Quantitative Risk Assessment of Bunkering Facilities

QUANTITATIVE RISK
ASSESSMENT REPORT
OF
MAHARASHTRA
BUNKERING FACILITIES ATREGION
JAWAHAR
DWEEP (BUTCHER
PIPELINE ISLAND)
SYSTEM
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation

Limited
http://ifluids.com
Quantitative Risk Assessment Report
BUNKERING FACILITY AT JAWAHAR DWEEP
Rev-01
DOCUMENT REVISION SHEET

REPORT TITLE Quantitative Risk Assessment Report
PROJECT Bunkering Facilities at Jawahar Dweep
CLIENT Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited
HSE CONSULTANT iFluids Engineering
DOCUMENT NUMBER HPCL/QRA/2016/001
TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 93
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
iFluids Engineering gratefully acknowledges the co-operation received from the management of
HPCL during the study. iFluids Engineering in particular would like to thank the Safety and other
Engineering team involved in this project for their support and help throughout the study.
DISCLAIMER
The advice rendered by iFluids Engineering is in the nature of guidelines based on good
engineering practices and generally accepted safety procedures and consultants do not accept any
liability for the same. The recommendations shown in the report are advisory in nature and not
binding on the parties involved viz. iFluids Engineering and HPCL.
1 03-12-16 Reissue for Review SPK VMa JS
0 03-12-16 Issued for Review SPK VMa JS

Comments / Nature Prepared Reviewed Authorized Approved
Rev Date
of Changes by by by By (HPCL)
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................... 5

QRA STUDY RESULTS ................................................................................................................. 5
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 8
1.1 OBJECTIVE ........................................................................................................................... 8
1.2 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................... 8
2. FACILITY DESCRIPTION ...................................................................................................... 11
3. METROLOGICAL CONDITIONS............................................................................................ 13
4. QRA STUDY METHODOLOGOY........................................................................................... 17
4.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ................................................................................................. 18
4.2 QRA INPUT DATA .............................................................................................................. 20
4.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS ................................................................................................. 21
4.4 DAMAGE CRITERIA ............................................................................................................ 23
4.5 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................... 26
4.6 IGNITION PROBABILITIES .................................................................................................. 26
4.7 RISK ASSESSMENT ............................................................................................................. 27
4.8 RISK EVALUATION ............................................................................................................. 27
4.9 RISK REDUCTION MEASURES ............................................................................................ 27
5. DETAIL STUDY INPUTS ....................................................................................................... 28
6. STUDY RESULTS ................................................................................................................ 31
7. RISK PRESENTATION ......................................................................................................... 42
7.1 LOCATION SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL RISK .............................................................................. 42
7.2 RISK RESULTS .................................................................................................................... 43
8. RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA .............................................................................................. 45
9. PROPOSED RISK REDUCTION MEASURES BY HPCL.............................................................. 46
10. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................ 51
11. LIST OF REFERENCE DOCUMENTS / STANDARDS ............................................................. 54
ANNEXURE-I ............................................................................................................................... 55
CONSEQUENCE CONTOURS ....................................................................................................... 55
ANNEXURE-II .............................................................................................................................. 68
QRA ASSUMPTION REGISTER ..................................................................................................... 68
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LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 1 WIND ROSE .......................................................................................................................... 13
TABLE 2 PASQUILL’S STABILITY CLASS ............................................................................................... 15
TABLE 3 WEATHER CONDITIONS ....................................................................................................... 16
TABLE 4 DAMAGE DUE TO OVERPRESSURE ...................................................................................... 25
TABLE 5 CONSEQUENCE RESULTS .......................................................................................... 32
TABLE 6 RISK CRITERIA.............................................................................................................. 45
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 1 WIND ROSE OF SITE ........................................................................................................... 14
FIGURE 2: QRA METHODOLOGY........................................................................................................ 17
FIGURE 3 LOCATION SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOUR ............................................................. 43
FIGURE 4 SOCEITAL RISK – FN CURVE ............................................................................................... 44
FIGURE 5 ALARP................................................................................................................................. 45
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
M/s. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) intends to conduct Risk Analysis study for
their proposed Bunkering Facility at Jawahar Dweep to assess the risk associated with loss of
containment of the products to be stored. This scope was awarded to iFluids Engineering and
accordingly risk analysis and quantitative risk assessment study has been carried out to provide a
better understanding of the risk posed to the plant and surrounding population. The
consequences & Risk estimation modeling was conducted using PHAST and PHAST RISK (Version
6.7) software developed by DNV GL.
QRA STUDY RESULTS

Quantitative Risk analysis was performed for the identified nineteen potential hazardous scenarios
by using DNV PHAST AND PHAST RISK software version 6.7 to obtain risk results in the form of risk
contours/FN curve by combining consequence analysis results and frequencies analysis results.
The following figure illustrates the societal risk (F-N) curve for the terminal:
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The following figure illustrates the location specific risk contour (LSIR) for the terminal:
Risk reduction measures: -

Based on the input conditions such as process parameters, climatological condition, etc., the risk
posed by all the Loss of containment (LOC) Scenarios covered under this project, it is observed
that the individual risk per annum is found to fall in the Acceptable limit as per HSE UK risk
acceptance criteria. Furthermore it is suggested to implement Risk control measures provided
below for Risk Improvement of the Bunkering facilities
1. Ensure all the import/export lines to be adequately designed for the maximum pressure
source.
2. Ensure all the import/export lines are pressure tested to rated pressure before
commissioning or after any maintenance activity.
3. Provide ROV-TO3B/MOV-TO3B open feed back permissive for starting P-201 A/B pumps.
4. Provide MOV-07B open feed back permissive for starting P-202 A pump.
5. Provide MOV-01B open feed back permissive for starting P-102 A/B.
6. Provide MOV-04B/MOV-08B/MOV-02B/1003 open feed back permissive for starting the
pumps P-101 A/B.
7. Provide ROV-TO3B/MOV-TO3B close feed back trip for the pumps P-201 A/B.
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8. Provide discharge PT’s for the pumps with high pressure alarms to avoid blocked discharge
running conditions due to multiple loop operations and low pressure alarm on running
condition to identify any leak scenario.
9. Provide low suction pressure alarm and low low pressure trip for the pump to avoid dry
run operation.
10. Ensure low level, low low level, high level, high high level indications, alarms, trips are
configured as per P&ID.
11. Ensure SOP is developed/displayed for critical operations.
12. Ensure proper training/regural assessment fot the operation crew.
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1. INTRODUCTION
HPCL has awarded iFluids Engineering to carry out Quantitative risk assessment study for their
proposed Bunkering facilities at Jawahar Dweep Island.
This document presents the data considered, software modelling results, conclusion and
recommendations of the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Study.
1.1 OBJECTIVE
The main purpose and objective of this report is to,

 Identification of Hazards and Major Loss of Containment (LOC) events.
 Calculation of physical effects of accidental scenarios, which includes frequency analysis for
incident scenarios leading to hazards to people and facilities (flammable liquid petroleum,
fire, and smoke, explosion overpressure) and consequence analysis for the identified
hazards covering impact on people and potential escalation.
 Damage limits identification and quantification of the risks and contour mapping on the
plant layout.
 Risk contour mapping.
 Evaluation of risks against risk acceptable limit
 Risk reduction measures to prevent incident to control the accident
 Hazard mitigation recommendations based on QRA
1.2 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
Accidents are sudden unintended departures from normal operating conditions in which some
degree of harm is caused.
ALARP As low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)
Consequences are the expected effects of an event occurring. In QRA, it usually means the size of
the zone within which fatalities are expected, or the number of deaths.
Escape may refer to movement on the platform away from the area affected by an incident; or the
process of leaving the area.
Evacuation is the planned method of leaving the installation in an emergency.
Event tree analysis (ETA) is a technique to illustrate or quantify the various events that may follow
from one initiating event.
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Explosion - is a release of energy, which causes a blast wave capable of causing harm.
Failure - is when a system fails to perform its intended function.
Fire is a combustion process releasing heat and/or smoke.
Flash fire is combustion of a mixture of air and vapour in which the flame passes through the
cloud without causing an explosion.
Frequency is the number of occurrences of an event per unit time. In QRA, it is usually expressed
as the frequency per year.
Hazards are physical situations with a potential for causing harm.
Hazard identification is a qualitative review of possible accidents, in order to select failure cases.
Incidents are relatively minor accidents, i.e. unintended departures from normal operating
conditions in which little or no harm was caused.
Jet fire is the combustion of material released with high momentum in a concentrated jet or
spray.
Likelihood is the probability or frequency of an event occurring.
Over pressure is the excess of pressure in a blast wave.
Probability is the chance of an even to occurring in specific circumstances.
Scenarios are complete sets of circumstances necessary to define the consequences of particular
failure cases.
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ABBREVIATIONS
ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable
DNV Det Norske Veritas
FO Furnace Oil
HFHSD High Flash High Speed Diesel
HPCL Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited
HSD High Speed Diesel
HSE Health safety and Environment
IRPA Individual Risk Per Annum
IS Isolatable Section
JD Jawahar Dweep
LFL Lower Flammability Limit
LOC Loss of Containment
LSIR Location Specific Individual Risk
MOV Motor Operated Valve
NA Not Applicable
NR Not Reached
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation diagram
PSV Process Safety Valve
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
VCE Vapour Cloud Explosion
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2. FACILITY DESCRIPTION
Bunkering in Mumbai is currently being done at various jetties like Hay Bunder jetty, Mallet
Bunder jetty and old Pirpav, through tank trucks and barges. The pipeline supplies, though
preferred, are currently not feasible in most of the jetties except that at old Pirpav.
Typical Bunker supply parcel size ranges from 500 to 1500 MT. Handling of such huge quantity
supplies through existing Supply chain, i.e. Tank-trucks and Barges, involves intensive Operations /
multiple handling and thus poses Safety and Environmental concerns.
View above, Mumbai Port Trust (MbPT) mooted up a proposal to commission a single point for
Bunkering in Mumbai Port at MOT – Jawahar Dweep (Butcher Island) and decommission all
existing bunkering operation points (viz. Mallet Bunder, Old Pir-pau, Haybunder).
The proposal envisages facilitating barge berthing at jetty JD-2, and creation of facilities for
Bunkering at Butcher Island for seamless Bunkering operations through Pipe-line. Facilities will
include Storage tanks, input and discharge lines, pump-house etc. Details are as under:
 TANKS: MbPT already has tanks in Butcher Island which are currently not in use and
have been offered to HPCL. All the tanks shall be cleaned, refurbished and put it to
use for storing of Class C bunker Fuels. Tanks proposed to be taken-over for
bunkering operations are 6 nos. with total proposed capacity of 36,600 KL.
 The proposed Bunkering Terminal area is clearly earmarked for exclusive use by
HPCL and the dyke area of the Tanks, Pump House and Roads etc. is approx. 17225
sqmtr., which will be taken on lease from MbPT for a period of 30 years. Entire land
on Jawahar Dweep (Butcher Island) belongs to MbPT.
 JETTY: MbPT shall be providing HPCL permission to load Barges at modified Jetty, so
that bunker product shall be directly loaded in the Barge through dedicated pipe-
lines and through Flow-meters.
HPCL proposes to develop Bunkering Terminal by Refurbishing tanks, Pipe-line modifications,

