of  the  Evidence  Act13,  which  provides  as  follows:  

‘The  court  may  presume  the  existence  of  any  fact  which  it  thinks  likely  
to   have   happened,   regard   being   had   to   the   common   course   of   natural  
events,   human   conduct   and   public   and   private   business,   in   their  

                                                                                                                       
10
 Nnamani,  JSC,  in  Joseph  Lori  v  State  (1980)  2  NCR  225  at    229.  
11
  Section   10   of   the   Provincial   Courts   Ordinance,   1914,   Ordinance   No.   7   of   1914,   Cap.   4   Laws   of   Nigeria   1923  
provided  for  the  application  of  the  English  common  law  and  doctrines  of  equity  in  the  Colony  and  Protectorate  
of  Nigeria.  Subsequent  legislations  retained  the  provisions.  See,  S.  12,  Protectorate  Court’s  Ordinance,  1933,  S.  
14,  Supreme  Court  Ordinance,  1943,  and  S.  30,  Magistrate’s  Courts  Ordinance,  1943.    
12
 See,  Circumstantial  Evidence  in  Nigerian  Law  by  Andrew  I.  Okekeifere,  at  page  18.  
13
 Cap.  E14,  Volume  6,  Laws  of  the  Federation  of  Nigeria,  2004.  

4  
 
relation  to  the  facts  of  the  particular  case,  and  in  particular  the  court  
may  presume  –    

a. That  a  man  who  is  in  possession  of  stolen  goods  soon  after  the  
theft  is  either  the  thief  or  has  received  the  goods,  knowing  them  
to  be  stolen,  unless  he  can  account  for  his  possession;    
b. That  a  thing  or  state  of  things  has  been  shown  to  be  in  existence  
within   a   period   shorter   than   that   within   which   such   things   or  
states  of  things  usually  cease  to  exist,  is  still  in  existence;  
c. That   the   common   course   of   business   has   been   followed   in  
particular  cases;  
d. That   evidence   which   could   be   and   is   not   produced   would,   if  
produced,  be  unfavourable  to  the  party  withholding  it;  
e. That  when  a  document  creating  an  obligation  is  in  the  hands  of  
the  obligor,  the  obligation  has  been  discharged.’    

THE  STATUTORY  LAW  

As   seen   above,   the   bulk   of   the   Nigerian   law   of   evidence   is   statutory  

having   come   to   birth   with   the   enactment   of   the   Evidence   Ordinance   (in  
which  inhered  the  principles  of  circumstantial  evidence)  of  the  colonial  
days.  The  Evidence  Act  of  today  continues  to  reflect  this.  See  Section  12  
thereof   which   provides   that   facts   not   otherwise   relevant   are   relevant  
(a)  if  they  are  inconsistent  with  any  fact  in  issue  or  relevant  fact;  and  (b)  
if   by   themselves   or   in   connection   with   other   facts   they   make   the  
existence  or  non-­‐existence  of  any  fact  in  issue  or  relevant  fact  probable  
or   improbable.   These   and   other   provisions   are   the   leeway   through  

5  
 
which   the   courts   have   continued   to   apply   the   common   law   rules   of  
evidence,  direct  or  circumstantial.14            

THE  CUSTOMARY  LAW  

The   fact   that   rules   of   circumstantial   evidence   are   employed   in   the  

customary  law  courts  (as  shall  be  seen  shortly)  makes  customary  law  a  
source   of   the   law   of   circumstantial   evidence.   Even   in   the   English   style  
courts   (the   Magistrate’s   Court,   High   Court,   Court   of   Appeal,   Supreme  
Court),   rules   of   customary   law   circumstantial   evidence   are   applied   to  
cases   involving   purely   customary   law   transactions.   Proof   of   the  
existence  of  a  custom  before  these  and  even  the  Customary  Court  is  by  
evidence,  unless  if  the  custom  has  been  judicially  noticed.      

NATURE  OF  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE  

Circumstantial  evidence  is  an  alternative  means  of  proof,  or  one  of  the  
three   ways   to   prove,   in   the   case   of   a   criminal   trial,   the   commission   of   a  
crime.  It  is  in  full  use.  The  barn  of  case  law  is  full  with  evidence  of  resort  
or  recourse  to  it  in  appropriate  cases.  According  to  the  Supreme  Court  
in   Ilodigwe   v   The   State15,   “The   prosecution   proves   its   case   against   the  
accused   by   all   or   any   of   the   following   means:   (a)   evidence   of   an  
eyewitness   of   the   crime;16   (b)   confession   or   admission   voluntarily  
made   by   the   accused;   and   (c)   circumstantial   evidence   which   is  
positive,   compelling   and   points   to   the   conclusion   that   the   accused  
committed  the  offence.”  

                                                                                                                       
14
 See,  R  v  Ihule  (1961)  1  All  NLR  462.  
15
 (2012)  18  NWLR  (Pt  1331,  1  at  29-­‐30  G-­‐B.  
16
 The  evidence  of  a  lone  eyewitness  is  sufficient.  See,  Adeyemi  v  The  State  (1991)  1  NWLR  (Pt  170)  679  at  694.  

6  
 
A   court   resorting   to   circumstantial   evidence   to   ground   a   conviction  
must  ensure  that  the  evidence  meets  the  required  standard.  According  
to  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  Osuoha  v  The  State17:    

“Circumstantial   evidence   sufficient   to   support   a   conviction   in   a  

criminal   trial,   especially   murder,   must   be   cogent,   complete   and  
unequivocal.   It   must   be   compelling   and   must   lead   to   the   irresistible  
conclusion  that  the  prisoner  and  no  one  else  is  the  murderer.  The  fact  
must   be   incompatible   with   the   innocence   of   the   accused   and  
incapable  of  explanation  upon  any  other  reasonable  hypothesis  than  
that  of  his  guilt.  The  cause  of  death  must  be  linked  to  the  act  of  the  
accused,   with   certainty   and   clarity   and   not   on   the   basis   of   conjecture,  
imagination  or  loose  induction  and  it  must  be  proved  that  the  accused  
knew   that   his   act   will   result   in   death   or   did   not   care   whether   the  
death  of  the  deceased  will  result  from  his  act.”      

In   the   Ilodigwe   case18,   a   dispute   earlier   arose   in   Isiokwe   Anaku  

Community   to   which   both   the   appellant   and   the   deceased   belonged  
over   the   ownership   of   the   Ikpi   Fishing   Pond.   The   appellant’s   family  
claimed   exclusive   ownership   thereof   while   the   family   of   the   deceased  
claimed   that   the   pond   belonged   to   the   entire   community.   Eventually,  
the  community  resolved  that  it  belonged  to  the  entire  community  and  
subsequently   let   the   pond   out   for   a   fee   to   one   Chief   Ezeoba.   The  
Manager   of   the   pond   employed   the   appellant   to   fish   in   the   pond   but  
later   replaced   him   with   the   deceased.   The   appellant   did   not   take   this  
turn   of   events   with   a   pinch   of   salt   and   in   fact   threatened   to   kill   and  
dispose   of   the   body   of   the   deceased   if   he   did   not   withdraw   from   the  
                                                                                                                       
17
 (2010)  16  NWLR  (Pt  1219)  364  at  375-­‐376  ratio  17.  See  also,  Bello  v  State  (2012)  8  NWLR  (Pt  1302)    207  at  240-­‐
241.  Akpa  v  State  (2008)  14  NWLR  (Pt  1106)  72,  Kada  v  State  (1991)  8  NWLR  (Pt  208)  134;  Ahmed  v  State  (2001)  
18  NWLR  (Pt  746)  622;  Omonga  v  State  (2006)  14  NWLR  (Pt  1000)  532.  
18
 Ibi  supra.  

