QRA LPG Plant PDF

[RISK ASSESSMENT ] [2015]
INDEX
Sl.No Chapters Page No.
PART - I
1 Index I
2 Preface II
3 Executive Summary III
4 Objectives, Philosophy and Methodology 1-5
5 Details of LPG Bottling Facilities 2-5
6 Health ,Safety and Environmental Features In the Facility 3-5

PART- II
7 Hazard Identification 4-5
Hazard Identification methods used and the basis for the selection
7.1 5-7
of the methods.
7.2 Credible accident sources/worst case scenarios 6 - 10

Source characteristics, and Methodology for hazard identification,
7.3 namely, FETI and Mortality Index Calculations and worksheets 7-3
for identified units.
PART - III
8 Consequence Modeling 7- 25
Damage Contours Clearly Drawn to Scale On Site/Plot Plan

8.1 7 - 22
Indicating the Population Affected.
Accident Frequency Estimation , System Boundaries; Specific

8.2 Assumption, Basic 'Frequency Data' Used and Its Sources; And 8-9
Calculated Frequency of Occurrence of the Worst Accident
PART- IV
9 Determination Of Plant Risk & Risk Criteria. 9- 1
10 Recommendations 10 - 1
PART- V
11 Acknowledgements IV
12 References V
13 Annexure VI - 2
[GGSS-QRA-IOCL-LPG-BP-TRIUNELVELI] Page 1
PREFACE
Indian Oil corporation Ltd , Tirunelveli LPG Bottling Plant, SIPCOT Industrial
Growth Centre, Gangaikondan Village, Tirunelveli Taluk And District, Tamil
Nadu – desired to go in for a Risk Assessment Study to identify the risks
associated with their Proposed LPG Bottling facility. The Company
commissioned the services of Green Global safety Systems for carrying out the
Risk Assessment Study and suggests mitigation measures to control and/or
eliminate the risk.
A specialist from Green Global safety Systems visited the site to collect the
required data and drawings to carry out the Risk Assessment. This Risk
Assessment report is an outcome of the work by a team of specialists of Green
Global safety Systems, having extensive field experience in LPG Bottling Plant
Operation & Safety and exposure to QRA studies.
Disclaimer
Green Global Safety Systems have exercised all reasonable skill and diligence in
carrying out the Risk Assessment Study. This report is not deemed to be any
undertaking, warranty or certificate.
M.Meganathan.,ME.,MIE.,DIS.,BOC.,Ph.D Scholar BBS
Trained and Experienced hazard analysis leader
by china Risk Management Solutions-China
Accredited Safety Auditor by Government of Tamilnadu
& Chartered Engineer –Chemical
Place : Chennai
Date : 15-03-2015
1.a ) Executive summary
As part of Risk management system in Proposed LPG Bottling plant of

Indian Oil corporation Ltd , Tirunelveli LPG Bottling Plant, SIPCOT
Industrial Growth Centre, Gangaikondan Village ,Tirunelveli Taluk and
District, have good commitment and attitude including the initiative to
this risk analysis.
Good Engineering design in the equipment locations , Maintenance area

,Emergency Exit Ways , Assembly areas and other risk mitigation
measures are well planned and constructed in the plant .
All the possible risks are taken into account and analyzed and mitigation
measures have been implemented for the proposed project.
Fire Fighting and Protection systems are well planned to mitigate the
fire emergency situations.
Fire fighting vehicle access is available outside the compound wall as the
plant is surrounded by three side road access and one side vacant land.
Risk involved in the offsite also considered and safety distances have
been well defined and adequate distances have been allocated as per the
Static and Mobile Pressure Vessels Rules requirements.
Minimum Safety distances ( 87 meters ) between Truck unloading bay to

the Mounded storage bullet pipe manifold area is well maintained. Risk
Analysis ,Pool fire model results Red Zone is about 51 meters .Hence
adequate space is available in the plant for fire fighting with safe
distances.
LPG Truck Unloading Shed shall be provided with proper drain systems
to prevent stagnation of LPG Liquid causing Unconfined vapor cloud
Explosion .
LPG pump house monorail resting on the steel columns of the roof
adequate structural stability shall be ensured.
Vapor line to the mounded storages requires proper rigid support .
Mounded storage manifold pipes shall be properly clamped with rigid

supports.
Emergency Access road from Cylinder filling shed to Emergency gate to

be provided .
TLD – Bay number 7 , Water spry nozzle to be fixed 5 inch away from
the bay so that damage could be prevented.
Wooden packing is used in the LPG main Pipe line from the mounded
storage shall be removed.
1.0 OBJECTIVES, PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 Introduction
Indian Oil corporation Ltd , Tirunelveli LPG Bottling Plant, SIPCOT

Industrial Growth Centre, Gangaikondan Village Tirunelveli Taluk And
District, Tamil Nadu – desired to get a Risk Assessment Study carried
out for their Liquefied Petroleum storage facility located at
Gangaikondan Village Tirunelveli Taluk And District, Tamil Nadu. The
job was entrusted to M/s Green Global Safety Systems, Chennai by the
work order .
1.2 Objectives
The objective of this study is to identify potential physical hazards which

could trigger loss causing events, such as fire and explosion and toxic gas
cloud dispersion. Further objective of this study is to identify major
accident scenarios, carry out consequence analysis, assess the associated
risks, and suggest measures for risk reduction wherever warranted.
1.3 Philosophy
Risk Assessment is a complex exercise and can be carried out to various

depths. The depth of the study is determined by the definition of the study
goals and study requirements.
Hazard identification is a key step in Risk Assessment. It is also an

important step in various safety studies and very many techniques are
available for hazard identification depending on the depth and objective of
the study. The most relevant to risk Assessment is the review of release
sources of hazardous chemicals.
For the selected release source scenarios, depending upon the failure
mode, causing loss of containment, are developed.
1.4 Methodology
Preliminary discussions were held with the Technical team of Indian Oil
corporation Ltd , Tirunelveli LPG Bottling Plant, SIPCOT Industrial
Growth Centre, Gangaikondan Village Tirunelveli Taluk And District on
the Handling storage of LPG facilities provided at site.
To carry out the Risk Assessment, the team did the following:
• Identification of all sections of the plant including the storage

section where substantial quantities of Hazardous chemicals
(Explosive flammable, toxic, corrosive) are handled.
• To collect the relevant properties of the Hazardous Chemicals

handled
• Identification of possible ways in which failure of plant installation

at various locations and storage areas could occur.
• Effects of heat radiation ,Pressure waves and Dispersion of vapor

cloud
• Study of possible failures in handling operations.
The following steps are involved in the analysis:
• Study of the plant facilities and systems.

• Identification of the hazards.
• Enumeration of the failure incidents.
• Estimation of the consequences for the selected failure scenarios.
Review of the risk management system provided for minimizing the risks,
planning emergency response and mitigating the impact of any
incident.
2. Details of the plant
Brief description of LPG bottling plant (60,000 MTPA) at Tirunelveli
Indane Bottling Plant of Indian Oil Corporation Limited is located in SIPCOT

industrial Growth Center in Tirunelveli district of Tamilnadu. The bottling plant
has been set up to feed the LPG market in districts of Tirunelveli, nagercoil and
Kanyakumari. The bottling plant contains following facilities & operations:
1. Receipt of LPG bulk:

The bulk LPG transported from refinery locations to bottling plants will be
unloaded using pressure differential method. Received LPG will be stored in
three mounded bullet each having 600MT capacities (3X600MT). LPG
compressors will be used for pressurizing the vessels which is to be unloaded by
taking the LPG vapor from the receiving vessel and the liquid line will be
connected to facilitate transfer of liquid LPG. The TLD will be provided with 8
bay. The TLD gantry will have unloading arms with inbuilt safety features like
break away coupling. Other safety devices like excess flow check valve, thermal
relief valves, ROV’s etc. will be provided on the pipeline a required.
2. Storage of Bulk LPG

Bulk LPG is stored in pressurized vessels at moderate pressure of 6 – 8 kg/cm2 g
under equilibrium. LPG will be stored in pressure vessels in two phases. LPG in
the form of liquid will be filled up to 85% max of the water capacity and the
balance 15% vapor space is left for expansion.
3. Carousel filling machine:

LPG filling shed for bottling in cylinders in two sets of 24 point automatic
electronic filling carousel system capable of filling max 1800cylinder/Hr with
complete upstream and downstream auxiliary facilities. Gas stop valves are
provided such that in any case of leakage from filling hose/gun, it will stop
automatically for further flow.
4. Bottling operations
Empty cylinders are received either from new cylinder manufacturer/
repairer or from distributors i.e., from the market.
New/repaired cylinders are purged with LPG vapor for ensuring no air
trapped in the cylinders, before filling LPG into the cylinder.
Pre-filling checks like visual check, cylinder due for testing and any
physically damaged cylinders are removed for rectification.
Fit cylinders are fed in the carousel m/c having 24filling points by means
of conveyors. The filling gun fixing, filling operation including cut off,
ejection of cylinders are done automatically. The cutoffs of filled cylinders
are based on gross weights.
Filled cylinders are weighed and the tolerance is -100 gms to +200 gms.
The cylinders filled out of this range are called over or under filled
cylinders which will be pushed into a conveyor for correction. Correct
weight cylinders are then sent for leak checking.
Over filled and under filled cylinders are corrected using ICU ( Integrated
Weight Correction Unit) provided on line and sent for re-checking and the
correct weight cylinders are sent down the line for further checks.
Valve leak/bung leak cylinders are checked through electronic VL/BL leak
detector. The permissible leak is 0.5 gms per hour.
The electronic ring detector checks ‘O’ ring inside the valve. Cylinders
which are not leaky are sent down the line.
Cylinders which are correctly filled and having no leaks are sealed with
PVC seals. Filled cylinders are stored and dispatched to the Indane
distributors as per the requirement.
‘O’ ring damaged /missing cylinder detected are changed with new ‘O
‘rings and sent for re-testing in O ring leak detector. Valve leakage
cylinders are evacuated completely and de-pressurized and old valve is
replaced with new valve and the cylinder is taken back for filling. Other
defective cylinders are marked with identification and stacked separately.
These cylinders are rectified or de-shaped depending up on the nature of
defect.
5. Utilities system
a) Compressed air system

b) Service water system
c) High Speed Diesel (HSD) System

d) Electric Power Distribution System
6. Safety & communication system
a) Fire fighting system
b) Gas Monitoring System
c) Public Address & Paging System
7. Fire Fighting Facilities:
The fire fighting detection and prevention system in the storage & handling area
comprise of the following:
3 nos of 615 cum/Hr Diesel engine drive fire pumps and the system is
kept pressurized by electric motor driven jockey pump
Other fire pump house equipment like security air compressor for MVWS
system, Fire Alarm Panel
Hydrants and monitors
Medium velocity water spray system consisting of 19 zones in filling shed,
LD, LPG Pump House and Mounded Bullet.
Fire detection and alarm system
Gas detection system
Manual call points and Emergency shutdown system
The plant is equipped with fire fighting facilities as per OISD 144. Fire water
storage consists of MS fixed cone roof fire water storage tank of 3 X 2500kl
capacity.
8. Power Supply System:

Total power requirement of the industry is 550kVA. 1 no. of DG set of 750kVA
for power and 1 no. of DG set of 250kVA for lighting is installed as an alternative
source of power.
9. CONTROL AND MONITORING PHILOSOPHY

LPG pumps, LPG compressors, air compressors, operation are from local control
station (LCS). MCCs will have start and stop push button.
All ROV’s are pneumatically and electrically operated. ROVs will be operated
locally through push button near the valve and remotely through PLC located in
the control room at ROV control panel. Local/remote selection facility for the
valves will not be provided. Status indication of valves is displayed in the PC
based work station located in the control room. Separate PC based work station
is provided in the control room for displaying status of fire fighting and gas
detection system. ROV’s of individual bullet will be closed when high level alarm
and high pressure signal of respective bullet received. All ROV’s will be closed on
the event of receipt of signal from fire fighting system.
For pumps and compressors, process parameters will be monitored locally and in
the local panel where ever provided by the vendor.
2.1 ) SURROUNDING AREAS
East - Vacant Land
West - Nova carbon - Factory
North - Vacant Land
South - 30 ft Road
The plant is situated in a less populated area.
2.2) population density

Gangaikondan had a population of 10,254. Males constitute 52% of the
population and females 48%. Gangaikondan has an average literacy rate of
74%, higher than the national average of 59.5%: male literacy is 81%, and
female literacy is 65%. In Gangaikondan, 13% of the population is under 6
years of age.
4.0. Meteorological Data:
Gangaikondan is located at 8°51′N

8°51 77°47′E , 8.85°N 77.78°E It has an average elevation of
47 metres (154 feet).
Maximum Temperature - 48 deg C
Minimum Temperature - 28 deg C
Average Rainfall - 174 mm
Maximum Relative Humidity - 92 %
Minimum Relative Humidity - 35 %
Wind Speed - 4.5- 6 m / sec
Predominant wind Direction - N/E
Floods - Nil
Wind rose Diagramme
[GGSS-QRA-IOCL-LPG-BP-TRIUNELVELI]
TRIUNELVELI] Page 11
5.0 Description of Facilities and Process:
Process Description:
At present the Bulk LPG required for bottling is transported to the plant byroad
tankers of 18 MT capacity which are specially fabricated for LPG transportation.
LPG from road tankers is decanted to the LPG storage vessels (Horton Sphere &
Bullets) by the pressure differential method using the LPG vapour compressors
provided for the purpose.
LPG from the storage bullets will be pumped to the 1* 24 point electronic filling
machines and the empty gas cylinders will be filled using the pneumatically
operated filling guns. Each cylinder for domestic use will be filled with 14.2 kg of
LPG, weight being automatically adjusted. The cylinders for industrial use will
be filled with 19.0 Kg and 47.5 Kg of LPG. After filling, the cylinders pass
through various quality checks including the weight check, leak test etc., before
sealing. The cylinders will be stored at the existing Filled Cylinder storage shed
and loaded into trucks for dispatch.
5.1 Various Activities at Plant
a. Receipt of LPG from Bulk Trucks

b. LPG stored in bullet
c. Receiving of empty LPG cylinder
d. Filling of LPG into cylinder
e. Dispatch of filled cylinders
7.0 Occupational Health, Safety & Environmental Features in the Project
7.1. Process Safety & Safety Features

Process Safety focuses on the prevention of fires, explosions and accidental
chemical releases at LPG Bottling facilities.
7.1.1. PROPOSED SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
The Safety Officer in co-ordination with Shift-in-Charge review all plant

operations to identify potential unsafe conditions and / or potential problems
which may lead to health or safety exposures.
Plant personnel shall work with the Safety Officer to identify potential problems
and to identify proper operational procedures and the operational areas of the
plant. Actions to be taken include equipment or procedural changes,
development of exposure monitoring strategies, and inclusion of warning
statements in procedures.
7.1.2. HAZARD ANALYSIS BY THE TEAM
QRA studies are conducted at plant before commissioning and also applied to the
proposed installation and modification of buildings, equipments, mechanical and
electrical systems, utilities, fire protection system, grounds etc.
Plans or specifications on designated projects shall be submitted to an

acceptance committee consisting of Operations Manager, Engineering. Manager,
Safety Manager for review prior to project implementation. Recommendations
will be submitted with the final plans and specifications to the Departmental
head for review. If the departmental head finds that plans and specifications are
not meeting the recommendations of the acceptance committee, he shall return
the final plans to the originator for modifications or a justification of deviations.
7.1.3. INSPECTIONS :-
The officer in charge of each function are responsible for ensuring the timely
completion of periodic inspections and correction of problems.
The frequency of specific inspections is as follows :
Plant inspections : Daily, Monthly (Internal)
Plant inspections : External
: State office / HO - Ops- Half yearly
: HO ( S & EP ) - Half yearly
: MDT - Yearly
: OISD audit - once in three Years
Electrical audit - internal Yearly / externally once in two years
Emergency Equipments : Internal / OEM’s - Weekly
Maintenance : Internal / OEM’s - Monthly
Office : Internal / OEM’s - Quarterly
Fire Protection Systems : Internal / OEM’s - Monthly & Annually
7.1.4.PLANT SAFETY COMMITTEE :
The safety committee / circle consists of minimum 50% representation from

Workmen and remaining from Management. Plant Manager will chair the
meetings while safety officer is responsible for convening the meeting.
7.1.5. EMERGENCY PREPARDNESS PLAN AND RESPONSE
TYPES OF EMERGENCIES : The type of emergencies that can be

expected in a LPG bottling plant are : i) Fire
ii) Explosion
iii) Vapour Cloud Formation

iv) LPG spill and leakages
o ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN IS AVAILABLE : If an accident / incident

takes place in a factory , its effects are confined to factory premises,
involving only the people working and the property in side the factory , it is
called as “ On-Site Emergency “.
o PROPOSED OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN : On the other hand, if the

accident is such that its effects inside the factory is uncontrollable and its
effects and consequences extend / spread outside the factory premises, then
it is called as “ Off-Site Emergency ”. Necessary plan is in progress .
o Disaster management plan is arrived in the plant
7.1.5.PROPOSED TRAINING PRACTICES IN THE ORGANISATION
* All Employees - Evacuation Procedures
- Reporting Emergencies
- Hazardous Materials Safe Handling
- Personal Protective Equipment
- Fire Safety
- Use of Fire Extinguishers
- First Aid
* Officers - Same as above
- Plan Provisions
- Risk Assessment / Loss Control
- HAZOP studies / HAZAN
* Brigade Members - Same as above
- First Aid
- Search and Rescue Techniques
- Use of Communications Equipment
- Fire Protection System
- Spill Control
- Use of personal protection equipments
* All Contract workers - Evacuation Procedures
- Fire Safety
- First Aid
* All Truck Drivers & Cleaners - Evacuation Procedures
- Fire Safety
- First Aid
7.1.6. SAFETY FACILITIES IN THE PLANT
• Leak detection, prevention

• Elimination of source of ignition
• Fire prevention / fighting
• Communication, First aid, Rescue and Personnel protection
equipment.
The facilities are detailed below.
7.1.7 LEAK DETECTION :
GAS MONITORING SYSTEM : The system consists of gas detecting sensors

with a control panel and audio / visual alarms. The sensors were located at
sensitive or potential hazard areas in the plant with two audio alarms at security
room and Filling shed to alert workmen regarding the risk and continuous
monitoring / recording in PC at control room .
PROPOSED
PROPOSED LEAK PREVENTION / MINIMISING :
AIR / VAPOUR EXTRACTION SYSTEM : It is basically a blower with ducts

extended to different operating points in filling shed. The blower extract any
leaking LPG vapour from the floor level and cold flares the same to free
atmosphere at LPG cylinder filling shed..
7.1.8. REMOTE CONTROL VALVES:
These are Electro – pneumatically operated quick shut off valves provided on
LPG pipelines with actuating points located remotely and nearer to operating
facilities in plant. When actuated, the valves will close within 25 seconds,
starving the LPG flow in pipelines. The ROV’s are installed at the following
locations :
Storage bullets Liquid & Vapour lines

TLD liquid lines
LPG Pump out let lines near filling shed
7.1.9.ROV’s INTERLOCK WITH HLA :
All LPG Bulk Storage vessels are fitted with High Level Alarm switches which
gives alarm when product reaches 85% of its volume. A signal has been taken
from HLA to actuate the ROV to close which will stop the flow of liquid into
vessels. This stops the over filling/flowing of LPG into vessels.
IGNITION SOURCES : Another identified potential source for Fire accidents is

“Ignition”. To eliminate such sources, following are ensured.
Installation of only flame proof ( FLP) and intrinsically safe ( IS)

electrical systems and equipments / enclosures in licensed area.
Spark retardate flooring or mastic flooring in cylinder handling areas.
Effective bonding and double earthing connections for equipments and
product pipelines to dissipate static electricity.
7.1.10.STATIC ELECTRICITY : The following approved system is being followed

meticulously to over come any fire hazard due to static electricity accumulation
/ generation during the process of bulk unloading & bottling operations.
All storage vessels and static & rotary equipments are double earthed to
dissipate the static charges.
Electronic filling Carousel is earthed and all filling guns are bonded.
Earthing connection are being made to Road tankers/bullet trucks at two
places viz one at body of the bullet and second at the chassis of the trailer.
The unloading arms are bonded and earthed. All these connection are
terminated in the earth pits and all pits are inter connected as grid to
have least resistance.
All the conveyor and online equipments are double earthing made and
tested as per IE rules and records maintained.
Earth pits are available all over the plant and are connected with earth
grid to get better / lease earth resistance value with double earthing
system.
7.1.11. FIRE FIGHTING FACILITIES

Following facilities are available in plant.
Water storage capacity - 2500 KL X 3Nos
Fire water pumps - 3 Nos ( Main 2X 615 Cum/Hr & Standby 1X 615 cum
/Hr)
Jockey pumps - 2 Nos ( 10 Cum/hr)
Hydrant Points (Double Head) , Water Monitors , Sprinklers,Deluge valve

systems are installed for the proposed project.
7.1.12. AUTOMATIC MEDIUM VELOCITY WATER SPRINKLER SYSTEM :
The system has been provided on all operating areas and considered to be a very
effective fire fighting system.
It has a control valve or deluge valve which when actuated, will deluge water
into protect spray installation and give an effective spray cover to the area.
An additional feature, compressed air lines with heat detectors or quartzoid

bulbs which breaks at 79 degree c and actuates the sprinkler system facility
automatically.
Remote actuating / Solenoid valve facility is available near security room .
7.1.13. PROPOSED PUBLIC ADDRESSING SYSTEM : This is an intrinsically safe,

internal communication system which facilitates internal communication as well
as public address.
INTERCOM : This Intercom connected to P & T line can be used for

communication internally and externally at Main Office.
7.1.14. PROPOSED SAFETY EQUIPMENTS :

Electrically operated siren : 1 Nos. ( 3KM )
Hand Operated Siren : 8 Nos.
In addition following First Aid / Rescue and Personnel Protection Equipments

are available.
Breathing Apparatus : 1 sets (1 Spare cylinders)

Fire Proximity Suits : 1
Safety Helmets : 60
Rubber Hand Gloves : 2 Pairs
Resuscitator : 2
Safety Belt with Harness : 2
Explosive Meter : 2
Stretchers : 2
First Aid Boxes : 4
Leak Sealing Pad : 1
Water jel blankets : 2
Voltage & Current Detector : 1
Red / Green flags : 1 set
FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
DCP - 9 kg CAPACITY : 97
75kg CAPACITY : 05
CO2 - 4.5 kg CAPACITY : 14
Foam Type – 9 lit 05
8.0. IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS

TYPE OF HAZARDS
It is identified from the below Details
Flammable gas and liquids have given rise to accidents involving fire
in industries. The effect of fires is radiation heat. As a result of heat objects may
be ignited and living organisms may be burned. Accidents and casualties result
in loss of life and property in industries. The likelihood of occurrences of fire
accidents can be reduced by process design and reliability. Mathematical models
and computer models are employed for calculating the consequences of such
events which helps in the research for mitigation of their consequences.
The most common scenarios of fire and explosions are Boiling Liquid
Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE), flash fires, vapor cloud explosions and
pool fires. The following sections deal with these scenarios and their estimation
follow subsequently. The assessment approach is based on the calculation of
dose radiation (energy per unit area). The following table will give us an idea on
the damage as a result of fire.
8.1 BLEVE
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosions occur by fire heating vessels

containing the flammable LPG liquid above its boiling point, increasing the
pressure inside. Flames impinging on the unwetted vessel surface can weaken
the tank which may fail as the internal pressure builds well beyond the capacity
of any relief valve. The vessel can then suddenly rupture propelling dangerous
shrapnel significant distances, releasing the superheated liquid which expands
rapidly, ignites and creates a big fireball with accompanying pressure effects as
an explosion. This can cause substantial damage to anyone or anything that
gets in the way of the blast. It is therefore important that any such vessels or
tanks are kept cool and the external fires extinguished quickly with water
sprays on carbonaceous materials or natural fluoroprotein based foams at low or
medium expansion where other hydrocarbon liquids are involved. This choice of
foam is best to resist the often severe radiant heat and minimize fuel pick up
into the bubbles to protect against re-ignition.
8.2 FLASH FIRE
A flash fire is the non-explosive combustion of a vapor cloud resulting from a

release of flammable material into the open air, which after mixing with air,
ignites. A flash fire results from the ignition of a released flammable cloud in
which there is essentially no increase in combustion rate. The ignition source
could be an electric spark, a hot surface, friction between moving parts of a
machine or an open fire.
Part of the reason for flash fires is that, flammable fuels have a vapor
temperature which is less than the ambient temperature. Hence, as a result of
a spill, they are dispersed initially by the negative buoyancy of cold vapors and
subsequently by the atmospheric turbulence. After the release and dispersion of
the flammable fuel the resulting vapor cloud is ignited and when the fuel vapor
is not mixed with sufficient air prior to ignition, it results in diffusion fire
burning. Therefore, the rate at which the fuel vapor and air are mixed together
during combustion determines the rate of burning in the flash fire.
The main dangers of flash fires are radiation and direct flame contact. The size
of the flammable cloud determines the area of possible direct flame contact
effects. Radiation effects on a target depend on several factors including its
distance from the flames, flame height, flame emissive power, local atmospheric
transmissivity, and cloud size. Most of the time, flash combustion of a flash fire
lasts no more than few seconds.
8.3. Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosions
Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosions (UVCE) normally occur where large

volumes of flammable fuel/air clouds develop before ignition begins with the
flame front accelerating rapidly in free space creating shock waves. This type of
explosion can occur up to 5 km from the leakage incident due to cloud drift, and
can cause major unpredicted secondary incidents with considerable damage to
people and property in a wide area. Evacuation of a wide area is advisable when
unignited clouds form. Containment for over rich clouds should be provided with
water curtain nozzles like hydroshields and portable ground monitors,
minimizing mixing. This avoids heat inputs which increase evaporation rates,
compounding the problem. For vapour pockets at or near the lower flammability
limit, vigorous mixing of more air into the vapour with water sprays on the
ground can be effective. Ground/oscillating monitors can greatly assist air
entrainment when nozzles are set at 45º spray angle pointing upwards, so
diluting the gas cloud concentration and safely dispersing the LPG vapours into
the atmosphere.
8.4. JET FIRE
Escaping jet of LPG from pressure vessels/piping, if ignited, cause a jet flame.
The jet flame direction and tilt depend on prevailing wind direction and velocity.
Damage
in case of such type of jet fires, is restricted to within the plant boundary.
However, the ignited jet can impinge on other vessels and equipment carrying
LPG and can cause domino effect.
8.5. POOL FIRE

The liquid pool, if ignited, causes a “Pool Fire”. In the pool fire, LPG burns with
long smoky flame throughout the pool diameter radiating intense heat which
create severe damage to the adjoining buildings, structures, other vessels and
equipment causing secondary fires. The flame may tilt under the influence of
wind and may get propagated several pool diameters down wind. Damage, in
case of such fires, is restricted within the plant area and near the source of
generation except causing a phenomenon, called BLEVE. However, in case of
plants having a good layout maintaining safe separation distances and other
precautionary measures, the damage is minimum.
8.6. LPG – LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS:PROPERTIES
Commercial LPG marketed in India consists of 60% Butane and 40% propane
with traces of Propylene, Butylene and Isobutane. They are in vapour form at
ambient temperature and they are condensed to liquid state by application of

moderate pressure and simultaneous reduction in temperature.
PROPERTIES OF LPG :
i. SENSIBLE
A. COLOR : Like air, LP gas is colour less, therefore it cannot be seen.

However, when liquid LPG leaks from a container, it vapourizes
immediately. This produces a cooling of surrounding air and may cause
water vapour in the air to condense, freeze and become visible.
B. ODOUR : LPG is basically odour less. Hence, it is distinctly odourised by
adding Mercaptan Sulphur to give warning in case of leakage. It can be
smelt sufficiently before it becomes dangerous enough to catch fire.
C. TASTE : LPG vapour is tasteless and non-toxic. Therefore, presence of
LPG vapours in atmosphere cannot be sensed by taste.
ii. PHYSICAL & CHEMICAL PROPERTIES :
A. DENSITY OF LIQUID : It is defined as mass per unit volume of substance

at a given temperature (grams/cm3). Density of liquid at 15 degree C
grade (Water = 1) is 0.542 i.e. half as heavy as water i.e. in all 1 litre
capacity container we can store 1kg of water whereas we can store 0.542
kg of LPG only.
B. DENSITY OF VAPOUR : It is defined as mass of a substance occupying a

unit volume at a stated temperature and pressure (kg/m3). LPG vapour is
1.5 to 2 times heavier than air. As a result of this property, any leaking
LPG tends to settle down at the lower most floor level. Therefore, it is
most important that floor level ventilation's should be provided to disperse
leaking gas to prevent accumulation of gas. The volume of gas at 15
degree C, 760 mm HG is 0.44 litres/gr.
C. COEFFICIENT OF VOLUMETRIC EXPANSION : It is defined as chains

in volume per unit of liquid for each degree of temperature change. The
coefficient of volumetric expansion of LPG is about 100 times that of the
steel (expansion rate between 0 degree C and 40 degree C for propane is
13.2% and for butane 8%). Hence, any LPG container must be filled to a
certain volume of liquid in order to leave sufficient space for LPG
expansion in case of temperature rise.
D. MELTING / FREEZING POINT : The lowest temperature at which liquid

assumes the solid state is known as melting point i.e., 187 degree C for
propane and 137 degree C for Butane.
E. CRITICAL TEMPERATURE : It is defined as the highest temperature at

which a substance exists as liquid irrespective of pressure applied i.e. 97
degree C for propane and 152 degree C for Butane.
F. CRITICAL PRESSURE : The minimum pressure required to obtain the

substance in liquid form at a critical temperature is called critical
pressure. That is 43 kg / Sq.cm for Propane and 39 kg/Sq.cm for Butane.
G. BOILING TEMPERATURE : The temperature at which vapour pressure

of a liquid becomes equal to the external pressure is called the boiling
temperature. The boiling point of LPG presently marketed is very nearly
Zero degree C or sub zero temperature. Therefore, this product cannot be
used at places where the ambient temperature is near / or sub-zero.
H. VAPOUR PRESSURE : The vapour pressure of – liquid at a give a

temperature is defined as the equilibrium, pressure developed at that
temperature in a closed container containing the liquid and its vapour
only. The point of equilibrium is reached when the rate of escape of

molecules for liquid = the rate of return to the liquid.
I. LATENT HEAT OF VAPOURIZATION OF LIQUID : It is defined as the

heat needed at a particular temperature to change a unit mass of liquid to
vapour without change in temperature. At zero degree C it is 90 KCAL /
kg for Propane, 92 KCAL / kg for Butane.
J. SPECIFIC HEAT : It is defined as quantity of heat requested to raise unit

mass of substance through unit temperature interval. It is 0.57 KCAL / kg
at 0 degree C for Butane.
K. FLAMABILITY RANGE : The minimum and maximum percentage of fuel

gas in air in which the mixture can be ignited are termed as lower / upper
limits of flammability. The range is 1.8% to 9%.
L. IGNITION TEMPERATURE : The minimum temperature of the spark /

flame / heated material required for burning of combustible mixture i.e.,
410 degree C to 580 degree C.
M. CALORIFIC VALUE : It is defined as amount of heat produced by

complete combustion of unit mass of the fuel. It is about 11,400 KCAL / kg
for LPG.
N. THEORETICAL FLAME TEMPERATURE : In air – 2000 degree C and in

Oxygen 2850 degree C.
O. VOLUME OF GAS PRODUCED ON VAPORIZATION : One volume of

liquid LPG produces 250 volumes of gas at a normal temperature and
pressure. Therefore, large quantity of gas can be compactly stored and

transported in liquid form.
P. VISCOSITY : Liquid LPG has a low viscosity and can leak in situations in
which water may not. It is a poor lubricant and leaks are therefore likely
to occur at seals (on pumps).
Q. AUTO REFRIGERATION : Refers the phenomena which occurs when the

pressure is rapidly released from a vessel containing liquid LPG. Any
evidence of frosting on outside of the vessel is an indication that auto
refrigeration is occurring.
SAFETY INFORMATION DATA SHEET
LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS
UN No. 1075 HAZCHEM 2WE
OTHER IMPORTANT INFORMATION
CORRECT TECHNICAL NAME : CAS REGISTRY NO :
LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS ADR HAZARD IDENTIFICATION NO : (23)
SYNONYMS : LPG : BOTTLED GAS : PYROFAX
CHEMICAL FORMULA: MAINLY STRAIGHT CHAN C. HYDROCARBON MIXTURE
PHYSICAL GAS MOLECULAR WEIGHT > 44

STATE
SPECIFIC GRAVITY AT 20o C 0.51 – 0.56
COLOUR COLOURLESS MELTING POINT 0o -
ODOUR MILD SWEET BOILING POINT Oo <5
AUTO-IGNITION TEMP Oo 320 – 405
FLASH POINT Oo EXPLOSIVE THRESHOLD Ppm mg/m3

LIMITS %V LIMIT VALUE (TLV
CC OC LEL HEL TLV – TWA 1,000 1,800
-104 to -60 - 1.6 9.5 TEV – STEEL - -
BEHAVIOUR WITH WATER : FLOATS AND BOILS ON WATER
VAPOUR : HEAVIER THAN AIR FLAMMABLE
TOXICITY DATA : IDLH : 19.000 ppm
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION :OUOUR THRESHOLD : 5.000 to 20,000 ppm
8.7 The purpose of Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment is to identify

possible accidents and estimate their consequences. Conceivably the
initiating event could be the only event but usually it is not and as a
matter of fact there are a number of events between the initiating event
and the consequence and these events are the responses of the systems
and the operators. Different responses to the same initiating event will
often lead to different accident sequences with varying magnitude of
consequences.
8.8 MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheets) for the chemicals handled are used
to identify the hazards of the respective chemicals. MSDS of all the
chemicals handled in the factory have been collected and studied to
identify the Hazards of each chemical.
8.9 HAZOP study was referred and recommendations implies study on QRA.
8.10 Fire and Explosion hazards connected with the chemicals stored and
handled have been identified and preventive measures have been taken
for control of the hazards.
DAMAGE CRITERIA – As per IS 15656
Table - 1
DAMAGE DUE TO INCIDENT THERMAL RADIATION INTENSITY
Incident Thermal
Radiation Intensity Type of Damage
KW/m2
Can cause heavy damage to process equipment, piping,
37.5
building etc.
32.0 Maximum Flux level for thermally protected tanks.
12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood.
8.0 Maximum heat flux for un-insulated tanks.
Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover
4.5
within 20 sec. (First Degree Burn).
1.6 Will cause no discomfort to long exposure.
0.7 Equivalent to solar radiation.
Table - 2
PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THRESHOLD THERMAL DOSES

Dose Threshold
Effect
KJ/m2
375 3rd Degree Burn.
250 2nd Degree Burn.
125 1st Degree Burn.
Threshold of pain, no reddening or blistering of skin
65
caused.
1st Degree Burn Involve only epidermis, blister may occur;

example: sun burn.
2nd Degree Burn Involve whole of epidermis over the area
of burn plus some portion of dermis
3rd Degree Burn Involve whole of epidermis and dermis;
subcutaneous tissues may also be damaged.
In case of MS having relatively higher vapour pressure, there is a

possibility of vapour cloud explosion. Damage effects due to blast over
pressure are given in Table - 3
Table - 3
DAMAGE EFFECTS DUE TO BLAST OVER PRESSURE

Blast Over Pressure
Damage Type
(Bar)
0.30 Major Damage to Structures
0.17 Eardrum Rupture
0.10 Repairable Damage
0.03 Damage of Glass
0.01 Crack of Windows
9.0 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS THROUGH OCCURRENCE AND

EVALUATION OF INCIDENTS
9.1 An important stage in any Risk Assessment study is to identify the
potential accidents that could result in the release of the hazardous
material from its normal containment. This is achieved by a systematic
review of the facilities together with an effective screening process.
LPG Chemical hazards are generally considered to be of two types:
• Explosive gas
• Flammable gas
Where there is the potential for confined gas releases, there is also the
potential for explosions when combined with air . These often produce
overpressures which can cause fatalities, both through direct action on the
body or through building damage.
9.2 Potential accidents associated with any plant, section of a plant or pipeline
can be divided into two categories:
1. There is a possibility of mechanical failure associated with each

mechanical component of the facility (vessels, pipes, pumps or
compressors). These are generic failures and can be caused by such
mechanisms such as corrosion, vibration or external impact
(mechanical or overpressure). A small event (such as a leak) may
escalate to a bigger event, by itself causing a larger failure.
2. There is also a likelihood of failures caused by specific operating

circumstances. The prime example of this is human error, however it
can also include other accidents due, for example, to reaction runaway
or the possibility of ignition of leaking tank gases due to hot work.
The first class of accident requires consideration of each component under

its normal operating conditions. Both classes may also require
consideration of some components under abnormal conditions. In
principle, an essential first stage in failure case identification of such a
facility is therefore every significant mechanical component in the plant
which could fail, together with its operating conditions, contents and
inventory.
In general, the following typical types of failures are considered :
For vessel / storage tank / Cylinders / Tonners
• Rupture
• Large leaks (20 % mm equivalent diameter)
• Medium and small leaks (due to corrosion, impact and other such
cases)
For pipelines :
• Full bore rupture

• Large, medium and small leaks
Failures of other components are dealt with in a similar manner giving
releases which are representative of accidents to that type of component.
For each identified failure case, the appropriate data required to define
that case is input into the EPA software ( Internationally accepted
software). When the appropriate inputs are defined, EPA calculates the
source terms of each release, such as the release rate, release velocity,
release phase and drop size. These source term parameters then become
inputs to the consequence modeling.
10.0 SELECTION OF INCIDENTS AND CONSEQUENCE CALCULATION
10.1 The major criterion for selection of scenarios is the potential for high
hazard considering the amount of hazardous substance involved,
operating conditions, and possibility of release and extent of consequence.
10.2 The details regarding the hazardous chemicals in tanks have been
furnished in an earlier section of this report. The consequence
calculations are based on the Source data supplied by M/s. Indian oil
corporation Ltd ,Gangai Kondan, Trinelveli ,Tamilandu.
10.3 Tabular reports and graphic plots are presented wherever appropriate.
The following incidents (Scenarios) are finalized based on the Hazard