develop Tank-farm area with proper PCC, Re-construct Dyke Wall, and Refurbish other allied
facilities including fire-fighting etc.
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Accordingly, they have already signed Agreement with Mumbai Port Trust (MbPT) for taking-over
of 6 nos. of Storage Tanks, Pump House and allied facilities for setting-up of Bunker Fuel Terminal.
As per Agreement, MbPT has also offered plot portion of the said Tank-Farm premises on long
term lease (30 years) to HPCL.
HPCL proposes Storage of Petroleum Products in 6 nos. Tanks as under:
HPCL have developed layout for Development of Bunkering Terminal, drawing enclosed herewith,
so as to achieve the purpose of “Receipt of products (FO-380, HF HSD) through MbPT pipeline,
storage in 6 Nos. tanks and delivery of products (FO-380, HF HSD) for bunkering at JD-2”.
Products (i.e. FO-380 and HFHSD) shall be received through Mumbai Port Trust’s Black oil and
White Oil pipe-lines respectively, from the HPCL Mahul Refinery. Product may also be received
through Pipe-line from Vessels berthing at Jawahar Dweep/ Pirpau.
Normal pipe-line contents in these MBPT’s pipe-line are FO-180 and HSD respectively.
Accordingly, it is envisaged to designate one tank each for storage of pipe-line content of FO-180
and HSD. Post receipt operations, this pipe-line content will be pushed-back to the pipe-line.
Delivery of the products (FO-380 and HFHSD) shall be primarily through MbPT Bunkering line in
the barges berthed at JD-2.
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3. METROLOGICAL CONDITIONS
This chapter describes the meteorological data which have been used for the risk assessment
study of the Bunkering facility.
The consequences of released flammable material are largely dependent on the prevailing
weather conditions. For the assessment of major scenarios involving release of flammable
materials, the most important meteorological parameters are those that affect the atmospheric
dispersion of the escaping material. The crucial variables are wind speed, wind direction,
atmospheric stability and temperature. Rainfall does not have any bearing on the results of the
risk analysis; however, it can have beneficial effects by absorption/washout of released materials.
Actual behavior of any release would largely depend on prevailing weather condition at the time
of release.
Wind Speed and Wind Direction
Based on the meteorological data provided in the table 1, the predominant wind speed of 2 and 5
m/s is considered for the risk analysis of terminal. Meteorological data of site have been taken
from the climatological observations from meteoblue website.
Table 1 Wind Rose
Total in
wind
terms of
speed 0 >0.3 >1.6 >3.4 >5.5 >8 >10.8 >13.9 >17.2
wind
m/s
direction
N 0.001484 0.027169 0.009361 0.000685 0 0 0 0 0 0.0387
NNE 0.001256 0.022032 0.007763 0.000571 0 0 0 0 0 0.0316
NE 0.000457 0.02226 0.010845 0.002055 0.000114 0 0 0 0 0.0357
ENE 0.001256 0.039498 0.076256 0.00879 0.000799 0 0 0 0 0.1266
E 0 0.014612 0.031393 0.005365 0.000913 0 0 0 0 0.0523
ESE 0.000799 0.008676 0.002968 0.000685 0.000114 0 0 0 0 0.0132
SE 0.000342 0.005137 0.001484 0.000342 0 0 0 0 0 0.0073
SSE 0 0.005137 0.001712 0.000457 0 0 0 0 0 0.0073
S 0.002511 0.014726 0.010502 0.003881 0.000799 0.000114 0 0 0 0.0325
SSW 0.000228 0.015868 0.03984 0.015525 0.003082 0.000342 0 0 0 0.0749
SW 0.000913 0.031393 0.077055 0.039041 0.011073 0.000571 0 0 0 0.1600
WSW 0 0.028082 0.050571 0.02089 0.010731 0.000457 0 0 0 0.1107
W 0.001256 0.039954 0.056735 0.028995 0.019863 0.000114 0 0 0 0.1469
WNW 0.000342 0.023744 0.035274 0.018836 0.008447 0.000114 0 0 0 0.0868
NW 0.001256 0.025228 0.017352 0.00411 0.000685 0 0 0 0 0.0486
NNW 0 0.017466 0.009018 0.001027 0 0 0 0 0 0.0275
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Figure 1 Wind Rose of Site
Ambient Conditions
Ambient Temperature : 30°C
Average Relative Humidity : 75 %
Weather category
One of the most important characteristics of atmosphere is its stability. Stability of atmosphere is
its tendency to resist vertical motion or to suppress existing turbulence. This tendency directly
influences the ability of atmosphere to disperse pollutants emitted into it from the facilities. In
most dispersion scenarios, the relevant atmospheric layer is that nearest to the ground, varying in
thickness from a few thousand meters. Turbulence induced by buoyancy forces in the atmosphere
is closely related to the vertical temperature gradient.
Temperature normally decreases with the increasing height in the atmosphere. The rate at which
the temperature of air decreases with height is called Environmental Lapse Rate (ELR). It will vary
from time to time and from place to place. The atmosphere is said to be stable, neutral or
unstable according to ELR is less than, equal to or greater than Dry Adiabatic Lapse Rate (DALR),
which is a constant value of 0.98°C/100 meters.
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Atmospheric Stability
Pasquill stability parameter, based on Pasquill – Gifford categorization, is such a meteorological
parameter, which decreases the stability of atmosphere, e.g., the degree of convective
turbulence.
Pasquill has defined six stability classes ranging from ‘A’ (extremely unstable) to ‘F’ (very stable).
Wind speeds, intensity of solar radiation (daytime insulation) at night time sky cover have beam
identified as prime factors defining these stability categories. Below table indicates the various
Pasquill stability classes.
Table 2 Pasquill’s Stability Class
Day: Solar Radiation Night: cloud Cover

Wind Speed
(m/s) Thinly < Overcast >
Strong Moderate Slight Moderate
40% 80%
<2 A A-B B - - D
2-3 A-B B C E F D
3-5 B B-C C D E D
5-6 C C-D D D D D
>6 C D D D D D
A – Very Unstable
B – Unstable
C – Slightly Unstable
D – Neutral
E – Stable
F – Very Stable
When the atmosphere is unstable and wind speeds are moderate or high or gusty, rapid
dispersion of pollutants will occur. Under these conditions, pollutant concentrations in air will be
moderate or low and the material will be dispersed rapidly. When the atmosphere is stable and
wind speed is low, dispersion of material will be limited and pollutant concentration in air will be
high. In general, worst dispersion conditions (i.e. contributing to greater hazard distances) occur
during low wind speed and very stable weather conditions, such as that at 1F weather condition
(i.e. 1 m/s wind speed and Pasquill stability F).
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Stability category for the present study is identified based on the cloud amount and wind speed.
For risk analysis the representative average annual weather conditions are assesses based on the
following:
Based on the weather analysis, predominant weather stability of “F” and “D” was selected with
wind speed 2 m/s and 5 m/s for consequence analysis, respectively. The consequence results are
represented in tabular form for all the weather conditions and are represented graphically for
worst weather condition.
Table 3 Weather conditions
Wind Speed in m/s Pasquill Stability

2 F
5 D
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4. QRA STUDY METHODOLOGOY

This section presents a brief description of the approach and steps followed in the QRA study.
The QRA Study included the following steps:
 Identification of the hazardous events associated with the project facility;
 Consequence modelling of the physical effects;
 Estimation of total failure frequencies;
 Evaluation / assessment of the risks arising from the pipeline network with respect to
UK HSE Risk Acceptance Criteria;
 Recommending risk reduction measures.
The overall QRA methodology is shown in Figure 2 and is described in more detail in the
subsequent sections.
Figure 2: QRA Methodology
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4.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
The hazardous scenarios considered in the QRA for the project facility will be identified based on
the properties of the materials handled and the identification of the potential hazards in the
pipeline systems which could lead to loss of containment events.
A technique commonly used to generate an incident list is to consider potential leaks and major
releases from fractures of all process pipelines and vessels. This compilation includes all pipe work
and vessels in direct communication, as these may share a significant inventory that cannot be
isolated in an emergency. The following data were collected to envisage scenarios:
 Composition of materials stored in vessels / flowing through pipeline

 Inventory of materials stored in vessels
 Flow rate of materials passing through pipelines
 Vessels / Pipeline conditions (phase, temperature, pressure)
 Connecting piping and piping dimensions.
Accidental release of flammable liquids / gases can result in severe consequences. Delayed
ignition of flammable gases can result in blast overpressures covering large areas. This may lead to
extensive loss of life and property. In contrast, fires have localized consequences. Fires can be put
out or contained in most cases; there are few mitigating actions one can take once a flammable
gas or a vapour cloud gets released. Major accident hazards arise, therefore, consequent upon the
release of flammable gases.
FACTORS FOR IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS
In any installation, main hazard arises due to loss of containment during handling of flammable
liquids / gases. To formulate a structured approach to identification of hazards, an understanding
of contributory factors is essential.
Blast over Pressures

Blast Overpressures depend upon the reactivity class of material and the amount of gas between
two explosive limits. For example, MS once released and not ignited immediately is expected to
give rise to a gas cloud. These gases in general have medium reactivity and in case of confinement
of the gas cloud, on delayed ignition may result in an explosion and overpressures.
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Operating Parameters
Potential gas release for the same material depends significantly on the operating conditions. The
gases are likely to operate at atmospheric temperature (and hence high pressures). This operating
range is enough to release a large amount of gas in case of a leak / rupture, therefore the pipeline
leaks and ruptures need to be considered in the risk analysis calculations.
Inventory
Inventory Analysis is commonly used in understanding the relative hazards and short listing of
release scenarios. Inventory plays an important role in regard to the potential hazard. Larger the
inventory of a vessel or a system, larger is the quantity of potential release. A practice commonly
used to generate an incident list is to consider potential leaks and major releases from fractures of
pipelines and vessels/tanks containing sizable inventories.
Range of Incidents
Both the complexity of study and the number of incident outcome cases are affected by the range
of initiating events and incidents covered. This not only reflects the inclusion of accidents and / or
non-accident-initiated events, but also the size of those events. For instance, studies may evaluate
one or more of the following:
 catastrophic failure of container
 large hole (large continuous release)
 smaller holes (continuous release)
 leaks at fittings or valves (small continuous release)
In general, quantitative studies do not include very small continuous releases or short duration
small releases if past experience or preliminary consequence modeling shows that such releases
do not contribute to the overall risk levels.
SELECTION OF INITIATING EVENTS AND INCIDENTS
The selection of initiating events and incidents should take into account the goals or objectives of
the study and the data requirements. The data requirements increase significantly when non -
accident - initiated events are included and when the number of release size increase. While the
potential range of release sizes is tremendous, groupings are both appropriate and necessitated
by data restrictions. The main reasons for including release sizes other than the catastrophic are
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to reduce the conservatism in an analysis and to better understand the relative contributions to
risk of small versus large releases.
As per CPR 18 E guidelines & Reference Manual BEVI Risk Assessments Version 3.2 only the Loss of
Containment (LOC) which is basically the release scenarios contributing to the individual and/ or
societal risk are included in the QRA. LOCs of the installation are included only if the following
conditions are fulfilled:
 Frequency of occurrence is equal to or greater than 10E-08 and
 Lethal damage (1% probability) occurs outside the establishment’s boundary or the
transport route.
There may be number of accidents that may occur quite frequently, but due to proper control
measures or fewer quantities of chemicals released, they are controlled effectively. A few
examples are a leak from a gasket, pump or valve, release of a chemical from a vent or relief
valve, and fire in a pump due to overheating. These accidents generally are controlled before they
escalate by using control systems and monitoring devices – used because such piping and
equipment are known to sometimes fail or malfunction, leading to problems.
On the other hand, there are less problematic areas / units that are generally ignore or not given
due attention. Such LOCs are identified by studying the facilities and Event Tree Analysis etc. and
accidents with less consequence are ignored. Some of the critical worst case scenarios identified
by the Hazard Identification study are also assessed as per the guidelines of Environment
Protection Agency.
4.2 QRA INPUT DATA
The following activities comprise the determination of input data required for conducting the QRA
study:
 Review of the project documents to determine process streams.
 Identification of Loss of Containment (LOC) scenarios based on the hazardous
properties of the material.
 Review of the design basis to obtain the properties of the stream (e.g. pressure,
temperature, composition and density); and
 Calculation of the inventory released due to LOC events
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4.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
Consequence assessment is conducted to understand the impact of identified scenarios in terms

of thermal radiation (Jet fire, Flash Fire, Pool Fire), Explosion (vapor cloud explosion) & toxic
dispersion. A range of potential consequences are assessed for each of the release scenarios
identified. This step identifies the fatality probability, based on hazard type and caused by each
release case, to personnel at a range of distances.
The consequence evaluation of accidental release will include the calculation of the following
parameters as a minimum:
 Source term (Vapor and/or Liquid and/or Two phase discharge rate; release duration,
spreading and evaporation)
 Fire characteristics (jet fire, pool fire, flash fires);
 Dispersion characteristics (flammable clouds);
 Explosion characteristics;
 Hazardous distances (referred to radiation from fires, UFL, LFL and overpressure levels);
CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS MODELLING