7  
 
employment.   On   8th   June,   1994,   the   deceased   disappeared   and   was  
never  found  again.  Three  months  later,  the  PW5  reported  that  he  knew  
the  deceased  was  killed  by  the  appellant  and  some  other  members  of  
the  appellant’s  family  he  could  identify.  He  testified  to  how  whilst  out  
fishing  on  the  fateful  night,  he  heard  the  deceased  scream.  On  getting  
to   the   scene,   he   flashed   his   torchlight   and   saw   the   appellant   and   the  
others.   He   also   saw   the   lifeless   body   of   the   deceased   on   the   ground.  
The  appellant  and  the  others  compelled  him  to  take  a  fetish  oath  that  
night   to   keep   their   secret   on   the   pain   of   death   should   he   renege.   He  
was  ordered  to  leave  after  the  oath  but  as  he  left,  he  overheard  them  
say  they  would  tie  weights  on  the  corpse  of  the  deceased  and  throw  it  
into   the   Anambra   River   to   avoid   it   coming   afloat.   He   later   fell   ill   and   on  
enquiry   was   told   by   his   native   doctor   that   he   was   ill   because   of   an   oath  
of   secrecy   he   took.   The   herbalist   performed   a   propitiatory   ritual   to   free  
him   from   the   oath   on   the   strength   of   which   he   came   out   with   his  
revolting  discovery.  The  defence  could  not  impeach  the  evidence  of  this  
witness  resulting  in  the  conviction  of  the  appellant  and  the  affirmation  
of   the   conviction   by   the   Court   of   Appeal   Enugu.   On   appeal   to   the  
Supreme  Court,  the  court  held  that  “…though  the  evidence  against  the  
appellant   and   his   co-­‐accused   persons   was   mainly   circumstantial,   as  
the   body   of   the   deceased   was   not   found,   it   led   to   the   irresistible  
conclusion   that   the   appellant   and   his   co-­‐accused   persons   killed   the  
deceased.”19  

The   case   of   Oluwatoyin   Abokokunyanro   v   The   State20   more   poignantly  

exemplifies  the  use  of  circumstantial  evidence  in  the  administration  of  
criminal   justice.   There,   the   appellant,   one   Sunday   Jegede   and   two  
                                                                                                                       
19
 See  also,  State  v  Uzuagwu  (1972)  2  ECSLR  (Pt  2)  429;  State  v  Edebor  (1975)  9-­‐11  SC  69;  State  v  Okorie  (1982)  1  
NCR  187;  and  Njoku  v  State  (1992)  8  NWLR  (Pt  262)  714.  
20
 (2012)  2  NWLR  (Pt  1285)  530.  

8  
 
others   were   arraigned   for   conspiracy,   murder   and   attempted   murder.  
The  case  of  the  prosecution  was  that  one  Mayowa  Adeleye  who  went  
to   the   farm   to   deliver   food   to   his   father   never   returned   after   delivering  
the  food.  When,  later  in  the  day,  the  parents  could  not  locate  him,  they  
raised   alarm   whereupon   a   search   began.   In   the   course   of   the   search,  
the  PW2  came  across  one  Sunday  Jegede  in  an  uncompleted  building.  
The  PW2  tried  to  search  the  building.  Sunday  resisted  his  attempt  and  
called   out   the   appellant   and   other   accused   persons.   Together   they  
attacked   the   PW2.   In   the   course   of   it,   the   appellant   brought   out   a  
sword   which   they   wanted   to   use   on   the   PW2.   The   PW2   snatched   the  
sword   and   escaped   to   their   traditional   ruler.   The   following   day,   the  
headless  body  of  a  boy  was  discovered  with  a  piece  of  cloth  covering  it.  
The   cloth   had   similar   material   and   design   as   the   window   blinds   in  
Sunday   Jegede’s   house.   The   appellant,   Sunday   Jegede   and   two   others  
were  apprehended  and  charged  before  the  Ekiti  High  Court.  Before  the  
trial  could  commence,  Sunday  Jegede  died  in  prison  custody.                    

The  appellant  and  the  others  were  convicted  and  sentenced  to  death.  
On   appeal   to   the   Court   of   Appeal,   the   court   saw   circumstantial  
evidence,   as   did   the   trial   court,   in   the   following   circumstances   or  
nuggets  and  snippets  of  proven  facts:  (1)  the  appellant  was  one  of  the  
four  persons  that  the  PW2  encountered  in  the  bush;  (2)  he  was  the  one  
that   brought   out   the   sword   which   the   PW2   seized;   (3)   the   scene   where  
the   PW2   was   attacked   and   where   the   headless   body   of   the   deceased  
was  found  covered  with  the  window  blind  of  Sunday  Jegede  were  close;  
(4)   the   sword   with   the   appellant   and   lack   of   explanation   of   the  
presence  of  the  appellant  and  the  others  in  the  bush  that  night;  and  (5)  
the  severance  of  the  head  of  the  deceased  could  only  have  been  caused  
by  a  sharp  object  like  the  sword.    

9  
 
According  to  UWA,  JCA,  in  the  leading  judgment:  

“The   law   is   trite   concerning   circumstantial   evidence,   that   once   the  

evidence   is   found   to   be   positive,   compelling   and   with   mathematical  
precision   points   to   the   guilt   of   the   accused,   the   prosecution   would  
succeed   in   proof   of   its   case   as   is   the   case   here.     All   the   surrounding  
circumstances  must  be  examined  together  for  a  logical  inference  that  
the   accused   now   appellant   committed   the   offence   charged.   The  
prosecution  has  proved  that  he  did.”    

The   above   cases   lucidly   show   what   amount   to   acceptable  

circumstantial   evidence.   The   courts   have   also   shown,   just   as   lucidly,  
what   do   not   add   up   to   circumstantial   evidence.   A   case   in   point   is  
Omotayo   v   The   State21.   There,   the   appellant   and   two   others   were  
arraigned   for   the   offences   of   conspiracy   and   murder.   The   prosecution’s  
case  was  that  the  deceased,  one  Joseph  Olatunde,  was  shot  and  killed  
in  the  sitting  room  of  the  1st  accused  by  the  said  first  accused  acting  in  
conspiracy   with   the   appellant   and   the   3rd   accused.   The   wife   of   the  
deceased  who  had  hitherto  been  at  the  scene  of  the  quarrel  between  
the   deceased   and   the   appellant   and   the   other   accused   persons,   as  
PW1,  testified  that  she  left  the  scene  of  the  argument  to  attend  to  her  
baby  who  was  crying;  that  she  heard  a  gunshot  not  quite  long  after  and  
that   upon   her   return,   she   met   her   husband   dead   with   a   gun   on   the  
table.   The   defence   case   was   that   the   1st   accused   and   the   deceased  
were   arguing   over   missing   cocoa   beans   which   the   1st   accused   alleged  
were   stolen   by   the   deceased;   that   a   crowd   later   gathered,   and   the  
deceased   walked   into   the   house   of   the   1st   accused,   locked   the   door  

                                                                                                                       
21
 (2013)  2  NWLR  (Pt  1338)  235.  

10  
 
from  behind  and  shot  himself  with  the  gun;  and  that  the  police  had  to  
break  into  the  house  to  gain  access  to  the  corpse  of  the  deceased.    

As   there   was   no   direct   eyewitness   account   of   the   shooting,   the   trial  

court   relied   on   circumstantial   evidence   on   the   ground   that   the  
appellant   was   present   at   the   scene   of   the   shooting   and   thereby  
convicted  the  appellant.  On  appeal,  the  Court  of  Appeal  couldn’t  agree  
less  with  this.  The  appellate  court  held  that  the  facts  fell  gravely  short  
of  the  standard  required  to  secure  a  conviction  based  on  circumstantial  
evidence.  According  to  IYIZOBA,  JCA,  in  the  leading  judgment:  

“How   else   does   one   explain   the   fact   that   so   many   persons   were  
mentioned  in  the  statement  of  the  accused  persons  who  were  said  to  
be   eyewitnesses   to   the   event,   yet   the   prosecution   failed   to   call   any   of  
the   witnesses   but   called   witnesses   who   were   not   present   and   could  
only   give   hearsay   evidence   that   the   deceased   was   killed   by   the  
accused   persons.   The   only   rational   explanation   is   that   if   those  
witnesses   had   been   called,   their   evidence   would   have   been  
unfavorable   to   the   prosecution.   I   am   of   the   view   therefore   that   the  
failure   of   the   prosecution   to   call   any   of   the   persons   mentioned   by   the  
accused  persons  in  their  statements  as  having  been  there  at  the  scene  
when  the  deceased  rushed  in  and  shot  himself  left  the  issue  of  suicide  
open.   As   far   as   the   issue   remains   open   the   circumstantial   evidence  
adduced   by   the   prosecution   is   not   so   mathematically   accurate   as   to  
point  to  only  one  irresistible  conclusion  –  that  the  deceased  was  killed  
by   the   1st   accused   in   collaboration   with   the   appellant   and   the   3rd  
accused.”  

