HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: BZNA Date: 12/02/2001 Sheet No: 1 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:

Pre Drilling See Attendance List

GUIDEWORD EVENT DESCRIPTION CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS No ACTION RECOMMENDED

Blowout Problems during appraisal
drilling with loss of circulation
suggest risk of blow out during
the development drilling
Potential fatalities with significant
loss of asset
 Normal drilling precautions
 Awareness of potential
problems
 Pre-drilling seismic site survey
2/2  Evaluate drilling program to
include loss of circulation
problems
 Conduct peer review on drilling
of Gas Group 1 Projects

Note that under SAFEGUARDS & ACTIONS consider in descending order of priority means of PREVENTION, CONTROL & MITIGATION
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: BZNA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 2 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:
BZNA-M-PLR-002
See Attendance List
Construction of New Platform and 6” – 0.5 mile Pipeline

GUIDEWORD EVENT DESCRIPTION CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS No ACTION RECOMMENDED

Platform Potential defficiemcy in piling
Installation
Potential mishandling of platform
in transit or during installation
Poor quality of fabrication
Pipelaying Mishandling of 6” pipeline
Anchor handling
Tie-in Loss of containment
Lifting to cut the 12” line
 Platform subsidence
 Potential capital cost
implication on project
 Platform damage
 Schedule delay
Failure in service
Potential damage to 12” line
Potential damage to 12” line (and
other lines in the area?)
Potential hydrocarbon release
Damage due to overstressing of the
12” line
Previous incindent of 6” pipeline
cracking (LLF-LLD).
Condition of pipeline is not known
in detail, pressure test has been
done.
 Plan to do a site survey with
the EPCI contractor after
contract award
 Provided document from
neighboring area
Normal precaution
BP quality assurance and quality
control
Part of bidding appraisal will
include consideration of the
competence and experience of
subcontractors and adequacy of
vessel and equipment
 Normal precaution
 Properly updated drawings
Depressurizing and degassing by
water flushing
Part of bidding appraisal will
include consideration of the
competence and experience of
subcontractors and adequacy of
vessel and equipment.
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2 A complete evaluation of contractors
and subcontractors personnel during
BLEQ and technical bid evaluation.
1/2  Pre-construction meeting with
parties involved
 Update pipeline drawings
following the seabed survey
1/3  Ensure that SCA and BZZB
platforms are shut-in and
positively isolated
 Develop procedure for
depressurising and degassing
1/3  Evaluate competency of
contractor’s pipeline installation
procedure. This should be
approved by company’s pipeline
specialist.
 Consider use of SMART PIG to
determine the condition of the
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: BZNA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 3 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:
BZNA-M-PLR-002
See Attendance List
Construction of New Platform and 6” – 0.5 mile Pipeline

pipe early after contract award

 The preffered method of subsea
tie in is without lifting the
pipeline, using smart flanges.
When pipe is cut, it may spring  Hazard to divers Pipecutting device does not require 1/3 As above
apart  Pipeline misalignment diver operation/presence
Pipehandling barge will handle re-
alignment of pipeline

Normal diving hazards Normal precautions 1/3

Note that under SAFEGUARDS & ACTIONS consider in descending order of priority means of PREVENTION, CONTROL & MITIGATION
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: BZNA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 4 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:
BZZB-MD-200
Construction on Existing Facility (BZZB) See Attendance List

GUIDEWORD EVENT DESCRIPTION CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS No ACTION RECOMMENDED

Loss of Breaking into line containing Import gas line will be

containment hydrocarbon depressurised and degassed for 6”
subsea tie-in
Separator will be depressurised and
water discharge line flushed
Hotwork Potential ignition source Ignition of any hydrocarbon Consider replacing the control
releases from the operating plant assembly with a prefabricated spool
to minimize hotwork on the platform
Arrange for all hotwork to be done
during plant shutdown and
depressurization

Note that under SAFEGUARDS & ACTIONS consider in descending order of priority means of PREVENTION, CONTROL & MITIGATION
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: BZNA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 5 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:
BZNA-P-PFD-0001
Operation of New Facility (BZNA) See Attendance List

GUIDEWORD EVENT DESCRIPTION CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS No ACTION RECOMMENDED

Blow out during  Expected frequent well
workover intervention
 Increases possibility of well
blowout
Rig moving into position and
potential impact on operating well
 Potential fatalities Normal well intervention procedure 2/2
 Major damage
As above Both wells will be shut-in by 2/2 Compare with best BP world-wide
SCSSV during rig positioning for practice on rig approach.
major workover involving a towed
vessel
(All pipelines also shut-in and
depressurised) as required by NWJ
SIMOPS procedure
However, for wirelining and coiled
tubing involving self-propelled
vessel, normal production is
maintained. Vessel procedures will
define weather limitations that will
apply with agreement with BP rep.

