DET NORSKE VERITAS

TM

REPORT NO./DNV REG NO.: 2013-4091 / 17TLT29-5
REV 1, 11.06.2013



APPENDIX B

HAZID






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Report for Skangass AS
Appendix B HAZID

MANAGING RISK







DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-5
Revision No.: 1
Date : 11.06.2013 Page 1 of 12

Table of Contents Page

1 BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF WORK ...................................................................................... 2
2 METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................................................. 4
3 PARTICIPANTS ................................................................................................................................. 6
4 SUMMARY OF HAZARDS IDENTIFIED ....................................................................................... 6
5 HAZID LOG ....................................................................................................................................... 7
6 REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................. 11



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Report for Skangass AS
Appendix B HAZID

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DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-5
Revision No.: 1
Date : 11.06.2013 Page 2 of 11

Conclusion of the review on the 17.05.2013:

After review of the HAZID inputs and conclusion delivered on the 18.05.2012, DNV assessed that no
update is required as the concept design used as basis for the HAZID has not changed in the detail
engineering phase.

1 BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF WORK
A one day HAZID workshop was carried out in June 2011 for the design at that stage of LNG
bunkering station in Risavika, ref. /1/. As the design has changed considerably since then, an update of
the HAZID was carried out on February 16 2012.

The objective was to identify and assess potential hazards for the LNG bunkering station, with focus
on safety. Risks reducing measures were identified and assessed where possible.

Like the HAZID in 2011, this update focuses only on hazards associated with bunkering of LNG to
ferries on jetty 38. This includes equipment and operations both inside and outside the LNG Base Load
Plant, ref. Figure B - 1 and Figure B - 2, respectively.

For remaining hazards associated with the LNG Base Load Plant, reference is made to the QRA from
2009, ref. /2/.

The HAZID does not take into account the risks due to ship or truck LNG loading to the ferry.

DET NORSKE VERITAS
Report for Skangass AS
Appendix B HAZID

MANAGING RISK







DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-5
Revision No.: 1
Date : 11.06.2013 Page 3 of 11


Figure B - 1 Equipment associated with the bunkering system located inside the plant

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Appendix B HAZID

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DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-5
Revision No.: 1
Date : 11.06.2013 Page 4 of 11


Figure B - 2 Route of the underground pipe and bunkering station on jetty 38

2 METHODOLOGY
HAZID (Hazard Identification) is a systematic review of installations and/or operations in order to
screen potential hazards. The HAZID review on February 16 2012 was run in a workshop with
participants from Skangass, Fjordline and DNV. Each hazard was assigned a likelihood and
consequence category, so that each hazard could be ranked in accordance with a predefined risk
matrix, see Table B - 1. This risk matrix is the same as the one used in HAZID in June 2011.
DET NORSKE VERITAS
Report for Skangass AS
Appendix B HAZID

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DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-5
Revision No.: 1
Date : 11.06.2013 Page 5 of 11


Table B - 1 Risk matrix

S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y

Consequence Categories
Likelihood

P
e
o
p
l
e

E
n
v
i
r
o
n
-

m
e
n
t

D
e
l
a
y

/

D
o
w
n
t
i
m
e

R
e
p
u
t
a
t
i
o
n



1 2 3 4 5 6

Failure is
not
expected

< 10
-5

Never
heard of in
Industry

10
-4
- 10
-5

An
incident
has
occurred
in
Industry
10
-3
- 10
-4

Has been
experienced
by most
Operators
10
-2
- 10
-3

Occurs
several
times
per year
per
Operator
10
-1
- 10
-
2

Occurs
several
times
per year
per
facility
>10
-1


1
No or
superficial
injuries
Slight effect
on
environment,
< 1 BBL
< 2 hours
Slight
impact; local
public
awareness
but no public
concern
L L L M M M

2
Slight
injury,
a few lost
work days
Minor effect
Non-
compliance.
< 5 BBL
< 1 day
Limited
impact; local
public
concern
may include
media
L L M M M H