11  
 
The   above   agrees   with   the   view   of   the   Court   of   Appeal   in   Anyanwu   v  
The  State22  where  the  court  held  that:  

“For   circumstantial   evidence   to   form   the   basis   for   conviction,   the  

circumstances   must   clearly   and   irresistibly   show   that   the   accused   was  
the   person   who   committed   the   offence   and   that   no   one   else   did.  
Thus,  circumstantial  evidence  required  to  prove  the  commission  of  a  
crime  must  not  only  be  cogent  and  unequivocal,  it  must  also  lead  to  
the   irresistible   conclusion   that   the   accused   did   in   fact   commit   the  
offence.   The   evidence   must   not   have   any   ground   for   reasonable  
doubt.  If  such  reasonable  doubt  exists,  it  must  be  resolved  in  favor  of  
the   accused.   In   other   words,   where   there   are   other   possibilities   in   the  
case  which  are  equally  consistent  with  the  innocence  of  the  accused,  
such   an   accused   person   cannot   be   convicted   of   murder,   as   in   such   a  
case,  the  trial  court  is  entitled  to  hold  that  reasonable  doubt  has  been  
created   in   the   case   of   the   prosecution   and   such   doubt   should   be  
resolved  in  favor  of  the  accused.”    

In  Enebehi  v  The  State23,  the  appellants  were  arrested  at  5.30  am  with  
four  expended  cartridges,  torchlight,  three  bundles  of  keys,  a  hammer  
and   some   money.   There   were   robberies   earlier   at   night   during   which  
the  homes  of  four  victims  were  raided  by  robbers  armed  with  shotguns,  
and   hammers   and   who   stole   money   from   them.   The   appellants   made  
confessional   statements   but   later   raised   the   defence   of   alibi   during  
trial.  The  Court  of  Appeal  affirmed  their  conviction  by  the  trial  court.  On  
their  final  appeal,  the  Supreme  Court  dismissed  their  appeal.    According  
to  OGEBE,  JSC,  concerning  the  1st  appellant  in  the  leading  judgment:  
                                                                                                                       
22
 (2012)  16  NWLR  (Pt  1326)  222  at  262  E-­‐H.  see  also,  Esai  v  The  State  (1976)  11  SC  39;  Adie  v  State  (1980)  1-­‐2  
SC116;  Akpa  v  State  (2008)  14  NWLR  (Pt  1106)  72;  Orji  v  The  State  (2008)  10  NWLR  (Pt  1094)  31;  and  Ismail  v  The  
State  (2008)  15  NWLR  (Pt  1111)  593.  
23
 (2009)  170  LRCN  91.  

12  
 
“The   1st   appellant   could   not   explain   how   he   came   about   the   keys  
belonging   to   the   victims   of   the   robbery   within   hours   of   the   robbery.  
He   was   caught   with   the   keys   by   villagers   of   the   neighboring   village  
who   had   no   information   of   the   robbery.   All   his   lawyer   is   arguing  
before  this  court  is  that  the  keys  were  not  properly  identified  by  the  
owners.  There  was  evidence  before  the  trial  court  that  the  PW6,  the  
police   witness,   showed   the   keys   to   the   owners   and   they   identified  
them   as   theirs.   The   circumstantial   evidence   before   the   trial   court  
which   was   also   evaluated   by   the   lower   court   irresistibly   pointed   to  
the  guilt  of  the  1st  appellant.”          

The   use   of   circumstantial   evidence   is   not   restricted   to   the   domain   of  

capital  offences,  neither  is  it  an  exclusive  adjudicatory  menu  of  superior  
courts  of  record.  As  a  branch  of  the  law  of  evidence,  it  finds  application  
in  every  court  where  the  culpability  of  a  person  for  an  alleged  crime  or  
the   civil   rights   and   obligations   of   a   person   is   up   for   determination.   In  
other   words,   it   is   applicable   in   every   court   that   exercises   criminal   and  
civil  jurisdiction.    

In  salami  v  C.O.P24  the  Magistrate’s  Court  Ilorin  convicted  and  jailed  the  
3rd   accused   person   for   the   offences   of   conspiracy   and   forgery   relying  
on  circumstantial  evidence.  The  said  accused  was  a  staff  of  the  Central  
Bank   of   Nigeria.   During   a   certificate   verification   exercise,   the   bank  
discovered   that   the   Higher   National   Diploma   certificate   in   Public  
Administration   presented   to   it   was   forged,   having   been   denied   by   the  
Kwara   State   Polytechnic   from   where   he   allegedly   obtained   it.   It   was,  
among   others,   revealed   in   evidence   that   at   the   material   time   the  
accused   person   claimed   to   have   obtained   his   “Upper   Credit”,   the  

                                                                                                                       
24
 (2009)  All  FWLR  (Pt  450)  728.  

13  
 
Polytechnic   had   not   graduated   any   student   in   the   HND   category   in  
Public  Administration!  On  appeal  against  his  conviction,  the  High  Court  
affirmed   the   judgment   of   the   trial   court.   On   a   further   appeal,   the   Court  
of   Appeal,   Ilorin   Division,   also   affirmed   the   judgment.   According   to  
NWEZE,  JCA,  in  the  leading  judgment:  

“In   this   case,   the   two   lower   courts   found   the   evidence   of   the  
circumstances  of  the  presentation  of  the  forged  certificate  so  cogent  
and   compelling.   They   were,   therefore,   right   in   relying   on   such  
circumstantial   evidence   in   the   conviction   and   affirmation   of   the  
conviction  of  the  appellant  respectively.  I  am  at  a  loss  as  to  how  the  
appellant  can  wriggle  out  of  the  angle  which  his  inordinate  craving  for  
an   unearned   title   has   landed   him   in.   I   shall   no   longer   temporize   on  
this  issue.  I  resolve  it  against  the  appellant.”25                  

In   Dick   v   C.O.P26,   the   accused   person   was   arraigned   alongside   other  

persons  at  the  Magistrate’s  Court  in  Rivers  State  on  a  two-­‐count  charge  
of   conspiracy   to   commit   misdemeanor   and   malicious   damage.   From  
adduced  evidence,  he  was  said  to  have  gone  in  the  company  of  another  
to   the   house   of   the   complainant   under   construction   and   warned   the  
workers   to   stop   work   or   else   they   would   destroy   the   building.   They  
went   back   the   second   time   and   repeated   the   threat.   Later,   the   building  
was  found  destroyed.  It  was  alleged  that  that  the  accused  person  met  
the  bricklayer  engaged  by  the  complainant  and  threatened  to  deal  with  
him   should   he   make   a   statement   to   the   police   with   regard   to   the  
destroyed  property.  Though  the  appellant  and  his  companion  were  not  
seen  while  allegedly  destroying  the  property,  they  were  prosecuted  and  
convicted  based  on  circumstantial  evidence.    The  trial  court  found  him  
                                                                                                                       
25
 (Supra)  at  page  749.  
26
 (2009)  All  FWLR  251.  

14  
 
guilty   of   malicious   damage   and   sentenced   him   to   one   year  
imprisonment   with   an   option   of   fine.   Aggrieved,   he   appealed   to   the  
High   Court   Okrika.   Upon   the   dismissal   of   the   appeal,   he   further  
appealed   to   the   Court   of   Appeal   where   his   appeal   was   again   dismissed.  
According  to  KEKERE-­‐EKUN,  JCA:27  

“The   law   is   that   where   there   is   no   eyewitness   account   or   direct  

evidence   of   the   commission   of   an   offence,   a   conviction   may   be   based  
on  circumstantial  evidence.”28          

Circumstantial   evidence   equally   has   accommodation   in   civil   cases.   It  

found  agreeable  use  in  Mbamalu  &  Ors  v  Mozie  &  Ors.29  In  that  case,  
the  1st  respondent  took  land  in  excess  of  the  four  plots  granted  him  by  
the  family.  This  was  not  known  until  the  1st  respondent  completed  the  
building  of  his  cottage  hospital  and  residence  and  a  fence  to  surround  
them.   In   all,   he   annexed   30   plots   of   the   family   land.   He   produced   a  
deed   of   conveyance   and   relevant   survey   plan   by   means   of   which   the  
land  was  granted  him  and  informed  the  family  that  he  had  obtained  a  
certificate  of  occupancy  in  respect  thereof.    