Discharge Rate
The initial rate of release through a leak depends mainly on the pressure inside the equipment,
size of the hole and phases of the release (liquid, gas or two – phase). The release rate decreases
with time as the equipment depressurizes. The reduction mainly on the inventory and the actions
taken to isolate the leak and blow-down the equipment.
Dispersion
Release of gas into the open air form clouds whose dispersion is governed by the wind, by
turbulence around the site, the density of gas and initial momentum of the release.in case of
flammable materials the sizes of these gas clouds above their lower flammability limit (LFL) are
important in determining whether the release will ignite. In the study, the results of dispersion
modeling for flammable materials are presented LFL distance.
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Consequence Events
In this section of the report we describe the probabilities associated with the sequence of
occurrences which must take place for the incident scenarios to produce hazardous effects and
the modeling of their effects.
Considering the present case, the outcomes expected are
 Flash Fire (FF)
 Jet fires
 Pool fire
 Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE)
Flash Fire
Hydrocarbon vapour released accidentally will spread out in the direction of wind. If a source of
ignition finds an ignition source before being dispersed below lower flammability limit (LFL), a
flash fire is likely to occur and the flame will travel back to the source of leak. Any person caught
in the fire is likely to suffer fatal burn injury. Therefore, in consequence analysis, the distance of
LFL value is usually taken to indicate the area, which may be affected by the flash fire.
Flash fire (LFL) events are considered to cause direct harm to the population present within the
flammability range of the cloud. Fire escalation from flash fire such that process or storage
equipment or building may be affected is considered unlikely.
Jet fires
Jet fire occurs when a pressurized release (of a flammable fluid) is ignited by any source. They
tend to be localized in effect and are mainly of concern in establishing the potential for domino
effects and employee safety zones rather than for community risks.
The jet fire model is based on the radiant fraction of total combustion energy, which is assumed
to arise from a point slowly along the jet flame path. The jet dispersion model gives the jet flame
length.
Pool fires
A pool fire is a turbulent diffusion fire burning above a horizontal pool of vaporizing hydrocarbon
fuel where the fuel has zero or low initial momentum. Fires in the open will be well ventilated
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(fuel controlled), but fires within enclosures may become under-ventilated (ventilation-
controlled). Pool fires may be static (e.g. where the pool is contained) or 'running' fires.
Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE)

Vapour cloud explosion is the result of flammable materials in the atmosphere, a subsequent
dispersion phase, and after some delay an ignition of the vapour cloud. Turbulence is the
governing factor in blast generation, which could intensify combustion to the level that will result
in an explosion. Obstacles in the path of vapour cloud or when the cloud finds a confined area, as
under the bullets, often create turbulence. Insignificant level of confinement will result in a flash
fire. The VCE will result in overpressures.
It may be noted that VCEs have been responsible for very serious accidents involving severe
property damage and loss of lives
4.4 DAMAGE CRITERIA
The damage criteria give the relation between the extents of the physical effects (exposure) and
the effect of consequences. For assessing the effects on human being’s consequences are
expressed in terms of injuries and the effects on equipment / property in terms of monetary loss.
The effect of consequences for release of toxic substances or fire can be categorized as
 Damage caused by heat radiation on material and people;
 Damage caused by explosion on structure and people;
 Damage caused by toxic exposure.
In Consequence Analysis studies, in principle three types of exposure to hazardous effects are
distinguished:
1. Heat radiation due to fires. In this study, the concern is that of Jet fires and flash fires.
2. Explosions
3. Toxic effects, from toxic materials or toxic combustion products.
The knowledge about these relations depends strongly on the nature of the exposure. Following
are the criteria selected for damage estimation:
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Heat Radiation:
The effect of fire on a human being is in the form of burns. There are three categories of burn
such as first degree, second degree and third degree burns. The consequences caused by
exposure to heat radiation are a function of:
 The radiation energy onto the human body [kW/m2];
 The exposure duration [sec];
 The protection of the skin tissue (clothed or naked body).
The limits for 1% of the exposed people to be killed due to heat radiation, and for second-degree
burns are given in the table below:
Table 4 Effects Due To Incident Radiation Intensity
Incident
Type of Damage
Radiation (kW/m2)
Sufficient to cause pain within 20 sec. Blistering of skin

4.0
(first degree burns are likely)
Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting
12.5
plastic tubing’s etc.
37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment
The actual results would be less severe due to the various assumptions made in the models arising
out of the flame geometry, emissivity, angle of incidence, view factor and others. The radiative
output of the flame would be dependent upon the fire size, extent of mixing with air and the
flame temperature. Some fraction of the radiation is absorbed by carbon dioxide and water
vapour in the intervening atmosphere. Finally, the incident flux at an observer location would
depend upon the radiation view factor, which is a function of the distance from the flame surface,
the observer’s orientation and the flame geometry.
Assumptions made for the study (As per the guidelines of CPR 18E Purple Book)
 The lethality of a jet fire is assumed to be 100% for the people who are caught in the
flame. Outside the flame area, the lethality depends on the heat radiation distances.
 For the flash fires lethality is taken as 100% for all the people caught outdoors and for
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10% who are indoors within the flammable cloud. No fatality has been assumed
outside the flash fire area.
Overpressure:
Vapour cloud Explosion (VCE)
The assessment aims are to determine the impact of overpressure in the event that a flammable
gas cloud is ignited. The TNO multi energy model is used to model vapour cloud explosions.
A Vapour cloud Explosion (VCE) results when a flammable vapor is released, its mixture with air
will form a flammable vapour cloud. If ignited, the flame speed may accelerate to high velocities
and produce significant blast overexposure.
The assessment aim is to determine the impact of overpressure in the event that a flammable gas
cloud is ignited. The damage effects due to 0.01 bar, 0.1 bar & 0.3 bar are reported in terms of
distance from the overpressure source.
In case of vapour cloud explosion, two physical effects may occur:
 A flash fire over the whole length of the explosive gas cloud;
 A blast wave, with typical peak overpressures circular around ignition source.
For the blast wave, the lethality criterion is based on:
 A peak overpressure of 0.1bar will cause serious damage to 10% of the housing/structures.
 Falling fragments will kill one of each eight persons in the destroyed buildings
The following damage criteria may be distinguished with respect to the peak overpressures
resulting from a blast wave:
Table 4 Damage due to overpressure

Peak Overpressure Damage Type Description
0.30 bar Heavy Damage Major damage to plant equipment structure

Repairable damage to plant equipment &
0.10 bar Moderate Damage
structure
0.03 bar Significant Damage Shattering of glass
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Assumptions for the study (As per the guidelines of CPR 18 E Purple Book)
 Overpressure more than 0.3 bar corresponds approximately with 50% lethality.
 An overpressure above 0.2 bar would result in 10% fatalities.
 An overpressure less than 0.1bar would not cause any fatalities to the public.
 100% lethality is assumed for all people who are present within the cloud proper
4.5 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS
Once the potential release scenarios are identified, the next stage is to estimate the failure
frequencies (likelihood for the event to occur) based on international standard databases.
The frequency analysis will be performed as follows:
 Identification of the base failure frequencies applicable to the liquid petroleum pipelines
and storage tanks from the relevant international standard databases;
 The total failure frequencies will be derived from the base failure frequency data along
with the consideration of modification factors if applicable.
4.6 IGNITION PROBABILITIES
For gas/ oil releases from the gas/ oil handling system, where a large percentage of rupture events
may be due to third party damage, a relatively high probability of immediate ignition is generally
used.
Delayed ignition takes other factors into account. Delayed ignition probabilities can also be
determined as a function of the cloud area or the location. In general, as the size of the cloud
increases, the probability of delayed ignition decreases. This is due to the likelihood that the cloud
has already encountered an ignition source and ignited before dispersing over a larger area (i.e.
the cloud reaches an ignition source relatively close to the point of origin).
For this study the ignition probabilities have been modified to suit the site conditions. The ignition
probabilities inside enclosed areas shall be much higher than the open areas. It is because of the
fact that there will be much more activities taking place and the possibility of ignition increases.
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4.7 RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk assessment will be undertaken to evaluate the risk associated with the project facilities. The
consequence analysis results and failure frequencies will be combined using PHAST RISK 6.7
software. The risk shall be typically presented as Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) contours
overlaid on a map and Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA).
4.8 RISK EVALUATION
It involves the evaluation of the individual risk results against the UK HSE Risk Acceptance Criteria
to determine whether the risks are broadly acceptable, ALARP or unacceptable and to make some
professional judgments about the significance of the risks.
4.9 RISK REDUCTION MEASURES
Based on the risk evaluation, if the calculated risks fall in the unacceptable region, risk reduction
measures shall be implemented in order to reduce the risk to a tolerable or ALARP region. All
physically possible risk reduction measures shall be identified, which could be new measures or
improvements to existing measures already installed/ implemented. The risk evaluation after
implementation of recommendation/ risk reduction measures shall be carried out to demonstrate
that the risk shall be reduced to ALARP region and the study recommendations are adequate for
the project.
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5. DETAIL STUDY INPUTS
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Mass flow rate/