3
Major
injury,
long term
absence
Localized
effect
Spill
response
required.
< 50 BBL
1 - 10
days
Considerable
impact;
regional
public/slight
national
media
attention
L M M M H H

4
Single
fatality or
permanent
disability
Major Effect
Significant
spill
response,
<100 BBL
10 - 60
days
National
impact and
public
concern;
mobilization
of action
groups
M M M H H H

5
Multiple
fatalities
Massive
effect
Damage
over large
area,
>100 BBL
> 60 days
Extensive
negative
attention in
international
media
M M H H H H

Risk Definition:

High
Actions must be taken to reduce risk to at least the medium level


Medium
Risk reduction measures must be taken if their respective costs are not disproportionately high as compared to their


attained benefits (ALARP principal); actions need to be taken to manage and measure risk.


Low
Monitoring actions required to identify whether the risk rises to medium level


DET NORSKE VERITAS
Report for Skangass AS
Appendix B HAZID

MANAGING RISK







DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-5
Revision No.: 1
Date : 11.06.2013 Page 6 of 11

3 PARTICIPANTS
Table B - 2 Participants at the HAZID workshop March 16 2012
Name Company Position / role in HAZID
Camilla Gautestad Skangass Process Manager, Gas & LNG projects
Gunnar Helmen Skangass Key Account Manager, LNG Industry & Marine
sbjrn Folvik Skangass Process engineer, LNG Industry & Regulations
Morten Larsen Fjordline Technical & Nautical Director
Erik Skramstad DNV HAZID facilitator
Jon Magne Ofte DNV QRA Project Manager
Jean-Baptiste Berthomieu DNV Scribe


4 SUMMARY OF HAZARDS IDENTIFIED
The new design of Skangass bunkering system is considered an improvement in terms of safety, as it
mitigates or eliminates some of the hazards identified in the HAZID from June 2011: The likelihood of
a leak is reduced by introducing underground, double wall pipeline and by eliminating buffer tanks and
flare.
Since the HAZID in 2011, the number of hazards with criticality High is reduced to one:
1-4 Leaks from the loading arm during bunkering operations, caused by fabrication or material
defects; weld defects, leaking seals and swivels. Possible consequences are fires if ignition
sources on and around bunkering ferry (under ro-ro operation) are present; risks to ship
passengers.
The main changes include the lower criticality of the following hazards, due to reduction of likelihood
and/or consequence:
Criticality changed from Medium to Low:
o 1-1 Release of N2 and HC from vents on the ship (ship-side)
o 1-2 Inability of purging N2 from the loading arms
o 1-12 Damage to loading arms with possible release of LNG (New: No crane operations
during bunkering operations.)
o 3-1 Loss of LNG supply capacity
o 3-2 Damage to piping system inside the LNG plant
Criticality changed from High to Medium:
o 1-10 Loss of control during filling of ship (New: ESD has been provided; the system
will fail in a safe position.)
Other changes since the HAZID in 2011 do not move hazards from one criticality level to the next.
All changes are marked with text in red in the HAZID log in the next chapter.

DET NORSKE VERITAS
Report for Skangass AS
Appendix B HAZID

MANAGING RISK






DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-5
Revision No.: 1
Date : 11.06.2013 Page 7 of 11
5 HAZID LOG
(Text in red has been revised since HAZID June 2011)
ID HAZARD CAUSE POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES
DETECTION SAFEGUARDS /
CONTROL MEASURES
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y