Identification:
Consequences Report :-
11.0. MOST CREDIBLE WORST SCENERIOS CONSIDERED IN THE LPG BOTTLING PLANTS –
IOCL , GANGAIKONDAN ,TRINELVELI,TAMILNADU
PROPOSED ( 600 MT 3 Nos Mounded Bullette Storages ) SYSTEM
Sl Scenario Source Consequences Figure
no
1. Direct Source: 25 cubic meters/sec Source Threat Modeled: Flammable
600 MT Mounded Height: 12 meters Area of Vapor Cloud
bullet Source State: Gas Model Run: Heavy Gas
Source Temperature: equal to ambient Red : 487 meters --- (10800
SRV Release for Source Pressure: 6 atmospheres ppm = 60% LEL = Flame
5 Minutes Release Duration: 5 minutes Pockets)
Release Rate: 20,700 kilograms/min Yellow: 1.5 kilometers ---
UVCE Total Amount Released: 103,349 kilograms (1800 ppm = 10% LEL)
2. 600 MT Mounded Direct Source: 25 cubic meters/sec Source Threat Modeled: Flammable
bullet Height: 12 Area of Vapor Cloud
Source State: Gas Model Run: Heavy Gas
SRV Release for Source Temperature: equal to ambient Red : 487 meters --- (10800 FIGURE-1
15 minutes Source Pressure: 6 atmospheres ppm = 60% LEL = Flame
Release Duration: 15 minutes Pockets)
UVCE Release Rate: 20,700 kilograms/min Yellow: 1.5 kilometers ---
Total Amount Released: 310,046 kilograms (1800 ppm = 10% LEL)
3. 600 MT Mounded Direct Source: 25 cubic meters/sec Source Threat Modeled: Overpressure
bullet Height: 0 (blast force) from vapor cloud
Source State: Gas explosion
SRV Release for Source Temperature: equal to ambient Type of Ignition: ignited by
15 minutes Source Pressure: 6 atmospheres spark or flame
Release Duration: 15 minutes Level of Congestion: congested
Blast Over Release Rate: 20,700 kilograms/min Model Run: Heavy Gas
Pressure Total Amount Released: 310,046 kilograms Red : LOC was never
exceeded --- (8.0 psi =
destruction of buildings)
Orange: 366 meters --- (3.5 psi
= serious injury likely)
Yellow: 489 meters --- (1.0 psi
= shatters glass)
4. 600 MT Mounded Direct Source: 25 cubic meters/sec Source Threat Modeled: Overpressure FIGURE-2
bullet Height: 12 meters (blast force) from vapor cloud
Source State: Gas explosion
SRV Release for Source Temperature: equal to ambient Type of Ignition: ignited by
15 minutes Source Pressure: 9 atmospheres spark or flame
Release Duration: 5 minutes Level of Congestion: congested
Blast Over Release Rate: 32,800 kilograms/min Model Run: Heavy Gas
Pressure Total Amount Released: 164,078 kilograms Red : LOC was never
Orange: 477 meters --- (3.5 psi
= serious injury likely)
Yellow: 617 meters --- (1.0 psi
= shatters glass)
5. 600 MT Mounded Direct Source: 25 cubic meters/sec Source Model Run: Heavy Gas FIGURE-3
bullet Height: 12 meters Red : 437 meters --- (19000
Source State: Gas ppm = PAC-3)
SRV Release for Source Temperature: equal to ambient Orange: 1.3 kilometers ---
15 minutes at Source Pressure: 9 atmospheres (3200 ppm = PAC-2)
9 atm Release Duration: 5 minutes Yellow: 1.4 kilometers ---
Release Rate: 32,800 kilograms/min (3000 ppm = PAC-1)
LPG Vapor Total Amount Released: 164,078 kilograms
dispersion threat THREAT AT POINT:
POINT
Concentration Estimates at
the point:
Downwind: 500 meters
Off Centerline: 2 meters
Max Concentration:
Outdoor: 15,500 ppm
Indoor: 10,100 ppm
6. 600 MT Mounded Leak from short pipe or valve in Threat Modeled: Thermal
bullet horizontal cylindrical tank radiation from jet fire
Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes Red : 62 meters --- (10.0
SRV Release for from tank kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal
60 minutes Tank Diameter: 6.5 meters Tank within 60 sec)
Length: 27.8 meters Orange: 86 meters --- (5.0
JET FIRE FROM Tank Volume: 923 cubic meters kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns
THE SRV PIPE Tank contains liquid Internal within 60 sec)
LINE Temperature: 32° F Yellow: 132 meters --- (2.0
Chemical Mass in Tank: 600 tons Tank is kW/(sq m) = pain within 60 sec)
94% full
Circular Opening Diameter: 4 inches THREAT AT POINT:
Opening is 6.50 meters from tank bottom Thermal Radiation Estimates
Max Flame Length: 39 meters at the point:
Burn Duration: limited the duration to 1 hour Downwind: 70.7 meters
Max Burn Rate: 2,230 kilograms/min Off Centerline: 182 meters
Total Amount Burned: 132,246 kilograms Max Thermal Radiation:
Note: The chemical escaped from the tank 0.836 kW/(sq m)
and burned as a jet fire.
7. Leak from short pipe in horizontal cylindrical THREAT ZONE:
ROAD TANKER tank Threat Modeled: Flammable
18 MT – Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not Area of Vapor Cloud
Temperature burning) Model Run: Heavy Gas
gauge damaged Tank Diameter: 1.77 meters Tank Red : 102 meters --- (10800
Length: 11.4 meters ppm = 60% LEL = Flame
Threat for Tank Volume: 28 cubic meters Pockets)
UCVCE Tank contains liquid Internal Yellow: 309 meters --- (1800
Temperature: 32° C ppm = 10% LEL)
Chemical Mass in Tank: 15.1 tons Tank is
85% full THREAT AT POINT:
Circular Opening Diameter: 2 inches Concentration Estimates at
Opening is 0.71 meters from tank bottom the point:
Release Duration: 18 minutes Downwind: 500 meters
Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 1,040 Off Centerline: 2 meters
kilograms/min Max Concentration:
(averaged over a minute or more) Outdoor: 852 ppm
Total Amount Released: 13,242 kilograms Indoor: 734 ppm
Note: The chemical escaped as a mixture of
gas and aerosol (two phase flow).
8. ROAD TANKER Leak from short pipe or valve in horizontal THREAT ZONE:
18 MT – cylindrical tank Threat Modeled: Thermal
Temperature Flammable chemical is burning as it escapes radiation from jet fire
gauge damaged from tank Red : 20 meters --- (10.0
Tank Diameter: 1.77 meters Tank kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal
Threat for Length: 11.4 meters within 60 sec)
JET FIRE Tank Volume: 28 cubic meters Orange: 27 meters --- (5.0
Tank contains liquid Internal kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns
Temperature: 32° C within 60 sec)
Chemical Mass in Tank: 15.1 tons Tank is Yellow: 42 meters --- (2.0
85% full kW/(sq m) = pain within 60 sec)
Circular Opening Diameter: 1 inches
Opening is 0.71 meters from tank bottom THREAT AT POINT:
Max Flame Length: 11 meters Thermal Radiation Estimates
Burn Duration: ALOHA limited the duration at the point:
to 1 hour Downwind: 5 meters
Max Burn Rate: 265 kilograms/min Off Centerline: 1.5 meters
Total Amount Burned: 12,952 kilograms Max Thermal Radiation: 62.9
Note: The chemical escaped from the tank kW/(sq m)
and burned as a jet fire.
9. ROAD TANKER BLEVE of flammable liquid in horizontal THREAT ZONE: FIGURE-4
18 MT TANK cylindrical tank Threat Modeled: Thermal
UNDER Tank Diameter: 1.77 meters Tank radiation from fireball
Length: 11.4 meters Red : 305 meters --- (10.0
BLEVE Tank Volume: 28 cubic meters kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal
Tank contains liquid within 60 sec)
Internal Storage Temperature: 32° C Orange: 431 meters --- (5.0
Chemical Mass in Tank: 15.1 tons Tank is kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns
85% full within 60 sec)
Percentage of Tank Mass in Fireball: 100% Yellow: 671 meters --- (2.0
Fireball Diameter: 139 meters Burn kW/(sq m) = pain within 60 sec)
Duration: 10 seconds
THREAT AT POINT:
Thermal Radiation Estimates
at the point:
Downwind: 200 meters
Off Centerline: 1 meters
Max Thermal Radiation: 22.3
kW/(sq m)
10. ROAD TANKER Burning Puddle / Pool Fire Threat Modeled: Thermal
18 MT – Puddle Area: 150 square meters Puddle radiation from pool fire
Mass: 15 tons Red : 51 meters --- (10.0
for POOL FIRE Initial Puddle Temperature: -42.2° C kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal
Flame Length: 29 meters Burn within 60 sec)
Duration: 12 minutes Orange: 66 meters --- (5.0
Burn Rate: 1,150 kilograms/min kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns
Total Amount Burned: 13,608 kilograms within 60 sec)
Yellow: 93 meters --- (2.0
kW/(sq m) = pain within 60 sec)
11. ROAD TANKER Direct Source: 0.5 cubic meters/sec Source THREAT ZONE:
18 MT – SRV Height: 2 meters Threat Modeled: Flammable
RELEASE Source State: Liquid Area of Vapor Cloud
Source Temperature: equal to ambient Model Run: Heavy Gas
UVCE Release Duration: 1 minute Red : 443 meters --- (10800
Release Rate: 286 kilograms/sec ppm = 60% LEL = Flame
Total Amount Released: 17,165 kilograms Pockets)
Note: This chemical may flash boil and/or Yellow: 1.3 kilometers ---
result in two phase flow. (1800 ppm = 10% LEL)
12. LPG CYLINDER Direct Source: 0.47 kilograms/min Source Threat Modeled: Flammable
14.2 Kg Height: 0 Area of Vapor Cloud
UCVCE Release Duration: 30 minutes Model Run: Heavy Gas
Release Rate: 470 grams/min Red : 11 meters --- (10800
Total Amount Released: 14.1 kilograms ppm = 60% LEL = Flame
Note: This chemical may flash boil and/or Pockets)
result in two phase flow. Note: Threat zone was not
drawn because effects of near-
field patchiness
make dispersion predictions
less reliable for short distances.
Yellow: 11 meters --- (1800
ppm = 10% LEL)
Note: Threat zone was not
drawn because effects of near-
field patchiness
13. LPG CYLINDER Direct Source: 0.47 kilograms/min Source Threat Modeled: Overpressure
14.2 Kg Height: 0 (blast force) from vapor cloud
Blast over Release Duration: 30 minutes explosion
pressure Release Rate: 470 grams/min Type of Ignition: ignited by
Total Amount Released: 14.1 kilograms spark or flame
Note: This chemical may flash boil and/or Level of Congestion: congested
result in two phase flow. Model Run: Heavy Gas
Red : LOC was never
Orange: less than 10
meters(10.9 yards) --- (3.5 psi =
serious injury likely)
Yellow: 17 meters --- (1.0 psi =
shatters glass)
14. LPG Pump Direct Source: 800 liters/min Source Threat Modeled: Flammable
Release of 800 Height: 0 Area of Vapor Cloud
lit / min of LPG Source State: Liquid Model Run: Heavy Gas
for three Source Temperature: equal to ambient Red : 73 meters --- (10800
minutes. Release Duration: 3 minutes ppm = 60% LEL = Flame
Release Rate: 443 kilograms/min Pockets)
Total Amount Released: 1,329 kilograms Yellow: 236 meters --- (1800
Note: This chemical may flash boil and/or ppm = 10% LEL)
result in two phase flow.
15. LPG Compressor Direct Source: 5.9 cubic meters/min Source Threat Modeled: Flammable
Release of 65.77 Height: 0 Area of Vapor Cloud
CFM , release Source State: Gas Model Run: Heavy Gas
Source Temperature: equal to ambient Red : 41 meters --- (10800
Source Pressure: 10 atmospheres ppm = 60% LEL = Flame
Release Duration: 1 minute Pockets)
Release Rate: 2.32 kilograms/sec Note: Threat zone was not
Total Amount Released: 139 kilograms drawn because effects of near-
field patchiness
Yellow: 133 meters --- (1800
ppm = 10% LEL)
16. JET fire Flammable gas is burning as it escapes from Threat Modeled: Thermal
pipe radiation from jet fire
Pipeline Leak 6 Pipe Diameter: 6 inches Pipe Red : 37 meters --- (10.0
inch dia Length: 50 meters kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal
Gas pipe Line - Unbroken end of the pipe is connected to an within 60 sec)
Full bore failure infinite source Orange: 51 meters --- (5.0 FIGURE-5
Pipe Roughness: smooth Hole Area: kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns
28.3 sq in within 60 sec)
Pipe Press: 5 atmospheres Pipe Yellow: 79 meters --- (2.0
Temperature: 32° C kW/(sq m) = pain within 60 sec)
Flame Length: 22 meters
Burn Duration: ALOHA limited the duration
to 1 hour
Burn Rate: 1,270 kilograms/min
Total Amount Burned: 47,538 kilograms
17. Flash fire Flammable gas escaping from pipe (not Threat Modeled: Flammable
burning) Area of Vapor Cloud
Pipeline Leak 4 Pipe Diameter: 4 inches Pipe Model Run: Heavy Gas
inch -Full bore Length: 100 meters Red : 72 meters --- (10800
failure Unbroken end of the pipe is connected to an ppm = 60% LEL = Flame
infinite source Pockets)
Pipe Roughness: smooth Hole Area: Yellow: 233 meters --- (1800
12.6 sq in ppm = 10% LEL)
Pipe Press: 10 atmospheres Pipe
Temperature: 42° C
Release Duration: ALOHA limited the
duration to 1 hour
Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 449
kilograms/min
(averaged over a minute or more)
Total Amount Released: 26,765 kilograms
18. Flammable gas is burning as it escapes from Threat Modeled: Thermal
pipe radiation from jet fire
Pipe Diameter: 4 inches Pipe Red : 10 meters --- (10.0
Length: 100 meters kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal
JET FIRE Unbroken end of the pipe is closed off within 60 sec)
Pipe Roughness: smooth Hole Area: Orange: 10 meters --- (5.0
Pipeline Leak 1 sq in kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns
thro 1 sq inch Pipe Press: 10 atmospheres Pipe within 60 sec)
hole in the 4 inch Temperature: 42° C Yellow: 16 meters --- (2.0
dia Vapor line Max Flame Length: 4 meters Burn kW/(sq m) = pain within 60 sec)
Duration: 2 minutes
Max Burn Rate: 99.4 kilograms/min
Total Amount Burned: 14.8 kilograms
12.0 Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Index (FETI) Approach
There are a number of hazard indices, which have been developed for various
purposes. The most widely used hazard index is the Dow chemical Company’s Fire and
Explosion Index. This hazard index is commonly known as the Dow’s Index or F & EI
(Fire & Explosion Index). The index is calculated using the loss potential of various
chemicals stored in the facility. It is a number, which indicates damage potential due to
the fire, and explosion of a particular unit and
comparison is based on numerical value that represents the relative level of significance
of each hazard.
12.1 Introduction
Hazard potential prevailing in a typical chemical process plant has attracted the
attention of several investigators who have attempted to devise means of classifying,
categorizing/indexing chemicals based on their flammability, toxicity, reactivity and
instability. FETI involves objective evaluation of the realistic fire, explosion, toxicity and
reactivity potential of process and/or storage units. The quantitative methodology relies
on the analysis based on historic loss data, the energy potential of the chemical under
study and the extent to which loss prevention measures are already applied. FETI is
primarily designed for operation involving storage, handling and processing of
flammable, combustible and reactive materials. It can also be used for analyzing
pipeline networks, boiler installations and certain elements of power plants.
12.2 Objective of FETI
The basic objectives that characterize FETI are:-
Identification of equipment within the plant that would contribute to the initiation or
escalation of an incident. Quantification and classifications of the expected damage
potential of fire, explosion and toxicity incidents in realistic terms.
12.3. FETI Methodology
The various factors involved in the calculation of this index are:
• Material factor
• General Process Hazard
• Special Process Hazard
The Material Factor (MF) is a measure of the energy potential of the most
hazardous material or mixture of materials present in the unit in sufficient quality actually
to present a hazard. The MF is a number in the range from 1 to 40 and is determined
using flammability and reactivity properties. The solid cargo proposed to be handled at
the terminal has not been classified under hazardous material category.
F & FI = MF X F3
12.4 Fire & Explosion Index (FEI)
The FEI value for each chemical is calculated from MF and F3 value. The degree
of hazard potential is identified based on the numerical value of FEI as per the criteria
given below:
FEI Range Degree of Hazard
0 – 65 Light
65 – 95 Moderate
95 & Above Severe
12.5 Toxicity Index (TI) – Not Applicable to LPG Handling
The toxicity index is primarily based on the index figures for health hazards
established by the NFPA in codes NFPA 704, NFPA 49 and NFPA 325m. The NFPA
figures are translated into a toxicity factor, in accordance to the following criteria-
NFPA Index Figure Toxicity

0 0
1 50
2 125
3 250
4 325
In addition, the toxicity factor has to be corrected for the Maximum Allowable
Concentration (MAC) value of the toxic substance by adding a penalty, which is
MCA-ppm Penalty
<5 125
5 – 50 75
> 50 50
assigned according to the following criteria:
12.6 Classification of Hazard Categories:
By comparing the indices FEI and TI, the unit in question is classified into one of
Category FEI TI
Light < 65 <6
Moderate 65-95 6-10
Severe >95 >10
the following three categories established for the purpose.
Certain basic minimum preventive and protective measures are recommended for the
three hazard categories.
12.7 Results of FETI
The various materials employed in the plant and their properties are listed in
Table . The vulnerable storage and process facilities identified within the complex are
LPG and High Speed Diesel (HSD) as details of FETI for various storage units are
given in Table 12.8 and the vulnerability of various units are listed in Table 12.90
12.8 Properties of Materials Employed
Name of Quantity Toxicity

Chemicals (TLV) Flammability Reactivity
LPG 3 x 600 MT 1000 PPM Flammable No reaction

,Mounded
storages
HSD 20 KL , Above 5 mg/m3 Flammable No reaction
ground
FETI Calculation Table 12.90
INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD ,
LPG BOTTLING PLANT ,Gangaikondan,Trinelveli
DOW FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX DATA SHEET FOR LIQUIFIED PETROLEUM GAS (LPG )
Sl Penalty factor
no Factors Penalty Factor Range Used
1 General Process Hazard
Base factor 1.00 1.00
A Exothermic Chemical reactions 0.3 to 1.25 0
B Endothermic chemical ractionss 0.2 to 1.4 0
C Material Handling and transfer 0.25 to 1.05 0.5
D Enclosed / Indoor Process units 0.25 to 0.9 0.6
E Access 0.2 to 0.35 0.2
F Draingae and Spill control 0.25 to 05 0.5
General Process Hazards Factor -- F1 ………………………………………………………….. 2.80
2 Special Process Hazards
Base factor 1.00
A Toxic materials 0.2 to 0.8 0.1
B Sub atmospheric pressure ( < 500 mm Hg ) 0.5 0
Operation in or near Flammable range
C Inerted ____ not inerted ___ 0
1.Tank farms storage flammable liquids 0.5 0
2.Process upset or Purge failure 0.3 0.3
3.Always in flammable range 0.8 0.8
D Dust Explsion ( See table 3 ) 0.25 to 2 0.1
Pressure ( See Fgure 2 )
E Operating Pressure ____142_psi____ (PSIg or Kpa )
Relief Setting __________213 Psi___ (PSIg or Kpa) 0.429
F Low temperature 0.2 to 0.3 0.2
Qualntity of Flammable and Unstable Material Quantity
G 1800,000 Kg (Lb or Kg ) ,
Hc = 11400 Kcal /Kg (BTU / Lb or Kcal /Kg ) 0
1.Liquids or Gases in process ( See Figure 3 ) 0
2.Liquids or Gases in storages ( See Figure 4 ) 0.5
3.Combustible soilds in storage , Dust in Proess ( See Figure 5 ) 0
H Corrosion and Errosion 0.1 to 0.75 0.2
I Leakage - Joints and Packaging 0.1 to 1.5 0.5
J Use of Fired Equipment ( See Figure 6 ) 0
K Hot oil Heat Exchange System ( See table 5 ) 0.15 to 1.15 0
L Rotating Equipment 0.5 0.5
Special PROCESS HAZARDS FACTOR F2 …………………………………………………………………… 4.63
Process unit Hazard Factor F3 = F1 X F2 ………………………………………………………………… 12.9612
MATERIAL FACTOR ( MF ) From Table 1 ………………………………… 21
FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX (MF X F3 ) …………………………………. 272

RISK LEVEL SEVERE
12.91. EFFECT MODEL APPROACH
FOR PROPOSED LPG STORAGE FACILITIES
MORTALITY INDEX CALCULATIONS
Marshall Equation : MI = PD * Q -0.33
MI – Mortality Index ( Number of fatalities per Tonne of Explosive
PD – Population Density
Q – Quantity LPG in Tonne
For the IOCL Facility
The storage capacity is 3 x 600 MT = 1800 MT
Assumption : Out of 1800 MT , 20 % of the LPG Vapor is favorable

for Explosion and Hence the quantity reduced to 360 MT.
PD = As per the Sensex 2011 ( Gangaikondan Population = 10500

Persons , out of which 10 Km2 is covered by SIPCOT Complex
and hence the population density is taken as 5 % of the total
people residing around 5 Km radius of the facility .
PD = 52.5 Persons / Sq.KM
Probable total number of deaths calculated is 7 to 10 Persons

(without Fire Protection Protections measures) if Safety credit
factors are used then number of deaths will be significantly
controlled to very minimum.
10.0 QRA RECOMMENDATIONS
10.1 Recommendations
Sl no Recommendations
1) As per the Risk contour map for the LPG relief from SRV is to be considered as a
major accident with the jet fire radiation distance of 150 Meters from the
storages and hence Necessary onsite mock drill to be planned and conducted
periodically.
2) Effectiveness of the Fire and Explosion mitigation measures shall be

periodically measured , recorded and reviewed.
3) Necessary first aid measures to be adopted and followed for the persons who
affected during fire / explosion emergency situations as a life saving measure in
the site itself.
4) LPG Truck Unloading Shed Slope Shall be maintained in such a way that
LPG Liquid causing Unconfined vapor cloud Explosion will be drained outside
the periphery of the Trucks.
5) LPG pump house monorail resting on the steel columns of the roof system -
adequate structural stability shall be ensured.
6) Vapor line to the mounded storages requires proper rigid support .
7) Mounded storage manifold pipes shall be properly clamped with rigid supports.
8) Emergency Access road from Cylinder filling shed to Emergency gate to be
provided
9) Wooden packing is used in the LPG main Pipe line from the mounded storage
shall be removed
10) TLD – Bay number 7 , Water spry nozzle to be fixed 5 inch away from the bay so
that damage could be Prevented.
11) As the Fire & Explosion Index for the Facility is Severe in the calculations ,
necessary Fire and Explosion protection measures shall always be ensured.
12) Offsite mock drill have to be conducted in consultation with district DRO and
Directorate of Industrial Safety and Health ( DISH ) Tamilnadu.
IV. Acknowledgements
This study has been carried out by
Indian Oil corporation Ltd , Tirunelveli LPG Bottling Plant, SIPCOT Industrial
Growth Centre, Gangaikondan Village, Tirunelveli Taluk And District, Tamil
Nadu - We would like to take this opportunity to extend our thanks to General
Manager –Operations – Plant , Deputy General Manager – Engineering ,
Manager –Projects , Safety officer , Employees who co-operated in supporting the
data Collections and information required, thus maximizing the effectiveness of
the study. The study identified the hazards and analysed the consequences of
potential accident scenarios .The above study results , conclusions and
recommendations were based on the information made available to us .
Green Global Safety Systems exercised all reasonable skill , care and diligence in
carrying out the study . However , this report should not be deemed as any
undertaking , warranty or certificate and cannot be challenged in any court of law
of the country .
The Courtesy and Cordiality extended by Indian Oil corporation Ltd , Triuneveli
LPG Bottling Plant, SIPCOT Industrial Growth Centre, Gangaikondan Village,
Tirunelveli, to our Green Global Safety System employees is appreciable.
M.Meganathan.,ME.,MIE.,DIS.,BOC.,Ph.D Scholar BBS
Trained and Experienced hazard analysis leader
by china Risk Management Solutions, China
Accredited Safety Auditor by Government of Tamilnadu &
Chartered Engineer –Chemical
Place : Chennai Date : 15-03-2015
V. References
As per the Guidelines of IS 15656 : 2006( Hazard Identification and Risk
Analysis )
Consequence Analysis of chemical Releases , Center for Chemical Process
safety , US .
Use of Vapor cloud Dispersion models , II nd Edition , Center for Chemical
Process safety , US .
guidelines for evaluating the characteristics of vapor cloud explosions, flash
fires, andbleves center for chemical process safety of the American institute of
chemical engineers 345 east 47 street, new york, ny 10017
Process and Instrumentation diagrams of LPG Bottling plant ,IOCL-BP-
Tirunelveli.
Material Safety Data sheets of LPG
Design details of the Piping and fittings in the LPG
VI. ANNEXURES
List of Drawings attached
SL Contour Maps
NO
1)
600 MT Mounded bullet SRV Release for 5 Minutes UVCE
2) 600 MT Mounded bullet ,SRV Release for 15 minutes UVCE
3) 600 MT Mounded bullet SRV Release for 15 minutes at 6 atm

Blast Over Pressure
4) 600 MT Mounded bullet SRV Release for 15 minutes at 9 atm Blast Over
Pressure
5) 600 MT Mounded bullet SRV Release for 15 minutes at 9 atm

LPG Vapor dispersion threat
6)
Road Tanker 18 Mt – Temperature Gauge Damaged Threat For Ucvce
7) Road Tanker 18 Mt – Temperature Gauge Damaged Threat For Jet Fire
8) Road Tanker 18 Mt Tank Under Bleve
9) Road Tanker 18 Mt – For Pool Fire

10) Road Tanker 18 Mt – Srv Release Uvce
11) Lpg Cylinder 14.2 Kg Ucvce
12) Lpg Cylinder 14.2 Kg Blast Over Pressure
13) LPG Pump Release of 800 lit / min of LPG for three minutes.
14) LPG Compressor Release of 65.77 CFM , release
Modes of Material Releases From Pipeline Sections:
Failure and mode Cause

Hair line crack - Construction failure
- Material failure
- Corrosion
Small hole - Construction failure

- Material failure
- Corrosion
- Mechanical damage by working close to the pipeline
Large hole - Landslide/upheaval

- Mechanical damage by working close to the pipeline
- Stress corrosion
Rupture - Landslide/upheaval
- Mechanical damage by working close to the
pipeline.
Welding leak - Construction failure

- Material failure
- Assemble failure
- Wrong welding material used
DATA REFERED FOR FREQUENCY OF FAILURE
Sl No. Item Failure Frequency
1 SHELL FAILURE
Process/ pressure vessel/Shell Failure 3/106 years
Pressurized storage vessel/Shell Failure 1//106 years
Refrigerated Storage Tank Shell Failure 0.3/106 years
2 FULL BORE VESSEL CONNECTION FAILURE
25mm dia.
40mm dia. 30/106 years
80mm dia. 7.5/106 years
100 mm dia. 5/106 years
3/106 years
3 FULL BORE PROCESS PIPELINE
D< 50mm 0.3/106 years
50<d<150mm 0.09/106 years
d>150 0.03/106 years
4 LPG FILLING MACHINE LOADING ARM 4/106/hr of operation

FAILURE
5 OTHER HOSE / ARM FAILURE 4/105/hr of operation
6 ARTICULATED LOADING/UNLOADING 0.5/106/hr of operation

GASKET FAILURE
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN
INDIANOIL CORPORATION LIMITED,

INDANE BOTTLING PLANT,
TIRUNELVELI
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND DISASTER

MANAGEMENT PLAN
(ERDMP)
Indian Oil Corporation Limited

(Marketing Division)
Indane Bottling Plant,

SIPCOT Industrial Growth Centre
Gangaikondan-627 352
Tirunelveli Dist.,Tamil Nadu
Ph: 0462-2445133, 2445233
Revision No. 0 Date: 01.06.2015 ERDMP Page 1 of 315


TIRUNELVELI
REVISION CONTROL SHEET
Rev.No. Date Page Clause No. Description

No.


TIRUNELVELI
Table of Contents
Chapter Contents Page No.

Introduction 6-23
Chapter-1
Terms & Definitions, List of Abbreviations 24-30
Chapter-2
(as per Clause No 2.0 of PNGRB regulations)
Applicability 31-32
Chapter-3
Scope & Intent 33-35
Chapter-4
Contents of ERDMP 36-37
Chapter–5
Classification of Emergencies 38-46
Chapter-6
ERDMP implementation Schedule 47-48
Chapter-7
Consequences of default or non-compliance 49-52
Chapter-8
(as per Clause No. of 8.0 of PNGRB regulations)
Compliance with other Statutes 53-56
Chapter-9
Chapter- Pre-Emergency Planning 57-107
10 (as per Clause No 10.0 of PNGRB regulations)
Chapter- Emergency Mitigation Measures 108-182
Chapter- Emergency Preparedness Measures 183-192
Chapter- Emergency Response Procedures & Measures 193-198
Chapter- Emergency Organization & Responsibilities 199-215
Chapter- Infrastructure 216-220
Chapter- Declaration of On-Site & Off-Site Emergency 221-227
Chapter- Resources for Controlling Emergency 228-236
Demographic Information 237-239
Chapter-
18


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Chapter- Medical Facilities 240-242

Chapter- Evacuation 243-247
Chapter- Information to Public 248-251
Roles & Responsibilities of Stakeholders 252-261
Chapter-
including external agencies
22
Chapter- Reporting of Incident 262-266
Chapter- Action after reporting of Incident by the entity 267-268
Chapter- Termination of Emergency 269-270
Chapter- Emergency Recovery Procedures 271-276
Chapter- ERDMP Road Transportation 277-288
Chapter- Integration of ERDMP with NDMP 289-299


TIRUNELVELI
APPENDIX
Reference
Sr. No. Description Page No.
Clause No.
Checklist Hazard Identification Clause No. 10.1 300-303
1 (d)
Checklist Incident Prevention Clause No. 11.3 304-305
2 Measures (xii)
Checklist Mutual Aid/Mock Drills Clause No. 12.1 306-307
3 (i)
Checklist ERDMP Response Clause No. 13.0 308-309
4 Measures/ Infrastructure
Checklist Review and Updating of Clause No. 14.2.1 310-310
5 ERDMP (a)
Checklist Availability of Resources Clause No. 17.0 311-312
6 (Internal /External) (5)
Checklist ERDMP Recovery Measures Clause No. 26.0 313-315
7 (2)


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 1
Introduction
(As per Clause No 1.0 of PNGRB Notification Dated 18 th January 2010)


TIRUNELVELI
1.0 Introduction
1.1 Incorporated as Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. on 1st September, 1964

Indian Oil and its subsidiaries account for approximately 48% petroleum
products market share, 34% national refining capacity and 71%
downstream sector pipelines capacity in India. It is India’s flagship
national oil company and downstream petroleum major thus being
India’s largest commercial enterprise.
1.2 As the flagship national oil company in the downstream sector, Indian
Oil reaches precious petroleum products to millions of people every day
through a countrywide network of about 35,000 sales points. They are
backed for supplies by 167 bulk storage terminals and depots, 101
aviation fuel stations, and 89 Indane (LPG) bottling plants.
The Indian Oil Group of companies owns and operates 10 of India's

20 refineries with a combined refining capacity of 60.2 million metric tons
per annum (MMTPA, .i.e. 1.2 million barrels per day). These include two
refineries of subsidiary Chennai Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
The Corporation's cross-country network of crude oil and product

pipelines, spanning over 10,000 km and the largest in the country, meets
the vital energy needs of the consumers in an efficient, economical and
environment-friendly manner.
1.3 As a leading public sector enterprise of India, Indian Oil has

successfully combined its corporate social responsibility agenda with its
business offerings, meeting the energy needs of millions of people
everyday across the length and breadth of the country, traversing a
diversity of cultures, difficult terrains and harsh climatic conditions.
2.0 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION
2.1 LOCATION:
Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli is located in SIPCOT Industrial Area at

Gangaikondan in Tirunelveli District of Tamil Nadu State. It is located
adjacent to NH-7 which connects Varanasi & Kanyakumari and 18 KM
from Tirunelveli city. The LPG Bottling Plant covers about 42 acres of land.
The nearest railway station is situated at Gangaikondan at a distance of
4KM(E).The nearest Airport is situated at Tuticorin at a distance of 33.55


TIRUNELVELI
KM(SW). The ground water is available at a depth of 60 M. The site is

conducted by road only. Site map is attached below,
2.2 Geological Settings:
The area is plain area with an altitude of around 56.7 m above MSL. The
geological formation is disintegrated soft rock.
2.3 TOPOGRAPHY :
The site is bounded by

East - Vacant land
West - Nova carbon Factory
North - Vacant land
South -30 ft road


TIRUNELVELI
The land is a plain area with average level of 76 an altitude of around

56.7 m above mean sea level (MSL). The site lies in Latitude 8º
49’50.10”N and Longitude 77º 44’41.27”E.
2.4 Soil Profile:
The area is Brownish red, Lateritic soil on top for 0.7m thickness followed
by Dark grey, fine to medium coarse Grains, Very Dense, Completely
weathered Rock, Descent from Khondalite and charnockite Rock
appearing at depth varying from 1.0 to 3.1m below ground level , Dark
grey, Medium to coarse Grains, moderately weathered Rock, Descent
from Khondalite and charnockite Rock at depth varying from 3.1m to 5m
and Dark grey, medium to coarse Grains, fresh Khondalite and
charnockite Rock at depth varying from 5m to 6 below ground level. The
safe bearing capacity the soil is about 30 MT sq.mtr.
2.6 Water Resources:
The location is facilitated with 3 nos. of bore wells also SIPCOT is making
adequate and large scale water supply scheme for this industrial area.
The ground water is available at a depth of 60 M.
2.7 Land Use:
The LPG Bottling Plant is located in Industrial Growth Centre,

Gangaikondan – SIPCOT which is located at about 18 KMs from Tirunelveli
in a village called Gangaikondan at an area of 2073.86 acres. As on
January 2013 there are 13 units functioning at an area of 174.87 acres
and 8 units are under construction at about 594.38 acres in
Gangaikondan growth Centre.
3.0 DEMOGRAPHY DETAILS
3.1 Demography:
Male Population in Gangaikondan : 5,332
Female Population in Gangaikondan : 4,922
Total Population in Gangaikondan : 10,254


TIRUNELVELI
4.0 METEROLOGICAL DATA:

4.1 Meteorological Data:
Maximum Temperature - 48o C
Minimum Temperature - 28o C
Wind Speed:
Relative Humidity (%) - 35% (Min) & 92% (Max)
Average Wind Velocity - 4.5- 6.0 m/sec
Predominant wind Direction - NE
Floods - Nil
4.2 Climate:
The climate of the study area is agreeable. The district enjoys a sub
tropical climate. The period from April to June is generally hot and dry.
The weather is pleasant during the period from November to January. The
climate of the district may be described as essentially equatorial-oceanic
type with sunny days and cool nights. Over the greater part of the
district, summers are languorously warm followed by rainfall in north east
monsoon.
Generally, the following four seasons are applicable to Tirunelveli district.
1.Hot Weather Season

2. South-west Monsoon- Not observed due to location of Tirunelveli in rain
shadow area.
4. North-east Monsoon- October November December- average rainfall-
175mm
Tirunelveli district receives an average rainfall of 175 mm. There are 53

(teriliaa) rainy days in the district on an average about 80% of annual
rainfall occurs during the north east monsoon period in Oct-Dec.
Base like ambient air quality status in the vicinity of the existing and
proposed project sites form an indispensable part of environmental impact
assessment studies. In view of variations in wind pattern and temperature
profiles with seasons, the base line studies for air environment carried out


TIRUNELVELI
through reconnaissance survey. The ambient air quality in this area is

very good.
Details of the Occupier/Management:
Occupier : Shri. V.M.Sundar

Senior Plant Manager
Address Office : Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.,

Indane Bottling Plant
SIPCOT Industrial Growth Center
Tirunelveli, Tamilnadu.
Contact Details
Phone Office : 0462-2445133, 2445233
Telecum Fax : 0462-2445133
Mobile No. : 09444904133

Email id : vsundar@indianoil.in
Alternate In Charge: Shri. M. Sivasankara Muthuvel

Deputy Manager (Plant)
Address Office : Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.,
Indane Bottling Plant
SIPCOT Industrial Growth Center
Tirunelveli, Tamilnadu.
Contact Details
Phone Office : 0462-2445133, 2445233
Telecum Fax : 0462-2445133
Mobile No. : 09443131008

Email id : muthuvelms@indianoil.in


TIRUNELVELI
5.0 Description of Facilities and Process:
Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. is

situated near at Gangaikondan, Tirunelveli District, in Tamil Nadu. The
core activities of the Plant are Receipt of Bulk LPG through tank trucks,
Storage, Bottling and Despatch of LPG in cylinders.
Receipt: IOCL Indane Bottling plant, Tirunelveli receives product through
Bulk Trucks from IPPL, CPCL & MRPL, which are Unloaded at Tank lorry
Decantation area.
Storage: The products are stored in Mounded Storage Bullet of capacity
3X600 MT(1800 MT), which is first of its kind.
Bottling: Bottling of 14.2 Kg & 19 kg –2X24 FM Electronic Carousel of
KOSEL make, which is also first of its kind.
Delivery: IOCL Tirunelveli Bottling Plant plays a crucial role in the
distribution of packed 14.2 kg & 19 Kg Indane cylinders to Deep South of
Tamil Nadu i.e Tirunelveli, Tuticorin, Nagarkoil and Kanyakumari.
The Plant is located at a distance of 33.55 KM from Tuticorin Airport and 4
km from nearest Railway Station (Gangaikondan).
LPG being flammable and can catch fire if exposed to ignition; facilities
and Operations of the Plant are designed and maintained to prevent any
incidence of fire. All electrical facilities in the plant are designed as Flame
Proof/ Intrinsically Safe as per IS -5572 & OISD- 113. Cylinder Trucks/
Bulk Trucks are allowed to enter the Plant with spark arrestors only.
Earthing system is provided to dissipate static electrical charges to
eliminate the chances of spark during product handling. Precautions are
taken during execution of maintenance and project works involving
welding, cutting, grinding or any other action that can generate spark.
Plant is well equipped with,


TIRUNELVELI
 Three nos of Fire Engines, each of 615 Cu.m/hr capacity.

 Fire Water Storage – 3 X 2500 KL capacity
 Fire Water Ring Main System, with 44 nos of Monitors (144
Cu.m. /hr capacity), 26 nos of double headed hydrants.
 10 nos. of MCPs/6 nos. of ETBs are situated at strategic
locations
 Filling cum empty cylinder shed, Filled cylinder storage shed,
TLD, CR shed, Mounded Bullet Area covered with Medium
Velocity Sprinkler System of 10.2 LPM/Sq.m & LPG Pump
House with 20.4 LPM/Sq.m. water spray density.


TIRUNELVELI
5.1 Various Activities at Tirunelveli Bottling Plant

Flow chart of LPG plant activities attached,
PROCESS FLOW CHART OF LPG BOTTLING PLANT
Plant Activities – Flow chart
Bulk receipt through Empty Cylinders New Cylinders

tankers through Trucks
Unloading into Bullets Empty Cylinders ST/HR

Stores Inspection,
Washing,Drying, Cap
Cylinders
Removal, ‘O’-Ring Repairer
Filling station Check Paint if Purging
Needed, ST DUE/HR
Check
Correction Scale
(ICU) Integrated Correction
Check Scale
Valve Leak & ‘O’ Ring

Leak Detector Valve Change
without Evacuation
Safety Cap Fixing
Body Leak Test
Sealing Rejection for

Destruction
Filled Cylinders
Dispatch


TIRUNELVELI
5.2 Facilities:
5.2.1 Storage tank details, quantity & storing method:
The storage vessels have been provided with all necessary fittings, for
filling, emptying, vapour pressurization, draining facilities and measuring
devices like pressure & temperature gauges and level indicators. The
details are as follows:
Vessel
Flammabilit Capacity
Product
y Class MT
LPG C Mounded bullets 3X 600 MT
5.2.2 PMCC Facilities:

Sr. No. Equipment Detail Rating Qty Make
1VY02031400
VCB 12 kV 1 ABB
1043
GW549650 ACB 1600 A 1 L&T
GW546803 ACB 1600 A 1 L&T
4945 TRANSFORMER 1250 KVA 1 EMCO LTD.,
2265 TRANSFORMER 250 KVA 1 SHEPHERD
AX557949 ACB 1600 A 1 L&T
AX563499 ACB 800A 1 L&T
N14A030401 GENERATOR 750 KVA 1 STAMFORD
N14A050905 GENERATOR 250 KVA 1 STAMFORD
BHARAT
M1310111 WASHING UNIT-1 3.7 KW 1
BIJLEE
BHARAT
M1309614 WASHING UNIT-2 3.7 KW 1
BIJLEE


TIRUNELVELI
VALVE CHANGE
BHARAT
M1310593 WITHOUT 3.7 KW 1
EVACUATION
BIJLEE
MOTOR- carousel
1018577583 1.1 KW 1 WEG
drive-1
MOTOR- carousel
10101880219 1.1 KW 1 WEG
drive-2
1000332468 AIR COMPRESSOR-1 55KW 1 KIRLOSKAR
1000328943 AIR COMPRESSOR-2 55KW 1 KIRLOSKAR
SERVICE WATER CROMPTON

IQL10021 5.5KW 1
PUMP-1 GREAVES
SERVICE WATER CROMPTON
IQL10020 5.5KW 1
PUMP-2 GREAVES
AIR COMP. CROMPTON
NDA4J 0.75KW 1
COOLING TOWER GREAVES
LPG PH COOLING CROMPTON
BEA1F4J 0.75KW 1
TOWER GREAVES
K1408726 JOCKEY PUMP-1 15KW 1 BHARAT BIJLEE
K1408882 JOCKEY PUMP-2 15KW 1 BHARAT BIJLEE
SEC.AIR
130844 2.2KW 1 ELGI
COMPRESSOR-1
SEC.AIR
130869 2.2KW 1 ELGI
COMPRESSOR-2
CROMPTON
AEC15813 DIESEL PUMP-1 1.1KW 1
GREAVES
CROMPTON
AEC15812 DIESEL PUMP-2 1.1KW 1
GREAVES
CROMPTON
AED13054 SUMP-1 3.7KW 1
GREAVES
CROMPTON
AED13101 SUMP-2 3.7KW 1
GREAVES
CROMPTON
AE795088 DV LPG PUMP-1 45KW 1
GREAVES
CROMPTON
AE795089 DV LPG PUMP-2 45KW 1
GREAVES
LPG VAPOUR
L1309226 45KW 1 BHARAT BIJLEE
COMP-1
LPG VAPOUR
L1309225 45KW 1 BHARAT BIJLEE
COMP-2
COOLING WATER CROMPTON
AEG14438 5.5KW 1
PUMP-1 GREAVES


TIRUNELVELI
COOLING WATER CROMPTON

AEG14437 5.5KW 1
PUMP-2 GREAVES
STAY BEND CROMPTON
BEG2F4DJ 7.5KW 1
MACHINE GREAVES
M1309413 DEGASSING UNIT 7.5KW 1 BHARAT BIJLEE
CAROUSEL
M1309710 3.7KW 1 BHARAT BIJLEE
INTRODUCTION-1
CAROUSEL
INTRODUCTION-2
CAROUSEL
EJECTION-1
CAROUSEL
EJECTION -2
EVACUATION CROMPTON
BEG10F45 7.5KW 1
COMPRESSOR GREAVES
VAPOUR BLOWER-
1060632 11KW 1 ABB
1
VAPOUR BLOWER-
1044843 11KW 1 ABB
2
M1309936 PURGING UNIT 1.5KW 1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1310120 DRYER-1 3.7KW 1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1309616 DRYER-2 3.7KW 1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1310659 TCC-1 3.7KW 1 BHARAT BIJLEE


TIRUNELVELI
M1309977 TCB-1 2.2KW 1 BHARAT BIJLEE

M1309946
TCB-4 2.2KW 1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1309942
M1309931
M1309943
M1309955
M1309941
M1310202
1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1309685 MOTOR-DU-1 1.5 KW
1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1309686 MOTOR-DU-2 1.5 KW
1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1308519 MOTOR-DU-3 2.2 KW
1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1309113 MOTOR-DU-4 2.2 KW
1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1309692 MOTOR-DU-5 1.5 KW
1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1309128 MOTOR-DU-6 2.2 KW
1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1309134 MOTOR-DU-7 2.2 KW
1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1309429 MOTOR-DU-8 2.2 KW
1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1309439 MOTOR-DU-9 2.2 KW
1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1310598 MOTOR-DU-10 3.7 KW
1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1310599 MOTOR-DU-11 3.7 KW


TIRUNELVELI
1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1310601 MOTOR-DU-12 3.7 KW
1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1309617 MOTOR-DU-13 2.2 KW
1 BHARAT BIJLEE
M1309693 MOTOR-DU-14 1.5 KW
M1310602 1 BHARAT BIJLEE

MOTOR-DU-15 3.7 KW

MOTOR-DU-16 3.7 KW

MOTOR-DU-17 2.2 KW

MOTOR-DU-18 3.7 KW
MOTOR-DU-19 2.2 KW

MOTOR-DU-20 2.2 KW

MOTOR-DU-21 1.5 KW

MOTOR-DU-22 1.5 KW

MOTOR-DU-23 2.2 KW

MOTOR-DU-24 2.2 KW

MOTOR-DU-25 2.2 KW

MOTOR-DU-26 3.7 KW

MOTOR-DU-27 3.7 KW

MOTOR-DU-28 2.2 KW

MOTOR-DU-29 3.7 KW

MOTOR-DU-30 3.7 KW

MOTOR-DU-31 3.7 KW

MOTOR-DU-32 2.2 KW

MOTOR-DU-33 2.2 KW


TIRUNELVELI

MOTOR-DU-34 1.5 KW

MOTOR-DU-35 1.5 KW

MOTOR-DU-36 2.2 KW

MOTOR-DU-37 2.2 KW

MOTOR-DU-38 2.2 KW

MOTOR-DU-39 2.2 KW

MOTOR-DU-40 2.2 KW

MOTOR-DU-41 3.7 KW

MOTOR-DU-42 3.7 KW
5.2.3 Tank Lorry Decantation Shed:

Total of eight bay Tank Lorry Decantation Shed (TLD) has been
provided to transfer Bulk LPG from road tankers to the storage vessels
with loading facilities at 2 bays as per Explosives & OISD regulations.
All the strategic location/areas of the plant are covered with portable fire
extinguishers for tackling fires at their incipient stage. Two type of
extinguishers (DCP & CO 2) of different capacities (DCP-9 Kg, 75 Kg.),
(CO2 - 4.5 Kg) has been provided at plant area for instant use.
75 Kg 4.5 Kg
Name of Location 9 Kg DCP
DCP CO2
Stores 2
Canteen 3
S&D 0 2
Office 2
Main Gate 1
Fire Trolley 2 2
Filling shed 64 2
TLD shed 8 1


TIRUNELVELI
LPG Pump house 10 1

Bullet 7 1
Fire Pump house 2 1
PMCC 0 10
Total 101 5 15
Additional Features at Strategic locations

1. Manual Call Points - 10 nos
2. Hand Siren - 08 nos
3. ETB - 06 nos
4. Automated ROVs - 11 nos
5. Gas Monitoring System (No. of sensors) - 35 nos
6. Electrically operated fire sirens - 01 nos
7. Portable Mega Phone - 01 nos
8. Red/Green Flags - 02 sets
9. Bore wells - 03 nos
10.Sprinkler System - All area
11.10 kg DCP fire extinguishers - 101 nos
12.75 Kg DCP fire extinguishers - 05 nos
13.Co2 type fire extinguishers - 15 nos
14.Fire Hoses (15 m length) - 65 nos
15.Jet Nozzles - 28 nos
16.Universal Nozzle - 02 nos
17.Water Curtain Nozzle - 02 nos
18.Fire Hydrant Monitors - 44 nos
19.Sand Buckets - 08 nos
20.Water Gel Blanket - 02 nos
21.First Aid Box with medicines - 04 nos
22.Safety Helmet - 50 nos
23.Breathing Apparatus - 01 nos
24.Resuscitator - 01 nos
25.Explosimeter - 02 nos
26.Stretchers - 02 nos
27.Fire Proximity Suit - 01 nos
28.Rubber Hand Gloves for electrical safety - 02 pairs
29.Co2 cartridges for 10 kg DCP - 101 nos
30.DCP bags - 1010 kg
31.Fire Trolley - 01 nos


TIRUNELVELI
5.2.4.Contents of fire trolley:
S.N Item Quantity Description/S

o. pecification
1. 2 Hydrant hoses
of 15m for
connecting
Hydrant Hoses
them to
hydrant
monitors
2. 15 Safety PPEs
Helmets
3. 2 Fire fighting
Fire Extinguishers
equipment
4. Safety Belts 2 Safety PPEs
5. 2 Fire Fighting
Jet Nozzles
purpose
6. 2 For rescue
Stretchers
operation
7. Water Curtain 2 Fire Fighting
Nozzles purpose
8. 2 Fire Fighting
Universal Nozzles
purpose
9. 2 Fire Fighting
Spray Nozzles
purpose
10 SCABA with spare 1 Fire Fighting
cylinder purpose
11. 1 Fire Fighting
First aid box
purpose
12. 1 Fire Fighting
Water Gel Blanket
purpose
5.2.5 Telephones:
Following communication equipment’s are used for internal and external

communication at IOCL Tirunelveli Bottling Plant:
 Inter com Telephone

 Land Line
 Mobile Phones


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 Walkie- Talkies
 Megaphone
5.2.6 Walkie Talkie Sets:
Walkie Talkie Base station set is provided at Control Room with 9 nos of
handsets used for communication during operation inside licensed area/
during emergency.
5.2.7 Transport Facilities:
Adequate transport vehicles are provided for medical treatment,

evacuation and the movement of key persons. One emergency vehicle is
stationed at Plant premise- 24 Hrs.
Finance department shall take help from outside transport agencies for
mass evacuation of plant persons, if required.
5.2.8 Water Source :
Borewell : 3 Nos for daily service use and cylinder testing .

Bore Well capacity – 15 KL /Hr
Rain water harvesting tank: 500 KL capacity used for Fire water
requirement.