Dyke details
Isolatable capacity Static Isolation Dynamic
Diameter Length Pressure Temp Capacity, Density Total
section Description Scenario inventory time inventory, Dyke
m m kg/cm2 C KL Kg/m3 Inventory, kg Area, Volume,
Name m3/hr Kg/s kg s kg height,
m2 m3
m
PIPELINES
Feeding pipeline to LEAK 0.4064 450 11.67 47.5 NA 700 192.50 990 57759.678 1800 4326.84 62086.52 NA NA NA
IS-1
Tank-1 FO 180 RUPTURE 0.4064 450 11.67 47.5 NA 700 192.50 990 57759.678 120 23100.00 80859.68 NA NA NA
Feeding pipeline to LEAK 0.4064 520 11.67 47.5 NA 700 192.50 990 66744.517 1800 4326.84 71071.36 NA NA NA
IS-2
Tank-2 FO 380 RUPTURE 0.4064 520 11.67 47.5 NA 700 192.50 990 66744.517 120 23100.00 89844.52 NA NA NA
Feeding pipeline to LEAK 0.3048 470 11 30 NA 540 123.00 820 28106.793 1800 3975.84 32082.63 NA NA NA
IS-3
Tank-3 HSD RUPTURE 0.3048 470 11 30 NA 540 123.00 820 28106.793 120 14760.00 42866.79 NA NA NA
Feeding pipeline to LEAK 0.3048 475 11 30 NA 540 126.00 840 29098.626 1800 3975.84 33074.47 NA NA NA
IS-4
Tank-7 HFHSD RUPTURE 0.3048 475 11 30 NA 540 126.00 840 29098.626 120 15120.00 44218.63 NA NA NA
Pump suction line from LEAK 0.4064 77 2 30 NA 950 261.25 990 9883.323 1800 1791.47 11674.79 NA NA NA
IS-5
Tank-1 FO 180 RUPTURE 0.4064 77 2 30 NA 950 261.25 990 9883.323 120 31350.00 41233.32 NA NA NA
IS-6
Tank-2 FO 380 RUPTURE 0.4064 80 2 30 NA 410 112.75 990 10268.387 120 13530.00 23798.39 NA NA NA
IS-7
Tank-3 HSD RUPTURE 0.3048 120 2 30 NA 700 159.44 820 7176.202 120 19133.33 26309.54 NA NA NA
IS-8
Tank-7 HFHSD RUPTURE 0.3048 140 2 30 NA 300 70.00 840 8576.437 120 8400.00 16976.44 NA NA NA
Pump discharge line LEAK 0.3048 380 12 30 NA 950 261.25 990 27435.847 1800 4387.57 31823.42 NA NA NA
IS-9 from Pump-102 A/ B FO-
RUPTURE 0.3048 380 12 30 NA 950 261.25 990 27435.847 120 31350.00 NA NA NA
180 58785.85
Pump discharge line LEAK 0.254 380 5.4 30 NA 410 112.75 990 19052.672 1800 2943.54 21996.21 NA NA NA
IS-10 from Pump-101 A/B FO-
RUPTURE 0.254 380 5.4 30 NA 410 112.75 990 19052.672 120 13530.00 NA NA NA
380 32582.67
Pump discharge line LEAK 0.3048 380 5.8 30 NA 700 159.44 820 22724.641 1800 2887.25 25611.90 NA NA NA
IS-11
from Pump-201 A/B HSD RUPTURE 0.3048 380 5.8 30 NA 700 159.44 820 22724.641 120 19133.33 41857.97 NA NA NA
Pump discharge line LEAK 0.2032 380 4 30 NA 300 70.00 840 10346.178 1800 2397.80 12743.98 NA NA NA
IS-12
from Pump-202A HFHSD RUPTURE 0.2032 380 4 30 NA 300 70.00 840 10346.178 120 8400.00 18746.18 NA NA NA
Inter tank transfer line LEAK 0.3048 280 5.4 30 NA 410 112.75 990 20215.887 1800 2943.54 23159.43 NA NA NA
IS-13
for FO-380 tanks RUPTURE 0.3048 280 5.4 30 NA 410 112.75 990 20215.887 120 13530.00 33745.89 NA NA NA
STORAGE TANKS
LEAK 24.4 14.63 atm 30 7200 NA NA 990 NA NA NA NA 1.8 6167 8050
IS-14 TANK-1 FO-180 RUPTURE 24.4 14.63 atm 30 7200 NA NA 990 NA NA NA NA 1.8 6167 8050
RUPTURE 27.44 12.8 atm 30 8050 NA NA 990 NA NA NA NA 1.8 6167 8050
IS-15 TANK-2 FO-380 LEAK 27.44 12.8 atm 30 8050 NA NA 990 NA NA NA NA 1.8 6167 8050
IS-16 TANK-3 HSD RUPTURE 15.24 14.63 atm 30 3200 NA NA 820 NA NA NA NA 1.4 3006 3490
IS-17 TANK-4 FO-380 RUPTURE 15.24 14.63 atm 30 3200 NA NA 990 NA NA NA NA 1.4 3006 3490
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Mass flow rate/

Dyke details
Isolatable capacity Static Isolation Dynamic
Diameter Length Pressure Temp Capacity, Density Total
section Description Scenario inventory time inventory, Dyke
m m kg/cm2 C KL Kg/m3 Inventory, kg Area, Volume,
Name m3/hr Kg/s kg s kg height,
m2 m3
m
LEAK 24.85 16 atm 30 8050 NA NA 840 NA NA NA NA 1.8 6167 8050
IS-18 TANK-7 HF HSD RUPTURE 24.85 16 atm 30 8050 NA NA 840 NA NA NA NA 1.8 6167 8050
LEAK 24.85 16 atm 30 8050 NA NA 840 NA NA NA NA 1.8 6167 8050
RUPTURE 30 16 atm 30 6900 NA NA 990 NA NA NA NA 2.8 2816 6920
IS-19 TANK-8 FO-380 LEAK 30 16 atm 30 6900 NA NA 990 NA NA NA NA 2.8 2816 6920
RUPTURE 30 16 atm 30 6900 NA NA 990 NA NA NA NA 2.8 2816 6920
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6. STUDY RESULTS
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The following table presents the impact distances due to the event consequences
Table 5 CONSEQUENCE RESULTS
Flash Fire Effects: Radiation Effects: Jet Radiation Effects:

Vapor Cloud explosion
100% LFL Ellipse Fire Ellipse Late pool Ellipse
Radiation
Isolatable Scenario Release Over
Distance in meters Levels Distance in meters Distance in meters Distance in meters
Section Description category pressure
(kW/m2)
level
2F 5D 2F 5D 2F 5D bar 2F 5D
4 NR NR 80.3881 98.4912 0.02068 NR NR

LEAK 22.5 21.9189 12.5 NR NR 47.73 60.2262 0.1379 NR NR
Feeding
pipeline to 37.5 NR NR NR NR 0.2068 NR NR
IS-1
Tank-1 FO 4 NR NR 97.4916 107.277 0.02068 NR NR
180
RUPTURE 9.74912 9.77656 12.5 NR NR 52.8124 53.7135 0.1379 NR NR
37.5 NR NR NR NR 0.2068 NR NR
4 NR NR 80.3881 98.4912 0.02068 NR NR
LEAK 22.5 21.9189 12.5 NR NR 47.73 60.2262 0.1379 NR NR
Feeding
pipeline to 37.5 NR NR NR NR 0.2068 NR NR
IS-2
Tank-2 FO 4 NR NR 103.826 114.288 0.02068 NR NR
380
Feeding 4 9.54032 11.1854 81.6084 101.057 0.02068 18.5285 34.1709
IS-3 pipeline to LEAK 17.9817 24.7552
Tank-3 12.5 7.17593 8.12563 45.2869 56.2447 0.1379 12.2082 23.6692
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Radiation
(kW/m2)
level
HSD 37.5 5.54125 6.1931 NR NR 0.2068 11.7087 22.8391
4 6.35047 6.18921 131.627 149.554 0.02068 NR NR
RUPTURE 7.03067 6.95071 12.5 4.63957 4.4744 67.7326 68.6548 0.1379 NR NR
37.5 3.47678 3.04087 NR NR 0.2068 NR NR
4 9.54032 11.1854 81.6084 101.057 0.02068 18.5285 34.1709
LEAK 17.9817 24.7552 12.5 7.17593 8.12563 45.2869 56.2447 0.1379 12.2082 23.6692
Feeding
pipeline to 37.5 5.54125 6.1931 NR NR 0.2068 11.7087 22.8391
IS-4
Tank-7 4 6.31569 6.15925 133.185 151.301 0.02068 NR NR
HFHSD
RUPTURE 6.99263 6.90689 12.5 4.61008 4.45196 68.6278 69.7497 0.1379 NR NR
37.5 3.45594 3.03014 NR NR 0.2068 NR NR
4 NR NR 49.8988 55.1685 0.02068 NR NR
LEAK 6.22664 6.90144 12.5 NR NR 25.0734 27.6257 0.1379 NR NR
Pump
suction line 37.5 NR NR NR NR 0.2068 NR NR
IS-5
from Tank- 4 NR NR 71.3158 78.4995 0.02068 NR NR
1 FO 180
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Radiation
(kW/m2)
level
4 NR NR 49.8988 55.1685 0.02068 NR NR

LEAK 6.22664 6.90144 12.5 NR NR 25.0734 27.6257 0.1379 NR NR
Pump
IS-6
from Tank- 4 NR NR 59.3288 65.0692 0.02068 NR NR
2 FO 380
4 2.30849 2.26463 53.2513 60.8622 0.02068 NR NR
LEAK 6.13762 6.86718 12.5 NR NR 24.8724 27.3396 0.1379 NR NR
Pump
IS-7
from Tank- 4 4.42 4.75 107.02 122.1 0.02068 NR NR
3 HSD
RUPTURE 4.97 4.88 12.5 3.08 3.4 52.75 53.54 0.1379 NR NR
4 2.30849 2.26463 53.2513 60.8622 0.02068 NR NR
Pump
suction line LEAK 6.13762 6.86718 12.5 NR NR 24.8724 27.3396 0.1379 NR NR
IS-8
from Tank- 37.5 NR NR NR NR 0.2068 NR NR
7 HFHSD
RUPTURE 4.66206 4.57433 4 4.15148 4.57186 90.0616 102.963 0.02068 NR NR
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Radiation
(kW/m2)
level
12.5 2.82325 3.26532 43.2389 44.1532 0.1379 NR NR

4 NR NR 81.1215 99.7418 0.02068 NR NR
Pump LEAK 22.32 21.9745 12.5 NR NR 48.3173 61.2999 0.1379 NR NR
discharge
line from 37.5 NR NR NR NR 0.2068 NR NR
IS-9
Pump-102 4 NR NR 98.733 108.725 0.02068 NR NR
A/ B FO-
180 RUPTURE 8.18818 9.15 12.5 NR NR 52.8837 53.658 0.1379 NR NR
4 NR NR 62.9336 71.7176 0.02068 NR NR
Pump LEAK 10.9302 13.0136 12.5 NR NR 33.8672 38.3925 0.1379 NR NR

discharge 37.5 NR NR NR NR 0.2068 NR NR
IS-10 line from
Pump-101 4 NR NR 89.1968 98.603 0.02068 NR NR
A/B FO-380 RUPTURE 4.34645 4.28864 12.5 NR NR 45.7338 46.4754 0.1379 NR NR
Pump 4 6.30038 7.0403 67.4643 79.4298 0.02068 18.1808 17.3965
IS-11 discharge LEAK 11.18 14.7781
line from 12.5 4.59302 5.02337 34.3204 39.1316 0.1379 12.1182 11.9151
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Radiation
(kW/m2)
level
Pump-201 37.5 3.23466 3.6116 NR NR 0.2068 11.639 11.4819
A/B HSD
4 4.75588 4.98924 128.701 146.462 0.02068 NR NR
RUPTURE 5.31622 5.21941 12.5 3.36744 3.58832 65.3108 66.2036 0.1379 NR NR
37.5 NR 2.36956 NR NR 0.2068 NR NR
4 4.5751 4.86792 61.3579 71.1812 0.02068 NR 16.8757
Pump LEAK 8.5614 10.6594 12.5 3.23437 3.3827 30.0043 33.3237 0.1379 NR 11.7803
discharge
line from 37.5 NR 2.12121 NR NR 0.2068 NR 11.3775
IS-12
Pump- 4 2.7325 3.39944 92.2273 105.668 0.02068 NR NR
202A
HFHSD RUPTURE 3.30442 3.28362 12.5 NR 2.20908 43.8026 44.8548 0.1379 NR NR
4 NR NR 62.9336 71.7176 0.02068 NR NR
LEAK 10.9302 13.0136 12.5 NR NR 33.8672 38.3925 0.1379 NR NR
Inter tank
transfer 37.5 NR NR NR NR 0.2068 NR NR
IS-13
line for FO- 4 NR NR 77.6201 85.631 0.02068 NR NR
380 tanks
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Radiation
(kW/m2)
level
4 NR NR 43.3179 47.2782 0.02068 NR NR