C
o
n
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e

L
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d

C
r
i
t
i
c
a
l
i
t
y
COMMENTS
1-0 Loading area loading arm from LNG Base Load Pant to ship
1-1 Release of N2 and HC
from vents on the ship
(ship-side)
N2 purging of loading arms
into the ship's main header
vent system
Fire hazard if ignition
sources on and around
bunkering ferry (under ro-
ro operation) are present
Design of cold vent;
minimise purging through
better control of the
process; design of fire
fighting system (foam etc.)
1 3 L This could be a problem when
simultaneous passenger and cargo
"offloading" are being carried out
1-2 Inability of purging N2
from the loading arms
Pollution of fuel in the
ship's fuel tank
Control of the purging
process
1 2 L
1-3 Release of N2 and HC
from the loading arms
(shore-side)
Unintended releases during
connection and preparation
for the LNG transfer
Minor fire with HC release Demonstration to authorities
on this (safe?) design
1 3 L Neighbouring pressure relief valves
can be connected to this onshore
header vent system. With the current
procedure, the release is small, then
the consequences will be small as
well.
1-4 Leaks from the loading
arm during bunkering
operations
Fabrication or material
defects; weld defects;
leaking seals and swivels
Gas dispersion Manual detection
possible but not
reliable (due to
surrounding noise
pollution during
work)
Gas detectors and
immediate / automatic shut-
down
2 3 M Consider visual indication of closed
connections; hydraulic backup
system of the loading arms should be
considered
DET NORSKE VERITAS
Report for Skangass AS
Appendix B HAZID

MANAGING RISK






DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-5
Revision No.: 1
Date : 11.06.2013 Page 8 of 11
ID HAZARD CAUSE POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES
DETECTION SAFEGUARDS /
CONTROL MEASURES
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y

C
o
n
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e

L
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d

C
r
i
t
i
c
a
l
i
t
y
COMMENTS
1-5 Fires if ignition sources
on and around bunkering
ferry (under ro-ro
operation) are present;
risks to ship passengers
Visual detection
(continuously
operated during
ship loading)
Immediate / automatic shut-
down; elimination of ignition
sources in classified areas;
fire-fighting
4 4 H Address radiation level and fire
effects on personnel and passengers
on the open-bridge and open decks
during the bunkering; Consider
access control to the open-deck and
fire protection on the bridge.
1-6 Embrittlement Spill protection (for the steel
on the deck)
3 3 M
1-7 Frost burns PPE mandatory 3 3 M
1-8 Unplanned disconnection
of the loading arms, with
possible damage to
equipment and release of
LNG
Excessive ship motions due
to failure in engine control
system on the ship; failure
in mooring; passing ships;
weather
Refer to consequences in
ID 1.04,1.05,1.06,1.07
Manual detection Berthing control of the ship;
weak link/quick release
coupling will minimise
damages to the loading arm
3 3 M Emergency procedures to be
addressed in the overall operation
procedures as well as during training
etc.
1-9 Overfilling of fuel tank
(ship)
Control failure (instrument;
operational etc.)
Release of LNG through
tank relief valves, and NG
through pressure relief
valves. Refer to
consequences in ID
1.04,1.05,1.06,1.07
Level alarm
controls
Operational procedures and
tank protection system
(level indicators)
4 3 M This is linked to the ship design, it will
be designed according to the IMO
guidelines (ESD link will be provided)
1-10 Loss of control during
filling of ship
Loss of power Abortion of the filling
process in an unsafe
state
Loss of power /
black-out should
be easily detected
This has to be addressed in
the ESD philosophy
(including the back-up of
power supply)
2 3 M ESD has been provided; the system
will fail in a safe position.
1-11 Damage to loading arms
with possible release of
LNG
Impacts from trucks and
crane arms
Fire hazards (trucks
acting as potential ignition
sources). Injuries to
facility operators and ferry
Manual detection Concrete or other protective
barriers and traffic rules
(speed limits etc.); no traffic
during bunkering operation
4 1 M
DET NORSKE VERITAS
Report for Skangass AS
Appendix B HAZID

MANAGING RISK






DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-5
Revision No.: 1
Date : 11.06.2013 Page 9 of 11
ID HAZARD CAUSE POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES
DETECTION SAFEGUARDS /
CONTROL MEASURES
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y