Later   in   court,   the   appellants   called   the   Surveyor-­‐General   of   Anambra  

State  who  testified  that  in  1979  a  survey  plan  showing  four  plots  of  land  
was   registered   on   behalf   of   the   1st   respondent   and   that   sometime   in  
1987   the   aforesaid   plan   was   withdrawn   and   a   new   plan   showing   a  
larger  portion  of  land  was  submitted  for  registration  on  behalf  of  the  1st  
respondent.   Both   survey   plans   bore   the   same   date   of   13th   January,  
1979.   Both   were   also   received   in   evidence   as   exhibits   1   and   2  
respectively.  The  respondents,  on  the  other  hand,  asserted  that  the  1st  
                                                                                                                       
27
 At  page  266.  
28
 See  also,  Igabele  v  State  (2004)  15  NWLR  (Pt  896)  314;  Peter  Igh  v  The  State  (1978)  3  SC  87.  
29
 (2002)  2  NWLR  (Pt  751)  345.  See  also,  Omoboriowo  v  Ajasin  (1984)  1  SCNR  108.  

15  
 
respondent  in  his  application  to  the  family  did  not  specify  the  number  
of  plots  sought  and  that  the  2nd-­‐6th  respondents  used  their  discretion  to  
grant   to   him   land   they   considered   sufficient   which   was   far   more   than  
four   plots.   The   6th   respondent,   in   his   capacity   as   the   family   union’s  
secretary   produced   the   1st   respondent’s   alleged   application.   He,  
however,   did   not   produce   the   family’s   minutes   book   under   his   custody.  
Instead,  he  explained  that  that  his  house  was  burgled  some  days  before  
he   gave   evidence   and   that   the   minutes   book   was   among   the   properties  
stolen.  At  the  end  of  the  trial,  the  court  held  that  the  appellants  did  not  
prove   the   fraud   alleged   against   the   respondents   beyond   reasonable  
doubt.  It,  therefore,  dismissed  the  case.  

Dissatisfied   with   the   judgment,   the   appellants   appealed   against   it.  

Allowing  the  appeal,  the  Court  of  Appeal  held:  

1. That   the   best   evidence   of   the   proceedings   of   a   meeting   is   the  

minutes  of  the  meeting  as  recorded  in  the  minutes  book  kept  for  
the  purpose,  and  as  a  corollary,  that  in  the  instant  case,  the  best  
evidence   of   the   size   of   the   land   approved   for   the   1st   respondent  
by   the   parties   family   would   be   found   in   the   family’s   minutes   book  
for  the  meeting  of  the  day  his  application  for  allocation  of  family  
land  was  approved.  
2. “Where  the  best  evidence  of  a  fact  is  not  available,  the  court  can  
resort  to  secondary  or  circumstantial  evidence  adduced  in  proof  
of  a  fact  in  issue.  In  the  instant  case,  since  the  minutes  book  in  
which   the   family   recorded   the   size   of   land   allocated   to   the   1st  
respondent  was  not  available,  the  court  resorted  to  the  evidence  
of  the  PW1  to  the  effect  that  the  survey  plan  prepared  and  filed  
on   behalf   of   the   1st   respondent   soon   after   the   land   in   dispute  
was   allocated   to   him   showed   only   four   plots   of   land   which  
16  
 
 evidence  is  in  line  with  the  case  of  the  appellants  that  only  four  
plots   of   land   was   allocated   to   the   1st   respondent   by   the   family  
Union.   In   the   circumstance,   the   appellants   proved   their   case  
against   the   respondents   and   ought   to   have   been   given  
judgment.”                      

IMPORTANCE  OF  CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE  

The  importance  of  circumstantial  evidence  cannot  be  overemphasized.  

It   has   often   been   described   as   the   best   evidence.30   If   the   criminal  
justice   system   did   not   allow   recourse   to   it,   people   who   are   crafty   or  
lucky   enough   to   evade   eyewitnesses   to   their   crimes   and   who   are   steely  
enough   to   withstand   police   interrogation   would   ipso   facto   escape   the  
long   arm   of   the   law.   This   will   confine   punishment   for   crimes   to   the  
careless  or  luckless  criminals  whilst  leaving  off  the  hook  crafty  and  lucky  
ones.   According   to   DENTON-­‐WEST,   JCA,   in   his   concurring   judgment   in  
Salami  v  COP31:    

“Justification   for   this   (resort   to   circumstantial   evidence)   has   been  

found   on   the   ground   that   since   offences   or   crimes   are   not   things  
which   are   usually   carried   out   in   the   open   and   since   it   will   be  
practically   abdicating   its   duty   for   a   court   to   always   wait   for   direct  
evidence   or   the   confession   of   an   accused   before   it   can   convict   on   a  
charge,  reliance  must  be  placed  on  evidence  of  circumstances  as  can  

                                                                                                                       
30
 See,  Enebehi  v  The  State  (supra)  at  page  153.  See  also,  Obosi  v  State  (1965)  NMLR  129;  Ukorah  v  State  (1977)  4  
SC  167  at  174;  Ona  v  The  State  (1985)  3  NWLR  (Pt  12)  236  at  241;  R  v  Taylor,  Weaver  &  Donovan  21  Cr.  App  R.  20  
at  21;  and  Nasiru  v  State  (1999)  1  SCNJ  83  at  101,  (1999)  65  LRCN  153.  
31
 (Supra)  at  7  54  F-­‐B)  

17  
 
be   inferred   from   the   facts   of   a   case.   This   becomes   even   more  
imperative  in  the  case  of  the  offence  of  conspiracy  which  has  secrecy  
as  one  of  its  main  ingredients.”  

Recourse  to  circumstantial  evidence  has  made  the  arm  of  the  law  long  
enough   to   catch   people   who   commit   the   crime   of   theft   even   where   the  
particular   item   stolen   or   ownership   of   the   stolen   property   cannot   be  
proved  by  direct  evidence.  The  application  of  this  welcome  principle  is  
of  distant  antiquity.  In  R  v  Burton32,  it  was  held  that:  

“If  a   man  goes  into  the  London  Docks  sober  without  means  of  getting  
drunk,  and  comes  out  of  one  of  the  cellars  very  drunk,  wherein  are  a  
million   gallons   of   wine,   I   think   that   would   be   a   reasonable   evidence  
that   he   had   stolen   some   of   the   wine   in   that   cellar   though   you   could  
not  prove  that  any  wine  was  stolen  or  wine  missed.”  

The  above  was  adopted  in  IGP  v  Ewekay33  where  the  court  held  that:  

“…It   is   not   necessary   in   order   to   obtain   a   conviction   that   direct  

evidence  of  ownership  of  the  stolen  property  should  be  given.  If  the  
facts   are   strong   and   cogent   enough   and   point   to   the   inevitable  
conclusion   that   the   articles   have   been   stolen,   although   it   is   not  
possible  to  obtain  direct  evidence  that  they  have  been  missed  by  their  
owner,  a  verdict  of  guilty  may  be  fully  justified.”    

USE AND ADMISSIBILITY OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE IN THE CUSTOMARY COURT

                                                                                                                       
32
 (1854)  Dears  282,  284,  169  ER  728,  729.  
33
 (1957)  LLR  13.  

18  
 
As   pointed   out   at   the   commencement   of   this   essay,   the   Customary  
Court   was   not   cut   in   the   mould   of   the   conventional   court.   It   is,  
therefore,   meet   that   we   concisely   examine   its   features   before  
launching   out   into   the   question   of   admissibility   and   usability   of  
circumstantial  evidence  therein.            

JURISDICTION  OF  THE  CUSTOMARY  COURT  

The   Customary   Court   has   original   jurisdiction   to   entertain   both   criminal  

and  civil  cases.  Customary  Courts  in  the  States  of  Southern  Nigeria  have  
similar   jurisdictions,   with   minor   variations.34   The   jurisdictions   are   only  
as   extensive   as   allowed   by   the   law   creating   them.   In   Enugu   State,   the  
criminal  jurisdiction  of  the  Customary  Court  is  limited  to  (1)  Breaches  of  
Local  Government  bye-­‐laws  or  rules  of  statutory  corporations  and  other  
offences  committed  in  contravention  of  any  written  law  punishable  by  
imprisonment   not   exceeding   two   years;   and   (2)   stealing   –   punishable  
with   twelve   months   imprisonment   or   N2,000.   00   fine.35   The   jurisdiction  
of   the   court   in   civil   cases   is   way   more   expansive   and   commodious  
encompassing  land  matters  (unlimited),36  matrimonial  causes  in  respect  
of   marriage   under   customary   law   (unlimited),   debt,   demand   and  
damages   claimed   between   persons   married   under   customary   law,   or  
arising   from   marriage   under   customary   law   (unlimited),   custody   of  
children   and   other   causes   and   matters   relating   to   children   under  
customary   law   (unlimited),   causes   and   matters   relating   to   inheritance  
upon  intestacy  under  customary  law  and  grant  of  power  of  attorney  to  
any   person   to   administer   the   estate   of   an   intestate   under   customary  

                                                                                                                       
34 rd
 See,  Modern  Nigerian  Legal  System,  3  Edition  by  OSITA  NNAMANI  OGBU,  at  page  305.  
35
 See  Second  Schedule  to  the  Customary  Courts  Law,  Cap.  32,  Laws  of  Enugu  State,  2004  (as  amended  in  2011.)    
36
 Section  30  of  the  Land  Use  Act  confers  jurisdiction  on  customary  courts  in  respect  of  land  situate  in  non-­‐urban  
areas.   The   Supreme   Court   has   however   held   in   Adisa   v   Oyinwola   (2000)   10   NWLR   (Pt   116)   that   both   the  
customary  Courts  and  the  State  High  Courts  have  concurrent  jurisdiction  in  such  matters.  

