THE RETURN OF THE CONCESSION

World War II shortages had choked off Mexico's access to newsprint. The
forestry code enacted in 1946 gave the president authority to grant UIEF
concessions to any corporation dedicated to "mining, paper manufacture,
construction, the production of war materiel, etc.," but did not spell out how
they should function in practice.' 4 The 1949 forestry code cleared the air.
Companies authorized to form a UIEF received the right to purchase wood
products from all private landowners, indigenous communities, and ejidos
within a territory demarcated by presidential decree. In exchange, the conces-
sionaires would file a comprehensive management plan, replant trees wher-
ever they cut, hire their own foresters, maintain tree nurseries, and pledge
not to consume more wood than needed. From a management perspective,
it seemed that UIEFs could simultaneously modernize the woodlands while
achieving maximum sustained use of natural resources. By the mid-1950;
some experts concluded that the concessions had industrialized the forestry
sector while maximizing productivity, minimizing waste, and more efficiently
distributing forest products.' 5
In addition, UIEFs were promoted as a tool to create jobs and build a
more robust market for locally produced forest products. Most UIEF con-
tracts directed concessionaires to hire people living within their territories as
road builders, sawmill operators, and lumberjacks. In practice, relatively few
jobs materialized. Most companies preferred to use existing employees rather
than hire villagers who typically lacked the skills and labor disciplines''' . Nor
did woodland communities experience UIEFs as a boon to their local econo-
mies. While the law directed concessionaires to pay a "just price" (as well a
stumpage fee known as derecho de monte) for the wood harvested on ejidos and
other properties in their boundaries, it remained silent about how to arrive
at such a price. This was a particularly thorny question because the conces-
sions distorted the market by removing other (legal) buyers from the scene
and depressing the value of forest products, except in the rare case that a com-
munity management plan allowed it to produce more timber (or pine resin or
pulpwood) than the concessionaire was able to consume. In many instances,
UIEFs aggravated the situation by continuing to pay the same price for forest
products from year to year, even when inflation began to erode rural incomes.
The first three concessions went to paper companies in the central high-
lands, beginning with the 1945 creation of a UIEF for the Atenquique Paper
Company of Jalisco. Two years later, the Loreto y Pena Pobre paper mills in