LEAK 4.53793 4.89137 12.5 NR NR 21.6396 24.2693 0.1379 NR NR
TANK-1 FO- 37.5 NR NR NR NR 0.2068 NR NR

IS-14
180 4 NR NR 91.5886 101.736 0.02068 NR NR
4 NR NR 43.3179 47.2782 0.02068 NR NR
LEAK 4.53793 4.89137 12.5 NR NR 21.6396 24.2693 0.1379 NR NR

IS-15
380 4 NR NR 91.5886 101.736 0.02068 NR NR
4 NR NR 46.1234 51.9181 0.02068 NR NR
TANK-3 LEAK 4.29844 4.72685 12.5 NR NR 21.2291 23.8639 0.1379 NR NR

IS-16
HSD 37.5 NR NR NR NR 0.2068 NR NR
RUPTURE 20.1577 20.3198 4 NR NR 73.0366 84.3184 0.02068 32.9986 33.1017
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Radiation
(kW/m2)
level
12.5 NR NR 31.9328 33.0385 0.1379 23.3657 23.3923

37.5 NR NR NR NR 0.2068 22.6043 22.6249
4 NR NR 42.9192 46.7964 0.02068 NR NR
LEAK 4.46004 4.80859 12.5 NR NR 21.3916 24.0485 0.1379 NR NR

IS-17
380 4 NR NR 68.2319 75.9524 0.02068 NR NR
4 NR NR 46.1234 51.9181 0.02068 NR NR
LEAK 4.29844 4.72685 12.5 NR NR 21.2291 23.8639 0.1379 NR NR
TANK-7 HF 37.5 NR NR NR NR 0.2068 NR NR

IS-18
HSD 4 NR NR 97.6319 112.227 0.02068 33.8411 34.0684
RUPTURE 26.1643 26.3202 12.5 NR NR 45.306 46.2026 0.1379 23.5838 23.6427
37.5 NR NR NR NR 0.2068 22.7731 22.8186
TANK-8 FO- 4 NR NR 43.3179 47.2782 0.02068 NR NR

IS-19 LEAK 4.53793 4.89137
380 12.5 NR NR 21.6396 24.2693 0.1379 NR NR
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Radiation
(kW/m2)
level
4 NR NR 66.46 73.9844 0.02068 NR NR
RUPTURE 24.9805 25.1277 12.5 NR NR NR NR 0.1379 NR NR
Note- NR in the table refers to distance Not Reached
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IMPACT ANALYSIS
This step identifies the hazard damage and fatality probability, based on hazard type, to personnel
at a range of distances.
Flash Fire Cases:

Flash Fire is usually dispersion case, where the extent of cloud until the flammability limits (LFL) is
measured. The important factor in measuring the extent of cloud is atmospheric stability & wind
speed. As the wind speed increases, the cloud tends to move farther down & gets diluted which
results in lower quantity of material in the flammability limits i.e. lower strength of flash fire/VCE.
The maximum LFL distance of 26.32 m was observed for IS-18 Catastrophic rupture of HFHSD tank
7 (highlighted) at 5 D weather condition.
Jet Fire cases:

The important factor contributing jet fire is the release rate which in turn depends on the process
parameters (Pressure, Temperature, etc.). If the release rate is low, the damage distance will not
be enough to cause considerable consequences, as shown in certain cases mentioned above.
The highest damage distances for Jet Fire are for IS-3 and 4, Leak in the feeding pipeline to Tank-3
and Tank-7 respectively (highlighted). First degree burns can be experienced upto a distance of
11m. Second degree burns (piloted ignition of wood, etc.) can be experienced up to a distance of
8m (12.5Kw/m2); 99% fatality (damage to process equipment) can be experienced up to a
distance of 6m.
Pool Fire cases:

Pool fire depends on factors like quantity of liquid released, availability of liquid drainage or dyke,
material released, etc. the higher the quantity released and lower then evaporation rate, the
higher will be the damage distances for pool fire. The highest damage distances of pool fire are for
IS-4, Rupture of feeding pipeline to Tank-7 HFHSD (highlighted). First degree burns can be
experienced upto a distance of 151m. Second degree burns (piloted ignition of wood, etc.) can be
experienced up to a distance of 69m (12.5Kw/m2) and 99% fatality is not reached.
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Explosion Cases:
Vapour cloud explosion is the result of flammable materials in the atmosphere, a subsequent
dispersion phase, and after some delay an ignition of the vapour cloud. The highest damage
distances for overpressure are for IS-3 and 4, Leak in the feeding pipeline to Tank-3 and Tank-7
respectively (highlighted).
Shattering of window glass can be experienced upto a distance of 34m. Repairable damage to
building and houses can be experienced up to a distance of 23m and pull away of steel frame
buildings from foundations and little damage for heavy machines (3000 lb) in industrial building
shall be suffered up to a distance of 22m.
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7. RISK PRESENTATION
Risk is often defined as a function of the likelihood that a specified undesired event will occur, and
the severity of the consequences of that event. Risk is derived from the product of likelihood and
potential consequence. Risk in general is a measure of potential economic loss or human injury in
terms of the probability of the loss or injury occurring and magnitude of the loss or injury if it
occurs.
Risk  f (Severity, Frequency)
Quantification of effects of the hazardous event was done using the event tree approach in which
all the possible outcomes of the hazardous event were considered and the likelihood of each type
of end event determined. This step in the process involves the use of consequence modelling to
predict both physical phenomena such as dispersion, size and duration of fires, overpressures due
to explosions, and the performance of equipment and systems such as availability of a fire & gas
detection system, availability of emergency shutdown system, and availability of fire protection
system. The end result of this phase of the assessment is a series of “end events”, together with
their estimated frequency of occurrence.
The risk modelling has been performed using DNV PHAST RISK 6.7 software. Thereby, the details
of the input data used for the risk modelling such as vulnerability criteria, ignition probability and
occupancy data are given in the QRA Assumption Register (Annexure 2).
The results of a QRA are expressed using Individual Risk Contours and Societal Risk Graphs given in
this section of the report.
7.1 LOCATION SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL RISK
The term “Location-Specific Individual Risk (LSIR)” is used for the calculations of the risk of fatality
for someone at a specific location, assuming that the person is always present at the location and
therefore, is continuously exposed to the risk at that location. This makes the LSIR a measure of
the geographic distribution of risk, independent of the distribution of people at that location or in
the surrounding area. The LSIR is presented as iso-risk contours (Figure 3) on a map of the location
of interest.
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7.2 RISK RESULTS
Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) is acquired directly from PHAST Risk software. The LSIR is
the individual risk at different locations based upon the assumption that an unprotected individual
is present at an unprotected location exposed to the risk for 24 hours a day, 365 days.
Individual Risk = Location Specific Individual risk * Occupancy factor
The Individual Risk represents the frequency of an individual dying due to loss of containment
events (LOCs). The individual is assumed to be unprotected and to be present during the total
exposure time.
Figure 3 Location Specific Individual Risk Contour
The Societal Risk represents the frequency of having an accident with N or more people being
killed simultaneously. The people involved are assumed to have some means of protection. The
Societal Risk is presented as an F-N curve (Figure 4), where N is the number of deaths and F the
cumulative frequency of accidents with N or more deaths.
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Figure 4 Soceital Risk – FN Curve
RISK RANKING
The following graph shows the top 10 risk contributing scenarios for the proposed Bunkering
facility.
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8. RISK ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

In India, there is yet to define Risk Acceptance Criteria. However, in IS 15656 – Code of Practice for
Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis, the risk criteria adopted in some countries are shown.
Extracts for the same is presented below:
Table 6 Risk Criteria
Maximum Tolerable Risk Negligible Risk

Authority and Application
(per year) (per year)
VROM, The Netherlands (New) 1.0E-6 1.0E-8
VROM, The Netherlands (existing) 1.0E-5 1.0E-8
HSE, UK (existing-hazardous industry) 1.0E-4 1.0E-6
HSE, UK (New nuclear power station) 1.0E-5 1.0E-6
HSE, UK (Substance transport) 1.0E-4 1.0E-6
HSE, UK (New housing near plants) 3.0E-6 3.0E-7
Hong Kong Government (New plants) 1.0E-5 Not used
Figure 5 ALARP
Based on the input conditions such as process parameters, climatological condition, etc., the risk
posed by all the Loss of containment (LOC) Scenarios covered under this project, it is observed
that the individual risk per annum is found to fall in the Acceptable limit as per HSE UK risk
acceptance criteria.
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9. PROPOSED RISK REDUCTION MEASURES BY HPCL

The proposed Risk mitigation measures for the Bunkering facility by HPCL is as follows
Butcher Island (Jawahar Dweep) is having only Petroleum facilities and is Restricted Area. Entire
land at Butcher Island belongs to Mumbai Port Trust (MbPT). Further, there are no other facilities
adjoining the tank farm proposed to be operated by HPCL, and is vacant.
In order to take care of above deviations, HPCL have proposed
 Sprinkler System – 2 rings for all Tanks and
 Remote operated Oscillating monitors on the side towards boundary walls, within the Dyke
with isolation valve or ROV outside the tank farm.
 In line with OISD 117 and 244, HPCL have proposed Hydrants at distance of 30 m and
Monitors at a distance of maximum 45 m.
Apart from above, Fire-fighting Facilities available with MbPT shall be allowed to be used by HPCL
as per Agreement.
Further, following improvement in proposed Layout is done after discussions with PESO officials
on 9th Sept., 2016:
1. Product pump-house is made independent and shall now shall be in exclusive control of
HPCL.
2. Entire boundary is segregated with gates at both ends of the road.
3. It is ensured that all the distances specified as per OISD are met. However, distance to
boundary from tank is being put up as exception.
4. All the inter tank distances and other salient distances clearly shown on the layout.
5. Agreement made between Mbpt and HPCL with regard to extension of fire services by
Mbpt to HPCL premises is enclosed. Also, enclosed details of the fire fighting available at
Mbpt end. It is confirmed that the capacity of fire pumps at MbPT are adequate.
6. Provision has been made that Fire pumps at Mbpt can be triggered from within HPCL
premises in case of emergency.
7. Capacity of tank no.8 is reduced and dyke area is increased, so that tank to dyke wall
distance is as per OISD norms.
8. Access road all round tanks (Dyke-I) provided, for access to fire-fighting facilities.
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SALIENT FEATURES OF LAYOUT, SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS, DETAILS OF FIRE-FIGHTING FACILITIES