19  
 
law  (N200,  000.  00),  civil  actions  in  contracts  and  torts  at  common  law  
and  customary  law  (N200,  000.  00).37      

There  is  a  clear  dearth  of  criminal  trials  in  the  customary  court.  This  is  
fallout  from  Section  36  (12)  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Federal  Republic  
of   Nigeria,   1999,   which   provides   that   no   person   shall   be   tried   or  
punished  for  any  offence  unless  the  offence  itself  and  the  punishment  
therefor   are   provided   for   in   a   written   law.   With   most   customary   laws  
unwritten,   it   is   not   surprising   that   many   punishable   conducts  
(abominations  and  taboos)  under  customary  law  are  not  offences.    Not  
helping   matters   is   the   fact   that   legislations   creating   crimes   routinely  
confer  jurisdiction  to  try  them  on  the  Magistrate’s  Court  and  the  High  
Court   to   the   exclusion   of   the   Customary   Court.   With   the   current  
transformation   of   the   customary   Court   in   most   jurisdictions,38   it   is  
expected  that  their  jurisdiction  to  try  criminal  offences  would  receive  a  
commensurate   boost.   A   leaf   could   be   borrowed   from   the   Customary  
Courts   Law   of   Abia   State   which   expressly   includes   in   its   criminal  
jurisdiction   offences   such   as   simple   assault,   affray   or   fighting   and  
conduct   likely   to   cause   a   breach   of   the   peace.   In   Anambra   and   Enugu  
States,   in   addition   to   breaches   of   local   government   bye-­‐laws   or   rules   of  
statutory  corporations,  the  Customary  Courts  of  those  States  are  vested  
with   jurisdiction   to   try   other   offences   committed   in   contravention   of  
any  written  law  punishable  by  imprisonment  not  exceeding  two  years.  
This  is  a  statutory  carte  blanche  for  the  trial  in  the  Customary  Court  of  
simple   offences   and   misdemeanors   contained   in   the   Criminal   Code.  
Unfortunately,   Police   Prosecutors   see   criminal   prosecution   as   a   one-­‐

                                                                                                                       
37
 The  criminal  and  civil  jurisdiction  of  the  court  is  being  remarkably  increased  in  an  ongoing  amendment  of  the  
law.    
38
  In   most   jurisdictions,   Customary   Courts   are   presided   over   by   lawyers   some   of   who   are   qualified   to   be  
appointed  as  Magistrates  and  Judges  of  superior  courts  of  record.    

20  
 
way   traffic   to   the   Magistrate   Court   in   crass   ignorance   of   the  
jurisdictional   competence   of   some   Customary   Courts   over   simple  
offences  and  misdemeanors.      

What   is   significant   here   is   that   the   customary   court   has   criminal   and  
civil   jurisdictions   and   that   its   civil   jurisdiction   extends   to   torts   and  
contract.  It  is  also  worthy  of  note  that  its  jurisdictions  in  some  of  these  
regards   are   concurrent   with   the   High   Court   (in   case   of   land   matters)  
and   with   the   Magistrate’s   Court   (in   case   of   some   actions   in   tort   and  
contract).      

MODUS  OPERANDI  

The  Customary  Court,  from  its  position  at  the  base  in  the  stratification  
of   courts,   presents   a   virtually   unorthodox   and   somewhat   befuddling  
system   of   justice.   Though   modeled   after   the   English   system   of  
adjudication,   its   modus   operandi   is   a   far   cry   from   the   technical,  
legalistic,   slow   and   rigidly   methodical   system   of   superior   courts   to  
which   lawyers   are   mostly   accustomed.   It   is,   in   its   ‘methodless’   method,  
powered   by   the   spirit   of   simplicity,   expedition   and   economy   both   of  
time   and   money.   According   to   E.   N.   NNAMANI,   J,   in   Ikenga   Okoye   v  
Chinelo  Okoye:39  

“…Order   4   Rule   5,   6   and   7   of   the   Customary   Courts   Rules   Cap.   32  

Revised  Laws  of  Enugu  State,  2004,  provide  for  a  very  loose  mode  of  
trial   procedure   in   the   Customary   Courts   in   the   State.   The   Rules  
carefully   and   deliberately   stipulates   the   simple,   uncomplicated  

                                                                                                                       
39 nd
  (Unreported)   Judgment   of   the   Customary   Court   of   Appeal   Enugu   delivered   on   2   February,   2011   in  
CCAE/3D/2010.  See,  Principles  of  Practice  and  Procedure  of  Customary  Courts  in  Nigeria  through  the  Cases,  by  
Chief  Tom  Anyafulude  at  page  320.        

21  
 
procedure  by  which  parties  can  join  issues  in  cases  before  Customary  
Courts…”    

 First   and   foremost,   it   must   be   borne   in   mind   that   (as   aforesaid)   the  
provisions  of  the  Evidence  Act  do  not  apply  to  or  govern  proceedings  of  
the   customary   court.   The   exclusion   of   the   court   from   the   sphere   of  
application  of  the  Act  is  express.40  See  Section  2  (2)  ©  of  the  Evidence  
Act.  The  Customary  Courts  Rules  of  Enugu  State,  2011,  recognizes  this  
position   of   the   law.   See,   Order   10   Rule   1   thereof   which   provides   as  
appertain  to  Customary  Courts  that  “In  the  establishment  of  any  fact  or  
the   proof   of   the   contents   of   any   document   in   the   customary   Court   of  
Enugu  State,  a  party  shall  not  apply  the  provisions  of  the  Evidence  Act.”    

In  Ekpa  v  Utong41  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  “Customary,  District  or  
Native  courts’  judgments  are  not  to  be  dealt  with  in  the  same  manner  
that   any   appellate   court   would   normally   handle   a   judgment   from   the  
High   Court   where   pleadings   are   invariably   ordered.   In   dealing   with  
judgments  from  customary  courts,  district  or  native  courts,  an  appellate  
court   should   not   limit   the   scope   of   the   issue   in   controversy   to   what  
appears   on   the   writ,   but   should   go   beyond   it   and   ascertain   from   the  
entire   evidence   before   the   court   what   was   really   the   nature   of   the  
dispute  and  land  involved.  Technical  procedure  rules  and  the  exactitude  
required  in  the  formulation  of  claim  in  the  regular  courts  do  not  apply  
to   native   courts.   These   native   courts   are   to   do   substantial   justice   in  
terms  of  the  real  issue  in  controversy  as  disclosed  by  the  writ  and  the  
                                                                                                                       
40
 See,  however,  the  case  of  Israel  Arum  v  Nwobodo  (2013)  10  NWLR  (Pt  1362)  374  where  the  Supreme  Court,  
Per   AKA’AHS,   JSC   stated   that:   “It   is   also   necessary   to   stress   the   fact   that   Area   or   Customary   Courts   are   to   be  
guided  and  not  to  be  strictly  bound  by  the  provisions  of  the  Evidence  Act.”  This,  it  is  submitted,  has  not  in  any  
way  brought  the  Customary  Court  within  the  canopy  of  courts  governed  by  the  provisions  of  the  Evidence  Act.  If  
anything,   it   confirmed   that   though   the   court   can   be   guided   by   the   provisions   of   the   Act,   it   nevertheless   remains  
excluded  as  it  is  not  strictly  bound  by  the  provisions  thereof.      
41
   (1991)  2  NSCC  278  at  pages  288  and  289  ratios  3  and  4  

22  
 
evidence   without   being   weighed   down   by   technical   rules   designed   for  
common   law   courts   and   courts   of   equity   for   ensuring   that   justice   is  
done  at  all  times  by  those  learned  in  the  law.”  