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 2
Terms & Definitions



TIRUNELVELI
Terms & Definitions (Clause No 2.0)
Terms & Definitions in this ERDMP document are same as given in

PNGRB Act & Regulations G.S.R. 39(E). Definitions are reproduced
below:
Definitions
(1) In this ERDMP document, unless the context otherwise requires
(a) “Act” means the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act,
2006;
(b) ‘‘Board” means the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board
established under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Act;
(c) “Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)” means the

violent rupture of a pressure vessel containing saturated liquid or
vapour at a temperature well above its atmospheric boiling point and
the resulting flash evaporation of a large fraction of the superheated
liquid which produces a large vapour cloud which burns in the form of a
large rising fireball due to ignition;
(d) “chief incident controller” means the person who assumes absolute
control of the unit and determines action necessary to control the
emergency;
(e) “codes of practice” means the codes of practice for emergency

response and disaster management plan notified by the Board;
(f) “disaster” means an occurrence of such magnitude as to create a

situation in which the normal patterns of life within an industrial
complex are suddenly disrupted and in certain cases affecting the
neighbourhood seriously with the result that the people are plunged into
helplessness and suffering and may need food, shelter, clothing, medical
attention protection and other life sustaining requirements;
(g) “disaster management plan“ means a well-coordinated,

comprehensive response plan to contain loss of life, property,
environment and provide speedy and effective recovery by making the
most effective use of available resources in case of a disaster;


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(h) “emergency” means a situation or scenario which has the potential

to cause serious danger to persons, environment or damage to property
and which tends to cause disruption inside or outside the premises and
may require the help of outside resources;
(i) “emergency response vehicle (ERV)” means a vehicle for handling

emergencies having necessary equipment meant for rescue and relief
operations and ERV can be put to use within installation, outside of
installation including road incident;
(j) “hazard” means an event related to the property of substance or

chemicals with a potential for human injury, damage to property,
damage to the environment, or some combination thereof;
(k) “incident” means an unplanned or unintended or intended event

having potential to cause damage to life, property and environment;
(l) “ incident record register” means a register containing complete

information pertaining to all incidents covering near miss, and all other
incidents leading to Level-I, Level-II and Level-III emergencies;
(m) “installation” means facilities, namely, gaseous product pipeline,

liquid Product pipeline, hydrocarbons processing installation, oil and
natural gas plants and commercial storage and transportation,
hydrocarbons gas bottling Installations including CNG, city gas
distribution facilities and retail outlets;
(n) “ leak” means release or discharge of a dangerous chemicals or

substances or material into the environment;
(o) “Level-I emergency” means an emergency as defined under sub

regulation 6 (a);
(p) “Level-II emergency” means an emergency as defined under sub

regulation 6 (b);
(q) “Level-III emergency” means an emergency as defined under sub

regulation 6 (c);


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(r) “Mutual aid association” means an industrial mutual aid association

in which participating industries as a community shall assist each other
in case of emergency. Mutual aid associations supplement a site’s
emergency control plan. Services of member industries shall be
requested only when the emergency threatens to exceed the capability
of otherwise available resources;
(s) "occupier” of an installation means the person who has ultimate

control over the affairs of the installation;
(t) “Off-site emergency” means an emergency that takes place in an

installation and the effects of emergency extends beyond the premises
or the emergency created due to an incident, catastrophic incidents,
natural calamities, etc. It no longer remains the concern of the
installation management alone but also becomes a concern for the
general public living outside and to deal with such eventualities shall be
the responsibilities of district administration
(u) “Off site emergency plan” means a response plan to control and
mitigate the effects of catastrophic incidents in above ground installation
(AGI) or underground installations (UGI) or road transportation. This
plan shall be prepared by the district administration based on the data
provided by the installation(s), to make the most effective use of
combined resources, i.e. internal as well as external to minimize loss of
life, property, environment and to restore facilities at the earliest;
(v) “On site emergency” means an emergency that takes place in an

installation and the effects are confined to the Installation premise’s
involving only the people working inside the Plants and to deal with such
eventualities is the responsibility of the occupier and is mandatory. It
may also require help of outside resources;
(w) “on site emergency plan” means a response plan to contain and
minimize the effects due to emergencies within the installations which
have a potential to cause damage to people and facilities within the
installation premises;
(x) “risk” means the chance of a specific undesired event occurring

within a specified period or in specified circumstances and it may be
either a frequency or a probability of a specific undesired event taking
place;


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(y) “risk analysis” means the identification of undesired events that

lead to the materialization of a hazard, the analysis of the mechanisms
by which these undesired events could occur and, usually, the
estimation of the extent, magnitude, and likelihood of any harmful
effects;
(z) “risk assessment” means the quantitative evaluation of the

likelihood of undesired events and the likelihood of harm or damage
being caused by them, together with the value judgments made
concerning the significance of the results;
(aa) “Risk management” means the program that embraces all

administrative and operational programs that are designed to reduce
the risk of emergencies involving acutely hazardous materials. Such
programs include, but are not limited to, ensuring the design safety of
new and existing equipment, standard operating procedures, preventive
maintenance, operator training, incident investigation procedures, risk
assessment for unit operations, emergency planning, and internal and
external procedures to ensure that these programs are being executed
as planned;
(ab) “Site incident controller” means the person who goes to the scene
of the emergency and supervises the actions necessary to overcome the
emergency at the site of the incident;
(ac) ‘Spill” means an unintended release or discharge of hydrocarbon or

any other dangerous liquid into the environment;
(ad) “transport emergency (TREM) card” means a card containing

details about the nature of hazards, protective devices, telephone
numbers and actions related to spillage, fire, first aid and other details
of national and international (UN) numbers or signage which is common
in India and abroad;
(ae) “ unconfined vapour cloud explosion (UVCE)” means the formation

of vapour cloud due to release of significant quantity of liquefied
hydrocarbons into the atmosphere and its explosion due to ignition
which may cause high over pressure and low pressure that cause very
heavy damage.


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(2) Words and expressions used and not defined in these regulations,
but defined in the Act or rules or regulations made there under, shall
have the meanings respectively assigned to them in this Act or in the
rules or regulation, as the case may be.
2.1 Abbreviations:
API - American Petroleum Institute

ASME - American Society of Mechanical Engineering
ASTM - American Society for Testing and Material
BLEVE - Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
CIC - Chief Incident Controller
CDM - Chemical Disaster Management
DHO - District Health Officer
DMI- Disaster Management Institute, Bhopal
ECO - Emergency Coordinating Officer
ERDMP - Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan
ESD- Emergency Shut down
ILSD- Interlock Shut Down
ERV - Emergency Response Vehicle
HAZCHEM - Hazardous Chemicals
HAZOP - Hazard & Operability Study
LPG- Liquefied Petroleum Gas
HSD - High Speed Diesel
HSE - Health, Safety and Environment
LFL - Lower Flammability Limit (same as LEL – Lower Explosive Limit)
LOPA - Layers of Protection Approach
MAH- Major Accident Hazard installation
MSDS- Material Safety Data Sheet
MSIHC- Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals
NDMA - National Disaster Management Authority
NDRF - National Disaster Response Force
OIC - Officer In- Charge
OISD- Oil Industry Safety Directorate
SRV- Safety Relief Valve
PAV- Pop-off Action Valve
HLA- High Level Alarm


TIRUNELVELI
ROV- Remote Operated Valve

MCP- Manual Call Point
MV Sprinkler System- Medium Velocity Sprinkler System
DCP- Dry Chemical Powder
PMCC- Power Motor Control Centre
QB- Quartzoid Bulb
PNGRB - Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board
SDRF - State Disaster Response Force
SDV- Shut down valve
SIC - Site Incident Controller
TREM - Transport Emergency Card
UVCE - Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion
ROU/ROW: Right of Way USE not included in the manual


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 3
Applicability


TIRUNELVELI
Applicability (Clause No 3.0)
This ERDMP is prepared based upon PNGRB regulations G.S.R. 39(E)

titled ‘Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (Codes of
Practices for Emergency Response and Disaster Management
Plan (ERDMP) Regulations, 2010’.
Clause No. 3 (e), of PNGRB regulations GSR 39 (E) are applicable for
ERDMP of IOCL, Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli. Emergency Response
and Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP) describes the organizational
structure, facilities, equipment, services and infrastructure necessary to
respond to the emergency, which could have on-site as well as off-site
implications at Receipt, Storage, Bottling and despatch points.
Emergency Response Plan covers all emergencies relating to Operation
& Maintenance, personnel, properties including serious accidents,
explosions, floods, fire and bomb threat etc.
This plan also applies to those Governmental Agencies that are

responsible for emergency response within the immediate area
surrounding the facilities and those agencies, organizations,
contractors, and facilities assisting Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli in
the event of an emergency. Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli shall
maintain liaison with concerned governmental agencies to ensure
proper understanding and interfaces regarding aspects of notification,
responsibilities of personnel and resources of state and local agencies to
be deployed in case of actual emergency situation.


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 4
Scope and Intent

(As per Clause No 4.0 of PNGRB Notification Dated 18th January 2010)


TIRUNELVELI
Scope and Intent (Clause No 4.0)
Scope
The Scope covers-
(i) the identification of emergencies;
(ii) the mitigation measures to reduce and eliminate the risk or
disaster;
(iii) the preparedness plans and actions when disaster or emergencies
occur;
(iv) the responses that mobilize the necessary emergency services
including responders like fire service, police service, medical
service, ambulance, government as well as non-governmental
agencies;
(v) the post disaster recovery with aim to restore the affected area to
its original conditions;
Intent
(a) Intent of this Emergency Response and Disaster

Management Plan (ERDMP) document is to formulate action plan
for all necessary functions that are required to be carried out
towards preparedness, response & management of emergencies. It
describes the emergency response organization, the resources
available (internal as well as external) and specific response
actions required for various types of emergencies that could occur
in IOCL Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli jurisdiction.
(b) ERDMP is not just to use as reference material for training.
(c) Objectives of Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan

(ERDMP) are:
(i) to prevent causalities-both on-site and off-site;

(ii) to reduce damage to property, machinery, public and
environment;
(iii) to develop a state of readiness for a prompt and orderly
response to an emergency and to establish a high order of
preparedness (equipment, personnel) commensurate with the
risk;
(iv) to provide an incident management organogram with clear
missions and lines of authority;


TIRUNELVELI
(v) to ensure an orderly and timely decision-making and response

process (notification, standard operating procedures);
(vi) to maintain good public relations;
In order to achieve the objectives of emergency planning, the critical

elements that form the backbone of the Emergency Response and
Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP) are:
i) Reliable and early detection of an emergency and careful

planning.
ii) The command, co-ordination and response organization structure
along with efficient trained personnel.
iii) Availability of resources for handling emergencies.
iv) Appropriate emergency response actions.
v) Effective notification and communication facilities.
vi) Regular review and updating of the Disaster Management Plan.
vii) Proper training of the concerned personnel.
viii)Liaison with civil Administration.
Imperatives of such a plan are to minimize the adverse effects of an

accident and restoration of normalcy at the earliest by providing
measures to contain the incident and limit the consequences.
Above objectives are sought to be achieved through following

measures:
i) Providing information to all concerned regarding consequences

of likely emergencies
ii) Warning and advising personnel & people likely to be affected
iii) Mobilizing on-site and off-site resources
iv) Calling up assistance from outside agencies
v) Initiating and organizing evacuation of affected people
vi) Providing necessary First aid and other medical services as
required
vii) Coordinating action taken by various agencies.


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 5
Contents of ERDMP


TIRUNELVELI
Contents of ERDMP. Clause No 5.0
Contents of this ERDMP documents have been listed under Table of

Contents. For better correlation, same Clause No’s have been retained in
the Contents as in PNGRB regulations G.S.R. 39(E).
(a) Classification of emergencies;

(b) Implementation schedule;
(c) Consequences of defaults or non-compliance;
(d) Statutory requirements;
(e) Pre-emergency planning;
(f) Emergency mitigation measures;
(g) Emergency preparedness measures;
(h) Emergency response procedures and measures;
(i) Emergency organisation and responsibilities;
(j) Infrastructure requirements;
(k) Declaration of on-site and off-site emergency;
(l) Resources for controlling emergency;
(m) Demographic information;
(n) Medical facilities;
(o) Evacuation;
(p) Public relations and information to public;
(q) Reporting of the incident;
(r) Emergency recovery procedures;
(s) ERDMP for tank trucks
(t) Integration of the ERDMP with National Disaster Management
Authority (NDMA) guidelines and action plan on Chemical Disasters
(Industrial);
(u) Security threat plan and action plan to meet the eventualities.


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 6
Classification of Emergencies


TIRUNELVELI
Classification of Emergencies (Clause No 6.0)
ERDMP has been developed to deal with emergency incidents which

occur within the premises of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.,Indane
Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli area. Emergency incidents will be classified
by the level of response that will be required. The actual classification
will be made by the Location in Charge (LIC) or his nominee as
information first becomes available on an incident. The level of
response may change as more information becomes available or
conditions change. Where information is lacking the worst case
scenario will dictate the level of response.
In IOCL, Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli premises, probable

emergencies can be categorized into three broad levels on the basis
of seriousness and response requirements, which are given as under:-
Level - 1 Emergency: This is an emergency or an incident

i. which can be effectively and safely managed,
ii. Contained within the site, location or installation by the
available resources.
iii. It has no impact outside the site, location or installation.
Level- 2 Emergency: This is an emergency or an incident that

i. Cannot be effectively and safely managed or contained at the
site, location or installation by available resource and additional
support is required.
ii. It is having, or has the potential to have an effect beyond the
site, location or installation and where external support of
mutual aid partner may be involved.
iii. It is likely to be danger to life, to the environment, to company
assets or reputation.
Level- 3 Emergency: This is an emergency or an incident,

i. Could be catastrophic and is likely to affect the population,
property and environment inside and outside the installation
ii. District Administration does management and control.
Based on the nature of emergency & severity the levels of type of

emergency to be declared and will be decided by the location in
charge. Various possible types of emergencies are tabulated as below:


TIRUNELVELI
Note: Level & Level-II shall normally be considered as onsite emergency

and Level-III as off-site emergency.
Type of Applicable
SN
Emergency EAP
Description of Emergency
 LPG leak from water draining valve,
while draining
 Breakage of glass on “ sight flow
indicator” on the pipeline
 Opening of pop-off action valve,
gland/packing etc
 Leakage through LPG pump
 Leakage due to bursting/rupture of LPG
hoses or swivel joints of body arms
 Excessive leakage from cylinders e.g.
leaky valve, venting of excess filled
cylinder, resulting in concentration of
the vapour in the atmosphere
 During degassing/purging operations if
method of free venting is followed
1 Level-1 On site  Leakage from the filling guns
 Escape of liquid/vapour LPG during
maintenance/repairs
 Leakage from flange joints
 Leakage of diesel in fire engine diesel
line
 Blast of Batteries due to accidental
short circuit
 Dry grass fire
 Panel fire due to contactor failure
 BDL/BL cylinders in truck inside the
plant premises
 Collision of filled cylinders truck inside
plant premises w/o fire


TIRUNELVELI
 Excess filling in the storage vessel and

the product coming out to the vapour
2 Level-2 On site line into LPG compressor and thereafter
venting into atmosphere
 Burst of product Pipelines inside &

outside premises.
 Opening of SRVs in storage vessel
 Failure of storage tanks.
 Pool fires
Off
3 Level-3  Vapour cloud explosion.
Site
 Agitation / forced entry by external
group of people.
 Natural Perils – Earthquake, flood,
tsunami
 Sabotage, Bomb explosion / Threat
Important Note: - The earlier emergency classification at

stations as per OISD-117 has been renamed as per PNGRB
Regulation- 2010 as follows.
OISD-117 classification ERDMP Regulation-2010

classification
Small Fire Level-1 Emergency
Major Fire Level-2 Emergency
Disaster Level-3 Emergency
Henceforth in the whole manual, terminology used for emergency is Level

1, Level 2 & Level 3 and words like Small fire, Major fire and Disaster as
per OISD-117 have been dropped.
TYPES OF EMERGENCIES:
The type of emergencies that can be expected in LPG Bottling
Plants are
1. Fire
2. Explosion
3. Vapour cloud explosion
4. LPG Spillages and Leakages


TIRUNELVELI
1. FIRE HAZARDS
(a) PRODUCT DISCHARGE – LIQUID PHASE : LPG has been
described as a safe fuel because of the fact that so long as it is
contained within a cylinder, vessel, or a pipeline, fire hazard is non-
existent. It is only the accidental discharge of the product from the
container, which creates a hazard. In the event of an accidental
discharge it is possible that either the liquid or vapour may discharge. A
liquid discharge is always more serious than a discharge in the vapour
phase. In the first place the volume of the product, which may
discharge, may be considerably less in the vapour phase than the liquid
phase through the same size of opening. As liquid discharges and
vaporises, the volume of the liquid changes into vapour of volume
approximately 250 times greater and therefore, a greater hazard exists.
It is always important to arrange equipment so that if an

accidental discharges does occur, it will be in the vapour phase.
(b) PRODUCT DISCHARGE – VAPOUR PHASE : The accidental

discharge of vapour from a container or a pipe may result in the
vaporisation of liquid within the container or pipe. This process will
require heat and will in effect have a cooling action upon the container.
If a container is exposed to surrounding fire, the cooling effect caused
by the vaporisation within the container can aid in preventing the
development of excessive temperatures of the container.
(c) IGNITION SOURCE

(i) Flame : As a general rule it may be said that if a flame is visible
it has sufficient heat to be used as a source of ignition for the
combustion of flammable LPG vapour mixture. A flame from a match
stick is sufficient to provide temperature considerably above that is
required, for ignition.
(ii) Heat : A piece of metal heated to 600 C may not be particularly

noticeable and might not attract attention. However, so long as the
metal on its surface has a temperature in excess of the ignition
temperature of flammable LPG vapour mixture, it can provide as an
ignition source. Likewise heat of a lighted cigarette or a bidi is sufficient
source to provide ignition.
(iii) Electric : Source of ignition may be developed electrically through

resistance in electrical circuit which heats an element or a portion of the


TIRUNELVELI
circuit to a temperature equal to or in excess of the required ignition

temperature. The making or breaking of an open switch or the
disengagement of a plug from a receptacle may cause a “Spark" which
has sufficient temperature to cause ignition.
(iv) Static Electricity and Friction Sparks : Static electricity or

friction sparks may be the source of ignition for a flammable mixture of
LPG vapour within the atmosphere. Static electricity may be caused by
agitation or pumping of liquid; venting liquid to the atmosphere; sand
blasting; non-conductive belts; the contact of separation of materials
such as synthetic clothing and action of foot wear on certain type of
floorings.
Static electricity is also produced by natural causes. Static charge is
induced from lightening discharges, by thunder clouds either directly
overhead or in the distance; by dust storms; or in rare instances from a
large volume of charged air.
Friction sparks are usually caused by the striking of one hard object
against another as in the case of striking a hardened steel tool against a
pipe or a casting; hitting of a cylinder against a steel structure.
(d) COMBUSTION
(i) Explosion : Rapid oxidation or rapid burning is the cause of
explosion. It may also be accompanied by such a release of energy that
structural damage may result. The rate at which energy is released,
rather than the amount of energy released, is the criteria of an
explosion.
The distribution of LPG vapor within the atmosphere in proper

proportions and within a confined space can create an explosion, should
the source of ignition be provided. Following an LPG explosion a fire
may be caused by the ignition of other flammable materials or a
continuing discharge of gas may burn. In some cases if the discharge of
gas has been stopped prior to the explosion, there may be no fire
following the explosion.
(ii) Fire : Depending upon the circumstances, the accidental LPG Fire
may take on any number of forms. In general, a fire fed by a liquid
discharge will be seen at ground level and may be remote from the
point of actual discharge. A fire fed by a vapour discharge may be
elevated and not impinging upon tanks, buildings, etc. The vapour fed
fire would normally burn relatively close to the point of discharge


TIRUNELVELI
(iii) BLEVE : Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)

occurs when LPG containers are accidentally surrounded by fire. Vapour
pressure in the container rises with the increase in temperature. At the
same time, temperature of the container wall in contact with the vapour
phase also rises. The wall strength deteriorates and eventually even
though a pressure relief valve may be operating, the stress imposed by
the vapour pressure exceeds the reduced strength of the wall. The
container then ruptures and super heated liquid is released, expands
and vaporize, in fraction of a second. As the contents of the container
are flammable, they form explosive mixtures with the air. Catastrophic
damage usually results from the spread and/or ignition of the vapours.
This phenomenon is true for any pressure vessels storing LPG, be it a
storage vessel, tank wagon bullet, tank truck bullet, or a LPG cylinder.
However, larger the vessel, larger would be the catastrophe.
a. PUVCE : When large quantity of LPG is released to

atmosphere and it forms vapour clouds which, when
unconfined, may travel from one place to another. Vapour
cloud can ignite and burn as deflagrations or fire balls. This
is termed as ‘Percussive Unconfined Vapour Cloud
Explosion’ i.e., PUVCE in short. Even though large
quantities of LPG emission is necessary, only a fraction of
this contributes to the percussive effect (more reactive
molecules such as ethylene in much smaller quantities).
Rare though PUVCE may be, their damage is large and
sometimes enormous.
OTHER HAZARDS
(a) LPG is usually stored as a liquid under pressure. Leakage to

atmosphere, especially as liquid, will result in rapid vaporisation
creating large volumes of flammable vapour. Because LPG is
heavier than air, it will tend to flow along the ground or through drains,
and will sink to the low level of the surroundings. Unless efforts are
quickly made to disperse the accumulation of vapour it may under
normal conditions remain there for a long time, with the possibility of
fire through a source of ignition at some distance away from the source
of leakage.


TIRUNELVELI
(b) A very small proportion of vapour in the air will give rise to a
flammable mixture, which can cause fire, if source of ignition is present.
(c) (i) Thermal expansion of LPG can lead to very serious hazards.
LPG streams under pressure in pipelines and equipment expand rapidly
as a result of only moderate increase in the temperature. For example,
the sun shining on a blocked line full of LPG, not provided with a relief
valve to protect against thermal expansion, can lead to excessive
pressures being built up within the line with eventual rupture of the
pipe.
(ii) The problem of thermal expansion also applies to laboratory sample

bombs where instructions must be clearly given not to fill the container
fully. The container should be filled up to a limit which permits liquid
expansion due to a normal rise in temperature without danger of over-
stressing the container. The maximum liquid level is usually marked on
the sample bomb.
(d) The low boiling point of LPG is liable to create a number of
operation hazards as under :
(i) The vaporization of LPG results into considerable cooling and can
lead to temperatures below the freezing point of water. This must be
clearly recognized while depressurizing equipments containing liquid LPG
and while draining water from vessels containing liquid LPG.
(ii) While draining water from LPG storage vessel, vaporization of LPG
resulting from the pressure drop across the throttle valve may result in
the freezing of water making it impossible to close the valve.
(e) The relatively low viscosity of LPG (0.3 CS at 45 0 C) adds to the

problem of containing it within the pressurized system. LPG will leak
through the flanged joints and glands more rapidly than Kerosene or
Naphtha.
(f) When pyrophoric substances come in contact with air, they react
with the oxygen generating heat. If the heat is not dissipated, the
temperature would rise high enough to ignite a flammable mixture. In
Oil and Gas industry, major source of pyrophoric substance is iron
sulphide. Pyrophoric iron sulphide is a corrosive product that may form
on the wall of the vessels, pipes, flare headers, etc. which contain or


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handle hydrocarbons containing sulphur compounds (e.g. hydrogen

sulphide, mercaptan etc.)


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 7
ERDMP Implementation Schedule


TIRUNELVELI
ERDMP Implementation Schedule Clause No 7.0
Schedule-1
(As per of PNGRB regulations G.S.R. 39(E))
Schedule of implementation of Code of Practice for ERDMP
Implementa
Sl. tion Time
No Activity (from the Compliance status
. notification
date)
On-Site Emergency Yes. Current DMP modified as
1 3- Months
Plan per regulation.
Off-Site Emergency
Plan (Submission of
2
Information to District 3- Months
Authority)
3 Resources in Position 6-Months Yes
Accredited Third Party Under process
4 Certification of 1-Year
ERDMP.
Testing and Mock Yes, Monthly
5 3-Months
Drills (On-Site)
Testing and Mock ** 12
6
Drills (Off-Site) months
** To be coordinated with District Authority


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 8
Consequences of Default or Non-Compliance


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Consequences of default or non compliance (Clause No 8.0)
8.1 There shall be a system for ensuring compliance to the provision of

these regulations through developing a well defining emergency response
and disaster management plan and conducting mock drill and safety audit
during the construction, commissioning and operation phase, as well as
an on-going basis. There shall also be system of do’s & don’ts regarding
safety, mock drill or real emergencies for visitors before entering and
establishment. This should be supported by written instruction sheet for
visitor and ensured that plant representative accompanies the visitor on
forward visit and return gate.
Following emergency drills being conducted at Indane Bottling Plant,

Tirunelveli:
i. Fire drill / emergency handling drill – Monthly.
ii. Internal Safety Audits- Yearly
iii. External Safety Audits- Once in two years
iv. For visitors/contractors, Do’s and Don’ts pamphlets are given while
issuing gate pass.
DO'S AND DON'TS
DO'S DON'TS
Actuate nearest hand
siren/ manual call point/
Walkie- Talkie DO NOT panic and avoid
Any One
communications and/or running all over the
Noticing
inform the shift In Charge. place, prevent other from
An Emergency
Activate ETBs/sprinkler, as doing so.
Situation
per duties detailed in fire
organization chart and
wait for Fire Chief’s
Instruction.
Stop work on hearing
DO NOT enter the site,
alarm. Assemble at the
Contractor till it is cleared for the
nearest / designated
Personnel normal work by site
ASSEMBLY POINT and be
incident controller.
ready to evacuate.
Keep the gate manned;
DO NOT allow
Security Keep the road clear for
unauthorized visitors free
movement of Emergency
to enter.
Vehicles/ Fire


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Tenders/Ambulance.
Control traffic at gates.
Leave the place and DO NOT enter the site if
Visitors
assemble at assembly emergency alarm is
point. heard.
On hearing FIRE alarm,
rush to emergency spot,
as directed in fire clock
All other
and discharge duties as DO NOT panic
Employees
detailed in fire
On Site
organization chart and
wait for further
instructions from Fire Chief
8.2 The Board shall monitor the compliance of ERDMP, Technical

Standards and Specifications including Safety Standards either
directly or indirectly by accredited third party through separate
regulations on third party conformity assessment.
8.3 In case of any deviation or shortfall, in achieving the

recommended standards the entities are liable to penal provisions
under the provisions of the technical standards, specifications including
safety standards
8.4 Mutual Aid Association not responding as per memorandum of

Understanding (MOU) or written agreement on request of assistance shall
attract penalty as per mutual Aid agreement are as under. However
details are elaborate in clause no-12.3 and check list -3,
 In the event of any dispute or differences between the parties, such

dispute or differences shall be resolved amicably by mutual
consultation or through the good offices of empowered agencies of
the government. If such resolution is not possible then the
unresolved dispute or differences shall be referred to the arbitration
or a arbitrator to be nominated by the Department of legal affairs
(Law Secretary) in terms of the Office memorandum No. 55/3/1/78-
CF dated 19-12-1975 issued by the Cabinet Secretariat Department
of cabinetry affairs) as modified from time to time. The arbitration
and conciliation Act 1996 (26 of 1996) shall not be applicable to the
arbitration under this clause. The award of the arbitrator shall be


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binding upon parties to the dispute. However, any party aggrieved

by such award may make further reference for setting aside or
revision of the award to Law Secretary whose decision shall bind the
parties finally and conclusively.
 The authorities mentioned in Mutual Aid Agreement both the parties

shall meet once in every six months to discuss the arrangement of
drills etc. and take necessary steps to overcome the short comings.
It will be the responsibility of all the two members’ establishments
to train their own personnel in fire fighting.


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 9
Requirements under other Statutes


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Requirements under other Statutes (Clause No 9.0)
Implementation of ERDMP is primarily governed & complying with

following regulations as per Schedule – II of PNGRB regulations G.S.R.
39(E)
REGULATION APPLICABILITY COMPLIANCE

STATUS STATUS
(YES / NO) (YES/NO)
The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (amended 1991) and
following Rules there under:
The Environment Yes Yes
(Protection) Rules,
1986
MSIHC Yes Yes
The Hazardous Yes Yes
wastes (Management
and Handling) Rules,
1989 (amended 2000
and 2003)
The Environment Prior Yes Yes
Clearance Notification,
2006
The Chemical Yes Yes
Accidents (emergency
Planning, Preparedness and
Response) Rules,
1996
Bio-medical Wastes No NA
(Management and
Handling) Rules. 1989
The Factories Act, 1948 (amended 1987):
Tamil Nadu Factory Yes Yes
Rules
The Inflammable Yes Yes
Substances Act, 1952
The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (amended 2001):
Public Liability Yes Yes
Insurance (PLI) Rules,
1991 (amended 1993)
The central Motor No NA
Vehicles Rules, 1989
(amended 2005)


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The Petroleum Act, 1934:

The Petroleum Rules, Yes Yes
2002
The Insecticide Rules, 1968 (amended 2000):
The Insecticide Rules, No NA
1971 (amended 1999)
National Environment No NA
Tribunal Act
The Explosives Act, 1984 (amended till 1983):
The Gas Cylinder Yes Yes
Rules, 2004
The Static and Mobile Yes Yes
Pressure Vessel
(Unfired) Rules, 1981
(amended 2002)
The explosives Rules, Yes Yes
1983 (amended 2002)
Prohibited Area Yes Yes
VHF License For Main Yes Yes

Station Hand Sets
Pollution Control Yes Yes
Board ( Water & Air)
Contract Labour Yes Yes
Registration
Calibration Of Yes Yes
Instruments
Calibration Of Yes Yes
Explosive Meter
Current compliance status with above rules / permissions is stated in the table
below.


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Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli as per PNRGB Schedule – II

as of DATE:
RENEWED
SL. VALID
DESCRIPTION LICENCE NO. /APPLIED REMARKS
NO UPTO
ON
1 FACTORY 26.02.2015
2 EXPLOSIVE - Storage of LPG in S/HO/TN/03

pressure vessels /1034(S513 31.03.2018
73)
filling of cylinders 30.09.2017
with compressed G/HO/TN/06
gas /363/(G299
29) 30.09.2017
storage of
cylinders filled with G/HO/TN/06
compressed gas /387/(G299
29)
3 PROHIBITED APPLIED NEW

AREA INSTALLATION
4 PLI FOR 5 020500/49/14/60/ 31.07.2015 INSURANCE
CRORES (M/S 00000001 DONE BY HO
UNITED INDIA
INSURANCE
COMPANY
LIMITED)
5 POLLUTION Order 31.03.2016
CONTROL No.23108,19145 dt
BOARD ( 7.4.2015
WATER & AIR )
6 CONTRACT R.04/2012-A/M DT AMENDED ------ ONE TIME
LABOUR 23.03.2012 ON 8.4.2015 APPROVAL
REGISTRATION
7 CALIBRATION CERTIFICATE NO. 08.06.2015 07.12.2015
OF EXPLOSIVE RESPO/15-16/132
METER DT 9.06.2015
8 HANDLING OF ---- --- --- WILL BE APPLIED
AFTER
HAZARDOUS
COMMISSIONING
WASTE
9 CALIBRATION Periodically
OF Renewed
INSTRUMENTS


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CHAPTER – 10
Pre-Emergency Planning


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10.1 Hazard Identification
“Hazard” means an event related to the property of substance or

chemicals with a potential for human injury, damage to property, damage
to the environment, or some combination thereof;
Therefore, all the relevant aspects of LPG decantation, storage, bottling
and distribution process have been thoroughly examined to assess their
potential for initiating or propagating an unintentional event or sequence
of events, which can lead to an accident or disaster. Type, quantity,
location, & conditions of release of LPG under various scenarios have been
examined in order to estimate its damage potential, area affected, and
the precautionary measures to be taken.
10.2 HAZARD POTENTIAL: DECIDING FACTORS
Factors considered to identify and analyze the hazard potential are:

1. LPG- slightly anaesthetic- health hazard
2. High Vapour Pressure
3. Boiling point & Freezing point
4. Auto Ignition Temperature
5. High Calorific Valve & Low viscosity
6. Potential for loss from containment
7. Storage/Handling Capacity
8. Potential for availability of ignition sources in the vicinity of
leakage or spillage
Apart from LPG, (HSD- fuel for generators/fire engines, LUBE OILS- for
engine lubrication, CHAIN KOTE- soap solution used in chain conveyor)
characteristics and process of its handling, size & layout of the plant and
its equipment are also analyzed in order to assess the hazard potential.
Similarly, domino or secondary effects of accidents occurring in one
facility at plant on to the adjoining area have been analyzed.
10.3 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS
LPG is inflammable in its basic character. They are dangerous because of

their intrinsic properties i.e. vaporization, boiling/freezing point, high
calorific value & low viscosity, flammability limits, etc. In addition to such
intrinsic properties, extrinsic factors like storage & operating conditions
and large storage quantity are also considered for hazard identification.
Material safety Data Sheets for the products handled are attached below


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MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET
1 – Chemical Identity
Chemical Name : Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)
Chemical Formula : Mixture of C3H8 and C4H10
Synonyms : LPG, Gas

General Use : Domestic fuel, Motor fuel
C A S No. : 68476 – 85 – 7
U N No. : 1075
Regulated Identification: Shipping Name: Liquefied Petroleum Gas, Hazchem Code:

2 WE
2 – Hazards Identification
Primary Entry Routes : Inhalation, skin

Acute Effects : Inhalation: Concentration in air greater than 10% causes dizziness in
few minutes. 1% conc. gives the same symptoms in 10 mts. High concentration causes
asphyxiation.
Skin irritant : Liquid on skin causes frostbite.
Carcinogenicity : Not listed as carcinogenic

Chronic Effects : No data available
3 – First Aid Measures
Eyes : Flush with water for 15 min. Get medical attention.

Skin : Frost bite can occur and appropriate treatment for it to be given. Remove the wetted
clothes. Wash with warm water & soap.
Inhalation : Remove to fresh air. Consult a physician if irritation persists.
4 – Fire Fighting Measures
Flash Point : Very inflammable

Auto ignition Temperature : 426 °C
LEL : 1.9 %
UEL : 9.5 %


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Flammability Classification : Flammable

Extinguishing Media : Foam, Dry Chemical Powder, CO2
Unusual Fire or Explosion Heat produces vapours and can cause violent rupture of
Hazards : containers. Tanks can explode due to BLEVE effect. Being
heavier than air vapours may travel long distance and flash
back.
Static electricity generation highly possible.
Hazardous Combustion Carbon di oxide, carbon mono oxide,
Products :
Fire-Fighting Instructions : Fires should not be extinguished until flow of LPG is not
stopped. Shut off gas and allow the product to burn. Cool the surroundings with water spray.
Fire fighters should wear self breathing apparatus while fighting fire
5 – Accidental Release Measures
Small Spills : Shut off leaks if safe to do so. Disperse vapours with water spray. Isolate area
and take a gas test before entering. Warn everyone that the mixture is explosive.
Containment : Prevent spillage from entering drains or water sources
Cleanup : As the product vaporizes clean up not necessary.
6 – Handling and Storage
Handling Precautions : Do not use/store near heat/open flame. Avoid contact with
liquid as frost bites can occur. Use gumboots, gloves while handling the product. Do not
inhale. Stay upwind while handling the product. Tanks and dispensing equipments should be
grounded to reduce static charge fires. It should be stored in closed containers away from
heat & source of ignition. Avoid contact with skin and eyes. Wash thoroughly after handling
Storage Requirements : Do not use/store near heat/open flame/water/acids. Stenched
with mercaptans for easy identification during leaks
7 – Exposure Controls / Personal Protection
Engineering Controls : Provide proper ventilation for environment to be below Time

Waited Average (TWA). Use explosion proof electrical fittings in classified areas
Respiratory Protection : Use respiratory protection if ventilation is improper
Protective Clothing / Use face shield, PVC gloves, safety boots while handling.
Equipment : Contaminated clothing to be immediately removed
8 – Protection Physical and Chemical Properties
Physical State : Gas at 15oC & 1atm. pressure. Handled as liquid in compressed stage
Appearance and Odour : Colurless gas with mercaptan odour
Vapor Pressure : < 152 psi at 38 °C (RVP)


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Specific Gravity : 0.55 gm / cc at 15 °C

Water Solubility : Insoluble
Boiling Point : > - 40 °C
Freezing Point : - 77 °C
Vapour Density : 1.5 (Air = 1)
9 – Stability and Reactivity
Stability: Chemically stable.

Chemical Incompatibilities: Incompatible with oxidizing agents.
Conditions to Avoid: Avoid high temperatures and ignition sources including static
electricity
Hazardous Decomposition Carbon di oxide, carbon mono oxide,
Products:
10 – Toxicological Information
ACIGH TLV TWA: LPG – 1000 ppm

Toxicity Data: LD50 (Oral-Rat) Not listed
Acute Inhalation Effects: Concentration in air greater than 10% causes dizziness in few
minutes. 1% conc. gives the same symptoms in 10 minutes. High concentration causes
asphyxiation.
11 – Ecological Information
Prevent spillage from entering drains or water sources. After spills wash area with soap and
water preventing runoff from entering drains. Can burn with lot of heat producing CO2 and
CO.
12 – Disposal Considerations
Disposal : Allow gas to burn under controlled conditions
13 – Transport Information
Shipping Name : Liquefied Petroleum Gas
14 – Regulatory Information
Non – Toxic / Highly Flammable Substance
* American Institutional Conference for Industrial & Govt. Hygenist (AICIGH)

* Threshhold Limit Value (TLV)
* Time Waited Average (TWA)


TIRUNELVELI
Additional Information / References.
Avoid contact with oxidizers. Olefinic impurities may laed to narcotic effect or it may act as
a simple.
Asphyxiant. A very dangerous hazard when exposed to heat or flame. If fire is big, keep
surrounding Areas cool by spraying water.
XI. DISCLAIMER
Information contained in this material data sheet is believed to be reliable
but
not representation, guarantees or warranties of any kind are made as to
its
accuracy, suitability for a particular application or results to be obtained
from
them.
* NIOSH is the accession number used by the registry or toxic effects of

chemical substances (RTECS) produced by the National Institute for
occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Cincinnati, Ohio 45226 USA.
* DOT is the U.S. Department of Transportation hazard code. This code is

recognized internationally and is in agreement with the United Nations
coding system and is used in transport documents, labels and placards. It
is also used to determine the regulations for shipping the material.
* OSHA is the permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) as defined by the U.S

occupational safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Department of
Labour. These standards may also include the notation “CL” indicating the
maximum short time peak allowed above the ceiling value.
*ACGIH is followed for the Threshold Limit Value, a (TLV) by the American
conference of Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). The TLV also
represents an air concentration to which workers can be exposed for a
normal 8-hour day, 40-hour work week without ill effects. The notation
“skin” indicates that the material penetrates into skin and skin contact
should be avoided though the TLV concentration is not exceeded.
* MAK code is followed by the German Research Society. Those materials

that are classified potentially carcinogenic by the German Research
Society are noted on this code. The MAK values are also revised annually


TIRUNELVELI
and discussions of materials, under consideration for MAK assignment are

included in the annual publication together with the current values.
* CAS is a code assigned to the material by the chemical abstract
services of the American Chemical Society. This code is becoming a
Universal “Social Security Number” for chemical entities. It is used
whenever possible in describing a substance to avoid confusion and
ambiguity caused by multiple synonyms for the same chemical.
The extent of the consequences arising from the LPG Plant would
depend on quantity of the LPG present, mode of containment, and
external factors like location, density of population etc. In many cases,
realization of hazard and its potential also depend on prevailing
meteorological conditions and availability of ignition source. Thus, most
serious consequences would arise from a large inventory of LPG
surrounded by a densely populated area. LPG requires interaction with air
or oxygen for its hazard to be realized. Vapours of the LPG when mixed
with air are explosive especially in confined spaces.
Following methods of hazard identification have been employed in this
study:
1. Characterization of major hazardous units based on manufacture,

storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, under Environment
Protection Act. 1987, Ministry of Environment & Forest, Government of
India, 1994, referred here as MSIHC Rules.
2. Identification of hazardous installations based on Consequence

Analysis, HAZOP studies and Reliability Analysis-Hazop study report
attached.
10.4 Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli AS PER MSIHC RULES,

2000
Major hazard installations in the country have been identified &

characterized by MSIHC Rules, 2000. The rules employ certain criteria
based on flammable, explosive & toxic properties and quantity of the
chemicals. Indicative criteria adopted in the MSIHC Rules and descriptions
of applicable provisions of the rules are given in Appendix I.
As per provisions of the MSIHC Rules, 2000 quantity of flammable liquid

(LPG) storage at the Plant has been analyzed and the applicable rules are


TIRUNELVELI
identified based on the type of petroleum oil, quantity of storage and the
threshold quantity given in the rules.
Applicable regulations of the rules to the Plant are identified in the

following Table. LPG are covered in MSIHC Rules in schedule 1 part 1 (b)
(ii) & (iii). The threshold quantities are given in schedule 2 (“isolated
storage” at installations, other than those covered by schedule 4).
Applicability of the rules is as follows:


TIRUNELVELI
Table 2.2 Applicability of MSIHC Rules to the Tirunelveli LPG

Bottling Plant.
Threshold Quantity
Maximum
No. of (Tonnes)) as per
Product Inventory in Applicable Rules
Tanks MSIHC Rules for
MT
Application of Rules
4, 5, & 7-
9 and 13- 10-12
15
LPG 3 1800 MT 5000 50000 2 (e) (i)
(3*600= 2 (e) (ii), 3,
1800 MT) 4 (1) (a)
4 (1) (b),
4 (2), 5,
7-9, 17
Total 3 1800
Applicable MSIHC Rules are as follows:

Rule 2: Identification for Existence of "Hazardous Chemicals”:
* "Hazardous chemicals" are existing in the Tirunelveli LPG Bottling
Plant, as per rule 2(e)(i) & 2(e)(iii), LPG stored in the plant are covered
under Schedule I(b)(ii)
* "Industrial Activity" being carried out in the plant involves operation
/ processes having hazardous chemicals and includes their on-site storage
&transportation as per Rule 2(h) (i). “Isolated storage” of petroleum
products is covered in schedule 2.
Rule 3: Duties of the Government Authorities:
* Duties of the Government Authorities as per schedule V.
Rule 4: General Responsibility of Occupier:
* As "hazardous chemicals" exist in the plant the occupier has to
provide evidence to show that he has:
(a) Identified the major accident hazards
(b) Taken adequate steps to:
(i) Prevent such major accidents and to limit their consequences to
persons & environment.


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(ii) Provide to the persons working on the site with the information,
training & equipment including antidotes necessary to ensure their safety.
Rule 5: Notification of Major Accidents:
* Notification of "Major Accidents" in the format given in Schedule 6
to Director of factories and to other authorities as listed in Schedule V.
Rule 7: Notification of Site:
* Notification of site and updated information of the modifications to
the competent authority as per Schedule VII.
Rule 8: Updating of the Site Notification Following Changes in the
Threshold Quantity:
* Any change in the “threshold quantity” (storage quantity) is to be
notified to the competent authority.
Rule 17: Collection, Development and Dissemination of Information on
"Hazardous Chemicals" Employed by the Occupier
(a) Material Safety Data Sheet is to be prepared as per Schedule IX
(b) Every container of hazardous chemical should be labelled or marked
to identify
i. Contents of the container
ii. The name and the address of the manufacturer
iii. Physical, Chemical and Toxicological data as per the criteria given in
Schedule
10.5 Major Hazards
GENERAL
When LPG is released from a storage vessel or a pipeline, a fraction of
LPG vaporizes immediately and the other portion forms a pool if the
released liquid quantity is more. LPG from the pool vaporizes rapidly
entrapping some liquid as droplets as well as considerable amount of air,
forming a gas cloud. The gas cloud is relatively heavier than air and forms
a thin layer on the ground. The cloud flows into trenches and depressions
and in this way travels a considerable distance.
As the cloud formed in the area of spill moves downwind under influence
of wind, it gets diluted. A small spark , when the vapour cloud is within
the flammability limit can cause flash fire , explosion and if the liquid pool
still exists and remains in touch of cloud under fire it can ignite the whole
mass of liquid.
However in case of non existence of any source of ignition there will be no
occurrence of hazardous event and the cloud may get diluted to such a
level that the mixture is no longer explosive. However, it can cause
asphyxiation due to displacement of oxygen. Different types of


TIRUNELVELI
combustion reactions associated in case of release of LPG from the

containment are listed in the following sections.
JET FIRE
Escaping jet of LPG from pressure vessels / piping, if ignited cause a jet
flame. The jet flame direction and tilt depend on prevailing wind direction
and velocity. Damage, in case of such type of jet fires, is restricted to
within the plant boundary. However, the ignited jet can impinge on other
vessels and equipment carrying LPG and cause domino effect.
POOL FIRE
The liquid pool, if ignited, causes a “Pool Fire”. In the pool fire, LPG burns
with long smoky flame throughout the pool diameter radiating intense
heat which creates severe damage to the adjoining buildings, structures,
other vessels and equipment causing secondary fires. The flame may tilt
under influence of wind and may get propagated / brown several pool
diameters down wind. Damage, in case of such fires, is restricted within
the plant area and near the source of generation.
UNCONFINED VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION (UVCE)
Clouds of LPG vapour mixed with air (within flammability limit) may cause
propagating flames when ignited. In certain cases flame take place within
seconds. The thermal radiation intensity is severe depending on the total
mass of LPG in the cloud and may cause secondary fires. When the flame
travels very fast it explodes high over pressures or blast effects causing
heavy damage at considerable distance from the release point. Such
explosions are called unconfined vapour cloud explosion.
BOILING LIQUID EXPANDING VAPOUR EXPLOSION (BLEVE)

This phenomenon occurs when pressure inside a storage vessel increases
above the design pressure due to a fire in the adjacent area. Due to
impingement of flame or due to radiant heat, temperature in the vapour
portion of the storage vessel increases rapidly compared to the portion
filled with liquid. Increase in temperatures softens and weakens the metal
wall of the shell. With the rise in vapour pressure and inadequate vapour
space for expansion , the shell of storage tanks bursts causing fragments
of the shell flying like projectiles with release of whole mass of
pressurized boiling liquid. The released liquid flashes and atomises
immediately often resulting a large fire ball in contact with an ignited
source. Although the fire ball lasts only a few seconds, its effect is
devastating due to flame contact and intense thermal radiation. This
phenomenon is called BLEVE. The effect of BLEVE extends beyond the
plant boundary in case of catastrophic failure of large pressurized storage
vessels.