& SAFETY FITTINGS ON TANKS:
Salient features of Layout, Safety considerations, Details of Fire Fighting Facilities and Safety
Fittings on Tanks, are given hereunder –
 HPCL Tank farm shall have Hook-up from the Mumbai Port Trust’s Main Fire Hydrant Pipe-
line of 30” dia. As per Agreement, MbPT has given permission to HPCL for tapping and
using their Hydrant system.
 Fire Fighting Pumps: There are 4 Pumps of 626 m3/hr capacity each and 2 Pumps of 545
m3/hr, with Head / Pressure of 15 kg/cm2. It is confirmed that MbPT’s Fire Pump
capacities are adequate to take care of HPCL’s Bunkering Terminal requirement.
 All tanks (irrespective of Petroleum class) shall be provided with 2 rings of fixed Water
Sprinkler System.
 All tanks shall be provided with Static Foam Pourer System, designed in line with OISD.
Details of Foam Pourers for each tank are given in Annexure. Total 7000 ltrs. of static foam
storage Tank is proposed, which is in line with requirement. Detailed Working is as per
Annexure.
 Access road all round tanks provided, for access to fire-fighting facilities (motorable road
not possible due to physical constraints, as it is old installation).
 HPCL have proposed Oscillating Monitors between tank & boundary wall, with isolation
valve or ROV outside the tank farm.
 HPCL have proposed Hydrants at distance less than 30 m and Monitors at a distance of
maximum 45 m., which is in line with OISD 117 and 244.
 Also, as per M B Lal Committee Recommendations (MBLC), HPCL have considered the dyke
volume increased to 110% of the largest tank.
 For Tank No. 8, as limited dyke area is available, HPCL have proposed dyke wall height of
2.8 mtrs. (9 ft., 2 inch). HPCL seek approval as per Petroleum Rules 2002, under Chapter
XII-Exemption, Article -6.
 Wherever Dyke height is more than 2 mtrs, suitable Railings are proposed. Also, in case of
Dyke Wall width less than 0.6 mtr., suitable Railings shall be provided.
 HPCL have also proposed ROV / MOVs on each tanks, as per MBLC. The same is shown in
Layout.
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HPCL have proposed for Provision so that Fire pumps at Mbpt can be triggered from within HPCL
premises in case of emergency.
 HPCL have proposed to install Radar Gauges on all the Storage tanks and also Tank Farm
Management System.
 All the Pumps, Equipment, Electrical Installations etc. shall meet OISD requirements.
Wherever necessary, Electrical fittings shall be Flame-proof.
 HPCL shall provide Flow-meters on the Delivery Lines, with display in Operating room and
On-off control “at Site” and “off-site”, to control the discharge.
 HPCL propose to conduct Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) for the deviations to OISD
distance norms, and all mitigating measures would be taken as per recommendations.
HPCL have proposed to incorporate standard SOPs are in place for Receipt and Delivery
Operations including as proposed in the Hazop.
The following table provides the proposed fire protection system for the Bunkering facility
DETAILS OF PORTABLE / TROLLEY-MOUNTED FIRE-FIGHTING SYSTEM (As per OISD 117)
Fire Extinguisher
Area Description
10kg DCP 25kg DCP (trolley)
Tank No.8 2
Tank Farm No.8 2
Tank No.6 2
Tank Farm No.6 2
Tank No.1 2
Tank Farm No.1 2
Tank No.2 2
Tank No.7 2
Tank Farm No.2 and 7 2
Tank No.3 2
Tank Farm No.3 2
Tank No.4 2
Tank Farm No.4 2
Tank No.5 2
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Fire Extinguisher
Area Description
10kg DCP 25kg DCP (trolley)
Tank Farm No.5 2
Shore crew quarters

14
canteen
TOTAL 30 14
DETAILS OF FIRE-FIGHTING FACILITIES
Sl. No. Description Qty.

Fire and Foam Monitors and Hydrants
1 Fire Water/ Foam Monitors 14
2 Fire/ Foam Oscillating Monitors 12
3 Hydrants 10
Portable Foam system
1 Portable foam monitor (2400 lpm) 2
Foam Compound Trolley
1 200/210 litres 2
Fire extinguishers (10 kg)
DCP
1 Tank 1 2
2 Tank 2 2
3 Tank 3 2
4 Tank 4 2
5 Tank 7 2
6 Tank 8 2
7 Oil Pump House 12
8 DG Room 2
CO2 (4.5 Kg)
1 Panel room 8
2 DG Room 1
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Sl. No. Description Qty.

Fire extinguishers (25 kg)
DCP
1 Tank Farm 1,2 & 7 2
2 Tank Farm 3 2
3 Tank Farm 4 2
4 Tank Farm 8 2
Foam Pourers
1 Tank 1 3
2 Tank 2 4
3 Tank 3 2
4 Tank 4 2
5 Tank 7 3
6 Tank 8 5
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10. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSION
Based on the information provided to iFluids Engineering team and the outcome of the QRA
report, following conclusions are made,
1. All the Distance norms are compiled including the inter tank distances, except following
Distance between Tank (shell) to Boundary Wall with respect to tank No. 2, 3, 4, 7 & 8; which
is specified (D/2 or min. 20 mtrs.) as per norms.
Distance between Tank No. 3 (Class “B”) and Tank No. 7 (Class “C”); which is specified as “D”
or 30 mtr, whichever is more.
The proposed distances inbetween the tanks are as follows
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Tank 1(Class C) 27 58.5 38 59.5 72 51 145 30 23 20
2 Tank 2(Class C) 27 38 60 94.2 122.7 12 194 68 73 14
3 Tank 3(Class B) 58.5 38 29 75.1 211.7 17 209 92 80 22
4 Tank 4(Class C) 38 60 29 30.4 171.7 56 170 69 43 7.5
5 Tank 5(Class C) 59.5 94.2 75.1 30.4 55.8 99.5 134.5 65 26.3 30.7
6 Tank 6 72 122.7 211.7 171.7 55.8 72.5 59.6 29.6 31 21.8

7 Tank 7(Class C) 51 12 17 56 99.5 72.5 220 95 96 13
8 Tank 8(Class C) 145 194 209 170 134.5 59.6 220 93 104 14.72
Tank Farm
9 30 68 92 69 65 29.6 95 93 3.7 11
Panel Room
10 Oil Pump House 23 73 80 43 26.3 31 96 104 3.7 20
11 Boundary Wall 20 14 22 7.5 30.7 21.8 13 14.72 11 20
 The Installation is pre-OISD set-up, thus not meeting above stipulations and all round
access to tank-farm, due to physical constraints. The entire land at Butcher Island belongs
to Mumbai Port Trust (MbPT) and it is restricted area. There is no other facility in the
adjacent land and is vacant.
 Proposed pump operator cabin and control room to be built as a blast proof structure as
per OISD-STD-163 norms.
 Medium velocity water sprinkler systems to be provide for all the tanks.
 Remote operated HVLR covering Tank 3 and Tank 7 on all sides to be provided.
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 As per OISD-STD-244, Clause 6.4.4 – 3d, minimum distance between tank shell and the toe
of the dyke wall shall not be less than half the height of the tank.Following tanks are not
meeting with the stated clause,
 Tank No.3 – 6m on the west side
 Tank No.4 – 5.2 m in the north side
 Tank No.7 – 7m in the west, 6m in the North West and 6m in the North East
side.
Operating level of the tank to be maintained not exceeding twice the distance between the tank
shell and toe of the dyke wall for the above tanks. Consider providing high level alarms configured
at particular height for the above tanks (Tank No.3 -12m, Tank No.4 -10.4m and Tank No.7 – 12m).
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is suggested to implement Risk control measures listed below for Risk Improvement of the
Bunkering facilities:
1. Ensure all the import/export lines to be adequately designed for the maximum pressure
source.
2. Ensure all the import/export lines are pressure tested to rated pressure before
commissioning or after any maintenance activity.
3. Provide ROV-TO3B/MOV-TO3B open feedback permissive for starting P-201 A/B pumps.
4. Provide MOV-07B open fed back permissive for starting P-202 A pump.
5. Provide MOV-01B open feed back permissive for starting P-102 A/B.
6. Provide MOV-04B/MOV-08B/MOV-02B/1003 open feed back permissive for starting the
pumps P-101 A/B.
7. Provide ROV-TO3B/MOV-TO3B close feed back trip for the pumps P-201 A/B.
8. Provide discharge PT’s for the pumps with high pressure alarms to avoid blocked discharge
running conditions due to multiple loop operations and low pressure alarm on running
condition to identify any leak scenario.
9. Provide low suction pressure alarm and low low pressure trip for the pump to avoid dry
run operation.
10. Ensure low level, low low level, high level, high high level indications, alarms, trips are
configured as per P&ID.
11. Ensure SOP is developed/displayed for critical operations.
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12. Ensure proper training/regural assessment fot the operation crew.
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11. LIST OF REFERENCE DOCUMENTS / STANDARDS

1. Guideline of Quantitative Risk Assessment - PGS 3 [Purple book]
2. Methods for the determination of possible damage – CPR 16E [Green book]
3. DNV SAFETI manual
4. UK HSE Risk Manual
5. DNVGL,PHAST-RISK(Safeti),Version6.7,
http://www.dnv.com/services/software/products/safeti/safeti/index.asp
6. www.meteoblue.com
7. OISD-Oil Industry Safety Directorate
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ANNEXURE-I
CONSEQUENCE CONTOURS
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This annexure presents the consequence contours of all the tanks. The annexure also contains
maximum contours for the transfer pipelines representative for tank feed line, Pump suction line,
pump discharge line and inter tank transfer pipe line.
1. FLASH FIRE CONSEQUENCES
PIPLINE CONSEQUENCES
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STORAGE TANKS
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JET FIRE SCENARIOS
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POOL FIRE SCENARIOS
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ANNEXURE-II
QRA ASSUMPTION REGISTER
Page | 68
QUANTITATIVE RISK
ASSESSMENT-
ASSUMPTION REGISTER
BUNKERING FACILITIES AT JAWAHAR
DWEEP (BUTCHER ISLAND) AT
MUMBAI
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation

Limited
http://ifluids.com
Quantitative Risk Assessment –Assumptions Register
Rev-00
DOCUMENT REVISION SHEET

REPORT TITLE Quantitative Risk Assessment- Assumption Register
PROJECT Bunkering facilities at Jawahar Dweep
CLIENT Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited
HSE CONSULTANT iFluids Engineering
00 03-12-16 Issued for Review SPK VJM
Approved
Rev Date Comments / Nature of Changes Prepared by Reviewed by
By (HPCL)
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Table of Contents Page
1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 3
1.1 Project Background ..................................................................................................... 3
1.2 Purpose of this Document ............................................................................................ 4
2. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................... 4

2.1 Definitions................................................................................................................... 4
2.2 Abbreviations .............................................................................................................. 4
3. QRA METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................. 6

3.1 Hazard Identification ................................................................................................... 6
3.2 QRA Input Data ............................................................................................................ 7
3.3 Consequence Analysis .................................................................................................. 7
3.4 Frequency Analysis ...................................................................................................... 7
3.5 Risk Assessment .......................................................................................................... 7
3.6 Risk Evaluation ............................................................................................................ 8
3.7 Risk Reduction Measures ............................................................................................. 8
4. QRA ASSUMPTION SHEETS .................................................................................................... 8