Similarly,  according  to  the  Supreme  Court  in   Erhunmwunse  v  Ehanire42  

“Proceedings   in   Customary   Courts   must   be   carefully   scrutinised   to  
ascertain   what   the   real   subject   matter   of   a   case   and   the   real   issues  
raised  therein  are.  Consequently,  it  is  permissible,  not  only  to  look  at  
the   plaintiff’s   claim   before   the   Customary   Court,   but   also   to   study   the  
findings   and   even   the   evidence   given   or   tendered   before   such  
Customary   Courts   with   a   view   to   identifying   the   real   issues   between  
the  parties  in  the  suit…It  ought  to  be  stressed  also  that  in  dealing  with  
proceedings   from   Customary   Courts,   an   appellate   court   must   not   be  
unduly  strict  or  rigid  with  regard  to  matters  of  form  or  procedure  as  
the   whole   object   of   trials   before   such   courts   is   that   the   real   dispute  
between  the  parties  should  be  adjudicated  upon.  

The   long   and   short   of   it   is   that   the   customary   court   is   a   court   of  

substantial   justice   and   has   no   accommodation   for   technicalities   in  
whatever   guise   it   might   rear   its   technical   head.   Complementing   this  
position  of  the  law  is  Section  20  of  the  Customary  Court  Law,  Cap.  32,  
Revised  Laws  of  Enugu  State,  2004  which  provides  as  follows:  

‘No   proceedings   in   a   customary   court   and   no   summons,   warrant,  

order,  decree  or  other  processes  issued  or  made  by  the  court  shall  be  
declared   void   or   otherwise   varied   upon   appeal,   solely   by   reason   of  
any  defect  in  procedure  or  want  of  form,  but  every  court  or  authority  
                                                                                                                       
42
 (2003)  LRCN  1786  AT  1803  EEOO.  See  also,  Olujinle  v  Adeagbo  (1988)  2  NWLR  (part  75)  238,  at  251;  Osu  v  Igim  
(1988)   1   NWLR   (part   69)   231;   Nwosu   v   Udeaja   (1990)   1   NWLR   (part   125)   188;   Ezeanya   &   Ors   v   Okeke   &   Ors  
(1995)  4  NWLR  (part  388)  142.        

23  
 
exercising   appellate   jurisdiction   by   virtue   of   this   law   or   any   other   law,  
shall   decide   all   matters   brought   to   it   on   appeal   from   a   customary  
court  as  substantial  justice    of  the  case  may  require.’43            

The   raison   d’etre   for   this   is   not   far   to   seek.   The   customary   court   is  
designed   to   be   a   simple   court   where   the   masses   may   ventilate   their  
disputes   on   a   judicial   floor   devoid   of   the   slippery   ‘banana   peels’   of  
technicalities.   It   is,   as   volunteered   by   the   Customary   Court   of   Appeal  
Enugu  in  Ozor  Peter  Chukwu  v  Ezeaku  Nwaowelle44  “…  a  court  where  
the   lay   litigant   grapples   with   his   equally   lay   adversary   in   an  
adjudicatory   atmosphere   devoid   of   the   usually   inhibiting   procedural  
legalese   operative   in   superior   courts   of   record.   The   litigants,   as  
aforesaid,   are   lay   men,   and   the   registrar,   before   whom   court  
processes   are   filed,   only   relatively   better.   Attitude   of   appellate   courts  
to   procedural   flaws   in   judgments   of   customary   courts   is,   therefore,  
that   of   condoning   as   discernible   in   Ekpa   v   Utong   (1991)   2   NSCC  
278…”45    

What   may   be   referred   to   as   the   guiding   principles   regarding   appeals  

from   decisions   of   the   customary   court   have   been   set   out   in   Michael  
Ugwu   &   Anor   v   Vincent   Edeh46   According   to   G.   C.   NNAMANI,   J   in   the  
leading  judgment  in  that  case:  
                                                                                                                       
43
 Similar  provisions  exist  in  the  Customary  Courts  Laws  of  other  States.  
44 th
 CCAE/117/2010:  Nwaowelle  v  Chukwu  delivered  on  16  May,  2012.  
45
 See  the  leading  judgment  of  G.  C.  NNAMANI,  J.  
46
  Judgment   of   the   Customary   Court   of   Appeal   Enugu   in   CCAE/142/2010   DELIVERED   ON   6TH   June   2012.  
It  must,  however,  be  pointed  out  that  the  loose  procedure  of  the  Customary  Court  does  not  permit  it  
to   act   in   breach   of   the   stiff   rules   of   fair   hearing   and   jurisdiction.   As   held   by   the   Customary   Court   of  
Appeal   Enugu   in   CCAE/27/2010:   DONATUS   ONYIA   OBETE   &   ANOTHER   v   JOHN   MADUABUCHI   ONYIA   &  
ANOTHER  on  15/12/2010  (In  the  leading  judgment  of  G.  C.  NNAMANI,  J):  “…fair  hearing  is  an  exception  
to  the  rule  that  proceedings  of  the  customary  court  cannot  be  vitiated  by  defects  in  procedure  as  contained  in  
section  20  of  the  Customary  courts  Law,  Cap.  32  Vol.  2,  Revised  Laws  of  Enugu  State,  2004.  The  customary  courts  
can  violate  rules  of  procedure  or  ride  roughshod  over  established  modus  of  adjudication  and  get  away  with  it,  

24  
 
 1. The   exclusion   of   the   customary   court   from   courts   governed   or  
regulated   by   the   Evidence   Act   under   Section   2   (2)   ©   of   the  
Evidence   Act,   Cap   E14,   laws   of   the   Federation   of   Nigeria,   2004  
means  that  judgments  or  proceedings  of  those  courts  cannot  be  
impeached   on   appeal   on   the   basis   of   lack   of   adherence   to   the  
rules  of  evidence.  
2. The   customary   court   is   a   court   of   substantial   justice.   Technical  
grounds   of   appeal   arising   from   the   court’s   proceedings,  
therefore,  have  no  prospect  of  success  on  appeal.  
3. Where   an   error   forming   a   ground   of   appeal   is   not   technical   in  
nature,   it   has   no   chance   of   appellate   success   if,   upon   a   holistic  
appraisal  of  the  judgment,  it  can  be  said  that  substantial  justice  
has   been   done.   See   Section   20   of   the   customary   courts   Law,   Cap  
32,   Revised   Laws   of   Enugu   State,   2004.   See   also   Ekpa   v   Utong  
(supra).    
4. Customary   court   proceedings   are   essentially   sui   generis,   having  
its   own   unique   modus   operandi   and   the   effect   is   that   it   is  
erroneous   to   subject   the   judgment   thereof   to   the   procedural  
niceties,   censors   and   strictures   of   superior   courts   of   record  
where  pleadings  are  filed  and  inexorably  followed.  
5. Appellate  attitude  to  errors  in  judgments  of  customary  courts  is  
permissive   unless   it   can   be   shown   to   have   violated   the  
immutable   precepts   of   such   issues   like   jurisdiction   which   is  
fundamental   in   the   administration   of   justice,   and   fair   hearing  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
but  that  is  until  they  venture  into  the  no-­‐fly  zone  of  fair  hearing.  When  they  do  this,  the  wings  of  their  decisions  
will   be   perforated   by   constitutional   spears   and   arrows   and   the   decisions   will,   however   well   meant,   gravitate  
downwards  to  shatter  on  the  clay  soil  of  nullity.          

   

25  
 
 which  is  constitutional.  See  Onyia  v  Obete  (unreported  judgment  
of  this  court  delivered  in  CCAE/27/10/2010  on  15/12/2010)  

In  David  Ude  &  Ors  v  Peter  Obioha47  His  Lordship  expanded  the  ambit  
of  these  principles  with  the  addition  of  the  following:  

1. Attacks   on   technical   errors   in   appeal   processes   filed   in   the  

registry   of   the   Customary   Court   in   order   to   initiate   appeals   do  
not  vitiate  the  appeals;  and  
2. The   Customary   Court   of   Appeal   almost   always   condones  
technical   errors   in   appeal   processes   filed   in   the   registry   of   the  
Customary  Court  in  order  to  initiate  an  appeal  in  the  interest  of  
hearing   the   appeals   on   merit   and   ultimately   the   doing   of  
substantial  as  opposed  to  technical  justice.  