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The Hazard, Severity, Population and precautions taken are tabulated

Area-wise herein below-
10.6 HAZARD ANALYSIS
10.6.1 GENERAL PRECAUTIONS TAKEN:
1. Continuous monitoring and maintenance.
2. All vehicles entering the license area should have spark arrestor.
3. Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for each activity is maintained
and operating personnel are trained on the same.
4. No maintenance or repair work and no entry into confined spaces
including a closed drain or manhole is permitted except under and
in accordance with the conditions of a written permit as per OISD
standard 105 issued by a competent person.
5. Security personnel and employees well trained in fire fighting, to
control and handle emergency.
6. Hydrant system is installed which is connected to the fire pump.
Hydrant line pressure maintained as per requirement.
7. Adequate quantity of fire extinguishers provided.
8. Adequate trained operating personnel.
9. Periodic mock drills being conducted to test and improve the
system.
10. Proper upkeep of fire fighting facilities.
11. Area maintained as per CCOE requirement
12. Wind sock is installed to monitor wind direction.
13. All electrical fittings are FLP type as per requirement.
14. Use of mobile phones strictly prohibited in bullet area, filling
shed, pump house, TLD shed and other hazardous area.
15. Mandatory use of PPE.
16. Automated processes enhance safety & reduce human error
by having interlock procedure & recording and measurement of
events.


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Hazard Logic tree and Event tree chart


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10.7 RISK ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT–RISK ANALYSIS
Based on the methodology discussed above a set of appropriate scenarios

was generated to carry out Risk Analysis calculations, as listed below:
(I) 600MT Mounded Bullet – SRV Release for 5 Minutes, UVCE.

(II) 600MT Mounded Bullet – SRV Release for 15 Minutes, UVCE
(III) 600MT Mounded Bullet – SRV Release for 15 Minutes, Blast over
pressure
(IV) 600MT Mounded Bullet – SRV Release for 15 Minutes, Blast over
pressure
(V) 600MT Mounded Bullet – SRV Release for 15 Minutes at 9 atm, LPG
Vapor dispersion threat
(VI) 600MT Mounded Bullet – SRV Release for 60 Minutes, Jet Fire
(VII) ROAD TANKER 18 MT – Temperature gauge damaged, UVCE
(VIII) ROAD TANKER 18 MT – Temperature gauge damaged, Jet fire
(IX) ROAD TANKER 18 MT-BLEVE
(X) ROAD TANKER 18 MT-Pool Fire
(XI) ROAD TANKER 18 MT -SRV RELEASE-UVCE
(XII) LPG CYLINDER-14.2kg-UVCE
(XIII) LPG CYLINDER-14.2kg- Blast over pressure
(XIV) LPG Pump Release of 800 lit / min of LPG for three minutes
(XV) LPG Compressor Release of 65.77 CFM , release.
(XVI) Pipeline Leak 6 inch dia Gas pipe Line -Full bore failure-Jet fire
(XVII) Pipeline Leak 4 inch -Full bore failure-Flash fire
(XVIII) Pipeline Leak thro 1 sq inch hole in the 4 inch dia Vapor line –
Jet fire


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Consequences Report :-
11.0. MOST CREDIBLE WORST SCENERIOS CONSIDERED IN THE LPG

BOTTLING PLANTS –
IOCL , GANGAIKONDAN ,TRINELVELI,TAMILNADU
PROPOSED ( 600 MT 3 Nos Mounded Bullette Storages )
SYSTEM
Sl Scenario Source Consequences Figure
no
1. Direct Source: 25 Threat Modeled:
600 MT cubic meters/sec Flammable Area
Mounded Source Height: 12 of Vapor Cloud
bullet meters Model Run:
Source State: Gas Heavy Gas
SRV Release Source Red : 487
for 5 Minutes Temperature: equal meters --- (10800
to ambient ppm = 60% LEL =
UVCE Source Pressure: 6 Flame Pockets)
atmospheres Yellow: 1.5
Release Duration: 5 kilometers ---
minutes (1800 ppm = 10%
Release Rate: LEL)
20,700 kilograms/min
Total Amount
Released: 103,349
kilograms
2. 600 MT Direct Source: 25 Threat Modeled:
Mounded cubic meters/sec Flammable Area
bullet Source Height: 12 of Vapor Cloud
Source State: Gas Model Run: FIGURE-
SRV Release Source Heavy Gas 1
for 15 Temperature: equal Red : 487
minutes to ambient meters --- (10800
Source Pressure: 6 ppm = 60% LEL =
UVCE atmospheres Flame Pockets)
Release Duration: Yellow: 1.5
15 minutes kilometers ---
Release Rate: (1800 ppm = 10%
20,700 kilograms/min LEL)
Total Amount
Released: 310,046


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kilograms
3. 600 MT Direct Source: 25 Threat Modeled:
Mounded cubic meters/sec Overpressure
bullet Source Height: 0 (blast force) from
Source State: Gas vapor cloud
SRV Release Source explosion
for 15 Temperature: equal Type of
minutes to ambient Ignition: ignited
Source Pressure: 6 by spark or flame
Blast Over atmospheres Level of
Pressure Release Duration: Congestion:
15 minutes congested
Release Rate: Model Run:
20,700 kilograms/min Heavy Gas
Total Amount Red : LOC was
Released: 310,046 never exceeded ---
kilograms (8.0 psi =
destruction of
buildings)
Orange: 366
meters --- (3.5 psi
= serious injury
likely)
Yellow: 489
meters --- (1.0 psi
= shatters glass)
4. 600 MT Direct Source: 25 Threat Modeled: FIGURE-

Mounded cubic meters/sec Overpressure 2
bullet Source Height: 12 (blast force) from
meters vapor cloud
SRV Release Source State: Gas explosion
for 15 Source Type of
minutes Temperature: equal Ignition: ignited
to ambient by spark or flame
Blast Over Source Pressure: 9 Level of
Pressure atmospheres Congestion:
Release Duration: 5 congested
minutes Model Run:
Release Rate: Heavy Gas
32,800 kilograms/min Red : LOC was
Total Amount never exceeded ---


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Released: 164,078 (8.0 psi =

kilograms destruction of
buildings)
Orange: 477
meters --- (3.5 psi
= serious injury
likely)
Yellow: 617
meters --- (1.0 psi
= shatters glass)
5. 600 MT Direct Source: 25 Model Run: FIGURE-
Mounded cubic meters/sec Heavy Gas 3
bullet Source Height: 12 Red : 437
meters meters --- (19000
SRV Release Source State: Gas ppm = PAC-3)
for 15 Source Orange: 1.3
minutes at Temperature: equal kilometers ---
9 atm to ambient (3200 ppm =
Source Pressure: 9 PAC-2)
LPG Vapor atmospheres Yellow: 1.4
dispersion Release Duration: 5 kilometers ---
threat minutes (3000 ppm =
Release Rate: PAC-1)
32,800 kilograms/min
Total Amount THREAT AT
Released: 164,078 POINT:
kilograms Concentration
Estimates at the
point:
Downwind: 500
meters
Off Centerline: 2
meters
Max
Concentration:
Outdoor:
15,500 ppm
Indoor:
10,100 ppm
6. 600 MT Leak from Threat Modeled:
Mounded short pipe or valve in Thermal
bullet horizontal cylindrical radiation from jet


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tank fire
SRV Release Flammable Red : 62
for 60 chemical is burning meters --- (10.0
minutes as it escapes from kW/(sq m) =
tank potentially lethal
JET FIRE Tank Diameter: 6.5 within 60 sec)
FROM THE meters Tank Orange: 86
SRV PIPE Length: 27.8 meters meters --- (5.0
LINE Tank Volume: 923 kW/(sq m) = 2nd
cubic meters degree burns
Tank contains within 60 sec)
liquid Yellow: 132
Internal meters --- (2.0
Temperature: 32° F kW/(sq m) = pain
Chemical Mass in within 60 sec)
Tank: 600 tons
Tank is 94% full THREAT AT
Circular Opening POINT:
Diameter: 4 inches Thermal
Opening is 6.50 Radiation
meters from tank Estimates at the
bottom point:
Max Flame Length: Downwind: 70.7
39 meters meters
Burn Duration: Off Centerline:
limited the duration 182 meters
to 1 hour Max Thermal
Max Burn Rate: Radiation: 0.836
2,230 kilograms/min kW/(sq m)
Total Amount
Burned: 132,246
kilograms
Note: The chemical
escaped from the
tank and burned as a
jet fire.
7. Leak from short pipe THREAT ZONE:
ROAD in horizontal Threat
TANKER cylindrical tank Modeled:
18 MT – Flammable Flammable Area
Temperature chemical escaping of Vapor Cloud
gauge from tank (not Model Run:


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damaged burning) Heavy Gas

Tank Diameter: Red : 102
Threat for 1.77 meters meters --- (10800
UCVCE Tank Length: 11.4 ppm = 60% LEL =
meters Flame Pockets)
Tank Volume: 28 Yellow: 309
cubic meters meters --- (1800
Tank contains ppm = 10% LEL)
liquid
Internal THREAT AT
Temperature: 32° C POINT:
Chemical Mass in Concentration
Tank: 15.1 tons Estimates at the
Tank is 85% full point:
Circular Opening Downwind: 500
Diameter: 2 inches meters
Opening is 0.71 Off Centerline: 2
meters from tank meters
bottom Max
Release Duration: Concentration:
18 minutes Outdoor: 852
Max Average ppm
Sustained Release Indoor: 734
Rate: 1,040 ppm
kilograms/min
(averaged over a
minute or more)
Total Amount
Released: 13,242
kilograms
Note: The chemical
escaped as a mixture
of gas and aerosol
(two phase flow).
8. ROAD Leak from short pipe THREAT ZONE:
TANKER or valve in horizontal Threat
18 MT – cylindrical tank Modeled:
Temperature Flammable Thermal
gauge chemical is burning radiation from jet
damaged as it escapes from fire
tank Red : 20
Threat for Tank Diameter: meters --- (10.0


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JET FIRE 1.77 meters kW/(sq m) =

Tank Length: 11.4 potentially lethal
meters within 60 sec)
Tank Volume: 28 Orange: 27
cubic meters meters --- (5.0
Tank contains kW/(sq m) = 2nd
liquid degree burns
Internal within 60 sec)
Temperature: 32° C Yellow: 42
Chemical Mass in meters --- (2.0
Tank: 15.1 tons kW/(sq m) = pain
Tank is 85% full within 60 sec)
Circular Opening
Diameter: 1 inches THREAT AT
Opening is 0.71 POINT:
meters from tank Thermal
bottom Radiation
Max Flame Length: Estimates at the
11 meters point:
Burn Duration: Downwind: 5
ALOHA limited the meters
duration to 1 hour Off Centerline:
Max Burn Rate: 1.5 meters
265 kilograms/min Max Thermal
Total Amount Radiation: 62.9
Burned: 12,952 kW/(sq m)
kilograms
Note: The chemical
escaped from the
tank and burned as a
jet fire.
9. ROAD BLEVE of flammable THREAT ZONE: FIGURE-
TANKER liquid in horizontal Threat 4
18 MT TANK cylindrical tank Modeled:
UNDER Tank Diameter: Thermal
1.77 meters radiation from
BLEVE Tank Length: 11.4 fireball
meters Red : 305
Tank Volume: 28 meters --- (10.0
cubic meters kW/(sq m) =
Tank contains potentially lethal
liquid within 60 sec)


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Internal Storage Orange: 431

Temperature: 32° C meters --- (5.0
Chemical Mass in kW/(sq m) = 2nd
Tank: 15.1 tons degree burns
Tank is 85% full within 60 sec)
Percentage of Tank Yellow: 671
Mass in Fireball: meters --- (2.0
100% kW/(sq m) = pain
Fireball Diameter: within 60 sec)
139 meters
Burn Duration: 10 THREAT AT
seconds POINT:
Thermal
Radiation
Estimates at the
point:
Downwind: 200
meters
Off Centerline: 1
meters
Max Thermal
Radiation: 22.3
kW/(sq m)
10. ROAD Burning Puddle / Threat Modeled:
TANKER Pool Fire Thermal
18 MT – Puddle Area: 150 radiation from
square meters pool fire
for POOL Puddle Mass: 15 tons Red : 51
FIRE Initial Puddle meters --- (10.0
Temperature: -42.2° kW/(sq m) =
C potentially lethal
Flame Length: 29 within 60 sec)
meters Burn Orange: 66
Duration: 12 minutes meters --- (5.0
Burn Rate: 1,150 kW/(sq m) = 2nd
kilograms/min degree burns
Total Amount within 60 sec)
Burned: 13,608 Yellow: 93
kilograms meters --- (2.0
kW/(sq m) = pain
within 60 sec)


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11. ROAD Direct Source: 0.5 THREAT ZONE:

TANKER 18 cubic meters/sec Threat
MT – SRV Source Height: 2 Modeled:
RELEASE meters Flammable Area
Source State: of Vapor Cloud
UVCE Liquid Model Run:
Source Heavy Gas
Temperature: equal Red : 443
to ambient meters --- (10800
Release Duration: 1 ppm = 60% LEL =
minute Flame Pockets)
Release Rate: 286 Yellow: 1.3
kilograms/sec kilometers ---
Total Amount (1800 ppm = 10%
Released: 17,165 LEL)
kilograms
Note: This chemical
may flash boil and/or
result in two phase
flow.
12. LPG Direct Source: 0.47 Threat Modeled:

CYLINDER kilograms/min Flammable Area
14.2 Kg Source Height: 0 of Vapor Cloud
UCVCE Release Duration: Model Run:
30 minutes Heavy Gas
Release Rate: 470 Red : 11
grams/min meters --- (10800
Total Amount ppm = 60% LEL =
Released: 14.1 Flame Pockets)
kilograms Note: Threat
Note: This chemical zone was not
may flash boil and/or drawn because
result in two phase effects of near-
flow. field patchiness
make
dispersion
predictions less
reliable for short
distances.
Yellow: 11
meters --- (1800


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ppm = 10% LEL)

Note: Threat
zone was not
drawn because
effects of near-
field patchiness
make
dispersion
predictions less
reliable for short
distances.
CYLINDER kilograms/min Overpressure
14.2 Kg Source Height: 0 (blast force) from
Blast over Release Duration: vapor cloud
pressure 30 minutes explosion
Release Rate: 470 Type of
grams/min Ignition: ignited
Total Amount by spark or flame
Released: 14.1 Level of
kilograms Congestion:
Note: This chemical congested
may flash boil and/or Model Run:
result in two phase Heavy Gas
flow. Red : LOC was
never exceeded ---
(8.0 psi =
destruction of
buildings)
Orange: less
than 10
meters(10.9
yards) --- (3.5 psi
= serious injury
likely)
Yellow: 17
meters --- (1.0 psi
= shatters glass)
14. LPG Pump Direct Source: 800 Threat Modeled:

Release of liters/min Flammable Area
800 lit / min Source Height: 0 of Vapor Cloud


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of LPG for Source State: Model Run:

three Liquid Heavy Gas
minutes. Source Red : 73
Temperature: equal meters --- (10800
to ambient ppm = 60% LEL =
Release Duration: 3 Flame Pockets)
minutes Yellow: 236
Release Rate: 443 meters --- (1800
kilograms/min ppm = 10% LEL)
Total Amount
Released: 1,329
kilograms
Note: This chemical
may flash boil and/or
result in two phase
flow.

Compressor cubic meters/min Flammable Area
Release of Source Height: 0 of Vapor Cloud
65.77 CFM , Source State: Gas Model Run:
release Source Heavy Gas
Temperature: equal Red : 41
to ambient meters --- (10800
Source Pressure: 10 ppm = 60% LEL =
atmospheres Flame Pockets)
Release Duration: 1 Note: Threat
minute zone was not
Release Rate: 2.32 drawn because
kilograms/sec effects of near-
Total Amount field patchiness
Released: 139 make
kilograms dispersion
predictions less
reliable for short
distances.
Yellow: 133
meters --- (1800
ppm = 10% LEL)
16. JET fire Flammable gas is Threat Modeled:
burning as it escapes Thermal
Pipeline Leak from pipe radiation from jet


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6 inch dia Pipe Diameter: 6 fire

Gas pipe Line inches Pipe Red : 37
-Full bore Length: 50 meters meters --- (10.0 FIGURE-
failure Unbroken end of kW/(sq m) = 5
the pipe is connected potentially lethal
to an infinite source within 60 sec)
Pipe Roughness: Orange: 51
smooth meters --- (5.0
Hole Area: 28.3 sq in kW/(sq m) = 2nd
Pipe Press: 5 degree burns
atmospheres within 60 sec)
Pipe Temperature: Yellow: 79
32° C meters --- (2.0
Flame Length: 22 kW/(sq m) = pain
meters within 60 sec)
Burn Duration:
ALOHA limited the
duration to 1 hour
Burn Rate: 1,270
kilograms/min
Total Amount
Burned: 47,538
kilograms
17. Flash fire Flammable gas Threat Modeled:
escaping from pipe Flammable Area
Pipeline Leak (not burning) of Vapor Cloud
4 inch -Full Pipe Diameter: 4 Model Run:
bore failure inches Pipe Heavy Gas
Length: 100 meters Red : 72
Unbroken end of meters --- (10800
the pipe is connected ppm = 60% LEL =
to an infinite source Flame Pockets)
Pipe Roughness: Yellow: 233
smooth meters --- (1800
Hole Area: 12.6 sq in ppm = 10% LEL)
Pipe Press: 10
atmospheres
Pipe Temperature:
42° C
Release Duration:
ALOHA limited the
duration to 1 hour


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Max Average
Sustained Release
Rate: 449
kilograms/min
(averaged over a
minute or more)
Total Amount
Released: 26,765
kilograms
18. Flammable gas is Threat Modeled:
burning as it escapes Thermal
from pipe radiation from jet
Pipe Diameter: 4 fire
JET FIRE inches Pipe Red : 10
Length: 100 meters meters --- (10.0
Pipeline Leak Unbroken end of kW/(sq m) =
thro 1 sq inch the pipe is closed off potentially lethal
hole in the 4 Pipe Roughness: within 60 sec)
inch dia smooth Orange: 10
Vapor line Hole Area: 1 sq in meters --- (5.0
Pipe Press: 10 kW/(sq m) = 2nd
atmospheres degree burns
Pipe Temperature: within 60 sec)
42° C Yellow: 16
Max Flame Length: meters --- (2.0
4 meters Burn kW/(sq m) = pain
Duration: 2 minutes within 60 sec)
Max Burn Rate:
99.4 kilograms/min
Total Amount
Burned: 14.8
kilograms
10.8 Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Index (FETI) Approach
There are a number of hazard indices, which have been developed

for various purposes. The most widely used hazard index is the Dow
chemical Company’s Fire and Explosion Index. This hazard index is
commonly known as the Dow’s Index or F & EI (Fire & Explosion Index).
The index is calculated using the loss potential of various chemicals stored
in the facility. It is a number, which indicates damage potential due to the
fire, and explosion of a particular unit and comparison is based on


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numerical value that represents the relative level of significance of each

hazard.
10.8.1 Introduction
Hazard potential prevailing in a typical chemical process plant has

attracted the attention of several investigators who have attempted to
devise means of classifying, categorizing/indexing chemicals based on
their flammability, toxicity, reactivity and instability. FETI involves
objective evaluation of the realistic fire, explosion, toxicity and reactivity
potential of process and/or storage units. The quantitative methodology
relies on the analysis based on historic loss data, the energy potential of
the chemical under study and the extent to which loss prevention
measures are already applied. FETI is primarily designed for operation
involving storage, handling and processing of flammable, combustible and
reactive materials. It can also be used for analyzing pipeline networks,
boiler installations and certain elements of power plants.
10.8.2 Objective of FETI
The basic objectives that characterize FETI are:-

Identification of equipment within the plant that would contribute to the
initiation or escalation of an incident. Quantification and classifications of
the expected damage potential of fire, explosion and toxicity incidents in
realistic terms.
10.8.3. FETI Methodology
The various factors involved in the calculation of this index are:

 Material factor
 General Process Hazard
 Special Process Hazard
The Material Factor (MF) is a measure of the energy potential of the most
hazardous material or mixture of materials present in the unit in sufficient
quality actually to present a hazard. The MF is a number in the range
from 1 to 40 and is determined using flammability and reactivity
properties. The solid cargo proposed to be handled at the terminal has not
been classified under hazardous material category.
F & FI = MF X F3


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10.8.4 Fire & Explosion Index (FEI)
The FEI value for each chemical is calculated from MF and F3 value. The
degree of hazard potential is identified based on the numerical value of
FEI as per the criteria given below:
FEI Range Degree of Hazard
0 – 65 Light
65 – 95 Moderate
95 & Above Severe
10.8.5 Toxicity Index (TI) – Not Applicable to LPG Handling
The toxicity index is primarily based on the index figures for health
hazards established by the NFPA in codes NFPA 704, NFPA 49 and NFPA
325m. The NFPA figures are translated into a toxicity factor, in
accordance to the following criteria-
NFPA Index Figure Toxicity

0 0
1 50
2 125
3 250
4 325
In addition, the toxicity factor has to be corrected for the Maximum

Allowable Concentration (MAC) value of the toxic substance by adding a
penalty, which is assigned according to the following criteria:
MCA-ppm Penalty
<5 125
5 – 50 75
> 50 50


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10.8.6 Classification of Hazard Categories:
By comparing the indices FEI and TI, the unit in question is classified into
one of the following three categories established for the purpose.
Certain basic minimum preventive and protective measures are
recommended for the three hazard categories.
Category FEI TI
Light < 65 <6
Moderate 65-95 6-10
Severe >95 >10
10.8.7 Results of FETI
The various materials employed in the plant and their properties are listed
in Table . The vulnerable storage and process facilities identified within
the complex are LPG and High Speed Diesel (HSD) as details of FETI
for various storage units are given in Table 10.8.8 and the vulnerability
of various units are listed in Table 10.8.9
10.8.8 Properties of Materials Employed

Name of Quantity Toxicity
Chemicals (TLV) Flammability Reactivity
LPG 3 x 600 MT 1000 PPM Flammable No reaction

,Mounded
storages
HSD 20 KL , 5 mg/m3 Flammable No reaction
Above
ground


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FETI Calculation Table 10.8.9

INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD ,
LPG BOTTLING PLANT ,Gangaikondan,Trinelveli
DOW FIRE AND EXPLOSION INDEX DATA SHEET FOR LIQUIFIED PETROLEUM GAS (LPG )
Sl Penalty Factor Penalty factor
no Factors Range Used
1 General Process Hazard
Base factor 1.00 1.00
A Exothermic Chemical reactions 0.3 to 1.25 0
B Endothermic chemical reactions 0.2 to 1.4 0
C Material Handling and transfer 0.25 to 1.05 0.5
D Enclosed / Indoor Process units 0.25 to 0.9 0.6
E Access 0.2 to 0.35 0.2
F Drainage and Spill control 0.25 to 05 0.5
General Process Hazards Factor -- F1
………………………………………………………….. 2.80
2 Special Process Hazards
Base factor 1.00
A Toxic materials 0.2 to 0.8 0.1
B Sub atmospheric pressure ( < 500 mm Hg ) 0.5 0
Operation in or near Flammable range
C Inerted ____ not inerted ___ 0
1.Tank farms storage flammable liquids 0.5 0
2.Process upset or Purge failure 0.3 0.3
3.Always in flammable range 0.8 0.8
D Dust Explosion ( See table 3 ) 0.25 to 2 0.1
Pressure ( See Fgure 2 )
Operating Pressure ____142_psi____ (PSIg or
E
Kpa ) Relief Setting
__________213 Psi___ (PSIg or Kpa) 0.429
F Low temperature 0.2 to 0.3 0.2
Quantity of Flammable and Unstable Material
G Quantity 1800,000 Kg (Lb or Kg ) ,
Hc = 11400 Kcal /Kg (BTU / Lb or Kcal /Kg ) 0
1.Liquids or Gases in process ( See Figure 3 ) 0
2.Liquids or Gases in storages ( See Figure 4 ) 0.5
3.Combustible soilds in storage , Dust in Process ( See
Figure 5 ) 0
H Corrosion and Erosion 0.1 to 0.75 0.2


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I Leakage - Joints and Packaging 0.1 to 1.5 0.5

J Use of Fired Equipment ( See Figure 6 ) 0
K Hot oil Heat Exchange System ( See table 5 ) 0.15 to 1.15 0
L Rotating Equipment 0.5 0.5
Special PROCESS HAZARDS FACTOR F2 …………………………………………………………………… 4.63
Process unit Hazard Factor F3 = F1 X F2 ………………………………………………………………… 12.9612
MATERIAL FACTOR ( MF ) From Table 1 ………………………………… 21
FIRE & EXPLOSION INDEX (MF X F3 ) …………………………………. 272

RISK LEVEL SEVERE
10.8.91. EFFECT MODEL APPROACH

FOR PROPOSED LPG STORAGE FACILITIES
MORTALITY INDEX CALCULATIONS
-0.33
Marshall Equation : MI = PD * Q
MI – Mortality Index ( Number of fatalities per Tonne of Explosive
PD – Population Density
Q – Quantity LPG in Tonne
For the IOCL Facility
The storage capacity is 3 x 600 MT = 1800 MT
Assumption : Out of 1800 MT , 20 % of the LPG Vapor is favorable for

Explosion and Hence the quantity reduced to 360 MT.
PD = As per the Sensex 2011 ( Gangaikondan Population = 10500
Persons , out of which 10 Km2 is covered by SIPCOT Complex and
hence the population density is taken as 5 % of the total people
residing around 5 Km radius of the facility .
PD = 52.5 Persons / Sq.KM
Probable total number of deaths calculated is 7 to 10 Persons (without Fire
Protection Protections measures) if Safety credit factors are used then
number of deaths will be significantly controlled to very minimum.


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10.9 QRA RECOMMENDATIONS

10.9.1 Recommendations
Sl no Recommendations
1) As per the Risk contour map for the LPG relief from SRV is to be
considered as a major accident with the jet fire radiation distance of 150
Meters from the storages and hence Necessary onsite mock drill to be
planned and conducted periodically.
2) Effectiveness of the Fire and Explosion mitigation measures shall be
periodically measured , recorded and reviewed.
3) Necessary first aid measures to be adopted and followed for the persons
who affected during fire / explosion emergency situations as a life saving
measure in the site itself.
4) LPG Truck Unloading Shed Slope Shall be maintained in such a way that
LPG Liquid causing Unconfined vapor cloud Explosion will be drained
outside the periphery of the Trucks.
5) LPG pump house monorail resting on the steel columns of the roof
system - adequate structural stability shall be ensured.
6) Vapor line to the mounded storages requires proper rigid support .
7) Mounded storage manifold pipes shall be properly clamped with rigid
supports.
8) Emergency Access road from Cylinder filling shed to Emergency gate to
be provided
9) Wooden packing is used in the LPG main Pipe line from the mounded
storage shall be removed
10) TLD – Bay number 7 , Water spry nozzle to be fixed 5 inch away from
the bay so that damage could be Prevented.
11) As the Fire & Explosion Index for the Facility is Severe in the calculations
, necessary Fire and Explosion protection measures shall always be
ensured.
12) Offsite mock drill have to be conducted in consultation with district DRO
and Directorate of Industrial Safety and Health ( DISH ) Tamilnadu.


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CHAPTER – 11
Emergency Mitigation Measures


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Emergency Mitigation Measures (Clause No 11.0)
Basic requirements of ERDMP

Schedule–III
(Refer regulation 11.1)
Basic requirements of ERDMP as per Schedule–III of PNGRB

regulations G.S.R. 39 (E):
1. Location Plan of the Installation indicating siting of the installation at

neighboring details up to a distance of 2 kms from the installation in each
direction. Schedule III (1), Clause No. 13.0 (a)


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2. Site plan of the installation showing a complete layout of the

installation indicating boundary walls, exit and entry gates and location of
various facilities.


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3. Layout of Fire Water Systems and Fire Fighting Equipment details.


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4. Line block diagram of manufacturing process and Process Flow Diagram

(PFD) of each unit. Schedule III (4)
PROCESS FLOW CHART OF INDANE BOTTLING PLANT,TIRUNELVELI


Stores Inspection,
Washing Cap
Cylinders
Check Paint if Purging
Filling station Needed, ST DUE/HR
Check
Correction Scale
Check Scale

without Evacuation
Safety Cap Fixing
Body Leak Test

Destruction
Filled Cylinders
Dispatch


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5. Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for all hazardous chemicals stored,
handled, produced and transported in the installation. Schedule III (5)

Synonyms : LPG, Gas

C A S No. : 68476 – 85 – 7
U N No. : 1075
Regulated Identification: Shipping Name: Liquefied Petroleum Gas, Hazchem Code: 2 WE

Acute Effects : Inhalation: Concentration in air greater than 10% causes dizziness in
few minutes. 1% conc. gives the same symptoms in 10 mts. High
concentration causes asphyxiation.


Skin : Frost bite can occur and appropriate treatment for it to be given.
Remove the wetted clothes. Wash with warm water & soap.

LEL : 1.9 %
UEL : 9.5 %


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heavier than air vapours may travel long distance and flash back.
Products :
Fire-Fighting Instructions : Fires should not be extinguished until flow of LPG is not stopped.
Shut off gas and allow the product to burn. Cool the surroundings
with water spray. Fire fighters should wear self breathing apparatus
while fighting fire
Small Spills : Shut off leaks if safe to do so. Disperse vapours with water spray.
Isolate area and take a gas test before entering. Warn everyone that
the mixture is explosive.
Handling Precautions : Do not use/store near heat/open flame. Avoid contact with liquid as
frost bites can occur. Use gumboots, gloves while handling the
product. Do not inhale. Stay upwind while handling the product.
Tanks and dispensing equipments should be grounded to reduce
static charge fires. It should be stored in closed containers away
from heat & source of ignition. Avoid contact with skin and eyes.
Wash thoroughly after handling
Storage Requirements : Do not use/store near heat/open flame/water/acids. Stenched with
mercaptans for easy identification during leaks
Engineering Controls : Provide proper ventilation for environment to be below Time Waited
Average (TWA). Use explosion proof electrical fittings in classified
areas

o
Physical State : Gas at 15 C & 1atm. pressure. Handled as liquid in compressed
stage


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electricity
Products:

minutes. 1% conc. gives the same symptoms in 10 minutes. High
concentration causes asphyxiation.
Prevent spillage from entering drains or water sources. After spills wash area with soap and water
preventing runoff from entering drains. Can burn with lot of heat producing CO2 and CO.
* American Institutional Conference for Industrial & Govt. Hygenist (AICIGH)



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Avoid contact with oxidizers. Olefinic impurities may laed to narcotic effect or it may act
as a simple.
Asphyxiant. A very dangerous hazard when exposed to heat or flame. If fire is big, keep
surrounding Areas cool by spraying water.
XI. DISCLAIMER
Information contained in this material data sheet is believed to be reliable but
not representation, guarantees or warranties of any kind are made as to its
accuracy, suitability for a particular application or results to be obtained from
them.
* NIOSH is the accession number used by the registry or toxic effects of chemical
substances (RTECS) produced by the National Institute for occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH). Cincinnati, Ohio 45226 USA.

recognized internationally and is in agreement with the United Nations coding
system and is used in transport documents, labels and placards. It is also used to
determine the regulations for shipping the material.
* OSHA is the permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) as defined by the U.S occupational
safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Department of Labour. These standards
may also include the notation “CL” indicating the maximum short time peak allowed
above the ceiling value.
conference of Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). The TLV also represents
an air concentration to which workers can be exposed for a normal 8-hour day, 40-
hour work week without ill effects. The notation “skin” indicates that the material
penetrates into skin and skin contact should be avoided though the TLV
concentration is not exceeded.
* MAK code is followed by the German Research Society. Those materials that are
classified potentially carcinogenic by the German Research Society are noted on this
code. The MAK values are also revised annually and discussions of materials, under
consideration for MAK assignment are included in the annual publication together
with the current values.
* CAS is a code assigned to the material by the chemical abstract services of the
American Chemical Society. This code is becoming a Universal “Social Security
Number” for chemical entities. It is used whenever possible in describing a


TIRUNELVELI
substance to avoid confusion and ambiguity caused by multiple synonyms for the
same chemical.
6. Internal and External Emergency contact numbers and addresses of
police, fire station, hospitals, mutual aid industry, factory inspectors,
Board, State Pollution Control Board, Petroleum and Explosive Safety
Organization (PESO), etc. Schedule III (6)
LIST OF COORDINATORS AND THEIR CONTACT NUMBERS

SL NAME DESIGNATION Phone no.
NO
1 V.M.SUNDAR Sr. Plant Manager 9444904133
M.SIVASANKARA
2 MUTHUVEL Dy. Manager (Plant) 9443131008
8129188006
3 S.SANKARI VENI Asst.Manager(Plant)
4 SHUBHENDRA KUMAR Engg.Officer-1 9442512591
5 MANOJ O J Engg.Officer-2 9400179499
(Address & Telephone directory of Civic Authorities)

S No. Designation Phone No.
Office Mobile
District Administration
1 District Collector, Tirunelveli 0462-2501032,
2501033
3 Dy. Chief Inspector Of Factories& 0462-2572103
Boilers
4 Dy. Commissioner of labour 0462-2573017
5 Divisional Fire Officer 0462-2572342 9445086249

Tirunelveli
Police Administration
1 SP, Tirunelveli 0462 2568025 8300015426
2 DSP,Thalayuth 0462-2301700
3 Inspector of Police,Gangaikondan 0462-2486144 9498194060


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11.7. Pipeline route map and details of various facilities such as

sectionalizing Valve(SV), intermediate Pigging (IP) stations, intermediate
pumping stations (IPS)across pipeline route
11.7.a.P&ID-LPG mounded storage and LPG pump


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11.7.b. P&ID-LPG Tank truck unloading and LPG compressor


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11.7.c.P&ID-LPG filling/Vapour extraction/Purging unit


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11.7.d. P&ID EVACUATION UNIT


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11.7.eP&ID Cooling water & Service water


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11.7.f P&ID DIESEL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM


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11.7.G.P&ID AIR COMPRESSOR& AIR DRYER


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8. Addresses and Telephone Directory of Technical Support Services such

as Environmental Laboratories, fire fighting chemical suppliers, public and
private consultant associated with emergency handling and Aviation
Medical Services, Schedule III (8)
ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE DIRECTORY OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT

SERVICES
SL NO. INSTITUTION PHONE NO.
Department of Chemical Sciences and
1 Environmental Technology, 0471-2442213
Regional Research Labouratory,
Trivananthapuram
Centre for Disaster Management and

Mitigation, Anna
2 University, Chennai 044 6450 2506
Government College of Engineering,

Tirunelveli
3 0462 255 2450
4 Dept. of Chemistry 0462 255 2450

Government College of Engineering,
Tirunelveli


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9. Bomb Threat contingency Plan &Security threat plan. Schedule III (9)
CONTINGENCY PLAN TO DEAL WITH BOMB THREAT-INDANE

BOTTLING PLANT,TIRUNELVELI
9.1. INTRODUCTION:
Security is a continuous commitment for the safety of the LPG

Plants and its utilities and the people working therein, both from
external and internal threats. Of late, militant activities have
increased manifold. The vital oil sector is a tempting target for
terrorist groups. With the addition of modern weapons and
explosives to the terrorist arsenal, the threat has increased
manifold. A contingency plan to deal with such threat to our
company’s assets is given below:
MOUNDED STORAGE
BULLET
(3X600MT)
PRODUCT PUMP HOUSE
TLD BAY
S&D,CONTROL
ROOM
FILLING
SHED ADMIN
SECURITY
BLOCK CABIN
PMCC/DG SET/
TRANSFORME STORES
CANTEEN
AMINITY
R/VCB ROOM
BLOCK/
FW TANK
FIRE PUMP HOUSE/AIR (3X2500 KL)
CL REST
COMPRESSOR
ROOM
HOUSE


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The oil sector is very vital to any economy & therefore can be made easy
target by the terrorist/militants organizations. It may also be subject to
law & order situations due to violence.
Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli is commissioned on June 2015 and is

located in SIPCOT Industrial Area at Gangaikondan in Tirunelveli District
of Tamil Nadu State. It is located adjacent to NH 7 which connects
Varanasi & Kanyakumari and 18 KM from Tirunelveli city. The LPG Bottling
Plant covers about 42 acres of land. The nearest railway station is
situated at Gangaikondan at a distance of 4km(E).The nearest Airport is
situated at Tuticorin at a distance of 33.55 KM(SW). Licensed area is
demarcated by a boundary wall of 1 meter. Outer boundary masonry wall
of 3 mtr height with Y shaped barbed wire fencing of 0.6 mtr height.
Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli has one main gate in the outer boundary
wall and one emergency gate. The main gate is a steel structure of height
3 mtrs & width 6 mtrs, which is being used for entry/exit of vehicles .
The surroundings of the LPG Plants are:
East - Vacant land

North - Vacant land
South -30 ft road
Neighboring Industries / Mutual Aid Agencies are:
Nova carbon India Private Limited, South India Bottling Co.

(P) Ltd., & ATC Tyres Pvt Ltd.,- Gangaikondan, Tirunelveli Dist.,
Working hours:
General shift : Monday –Saturday :- 0830-1715 hrs
Storage: (MOUNDED STORAGE BULLETS):

Tank No. Product Capacity (in MT) Total
B-142, LPG 3 x 600MT each 1800 MT
B-143,
B-144
TOTAL 1800 MT


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9.2 Objective :
The objective of this plan is to prevent, detect and neutralize any

attempt to blast this installation by planting any explosive device in
the Plant premises.
9.3 Preventive Measures :
We have 12 unarmed security guards (deployed in 3 shifts round

the clock) and 01 security supervisor (deployed in general shift).
Handheld metal detectors are used for entry to the Administrative
block and Door frame metal detectors are used for entry to the
licensed area.
(i) All employees are required to wear and display their identity cards
inside the installation premises.
(ii) Good housekeeping in and around Installation is ensured to reduce

the opportunity for planting of any device.
(iii) Only authorized vehicles (cars, scooters/motor-cycles, etc.) are

allowed to park at the designated parking place.
(iv) In-house Intelligence Cell keeps a watch over undesirable

activities/behavior of employees and contractors’ workers.
(v) Perimeter security receives special attention.
(vi) Main gate & emergency gate are monitored by Security. Entire plant
area is under CCTV surveillance.
(vii) Since the staff members are familiar with the layout of the plant,
they will be advised to keep close watch on unusual activity or
suspicious items. The staff will be encouraged to report matters of
security concern.


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Training will be provided at regular intervals to all concerned to execute

the BTCP successfully. The same will be rehearsed through mock-drills.
The above guidelines are general in nature. The management may issue
additional guidelines to meet any eventuality.
9.4 BOMB THREAT ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE (BTAC):
The following Committee will start functioning in the event of receipt

of any bomb threat, either in the form of verbal or written
communication:
S. Position. Name/Designation. Office Mobile
No Phone Phone.
.
1. Co-ordinator. Shri V.M.SUNDAR, 0462- 0944490
Sr. Plant Manager 2445133 4133
2. Alt.Co- Shri.M.SIVASANKARA 0462- 0944313

ordinator. MUTHUVEL 2445233 1008
Dy.Manager(Plant)
3. Security Ms. S.SANKARI VENI 0462- 0812918
Incharge Asst. Manager (LPG- 2445233 8006
Safety)
4. Member Sh. MANOJ O.J 0462- 0940017

OO(LPG) 2445233 9499
5. Member. Collector, Tirunelveli 0462-

2501032
6. Member. SP,Tirunelveli 0462- 8300015
2568025 426
7. Member Divisional Fire officer, 0462- 9445086
Tirunelveli 2572342 249
Immediately on receipt of Bomb Threat, the above committee

members shall assemble in Sr. Plant Manager’s cabin in the
Administrative Building to gather information and analyze the threat
and act accordingly.


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The BTAC shall act immediately without waiting for any specific
member or all members because evaluation of the threat and taking of
appropriate action cannot be delayed.
9.5 RESPONSIBILITIES:
Co-ordinator:
As soon as the message is received, the same shall be conveyed to
the members. Further, the Co-ordinator will -
(a) Inform the Police Control Room, medical officer, fire station,
Bomb Squad, concerned State/Regional office and Corporate
Security.
(b) Inform all the members of BTAC and other External
Agencies.
(c) Start a log of arrivals of all the members of the BTAC.
(d) Collect ‘Information Form’ from the receiver of the bomb
threat call. Analyze the call as per annexure. If receiver is
available at the unit, ask him to remain present to assist the
BTAC in analyzing the call
(e) Request the concerned to be on duty even after dismissal
time, to maintain continuity.
(f) Keep adequate number of sand bags ready.
(g) Submit report to State Office /Regional Office.
Alternate Coordinator:
In the absence of the Coordinator, the alternative Coordinator will
function as the Coordinator. When the coordinator is available in
station, alternate coordinator will assist him.
Members:
They will assemble immediately and help the Coordinator to take
appropriate action in respect of the crisis.
Shift Incharge:
 They will assist the Coordinator in evacuating the area
 Close down the facility to avoid damage
 Help the search team in searching the suspected area(s)
 Assist Security personnel/Police Personnel.
 Ensure minimum movement of personal vehicle / support
vehicles near the threatened site.
 Cordon off the area with unit security and assist local police.


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Security Supervisor:
 They will assemble at the Assembly point and cordon off the
affected area
 Arrange evacuation of premises in consultation with coordinator.
 Restrict movement of vehicles.
 Assist search team in searching the area and later on help the
explosive experts.
 Collect intelligence through local contacts.
9.6 SEARCH TEAM:
The following will be the members of search team:
1. Shift In Charge : With two staff member, one security guard on

duty (During duty hours)
2. Safety officer : With two staff member, one security guard on
duty (During duty hours)
3. Dy.Manager(P) : With two security member on duty (During
on/off shift)
The Search Team will mobilize the following equipment:

A. Bomb Detector.
B. Bomb Separation Blanket, Bomb Circle.
C. Hook and line set.
D. Metal Detector.
E. Search Mirror.
F. Emergency Lights.
G. Flash Lights.
H. Stethoscopes.
I. Metallic & Non-Metallic probe.
J. Screwdriver set.
K. Chalks or Lime powder for marking searched areas.
All other implements required will be brought by the BDDS team.
The search team will not make a move to handle the

suspicious object or attempt to dispose it. If possible, the
object will be covered by bomb blanket or sand bags would be kept
around it. The basic idea is to find the suspicious object and isolate
the area till experts arrive to take charge.


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9.7 SEARCH RULES:
The search team will follow the following search rules.

(a) Never use more searchers then absolutely necessary.
(b) Use searchers in alternate rooms to minimize injuries.
(c) Never assume that only one device has been planted.
Continue the search till the whole area is cleared.
(d) Clearly mark the area, which is searched to avoid duplication.
(e) Trust nothing and assume nothing is safe.
(f) Do not accept anything on face value
(g) Take rest during search process if needed.
(h) Clearly mark areas, which are suspected to be hazardous and
inform the coordinator of BTAC immediately.
(i) Mark the area in bold letters “DANGER – BOMB”.
(j) Detonation of an explosive device may be caused by
alteration of the changing environment i.e., temperature
variations, the presence of an electric current, etc. Therefore,
those who conduct the search should never cause any change
in the environment. They should not put on electric lights in
dark rooms and should not change the settings of
thermostats, etc. In dark rooms, flashlight should not be
used.
(k) Medical personnel should be kept close at hand during the
search.
(l) Fire brigade personnel should remain on the alert.
9.8 WHAT TO LOOK FOR:
The search team should look for the items listed below:
(a) Ground appearing to have been recently disturbed.

(b) Tin foil
(c) Disturbed carpet
(d) Scratch mark or new paint
(e) Fresh plaster or cement
(f) Greasy paper wrapping
(g) Brick dust/sand dust
(h) Partly opened windows/doors / drawers
(i) Unusual or out of place objects.
(j) Loose switch board, floor boards and paneling
(k) Loose electrical fittings


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(l) Packing / wrapping material

(m) Disturbed vegetation
(n) Safety fuses
(o) Dirty rope
(p) Batteries
(q) Loose wires or pieces of insulation
(r) New brick work
The Above list is only indicative, not exhaustive. The search team
will examine all suspicious objects.
9.9 WHERE TO LOOK:
(a) Visitors’ room in Administrative Building

(b) Rest rooms for workers
(c) In Administrative building/Security gate
(d) Under stair cases - in Administrative building
(e) Waste baskets- in each room.
(f) Flower pots- in open spaces and in buildings
(g) Bushes/ shrubs-in TT parking area
(h) Garden / Nursery in front of store
(i) Car / Scooter Parking Shed
(j) Drains, sewage, manholes, etc.
(k) Telephones, air – conditioners, coolers
(l) Store & Scrap Yard
(m) Toilets, water supply systems - In Administrative, S&D room,
Canteen
(n) False Ceilings - In Administrative building
(o) Fire water storage tanks and Overhead Diesel tanks
(p) Batteries & Loose wires / pieces of insulation material
9.10. SEARCH TECHNIQUES:
(a) Open area: The area in front of Security Room at Main Gate
No 1 and Frisking gate.
The open area will be visually scanned from a safe distance

for any suspected objects:
(i) In case, no suspicious object is found on visual search
then equipment like explosive detector, metal detector,
etc. shall be used.


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(ii)Sniffer dogs, if available, will also be used.
(b) Room Search:

The entire room will be divided into four levels for the
convenience of searching.
(a) First Level - upto waist level

(b) Second level - from waist level to head level
(c) Third level - from head level to ceiling level
(d) Forth level - false ceiling area/roof
Before starting the search, the team comprising two persons will
stand attentively near the door and try to pick up any ticking sound
of a timing mechanism.
The members thereafter will stand back to back at a particular place

and simultaneously start searching the room starting from up to
waist level stage.
After completion of search, the team will mark clearly with chalk that
the room has been searched.
9.11. EVACUATION OF AREA:
The BTAC after considering all pros and cons shall decide on
evacuation and search. S&D Officer will be the in charge for
Communication. The exit route and assembly area shall be
decided and communicated as soon as the decision for evacuation is
taken. Sr.Plant Manager shall guide the people with the help of the
Safety Officer. Dy. Mgr (P) shall make an announcement over the
public address system (walkie Talkie, Intercom, Handheld Loud
speakers etc) about the threat and advise the employees to vacate
the area peacefully via the prescribed evacuation route and
assemble at the specified holding area. During evacuation, all
safety and security measures shall be observed.
For effective and smooth evacuation

- The holding area should be earmarked in advance.
- An evacuation signal and evacuation route should be pre-
arranged.
- The entire evacuation shall be supervised by the in-charge.