4.1 QRA Project Scope ....................................................................................................... 9
4.2 Meteorological Conditions .......................................................................................... 11
4.3 Loss of Containment Scenarios ................................................................................... 13
4.4 Material Composition, Process Conditions, Inventory & Discharge Coefficient .............. 14
4.5 Software Used ........................................................................................................... 15
4.6 Release Size, Height, Duration & Direction .................................................................. 16
4.7 Failure Frequency ...................................................................................................... 17
4.8 Ignition Probability .................................................................................................... 18
4.9 Occupancy Data & Population ..................................................................................... 19
4.10 Dyke Area .................................................................................................................. 20
4.11 Blocking factors ........................................................................................................ 21
4.12 Impact Criteria .......................................................................................................... 22
4.13 Risk Acceptance Criteria ............................................................................................ 23
5. LIST OF REFERENCE DOCUMENTS / STANDARDS ........................................................ 24
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1. INTRODUCTION
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited has awarded iFluids Engineering to carry out Quantitative
risk assessment study for their Proposed Bunkering facility at Jawahar Dweep. The contract identifies
the methodology proposed by iFluids Engineering and accepted by HPCL for the completion of the
Quantitative Risk Assessment Study (QRA) study.
This document describes the methodology and assumptions that will be considered for the completion
of the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Study of the scope.
1.1 Project Background
 Jawahar Dweep is currently being used exclusively for Handling of Petroleum Products by Mumbai
Port Trust and it has facilities for unloading of Crude Oils, Import & Export of Finished Oils. Total 4 nos.
of Jetties, all connected to HPC & BPC Refineries thro’ sub-sea pipe-line
 Exclusive pipe-lines for White Oils and Black Oils, are connected to HPC/BPC Refineries
 Tri-partite Agreement signed between Mumbai Port Trust (MbPT), HPC & BPC for setting-up of
Bunkering facilities at Jawahar Dweep.
 Mumbai Port Trust (MbPT) has offered HPCL total 6 nos. Tanks, aggregating approx. 34 TKL of
tankages along with Pump-House and connected Pipe-lines
 Agreement is being signed for taking-over of Tank-farm area on long lease of 30 years.
 Entire land on Jawahar Dweep (Butcher Island) belongs to MbPT.
 HPCL is planning to develop exclusive Bunkering Terminal by Refurbishing tanks, Pipe-line

modifications, and Revamp other allied facilities including fire-fighting etc.
 The details of those six tanks are as follows
HPCL’S BUNKERING TERMINAL – OPERATIONAL PART:
Products (i.e. FO-380 and HFHSD) shall be received through Mumbai Port Trust’s Black oil and White Oil pipe-lines
respectively, from the HPCL Mahul Refinery. Product may also be received through Pipe-line from Vessels berthing at
Jawahar Dweep/ Pirpau.
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Normal pipe-line contents in these MBPT’s pipe-line are FO-180 and HSD respectively. Accordingly, it is envisaged to
designate one tank each for storage of pipe-line content of FO-180 and HSD. Post receipt operations, this pipe-line content
will be pushed-back to the pipe-line.
Delivery of the products (FO-380 and HFHSD) shall be primarily through MbPT Bunkering line in the barges berthed at JD-2.
1.2 Purpose of this Document
This register is the basis of agreement between HPCL and iFluids Engineering on the assumptions
necessary to be made prior to the commencement of the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study
for the “Bunkering Facilities at Jawahar Dweep” project.
This document presents the assumptions made prior to starting the QRA study. Any further
assumptions that may be necessary in order to develop the study will be clearly presented in the QRA
study report.
2. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
2.1 Definitions
COMPANY Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited
CONSULTANT iFluids Engineering, appointed by the COMPANY to perform PROJECT.
CONTRACT The contract between COMPANY and CONSULTANT for PROJECT
PROJECT Bunkering Facilities at Jawahar Dweep
SERVICES Services being provided by iFluids Engineering as per the CONTRACT for the
PROJECT
2.2 Abbreviations
ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable
DNV Det Norske Veritas
FO Furnace Oil
HFHSD High Flash High Speed Diesel
HSE Health safety and Environment
HPCL Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited
HSD High Speed Diesel
IRPA Individual Risk Per Annum
IS Isolatable Section
JD Jawahar Dweep
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LFL Lower Flammability Limit
LOC Loss of Containment
LSIR Location Specific Individual Risk
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
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3. QRA METHODOLOGY
This section presents a brief description of the approach and steps followed in the QRA study.
The QRA Study included the following steps:
 Identification of the hazardous events associated with the project facility;
 Consequence modelling of the physical effects;
 Estimation of total failure frequencies;
 Evaluation / assessment of the risks arising from the pipeline network with respect to UK HSE Risk
Acceptance Criteria;
 Recommending risk reduction measures.
The overall QRA methodology is shown in Figure 1 and is described in more detail in the subsequent
sections.
Figure 1: QRA Methodology
3.1 Hazard Identification
The hazardous scenarios considered in the QRA for the project facility will be identified based on the
properties of the materials handled and the identification of the potential hazards in the pipeline
systems which could lead to loss of containment events.
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3.2 QRA Input Data
The following activities comprise the determination of input data required for conducting the QRA
study:
 Review of the project documents to determine process streams.
 Identification of Loss of Containment (LOC) scenarios based on the hazardous properties of the
material.
 Review of the design basis to obtain the properties of the stream (e.g. pressure, temperature,
composition and density); and
 Calculation of the inventory released due to LOC events
3.3 Consequence Analysis
Consequence modeling will be conducted to evaluate the effect distances of the identified LOC
scenarios and their impact on people. The following activities comprise the consequence analyses
which will be carried out for the project:
 Source term modelling to determine the release rate;
 Physical effects modelling to determine the size of the hazard that is associated with the released
fluid (for example heat radiation, flammable liquid petroleum dispersion and toxic liquid
petroleum dispersion);
 Comparison of the physical effects model with the impact criteria.
The consequence modeling will be performed using DNV PHAST 6.7 software.
3.4 Frequency Analysis
Once the potential release scenarios are identified, the next stage is to estimate the failure frequencies
(likelihood for the event to occur) based on international standard databases.
The frequency analysis will be performed as follows:
 Identification of the base failure frequencies applicable to the liquid petroleum pipelines from the
relevant international standard databases;
 The total failure frequencies will be derived from the base failure frequency data along with the
consideration of modification factors if applicable.
3.5 Risk Assessment
Risk assessment will be undertaken to evaluate the risk associated with the project facilities. The
consequence analysis results and failure frequencies will be combined using PHAST RISK 6.7 software.
The risk shall be typically presented as Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) contours overlaid on a
map and Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA).
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3.6 Risk Evaluation
It involves the evaluation of the individual risk results against the UK HSE Risk Acceptance Criteria to
determine whether the risks are broadly acceptable, ALARP or unacceptable and to make some
professional judgments about the significance of the risks.
3.7 Risk Reduction Measures
Based on the risk evaluation, if the calculated risks fall in the unacceptable region, risk reduction
measures shall be implemented in order to reduce the risk to a tolerable or ALARP region. All
physically possible risk reduction measures shall be identified, which could be new measures or
improvements to existing measures already installed/ implemented. The risk evaluation after
implementation of recommendation/ risk reduction measures shall be carried out to demonstrate that
the risk shall be reduced to ALARP region and the study recommendations are adequate for the
project.
4. QRA ASSUMPTION SHEETS
The following assumptions are presented in the format of assumption sheets in the subsequent
section.
Assumption
Description
No.
1. QRA Project Scope
2. Meteorological Conditions
3. Loss of Containment Scenarios
4. Material Composition, Process Conditions, Inventory & Discharge Coefficient
5. Software used
6. Release Size, Height, & Direction and Isolation time
7. Failure Frequency
8. Ignition Probability
9. Occupancy data & Population
10. Dyke area
11. Blocking factor
12. Impact criteria
13. Risk Acceptance Criteria
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Assumption 4.1 QRA Project Scope Assumption No. 1

iFluids Engineering scope of work is to perform a Quantitative Risk Assessment Study for the proposed
Bunkering facilities at Jawahar Dweep with the background as follows
Bunkering in Mumbai is currently being done at various jetties like Hay Bunder jetty, Mallet Bunder jetty
and old Pirpav, through tank trucks and barges. The pipeline supplies, though preferred, are currently
not feasible in most of the jetties except that at old Pirpav.
Typical Bunker supply parcel size ranges from 500 to 1500 MT. Handling of such huge quantity supplies
through existing Supply chain, i.e. Tank-trucks and Barges, involves intensive Operations / multiple
handling and thus poses Safety and Environmental concerns.
View above, Mumbai Port Trust (MbPT) mooted up a proposal to commission a single point for
Bunkering in Mumbai Port at MOT – Jawahar Dweep (Butcher Island) and decommission all existing
bunkering operation points (viz. Mallet Bunder, Old Pir-pau, Haybunder).
The proposal envisages facilitating barge berthing at jetty JD-2, and creation of facilities for Bunkering at
Butcher Island for seamless Bunkering operations through Pipe-line. Facilities will include Storage tanks,
input and discharge lines, pump-house etc. Details are as under:
 TANKS: MbPT already has tanks in Butcher Island which are currently not in use and have
been offered to HPCL. All the tanks shall be cleaned, refurbished and put it to use for
storing of Class C bunker Fuels. Tanks proposed to be taken-over for bunkering
operations are 6 nos. with total proposed capacity of 36,600 KL.
 The proposed Bunkering Terminal area is clearly earmarked for exclusive use by HPCL and
the dyke area of the Tanks, Pump House and Roads etc. is approx. 17225 sqmtr., which
will be taken on lease from MbPT for a period of 30 years. Entire land on Jawahar
Dweep (Butcher Island) belongs to MbPT.
 JETTY: MbPT shall be providing HPCL permission to load Barges at modified Jetty, so that
bunker product shall be directly loaded in the Barge through dedicated pipe-lines and
through Flow-meters.
HPCL proposes to develop Bunkering Terminal by Refurbishing tanks, Pipe-line modifications, develop
Tank-farm area with proper PCC, Re-construct Dyke Wall, and Refurbish other allied facilities including
fire-fighting etc.
Accordingly, they have already signed Agreement with Mumbai Port Trust (MbPT) for taking-over of 6
nos. of Storage Tanks, Pump House and allied facilities for setting-up of Bunker Fuel Terminal. As per
Agreement, MbPT has also offered plot portion of the said Tank-Farm premises on long term lease (30
years) to HPCL.
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Assumption 4.1 QRA Project Scope Assumption No. 1

HPCL proposes Storage of Petroleum Products in 6 nos. Tanks as under:
HPCL have developed layout for Development of Bunkering Terminal, drawing enclosed herewith, so as
to achieve the purpose of “Receipt of products (FO-380, HF HSD) through MbPT pipeline, storage in 6
Nos. tanks and delivery of products (FO-380, HF HSD) for bunkering at JD-2”.
Products (i.e. FO-380 and HFHSD) shall be received through Mumbai Port Trust’s Black oil and White Oil
pipe-lines respectively, from the HPCL Mahul Refinery. Product may also be received through Pipe-line
from Vessels berthing at Jawahar Dweep/ Pirpau.
Normal pipe-line contents in these MBPT’s pipe-line are FO-180 and HSD respectively. Accordingly, it is
envisaged to designate one tank each for storage of pipe-line content of FO-180 and HSD. Post receipt
operations, this pipe-line content will be pushed-back to the pipe-line.
Delivery of the products (FO-380 and HFHSD) shall be primarily through MbPT Bunkering line in the
barges berthed at JD-2.
Reference:
1. Scope of Work
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Assumption 4.2 Meteorological Conditions Assumption No. 2
The following ambient conditions shall be used in the study: [Ref 1]
 Average Ambient Temperature: 30°C

 Average Relative Humidity: 75%
2
 Solar Radiation: 1 kW/m
The Pasquill Atmospheric Stability Classes [Ref 2]
Table 1: Pasquill Stability Class
Stability Class Definition
A Very Unstable
B Unstable
C Slightly Unstable
D Neutral
E Slightly Stable
F Stable
Based on the above figure, following stability/wind-speed categories shall be used in the study for two
weather conditions representing day and night:
 F Stability, 2 m/s wind speed

 D Stability, 5 m/s wind speed
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Assumption 4.2 Meteorological Conditions Assumption No. 2
Figure 2 Wind Rose Diagram- Jawahar Dweep
Surface Roughness
The ground characteristic shall be represented by surface roughness which is assumed as open flat
terrain & few isolated objects (30 mm).
Reference:
1. www.meteoblue.com-
LINK-https://www.meteoblue.com/en/weather/forecast/modelclimate/butcher-
island_india_1275027
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Assumption 4.3 Loss of Containment Scenarios Assumption No. 3
Isolatable section will be considered based on the shutdown valves (SDV) if available or the isolation/ block
valves. In conformance with industry standard methodology, Non-Return Valves (NRVs) or process control
valves are not considered to be an adequate or reliable form of isolation.
Note: 2” pipeline will not be considered for QRA modeling since it has negligible amount of inventory.
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4.4 Material Composition, Process Conditions,