DIALECTICS   ON   USE   AND   ADMISSIBILITY   OF   CIRCUMSTANTIAL        

EVIDENCE  IN  THE  CUSTOMARY  COURT  

With   the   exclusion   of   the   Customary   Court   from   the   roster   of   courts  
governed  by  the  provisions  of  the  Evidence  Act  at  the  back  of  the  mind,  
the   temptation   to   conclude   that   circumstantial   evidence   is   not  
applicable   in   the   Customary   Court   is   strong.   The   conclusion   will,  
however,  be  anything  but  correct.  Circumstantial  evidence  is  admissible  
in   the   Customary   Court   as   much   as   it   is   in   other   courts.   To   start   with,  
though  Customary  courts  are  not  rigidly  bound  by  the  rules  of  evidence,  
they   are   nevertheless,   guided   thereby   as   flows   from   the   position   of   the  
Supreme  Court  in  Arum  v  Nwobodo  (supra).  Also,  legions  of  authorities  
have  sprouted  and  continued  to  develop  from  superior  courts  of  record  
                                                                                                                       
47 th
 Judgment  of  the  Customary  Court  of  Appeal  Enugu  in  CCAE/37/2010  delivered  on  27  September  2012.  

26  
 
establishing   and   entrenching   applicable   principles   of   law.   While  
Customary  Courts  are  not  bound  by  the  provisions  of  the  Evidence  Act  
on  the  basis  of  which  these  principles  evolved,  they  are  bound  by  the  
decisions,  nevertheless.    

CRIMINAL  CASES  

With   regard   to   criminal   cases,   circumstantial   evidence   is   applicable   in  

line   with   the   type   of   evidence   needed   to   prove   the   genres   of   cases  
coming   up   before   the   court.   In   a   charge   of   stealing   grains,   for   example,  
if   the   accused   went   into   a   richly   stocked   silo   empty-­‐handed   but  
emerged   moments   later   concealing   a   bucket   of   beans,   the   Customary  
Court  can,  following  the  decision  in  R  v  Burton  (supra)  convict  him  for  
stealing   based   on   circumstantial   evidence   notwithstanding   that   it   is  
uncertain  if  beans  was  really  taken  out  of  the  silo  owing  to  the  practical  
impossibility  of  measuring  the  beans  in  the  silo.  The  same  consideration  
would   apply   where   there   is   evidence   to   prove   that   the   accused   stole  
eggs  from  a  poultry  farm  in  a  similar  circumstance.    

CIVIL  CASES  

Civil  cases  offer  in  the  Customary  Court  an  even  more  fertile  soil  for  the  
application   of   the   law   of   circumstantial   evidence.   Certain   principles   of  
land  law  run  on  the  wheels  of  circumstantial  evidence.  The  Customary  
Court   can   make   conclusions   from   inferences   as   may   be   drawn   from  
adduced   evidence.   According   to   a   learned   author,   the   use   of  
circumstantial   evidence   in   the   customary   law   is   a   systematic   process   of  
inferring  from  proven  facts  (the  proof  of  which  might  in  the  past  be  by  

27  
 
supernatural   means)   the   existence   or   non   existence   of   the   facts   in  
issue.48    

I  will   now  consider  some  of  the  areas   which   are   receptive   to   the  law  of  
circumstantial  evidence  in  the  civil  procedure  of  the  customary  Court.  

POSSESSION  OF  LAND  

The   position   of   the   law   as   decided   by   the   Supreme   Court   in  Okhuarobo  

v  Aigbe  (2002)  9  NWLR  (Pt  771)  129,  is  that  whenever  ownership  of  a  
thing  is  in  issue,  the  person  in  possession  is  presumed  to  be  the  owner  
of  the  thing  and  that  the  burden  of  proving  that  he  is  not  the  owner  is  
on  the  person  who  affirms  that  he  is  not  the  owner.  This  is  an  aspect  of  
the   civil   complexion   of   circumstantial   evidence   and   finds   ready  
application   by   customary   courts   in   the   determination   of   ownership   of  
disputed  lands.    

Furthermore,   three   out   of   the   five   methods   of   proof   of   title   to   land   are  
propelled  by  the  law  of  circumstantial  evidence.  They  are:  positive  acts  
of   ownership   extending   over   a   sufficient   length   of   time;   acts   of   long  
possession   and   enjoyment   of   land;   and   possession   of   connected   or  
adjacent  land  in  circumstances  rendering  it  probable  that  the  owner  of  
such   connected   or   adjacent   land   would   in   addition   be   the   owner   of   the  
land  in  dispute.49    

NATIVE  OATH  TAKING  

                                                                                                                       
48
 Andrew  I.  Okekeifere:  Circumstantial  Evidence  in  Nigerian  Law  at  page  166.  
49
 Idundun  &  Ors  v  Okumagba  &  Ors  (1976)  NSCC  445  ;  Ayoola  v  Odofin  (1984)  11  SC  120;  Ewo  v  Ani  (2004)  17  
NSCQR   36;   Ndukuba   v   Izundu   (2007)   1   NWLR   (Pt   1016)   432;   Adanyi   v   Anwase   (2006)   12   NWLR   (Pt   993)   183;  
Nkado   v   Obiano   (1997)   5   NWLR   (Pt   503)   31   at   34;   Nkwo   v   Iboe   (1998)   7   NWLR   (Pt   558)   354;   Chukwu   v   Diala  
(1999)  6  NWLR  (Pt  608)  674,  etc.    

28  
 
Native   oath   taking   is   a   method   of   circumstantial   evidence   of   ownership  
of   land   known   to   customary   law.   HON   JUSTICE   I.   A.   UMEZULIKE  
described  it  as  “a  very  popular  and  common  form  of  assertion  of  title  to  
land  under  customary  law.”50    According  to  the  jurist:  

“In  a  land  dispute  between  A  and  B  wherein  title  is  in  issue  under  native  
law  and  custom,  the  matter  is  usually  first  referred  to  a  native  tribunal  
panel  called  the  council  of  elders.  Where  evidence  of  both  parties  are  
inconclusive,   oath   taking   is   suggested   whereby   both   parties   are  
subjected   to   swear   to   one   of   the   local   deities   with   an   invocation  
spelling  out  what  would  befall  the  party  telling  lies  or  swearing  falsely  
within   a   given   period.   The   party   that   survives   the   given   period  
unscathed  is  regarded  as  the  party  to  whom  title  to  the  land  vests.”51  

The   place   of   native   oath   taking   in   the   resolution   of   dispute   under  

customary  law  is  well  secured  in  case  law.  According  to  OGUNDARE,  JSC  
in   Ume   v   Okoronkwo52,   oath   taking   is   one   of   the   methods   of  
establishing   the   truth   of   a   matter   and   was   known   to   customary   law.  
Speaking  the  same  language,  AGBAKOBA  J,  in  Ofomata  &  Ors  v  Anoka  
&  Ors53:  

“Oath   taking   is   however   a   recognized   and   accepted   form   of   proof  

existing   in   certain   customary   judicature.   Oath   may   be   sworn   extra-­‐
judicially   but   as   a   mode   of  judicial   proof,   its  esoteric   and  reverential  
feature,  the  solemnity  of  the  choice  of  an  oath  by  the  disputants  and  
imminent   evil   visitation   to   the   oath-­‐breaker,   if   he   swore   falsely,   are  

                                                                                                                       
50
 See,  the  book  ABC  OF  CONTEMPORARY  LAND  LAW  IN  NIGERIA  (Revised  and  Enlarged  Edition)  at  page  38.  See  
also,  CUSTOMARY  LAW  IN  NIGERIA,  by  S.  O.  Tonwe,  J,  and  O.  K.  Edu  at  pages  75-­‐77.  
51
 Ibi  supra.  
52
 (1996)  12  SCNJ  404  
53
   (1974)  4  ECSLR  51.  

29  
 
the   deterrent   sanctions   of   this   form   of   customary   judicial   process  
which  commends  it  alike  to  rural  and  urban  indigenous  courts.”      