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9.12. EVACUATION:
The main purpose of evacuation is to move people to a safe

area from the danger area. The bomb threat assessment
committee after considering all pros and cons may take any of
the following decisions:
(a) Search without evacuation.
(b) Evacuate partially and search.
(c) Evacuate and search simultaneously.
(d) Evacuate fully and then search.
(e) Evacuate fully but desist from searching search.
9.13. EVACUATION PLAN:

(a) Shift In charge will be responsible for effective
communication.
(b) Wireless / Walkie – talkie, Public Address System, Page
Phone, Land line Telephone and Mobile telephones will be
used for uninterrupted communication.
(c) Apart from the main gate, the Emergency Gate is the other
designated route for emergency exit.
(d) Security Supervisor and security guards will work as guides
during evacuation.
(e) Training to the designated employees, with particular
responsibilities mentioned above, will be imparted from time
to time.
(f) The assembly area will be infront of control room. where a
board reading “Assembly Point” is displayed.


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EVACUATION ROUTE
MOUNDED STORAGE
BULLET
(3X600MT)
PRODUCT PUMP HOUSE
TLD BAY
S&D,
CONTROL ROOM
MAIN
GATE
FILLING
SHED ADMIN
SECURITY
BLOCK CABIN
PMCC/DG SET/
TRANSFORME STORES
CANTEEN
AMINITY
R/VCB ROOM
BLOCK/
FW TANK
ROOM
REST
COMPRESSOR HOUSE
CL


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9.14. EVACUATION PROCEDURES:
Once the Bomb Threat Assessment Committee recommends

evacuation, the designated member would announce the decision over
the public address system in a manner calculated to cause minimum
panic and confusion. The announcer should keep his calm and should
not show any anxiety. He should specify the evacuation route and
names of officials who would guide the employees to the assembly
area. He would also state the importance of remaining in the assembly
area till further instruction.
During evacuation the employees should follow the guidelines

stated below:
(a) Remain calm.

(b) Walk out of the building quietly and orderly manner.
(c) Avoid running or jostling.
(d) Follow the evacuation route.
(e) Follow instruction from guides regarding the route to be
followed.
(f) Do not indulge in speculation about the nature of the
emergency, thereby causing loss of time.
(g) Do not obstruct the evacuation process in any way.
(h) Do not leave behind any personal belongings.
(i) Switch off the Plant machinery and power supply before
leaving the area.
(j) Help ladies and old people to reach the safe area.
(k) Remain quietly in the assembly area until further instruction.
(l) Do not spread rumours.
(m) Check if all the employees have reached the assembly area.
If anybody is missing, the matter should be immediately
reported to the coordinator of the Bomb Threat Committee.
(n) Follow the rule “ DO NOT TAKE THE BOMB AWAY FROM
THE PUBLIC. TAKE THE PEOPLE AWAY FROM THE BOMB.
9.15. SIGNAL FOR EVACUATION:
Walkie-Talkie sets will be used to direct the employees in the

affected area to evacuate. The specific code signal for evacuation
will be “ALL EMPLOYEES SHOULD COME NEAR ADMIN AND S&D
ROOM FOR MEETING CALLED BY SENIOR PLANT MANAGER, ALL


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OTHER PERSONS LIKE CONTRACTOR WORKERS, VISITORS IF ANY,

SHALL ALSO BE BROUGHT THERE.”
9.16. EVALUATION OF THE BOMB THREAT:
BOMB THREAT:
The bomb threat may be received either on telephone or through

written message . The threat may be genuine or false. Evaluating the
bomb threat message correctly is an important task of the Bomb
Threat Assessment Committee.The bomb threat message to be
reported as per Annexure A. Even a seemingly hoax call would have
to be properly assessed before reaching a conclusion.
GENUINE MESSAGE
It is possible to form an idea as to whether a bomb threat call is

genuine or not from the way the caller talks and gives information
about the bomb. A genuine bomb threat caller would be able to
describe the bomb in detail, as also the location of the bomb, time
set for explosion, type of bomb, reason for planting the bomb, who
is responsible for planting bomb, etc.
Genuine bomb threat caller is
a) The person who planted the bomb

b) Who knows about the placement of bomb
The genuine bomb threat caller would be very confident in passing

on the message and replying to queries about the bomb.
HOAX MESSAGE
The hoax calls can be identified from the following:
a) The caller’s voice shakes while giving details about the bomb.
b) He is unable to give full details of the bomb.
c) On being questioned the caller drops the telephone abruptly


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ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON RECEIPT OF A BOMB THREAT
Whenever a bomb threat is received the message receiver must

remain calm and try to extract as much information as possible so
that the genuineness of the threat can be assessed.
A set of questions that may be posed to the caller, is given below:
a) What is your name?

b) What is your address?
c) What is your telephone number?
d) Where are you speaking from?
e) Where is the bomb right now?
f) When is it going to explode?
g) What kind of bomb is it?
h) What does it look like?
i) How to get rid of the bomb?
j) What will cause it to explode?
k) Who placed the bomb? How do you know about it?
l) Why has the bomb been placed?
ADDITIONAL DATA:
During the conversation with the bomb threat caller, the receiver of
the call should also note:
a) The language of the caller

b) Mix of languages if any
c) Manner (calm, emotional, angry, vulgar, threatening,
laughing, serious, jovial, etc.)
d) Voice (soft, loud, intoxicated, etc.)
e) Speech (slow, fast, nasal, etc.)
f) Whether the voice sounds familiar?
g) Background noises, like street sounds, house noises, animal
noises, crockery, motor, music, train, factory machinery,
office machinery, aircraft, traffic, etc.
The additional information will help to identify the genuineness of

the threat and trace the caller.


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BOMB THREAT DRILL PROCEDURE
1. Receipt of bomb threat.
2. Immediately inform Co-ordinator and Police control room.
3. Inform Local Civil authorities and Police authorities and apprise them of
bomb threat.
4. Also inform Fire services of threat received at Plant.
5. Evaluation of the repercussions of the bomb explosion based on the

threats received.
6. Decision to search or evacuate the area.
7. In case of evacuation, premises are cleared off in order to minimise the

loss of bomb explosion.
8. Search the bomb:

a. Bomb located -
i. Fire fighting system checked for readiness.
ii. All precautionary actions to minimise or making the bomb
inactive.
iii. Disposal of bomb with the help of local authorities and bomb
disposal squad.
iv. Investigate the bomb threat thoroughly.
v. Declaration that area is safe.
vi. Order re entry of employee.
b. Bomb not located -

i. Call off all the activities of the Plant.
ii. Declaration that area is safe.
iii. Order re entry of employee.


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1. BRIEF DESCRIPTION AND METHOD OF HANDLING THE

SUSPECTED OBJECT
1 Description Method Of Handling
a. It has a Metal shell of GOOD Possibly service ammunition.

FINISH AND BEARS Leave it at site and surround
MARKINGS OF letters figures with sand bags. Request
or monogram. It is not fitted Inspector of Explosives
with a wick of fuse. concerned to come and
examine object on site. If
possible, contact nearest
military establishment for
help in identification and
removal of object.
b. It HAS A METAL SHELL of Possibly a mechanically
good or bad finish and is operated grenade. DO NOT
FITTED externally WITH A meddle with the spring-
SPRING LOADED HAMMER or loaded hammer/ plunger
PLUNGER, secured by a pin mechanism.
or string (Spring may not be
visible).
c. Object looks like a BALL of Take a bucket GENTLY place
JUTE YARN OR COTTON object in the bucket. DO
YARN OR STRIPS OF CLOTH. NOT press object between
It is NOT fitted with a wick or fingers while picking it up.
fuse. Size less than 50 mm
in diameter.
d. Object looks like BALL OF Possibly a cracker. Send in a
JUTE YARN. It is fitted WITH padded box or carton to the
A WICK. Diameter not more concerned Inspector of
than 25 mm. It may or may Explosives.
not have attractive finish.
e. Object looks like a bulky Could be a book-bomb,
Book. DON’T OPEN DON’T UPTURN
OR TILT.


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2. PRECAUTIONS WHICH MUST BE FOLLOWED IN ALL CASES:
a) Be careful about entering into a room in which or next to

which an explosion has occurred to bring you there. It may
be a ruse to trap you.
b) Do not open a closed room / door /window / almirah /
cupboard/ box in the normal way, open with a long pole or in
any other improvised manner.
c) Do not switch on any electric line if the room is dark use hand
torch for illumination.
d) Do not touch, lift, drag, kick, hit or move the suspected
object,
e) Do not try to defuse a suspected bomb. Leave the task to
experts.
f) Isolate or cover with bomb blanket, if available.


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ANNEXURE-A
BOMB THREAT MESSAGE FORM
UNIT
LOCATION TIME DATE
Forwarded to ---------------------------------------------------------------
Exact wording of the threat:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Where is the bomb right now?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. When is it going to explode?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. What does it look like?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. What kind of bomb is it?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. What will cause it to explode?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Did you place the bomb?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Why are you doing this?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


TIRUNELVELI
ANNEXURE-A
[2/4]
8. Who are you?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. What is your name?

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. What is your address?

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11.What is your telephone number? ---------------------------------
12.Where are you now? ------------------------------------------
13. Origin of call.
Public phone Private phone

Internal Long call
14.Specific number dialed by the caller -----------------------------
15. Sex --------------------------------------------------------------
16. Approximate age ---------------------------------------------------
17. Call received: Time -------- Completed --------------
Duration --------
18. Nationality ---------------------------------------------------------
19. Threat Language:
A. Well Spoken B. Irrational

C. Taped D. Foul
E. Incoherent F. Message read by threat
maker


TIRUNELVELI
ANNEXURE-A
[3/4]
20. Voice characteristics:
A. Loud B. Pitched C. Rasping
D. Intoxicated E. Soft F. Deep
G. Pleasant
21. Callers voice:
A. Calm B. Crying C. Excited
D. Stutter E. Rapid F. Deep
G. Disguised H. Familiar I. Clearing throat
J. Angry K. Slow L. Fast
M. Laughter N. Nasal O. Lisp
P. Hoarse Q. Slowered
22. Accent:
Local Not local

Foreigner Regional
Language used by the caller ----------------------------------
23. Back ground sound:
Quite Mixed Street Noises

Music Crockery House Noises
Motor Voice Animal Noises
PA system Booth Factory Machinery
Children Traffic Office Machinery
Train Buses Airport Activities
Party Atmosphere Others
24. Did the caller appear familiar with the area by his description of the
bomb location ?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
25. If the voice sound familiar, whose did at sound like?

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
26. Command of language:
Excellent Good
Fair Poor


TIRUNELVELI
ANNEXURE-A
[4/4]
Remarks:
Name of the person who received the bomb threat:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Designation Department Phone
Message passed on to (Name)
Designation Department Phone
Date Time Signature


TIRUNELVELI
9.17. EVALUATION OF BOMB THREAT MESSAGE:
Once the bomb threat call is received and the conversation is over,
the person receiving the message will complete the “bomb threat
information from” and forward it to the Coordinator of the bomb
threat assessment committee.
The Bomb Threat Assessment Committee will immediately assemble

at the designated place. While evaluating the bomb threat the
committee will consider the exact message received, number of
hoax calls received in last 3-4 months, recent incidents of bomb
explosion in and around the plant in last one year, loss of
production if the operation is discontinued, dangers involved to
public, employees, properties and installation.
The Committee should be very careful in evaluating the bomb threat
message because of its serious implications.
Bomb Threat Message Evaluation Method:
As soon as the Coordinator of the Assessment Committee is

informed of the bomb threat evaluation, he should convene a
meeting of the committee in the designated place. It will not be
desirable to wait for all the members to assemble to evaluate the
bomb threat message for further necessary action. The Committee
will start functioning on the arrival of two or three members.
The Part-A of Annexure B - Bomb Warning Assessment Form

(BWAF) will be completed in all respect by the Coordinator
immediately. Part – A, will help to fix the details of bomb and its
location.
From the detailed report submitted by the bomb threat message

receiver, the Part-B of Annexure B will be filled, which will be
helpful in identifying the exact place or location where the bomb has
been planted.
Part-C of Annexure B indicates the exact type of device, likely time

of explosion, the person or organization responsible, technical
description of the device, etc.


TIRUNELVELI
One or more ticks in Part B and Part C of the evaluation form will
lead to the bomb threat call as “RED” or SPECIFIC”. In that case,
the following actions should be considered.
a) Whole Area of Unit to be evacuated.

b) Thorough search by Search Team of whole unit, starting with
suspect area, till the bomb detection and disposal squad
arrives. The bomb detection and disposal squad will
thereafter search the whole area, with the assistance of
employees of the organization.
c) All safety measures will be adopted. Station fire fighting
equipment should be moved near the threatened area.
d) Hospital to be alerted.
e) Local police to be informed for cordoning the unit from
outside, moving people away and dispatching bomb squad to
the site.
f) Vehicular traffic to be diverted away from roads adjoining the
unit.
g) Power supply to threatened unit to be cut off.
In case the Part B or C of the evaluation form does not have

sufficient information to categorize the bomb threat call as “RED” or
“ SPECIFIC”, the information provided in Part-D of the evaluation
form should be analyzed. Part D contains background data, such as
history of bomb warnings and state of internal security, status of
industrial relations at the time, etc. The details of part D will
suggest the nature of precautionary measures to be adopted.
In case part B and Part C do not have sufficient information to

merit classification of the message as “RED” or “SPECIFIC” but part
D has information which indicates need for taking certain
precautionary measures, the call will be classified as “Amber”. In
the case of “Amber” threats following steps are indicated:
1. Police Control Room, Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad,

Superintendent of Police and District Magistrate to be
informed.
2. Security arrangements to be augmented in the area.
3. Search team to start searching without affecting normal
functioning of unit.
4. Station Fire fighting equipment be put on alert.


TIRUNELVELI
5. Specific area threatened to be evacuated and declared out-of-

control for everyone.
If Part-A, Part B, Part C and Part D contain no information

indicating that the call is genuine, it will be termed as “Green”, in
which case normal functioning will be continue, while the target
area is searched for suspicious objects.
Hence, the bomb threat call will be labeled “RED” or “SPECIFIC”

“AMBER” OR “GREEN” as per information available in Part A, Part B,
Part C and Part-D.
Note: In case of difference of opinion amongst the members about

the nature of the threat, it would be advisable to err on the side of
caution.
The decision of the committee will be recorded in the bomb threat

evaluation Performa and signed by all the members.
The evaluation of bomb threat will be done as quickly as possible as

time lost may prove costly.
ANNEXURE-B
BOMB WARNING ASSESSMENT FORM
Indian Oil Corporation Limited
PART-A
Message received by:

Name
Designation
Telephone no.
Time of receipt
Exact wording of threat call:

-----------------------------------------------------


TIRUNELVELI
-----------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------
Additional information: -----------------------------------------------------
Location of bomb: -----------------------------------------------------------
Anticipated time of Explosion: ----------------------------------------------
Description of bomb: --------------------------------------------------------
Name & Organisation -----------------------------------------------------

of the caller:
Telephone no. of the caller: ------------------------------------------------
Whether the message is taped: Yes/No
Any other information: -----------------------------------------------------
PART-B
Caller specified the name of the building? ---------------------------------
Caller specified any room no.? ---------------------------------------------
Where the bomb is kept? ---------------------------------------------------
Caller informed any specific location? --------------------------------------
PART-C
Exact construction of device specified. -------------------------------------
Detailed technical description of device specified. ------------------------


TIRUNELVELI
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Means of concealment of bomb explained. --------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Extortion or political demand made. ---------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Identification of a person with his address and description. --------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The type of bomb or device. ------------------------------------------------
Expected time of explosion
Terrorist or other organisation made or code word given. ----------------
Any other information
PART-D
Background data:
History of bomb warning and state of internal security: ------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
History of activities of terrorist in last three months: ---------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Any term used indicating call to be genuine or spurious: -----------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


TIRUNELVELI
Influence of current events: ------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional security measures taken recently: -----------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
State of industrial relation: -------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Anti social elements activities: ---------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intention to disrupt / create tension or violence in the locality: ----------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Any other information to decide the call as Genuine or false: ------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


TIRUNELVELI
9.18. PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED AFTER IDENTIFICATION OF

SUSPECTED OBJECT:
Actions to be taken:
A. In case, any suspicious object is located during search, the area is

to be cordoned off and a sign reading “DANGER - BOMB” is
displayed in the Area.
B. The Coordinator of the Bomb Threat Assessment Committee is to be

informed about the finding of the suspicious object.
C. The Coordinator in turn will inform all the members of the

Committee, Bomb Disposal Squad, Police, Fire Brigade, Medical
Authorities and Civil Authorities.
D. The BTAC considering all the factors shall decide the extent of the
evacuation required.
E. The designated officer shall order the evacuation of the area. The
safe distance for evacuation shall also depend on the size, nature
and location of the explosive device.
F. It is advisable to evacuate the employees to an assembly area,

which is at least 300 meter away from the suspected object.
G. The evacuation route and the assembly area should be checked for
any bombs or IEDs.
H. The object should be delicately covered with bomb blanket and then
a 3 ft. high wall of sand bags should be built around it. A minimum
of 100/200 sandbags may be kept at each location for this purpose.
I. In the absence of Bomb blankets, mattresses or cushions can be

used to reduce the blast effect.
J. The bomb separation ring consisting of a pre-cast concrete structure

with adequate wall thickness can also be used in place of sandbags.
An efficient method for quickly transporting the concrete structure
should be worked out.


TIRUNELVELI
K. If the suspected object is found in an office building or in any room,

the windows and doors should be opened to minimize the extent of
the bomb blast damage.
L. In case, the suspected object is located adjacent to very important

rooms like control room, MCR and Power House Control room or
compressor and generator room, etc., wall buttressing can be done
by stacking sandbags along the wall of the adjacent room to
minimize the damage from blast and shock effect.
M. In a confined room the bomb blast wave will travel all round in case
the room is big enough. But if there are any outlets, the blast wave
will try to escape first through these outlets. This will lead to severe
damage around the outlets. Therefore, no employee should be
allowed to move or assemble in such areas.
N. The evacuated employees should not be permitted to re-enter the

building, or the affected area, until the bomb squad clear the bomb,
declare the area safe and final clearance certificate is issued by the
Bomb Threat Assessment Committee.
9.19. ALL CLEAR/COMPLETION CERTIFICATE:
The all-clear signal/message is to be communicated to the

employees and people of the affected area after the bomb threat
search procedure is completed. We have decided to announce over
Handheld loudspeaker and Walkie Talkie “MEETING WITH SENIOR
PLANT MANAGER IS OVER, ALL ARE REQUESTED TO GO TO THEIR
RESPECTIVE WORK PLACES”. The BTAC shall prepare the Bomb
Threat Search Completion Certificate which will be signed by all the
members. Copies of the certificate will be forwarded to the higher
authorities for information and record.
If the bomb Search has been carried out by Army/Police Bomb

Disposal Squad then they shall issue a clearance certificate and the
same will be counter signed either by the SP or his representative
available at the Command Centre/Control Room.
After completion of all the above exercises the BTAC will ensure that
normalcy is restored and all the agencies are informed accordingly.


TIRUNELVELI
The PR Section (Corporate Communication) will ensure that the

press releases are issued only in consultation with the Unit Head.
9.20. IMPORTANT:
The list of DO’s and DON’Ts given below, procedure for dealing with
suspected objects/bombs shall be circulated to all the Employees
and displayed prominently at some place where it will receive
maximum exposure.
LIST OF DO’S & DON’TS
a) Do not touch or remove the suspected object unless you are duty
bound to do so.
b) Do not open the package with hand or other materials.
c) Do not puncture the package, object or device.
d) Do not submerge the suspected object in water as there are some

bomb which gets activate in water.
e) Do not cut the strings or wire attached to the object. Some bombs
are designed to get activated once the string or wire is cut.
f) Do not accept the identification marks on the package on its face

value.
g) Do not pass any metallic object over the package as some bombs
are designed metal sensitive.
h) Do not attempt to open the baggage by hand or any other

unapproved methods. Use always entry technique only.
i) Do not focus any flash light directly over the suspected object as
some bombs explode on exposure to light source.
j) Do not allow anybody to re-entry in the affected area until the

danger is cleared for safe and advised for re-entry.
k) Do not take bomb away from public. Take public away from bomb.


TIRUNELVELI
l) Do not bring suspected object in the control room.
m) Do not transport the suspected object in the control through

congested area.
n) Once the bomb is located evacuate the employees immediately to

the assembly the area which is notified at a safer distance.
o) Open all the doors and windows to minimize the extents of damage
due to blast or shock effect.
p) Inform the Bomb Threat Committee co-ordinator.
q) Inform bomb disposal squad.
r) Inform civil authorities, police, fire brigade, hospital and ambulance.
s) Handle the suspected item only if you are trained and duty bound to
handle it.
9.21. DAMAGE CAUSED BY A BOMB:
A bomb causes damage both by blast effect and by flying shrapnel,

which are scattered over a fairly wide area but cause damage only to
points, struck with sufficient force.
9.22. APPEARANCE AND SIZE OF HOME-MADE BOMB:
Homemade bombs are not manufactured to any fixed standards.

Therefore, their materials of construction, shape, size explosive
charge, finish and workmanship vary widely. A homemade bomb may
look like anything from a ball of jute yarn to well-finished service type
ammunition. Bamboo tubes, cigarette, tins, glass bottles, coconut
shells, earthen capsules, metal pipes and shells of various types have
been and are used in making home made bombs.
23. APPARENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SERVICE (MILITARY

BOMBS) AND HOME MADE BOMBS:
All service bombs have very good finish of a manufactured article and
bear markings in the form of letters, figures or monograms.


TIRUNELVELI
Home made bombs generally have a crude finish and do not bear
markings, even if the finish is good.
9.24. DIFFERENT TYPES OF HOME MADE BOMBS:
Homemade bombs may be classified as under: -

(i) Bomb, which explodes at a preset time.
(ii) Bomb, which explodes when its position is disturbed.
(iii) Bomb, which explodes on impact.
(iv) Bomb initiated by the action of sulfuric acid.
(v) Bomb initiated mechanically.
(vi) Bomb fitted with fuse, which has to be lighted.
(vii) Booby trap bomb.
(viii) Letter bomb.
A) TIME BOMB:
A time bomb may have one of the following timing

arrangements:
(a) A time piece or watch acting as a time switching device
in an electrical circuit consisting of a flash light battery
with a filament of resistance (torch light bulb with its
glass globe broken).
(b) Corrosive acid or chemical in a corrodible capsule.
(c) A special alloy which fatigues at a specified rate when
under tension.
(d) A long length of safety fuse or a slow burning fuse.
(e) A time pencil, which triggers the explosion at a preset
time.
WARNING: The timing device is usually concealed in the

bomb. It is rarely possible to identify a Time Bomb or to
ascertain the set time. There is therefore a measure of risk in
dealing with a Time Bomb.


TIRUNELVELI
B) LETTER BOMB:
All letter bombs contain a charge of explosive and a suitable

initiating device. The weight of explosive in a letter bomb is
not very great. Neither need a letter bomb be too bulky. A
LETTER BOMB CAN KILL A PERSON WHO OPENS IT.
Letter bombs can also be made with explosive charge which is

sufficiently sensitive to rough handling and does not need any
special initiating arrangement. Such a bomb may be
expected to be delivered only through a messenger and not
by post as it may result in premature explosion. However,
such sensitive letter bombs may also be sent by post as in the
Patiala Post Office blast case.
C) POCKET/PARCEL/BOOK BOMB:
A packet/parcel/book bomb contains a charge of explosive

with a suitable initiating device. The weight of a bomb of this
type will be much more than that of a letter bomb. In general,
the effects of explosion of this type of bomb will be far more
serious than that of a letter bomb.
In the case of packet/parcel/book bomb delivered through

messenger, the initiating device may be modified to make it
work when the packet/parcel/book is upturned.
D) DETECTION OF LETTER BOMBS, PACKET /PARCEL / BOOK

BOMBS:
The following pointers should be looked for in determining a

suspected letter/packet/parcel/book bomb.
i Over stamped but unregistered

ii Unevenly balanced
iii It has a bulge
iv Too heavy for its size
v There is a small pinhole in one corner
vi Thin wire protrudes out of it
vii It has grease marks
viii It gives off odour of almond


TIRUNELVELI
ix It has springiness on top, bottom or sides. Don’t

press or bend.
x If shaken gently, there is noise of loose metal
inside
xi It gives the feeling of containing a cardboard or a
stiff liner.
xii NOTE: A letter bomb may, be marked “Personal” or
“Confidential” to make sure that it gets to the
intended victim.
9.25. EQUIPMENT / MATERIALS REQUIRED FOR DEALING

BOMBS:
The following materials should be kept ready at all times as a kit for
dealing with bombs:
(i) Strong, smooth string of well twisted cotton yarn or plastic
yarn approximately, 3mm in diameter and 30 meter long.
(ii) 2 meters long pole of bamboo or wood (long police lathi)
(iii) A bucket or tin can with its top open
(iv) A sharp knife or a pair of scissors


TIRUNELVELI
9.26 BOMB THREAT EVALUATION & MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
MARKETING DIVISION :
1. Location Incharge – Coordinator

Sh. V.M.SUNDAR, Sr. Plant Manager
0462 2445133, 0462-2445133 (Tele fax), 9444904133 (Mo)
2. Alternate Coordinator
Sh. M. SIVASANKARA MUTHUVEL, Dy. Manager (P)
0462 2445233, 9443131008 (Mo)
3. Incharge of security
Ms. S.SANKARI VENI, Asst. Manager (LPG-Safety)
0462 2445233, 8129188006 (Mo)
4. SP / DSP / Local Police Rep.

SP, TIRUNELVELI - 0462 2568025, 8300015426
DSP, THALAIYUTHU – 0462-2301700
POLICE STATION,GANGAIKONDAN – 0462-2486144,
9498194060
5. DM / SDM / Local Civil Rep.

DISTRICT MAGISTRATE – 0462
2501032,2501033,2501035,2501036


TIRUNELVELI
6. Incharge of the nearby industry / oil terminal / depot
Other
CONTACT PERSON Contact Tel. No. contact no.
IOCL Terminal, Sh. S. VANJICKO, Sr. 0462-2352570 9444910932

Tuticorin Terminal Manager
IOCL, Indane Sh. M B Manohar Roy 0452-254133 9443389136

Bottling Plant, Ch. Plant Manager
Madurai
IOCL Terminal, Sh. RENGANATHAN V 0452-26447905 9619183658

Madurai Ch. Terminal Manager
IOCL, AFS, Sh. L.R.L.M.RAO 0452-2690347 9381255486

Madurai BOMMUSETTI,
Sr. Station Master
Nova carbon, Michael.X 0462-2568800 8754001903

Gangaikondan AGM
South Indian G.Pradeep 0462-2950250

Bottling Plant, GM
Gangaikondan
ATC tyres, 0462-3987302 0462-3987300

Gangaikondan
7. Local fire fighting authority

DIVISIONAL FIRE OFFICER , TIRUNELVELI - 0462 2572342
FIRE STATION, PALAYAMKOTTAI – 101,0462-2572099
FIRE STATION,PETTAI-0462-2342003


TIRUNELVELI
LIST OF IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS
1. POLICE CONTROL ROOM : 100, 0462-2572100

TRAFFIC POLICE (HELPLINE) : 0462-2579066
2. BOMB THREAT CO-ORDINATOR : 0462 2445133,

9444904133(Mo)
3. ALTERNATE BOMB THREAT
CO-ORDINATOR : 0462 2445233,
9443131008(Mo)
4. MEMBER OF CO-ORDINATION
COMMITTEE : 0462 2445233,
8129188006 (Mo)
5. LOCAL HOSPITAL,TIRUNELVELI: 0462-2560823
6. IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS:HQ

CORPORATE OFFICE : 011 26260101
REFINERY HQ : 011 24361364
PIPELINES HQ : 0512 2448512
MARKETING HQ : 022 26426075
7. IMPORTANT TELEPHONES OF UNIT

ED,TNSO : 044-28330122,9444065760
GM(I/c),SRO : 044-28339000,9445172089
DGM(LPG),TNSO :044-28330091,9445456347
CHIEF MANAGER(LPG-O) :044-28330133,9444442093
CHIEF MANAGER(H,S&E),SRO :044-28339200,9444902974
10. AVAILABILITY OF AMBULANCE:

(A) GOVT. 0462-2572511
0462-2572511
(B) PRIVATE,TIRUNELVELI 0462-2560823,
9842144323


TIRUNELVELI
Scheme for the maintenance of the Essential Services (Bottling

Operation, Bulk Decantation and Packed LPG supply to
distributors) in Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli in the event of
an Emergency.
9A -SECURITY PROTECTION SCHEME
9a.1 Introduction, Topography & Geographical location of Indane Bottling

Plant,Tirunelveli
MOUNDED STORAGE
BULLET
(3X600MT)
PRODUCT PUMP HOUSE
TLD BAY
S&D,CONTROL
ROOM
FILLING
SHED ADMIN
SECURITY
BLOCK CABIN
PMCC/DG SET/
TRANSFORME STORES
CANTEEN
AMINITY
R/VCB ROOM
BLOCK/
FW TANK
CL REST
COMPRESSOR
ROOM
HOUSE


TIRUNELVELI
The oil sector is very vital to any economy & therefore can be made easy
target by the terrorist/militants organizations. It may also be subject to
law & order situations due to violence or civil unrest. With the current
situation of terrorism in the country & worldwide, the necessity of the
having a contingency plan to deal with such a threat in oil industry is felt
necessary. Accordingly, security protection plan/scheme has been
worked out for LPG Bottling Plant, to meet any eventuality/ emergency
arising out of such a threat.
This scheme will be kept secret & made known to only those who should
know about for successful implementation.
Neighboring Industries:
Nova carbon India Private Limited, South India Bottling Co.

(P) Ltd., & ATC Tyres Pvt Ltd.,- Gangaikondan, Tirunelveli Dist.,
Working Hours -
General shift : Monday –Saturday :- 0830-1715 hrs
Closed holiday: Sunday/Listed Holidays
Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli was commissioned in June 2015. The

nearest railway station is situated at Gangaikondan at a distance of
4km(E).The nearest Airport is situated at Tuticorin at a distance of 33.55
KM(SW).
Plant Location
Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli is commissioned on June 2015 and is
located in SIPCOT Industrial Area at Gangaikondan in Tirunelveli District
of Tamil Nadu State. It is located adjacent to NH 7 which connects
Varanasi & Kanyakumari and 18 KM from Tirunelveli city. The LPG Bottling
Plant covers about 42 acres of land.
East - Vacant land

North - Vacant land
South -30 ft road
The main entrance gate of LPG bottling plant is located facing South.


TIRUNELVELI
9a.2 Objective: -
To maintain the regular & uninterrupted supply of LPG cylinders in

the specified area & proper protection of plant during the situation
of disturbances, strikes, mob violence, transporters’ strike, militants
attacks, fire etc. To meet these contingencies fire brigade, civil
defence & district authorities are required to maintain the law &
order situation. This scheme will be enforced under the orders of
Collector & District Magistrate, as & when emergency arises. The
main objectives of this plan is to maintain the working of the plant
& to protect the plant in the event of any attempt of sabotage, civil
commotion, strike or lock out with the help of available loyal staff.
9a.3. The Scheme will be enforced under the orders of the District
Magistrate, Tirunelveli as and when an emergency arises in
respect of one or more of the services.
9a.4. If there is adequate warning of the impending emergency, the

scheme will be implemented in three stages, viz. (i) Preliminary,
(ii) Precautionary and (iii) Executive.
(a) On receipt of the Preliminary warning, the following action will

be taken :
(i) The Officer in Charge, Gangaikondan Police

Station acting as the Liaison Officer, will get in touch
with the Head of the Services of the installation affected
(ii) The District Special Branch Police Staff will raise useful
and reliable informants (sources) and obtain advance
information of the plans and activities of strikers and
subversive elements.
(iii) Police personnel to be deployed at the location of the
affected services, under the Scheme, will be briefed
about their duties.
(iv) The Head of Services affected will get in touch
immediately with the Heads of the Departments, whose
assistance may be required and alert them to keep the
staff earmarked for emergency duty in readiness to
report at short notice to the Heads of Services affected.
(b) On receipt of the Precautionary warning :


TIRUNELVELI
(i) Mobilization: All the Police Circles will be mobilized and

men kept ready at their stations.
(ii) The Officer in Charge, Gangaikondan Police

Station in charge of the arrangements will post guards
at the premises of the vital installation whose services
are affected, as required under Part-II of this Scheme.
(iii) The Heads of affected Departments will keep their loyal

staff ready to take charge of their designated posts.
(iv) The staff requisitioned from other departments for duty,

will report to the Heads of the Services affected.
(c) On receipt of the Executive warning:
(i) The loyal staff, the personnel supplied by other

departments, if any and the Police, will be detailed for
duty.
(ii) The Scheme will be brought into full operation in respect

of the services affected.
Note: - In the event of a sudden strike, the first two stages will be
telescoped and abbreviated and actions prescribed for the Executive
phase will commence with minimum delay.
9a.6 A list of the loyal staff under the various categories, whose services
will be utilized in an emergency situation, will be drawn up by the
Management in advance and mentioned below of the scheme. If there is
dearth of loyal staff, it will be the Management’s responsibility to make
the required manpower available by drawing personnel from other
Departments, or through temporary recruitment, or any other means, for
implementation of the Executive stage.


TIRUNELVELI
LIST OF LOYAL STAFF
1. Name of the Location with full Indian Oil Corporation Limited(MD),

address & telephone No Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli
SIPCOT Industrial Growth
Centre,Gangaikondan, Tirunelveli
Dist
Tamil Nadu. PIN – 627 352
Ph. No. 0462-2445133,2445233
Fax: 0462-2445133
2. State Tamil Nadu
3. District Tirunelveli
4 Address of nearest police Police Station, Gangaikondan
station
5 Concerned State Office & Officer Sri SURAJIT ROY, DGMI/c(LPG)
name & Tel No TamilNadu State Office
Telephone No. – 044-28339181
Mob. No. - 9444085602
6 Name & designation, address & V.M.Sundar
Tel No of In-charge Sr Plant Manager
Indian Oil Corporation Limited(MD),
Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli
Dist
Ph. No. 0462-2445133,2445233
Fax: 0462-2445133
7 Name & designation, address & M. Sivasankara Muthuvel
Tel No of alternate In-charge Dy. Mgr. (P)
SIPCOT Industrial Growth Centre,
Gangaikondan, Tirunelveli Dist
Ph. No. 0462,2445233, Fax: 0462-
2445133
8 Name & designation, address & As per details, vide point no 12
Tel No of all officers who will be below
assigned with essential duties
to be performed by them in the


TIRUNELVELI
event of an emergency at the

Location.
9 Name & Designation of the As per details, vide point no 12
members of a committee to be below
formed at the location to decide
the plan of action in the event
of an emergency at the
location.
10 Name & Designation of the As per details, vide point no 12
officer who will be assigned to below
collect intelligence information
at the location in the event of
an even anticipated emergency
at the location to be conveyed
to all concerned including the
labor dept. of the state Govt.
11 Name & design. of the officer As per details, vide point no 12
who will be assigned to do below
liaison with various authorities
such as Police/DM/Fire
Brigade/Civil Defense /Hospital
/ Electricity/Transporters etc.
12 Name & address of the officers 1.M. Sivasankara Muthuvel
& loyal employees Dy. Mgr. (P)
Indian Oil Corporation
Limited(MD),
Mob. No. - 9443131008
2) S.Sankari Veni
Asst.Manager(LPG-Safety)
Mob. No. - 8129188006
3) Shubhendra Kumar
Engg. Officer


TIRUNELVELI

Mob. No. – 9442512591
4) Manoj O J
Engg. Officer
Mob. No. – 09400179499
13 State whether the location is Yes

declared as a protected place or
prohibited area under the
Indian Official Secret Act.
14 State whether the location is Yes
declared as public utility
service.
15 List of vital customers INDANE Distributors
9a.7. Communication: - The occurrence of any emergency should be

promptly communicated by the Heads of the Services affected to
the Police Control/ Headquarters/ Police Station, specifically
mentioning the following points:-
(i) Particulars and location of the services affected
(ii) Whether the strike is anticipated, imminent or in progress
In addition, Heads of the Services affected will also inform Heads of

the departments whose assistance may be required for running the
services.


TIRUNELVELI
9a.8. The names of the Heads of services, who would be contacting the
police in the event of an emergency are:

Tel No of In charge Sr Plant Manager
Dist
Ph. No. 0462-2445133,2445233
Fax: 0462-2445133
Mobile No.: 09444904133
Ph. No. 0462,2445233, Fax: 0462-
2445133
Mobile No.9443131008
9a.9 The Heads of the Departments from whom assistance may be

required are

Tel No of In charge Sr Plant Manager
Centre,Gangaikondan, Tirunelveli Dist
Ph. No. 0462-2445133,2445233 Fax:
0462-2445133
Mobile No.: 09444904133


TIRUNELVELI

Ph. No. 0462,2445233, Fax: 0462-
2445133
Mobile No.9443131008
9a.10 Action in Police Control :- In the event of an emergency

and, on receipt of a message from the Heads of the Services affected
(listed at Annexure-B), the Police Control will first re-contact the caller to
verify the genuineness of the call and then promptly pass the information
to the following :-
(i) The Supdt. Of Police, Tirunelveli

(ii) District Magistrate, Tirunelveli
The police Control will at the same time obtain the orders of the
Dist. SP, regarding the nature of the warning to be issued i.e.
‘Preliminary’, ‘Precautionary’ or ‘Executive’ and communicate it to: -
(i) The officer nominated to be in-charge of the arrangements.

(ii) Police Special Branch
(iii) All officers responsible for deputing Police force for duty at
the installation.
9a.11.Operation of the Scheme: - The Scheme will consist of four

parts:
(i) Maintenance of essential services, with the assistance of loyal

staff, and those drawn from other Departments, if any, and
the Police.
(ii) Protection of the premises of the vital installation where
services are affected.
(iii) Protection of loyal workers.
(iv) Protection of departmental vehicles ferrying loyal workers,
while in transit.


TIRUNELVELI
PART – I
Maintenance of Essential Services with the assistance of loyal staff and

staff drawn from other department, if any, and the police.
9a.12.This is the joint responsibility of the Loyal staff and the personnel
drawn from other departments, if any, and the police. Instructions
to Heads of the Services.
9a .13.On receipt of the Scheme, the Heads of the Services will select
from among their trustworthy and reliable men, who will be willing
to serve in the event of an emergency. A list of such staff will be
sent well in advance by the Heads of the Services to the District
Magistrate, Tirunelveli as and when an emergency arises in
respect of one or more of the services. in a name cover, sealed and
marked ‘Secret’ for verification. If any adverse Police report is
received on any member of the staff, he should not be employed on
any duty. The list should be maintained upto date by the Heads of
Essential Services.
9a.14.The loyal staff selected must be kept informed of the nature of

duties to be performed by them. This should be done only when a
strike is anticipated, i.e. when the Preliminary and Precautionary
stages have been reached.
Duties of the Police
9a.15.The Police are mainly responsible for the proper working of the
Scheme. It is their duty to see that the instructions contained in
the Scheme are strictly followed. As the police have no technically
skilled staff, they will be assisted by the loyal staff and the
personnel drawn from other departments, if any.
PART – II
Protection of the premises of the Services & Vital installations
9a.16.This is the responsibility of the Police. A list of the premise of the

Services and vital installations to be guarded is


TIRUNELVELI
NAME & ADDRESS TELEPHONE NO.

Indian Oil Corporation Limited(MD), STD CODE – 0462
Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli Ph. Nos. 0462-
SIPCOT Industrial Growth Centre, 2445133,2445233
Gangaikondan, Tirunelveli Dist Fax No. - 2445233
Ph. No. 0462-2445133,2445233 Fax:
0462-2445133
On receipt of the Precautionary warning, the Circle Inspector

concerned or officer nominated to be in-charge of arrangements will
arrange to post the guards in and around the premises of the
Services and vital installation affected, The men must constantly
patrol the entire portion of the premises and installations and be
prepared to deal with any mischief or trouble by the unruly
elements, urchins and hooligans. They will wear steel helmets and
carry fire arms.
9a .17. The guards on duty must be alive to the general dangers of

sabotage or other mischievous activities by the disloyal elements
among the workers and they should realize that they are protecting
vital assets and in the event of any attack, they must act vigorously
and without any hesitation within their lawful power and prevent
damage to the vital installations. If any extra assistance is
required, the Police Control should be immediately contacted by
telephone for reinforcements. For this purpose, two sections of
men (armed) will stand by at each control room.
Control of admission to the premises of the Services and vital

installations
9a .18.In the event of an emergency, admission into the premises of the

Services and vital installation will be regulated by passes. Passes
will be issued to the loyal staff and others, who visit the premises of
the Services and vital installations in the course of their normal
duties by the authorities of the Services concerned. In the case of
the personnel drawn from other departments, the passes will be
issued by the Chief of the Project, who has his head quarters in the
project area, Copies of which will be sent to the heads of the
Services affected. In the case of Police personnel no pass would be


TIRUNELVELI
necessary but they must either be in their uniform or carry their

identity cards.
9a.19.The Police on duty are responsible for the admission of persons

inside the affected premises and they must take particular care to
see that no unauthorized persons are allowed to enter or even loiter
in the vicinity of the premises. The policemen on duty should be
familiarized with the passes issued to the loyal/requisitioned
workers. For this purpose, the Heads of the Services and the Heads
of Departments will send samples of the passes issued by them to
the District Superintendent of Police.
PART – III
Protection of Loyal Staff
9a.20.This is the responsibility of the concerned local police. The question

whether Police protection would be necessary, must be decided by
the Inspectors concerned, in consultation with the SP, Tirunelveli
and the Heads of the Services, taking into account the prevailing
situation. If the local situation is so alarming as to necessitate
Police protection, arrangements must be made to transport the
loyal staff in police vans with sufficient guard. Patrols must also be
sent to localities where loyal servants reside, to see that they and
their families are not victimized by the unruly elements. If the local
situation does not warrant police protection, the authorities of the
Services must be told to make their own arrangements for
transporting their staff.
9a.21 The concerned Inspectors will obtain in advance a list of loyal staff
and the personnel drawn from other departments, if any, with their
addresses, from the Heads of Services and heads of Departments
for this purpose.
PART – IV
Protection of Buses on the road utilized for transporting workers
9a.22.This is also the responsibility of the local police, provided there is

need for it. Buses will be provided with Police arrangements on the
following scale :-
Buses: Two Police constables per bus.


TIRUNELVELI
9a.23.They should offer sufficient protection to the drivers and conductors

and the traveling public and prevent hooliganism. If they
apprehend trouble, the police control concerned must immediately
be contacted for sending reinforcements.
Intelligence Duties
9a.24This is the responsibility of the District Police Special Branch.
9a.25The Special branch staff must be on the alert to get advance

information of any possible acts of sabotage or subversive activities and
take immediate steps to prevent any dangerous plans by the disloyal
elements among the workers and others in the Services.
9a.26 On receipt of the Preliminary warning, the Special Branch staff will
organize a network of informants, from among the trusted workers, with
a view to obtaining advance information of the plans and activities of the
disloyal elements among the workers. The Special Branch staff should
also keep in close touch with the movements of the workers and any
information of interest, that comes to notice, must immediately be passed
on to the District Superintendent of police concerned, by telephone.
Matters affecting the security of the Services must be promptly
communicated to the Heads of the Services, under instructions from the
District Superintendent of Police.
9a.26 Steps must be taken to ensure the reliability of the loyal staff and
the personnel drawn from other Departments, if any, by subjecting them
to a careful examination, without arousing their suspicion, in consultation
with the Heads of the Services and the Heads of the Departments
supplying the personnel.
9a.27All officers on intelligence duties will be in plainclothes and carry

their sanads or identity cards.
DISCIPLINE
9a.28 Misconduct, on the part of the loyal staff and the personnel drawn
from other departments, if any, must be immediately reported to the
Heads of the Services and Departments, for necessary action.