Assumption Assumption No. 4
Inventory & Discharge Coefficient
Material Composition
The typical material composition for products handled shall be considered for the identified LOC
scenarios.
Components Composition
FO-180 N-TRICOSANE-100%
FO-380 N-TRICOSANE-100%
n-Decane- 2%
HSD n-Undecane- 8%
n-Dodecane-12%
n-Tridecane-15%
n-Tetradecane-20%
n-Pentadecane-20%
HFHSD n-Hexadecane-10%
n-Heptadecane-8%
n-Octadecane-5%
Note-
FO-180 & 380 will be considered as N-Tricosane which shall be the worst case scenario. Since the
difference between FO 180 & 380 is only viscosity, same composition will be considered.
Similarly for HSD & HFHSD, same composition will be considered for the assessment as a worst case
scenario.
Inventory
Inventory considered for each LOC scenarios is the sum of static inventory and dynamic inventory. The
static inventory is the holdup volume of materials within the pipeline.
The formula used for calculating the liquid petroleum inventory in the pipeline is (πD2Lρ)/4 kg. Where
D is pipeline diameter in meter and L is pipeline length in meter. The total pipeline inventory shall be
calculated based on the following information provided by Engineering team.
The dynamic inventory shall be calculated by considering 30 minutes for small leak and 10 minutes for
medium leak and 2minutes for large release of liquid petroleum from the above ground pipelines. 30
minutes will be considered for pin hole leaks and 10 minutes for medium and full bore rupture of
buried pipelines.
Reference:
2. Best Engineering practice.
Page | 14
Rev-00
Assumption 4.5 Software Used Assumption No. 5
The following software shall be used for this QRA study:
 PHAST 6.7
 PHAST RISK 6.7
Reference:
https://www.dnvgl.com/services/hazard-analysis-phast-1675
Page | 15
Rev-00
Assumption 4.6 Release Size, Height, Duration & Direction Assumption No. 6
Release Size
Table-2 presents the representative release sizes which shall be used for the LOC scenarios [Ref. 1].
Table 2: Representative Release Size for aboveground pipeline
Release Category Release Size, mm

Leak 10
Rupture Full bore
Release Height
The release height has been assumed to be at 1m from ground level.
Release Duration
The release duration will have a significant effect on the consequence modelling. In this study,
following release duration is considered.
Table 3 Isolation time
Release Category Isolation time, Seconds

Small Leak 1800
Large Leak 600
Rupture 120
Release Direction
The release direction shall be considered as horizontal for above ground pipeline/Tank release
scenarios.
Reference:
1. Guideline of Quantitative Risk Assessment - PGS 3 [Purple book].
Page | 16
Rev-00
Assumption 4.7 Failure Frequency Assumption No. 7
The following tables represent the failure frequencies which shall be used in this study.
Table 4: Failure Frequency for aboveground Liquid petroleum Pipeline (per m per year)
Table 5 Failure Frequency for tanks
Note-For this project, the tanks are considered as single containment tanks.
Reference:
1. Guideline of Quantitative Risk Assessment - PGS 3 [Purple book].
Page | 17
Rev-00
Assumption 4.8 Ignition Probability Assumption No. 9
The delayed ignition value, on the other hand, shall be calculated within PHAST Risk 6.7 and is unique
to each release case and release direction. The probability of delayed ignition depends on the strength,
location and presence factor of all ignition sources and the extent and duration of dispersing
flammable vapour clouds being exposed to those sources. Delayed ignition sources shall be modelled
as point, population, line and area sources.
The following ignition probabilities with respect to the ignition source for a time interval of one minute
shall be considered in this QRA study. (sources as applicable to the facility)
Table 6: Probability of ignition for a number of sources
Reference:
1. Guideline of Quantitative Risk Assessment - PGS 3 [Purple book]-Appendix 4.A
Page | 18
Rev-00
Assumption
Assumption 4.9 Occupancy Data & Population 10
No.
The occupancy data associated with the project are presented below:
Table 7: Occupancy data
Fraction Fraction
Location of interest Population
Indoor* outdoor*
1. HPCL Tank area 10 0.80 0.20
2. BPCL area 30 0.90 0.10
3. Jetty Area (all 80 0.85 0.15

together)
4. Canteen 30 0.95 0.05
5. Pipeline manifold 20 0.90 0.10
Reference:-
1. Client input and best Engineering practice
Page | 19
Rev-00
Assumption
Assumption 4.10 Dyke Area 10
No.
The following Dyke (bund) area was considered during the risk assessment. These bunds are
considered that it will confine the leakages from the tanks.
Si. No Dyke Tanks under Effective Enclosure Net Height of

number the Dyke Area, m2 Capacity, KL Dyke wall, m
1. DYKE-I Tanks-1, 2 7 6167 8050 1.8
2. DYKE-II Tanks-3, 4 3006 3490 1.4
3. DYKE-III Tank-8 2816 6920 2.8
Reference:-
1. Layout plan- HPCL/MOT-JD/LAY/001, Rev-0
Page | 20
Rev-00
Assumption
Assumption 4.11 Blocking factors 11
No.
The credit of the following modification factors will be considered for the frequency analysis since they
have the potential for risk reduction.
 An automatic blocking system is a system where the detection of the leakage and closure of the
blocking valves is fully automatic. There is no action of an operator required.
- - The failure upon demand for the blocking system is 0.001 per demand.
 A remote-controlled blocking system is a system where the detection of the leakage is fully
automatic. The detection results in a signal in the control room. The operator validates the signal
and closes the blocking valves using a switch in the control room.
- The failure upon demand for the blocking system is 0.01 per demand.
 A hand-operated blocking system is a system where the detection of the leakage is fully automatic.
The detection results in a signal in the control room. The operator validates the signal, goes to the
location of the blocking valves and closes the valves by hand.
- The failure on demand for the blocking system is 0.01 per demand.
For this project, the blocking factor was considered as Manual
Reference:-
Guideline of Quantitative Risk Assessment - PGS 3 [Purple book].
Page | 21
Rev-00
Assumption 4.12 Impact Criteria Assumption No. 12
The following impact criteria shall be used for the QRA study.
Flammable Liquid petroleum Dispersion
The impact distances shall be identified for the following concentrations:
 100% LFL
Thermal Radiation Criteria
Table 8 :Thermal Radiation Criteria shows the impact criteria for Thermal Radiation.
Table 8 :Thermal Radiation Criteria
Radiation
Unit Impact
Level
4* kW/m2 Indicative of personal injury after 30 seconds exposure
2
12.5* kW/m Indicative of 70% fatality
37.5* kW/m2 Indicative of 100% fatality
* All thermal radiation modelling shall include solar radiation (1 kW/m2) in the consequence
estimation.
Vapour cloud explosion Criteria
Table 9: Overpressure Criteria shows the impact criteria for Overpressure criteria.
Table 9: Overpressure Criteria
Overpressure
Unit Impact
Level
0.01 Bar Shattering of glass
0.1 Bar Repairable damage to plant equipment & structure
0.3 Bar Major damage to plant equipment structure
Reference:
Page | 22
Rev-00
Assumption 4.13 Risk Acceptance Criteria Assumption No. 13
Risk Acceptance Criteria for worker group shall be assessed from the Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA)
value. The IRPA value shall be compared against the industry standard acceptance criteria as
presented in the UK HSE Risk Acceptance Criteria. The IRPA value shall primarily serve as the decision
making tool for worker group.
Table 10 Risk Criteria in Some Countries
MAXIMUM
NEGLIGIBLE RISK
AUTHORITY AND APPLICATION TOLERABLE RISK
(PER YEAR)
(PER YEAR)
VROM, The Netherlands (New) 1.0E-6 1.0E-8
VROM, The Netherlands (existing) 1.0E-5 1.0E-8
HSE, UK (existing-hazardous industry) 1.0E-4 1.0E-6
HSE, UK (New nuclear power station) 1.0E-5 1.0E-6
HSE, UK (Substance transport) 1.0E-4 1.0E-6
HSE, UK (New housing near plants) 3*1.0E-6 3*1.0E-7
Hong Kong Government (New plants) 1.0E-5 Not used
Figure 3 ALARP Principle
Reference:
1. UK HSE Risk Criteria
Page | 23
Rev-00
5. LIST OF REFERENCE DOCUMENTS / STANDARDS
2. Methods for the determination of possible damage – CPR 16E [Green book]
4. UK HSE Risk Manual
5. P&ID- Black Oil system, White Oil system, Fire Protection system
6. Layout plan- HPCL/ MOT/-JD/LAY/001, rev-0
Page | 24

Quantitative Risk Assessment of Bunkering Facilities

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QUANTITATIVE RISK

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation

DOCUMENT REVISION SHEET

1 03-12-16 Reissue for Review SPK VMa JS

0 03-12-16 Issued for Review SPK VMa JS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................... 5

QRA STUDY RESULTS

Risk reduction measures: -

The main purpose and objective of this report is to,

1.2 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

HPCL proposes to develop Bunkering Terminal by Refurbishing tanks, Pipe-line modifications,

HPCL proposes Storage of Petroleum Products in 6 nos. Tanks as under:

Wind Speed and Wind Direction

Figure 1 Wind Rose of Site

Day: Solar Radiation Night: cloud Cover

Wind Speed in m/s Pasquill Stability

4. QRA STUDY METHODOLOGOY

The QRA Study included the following steps:

 Identification of the hazardous events associated with the project facility;

 Consequence modelling of the physical effects;

 Estimation of total failure frequencies;

 Recommending risk reduction measures.

Figure 2: QRA Methodology

4.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

 Composition of materials stored in vessels / flowing through pipeline

Blast over Pressures

4.2 QRA INPUT DATA

4.3 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

Consequence assessment is conducted to understand the impact of identified scenarios in terms

CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS MODELLING

Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE)

4.4 DAMAGE CRITERIA

 Damage caused by heat radiation on material and people;

 Damage caused by explosion on structure and people;

 Damage caused by toxic exposure.

3. Toxic effects, from toxic materials or toxic combustion products.

 The radiation energy onto the human body [kW/m2];

 The exposure duration [sec];

 The protection of the skin tissue (clothed or naked body).

Table 4 Effects Due To Incident Radiation Intensity

Sufficient to cause pain within 20 sec. Blistering of skin

Vapour cloud Explosion (VCE)

In case of vapour cloud explosion, two physical effects may occur:

For the blast wave, the lethality criterion is based on:

Table 4 Damage due to overpressure

0.30 bar Heavy Damage Major damage to plant equipment structure

4.5 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS

4.6 IGNITION PROBABILITIES

4.7 RISK ASSESSMENT

4.8 RISK EVALUATION

4.9 RISK REDUCTION MEASURES

5. DETAIL STUDY INPUTS

Mass flow rate/

Mass flow rate/

Table 5 CONSEQUENCE RESULTS

Flash Fire Effects: Radiation Effects: Jet Radiation Effects:

4 NR NR 80.3881 98.4912 0.02068 NR NR

4 NR NR 49.8988 55.1685 0.02068 NR NR

12.5 2.82325 3.26532 43.2389 44.1532 0.1379 NR NR

Pump LEAK 10.9302 13.0136 12.5 NR NR 33.8672 38.3925 0.1379 NR NR

4 NR NR 43.3179 47.2782 0.02068 NR NR

TANK-1 FO- 37.5 NR NR NR NR 0.2068 NR NR