C
o
n
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e

L
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d

C
r
i
t
i
c
a
l
i
t
y
COMMENTS
1-12 Dropped objects on loading
arms from cranes loading
the ship
passengers. Refer also to
consequences in ID
1.04,1.05,1.06,1.07
Manual detection No crane operations during
bunkering operations
3 1 L Crane activities should be carried out
at a safe distance from loading
manifold (or vice versa)
1-13 Ship collision / impact
from other passing
vessels
Human error and / or
technical failures, leading to
loss of navigational control
Structural damage to the
ship. Possible damage to
the loading arms cannot
be disregarded.
Manual detection Port traffic controls 3 2 M Harbour traffic control (especially due
to the increased sea traffic opposite
to LNG bunkering facility) - Refer to
DNV Risk Analysis on Risavika
Harbour
1-14 Damage to loading arms
when disconnected
Truck traffic; dropped
containers; collision impact
from other vessels
Material damage to the
(normal stainless steel)
arm and possible release
of LNG (before LNG has
evaporated)
Visual observation
/ inspection
Shut-down valves at both
the ship-side and onshore
tank-side of the filling line;
consider possibility to empty
loading arm after
disconnection
2 3 M Low probability (and minimal spillage
of LNG); Loading arm will contain
LNG shortly after loading; safety zone
around the loading arm; access is
restricted to limited (trained)
personnel; protection equipment by
personnel present at that area
1-15 Unplanned abortion of
fuelling operation
External fire (on ship,
building and truck)
Damage to equipment
(including escalation);
delay
Visual observation Fire detection and fire-
fighting; ESD and
emergency plans
3 3 M To be addressed as part of the ESD
procedures
1-16 Sabotage and terrorist
attacks
Covered as part of meeting the
international regulation requirements
(ISPS)
1-17 Failure of the vacuum-
insulated transfer line
Material fabrication defects Shut down and need for
repairs
Loss of vacuum
(detected in the
control room)
Design of culvert, pipe
support and draining
system of the culvert,
ventilation system if culvert
is closed
3 3 M
DET NORSKE VERITAS
Report for Skangass AS
Appendix B HAZID

MANAGING RISK






DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-5
Revision No.: 1
Date : 11.06.2013 Page 10 of 11
ID HAZARD CAUSE POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES
DETECTION SAFEGUARDS /
CONTROL MEASURES
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y

C
o
n
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e

L
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d

C
r
i
t
i
c
a
l
i
t
y
COMMENTS
1-18 LNG releases in the
culvert
Double barriers failure;
digging activities; flooding;
Fatigue; improper
installation; excessive loads
of traffic activities;
vibrations; settlement.
Fire and explosion Gas detectors (if
flanges are
present inside the
culvert); otherwise
vacuum detectors
/ monitoring
should be
adequate
Minimise valves / flange
connections inside the
culvert
4 1 M Valves / flange connections should
preferably be outside the culvert
2.0 LNG Buffer Tank(s) (top and bottom filling inlets) & its filling lines No longer part of the design
3-0 Main LNG plant - 42-TR-101 tank & truck loading bay
3-1 Loss of LNG supply
capacity
Loss of fuelling capacity,
i.e. breakdown of facility's
reliability
Visual Revise the operational
manual so as to consider
the reliability of the truck
and Buffer tank(s) filling
1 3 L
3-2 Damage to piping system
inside the LNG plant
Release of LNG in Truck
Loading Bay; fire and
explosion (due to ignition
sources from the trucks)
Process control
and gas detectors
at the Truck
Loading Bay
Ensure that piping system is
designed for situation with
back-flow in the system
1 3 L Vapour return line to be considered?
3-3 Failure of liquid lines from
pump 42-PS-101B
Increased frequency of use The increased use of this pump
should be reflected in the QRA

DET NORSKE VERITAS
Report for Skangass AS
Appendix B HAZID

MANAGING RISK







DNV Reg. No.: 17TLT29-5
Revision No.: 1
Date : 11.06.2013 Page 11 of 11

6 REFERENCES
/1/ Risikovurdering av LNG bunkring av RoPax ferje i Risavika havn, DNV reg. no. 12PABXZ-
21, 26.08.2011
/2/ QRA for Skangass LNG plant, DNV report no. 2009-0068, rev 1, 08.05.2009






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