TIRUNELVELI
ACCOMMODATION
9a .29. Accommodation for the Police will be arranged by the Heads

of the Services affected. If no suitable accommodation is available,
tents will be pitched. The concerned Inspectors will attend to this.
CONVEYANCE
9a.30. Policemen deployed for various duties will be conveyed in

Police vans. This will be arranged by the concerned Inspectors or
the officer-in-charge of the operation, who will arrange this well in
advance. Police personnel on duty will be provided vehicles by the
affected installation, for discharging their responsibility of ensuring
that the loyal staff and the personnel drawn from other
departments, if any, reach their worksites safely.
FEEDING
9a .31. All Policemen on duty will be fed by the concerned Inspectors

at Government cost, at the usual rates sanctioned by the
Government.
9a .32. The policemen will work in 24-hour shifts, their relief being
arranged by the Officer-in-charge. The Heads of the Services and
Heads of Departments will arrange for the rotation of their own
staff.
GENERAL
9a .33. The working of the scheme is primarily the responsibility of

the loyal staff, the personnel drawn from other departments, if any,
and the Police who would work in close co-operation. All duties
concerned with the scheme must be performed in a most courteous
and polite, but firm manner.
9a .34. The Heads of Services should realize the importance of the

help given by the Police and the Personnel drawn from other


TIRUNELVELI
Departments, if any, in this matter and render them all possible

assistance.
9a .35. The Scheme will be kept ‘Secret’ and made known only to
those, who should know about it for its successful implementation.
9a .36. The District S.P. shall submit daily situation reports to the
District Magistrate and the latter, in turn, to the Chief Secretary of
the State, during the period of emergency.
9a .37. The instructions drawn up in the preceding paragraph are

purely precautionary in nature and issued solely to ensure that all
Officers know the appropriate action to be taken, should such
circumstances arise.
------*------


TIRUNELVELI
15. Mock Drill Report Clause No. 12.1
INDANE BOTTLING PLANT,TIRUNELVELI

MOCK FIRE DRILL REPORT
Location : Location in charge :

Region : State Office :
Date
Inspection by : :
1.0 Location of Emergency :

2.0 Nature of Emergency :
3.0 Date of the drill :
4.0 Details of response time :
S/No. Activity Time Response

(Detailed description of
Activity)
4.1 Emergency spotted at
4.2 Alarm raised (Vocal/ Hand siren)
4.3 Electrical siren (wailing)
4.4 Sprinkler started
4.5 Monitor started
4.6 DCP Fire Extinguisher discharged
4.7 Rescue team on site
4.8 All Bulk TTs evacuated
4.9 All packed TTs evacuated
4.10 Mutual Aid members on site
4.11 Keep adding relevant activities
4.12 All clear signal given at
4.13 Electrical All clear siren
5.0 Feature of the Drill :


TIRUNELVELI
6.0 Overall assessment of preparedness or emergencies :
7.0 Areas of improvement :
8.0 Training imparted :
Signature of Signature of
Location in charge Inspecting officer


TIRUNELVELI
Resource Mobilization
Schedule IV
(Refer Regulation 11.2)
Resource Mobilizations (Men and Equipment)

Available
SN Total Requirement with
Installation
1 MANPOWER
Regular employees 10
Security staff 20
Personnel Trained in first aid 10
Others (Technicians/Helpers) 5
FIRE FIGHTING APPLIANCES
2
/EQUIPMENT/CHEMICALS
Fire Tenders-Nil Fire
Fire Tenders/ Fire Fighting Engines
Fighting Engines -3
Water storage capacity 7500 KL
Fire Hoses 67
Jet/Fog /Spray Nozzles 28/2/2
Foam Branch NIL
Jumbo Jet Nozzles NIL
Foam Compound (KL) NIL
3 SAFETY EQUIPMENT
PVC Suit -
Compressed air B.A Set 1
Refill Cylinders for B. A. Set 1
Cascade B.A.SET -
Fire proximity Suit 1
4 COMMUICATION
Walkie –Talkie 9
Public Address System 1
Megaphone -
5 TRANSPORT
Jeeps -


TIRUNELVELI
Cars 1
Ambulance -
Trucks NIL
Buses 1- Van
Tractors NIL
Boats NIL
Mobile cranes NIL
6 MISCELLANEOUS
Ropes (Meters) 2X8 mtr.
Empty drums 70
Buckets’ 8
Sand bags 100
Dewatering pump NIL
Pneumatic pump NIL
Photo camera NIL
Video Camera NIL
EQUIPMENTS FOR CORPS
7
DISPOSAL
Light Metal Stretchers 02
Tarpaulin 12’x12” 1
Rope -
Bucket 8
Rubber gloves 02 Pairs
11.3 Incident preventing measures and procedures:
The incident prevention measures and procedures at IOCL, Tirunelveli

Bottling Plant installation includes following prevention measures:-
I. Health Safety and Environment (HSE) policy has been formulated

and approved by management.
II. Meetings of Safety committee with participation of executives &

staff are held every month in order to deliberate on any unsafe
development and recommendations for elimination of risks. Safety
committee also discusses pending recommendations of earlier


TIRUNELVELI
meetings, performance & shortcomings observed during recent

mock drills etc. and minutes signed by all members.
III. Internal Safety Audits and Inspections are carried out as per
OISD-144 & OISD GDN 145 checklists. Inter unit safety audits are
conducted by experts from other facilities.
IV. Work permits in line with OISD – 105 are issued and monitored
V. Gas Monitoring alarm system to identify gas leaks have been

installed with the indication in the control room and security cabin.
VI. In-built safety interlocks system such as Pressure Safety Valves

(PSVs); non-returning valves (NRVs), and emergency trip systems
are incorporated in design of installation.
VII. Fire Protection system i.e. Hydrants, Monitors and Hose Boxes are
provided in the premise.
VIII. Written safety instructions are given to visitors including assembly

procedure and escape route, dos and don’ts before entry.
IX. Safety MIS system is established. Unit sends monthly safety

reports including Exception reports to Corporate SHE department
who issues monthly HSE report for whole organization.
X. All standby equipment’s are operated periodically and checked as

per specified schedule. Warning system, first aid, evacuation
procedures are tested periodically.
XI. Check list points for incident prevention measures as per Check
list – 2 as per regulation 11.3 (xii)


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 12
Emergency Preparedness Measures



TIRUNELVELI
Emergency Preparedness Measures (Clause No 12.0)
12.1 Emergency Drills & Mock Exercises (As per clause No. 12.1)
In emergency management time is very important, the initial few minutes

are critical and timely action may contain the emergency. For persons to
perform quickly their assigned roles, it is essential that each individual
should be made aware of emergency rehearsals which will impart
procedures and their individual roles through proper training.
These mock drills cover various probable emergency scenarios e.g. a fire,
explosion, gas leak etc. Mock drill results are reviewed by LIC and reports
communicated to Factory Inspector.
Mock Drill rehearsals are carried out as per scheduled frequency (i.e.
Mock drills- Once in a month, On Site Emergency Response Drill–
on in every six months and off site Drill on yearly basis) considering
different scenarios to improve awareness and to build up the confidence
among the employees for quick and correct action as per their role and
responsibilities to mitigate the Emergency.
On completion of the mock drill rehearsal, the debriefing meeting chaired

by Location In-charge of the unit is conducted to ensure the efficacy of
the rehearsal and to discuss the observations.
Recommendations/observations received from the observers in this
regards are complied with time bound schedule. Moreover the rehearsal
on “Off-site emergency action” has been conducted with the consent of
and under the guidelines of District Collector for surrounding MAH
industries.
INDANE BOTTLING PLANT,TIRUNELVELI

MOCK FIRE DRILL REPORT
Location : Location in charge :
Region : State Office :
Date
Inspection by : :
1.0 Location of Emergency :

2.0 Nature of Emergency :
3.0 Date of the drill :
4.0 Details of response time :


TIRUNELVELI
S/No. Activity Time Response

(Detailed description of
Activity)
4.1 Emergency spotted at
4.2 Alarm raised (Vocal/ Hand siren)
4.3 Electrical siren (wailing)
4.4 Sprinkler started
4.5 Monitor started
4.6 DCP Fire Extinguisher discharged
4.7 Rescue team on site
4.8 All Bulk TTs evacuated
4.9 All packed TTs evacuated
4.10 Mutual Aid members on site
4.11 Keep adding relevant activities
4.12 All clear signal given at
4.13 Electrical All clear siren
5.0 Feature of the Drill :
6.0 Overall assessment of preparedness or emergencies :
7.0 Areas of improvement :
8.0 Training imparted :
Signature of Signature of
Location in charge Inspecting officer


TIRUNELVELI
12.2 Training (As per clause No. 12.2)
1. An ERDMP shall be easier to use if training material and general

philosophy on emergency prevention and control are kept separate
from the working plan.
2. Training shall be imparted to all the personnel likely to be involved

directly or indirectly to the emergencies including employees,
contract workers, transport crew and security personnel.
3. Contract personnel and contract labourer shall be allowed to start

work only after clearance of attending and passing safety training.
4. Refresher training shall be conducted at regular intervals.
5. Critical Safety Campaigns are being conducted monthly on various

safety topics circulating by CO-HSE by involving all Employees,
Contract Employees and Security Personnel.
Moreover Training is being imparted to all IOCL regular employees,

security personnel, contract employees on schedules as per approved
Training Calendar as per OISD Std. 154 for HSE training. Training
modules are prepared by Fire & Safety specialists and external expert
faculty also invited. Contract workers are allowed to work only after
attending safety training.
12.2.1 System of Periodicity/frequency of training
Sl.no Department Periodicity
1 IOCL Employees Yearly
2 Security Monthly
Monthly
3 Contract labours
Drivers
4 Monthly
(Packed &Bulk Truck)


TIRUNELVELI
12.3 Mutual Aid (As per clause No. 12.3)
Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli has

Mutual Aid agreement with Coca Cola and Nova Carbon situated at
SIPCOT industrial area. Various activities to promote Health Safety and
Environment awareness amongst each other, regular lectures / visits /
exhibitions are conducted for knowledge sharing of the expertise of
individual organisational related activities to adopt the best suitable
measures in each other.
To make the emergency plan a success, the following exchange of

information amongst the member organizations of mutual aid association
is considered essential:
(i) The types of hazards in each installation and fire fighting measures.
(ii) List of all the installations or entities falling along the routes of
transport vehicles carrying petroleum or petroleum products. –TREM
CARDS
(iii) The type of equipment, that would be deployed and procedure for
making the replenishment.
(iv) Written procedures which spell out the communication system for
help and response. This is also required to get acquainted with
operation of different fire fighting equipment available at mutual aid
members and compatibility for connecting at users place.
(v) Familiarization of topography and drills for access and exit details
carried out by mutual aid members.


TIRUNELVELI
Mutual Aid Agreement


TIRUNELVELI


TIRUNELVELI


TIRUNELVELI


TIRUNELVELI


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 13
Response Procedures and Measures



TIRUNELVELI
Response Procedures and Measures (Clause No 13.0)
Containing the consequences of an emergency requires well planned

and documented procedures to ensure prompt response and coordination
among various task groups. The following response procedures as
prevalent in the location shall be carried out during emergency.
(a)Zoning and maps
i) Different zones as per the risk scenarios based on the risk analysis are
already mentioned in chapter 10 and also refer Quantitative Risk
Analysis Report. Location of assembly point is near the Control room.
ii) Nearby areas and living population is detailed in chapter 01.


TIRUNELVELI
(b) Detailed lay out and flow diagram for different

activities/process is given below
PROCESS FLOW CHART OF INDANE BOTTLING PLANT,TIRUNELVELI


Stores Inspection,
Washing Cap
Cylinders
Check Paint if Purging
Filling station Needed, ST DUE/HR
Check
Correction Scale
Check Scale

without Evacuation
Safety Cap Fixing
Body Leak Test

Destruction
Filled Cylinders
Dispatch


TIRUNELVELI
(c) MANPOWER- data is provided in the Checklist-4.
Check points on ERDMP response measures are given at Check list- 4 as

per regulation 13.0 in Appendix
Response Procedures and Measures
Emergency Shutdown Procedures in Plant
General:
Tirunelveli Bottling Plant, where receipt of bulk LPG, storage, bottling &
despatch of packed cylinders are carried out as per OISD. As per the
management circular the following Emergency Shutdown philosophy is
adopted in the location in case of emergency.
ILSD:
ILSD is the procedure to be invoked in case of any emergency at the

location, purpose of ILSD is to STOP all ongoing process/Power at the
location
Automatic fire protection (Fixed) system based on heat detection through

quartz bulbs detectors is provided. Detectors shall be installed at all
critical places wherever medium velocity spray system has been installed.
At 79 deg. C (max.)- Blow of Quartzoid bulbs- Opening of deluge valve of
the affected zone as well as adjacent zones. - Audio-visual alarm
indicating the affected zone at the fire pump house, Security cabin and
control room- Fire siren of 1 km range- Closure of all Remote Operated
Valves- Tripping of main power supply barring the emergency
Power- The water spray from all nozzles within 30 seconds- The fire water
pump(s) shall start based on their set pressure to supplement/ to
maintain the fire water pressure in the ring main.
Additionally, push button arrangements are provided and can be pressed

from anywhere in the location. These Emergency Shutdown
Button(ESD) activates the following
- Fire siren of 1 km range

- Closure of all Remote Operated Valves
- Tripping of main power supply barring the emergency Power


TIRUNELVELI
LOCATION OF ESD:
ESD’s are provided at the following locations in the premises with Break
glass & hammer/ emergency markings.
 Mounded bullet
 LPG Pump House
 TLD
 Loading shed
 Carousel
 Unloading shed
ESD:
Actuation of ESD switches of the power to all facilities except the

following.
 Siren
 Bore wells
 Power in Fire Pump House/DG Shed and PMCC
 Lighting supply
 CCTV
As soon as an emergency is declared, the security will raise the siren and
Fire chief will take stock of the situation. As per the necessity of the
severity & Nature of emergency (Level1, 2&3) the CIC will decide the
action plan to be put in place with the help of Site incident controller and
his fire combating teams.
CHECK LIST-4
ERDMP Response Measures/Infrastructure
S.No. Check Points Yes/No

Remarks
1 Does the Location have Emergency Zones clearly Yes
identified for
Incident prone areas
2 Do the Maps indicate location of Emergency Assembly Yes
Points and
Emergency Control Rooms
3 Is the process Lay-out prominently displayed Yes


TIRUNELVELI
4 Does the Piping and instrument Diagram include Yes

emergency control valves, shutdown system, isolation
valves, important control valves etc.
5 Does the Fire Hydrant Layout conspicuously displayed. Yes
Manpower
1 Is the ERDMP Organogram clearly displayed. Yes
2 Does the Organogram include all duties to be attended Yes
in connection with an emergency.
3 Is the Organogram include key personnel by their Yes
names or, work
position
4 Does it have the alternate coverage to take care of the Yes
absence of a particular person [ in cases where
Organogram is developed basis names]
5 Does it include assignment of all key coordinators viz. Yes
the Incident
Controller, Administration and Communication
Controller and Safety Coordinator.
Emergency Control Centre (ECC)
1 Is the ECC well defined and clearly marked on the Yes
displayed layout
2 Is it strategically positioned to be outside the Yes
periphery of immediate affected area.
3 Is the centre have adequate communication channels Yes
including internal and external telephone connections,
PA, paging and VHF systems
4 Is list of key personnel and essential telephone nos. Yes
are prominently displayed.
5 The layout of fire fighting system, different hazardous Yes
zones, Assembly Points is prominently displayed.
Emergency Assembly Points
1 Are the EAPs well defined and clearly marked on the Yes
displayed layout
2 The EAPs have pre-defined in-charges during Yes
emergencies who keep in touch with the Emergency
Control Centre and Administrative
Controllers and updates on the roll call on people
reporting


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 14
Emergency Organization & Responsibilities



TIRUNELVELI
Emergency Organization & Responsibilities (Clause No.14.0)
Detailed information on roles and responsibilities of various coordinators

and other employees and action to be taken in case of emergency in IOCL
TIRUNELVELI BOTTLING PLANT area is provided in this chapter. The
success of control of an emergency situation depends upon the timely
action by the key personnel of the organization.
Emergency Response Organization:
Overall objectives of an emergency response organization shall be such as

to:
a) Promptly control problems as they develop at the scene.

b) Prevent or limit the impact on other areas and off-site.
c) Provide emergency personnel, selecting them for duties compatible
with their normal work functions wherever feasible.
d) Follow Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s) laid down for all
types of emergencies.
e) Employees must assume additional responsibilities as per laid down
procedure of ERDMP whenever an emergency alarm sounds.
f) In setting up the organization, the need for round-the-clock
coverage shall be essential. Shift personnel must be prepared to
take charge of the emergency control functions or emergency
shutdown of system, if need be, until responsible personnel arrive
at the site of emergency. The organization should have an alternate
arrangement for each function.
14.1 Emergency Organization Chart
Role of key personnel is clearly defined to avoid confusion and to

meet the emergency effectively. The Chief Incident Controller and
the Site Incident Controller are two main positions for effective
control of an emergency at site. They shall be supported by
Emergency Management Team comprising of technical resources
from Operations & Maintenance, mechanical, electrical,
instrumentation, civil, communications, technical services etc. Fire &
Safety, Security, HR (Personnel & Administration), Finance &
Accounts, shall also take due roles & responsibilities.


TIRUNELVELI
Affected Stake Off-Site

Holders and Off-Site Incident
Off-Site Incident
Incident
CONTROLLER
Commander
Government Commander
(District
(District Medical Services
Authorities (District
Magistrate/ District
Magistrate) and Ambulance
Magistrate)
Authority)
Municipal transport
rescue and
rehabilitation team
Fire Brigade
Services
Services
Police
Services
CHIEF INCIDENT
CONTROLLER
Mutual Aid
SITE INCIDENT
CONTROLLER
Support Administration and Fire Safety & Operations

Services communication co- Fire Team/ HSE team/
Ordinator Co-Ordinator technical
team etc
Correspondence between various positions as per Emergency

organogram and IOCL TIRUNELVELI BOTTLING PLANT organogram
are depicted in TABLE – 1 below.
14.1.1 on site Emergency:
EMDMP Fire Organization chart for Onsite Level -01 & Level-02
emergencies during General shift is as below


TIRUNELVELI
FIRE ORGANOGRAM
Fire chief/Incident Controller
V.M.SUNDAR
Sr.Plant Manager
Alternate In- Charge

Dy. Manager (P)
Combating Team/Site Auxiliary Team Rescue Team/Safety

controller Maintenance Officer Co-ordinator
Floor Officer S&D Officer Safety Officer
Carousel – 1 M&R 1&2 Evacuation

Carousel - 2 Water Bath – 1 & 2, S&D Assistant
LPG PH/TLD Operator PMCC Operator Tally
` ICU Relief Duty
VCWE
1. First responder is operator or maintenance worker who on

discovering fire / explosion / gas Leak shall inform to Shift-In-
Charge
2. Call for ‘HELP’.
3. Try to extinguish or contain fire with help of nearest available fire
extinguisher, water hydrant, without endangering himself.
4. Immediately notify control room confirm location, type & extent of
emergency, numbers of injured, if any and nature if injuries,
name of reporter etc.
5. Control room shall inform to Location- In-charge/ Fire Chief who
shall take charge to deal with emergency
6. Fire coordinator shall take immediate ‘turnout’ and action to
control emergency.
7. Security coordinator shall control of personnel to those required
for emergency control.
8. Shift in-charge/ security shall contact Location- In-charge/Fire
Chief and apprise them about nature & extent of emergency.


TIRUNELVELI
9. Shift-In-charge –Security ( Main Gate) shall

 Communicate emergency message to Location- In- Charge
 Organize arrangement for transportation of officials to site
10. Officer In-charge, shall rush to site with members of Emergency
Management team and take action to mitigate / contain
emergency.
11. All coordinators shall be at respective spot and obey instructions
from Fire Chief
12. Fire Chief will assume full responsibility of emergency action plan.
He shall take decision regarding level of emergency, start of
Emergency Plan
13. Fire Chief shall take necessary emergency control measures till
situation is brought under control. He shall initiate actions &
decisions regarding:
 Operation & maintenance
 Shut-down of plant
 Evacuation of personnel
 Medical assistance to injured
 Assistance from mutual aid members and external agencies.
 Escalation of emergency & reporting incident to district
authorities Communication & assistance to affected public
TABLE – 1
On site-Emergency Organogram & IOCL Organogram

Correspondence:
S Emergency Organization
N Chart Primary Alternate
Location In Deputy Plant
1 Chief Incident Controller charge/SPM Manager/
DM(P)
2 Site Incident Controller Floor In Charge DSO
Deputy Manager
3 Administration Coordinator
(Finance)
4 Communication Coordinator (S&D) In Charge Finance
Maintenance
5 Fire & Safety Coordinator DSO
In Charge


TIRUNELVELI
6 Emergency Management Team

Operations & Maintenance
Mechanical
Electrical Safety & Maintenance Section
Instrumentation
Civil
Communication Services
Security Coordinator Deputy Manager SPM
7
(Plant)
8 Support & Auxiliary Services
Team
HR & Welfare Coordinator
Transport & Logistics
S&D Section /Finance
Media & Public Relations
Medical Services
Finance Coordinator
Material Coordinator
Note:
1. SPM shall be Chief Incident Controller for over all coordination.

2. Deputy Manager (Plant) shall be Site Incident Controller at Site.
3. All Coordinators shall report to the Site Incident Controller at site
4. All IOCL Employees working inside shall assemble at ASSEMBLY
POINT in front of Admin.
(Here after all IOCL Employees means the persons whose role is
not defined in Fire Organization Chart)
TABLE -2
Emergency Organogram during ON-office hours
Emergency Coordinator IOCL designation

Security supervisor/Security
Chief emergency coordinator
team
1 Chief Incident Controller SPM/Tirunelveli BP
2 Site Incident Controller Deputy Manager (Plant)
3 Fire & Safety Coordinator DSO


TIRUNELVELI
4 Security Coordinator Deputy Manager (Plant)/SPM
ERDMP Organogram for level 1 & level 2 (Onsite) emergencies
FIRE FIGHTING TEAMS
Three teams namely Fire Combat Team, Auxiliary Team & Rescue
Team have been formed for handling fire emergencies of level 1 &
level 2 at all stations. This helps in executing pre-assigned role to each
team and considerable reduction in response time. In general roles of
various teams are as follows.
Fire Combat Team (IDENTIFICATION JACKETCLOUR ORANGE)

TEAM HEAD: FLOOR- IN- CHARGE
1. The personnel working at TARE WEIGHT ENCODING station should
rush to the fire spot carrying the correct and appropriate fire
extinguishers and to act as per the instructions of Fire Chief
2. The personnel working at unloading spot should rush to the fire spot
carrying the correct and appropriate fire extinguishers and to act as
per the instructions of Fire Chief
3. The personnel working at ICU spot should rush to the spot with
hydrant hoses and connect them to the nearest hydrant point and
wait for instructions from fire Chief
4. The personnel working at LPG P/H to close all ROV’s, collect fire
proximity suit, wear the same and rush to the fire spot
5. The personnel at loading spot should rush to the spot with hydrant
hoses and connect them to the nearest hydrant point and wait for
instructions from fire Chief
6. The personnel working in evacuation spot t disconnect the hoses,
remove the cylinders from evacuation stand, place them upright,
stop all leaks from cylinders by plugging in the safety caps, to close
the isolation valves/stand by valves
7. The personnel working in CR spot to rush to nearest Water Monitor
and be ready to start as per the instructions from fire chief
Auxiliary Team (IDENTIFICATION JACKETCLOUR YELLOW)

TEAM HEAD: M&R IN CHARGE
1. The personnel in maintenance spot, to rush to emergency spot with
fire trolley, replenishing of fire fighting equipments to combating
team, supply of hoses/nozzles required for combating team


TIRUNELVELI
Rescue Team (IDENTIFICATION JACKETCLOUR GREEN)

TEAM HEAD: DSO
1. Team head to lock important documents/records and valuables,
informing to fire service, ambulances, police control room, hospitals
and civil authorities/ state office
2. Assistant (Finance) to lock important documents, co-ordinate with
main gate security for vehicle entry/exit movement, evacuation of
workmen other than employees of the plant to assembly point
3. Junior Business Asst. to rush to fire spot with First-Aid boxes, mega
phone and aid in evacuation of workmen other than employees of
the plant to assembly point
However, spot persons have the liberty to add/delete any roles

assigned to any team considering specific requirement. Accordingly,
following are the team constituted based on the shift working
position of the plant.
14.2 Roles & responsibilities:
During an emergency situation, Roles & Responsibilities (duties) of

IOCL personnel’s are defined below:-
14.2.1 Chief Incident Controller (SPM):
1. Preparation, review & Updating of ERDMP Document as per

Check list-5 attached in Appendix.
2. Assessment of Situation, declaration of emergency and activate
the action plan.
3. Mobilization of main coordinators & key personnel at respective
locations
4. Depending on seriousness of the emergency, seek assistance
mutual aid members & external agencies like Police, Fire Brigade,
Hospitals etc.
5. Exercise control of the unaffected areas.
6. Continuous review of situation and monitor the emergency
situation.
7. Ensure that injured are receiving prompt medical treatment, take
stock of casualties, if any and that relatives are properly
informed / advised.
8. Ensure correct accounting and position of personnel.


TIRUNELVELI
9. Taking decision in consultation with district authorities, when the

Off-Site Emergency to be declared.
10.Regulate vehicular movement in the factory.
11.Arrange for chronological records of the incident / emergency.
12.If emergency is prolonged, arrange for replacement of
emergency handling personnel.
13.Authorize statements to external agencies, media.
14.In case of escalation of situation which may leads to damage to
nearby population inform district authorities to warn nearby
population.
15.Ensure that incidents are investigated and recommendations are
implemented.
14.2.2 Site Incident Controller (DM (P)):
The Site Incident Controller (SIC) shall be identified by the Chief

Incident Controller and will report directly to him.
1. He shall put in action workable emergency control plan, establish

emergency control centre, organize and equip the organization
with ERDMP and train the personnel.
2. Immediately on knowing about the emergency, he shall proceed
to the site.
3. Assess the level of emergency and apprise CIC / Control Room
about situation
4. Activate the emergency procedure / control plan as required.
5. Direct all operations within the affected area as per priority
6. Ensure affected area is cordoned off and all non-essential
workers in the affected area are evacuated to the assembly
point.
7. Ensure rescue and fire fighting operation are started.
8. Minimize damage to Plant, property & environment
9. Alert medical centre and any specialist support as required.
14.2.3 Administration and Communication Coordinator (DM(F)):
Communications Coordinator shall ensure that:

1. Communication equipment and systems are maintained to a
high standard and functional throughout the emergency.
2. Back-up communication system is available in the event of the
Control Room is not available.


TIRUNELVELI
3. Providing quality and diverse communication systems for use in

routine and emergency situations.
4. Rush to his office and take charge of medical, welfare and
media.
5. Activate medical Centre and render first aid to the injured by
assigning first-aid personnel to specific duties.
6. Arrange additional medical supplies, drugs and equipment’s,
spares for firefighting, as required.
7. Arrange ambulance for transporting casualties and coordinate
with hospitals for prompt medical attention to casualties.
8. Keep all the vehicles and drivers in readiness and send vehicles
as per requirement of different coordinators and officials. to
mobilize transport to various teams for facilitating the response
measures;
9. To monitor entry and exit of authorized personnel into and out
of premises
14.2.4 Fire Safety Coordinator – (DSO):
1. Activate local Siren(s).

2. Rush to the site and take charge of fire and rescue operations.
3. Work in close association with site incident controller / chief
incident controller.
4. Render technical guidance and logistics to fire personnel.
5. Establish danger zone and arrange barricading if necessary.
6. Ensure sufficient firefighting chemicals and rescue equipment’s
are available at site.
7. Ensure that fire water pump house is manned and sufficient
hydrant pressure in fire water mains and monitor water level in
reservoir.
8. Arrange for additional fighting resources help from mutual aid
partners & other fire services if necessary, in consultation with
site incident controller.
9. Coordinate with outside fire brigades and agencies for fire
fighting / rescue operations.
10. Ensure that casualties are promptly sent to first aid Centre /
hospital.


TIRUNELVELI
14.2.5 Support & Auxiliary Services Coordinator – ((S&D)IN

CHARGE)
1. Assuming responsibility for any tasks delegated by Chief-

Incident-Controller/SPM
2. Replenish fire fighting equipments
3. Take care of public relation, inform relatives of injured.
4. Arrange canteen facilities and proper food / refreshment.
5. Arrange to meet emergency clothing requirement.
6. Arrange to contact the families of the injured.
7. Maintaining public relation and arrange media briefing wherever
necessary
8. To control the mob outside, if any, with the assistance of the
police and to provide administrative and logistics assistance to
various teams;
9. Issue press statement with the approval of Competent Authority
10. Take help of welfare bodies, social organizations, NGO’s, local
administrations, blood bank, blood donors, hospitals, doctors,
ambulance services, water supply department, transport hire
service, catering services as per requirement.
11. Inform police, civil authorities, statutory authorities etc., if
necessary.
14.2.5.7(a) Maintenance of ERDMP Records.
DSOs will maintain separate registers for Incident Record, Near

Miss, Accident report file etc.
Post–disaster documentation like resources deployed, relief,

rehabilitation measures and lesson learned to avoid re-occurrence of
any such emergency need to be prepared by DSO.
14.2.5.8 Communications Services.


TIRUNELVELI
Employee/
Police Security
Public
gas detection
system
CONTROL
ROOM
First MANAGEMENT
Responder TEAM
(All Section CRISIS
Heads/Employees at MGMT
Filling shed/ TLD/LPG GROUP
Fire safety/HSE SITE INCIDENT
P/H, S & D, Finance )
Coordinator and CONTROLLER
fire team
District
CHIEF INCIDENT Administration
CONTROLLER and Central
Govt. agencies
Info. to Fire Mutual Aid
Brigade, Police, Members
Medical and
Government Others (required Note: Level I
Authorities coordinators of the
installation) Level II
Level III
Note: 1. above is a typical communication flow chart for notification of

emergency.
2. Wherever communication exists for any level of emergency, it
automatically implies that the communication exists for all
higher levels of emergencies.
Flow of Information:
(a) Control Room shall receive the information form field either in
person or from the various systems available in the
installation.
(b) Floor-In-charge will actuate the ERDMP and notify the
emergency to site incident controller/ CONTROL ROOM/CIC
(c) SIC or CIC depending upon the level of emergency will activate
the ERDMP and inform the concerned authorities as depicted
above in the chart.


TIRUNELVELI
14.2.5.8 (a) Control Room In Charge:
1. Clearly note down the type of emergency and the location.

2. Perform the role of Auxiliary team
14.1.2 off site Emergency:
IOCL TIRUNELVELI BOTTLING PLANT is notified as a ‘Major Accident

Hazard’ installation under Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous
Chemicals MSIHC rules, 1989 of EPA. Therefore, it is required to
formulate an Off-site Emergency Plan.
Emergency Action Plan for Emergency during Off- Shift Hours

(Including Holidays):
1. During other than office hours (including holidays) the Security

In-charge shall perform the duties of Site Incident Controller.
Security at Visitor Gate shall also perform duties of
Communication, Welfare & Medical, and Material Coordinator in
addition to his normal duties
2. The Security in-charge in consultation with the SPM/Chief-

Incident-Controller shall act upon depending on the situation till
arrival of the concerned coordinators for effective handling of
emergency. They shall take care of the safety of personnel, plant,
property etc. Safe operating procedures which are already in
practice shall be followed.
During offsite emergency chief incident controller/SPM will coordinate with

district authorities for effective coordination of District crisis management
group as per the District disaster Management plan circulated.
Emergency during off-office hours (including holidays)
 Security supervisor will act as fire-in- chief till the arrival of

location in charge to the spot.
 Person noticing the fire should alert the people by shouting “Fire,
Fire, Fire”; operate the manual hand siren/electrical siren and the
nearest fire extinguisher to extinguish the fire.


TIRUNELVELI
 Security Guard- 1(Main Gate): Operate the emergency trip

button at the main gate and communicate to the location in charge
about the emergency.
 Security Guard- 2(Frisking Gate): Rush to the fire spot and

operate the sprinklers by operating the fire caught zone deluge
valve.
 Security Guard-3 (Main Gate - Patrolling): Rush to the spot

and operate sprinklers if not yet operated and operate the nearby
Monitor/hydrants.
 Security Guard –4 (Frisking Gate - Patrolling): Keep the

pointer of Fire clock in the emergency declared position. Rush to the
fire spot and assist in operation of hydrant/monitor.
 PMCC Operator: Trip the power and rush to the fire water pump
house and ensure the hydrant pressure is maintained for the
operation of deluge valve as per the instructions of fire- in-chief.
Emergency DO'S AND DON'TS
DO'S DON'TS
Actuate nearest fire alarm
Any One
manual call point and /or DO NOT panic and
Noticing
inform CR on Walkie- Talkie or avoid running all over
An
inform the Shift- In – Charge. the place, prevent other
Emergency
Wait till arrival of fire crew and from doing so.
Situation
direct then to the site of
emergency.
Stop work on hearing alarm. DO NOT enters the
Contractor Assemble at the ASSEMBLY site, till it is cleared for
Personnel POINT and be ready to the normal work by site
evacuate. incident controller.
Keep the gate manned; Keep the DO NOT allow
Security
road clear for movement of fire unauthorized visitors
tenders. Control traffic at gates. free to enter.
DO NOT enter the site
Visitors Leave the place and assemble at if emergency alarm is
assembly point. heard.


TIRUNELVELI
All DO NOT panic

On hearing FIRE alarm, to
Other DO as per instructions
discharge their duties as per fire
Employees of site main/incident
organization chart
On Site controller.
TABLE -2
LIST OF COORDINATORS AND THEIR CONTACT NUMBERS
LAND MOBILE
LINE/INTERCOM
OFFICIAL :
V.M.SUNDAR 0462-2445133 9444904133
M.SIVASANKARA MUTHUVEL 0462-2445233 9443131008
S.SANKARI VENI 0462-2445233 8129188006
SHUBHENDRA KUMAR 0462-2445233 9442512591
MANOJ O J 0462-2445233 9400179499
SUPPORT SERVICE:
CONTROL ROOM 0462-2445233
MAIN GATE- SECURITY 0462-2445233
DIST. AUTHORITIES & OUT
SIDE AGENCIES :
0462-2501032,
DISTRICT COLLECTOR,
2501033
TIRUNELVELI
SUPERINTENDENT OF 0462 2568025
POLICE, TIRUNELVELI 8300015426
DY SUPERINTENDENT OF 0462-2301700
POLICE, THALAIYUTHU
DIVISIONAL FIRE OFFICER, 0462 2572342
TIRUNELVELI
INSPECTOR OF POLICE, 0462-2486144
GANGAIKONDAN 9498194060
0452-2530914
ALC CENTRAL,MADURAI
9840922016
LEO CENTRAL,TUTICORIN
DIRECTORATE OF 0462-2551103
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH,TIRUNELVELI


TIRUNELVELI
0462-2530524
CHIEF ENGINEER EB
FIRE STATION, 0462-2572099
PALAYAMKOTTAI
FIRE STATION, PETTAI 0462-2342003
GOVT. HOSPITAL, 0462-2572511,
TIRUNELVELI 0462-2572511
INSPECTOR OF 0462-2551103
FACTORIES,TIRUNELVELI
ALL INDIA RADIO 0462-2561139
STATION,TIRUNELVELI
TIRUNELVELI RAILWAY 0462-2333185
STATION
PESO CONTACT NUMBERS
Chief Controller Of 0712-2510248
Explosives, Nagpur
Joint Chief Controller Of 022-27575946
Explosives, Mumbai 022-
27575946/27564941
Jt.CHIEF CONTROLLER OF 044-28514848
EXPLOSIVES,CHENNAI
MUTUAL AID MEMBERS
NOVA CARBON 0462-2568800
COCO COLA 0462-2910054
ATC TYRES 0462-3987302
0462-3987300
OFFICIAL
Telephone No.
SN Designation
Office Residence
ED, Tamil Nadu State Office, 044-28339251 044-
01
Chennai 24411652
044-28330001 044-
02 GM, Regional Services, Chennai
28353291
DGM (LPG), Tamil Nadu State 044-28330091
03
Office, Chennai 044-28330132
04 DGM (LPG- OPS) HO, Mumbai 0120-26447401
Chief (H,S & E) Manager, 044-28339200 044-
05
Chennai 044-28330063 28275588


TIRUNELVELI
0120-24361459 0120-
06 DGM (H,S&E),HO, Mumbai
4291699
044-28339023 0422-
07 Chief Manager (HR)
23642975
Senior Manager (H, S & E), 044-2833709
08
Chennai
0452-2533952 0452-
09 Chief Area Manager, MADURAI
2532054
14.2.5.9 Siren codes:
(1) The Emergency siren/s should be located suitably to cover the whole
area with the operational control within the installation. These should be
tested atleast once in a week to keep them in working condition.
Emergency siren code should be as follows, namely:-

(a) Emergency Level-I : A wailing siren for two minutes
(b) Emergency Level-II and III: same type of siren a sin case of
level-I and level-II but the same will be sounded for three times
at the interval of one minute i.e. (wailing siren 2 min + gap 1
min + wailing siren 2 min + gap 1 min + wailing siren 2 min)
total duration of disaster siren to be eight minutes
(c) All Clear Siren: Straight run siren for two minutes
(d) Test: Straight run siren for two minutes at frequency at least
once a week
(e) Public address system is provided with message indicating the

Zone number and location of emergency.


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 15
Infrastructure


TIRUNELVELI
Emergency Infrastructure (Clause No 15.0)

Emergency Control Centre (ECC) (As per clause No. 15.1)
Control Room has been designated as Emergency Control Centre (ECC)

for Tirunelveli Bottling Plant. In case same is not functional, then OIC
office shall act as back up ECC.ECC is fully Air conditioned room of 110
sqm2 with false flooring and ceiling.
Following supplies and dedicated equipment are made available at the

ECC.
1) A copy of the ERDMP is made available.

2) Maps and diagrams showing buildings, roads, process lines, drainage
trenches, and utilities such as air, LPG, water and electricity are
displayed.
3) Maps showing the site, surrounding area, high-ways, rivers, etc. are
displayed,
4) Names, addresses, and telephone numbers of employees displayed.
5) Updated lists of names, addresses, and telephone numbers of off-
site groups and organizations are made available that might have to
be contacted during emergency.
6) Dedicated and reliable communication equipments are provided at
the ECC.
7) ECC has 2 nos. of 110V DC emergency lights and back up UPS power
so that operations can continue in the event of power failure.
8) CCTV display system is available at control room to log events
during emergency.
9) ECC also has dedicated computer with LAN / internet facility to
access the installation data and also it has the latest and updated
soft copies of all standard operating practices (SOP) etc.,
Assembly Points (As per clause No. 15.2)
(1) Emergency Assembly Point in front of S&D building is pre-

designated areas in safe zone as per quantitative risk analysis,
where the personnel like workers, staff, contractor workers etc. not
involved in emergency operations (as per ERDMP) shall assemble in
case of an emergency.
(2) Designated assembly point is clearly marked with display board

along the route.


TIRUNELVELI
(3) During an emergency, pre-designated persons would take

charge of this point and take the roll call of the people
reporting. Provisions are made for assembly points,
communication and headcount facilities at assembly points, and
personnel to control the movement of assembled employees.
COMMUNICATION FACILITIES
 BSNL PHONES
 VHF SETS
 INTERCOM PHONES
LAND LINE MOBILE

OFFICIAL :
V.M.SUNDAR 0462-2445133 9444904133
M.SIVASANKARA MUTHUVEL 0462-2445233 9443131008
S.SANKARI VENI 0462-2445233 8129188006
SHUBHENDRA KUMAR 0462-2445233 9442512591
MANOJ O J 0462-2445233 9400179499
SUPPORT SERVICE:
CONTROL ROOM 0462-2445233
MAIN GATE- SECURITY 0462-2445233
DIST. AUTHORITIES & OUT
SIDE AGENCIES :
0462-2501032,
DISTRICT COLLECTOR,
2501033
TIRUNELVELI
SUPERINTENDENT OF 0462 2568025
POLICE, TIRUNELVELI 8300015426
POLICE, THALAIYUTHU
TIRUNELVELI
0452-2530914
ALC CENTRAL,MADURAI
9840922016
LEO CENTRAL,TUTICORIN
DIRECTORATE OF 0462-2551103
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY AND


TIRUNELVELI
HEALTH,TIRUNELVELI
0462-2530524
CHIEF ENGINEER EB
PALAYAMKOTTAI
FIRE STATION, PETTAI 0462-2342003
PESO CONTACT NUMBERS
Chief Controller Of 0712-2510248
Explosives, Nagpur
Joint Chief Controller Of 022-27575946
Explosives, Mumbai 022-
27575946/27564941
Jt.CHIEF CONTROLLER OF 044-28514848
EXPLOSIVES,CHENNAI
MUTUAL AID MEMBERS
NOVA CARBON 0462-2568800
COCO COLA 0462-2910054
ATC TYRES 0462-3987302
0462-3987300
OFFICIALS
Telephone No.
SN Designation
Office Residence
ED, Tamil Nadu State Office, 044-28339251 044-
01
Chennai 24411652
044-28330001 044-
02 GM, Regional Services, Chennai
28353291
DGM (LPG), Tamil Nadu State 044-28330091
03
Office, Chennai 044-28330132
04 DGM (LPG- OPS) HO, Mumbai 0120-26447401
Chief (H,S & E) Manager, 044-28339200 044-
05
Chennai 044-28330063 28275588
0120-24361459 0120-
06 DGM (H,S&E),HO, Mumbai
4291699
044-28339023 0422-
07 Chief Manager (HR)
23642975


TIRUNELVELI
Senior Manager (H, S & E), 044-2833709

08
Chennai
0452-2533952 0452-
09 Chief Area Manager, MADURAI
2532054


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 16
Declaration of On-Site & Off-Site Emergencies



TIRUNELVELI
Declaration of On-Site & Off-Site Emergencies (Clause No 16.0)
(1)An emergency starts as a small incident which may become a major

incident with passage of time. At the initial stages, the emergency
organization chart shall be put into action. If the incident goes beyond
control the on-site emergency plan will be actuated by the chief incident
controller at the appropriate stage as considered necessary.
(2) During idle shift or holidays, the security personnel will combat the
incident as per the ERDMP organization chart
(3) When emergency becomes catastrophic and evacuation beyond the

plant premises is considered necessary by the chief incident controller,
the situation will be handed over to district authority for implementing the
off-site emergency plan.
(4) The management of emergency henceforth has to be controlled by the

district crisis management group under the supervision of the District
Collector/DDMA.
(5) In addition to preparation of on-site emergency plan, furnishing

relevant information to the district authorities for the preparation of off-
site emergency plan is a statutory responsibility of the occupier of every
industry handling hazardous substance.
WHO SHOULD REPORT THE FIRE DISASTER AND HOW:
Any person in the filling shed/LPG P/H/TLD/Mounded Bullet

area/FWPH/PMCC, who sees a fire or unsafe conditions anywhere in the
plant, should report it at once to the Control Room. Person reporting the
fire / emergency should state the location at a prominent place to guide
fire-fighting crew arriving on the scene. The man should try to attempt to
mitigate the emergency, extinguish the fire with the equipment available
nearby till arrival of fire fighting crew. He should draw the attention of
nearby people by shouting ‘FIRE, FIRE, FIRE’
DECLARATION OF THE DISASTER
Level 1& 2 disaster- The disaster is declared by the Chief Incident

controller.
Level 3 disaster- The disaster is declared by District Authority


TIRUNELVELI
Initial Announcement of an Emergency
Any untoward incident/emergency has to be reported either by person or

through telephone/VHF or by any other means to the Location In-
Charge/Security Gate. The Location In-Charge shall act as per Roles &
Responsibility defined in clause No.14.2.
Location In Charge shall decide the nature of emergency

[Minor/Major/Disaster] and take appropriate action.
Note: The announcement regarding Major Emergency will be made by the

Location-in-Charge [Chief incident Coordinator] or his nominee as
information first becomes available on an incident.
This plan has been developed to deal with emergency incidents which
occur totally within the Indian Oil Tirunelveli Bottling Plant premises and
which do not endanger the outside community. Emergency incidents will
be classified by the level of response that will be required. The actual
classification will be made by the Location-In-Charge or his nominee as
information first becomes available on an incident. The level of response
may change as more information becomes available or conditions change.
Where information is lacking the worst case scenario will dictate the level
of response.
Level 1:
Incidents with minor release or leak of products or other emergency,

which amounts to minimum spill or minimum release of volume,
could poses a minor threat to the safety of employees, residents,
the environment or property and can be safely contained On-Site,
which doesn’t produce any off site impact and doesn’t seek any
outside involvement.
Level 2:
Incidents with moderate release or leak of products handled or other

emergency, which amounts to moderate spill or moderate release,
could poses a moderate threat to the safety of employees
residents, the environment or property which could have safely
contained On-Site, could produce off site impact and could seek any
outside involvement and could require outside resources.


TIRUNELVELI
Level 3:
Incidents with major release or leak of hydrocarbon products or other

emergency, which amounts to large spill or large release of volume
involved, could poses a total threat to the safety of employees,
residents, the environment or property which produce off site impact
and require large outside involvement & district outside resources.
Termination of emergency period and restoration of normalcy period,

which follows all clear sirens, shall also be declared by the “Chief-
Incident- Controller” or the higher management who replaces him.
Emergency Action Plan for Emergency during Off- Shift Hours

(Including Holidays):
3. During other than office hours (including holidays) the Security

In-charge shall perform the duties of Site Incident Controller.
Security at Main Gate shall also perform duties of Communication,
in addition to his normal duties till the arrival of the concerned
coordinator.
4. The Security in-charge in consultation with the site incident

controller shall act upon depending on the situation till arrival of
the concerned coordinators for effective handling of emergency.
They shall take care of the safety of personnel, plant, property
etc. Safe operating procedures which are already in practice shall
be followed.
5. All other non-essential personnel whose roll is not defined in the

action plan shall assemble at assembly points.