The   cumulative   position   of   the   law   as   handed   down   by   the   Supreme  

Court   is   that   where   two   parties   to   a   dispute   voluntarily   agree   to   the  
resolution  of  their  dispute  by  oath  taking  in  accordance  with  customary  
law,   neither   of   them   can   thereafter   resile   from   the   exercise   of   the   oath  
taking.54  Consequently,  common  law  principles  in  respect  of  trespass  to  
land   and   proof   of   title   to   land   no   longer   apply   as   they   are,   in   that  
situation,   based   on   the   rules   by   the   traditional   arbitration   resulting   to  
the  oath  taking.  Also,  once  the  fact  of  such  arbitration  and  oath  taking  
and  survival  have  been  successfully  established,  the  oath  taker  acquires  
the   right   of   full   ownership   and   possession.   If   the   other   party   remains   in  
possession,  he  does  so  as  a  trespasser  if  such  possession  is  not  with  the  
consent  of  the  owner.55  

In   Cyril   Onwukwe   Akpa   v   Inspector   Lawrence   Nwuko   (Rtd)   &  

Another,56   there   was   evidence   that   the   defendant’s   father   took   a  
native  oath  regarding  the  land  in  dispute.  A  palm  wine  tapper,  he  swore  
with  his  climbing  rope  stating  that  he  should  fall  from  a  palm  tree  if  the  
land  in  dispute  did  not  belong  to  him.  Four  days  later,  he  fell  from  the  
palm   tree   and   died.   The   customary   court   Nenwe,   saw   circumstantial  
evidence  in  this  development  and  among  other  reasons,  held  that  the  
land   belonged   to   the   plaintiff.   On   appeal,   the   Customary   Court   of  

                                                                                                                       
54
 See,  Onyenge  v  Ebere  (2004)  13  NWLR  (Pt  889)  20,  Oparaji  v  Ohanu  (1999)  9  NWLR  (Pt  618)  290,  Oline  v  Obodo  
(1958)  SCNLR  298,  and  Edwin  Onodugbo  v  Stanislaus  Odume  (unreported)  judgment  of  the  Customary  Court  of  
rd
Appeal  Enugu  delivered  0n  3  April,  2012  in  CCAE/69/2010.  
55
 See,  Onyenge  v  Ebere  (supra).  
56 th
 (Unreported)  judgment  of  the  Customary  Court  of  Appeal  Enugu  delivered  on  26  September,  2014,  in  
CCAE/53/2014.  

30  
 
Appeal   Enugu   saw   no   reason   to   frown   at   the   trial   court   for   making  
reference  to  the  said  fatal  oath  in  the  buildup  to  its  eventual  decision.    

PROOF  OF  ADULTERY  IN  DIVORCE  PROCEEDINGS  

Adultery   is   a   ground   for   dissolution   of   marriage   under   customary   law.  

Adultery   is   conjugal   trespass   usually   committed   in   secret.   For   this  
reason,   it   is   mostly   proved   by   circumstantial   evidence   in   divorce  
proceedings.   According   to   LORD   BUCKMASTER   in   Ross   v   Ross,57  
“Adultery   is   essentially   an   act   which   can   rarely   be   proved   by   direct  
evidence.   It   is   easy   to   suggest   conditions   which   can   leave   no   doubt  
that  adultery  has  been  committed,  but  the  mere  fact  that  people  are  
shown   together   in   an   environment   which   lends   itself   to   the  
commission   of   the   offence   is   not   enough   unless   it   can   be   shown   by  
documents   e.g.   letters   and   diaries   or   antecedent   conduct   that   the  
association  of  the  parties  was  so  intimate  and  their  mutual  passion  so  
clear   that   adultery   might   reasonably   be   assumed   as   the   result   of   an  
opportunity  for  its  occurrence.”  

In  the  customary  court  where  procedural  impediments  are  jettisoned  in  

the   interest   of   substantial   justice,   proof   of   adultery   should   be   less  
burdensome  through,  for  example,  the  tendering  of  a  GSM  handset  or  
handsets   containing   suggestive   text   messages   between   a   respondent  
and  his/her  co-­‐cheat.  It  can  also  be  proved  circumstantially  where  there  
is  evidence  that  a  respondent  delivered  a  child  360  days  after  the  last  
time   intercourse   occurred   between   the   couple;58   where   there   is  
evidence  that  a  partner  infected  the  other  with  a  venereal  disease;  or  
where  through  a  DNA  test  it  is  clinically  proved  that  a  petitioner  is  not  

                                                                                                                       
57
 (1930)  AC  1,  7.  
58
 Preston-­‐Jones  v  Preston-­‐Jones  (1951)  AC  391.  

31  
 
the  biological  father  of  a  child  purported  by  the  wife  to  be  his.  Any  of  
these   methods   of   proving   adultery   is   a   circumstantial   evidence   and   is  
applicable  in  the  customary  court.  

OTHER  COLLATERAL  CONSIDERATIONS  

As  a  court  not  tethered  to  technicality,  there  are  situations  and  matters  
that   may   arise   from   which   the   Customary   Court   may   make   inferences  
and  arrive  at  substantial  justice.    

Only   recently,   the   Customary   Court   of   Appeal   Enugu   agreed   with   the  
Customary  Court  Ngwo  in  Emmanuel  Ngwu  &  Ors  v  Emmanuel  Ude  &  
Ors  59  that  the  refusal  of  elders  of  the  defendant’s  family  to  join  and  the  
voluntary   withdrawal   of   certain   members   of   the   said   family   from   the  
suit   in   which   ownership   of   the   alleged   family   land   was   in   dispute  
pointed   to   the   possibility   that   the   land   did   not   belong   to   the  
defendant’s  family.  According  to  the  court:  

“…the   trial   court’s   observation   with   regard   to   the   voluntary  

withdrawal  of  Mr.  Clement  Ngwu  from  the  suit  as  a  defendant  as  well  
as  the  refusal  of  the  elders  in  the  appellants’  family  to  join  the  tussle  
for  the  land  in  dispute  is  not  without  a  basis.  It  is  a  notorious  fact  that  
Igbo   men   place   serious   premium   on   ownership   of   land.   Where   the  
elders  in  a  family  look  the  other  way  while  a  supposed  family  land  is  
on   the   line   in   litigation,   the   court   is   bound   to   raise   eyebrows.   Also,  
Igbo   men,   as   they   age,   develop   greater   reverence   for   land   and   are  
more  unlikely  to  support  a  claim  they  are  not  sure  of.”  

                                                                                                                       
59 th
 Judgment  of  the  Customary  Court  of  Appeal  Enugu  delivered  on  Friday  the  26  day  of  September,  2014  in  
CCAE/9/2011.  

32  
 
RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

I  strove  in  this  concise  essay  to  unearth  and  portray  the  applicability  of  
the   law   of   circumstantial   evidence   within   the   limited   adjudicatory  
universe  of  the  Customary  Court.  I  have  tried  to  show  that  recourse  to  
it   is   not   only   necessary   but   also   inevitable   since   it   naturally   takes   the  
place   of   direct   evidence   in   certain   cases.   In   States   where   the   criminal  
jurisdiction   of   the   Customary   Court   is   unwittingly   or   by   deliberate  
official   neglect   restricted   to   breaches   of   local   government   bye-­‐laws,  
rules  of  statutory  corporations,  etc.,  the  law  of  circumstantial  evidence  
finds   scant   application.   Owing   to   that,   there   is   a   crying   need   for   a   quick  
boost   to   or   enrichment   of   the   criminal   jurisdiction   of   the   Customary  
Court   in   States   where   it   is   poor.   Where   it   is   otherwise,   the   needed  
panacea   is   enlightenment   of   the   police   and   other   stakeholders   in   the  
administration   of   criminal   justice   on   the   jurisdictional   competence   of  
the   Customary   Court.   This   will   not   only   stave   off   the   current  
underutilization   of   the   Customary   Courts   but   also   decongest   the  
Magistrate’s   courts   which   undeniably   are   overburdened   with   the   high  
numerical   strength   of   cases   pending   in   them.   With   lawyers   (some   of  
them   qualified   to   be   appointed   Judges   of   superior   courts   of   record)  
now   presiding   over   most   Customary   Courts   in   some   States,  
adjudicatory  competence  is  no  longer  a  cause  for  concern.  

Once   again,   let   me   commend   the   NJI   for   the   enviable   opportunity   to  
stand  before  this  esteemed  audience.  I  thank  the  participants  for  their  
time  and  rapt  attention.  God  bless  you  all,  my  learned  brothers.  

   
HON. JUSTICE GEORGE CHIBUEZE NNAMANI  

33  
 
              

                                               

34