TIRUNELVELI
List of District and State Authorities with Telephone Numbers
Table – 1
List of Telephone Numbers of Civil Authorities in Tirunelveli

District
Telephone No.
S
Designation Residenc
N Office
e
0462-2501032,
DISTRICT COLLECTOR,
01 2501033
TIRUNELVELI
0462 2568025
SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,
02 8300015426
TIRUNELVELI
03
POLICE, THALAIYUTHU
04
TIRUNELVELI
05
06 ALC CENTRAL,MADURAI 0452-2530914
07 LEO CENTRAL,TUTICORIN 9840922016
DIRECTORATE OF INDUSTRIAL 0462-2551103
08 SAFETY AND
HEALTH,TIRUNELVELI
09 CHIEF ENGINEER EB 0462-2530524
10
PALAYAMKOTTAI
11 FIRE STATION, PETTAI 0462-2342003
12
13
1. When emergency becomes catastrophic and evacuation beyond

the plant premises is considered necessary by the chief incident
controller, the situation will be handed over to district authority
for implementing the off-site emergency plan.


TIRUNELVELI
2. The management of emergency henceforth has to be controlled

by the district crisis management group under the supervision of
the District Collector/DDMA.
3. In addition to preparation of on-site emergency plan, furnishing

relevant information to the district authorities for the preparation
of off-site emergency plan is a statutory responsibility of the
occupier of every industry handling hazardous substance.
Off site emergency plan for the surrounding areas
In the event of a major fire accident/ gas leak in the plant. We anticipate
that it may have an effect on the surrounding areas adjoining the plant.
The Chief-Incident- Controller/SPM with the assistance of other officers on
duty will co-ordinate the following activities
1. Seek the assistance by telephone from Gangaikondan Police

Station. Police control room to control the movement of personnel
on the Tirunelveli- Madurai Highway (NH-7)
2. To alert the residents of the surrounding villages/ hamlets and other
industrial units/ establishments
3. Inform commissioner / superintendent of police, Tirunelveli,
Divisional District Fire Officers at Tirunelveli and other industrial
units/ establishments surrounding the plant area for alert and
necessary assistance
4. Contact any other protection forces such as CRPF, RPF fire officers/
safety officers available in the respective offices/ establishments/
units of the surrounding areas
5. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Tirunelveli and the nearby Electrical
sub-station in charges for continuous power supply/ total
disconnection of power as the case may be according to hour to
hour situation and fire fighting needs
6. Arrange for the security of the premises, pipelines, pressure
vessels, employees and other vital installations
7. Arrange for required number of transport vehicles for movement of
key personnel/ employees for residence to location or from location
to places of safety or residence as the case may be required.
8. Alert station master Gangaikondan Railway Station.
9. Contact and seek assistance of the Medical personnel from the
Primary Health Centre/ Tirunelveli Government Hospital and other


TIRUNELVELI
available medical officers from the nearby factories, industrial

establishments/ units
10. Assign a team for recharging fire extinguishers, monitoring the
water pressure for continuous supply of water and other fire fighting
materials
11. To provide food, water etc., for the employees who manning the
emergency situation
12. Inform important customers like Road Transport Corporations,
Railways, Defence, police, Electricity, Municipal Corporation, Milk
Dairies etc on the repercussions of the emergency situation


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 17
Resources for Controlling Emergency



TIRUNELVELI
Resources for Controlling Emergency (Clause No.17)
In order to meet all possible emergencies, adequate number of resources

and systems has been provided as per identified Risk level and also in
compliance with statutory requirements under Factories Act, 1948 and
other OISD regulations. These are enumerated Table – 1 below:-
Fire Fighting, Arrangement with the Factory
Name of Chemical Class of fire Substance required

to extinguish the fire
F/F DCP type (Dry
chemical powder)
Liquefied Petroleum C contains NaHCO3 97%
Gas + Mag. Bi Carbonate
(1800 MT ) 1% +Tri calcium
Phosphate ½ %.
CO2 type fire

extinguisher
LPG is a highly inflammable product, hence adequate care have taken by

providing full proof automatic fire-fighting system at the plant to meet
any emergency.
SINGLE LARGEST RISK (Zone wise)

SINGLE LARGEST RISK AREA (Filling shed) = 1258.60 m2.
WATER REQUIRED FOR SINGLE LARGEST RISK AREA = 770.26 KL/Hr.
3
Water required for 2 water monitors @ 144 m /hr = 288 KL/Hr.
Total requirement = 1058.26 KL/Hr.
WATER REQUIRED FOR 4 HOURS = 4* 1058.26 = 4233.04 M3/hr
Water storage capacity required for running
2 pumps for 4 hours = 2x615x4=4920 KL Storage
WATER STORAGE CAPACITY (3 * 2500 M3) = 7500 M3.
PUMP & STORAGE AREA

NO. OF MAIN PUMPS Required = 2 Nos.
NO. OF SPARE PUMPS = 1 No.


TIRUNELVELI
CAPACITY OF EACH PUMP = 615 m3/hr.

NO. OF JOCKEY PUMPS = 2 Nos.
CAPACITY OF EACH JOCKEY PUMP = 10 m3/hr.
ACTUAL REQUIRED SHORTFALL

WATER STORAGE 7500 M3 4920 M3 NIL
MAIN FIRE PUMPS 2 NOs. 2 NOs. NIL
STAND BY FIRE 1 NOs. 1 NOs. NIL
PUMPS
JOCKEY PUMP 1 NO. 1 NO. NIL
STANDBY JOCKEY 1 NO. 1 NO. NIL
PUMP
Fire fighting appliances ACTUAL REQUIRED SHORT

/equipment/chemicals FALL
3 Fire 3Fire Nil
Fire tenders/ fire fighting engines
Engines Engines
Nil
Water storage capacity 7500 KL
4920KL
67 No’s nil
Fire hoses incl spares 67 No’s
Jet/fog /spray/water curtain 28/4/2/2 Nil
28/4/2/2
nozzles
A) Personnel Protective Equipment

The following PPE are available in the plant
 Stretcher
 Safety belt
 Hand gloves ( canvas)
 Clothing pant Shirt & Jersey
 Safety Shoes
 First AID Box
 Asbestos hand gloves
 Rubber hand gloves
 Safety Helmets


TIRUNELVELI
B) Fire Extinguishers
These are the locations where portable fire extinguishers are
placed to combat small & medium size fires in the plant.
Name of Location 9 Kg DCP 75 Kg DCP 4.5 Kg CO2
Stores 2
Canteen 3
S&D 0 2
Office 2
Main Gate 1
Fire Trolley 2 2
Filling shed 64 2
TLD shed 8 1
LPG Pump house 10 1
Bullet 7 1
Fire Pump house 2 1
PMCC 0 10
Total 101 5 15
The personal protective equipment are periodically checked and if not found in
order these are replaced.
Classification of Fire:
Fire is classified basically on the basis of the combustible material

involved in it as below:
Type of Fire Materials Involved

Class ‘A’ Fire Ordinary combustibles as Wood, Cloth,
(Combustible Solid) Rubbish, Plastic, Paper.
Inflammable substances as Oil, Mob,
Class ‘B’ Fire
Benzyl, Solvent etc. And also all the
(Combustible Liquid)
fires, which occur in fast and vapour.
Class ‘C’ Fire
Fire involving gases i.e. LPG, CNG,
(Combustible Gases &
Synthetic gas, Hydrocarbon Gases etc.
Energized Electrical
and energized electrical equipment.
Equipment )
Class ‘D’ Fire All Combustible metallic fire, Potassium,
(Combustible Metal) Magnesium, Sodium etc.


TIRUNELVELI
For Fires of:

1. Electric Origin, use only CO2 or dry chemical fire extinguishers to
extinguish fire on or around electrical equipment. Do not use water
or foam.
2. Do not extinguish a gas fire until the source of fuel has been cut off
to avoid an explosive mixture being formed.
Suitability of Fire Extinguishers:
Types of
Class ‘A’ Class ‘B’ Class ‘C’ Class ‘D’
Extinguishers
Water Type
Suitable Unsuitable Unsuitable Unsuitable
Fire Extinguishers
Unsuitable but
Foam Type
will control small Suitable Unsuitable Unsuitable
Fire Extinguishers
fires
Unsuitable but
CO2
will control small Suitable Suitable Unsuitable
Fire Extinguishers
fires
Unsuitable but
Dry Powder
will control small Suitable Suitable Suitable*
Fire Extinguishers
fires
*Special type of DCP
Fire Alarm System:
Siren is kept in auto mode and will sound in case of operation of break
glass unit/MCP.
Manual Call Points

Fire Alarm System Siren
Indication panel


TIRUNELVELI
Wind Socks:
Wind socks are installed for knowing wind direction during emergency.
Adequate number of Wind Socks has been installed in at strategic
locations such as in shed, TLD shed etc.
Portable Fire fighting Extinguishers:
All the strategic location/areas of the Plant are covered with portable fire
extinguishers for tackling fires at their incipient stage. Two type of
extinguishers (DCP & CO 2) of different capacities (DCP-9 Kg, 75 Kg.),
(CO2 - Kg 4.5 Kg.) has been provided at hazardous area for instant use.
Hydrants, Monitors & Hose Boxes:
Entire Plant premises & strategic processing areas are covered with
hydrant point; water Monitor & Water sprinkler System. Every hydrant
point is provided with one hose box having two delivery hoses and one
branch/Nozzles.
Fire Water Network:
Entire Plant premise is covered with fire water Network to meet the
emergency along with Monitors, Fire Hydrant points and sprinkler at
strategic points as per OISD requirements.
EMERGENCY RESCUE KIT

Emergency Kit consists of listed emergency equipments required for
rescue and control/arresting leakage in case of emergency in LPG Plant.
The equipments shall be mounted on a compact light weight trolley.


TIRUNELVELI
Emergency Kit shall be consisting of the following emergency equipments:

S.No. Item Quantity Description/Spe
cification
1. 2 Hydrant hoses of
15m for
Hydrant Hoses connecting them
to hydrant
monitors
2. 15 Safety PPEs
Helmets
3. 2 Fire fighting
Fire Extinguishers
equipment
4. 2 Safety PPEs
Safety Belts
5. 2 Fire Fighting
Jet Nozzles
purpose
6. 2 For rescue
Stretchers
operation
7. 2 Fire Fighting
Water Curtain Nozzles
purpose
8. 2 Fire Fighting
Universal Nozzles
purpose
9. 2 Fire Fighting
Spray Nozzles
purpose
10 SCABA with spare 1 Fire Fighting
cylinder purpose
11. 1 Fire Fighting
First aid box
purpose
12. 1 Fire Fighting
Water Gel Blanket
purpose
Telephones:
Following communication equipment’s are used for internal and external
communication at Indane Bottling Plant:
 Inter com Telephone

 Land Line
 Mobile Phones
 Walkie- Talkies
 Megaphone
Telephones are provided at Plant and in various departments for internal
as well as external communication (selected locations). Telephone facility
is also provided at the residence of all employees.


TIRUNELVELI
Walkie Talkie Sets:
Walkie Talkie Base station sets are provided to all Sections Shed &
Security Main gate for internal communication during emergency.
Operating personnel/contractors are provided mobile type hand set walkie
talkies are provided.
Transport Facilities:
Adequate transport vehicles are provided for medical treatment,

evacuation and the movement of key persons. One emergency vehicle is
stationed at Plant premise.
Finance department shall take help from outside transport agencies for
mass evacuation of Plant persons, if required.
Check list - 6 as per regulation 17 (5) is attached in Appendix
Mutual Aid Help:
Mutual aid assistance and agreement has signed with coca cola and Nova
carbon.
The commitment in writing to render assistance in emergency is available.

The details of facilities are exchanged among industries. The mutual aid
scheme applicable not only for safety, but also security and sharing of
common facility. Quarterly meeting conducted and action plans drawn.
ROLES OF MUTUAL AID PARTNERS DURING EMERGENCY:

The following are the important roles to be fulfilled at the time of
emergencies.
1. Traffic Control - Road
2. Auxiliary Assistance
3. Rescue Assistance


TIRUNELVELI
Brief description of the above roles is given below.

1. Traffic Control – Road
(a) To take control of LPG Bullet Truck and packed cylinder truck
parking area and arrange for smooth evacuation of trucks towards
Central prison.
(b) Take up traffic control of approach road leading to LPG Plant;

including stopping of vehicles other than ERD related vehicles in the
approach road
(c) The Traffic control team should guide all rescue vehicles towards
the unit in which emergency is there & hand over the traffic control
to Police on their arrival (thereafter to assist Police, if need be).
2. Auxiliary Assistance
On receipt of information, personnel should rush to the site with
safety equipments and report to the fire-chief of the concerned unit
where emergency is there. The auxiliary team shall assist the unit in
which emergency is there, by providing equipments and manpower
as necessitated at site.
3. Rescue Assistance
On receipt of information from unit having emergency, personnel
shall rush to the site with rescue materials and first aid gadgets.
The rescue team shall help by providing first-aid to injured persons
till such time health team arrives. Also, the rescue team shall assist
in shifting injured, if any, to hospital.


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 18
Demographic Information


TIRUNELVELI
Demographic Information (As per Clause 18.0)
Indane Bottling Plant, Tirunelveli is located in SIPCOT Industrial Area at

Gangaikondan in Tirunelveli District of Tamil Nadu State. It is located
adjacent to NH-7 which connects Varanasi & Kanyakumari and 18 KM
from Tirunelveli city. The LPG Bottling Plant covers about 42 acres of land.
The nearest railway station is situated at Gangaikondan at a distance of
4KM(E).The nearest Airport is situated at Tuticorin at a distance of 33.55
KM(SW). The ground water is available at a depth of 60 M. The site is
conducted by road only
DEMOGRAPHY DETAILS
18.1 Demography:
Male Population in Gangaikondan : 5,332
Female Population in Gangaikondan : 4,922
Total Population in Gangaikondan : 10,254
4.0 METEROLOGICAL DATA:

18.2 Meteorological Data:
Maximum Temperature - 48o C
Minimum Temperature - 28o C
Wind Speed:
Relative Humidity (%) - 35% (Min) & 92% (Max)
Average Wind Velocity - 4.5- 6.0 m/sec
Predominant wind Direction - NE
Floods - Nil


TIRUNELVELI
a. Neighboring population in a 5 Km radius- NIL

b. Housing Colonies of industries- NIL
c. Sensitive institutions such as schools, hospitals, religious
establishments and old age homes etc.- NIL
d. Cattle and livestock- NIL
e. Flora and fauna- NIL


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 19
Medical Facilities


TIRUNELVELI
Medical Facilities (Clause No 19.0)

Details of medical facilities to be provided in the ERDMP as per the
following:-
(a) Facilities Available at First Aid Centre.
Facilities Available at First Aid Centre.

Location with Staff
Description Strength
S. No. Exceeding 50
1 Small Size Sterilised dressings 24 Rolls
Medium Size Sterilised
2 dressings 12 Rolls
3 Large Size Sterilised dressings 12 Rolls
4 Dettol 6 bottle
5 Hydrogen peroxide 12 Nos
6 Moov 6 Tube
7 Crocin 60 tabs
8 Soframycin 6 Tube
9 Scissors 6 Pair
10 Bandage 12 Rolls
11 Burn Ointment 6 Tube
(b) Details of trained persons in first aid in the Plant
The details will be attached after commissioning of plant. As staffs are

not deployed yet.
(c) Facilities available at identified hospitals.
List of Hospitals with facilities available at nearby Cities

Details & Contact details of neighbouring Hospitals
Sr. Hospital Contact No.

No.
1. Tirunelveli Medical College hospital 0462-2572511

0462-2572512
(d) Antidotes and emergency medicines


TIRUNELVELI
Available at Emergency Control Room at IOCL plant and at the

above mentioned Hospitals under (c) & (d) above.
(e) Details of specialist doctors in the town
Available at the above mentioned Hospitals under (c) & (d)

above..
(f) Details of hospital in nearby cities.
As per (c) & (d) above.


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 20
Evacuation


TIRUNELVELI
Evacuation (As per Clause No 20.0)

The Chief Incident controller will intimate regarding evacuation.
Evacuation of the personnel shall be carried out in a planned manner
along the escape route to assembly points. People must be evacuated at
right angle to wind or opposite to the wind direction.
All Team Heads/Security will provide the exact head count details during
the emergency. Accounting for site personnel, visitors and contractors,
particularly those known to have been in the affected area will be done.
Figures of contract labor may vary depending upon day and time, but the
exact figure (inside Plant) will be available at main gate (Security
Department keeps record of contract person/ visitor etc. who have
entered inside plant. Total number of persons available at site shall be
calculated from above.
Rescue operation will be carried out by the Rescue Team personnel

immediately attending to the emergency. The list of casualties etc. shall
be reported to the Chief Incident Controller at site. Casualties will be
shifted to hospital, if required, in consultation with Chief Incident
Controller/SPM.
Evacuation of those personnel who are not required to be present will be

carried out in consultation with Chief Incident Controller. When required,
all personnel shall proceed to ASSEMBLY POINTS through designated
routes.
All the plant staff / security personnel are trained and participate in fire
fighting
All Section heads/ Team Coordinators will ensure that the employees
nominated by them from their respective Sections must report at
emergency site to extend their support to Team Coordinators.
Evacuation Plan
 When the emergency message received, all personnel should

ensure that nearby personnel are aware of the emergency, quickly
shutdown operating equipment by operating ESDs (e.g., ROVs,


TIRUNELVELI
Carousel & Allied machines, Pumps, Compressors etc. gets

closed/off).
 All personnel should know where primary and emergency exits are
located, and be familiar with the various escape routes available.
 Be aware of all marked exits and evacuation routes from your area
of the building. Know the escape routes from your work area.
 When officially told to evacuate, leave by the nearest exit and alert
others to do the same.
 Assist the disabled in exiting the building, if requested.
 Once outside, move to the assembly point designated for your

building. Stay there until an accurate head count has been taken.
 Keep streets and walkways next to exits clear for emergency

vehicles and personnel. Keep the street side of buildings clear so
that emergency equipment can reach buildings.
 Do not return to an evacuated Plant/ building until & unless

directed to do so by the Safety & Fire Department personnel.
EVACUATION & REHABILITATION
If a major industrial accident does occur, the general public in
surrounding areas will have very little time to react and save themselves.
The local population will have to be warned in a very short period. Time
available to population for a safe escape and threatened by the accident
will depend on the nature of accident. A fire will give more time to escape
and generally area affected will be small. Effects of a fire on population
will be injuries due to thermal radiation. An explosion will give little time
to warn population and area affected may be much larger than that in
case of a fire. Effects of an explosion on the population will be injuries
caused by shock wave, flying debris collapsing structures as well as
exposure to thermal radiation.
FOR INSIDE BATTERY AREA:

The entry of contract personnel working inside the battery area is
through Main Gate only. In case of emergency / major accident / disaster,
assembly points have been identified and marked in safe area for
assembling of people for head counting / transportation to a safe place.


TIRUNELVELI
FOR OUTSIDE BATTERY AREA:

Evacuation of the population effected villages / other places outside
the battery area depending on the emergency and provision of temporary
shelter and supplies (in the relief camp) will be under the overall control
of the District Administration.
PERIODIC ASSESSMENT:
Incident Controller (Chief Co-Ordinator) will carry out periodic
assessment of the actual disaster zone and resources deployment
ACTIONS BY GENERAL POPULATION

 On being warned of a major industrial accident general public
should take the following actions:
 Immediately go outdoors
 Extinguish all flames
 Store water for emergency use
 Do not jam emergency phone lines by calling emergency services.
 Wait for further instructions from emergency services before moving
out.
EVACUATION
In major disaster, it may become necessary to evacuate people from
and around the area likely to be affected by accident. Sometimes, the
evacuation may have to be made to safe places within the complex area
itself. At other times, however, especially in cases of catastrophic
disaster, it will be necessary to shift the entire population outside the
complex area to certain pre-designated places fixed in advance. The task
may be difficult as there will be no notice or very short notice of a
calamity, there may be failure of electricity, there may be shortage of
manpower resources etc.
REQUISITIONING OF BUSES / TRUCKS

The Local Police station in charge under the respective station will be the
Commander-in-Charge of evacuation under the direction of respective
Superintendent of police. He will determine the extent of evacuation
necessary in view of the likely hazards of disaster. Once this is decided
upon, the next job would be to effect necessary evacuation as quickly as
possible. Whether evacuation is internal in the complex area itself or
external, transport facilities would be a major requirement. For this the
evacuation. Commander will requisition all available buses / trucks. A list
of such vehicles should be prepared in advance and kept ready.


TIRUNELVELI
For ordering evacuation, it will be necessary to fix up pick-up points in

different areas in advance so that residents would know where exactly to
board the buses. The buses / trucks will be lined up at these points for
shifting people to safe places.
The entire area to be evacuated should be divided into convenient sectors

and each sector should be placed in charge of a senior officer, whose duty
it would be to ensure that all persons from this sector are compulsorily
shifted. Help of security / police staff should also be taken in achieving
this task, if considered necessary.
Repeated announcements should be made over mobile-vans, fitted with

mikes, directing people to evacuate immediately and board buses / trucks
at pick – up points. Staff who would be employed for supervising
arrangements at pick – up points should be earmarked in advance. The
routes by which evacuation will be made from different areas will be fixed
in advance. The drivers of buses / trucks will be informed about their
routes and also about their destinations where the residents are to be off-
loaded. In the case of shifting to city, the Chairman of Municipality should
be informed for keeping the places of accommodation ready to receive
evacuated persons and also to make other arrangements. Sheltering of
shifted people will be taken care of by District Collector.
EDUCATION
Educating general public about the potential hazards associated with plant
operations and actions to be taken in case of accident will be one of the
key areas of disaster management plan. For this purpose, the following
actions are proposed:
Pamphlets / booklets regarding industrial hazards will be prepared and
distributed to general public of the concerned area.
Help of voluntary organizations and local schools will be taken to conduct

educational sessions to make people aware of the actions that the general
public should take in case of any major emergency. Periodic meetings
with the village heads to educate (by conducting ERMD in the presence of
district authorities/ local village heads)


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 21
Information to Public


TIRUNELVELI
Information to Public (As per Clause No 21.0)
(1) General public who are likely to be affected shall be informed about
safety measures to be taken in the event of an emergency.
During On-site emergency Fire Mock Drill nearby public are
informed & their participation also ensured to have holistic
experience of the emergency & precautionary measures to be
adopted during emergencies.
Awareness camp also being conducted regularly for sensitizing the
people about the emergency nature.
(2) Display boards carrying Do’s and Don’ts shall be located outside
the gate as well as in the neighbouring areas and other habitat
areas in the immediate vicinity. Use of Dos' and Don’ts shall be
prepared and furnished to the District Crisis Management
Group.Do’s & Don’ts during emergency situation for the public as
well as management is prepared & display along premises of the
location
(3) Safety leaflets are printed having the information on Hazards of
Petroleum products & action in case of emergency is distributed
among villages near by the area as per Chapter-18.
Public Awareness Pamphlets in Tamil is attached herewith


TIRUNELVELI


TIRUNELVELI
Assessing the situation at Site & Making Emergency known to

People
Whosoever will notice any situation as per the scenarios discussed
in Chapter-2, he will immediately inform to Control Room / Shift- In -
Charge / supervisor by means of Walkie- Talkie or nearest alarm point or
personally. Officer-In-Charge, after seeing the magnitude of the situation,
will organize as per fire organization chart and communicate to security,
the level the emergency, & blow Major Fire Siren. Accordingly a Wailing
Siren, emergency will be controlled by the teams as per organogram.
If the Fire Fighting crew is not capable of controlling the situation, after
assessing the situation, the Incident controller of the station will declare
the disaster i.e. level 3 disaster.
The information about the disaster to key personnel will also be given on
telephone by Rescue Team.
Name & Telephone nos. of Key Personnel of Tirunelveli Bottling

Plant is given in TABLE- 2 of Chapter-14
External Public:
Public Awareness System
For disclosure of information to the public, ERMD is being

conducted, at regular interval, in the presence of district authorities/
village panchayat. Write up/ facilities folder is being given to above all in
the form of a brief write up for further propagation in their villages. Many
programs are conducted in villages through corporate social responsibility
programs and various developments schemes are implemented. To avoid
any panic, it is been considered that the necessary announcement will be
made in nearby villages releasing the information to the tune of
requirement only.
The use of Electronic Media
For bringing the awareness among the external public at large, the
use of electronic media like TV, Air & Press coverage is used.


TIRUNELVELI
CHAPTER – 22
Roles and responsibilities of stakeholders

including external agencies


TIRUNELVELI
Roles and responsibilities of stakeholders including external

agencies
(1) Role and responsibilities of stakeholders including external agencies

such as District Authority, police, fire service, revenue department, health
department, pollution control board, National Disaster Response Force
(NDRF) and State Disaster Response Force (SDRF).
(2) For roles and responsibilities of above stakeholders and responders,

Primarily district collector as Head of emergency operation and other
authorities under his charge including external agencies, has been defined
in Schedule–V. These roles and responsibilities are generally in line with
National Disaster Management Guidelines on Chemical Disasters, April,
2007, brought out by National Disaster Management Authority.
Schedule – V
The important Roles and Responsibilities of Various Stakeholders
a) Tirunelveli Bottling Plant – LPG bottling installations having

receiving, storage and handling facilities including storage for LPG-
(Mentioned in Regulation 3)
During Emergencies the installation will provide necessary information

to Mutual Aid Association, District Authority, Police and Fire Services
about.
 List of Hazardous Chemical and Systems which have potential to

cause danger to Human, Environment and Property.
Material Data Sheet is attached below


TIRUNELVELI
Synonyms : LPG, Gas

C A S No. : 68476 – 85 – 7
U N No. : 1075
Regulated Identification: Shipping Name: Liquefied Petroleum Gas, Hazchem Code:

2 WE

Acute Effects : Inhalation: Concentration in air greater than 10% causes
dizziness in few minutes. 1% conc. gives the same symptoms
in 10 mts. High concentration causes asphyxiation.


Skin : Frost bite can occur and appropriate treatment for it to be given.
Remove the wetted clothes. Wash with warm water & soap.



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LEL : 1.9 %
UEL : 9.5 %
heavier than air vapours may travel long distance and flash
back.
Products :
Fire-Fighting Instructions : Fires should not be extinguished until flow of LPG is not
stopped. Shut off gas and allow the product to burn. Cool the
surroundings with water spray. Fire fighters should wear self
breathing apparatus while fighting fire
Small Spills : Shut off leaks if safe to do so. Disperse vapours with water
spray. Isolate area and take a gas test before entering. Warn
everyone that the mixture is explosive.
Handling Precautions : Do not use/store near heat/open flame. Avoid contact with
liquid as frost bites can occur. Use gumboots, gloves while
handling the product. Do not inhale. Stay upwind while
handling the product. Tanks and dispensing equipments should
be grounded to reduce static charge fires. It should be stored in
closed containers away from heat & source of ignition. Avoid
contact with skin and eyes. Wash thoroughly after handling
Storage Requirements : Do not use/store near heat/open flame/water/acids. Stenched
with mercaptans for easy identification during leaks


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Engineering Controls : Provide proper ventilation for environment to be below Time

Waited Average (TWA). Use explosion proof electrical fittings
in classified areas
Physical State : Gas at 15oC & 1atm. pressure. Handled as liquid in compressed
stage

electricity
Products:

minutes. 1% conc. gives the same symptoms in 10 minutes.
High concentration causes asphyxiation.
Prevent spillage from entering drains or water sources. After spills wash area with soap and
water preventing runoff from entering drains. Can burn with lot of heat producing CO2 and
CO.


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* American Institutional Conference for Industrial & Govt. Hygenist

(AICIGH)
Avoid contact with oxidizers. Olefinic impurities may laed to narcotic

effect or it may act as a simple.
Asphyxiant. A very dangerous hazard when exposed to heat or flame. If
fire is big, keep surrounding Areas cool by spraying water.
XI. DISCLAIMER
Information contained in this material data sheet is believed to be reliable
but
not representation, guarantees or warranties of any kind are made as to
its
accuracy, suitability for a particular application or results to be obtained
from
them.
* NIOSH is the accession number used by the registry or toxic effects of

chemical substances (RTECS) produced by the National Institute for
occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Cincinnati, Ohio 45226 USA.

recognized internationally and is in agreement with the United Nations


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coding system and is used in transport documents, labels and placards. It

is also used to determine the regulations for shipping the material.
* OSHA is the permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) as defined by the U.S

occupational safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Department of
Labour. These standards may also include the notation “CL” indicating the
maximum short time peak allowed above the ceiling value.
conference of Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). The TLV also
represents an air concentration to which workers can be exposed for a
normal 8-hour day, 40-hour work week without ill effects. The notation
“skin” indicates that the material penetrates into skin and skin contact
should be avoided though the TLV concentration is not exceeded.
* MAK code is followed by the German Research Society. Those materials

that are classified potentially carcinogenic by the German Research
Society are noted on this code. The MAK values are also revised annually
and discussions of materials, under consideration for MAK assignment are
included in the annual publication together with the current values.
* CAS is a code assigned to the material by the chemical abstract
services of the American Chemical Society. This code is becoming a
Universal “Social Security Number” for chemical entities. It is used
whenever possible in describing a substance to avoid confusion and
ambiguity caused by multiple synonyms for the same chemical.
 On-Site Emergency Plan and Periodic Mock Drill.
The above entities will support authorities in mitigation, rescue and

rehabilitation, with resources identified and agreed with the authorities in
advance. Such areas shall be included in Off-Site Emergency Plans.
b) The district authority is responsible for the Off-Site emergency plan

and it shall be equipped with up-to-date Major Accident Hazard units,
website, control room etc., with provisions for monitoring the level of
preparedness at all times. Regular meetings of various stakeholders of
Chemical Disaster Management will be conducted by district
administration/District Disaster Management Authority to review the
preparedness of Chemical Disaster Management & IOCL, Indane Bottling


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Plant, Tirunelveli is participating actively in all disaster management

review meetings.
c) The police will be an important component of all disaster management

plans as they will be associated with investigation of incident s/disasters.
Police take overall charge of the Off-Site situation until the arrival of the
district collector or its representative at the scene.
d) The fire services are one of the first responders and shall be
adequately trained and equipped to handle chemical emergencies. Fire
services are to acquire a thorough knowledge of likely hazards at the
incident site and the emergency control measures required to contain it.
e) In a chemical emergency, the revenue department shall coordinate

with other agencies for evacuation, establishment of shelters and
provision of food, etc.
f) When required for evacuation purposes in a chemical emergency, the

Department of transport should made transport promptly available.
g) The role of civil society and private sector in the Off-Site plan shall
be defined.
h) The health department needs to assure that all victims get

immediate medical attention on the site as well as at the hospitals/health-
care facility where they are shifted. In addition, the department needs to
network all the health-care facilities available in the vicinity for effective
management and also take effective measures to prevent the occurrence
of any epidemic.
i) Pollution control boards need to ascertain the developing severity of

the emergency in accordance with responsive measures by constant
monitoring of the environment. If and when an area is fit for entry will
depend upon the results of the monitoring. A decontamination operation
would be required to be carried out with the help of other agencies and
industries.
j) The NDRF and SDRF are the specialized forces to manage these
disasters in a longer run according to the severity and nature of the
disaster. Their specialized training is an effective measure that needs to
be built up and maintained with time for achieving a higher standard of


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preparedness. They need to coordinate with other local agencies such as

the Central Industrial Security Force that may be responsible for security
at the industrial site.
* Role of above External Agencies have been defined in Annexure – E of

National Disaster Management Guidelines Chemical Disasters, April, 2007
NDRF: National Disaster Response Force

SDRF: State Disaster Response Force
ASSISTANCE FROM OUTSIDE AGENCIES

The extent of involvement, if any by government agencies (i.e. fire,
police, electricity board, etc.) and other organizations (i.e.) hospitals,
telephones, railways, local bodies, etc.) in a plant emergency, will depend
upon the type and magnitude of the crisis.
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, POLICE & FIRE BRIGADE:

 Fire service
Fire service forces will rush the fire tenders and their force to the
plant and to co-ordinate with the plant authorities in meeting the
emergencies
 Police
Police force will maintain “law & order” at the emergency scene and
adjacent area to the plant. They will also regulate the movement of
traffic in the High way in co-ordination with the RTO authorities.
Priority for movement of ambulance, fire services vehicles etc, will
be given by the police
 Local Panchayat
Local panchayat will co-ordinate the evacuation of the community,
surrounding the plant area aid in information dissemination
regarding the emergency situation and assist in rescue operations
 Electricity Board
They will assist in emergency cut-off/ supply of power to the
emergency area and will co-ordinate with the plant authorities to
contain the situation
 Evacuation of population, if necessary
ASSITANCE REQUIRED FROM IRRIGATION AUTHORITIES:

 To make available earth-moving equipments like bulldozers, drag
line etc. for making approach road and constructing bunds in the


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canal / river for containing the spread of products for reclaiming the
same.
ASSISTANCE FROM HOSPITAL, TELEPHONES, TRANSPORT:

 Hospital
Emergency panel of doctors with Para-medical attendants equipped
with life saving drugs and for treatment of cold burns, first aid
equipments and apparatus shall rush to the site. They will establish
camp for treatment of those affected by the emergency situations
 Telephones
Telecom & Telegraph personnel will extend their service in speedy
communication regarding the emergency situation and operation in
co-ordination with the plant authorities
 Transport
Necessary adequate movement of public transport required for
evacuation of community surrounding the plant area will be
arranged
ASSISTANCE REQUIRED FROM NEIGHBOURING INDUSTRY

(MUTUAL AID PARTNERS):
 Mutual Aid Members will render the help at the time of emergency.
They will mobilize the
 Equipments, Manpower, etc. to mitigate the loss due to disaster or
accident. They will provide support
 To combat the disaster situation in an efficient way and will provide.
 Fire Tender and Crew
 F/F material, First Aider, their hospital facilities if any.
 Technical expertise, communication facilities, vehicles as required


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CHAPTER – 23
Reporting of the Incident



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23.0 Reporting of the Incident:
1) All incidents covered under Level-I should be maintained by the entity

for inspection whenever called for inspection and Level-II and Level-III
shall be reported to the Board in the format specified and placed at
Schedule-VI including near miss incident. The above report should be
submitted within 48 hours after occurrence of the incidents or any other
reason triggering major incident.
2) Investigation report of all major incidents shall be submitted to the

Board. An incident shall be treated as Major if any of the following occurs;
(a) Fire for more than 15 minutes

(b) Explosion / blowout
(c) Fatal incident.
(d) Loss above Rs. 5.0 Lac
(e) Cumulative man hours lost more than 500 hrs.
(f) Plant shutdown / outage due to the incident
(g) Level-III incident
Any incidents in the location has to be reported to the concerned

authority based on the guidelines of the regulation & the format
as attached below
SCHEDULE – VI
INCIDENT REPORTING FORMAT
1. Organisation 2. Sector
3. Location 4. Incident Sr. No.
5. Date of Incident 6. Time of Incident
7. Major / Minor / Near 8. Report -

miss Preliminary / Final
9. Fire / Incident 10. Duration of fire -
Hrs / Min
11. Type of Incident with loss of life / injury, Fire, Explosion, Blowout,
Electrocution, Fall from Height, Inhalation of Gas, Driving, Slip / Trip, Others,
NA
12. Location of Incident ( Name of Plant / Unit / Area / Facility / Tank farm /
Gantry / Road / Parking area etc )
13. Whether plant shutdown / caused outage of the facility? Yes / No
14. Fatalities nos. a) Employees = b) Contractor = c) Others =


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15. Injuries nos. a) Employees = b) Contractor = c) Others =
16. Man - hours Lost a) Employees = b) Contractor = c) Others =
Direct Loss due to the incident ( Rs. In Lacs ).

17. Loss to equipment /
Machinery as per Insurance claim etc.
18. Indirect Losses : Through put / Production Loss, etc.
Status of the Facility : Construction / Commissioning / Operation /

19. Shutting
down / Turn around, Maintenance / Start up / Any
other.
20. Brief Description of the Incident including post
incident measures.
( Attach details in separate sheet )
21. Whether similar Incident has occurred in past at the

same location, If yes, give brief description of the
incident and attach details in separate sheet.
22. Whether Internal Investigation has been completed.
If no, likely date by which it will be completed.
23. Whether internal investigation report ( Major
Incident ) has been submitted to PNGRB. If no, likely
date by which it will be submitted.
24. Cause of the Incident ( Tick the most relevant cause preferably one, maximum two )
A) Deviation from Procedure I) Not using the PPE
B) Lack of Job Knowledge J) Equipment failure
C) Lack of supervision K) Poor design / Layout etc.
D) Improper Inspection L) Inadequate facility
E) Improper Maintenance. ( Mech. / Elec. / Inst ) M) Poor House Keeping
F) Improper material handling N) Natural Calamity
G) Negligent Driving O) Pilferage / Sabotage
H) Careless walking / climbing etc. P) Any other (give details)
25. Cause of leakage - Oil, Gas or Chemical ( Tick one only )
A) Weld leak from equipment / lines E) Leakage due to improper

operation
B) Leak from flange, gland etc. F) Leak due to improper
maintenance
C) Leak from rotary equipment G) Normal operation -

Venting / draining


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D) Metallurgical failure H) Any other
26. Cause of Ignition leading to fire ( Tick only one cause )
A) Near to hot work F) Static Electricity
B) Near to Furnace / Flare etc. G) Hammering / Fall of

object
C) Auto - ignition H) Heat due to Friction
D) Loose electrical connection I) Lightning
E) Near to hot surface J) Any other ( pyrophoric etc

)
27. Was the incident Avoidable? ( Yes / No )
28. The incident could have been avoided by the use of / or by ;

( Tick the most relevant point preferably one, maximum two )
A) Better supervision F) Personal Protective
Equipment
B) Adhering to specified operating procedure G) Better equipment
C) Imparting Training H) Management Control
D) Giving adequate time to do the activity through I) Adhering to specified

proper planning. maintenance procedure
E) Adhering to the work permit system J) Adhering to specified
Inspection / Testing
procedures.
K) Any other information;
Guidelines for filling the Incident Report:

1. All Major, Minor and Near miss incidents shall be reported in the
quarterly report.
2. Incident Reporting form shall be filled up for all Major, Minor and Near
miss Incidents.
3. Summary report shall be enclosed with every quarterly report.
4. Investigations shall be carried out for all Major, Minor and Near miss
Incidents.
5. Investigation report of all Major incidents shall be submitted to PNGRB.
An incident shall be treated as Major if any of the following occurs;
- Fire for more than 15 minutes
- Explosion / Blowout
- Fatal Incident.
- Loss above Rs. 5.0 Lac.
- Cumulative man hours lost more than 500 hrs.
- Plant Shutdown / Outage due to the incident


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6. Loss time Incident shall be monitored till the affected person joins
duty. In case the affected person is yet to join the duty, then the
status of report submitted will be preliminary. Final report against
the same incident shall be sent once he joins duty and the man -
hours lost are known.
7. All columns must be filled up.
8. For any additional information use separate sheets as required.
9. Quarterly report shall be sent to PNGRB within 15 to 30 days of end of
quarter.
10. Immediate reporting of incident through fax/telephone shall
continue as per the prevailing system.
Signature
Name
Designation of the Occupier/Manager


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CHAPTER – 24
Action after Reporting of Incident by the

Entity


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24.0 Action after reporting of incident by the entity
After reporting of the incidents to Board, Nodal officer of the Board (head
of Technical Standards the specifications and safety group) shall have
responsibility of informing all the Members of the Board and shall
coordinate with appropriate level in National Disaster Management
Authority (NDMA) till normalization of the situation


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CHAPTER – 25
Termination of Emergency


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25.0 Termination of emergency
(1) Termination activities should concentrate on giving accurate information to

people who need it most especially employees, neighborhood, District Authorities
engaged in offsite emergencies, and should begin as soon as the emergency
phase of the operation is completed.
(2) The termination of emergency shall be declared through siren as per the
Siren Code defined by industry in case of Level- I and II. For Level-III
termination of emergency shall be declared by District Authority through
appropriate mode of information transfer so as to reach each and everyone


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CHAPTER – 26
Emergency Recovery Procedures

(As per Clause No 26.0 of PNGRB Notification Dated 18th January 2010


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26.0 Emergency Recovery Procedures

1) After the emergency, the following activities need to be carried out in
detail by the concerned coordinator.
a) Information to statutory authorities.
b) Incident investigation.
c) Damage assessment.
d) Salvage of products, de-contamination, clean-up and restoration.
e) A detailed report shall be prepared based on the entire experience of
the incident, including restorations, limitations and lessons learnt.
f) Ambient air monitoring at the site as well as 5 km radius of the
installation by State Pollution Control Board to determine the
contamination level affecting health.
Introduction:-
Business restoration planning is as important as having an emergency

response plan. All the management personnel need to be involved in
bringing the operation to normalcy after an emergency situation has
occurred. This involves an emergency response planning and follows up.
The Location Incharge will be completely responsible for restoration of

site.
JOB IDENTIFIED EXECUTIVES RESPONSIBLE FOR EXECUTION
Retrieval of Data for: LIC /Enabling Objective /Investigation
Information to Insurance: DM (F)/Tirunelveli BP with management’s

approval/ Agencies and Lodging Claims
Information to District Authorities: LIC/ Authorities on Casualties/

Permanent Disabilities
Individual station Start-up Plan: LIC in consultation with DGM

(LPG)/TNSO & with the approval of the management.
Check points on ERDMP recovery measures as given at Check list-7


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26.1 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

An accident may have one or more causes. In most of the case, there are
two categories of accident causes:
a) Unsafe Acts
b) Unsafe Conditions
causes are that causes the accident and Secondary that did or may have
contributed. It is difficult to separate to Primary and Secondary causes in
most of thecases.
Why Necessary
A thorough investigation of an accident is essential to prevent or reduce
the possibility of re-occurring accidents, of the same type. An
investigation should determine causes so that unsafe situations may be
eliminated.
When to Conduct
An investigation should be conducted as soon as possible before the
available evidence are destroyed or removed and before the witnesses
move away. Accuracy of the first account from the persons, present of the
site of accident also depends on how soon their statements are recorded.
With the passage of time most of the persons may not be able to describe
the events accurately.
How to Investigate
Although investigation of an accident depends upon the knowledge and
experience of the investigating person some of the keys guidelines in this
respect are given below:-
a) Do not rule out any probability during the course of investigation. All
possible unsafe acts and conditions should be kept in mind and the
possibilities of their occurrence should be investigated.
b) Note details of operation, maintenance, project and any other activities

at the accident or in the surrounding area at the time of accident.
c) Examine instruction book and previous records.
d) Examine health conditions of equipment, accessories, and safety

system. Make special check about availability and operation of safety
systems at the time of accidents.
e) Look out for the possible source of fuel such as drain valves.
 sample points.
 corroded and damage portion of the equipment,


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 passing of valves in the circuit,

 leakage in line from flanges, instrument tapping point weld
 stagnant oil and trapped vapours in the confined space (vessel,
pipelines,OWS)
 vapors from open containers / overflow / back flow etc.
f) Look out for source of ignition in case of fires such as

 spark from automobiles engine or exhaust
 spark from electrical gadgets and fittings,
 on-going hot jobs,
 striking or fall of tools,
 any other source of fire e.g. near-by furnace / direct flame,
 pyrophoric iron
 Lightning
 auto-ignition on touching a hot surface
 spark due to static charge etc.
g) Check for the safe design and installation of temporary structures,

ladders, scaffolding, hoist and tackles, electrical systems, integrity of
grounding system and flame proof fittings.
h) Get details of practices on security, operation and work permit system,
giving clearance for the maintenance and project related jobs. The
availability and use of personal protective equipment should also been
examined.
i) Examine all available fragments of debris. Note their color, shape, size,
orientation of damage portion and distance from the original place.
j) Examine the affected spots at and around accident site and the nature
of damage caused by the accident.
k) Get photographs of the site debris, affected areas from various angles
before the removal and clearing of debris.
l) Get the statements of (as necessary)
 Officer-in-Charge of the Location
 Officer-in-Charge of the operation area
 Officer-in-Charge for maintenance/project activities
 Area operator and any co-worker
 Contractor, supervisor and his workmen at site
 TT crew or persons from any other external agency involved in
the accident (Such as Railways, Port Authorities etc).
 Fire fighting and rescue team personnel
 Security staff


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 Any other person in public who has seen or affected on account

of the accident.
m) Examine the possibility of unsafe conditions such as grounding
connection not made, positive isolation of charged product lines, barriers
between operating and project area, vessel not free from hydrocarbons.
Final result of an accidental event may be due to a number of accidents
occurring one after the other in series or in parallel. Hence it may be
essential to split the main event into various fragments and investigate
unsafe acts and Unsafe conditions for each event.
Based on the information so collected examine each individual possible

cause thoroughly before discarding the same. Use of mathematical
models, past data on similar accidents and own experience should be
made to analyze each cause.
Thereafter, construct a possible scenario of events leading to the accident
and effect of the same.
Inquiry Committee
For major fires / fatal accident cases, the constitution of the Committee
will be as per the following guidelines.
Own Locations
a) However, ED of the Region may appoint a higher grade Officer
considering the gravity of the situation and the magnitude of the accident
b) An Officer from S&EP Department of the Region.
c) Officer from a specialized Department such as HR, Finance, Engineering
etc in case terms for investigations so required.
Customers / Agencies Premises / Public places Spillage in Port areas
An Officer from State / Div. Area Office / along with an Officer from the
S&EP from the Region. For Port area, Location-in-Charge will be
associated.
General Concern:
a) All investigations for internal use must inc Remedial measures and
Expeditious corrective actions) report. Lessons learnt should be drawn
and circulated to all Locations.
b) Concerned Department in HO will maintain constant liaison with Region
/ State Office and provide necessary assistance for handling emergency,
besides providing all the required information to the Director (M).
c) In all the above cases, concerned Department and S&EP of the Regions
will be kept informed.


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The policy given here in respect of reporting and inquiry of accidents is for
standard investigations. Committees appointed by HO/CO etc for
investigation from various angles will not fall under this policy.


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CHAPTER – 27
ERDMP For Road Transportation



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22.0 ERDMP for road transportation.
The road transport of Petroleum product has significant presence and

needs special attention. Complete details of treatment for handling
emergency arising out of road transportations have been provided below:
27.1 Resource mobilization for road transport emergency
Resource mobilization for road transport emergency shall be as per the

Schedule-VIII.
27.2 TREM Card (Specific to Road Transportation)
TREM Card format including sample as per details shown in and Route
Map shall is provided to the Tank Truck Crew which shall be referred in
case of an emergency
SCHEDULE –VIII
Resource Mobilisation for Road Transportation Emergencies
A. In-Plant Resources
Following items should be available at the Plant in

adequate quantity / nos.
Compliance
Mechanical Equipment: Status YES/NO
1. Gaskets (Carbon Asbestos Filled) YES
2. Studs and bolts. YES
3. Teflon tapes. YES
4. ½” / ¾” crowbar (1 m long) YES
5. Spade / blind flange YES
6. Rope (Manila / Jute) YES
7. Spark arrestors. YES
8. Tapered wooden pegs. YES
9. Chopper YES
11. Wind sock YES
12. M-Seal / epoxy-base cold-welding compound. YES
13. Wooden slippers YES
14. Teflon-taped spanners, wrenches YES
15. Spark-proof wrenches hammer and tools. YES
16. Barricading masts and ropes / tapes YES
17. Hoses YES
18. Chain pulley blocks and stay pipes YES


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19.Small valve keys for operating valves in the tank truck YES
Electrical Equipment :
1. Gas Explosi-meter YES
2. Flame-proof torches YES
3. Earthing wires (10 m long) with crocodile clips YES
Personnel Protective Equipment :
1. Gloves YES
i) Rubber gloves YES
ii) Low Temperature Gloves YES
iii) Industrial gloves (with leather lining) YES
iv) Canvas gloves YES
2. Face shields YES
3. Ear muff / ear plugs YES
Other Safety Items:
1. 1 roll of gunny / hessian cloth (about 10 mts. long) YES
2. First aid box (containing water gel compounds) YES
3. Soap YES
4. Blanket. YES
5. Water Gel Blanket YES
6. Breathing Apparatus (With spare filled cylinder and YES
Canister gas masks)
7. Fire proximity suit YES
Fire Fighting Equipment :
1. Portable Dry Chemical Powder Fire Extinguishers YES
2. Fire-water Hoses YES
3. Triple Purpose diffuser nozzle for use with fire hoses. YES
Communication Equipment :
1. Hand operated sirens YES
2. Whistles YES
3. Megaphone, Mobile Phones, VHF sets. YES
Traffic Control Equipment :
1. Red lights (Battery operated) - for traffic diversion YES
2. Area maps YES
3. Diversion Boards YES
(a) In order to handle Emergencies, which may arise due to incident

involving Petroleum Product Transportation, it is required that a
comprehensive Emergency Management Plan is readily available with the
industry as well as with other related authorities all along the routes. The
ERDMP should be clearly understood by its users so that the emergencies
can be handled in a systematic manner with minimum response time in
accordance with the prescribed procedure.


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(b) Copies of the ERDMP shall be made available by the Industry to all the
field locations i.e. Installations, POL Depots, Terminals /Installations,
Refineries, Gas Processing Plants, Dispatch units of etc., the concerned
District Administration, Police Stations and Fire Brigades en-route and
within vicinity of specified tank truck routes, oil industry sales personnel
of concerned area as may be required.
(c) Location specific availability of Emergency Response Vehicle shall be

mentioned in the ERDMP.
SCHEDULE – IX
Transport Emergency Card Format
Nature of Hazard:
Protective Devices:
Emergency Action
Spillage
Fire
First Aid
Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) No
(For universal acceptance of material, both numbers should be mentioned
on TREM Card)
Emergency Telephone Numbers/mobile numbers

Name and contact numbers of the control room/contact person of the
supplying company
Name and contact numbers of the control room/contact person of the
receiving company
Name and contact numbers of Transporter
Other important Name and contact numbers of civic authorities, fire and
police
Note: The format is designed & provided in English, Hindi and local
language where crews are operating
The following is the sample transport emergency card formatted &

circulated to the transporter by the company.


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SAMPLE TRANSPORT EMERGENCY CARD FORMAT:

Cargo: LPG
Nature of Hazard: Highly volatile and Inflammable.
Can cause Cold Burns
Inhaling vapour can cause nausea, breathlessness
& headache.
Air / vapour mixture highly explosive.
Leakage can cause Vapour Cloud explosion and
BLEVE.
Protective Devices: Hand gloves (Rubber / low temperature)
Safety Goggles.
Self-contained Respiratory device to work in
vapour-rich
Area.
Low temperature / fire proximity suit.
Emergency Action:
Try to move the vehicle to open area. (In case of the LPG is leaking from
a stationary tanker whose engine is shut, don’t try to start the
engine.)
Stop Engine.
Vehicle should not be left unguarded.
Contact Police, Fire Brigade, Sarpanch, nearest Oil Company by sending
helper /passerby
Keep public and traffic away by displaying ‘Danger Boards’ at sufficient
distance.
“No Smoking” and “No Naked Lights” within the cordoned off area.
Keep ready for action Fire Extinguishers and Safety Kit.
Stay Upwind.
Don’t park the vehicle blocking the route.
Spillage: Check the valves and caps for tightness by hand and stop leak
if possible
Fire: If minor, try to extinguish by suitable fire extinguishers
First Aid: Pour water in case of cold or hot burn Seek medical help, if
necessary
Emergency Telephone Numbers/mobile numbers
IOC _____________________ HPC_____________________

BPC _____________________ IBP______________________
FIRE 101 _______________ POLICE 100_________________


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1. Accident with no damage to the bullet (head on collision with

cabin damage and minor injury to crew)
i. Place of accident- Main highway and within populated area
ii. TREM CARD instructions in case of emergency should be

immediately enforced
iii. The battery should be disconnected immediately
iv. Fire extinguishers kept aside, as stand by
v. Bullet Tank should be surveyed thoroughly for leakage from

any of the fittings
vi. Traffic should be stopped in case of major leakage
vii. Nearby police station should be informed through passing

truck or messenger
viii. With the assistance of TREMCARD, nearest LPG plant and

transporter should be contacted through telephone
ix. In case the crew has been moved to hospital for first aid, the
truck should be guarded by any willing volunteer
x. Crowding around by people and smoking in the vicinity of 10

mts radius should be controlled
xi. In case of any leakage from any of the fittings, the portion
should be covered with wet gunny bags and water should be
continuously applied, to allow, the freezing/ice formation
around the areas of leakage. Alternatively, “leak scaling pad”
should be wrapped around the spot
xii. Police shall control the traffic with fire brigade as stand by, till
the rescue operations were completed and tank is moved to
nearest plant for decantation of product and degassing
xiii. Subsequently the truck can be taken for repair


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2. Accident with no damage to bullet head on collision with

cabin damage and fatal injury to crew
ii. TREM CARD instructions in case of emergency should be

immediately enforced
iii. The injured crew should be removed from the cabin and to be
admitted in nearest hospital through any vehicle available
iv. If the accident resulted in the death of crew, the bodies

should be removed, should be kept in the clean place covering
with a cloth
v. The battery should be disconnected immediately. Fire

extinguishers kept aside, as stand by
vi. Bullet Tank should be surveyed thoroughly for leakage from

any of the fittings
vii. Traffic should be stopped in case of major leakage
viii. Nearby police station should be informed through passing

truck or messenger
ix. With the assistance of TREMCARD, nearest LPG plant and

transporter should be contacted through telephone
x. In case the crew has been moved to hospital for first aid, the
truck should be guarded by any willing volunteer
xi. Crowding around by people and smoking in the vicinity of 10

mts radius should be controlled
xii. In case of any leakage from any of the fittings, the portion
should be covered with wet gunny bags and water should be
continuously applied, to allow, the freezing/ice formation
around the areas of leakage. Alternatively, “leak scaling pad”
should be wrapped around the spot


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xiii. Simultaneously information should be sent to chief controller

of explosives at the following address:
Chief controller of Explosives

Govt. of India
Dept of Explosives
Nagpur
TELEGRAM: EXPLOSIVES, NAGPUR
xiv. Police shall control the traffic with fire brigade as stand by, till
the rescue operations were completed and tank is moved to
nearest plant for decantation of product and degassing
3. ACCIDENT WITH BULLET OVERTURNING OF BULLET
WITHOUT DAMAGE TO BULLET

ii. In case crew requires any first aid treatment at any nearby
hospital the truck should be attended by any other
responsible person who may volunteer to do so
iii. The battery should be disconnected immediately. Fire
extinguisher should be kept aside as a standby
iv. All tank fittings like SRV, Liquid and Vapour valves, pipelines
and rotogauge should be checked closely for any
leakage/damage
v. In case of minor leakage, it can be controlled by sealing the
spot by gunny bags or marking an earth bund around.
Message should be send to nearest police station and fire
station for assistance. Truck owner should be informed as per
the information painted on tank body
vi. Police should inform the LPG plant, telephone, nearest Indian
oil depot and the truck owner through nearest telephone for
any assistance. Police/Volunteers should be gathered and
advised to stop all persons smoking within the vicinity of 30
mts radius if gas is leaking and also should advice people
staying in nearby areas to be readiness for evacuating the
area. People should be moved from upwind side to downwind
side
vii. The vehicle should be hoisted into an upright position using
suitable capacity crane or pulley block arrangement while
taking all precautions about fittings to avoid any further
damage which may lead to leak


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viii.
After completion of the rescue operations the tank should be
moved to the nearest bottling plant for decantation and
degassing. Subsequently the vehicle shall be taken for repairs
4. ACCIDENT TO BULLET TRUCK WITH DAMAGE TO BULLET
TRUCK RESULTING IN LEAKAGE AND FIRE
i. Effort should be made to confine or control rather than

extinguishing
ii. In case of fire is minor in nature it should be extinguished
using fire extinguisher, provided it is very sure that the
sourced of leakage can be stopped
iii. If the fire is uncontrollable nearby public and vehicle should
be alerted to move away from the fire spot
iv. People in the vicinity of 100 mts should be evacuated and the
spot should be evacuated and the spot should be condoned off
v. People should be moved from up-wind side to down-wind side
vi. Simultaneously, police and fire brigade should be informed
through telephone/messenger
vii. The fire cannot be controlled still, awaits till the help arrives
viii. Fire brigade should control the fire as per the following:
1. Water spray should start within 8 mins of starting fire as
BLEVE can take place b/w 8 to 25 mins of starting fire
2. Fire should be handled with extreme caution
3. Provide 2 attack lines one from each direction. If space
permits give special attention the space b/w the rear and
driver’s cabin and avoid possibility of overturning due to
water jet force
4. 2 attack lines with 250 GPM nozzles at 80 PSI should be
move one line directing the spray system of tank and the
other using wide angle sprays for protection, make sure
that continuous cooling is maintained on dish ends of bullet
truck
5. When reinforcement arrives, attack with 2 lines with 4 fire
man on each line with the third approach line dish end
6. With continuously cooling, SRV, which might have opened
due to increase in pressure inside the tank, will reset.
Cooling should be continued till normal vapour pressure
reached inside the tank. When the relief valve closes all
three attack lines should switched to narrow angle spray
and back-up line to narrow line, after stable condition is


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achieved, close the leaky valve/fitting using proper blanks,

without coming in line with attack line
7. After controlling the fire on tank, attack fire on tyres,
cabin, and engine compartments
8. Fire fighters and personnel dealing with vapour clouds
must be protected continuously by water spray. Care
should be taken to ensure that static charge is not
generated in the vapour cloud. Hence solid jets of water
must be avoided and spray nozzles should be used. Use
protective clothing like fire proximity suit/ SCABA when
necessary.
27.3 Role of External Agencies for road transportation emergency

It is expected that the following roles shall be performed by various
agencies:
27.3.1 Fire Brigade

On receipt of information from any source on incident of tank truck, fire
brigade may contact nearest installation and police station. After
assessing the situation, it may:
(a) Rush fire tender to the incident site with all necessary fire fighting
equipments;
(b) Prepare a contingency plan for removal of tank truck, if not leaking, in
consultation with installation personnel;
(c) dispersal of vapors by water spray away from inhabited area, in case
of leakage. Extinguish the fire, in case leakage source cannot be stopped;
(d) Allow the fire to burn under controlled conditions if isolation is not
possible in case of gaseous fuels;
(e) Save human lives and salvage material from incident affected truck;
(f) Liaise with fire brigade in the adjoining town for additional help, if
necessary;
(g) Arrange water through municipal water tanker or any other source;
In addition to the above, the Schedule-V shall be followed.


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27.3.2 Role of Police

On receipt of information, police may take the following actions as per
Schedule-V derived from the National Disaster Management Guidelines
Chemical Disasters (Industrial), April, 2007. However, the following points
may also be taken care by the police authority:
(a) Stop the traffic from both ends of the road.
(b) Warn the people living in adjacent area for stopping all fire, smoking,
evacuation to safe places, if necessary.
(c) Contact nearest district police headquarters and giving the situation
report
.
(d) Evacuate personnel from the area, if required.
(e) Extend help in removal of injured personnel to the nearest first aid
centre /hospital, contacting highway patrol, completing legal formalities in
case of any casualty.
In addition to the above, the shall be followed
27.3.3 District Administration

On receipt of information, District Administration may take the following
actions as per Schedule-V derived from the National Disaster Management
Guidelines Chemical Disasters (Industrial), April, 2007. However, On
receipt of information, following actions should be taken care:-
(a) To keep watch on the overall situation.
(b) Rush ambulance to the incident site if casualties are reported.
(c) Direct cranes or any other such equipment to carry out rescue
operations.
(d) Issue warning messages to people through public address system, if

any evacuation is required.
(e) Arrange emergency vehicles for evacuation purposes.


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(f) Give direction to hospitals having burns injury ward for readiness to
receive patient in case of incident involving fire.
(g) Provide basic amenities, e.g., water, electricity, food and shelter to
the affected people as required.
In addition to the above, the Schedule-V shall be followed.


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CHAPTER – 28
Integration of ERDMP with NDMP



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Integration of ERDMP with NDMP (As per Clause No 29.0)

28.1 National Disaster Management Plan (NDMP)
On 23 December 2005, the Government of India took a definite step
towards NDMP by enacting the NDMP ACT, 2005. The NDMP Act, 2005
covers all aspects of disasters from prevention, mitigation, preparedness
to rehabilitation, reconstruction and recovery.
National Disaster Management Guidelines Chemical Disasters

(Industrial)
The growth of chemical industries has led to an increase in the risk of

occurrence of incidents associated with hazardous chemicals
(HAZCHEM). Common causes for chemical accidents are deficiencies in
safety management systems and human errors, or they may occur as a
consequence of natural calamities or sabotage activities. Chemical
accidents result in fire, explosion and / or toxic release.
With formulation of National Disaster Management Guidelines—Chemical

Disasters, There has been a paradigm shift in the government’s focus
from its rescue, relief, and restoration-centric approach to a planning,
prevention / mitigation and preparedness approach. It has been realized
that effective Chemical Disaster Management (CDM) is possible by the
adoption of preventive and mitigation strategies as most chemical
disasters are preventable in comparison to natural disasters that are
difficult to predict and prevent. With this renewed emphasis, the
National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) took up the task of
strengthening CDM in recognition of the gravity of the risk posed by
HAZCHEM.
The main stakeholders in the management of chemical disasters are

Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF; the nodal ministry); Ministry
of Home Affairs (MHA); Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoH &
FW); Ministry of Labour and Employment (MoLE); Ministry of Agriculture
(MoA); Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and Highways (MoSRT &
H); Ministry of Defence (MoD); Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers
(MoC & F); Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MoP & NG),
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE); state governments and Union
Territories (UTs) and the chemical industries.


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Tamilnadu State Disaster Management Policy:

The Government formulated the Tamil Nadu Disaster Management Policy
for the management of disaster in the State.
The aim of Tamil Nadu Disaster Management Policy is to reduce the
negative impact of all kinds of disasters through a vibrant disaster
management machinery so that loss of lives, property & critical
infrastructure is minimized and economic and development gains made
by the State are not lost due to such calamities/ disasters.
Objectives of the policy:

 To replace the existing approach of re-active relief by a proactive
approach.
 To develop a new culture of prevention, preparedness and quick
response for management of disasters.
 To reduce the vulnerability of the community through proper risk
analysis.
 To put institutions and structures in place for efficient and effective
management of disasters.
 To establish a clear chain of command with well-defined authority
and responsibility of various stakeholders.
 To identify and utilize the available resources efficiently.
 To ensure transparent, consistent and equitable relief to the
victims.
 To make disaster management planning an integral part of
development planning
 To design appropriate disaster prevention and mitigation strategies
for different disasters.
 To create database about the policies, resources and strategies of
disaster management.
 To create awareness among all sections of society especially
students to develop expertise in the disaster management
discipline.

The Key Components of Tamil Nadu Disaster Management
Programme are
 To establish a Disaster Management Authority (DMA), a Nodal
agency to guide, facilitate, coordinate and monitor various aspects
of disaster management.
 To take steps for convergence of disaster management and
development Planning.


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 To take steps to formulate comprehensive disaster management

plans at all levels after taking into account the local conditions.
 To focus on the reduction of vulnerability of communities instead
of mere disaster relief
 To provide necessary legislative support for recognizing the role of
present and future stakeholders.
 To recognize the need for an integral approach based on multi-
disciplinary process in dealing with the disaster.
 To promote a culture of prevention, among the community and
various members of Government through training and awareness
campaigns.
 To involve the community at all stages in the disaster
management activities.
 To give due importance to NGOs community based organizations
and other voluntary institutions.
 Not allowing discrimination on the basis of caste, creed,
community or sex while distributing the assistance/relief.
 To ensure transparency in decision-making and information
sharing
 To create a trained and committed volunteer force on the line of
Home Guards for disaster Management.
Strategy for Implementation
Disaster management activities divided into three phases.
1. Pre disaster phase. (Phase-1)
2. Impact phase. (Phase-II)
3. Post disaster phase. (Phase-III)
Pre-disaster phase activities related to prevention, mitigation and

preparedness to face the disasters. Prevention activities would include all
the steps that can be taken to prevent certain disasters like fire,
landslides, chemical/ nuclear related accidents, outbreak of epidemics
etc. Mitigation activates aim to reduce or eliminate hazards associated
with disasters or lessening the impact of such disasters. All the District
Collectors would prepare detailed action plans at local body level and at
district level as per the local needs. The public and private sectors,
voluntary agencies and community would be actively involved in the
formulation of such plans.
State Disaster Management Authority/State Relief Commissioner
would prepare such plans at State level. During this phase, the following
activities would be taken up.


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Formulation of appropriate policies and Guidelines for various

stakeholders of Disaster Management.
 Incorporation of Disaster Management measures in the
development planning.
 Risk analysis and mapping of disaster vulnerability.
 Formulation of Disaster Management plans at all levels as per local
needs.
 Creation/sharing of database relating to Disaster vulnerability
resources, trained manpower etc.
 Establishment of a clear chain of command along with robust
communication network.
 Setting up surveillance and early warning system for hazards.
 Enhancing capabilities and expertise of the concerned
departments/agencies dealing with disasters.
 Capacity building of individuals and community based
organizations, through proper training and awareness programmes
and organizing a committed cadre for disaster management.
 Conducting sensitization meetings and mock drills of stakeholders.
 Identifying various sources of funds.
Impact phase is the phase when the disaster has actually struck.
During this phase the following actives would be taken up:
 Warning and evacuation of the people
 Immediate search and rescue operations.
 Providing essential medical care, adequate health and sanitation to
control outbreak of epidemics.
 Provision of safe drinking water, food and shelter to the victims.
 Restoration of basic infrastructure and essential services.
 Providing security to victims and other citizens and protecting the
public property.
 Providing proper information and collecting feedback through
proper media management.
 Involving community volunteer force and community based
organizations for better appreciation and effective delivery of
rescue and relief operations.
 Assessing preliminary damages quickly.
 Mobilising funds for relief, rehabilitation and restoration activities.
 Finalising relief packages as per the guidelines/ Government
instructions


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Post disaster phase relates to the measures taken to restore

normalcy. It begins soon after the reduction in critical response activities
permits the re-allocation of resources to longer term recovery activities.
It may extend over years depending upon the nature and magnitude of
the disaster. Typically the activities include reconstruction, financial
assistance programmes, and counseling and economic impact studies.
During this phase following activities would be taken up.
 Carrying out detailed damage assessment
 Providing assistance to restore/re-construct houses.
 Relocation of affected people to other places if required.
 Finalising detailed reconstruction/rehabilitation plans.
 Disbursement of funds and audit of accounts.
 Monitoring the execution of various projects.
 Redressal of disputes/grievances.
 Documentation of the lesson learnt.
 Modification/ updation of disaster plans.
 Updation of resources inventory.
To ensure coordinated steps towards mitigation, preparedness and
coordinated response to the disaster a Disaster Management Authority
has been constituted under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary to
Government.
GOI-UNDP disaster Risk Management Programme:

With a view to reducing the vulnerability of the communities to natural
disasters in identified multi-hazard prone areas, the Government of
India and the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] have
signed an agreement in August 2002, for implementation of a
programme called Disaster Risk Management Programme. The goal of
the programme is sustainable reduction in natural disaster risk in the
most hazard prone districts in selected states of India. The thematic
focus will be on awareness generation and education, training and
capacity development for mitigation and better preparedness in terms of
disaster risk management and recovery at community, district and state
levels, and strengthening of state and
district disaster management information centres for accurate and timely
dissemination of warning. The Ministry of Home Affairs is the executing
agency for the programme. A Project Management Board has been
constituted under the Chairmanship of the Union Home Secretary to
provide overall guidance for the implementation of the programme. In
the State of Tamil Nadu, Disaster Risk Management Programme is being
implemented in the Districts of Thiruvallore, Kancheepuram, Cuddalore,


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Nagapattinam, Kaniyakumari and The Nilgiris and its subcomponent

UEVRP is being implemented in the seismic zone III cities of Chennai
and Coimbatore. The entire programme is funded by UNDP. A
Memorandum of Understanding between United Nations Development
Programme and the Government of Tamil Nadu was signed in the
presence of the Hon'ble Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu on the 30th of
October 2003.
The District Disaster Management Authority

The District Disaster Management Authority is headed by the District
Magistrate/District Collector of the District with the chairperson of the
Zilla Parishads as the Co-Chairperson. The other members of the
authority will be as stipulated in DM Act 2005.
Institutional Framework
The State Disaster Management Authority
The State Disaster Management Authority headed by the Chief Minister

is the apex body for disaster management in the State. The other
members of the authority as stipulated in DM Act 2005.
The State Executive Committee
The State Executive Committee comprises the State Chief Secretary as

the Chairperson. Other members of the committee would be as
stipulated in DM Act 2005.The Home Department will be the Nodal
Department for disaster management and under the leadership of the
Additional Chief Secretary/ Principal Secretary Home and
Secretary/OSD, SDMA shall play the coordinating role in disaster
management. All departments shall ensure adequate assistance to the
nodal department.
The District Disaster Management Authority
The District Disaster Management Authority is headed by the District

Magistrate/District Collector of the District with the chairperson of the
Zilla Parishads as the Co-Chairperson. The other members of the
authority will be as stipulated in DM Act 2005.


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The State Disaster Emergency Response Force
The State will create response capabilities from within its existing
resources by equipping and training at least one battalion equivalent
force for effective management of disasters and necessary training
arrangement will be made for the force in disaster management skills in
consultation with the National Disaster Response Force.
State Police and Fire Services
The State Police Forces and the Fire Services are crucial responders to
disasters. The police force will be trained in disaster management skills
and the Fire Services will be upgraded to acquire multi-hazard rescue
capability.
Civil Defence and Home Guards

The mandate of the Civil Defence and the Home Guards will be redefined
to assign an effective role in the field of disaster management. They will
be deployed for community preparedness and public awareness. A
culture of voluntary reporting to duty stations in the event of any
disasters will be promoted.


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28.2 Integration of ERDMP with NDMP


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This ERDMP document has been developed taking into account all
possible Inputs on the subjects from various stake holders. Efforts have
also been made to synergize this with the document on National Disaster
Management Guide - Chemical Disasters (Industrial) as well as
Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Gazette notification G.S.R.
39 (E) (Codes of Practices for Emergency Response and Disaster
Management Plan (ERDMP)) Regulations, 2010.
For the purpose of specialized response to a threatening disaster

situation or disasters/ emergencies both natural and manmade such as
those of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) origin,
the DM Act, 2005 has mandated the constitution of a NDRF
In the support of NDRF, SDRF are the available forces at state level. In
some cases SDRF has not been created.


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28.3 Security Threat Plan
With increase in terrorist activities towards the end of 20th century and
installations having, significant role in national economy, sabotage and
bomb threats to such installation should also be considered in the
disaster management plan. Such as high level of alertness measures,
strengthening security measures by security gadgets mechanical and
electronic security gadgets. In any of such situation, city police/
administration should be informed immediately and their help should be
sought.
Emergency Action in case of Bomb Threat:
a) The persons inside the Plant should be evacuated as soon as

possible.
b) All the vehicles in the Plant premises should be evacuated to
safer Places.
c) Plant personnel should contact district authorities
immediately.
d) Any new or doubtful thing should not be touched.
e) All pipeline and storage tank valves should be closed and all
operations inside are carried out with due vigilance.
f) In case of fire, firefighting equipment shall be operated and
city fire brigade should be called immediately during
emergency.
Tirunelveli LPG Bottling Plant has developed an action plan on bomb

threats and implemented Instructions & check lists applicable for bomb
threat. These include receiving & verification of bomb threats, search for
bomb / explosives and action plan.
Bomb threat as well as Security threat Contingency Plan is

prepared is mentioned in chapter-11(SCHEDULE III(9)).


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CHECKLISTS


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CHECK LIST-1
(Refer Regulation 10.1(d))
Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan
(ERDMP)
Hazard Identification
Sl.N YE N REMARKS
CHECKPOINT
o S O
Hazard Analysis & Risk Assessment
1 Whether any of the following procedures or techniques for hazard identification
has been used in the terminal/ installation :
HAZOP √ HAZOP
Accident Consequences & Analysis √
Event Tree Analysis. √
Fault Tree Analysis ×
Failure Modes, Effects & Criticality Analysis. √
Risk Assessment √
What If, analysis. ×
Other accredited practice
Hazard Identification :
2 Is the terminal / installation covered under the √
definition of “Major Accident Hazard Installation”
as per the Manufacture Storage & Import of
Hazardous Chemicals Rules 1989?
3 If yes, whether major accident hazards √
identified and steps taken for their prevention
4 Whether design deficiencies, failures or errors √ Failure or errors
which contribute
which can contribute to hazards and cause
to the hazards are
abnormalities leading to an accident are taken into
identified. consideration
excluding design
deficiencies
5 What are the measures undertaken to counter √
above deficiencies or, errors
6 Consequences of a major accident on the √
workers, people in the neighbourhood and the
environment are considered
7 Steps envisaged for mitigation of the √
consequences of such accident
8 Does the installation produces / handle / use / √
import / store any hazardous chemicals as
defined under MSIHC Rules 1989?
9 If yes, whether a list of these chemicals, √
preferably in alphabetical order with their
maximum licensed storage quantities is
displayed


TIRUNELVELI
Sl.N YE N REMARKS
CHECKPOINT
o S O
10 Are material safety data sheets (MSDS) of these √
chemicals are prepared / obtained in the
prescribed format as per MSIHC Rules and State
Factory Rules?
11 Whether a system for disseminating information √
about these MSDS to concerned workers are
existing
12 Are there a system of labelling of containers / √
storage tanks for the chemicals / hazardous
substances
13 Whether estimation of maximum possible √
quantity of each hazardous substance are
considered including any vehicle (TT/TW) on
site or within 500 mtrs of the site.
14 Whether location, configuration and condition √
under which the hazardous substances are
stored & handled are clearly declared
Vulnerability Analysis :
15 Whether zones of influence or vulnerable zones √
are estimated by considering the maximum
single storage of hazardous substance &
maximum loss scenario
16 Whether effects of influence on the vulnerable √
zones are made after considering the
population, facilities & environment
encompassed inside that zone
Risk Analysis :
17 Whether a relative measure of the probability & √
consequences of various possible hazardous
events are taken into account.
18 Whether risks are calculated by multiplying the √
probability of occurrence of each event by the
consequences of that event and then summing
up the results
19 Whether all types of events possible in √
petroleum installations are considered including
i) storage tanks on fire, ii) pool fire [burning
pool of liquid fuel], iii) Flange joint leakage in
pipelines, iv) Fire in TT or TW gantry, and v)
rupture of hoses.
Risk Reduction Measures :
20 Whether measures for reduction of identified √
high risks are included by reducing the
consequences thru’ hazard Mitigation measures.
21 Whether steps have been consider to reduce √
risks to the exposed population by increasing


TIRUNELVELI
Sl.N YE N REMARKS
CHECKPOINT
o S O
safe distances by acquiring property around the
facility, if possible
HAZOP Study
22 Whether the above method is applied if the √
location handles more than specified storage
and / or critical operations
23 Whether the study systematically identifies all √
possible deviations from normal operations
24 Whether risk levels are established for each √
deviation after considering the probability &
consequences of each such events
25 Whether potential means for detection of such √
events & preventive measures are
recommended by the study


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CHECK LIST-2
(Refer Regulation 11.3 (Xii))
Incident Prevention Measures
Sl.N YE N
CHECKPOINT S O REMARKS
o
1 Whether Safety, Health and Environment Policy of √
the location is displayed
2 Whether the Safety Policy is documented and duly √
approved by the top management
3 Whether the Safety Policy is well structured to √
cover all elements of Safety, Health and
Environment protection
4 Whether the layout is convenient from operation & √
safety aspects and meets minimum distance norms
as per OISD-118
5 Whether a duly constituted Safety Committee is √ Will be formed
functioning in the location with representation from after
workmen/staff commissioning
6 Whether all unsafe developments & likely risks are √ -do-
deliberated in the meetings and appropriate steps
are recommended for eliminating such risks
7 Whether compliance status of recommendations of √ -do-
earlier Safety Committee meetings are discussed
before taking up new issues.
8 Whether performance & shortcomings observed √ -do-
during recent mock disaster drills form part of the
discussions in safety committee meetings
9 Is the safety committee minutes are recorded & √ -do-
signed by all the attending members
10 Whether periodical safety audits & inspections by √ New
internal and external audit teams are conducted in installation,
defined intervals yet to
commission
11 Whether a system of regular monitoring of such √
audit compliances by controlling offices / HO are in
place
12 What is the composition of external audit teams to √ External audit is
carried out by
ensure impartiality of audit findings
TN govt.
approved
auditing agency
13 Whether Work Permit System in line with OISD-105 √
have been implemented
14 Whether work permits are issued for hot work, cold √
work, electrical work & vessel entry jobs


TIRUNELVELI
Sl.N YE N
CHECKPOINT S O REMARKS
o
15 Whether the location-in-charge remain the issuer √
for all hot work & vessel entry permits for enhanced
safety & control
16 Whether work permits are duly closed at √
completion of the stipulated jobs, duly certified by
the supervising officer
17 Whether heat detectors in tank sprinkler systems, √
high level alarms of tank farm management system
are provided & checked for regular functioning
18 Whether in-built safety interlocks provided in the √
design of the plant are adequately specified &
checked for regular functioning


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CHECK LIST-3
[Refer Regulation 12.1(i)]
MUTUAL AID / MOCK DRILLS
SR.N YE
o CHECK POINT S
NO REMARKS
Whether mock fire / emergency response √ Mock drills
drills are held are
conducted
monthly.
1 After
commissioni
ng ERD will
be conducted
If yes, periodicity of emergency response √ After

commissioni
2 drills ng ERD will
be conducted
3 Mock drills cover all types of probable √

emergencies
Does the location have Mutual Aid Plan √ Mutual aid
is
available
with Nova
4 carbon,
Coco cola
Bottling
Plant
If yes, the details of other members √ List
5 including names and contact nos. of Enclosed
concerned officials
List of fire fighting equipment’s available √ List
6 with each Mutual Aid members including Enclosed
District Fire Service
Compatibility of safety equipment of all √ List
Mutual Aid members including District Fire Enclosed
7
Services with said location has been tested
and documented in the DMP
Details of water storage available with √ List
Mutual Aid member including District Fire Enclosed
8 Service and mechanism to utilize the same
in the said location well documented in the
DMP
Details of fire fighting foams concentrate √ List
9 /chemicals available with Mutual Aid Enclosed
members including nearest Fire Service has
been incorporated
Details of lead time for response of Mutual √ List
10
Aid members including District Fire Service Enclosed


TIRUNELVELI
SR.N YE
CHECK POINT NO REMARKS
o S
has been documented in the DMP
Periodicity of safety training for officers, √ Officers &
staff, contractor workers, in crew and Staff are
trained once
security personnel mentioned in the ERDMP in 3 years in
LPG
refresher
course.
11 Security, TT
crew &
contract
labour are
given
refresher
training once
in a year
Mutual Aid Plans
Does the location have established Mutual √
12 Aid Plans
13 Which are the Mutual Aid Team members √
and the assistance offered?
Does the plan clearly indicate types of √
14 possible hazards and fire fighting
measures required?
Does the plan include expected √
15
assistance from each members
Does the Plan spell out the communication √
16 protocol and the channels in times of
emergency
Periodic joint exercise and meetings for √
17 practice, familiarization and identifying
and resolving compatibility issues.


TIRUNELVELI
CHECK LIST-4
[Refer Regulation 13.0]
ERDMP Response Measures /Infrastructure
YE REMARKS
Sl. CHECKPOINT NO
S
Zones, maps & layouts
1 Does the Location have Emergency Zones clearly √
identified for accident prone areas
2 Do the Maps indicate location of Emergency √
Assembly Points and Emergency Control Rooms
3 Is the process Lay-out prominently displayed √
4 Does the P&I Diagram include emergency control √
valves, shutdown system, isolation valves,
important control valves etc.
5 Does the Fire Hydrant Layout conspicuously √
displayed.
Manpower
1 Is the Fire Organogram clearly displayed. √
2 Does the Organogram include all duties to be √
attended in connection with an emergency.
3 Is the organogram include key personnel by their √
names or, work position
4 Does it have the alternate coverage to take care √
of the absence of a particular person [ in cases
where organogram is developed basis names]
5 Does it include assignment of all key co- √
ordinators viz. the Incident Controller,
Administration & communication Controller &
Safety Coordinator.
Emergency Control Centre
1 Does the ECC well defined & clearly marked on √
the displayed layout
2 Is it strategically positioned to be outside the √
periphery of immediate affected area?
3 Does the centre have adequate communication √
channels including internal & external telephone
connections, PA, paging & VHF systems
4 Does a list of key personnel & essential √
telephone nos. are prominently displayed.
5 Does the layout of fire fighting system, different √
hazardous zones, Assembly Points are
prominently displayed.
Emergency Assembly Points
1 Does the EAPs well defined & clearly marked on √
the displayed layout


TIRUNELVELI
YE REMARKS
Sl. CHECKPOINT NO
S
2 Does the EAPs have pre-defined in-charges √
during emergencies who keeps in touch with the
Emergency Control Centre and Administrative
Controllers and updates on the roll call on people
reporting.


TIRUNELVELI
CHECK LIST-5
[Refer Regulation14.2.1 (a)]
Review & Updation of ERDMP
Sl.N YE
CHECKPOINT NO REMARKS
o S
1 Frequency of mock-drills for practice, √ Monthly basis
refinement & updation. including
security
personnel
2 Does the records for periodic Mock √ Records are
drills maintained in a well defined maintained in a
well defined
format. format
3 After each drill, whether assembly √ All security
meetings involving all staff and personnel were
involved.
contract personnel are conducted to
share experience of the event as also
to identify the shortcomings and
scopes for further improvement in
procedures. Whether the issues are
discussed & the plan modified suitably.
4 Does the review ensures efficiency of √
the plan particularly w.r.t. response,
communication & coordination
aspects.
5 Do the Mutual Aid members √ Once
participate in the drills and based on commissioned
it will be done.
the actual response & difficulties
experienced, corrective actions
initiated for refinement of the plan.
6 Does a procedure exist in √
incorporating the findings/learning of
the actual disaster management
handling, if any so that the plan can
be revised accordingly.


TIRUNELVELI
CHECK LIST-6
[Refer Regulation 17.0 (5)]
Availability of resources [Internal / External]
Sl.N REMARK
CHECKPOINT YES NO
o S
1 Details of fire fighting equipment of the √
location is incorporated in the DMP
2 Information on critical resources like no. √
of fire hydrants, water monitors, fire
fighting pumps, static water storage,
portable fire fighting equipment and
foam systems are included
3 Available resources as per Annexure- √ Lost
IV Enclosed
4 Location has storage of water for 4 √
hours fire fighting. In case water
availability is less, a plan for
replacement from nearby sources
5 Details of drainage system including Oil √
Water Separator is available in DMP,
wherever applicable.
6 Requirement & availability of Personal √
Protective Equipment
7 Whether manpower available during √
regular as well as idle shift hours
including security personnel clearly
indicated in the plan
External & Internal Resources for
combating Emergency
8 Does the plan enumerate the following √
resources available internally with the
location as also from external agencies
including Mutual Aid Members and govt.
agencies like fire brigade, police,
municipal authorities etc. :
a. Water – from static reservoir as also √
mobile water tankers
b. Fire Hoses √
c. Specialized nozzles e.g. fog, jet, √
triple purpose etc.


TIRUNELVELI
Sl.N REMARK
CHECKPOINT YES NO
o S
d. Mobile water monitors √
e. Fire Extinguishers – type & capacity √
f. Water Gel Blankets √
g. Foam Compounds √
h. First Aid material, Medicines,
Stretchers √
i. Mobile / fixed ladders √
j. Vehicles available √
k.Trained manpower for combating √
emergency
9. Any other resources considered √
necessary


TIRUNELVELI
CHECK LIST-7
(Refer Regulation 26.0 (2))
ERDMP Recovery Measures
Sl.N
CHECKPOINT YES NO REMARKS
o
Post Emergency Recovery
Salvage of product
1 Check that spilled / accumulated product √ NA
contents are transferred to the OWS or collected √
in drums.
2 Check whether the quality & quantity estimation NA
of the product extracted from OWS has been
done for further disposal in line with standing
QC guidelines by either transferring to service
tanks or to nearest refinery for blending /
reprocessing or not.
3 Check that correct stock accounting of spilled NA
product as loss has been completed in
accounting system.
4 Check that affected area has been completely √
cleaned and dried after evacuation of spilled
product.
5 Declare that affected area after salvage √
operations is fully clean & safe for movement of √
the working personnel.
6 Check that all drains are not having any residual √
oil and are thoroughly cleaned & dried.
7 Check that all control valves on product lines & NA
OWS lines outside dyke area and drains are
completely closed after removal of the spilled
product.
8 Check that interlocking system of tanks / gantry √
has been reactivated for normal operations.
9 Check whether the soil testing of the affected √
area, if required, has been done to assess the
soil contamination level to meet the
Environmental – SPCB norms / requirements.
Taking care of affected manpower
10 Whether physical accounting of all personnel on √
duty during & after the incident are ascertained
by the Main Incident Controller and reconciled
immediately
√
11 Whether the first-aid treatment & post-incident √
health check of the affected personnel has been
undertaken in time
12 Whether these personnel are declared fully √
physically fit before allowing them to resume


TIRUNELVELI
Sl.N
o
their normal duties
13 Whether the records for such first aid & √
treatment of the affected personnel are
maintained in a well-defined format
Addressing media & outside bodies
14 Whether the DMP event was appropriately √
informed to the local media in line with the
respective company’s Press & Media Policy
15 Whether the role of neighbouring population √
during the drill / disaster is suitably informed to
the population during subsequent meetings with
local administration/ Panchayat etc. for
necessary improvements
16 Whether the awareness & preparedness on √
disaster is regularly assimilated / shared with
nearby public / societies and stake holders.
Reporting
17 Check whether that disaster incident report was √
communicated to respective controlling office /
HQ on time in a standard format.
18 Whether the incident reports are also sent to √
concerned State Level Industry Coordinator on
time.
19 Check that detailed report on disaster in proper √
format was communicated to PNGRB/ Factory
inspector / Labour inspector / SPCB / District
Magistrate /PESO.
Investigation
20 Whether investigation teams are constituted as √
per respective company policies
21 Whether RCA (Root Cause Analysis) of the √
disaster is conducted by the investigating team
22 Whether detailed analysis including effective √
functioning of interlocks, detection devices,
automation controls & applicable norms are
carried out to find out possible improvements in
design / construction / operations /
maintenance & training aspects
23 Whether a system of initiating appropriate √
corrective measures including suitable revisions
to the Disaster Management Plan are adopted
based on findings of the investigation
Damage Assessment – Monetary &

Physical


TIRUNELVELI
Sl.N
o
24 Check the valuation / cost of product loss / √
down gradation on account of contamination, if
any / Property / Structures / damaged assets –
equipment.
25 Whether repairs & maintenance cost of √
property, assets & equipment are assessed.
26 Whether any penalty by statutory authorities √
like SPCB / Factory Inspector and Labour
Commissioner are assessed.
27 Whether possible impact on environment are √
also assessed & appropriate measures are taken
28 Whether damage assessment also include √
potential erosion of reputation – from company,
industry & national perspectives
Clean up and Restoration
29 Whether the affected area has been fully
cleaned and cleared after due clearance from √
investigation team
30 Check whether heat detectors, high level
alarms, in built safety systems (NRV, TSV etc.) √
are fully functional after the disaster incident.
31 Check whether all fire fighting equipment like – √
hoses / nozzles / Fire Extinguishers etc. have √
been put back at designated places and are fully
ready for reuse
√
32 Whether a clearly defined steps are in place to √
allow resumption of normal operations √

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[RISK ASSESSMENT ] [2015]

Sl.No Chapters Page No.

3 Executive Summary III

4 Objectives, Philosophy and Methodology 1-5

5 Details of LPG Bottling Facilities 2-5

6 Health ,Safety and Environmental Features In the Facility 3-5

7.2 Credible accident sources/worst case scenarios 6 - 10

Damage Contours Clearly Drawn to Scale On Site/Plot Plan

Accident Frequency Estimation , System Boundaries; Specific

M.Meganathan.,ME.,MIE.,DIS.,BOC.,Ph.D Scholar BBS

Trained and Experienced hazard analysis leader

by china Risk Management Solutions-China

Accredited Safety Auditor by Government of Tamilnadu

& Chartered Engineer –Chemical

1.a ) Executive summary

As part of Risk management system in Proposed LPG Bottling plant of

Good Engineering design in the equipment locations , Maintenance area

Minimum Safety distances ( 87 meters ) between Truck unloading bay to

Vapor line to the mounded storages requires proper rigid support .

Mounded storage manifold pipes shall be properly clamped with rigid

Emergency Access road from Cylinder filling shed to Emergency gate to

1.0 OBJECTIVES, PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY

Indian Oil corporation Ltd , Tirunelveli LPG Bottling Plant, SIPCOT

The objective of this study is to identify potential physical hazards which

Risk Assessment is a complex exercise and can be carried out to various

Hazard identification is a key step in Risk Assessment. It is also an

• Identification of all sections of the plant including the storage

• To collect the relevant properties of the Hazardous Chemicals

• Identification of possible ways in which failure of plant installation

• Effects of heat radiation ,Pressure waves and Dispersion of vapor

• Study of possible failures in handling operations.

The following steps are involved in the analysis:

• Study of the plant facilities and systems.

2. Details of the plant

Brief description of LPG bottling plant (60,000 MTPA) at Tirunelveli

Indane Bottling Plant of Indian Oil Corporation Limited is located in SIPCOT

1. Receipt of LPG bulk:

2. Storage of Bulk LPG

3. Carousel filling machine:

a) Compressed air system

c) High Speed Diesel (HSD) System

8. Power Supply System:

9. CONTROL AND MONITORING PHILOSOPHY

2.1 ) SURROUNDING AREAS

East - Vacant Land

West - Nova carbon - Factory

North - Vacant Land

The plant is situated in a less populated area.

2.2) population density

4.0. Meteorological Data:

Gangaikondan is located at 8°51′N

Maximum Temperature - 48 deg C

Minimum Temperature - 28 deg C

Average Rainfall - 174 mm

Maximum Relative Humidity - 92 %

Minimum Relative Humidity - 35 %

Wind Speed - 4.5- 6 m / sec

Predominant wind Direction - N/E

Wind rose Diagramme

5.0 Description of Facilities and Process:

5.1 Various Activities at Plant

a. Receipt of LPG from Bulk Trucks

7.0 Occupational Health, Safety & Environmental Features in the Project