Blow out during Potential problem of stuck drill
drilling a third pipe due to pressure depletion
well
 Rig moving into position and
potential impact on operating
well
 Heavy lift associated with
drilling activity
Potential damage  Dropped objects
to export pipeline  Drilling rig jackup legs
 Anchor handling
 All potentially causing
damage to export line
Loss of Process leak from Manifold
 Cost and schedule impact
 Radioactive source stuck
downhole
 Potential fatalities
 Major damage
Major damage due to gas release
from pipeline
 Major damage to the platform,
 Reduce mud weight 2/2
 Redesign casing point to cover
both gas and depleted zone
 Producing wells are shut in
until BOP is in place
 Rig orientation such that 2/2
pipeline is away from drilling
rig approach
 Conduct SIMOPS meeting
 Means of leak detection limited 2/2  Consider use of ultrasonic leak
 HAZID REPORT FORM
Project: BZNA
Area or System:
Operation of New Facility (BZNA)
containment if ignited
 Potential fatality if the platform
is manned
 Potential escalation to pipeline
riser
Riser leak outboard of the ESDV Uncontrolled release from pipeline
Pipeline leak  Uncontrolled release from
Corrosion as the leak source pipeline
 Gas and some condensate
release to the environment
 Hazard to passing ships/boats
Drawing Nos
BZNA-P-PFD-0001
to low pressure (decreasing
pressure?) detection
 Open well ventilated platform
will help disposed gas released
 Fusible plugs in instrument gas
system to initiate shut down
 Two means of escape to
boatlanding platform
 (Boat maybe 1-2 miles away at
another platform)
 Platform operator carries
personal radio with 13 miles
range
 Host platform has an isolation
valve but no means of
detection of release other than
low pressure at BZZB
 Splash zone will have
protection coating
 Fortuitous detection during
routine travel between
platforms
 Corrosion inhibitor injection at
BZNA
 Valve isolation of 12” static
line to avoid static line & water
buildup
 6” line not pigable
 No means of detecting a leak
directly.
 Regional emergency response
plan & procedures in place
with the equipment at Citra
Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 6 of
Attendees:
See Attendance List
detector
 Procedure for boarding platform
shall include gas detection as a
first priority
 Check with HSE dept on
procedure/criteria for offshore
evacuation
 Procedure of detection and
evacuation for injured people
(buddy system?)
 Main isolation valve need to be
operable in the event of possible
fire exposure for 15 minutes
2/2  Ensure that there is appropriate
protection of the riser from
impact damage (e.g. supply boat)
 BZZB platform needs to be
modified to send a signal to the
nearest manned platform
(BRAVO Flow station)
1/2  Chemical injection arrangement
should include at least 2 times
50% pumps on line
 Chemical storage should be
sufficient to allow continuous
operation between platform
service
 Consider high quality metallurgy
for 6” short line due to potential
pitting corrosion or line sizing to
avoid water accumulation
 Consider the advantages of
pigging 12” line and ensure that
new valve in the line is piggable

Project: BZNA
Area or System:
Operation of New Facility (BZNA)
Leak from instrument gas system
Normal venting of instrument gas
system
Leak of scale inhibitor or
corrosion inhibitor
Structural failure Corrosion
Wind & waves
Seismic, earthquake
Seabed foundation failure
HAZID REPORT FORM
 Potentially up to 2” failure of
production gas system
 Increased frequency of gas
releases
Environmentally impact
Hazard to personal and
environment
Structural collaps
Structural collaps
 Structural collaps
 Potential failure of well
conductors and loss of contain
hydrocarbon
Structural subsidence
Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 7 of
Drawing Nos
Attendees:
BZNA-P-PFD-0001
See Attendance List
Ayu terminal located in the  Review the realistic pipeline
vicinity of Bravo area. leaks and the potential effect on
 Collaboration with MAXUS the environment (local fish and
(neighbouring PSC) for shrimp farm, etc.) for all pipeline
additional support of spillage locations (note that JJA and KKA
handling are very close to shore,
approximately 2 miles for JJA)
 Maximum size 2” 1/3 Consider the merits of gas powered
 Potential escalation to main hydrolic system
production system
 ESDV on instrument gas
system
 Project requirement to 1/3 Consider the merits of gas powered
minimize hydrocarbon venting hydrolic system
 Spill containment of the 1/3
chemical skid is directed to the
slop tank
 Sacrificial anode protection 15 2/1 Anode should be welded to the
years design life structure
 Increased corrosion allowance
by 1/8” in the splash zone
 Major inspection of the
platform every 2-3 years,
topsides and subsea
 Design criteria is 2/1
simultaneously 100 years wind
and waves
 10 years wave occurrence,
fatigue design life 15 years
Ductility criteria 800 years 2/1 Consider providing seismic detector
recurrence interval and 0.2 g peak system to initiate shut down
ground acceleration
 Previous problem with KL area Consider design detail to take into
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: BZNA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 8 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:
BZNA-P-PFD-0001
Operation of New Facility (BZNA) See Attendance List

platforms associated with account possible future sudsidence

reservoir depletion. This new (eg. relative movement between riser
platform areof similar geology and platform)
but of smaller reservoir
depletion hence risk of
subsidence can not be
discounted with risk relatively
low
 Current foundation design
based on typical soil data and it
is intended to carry out site
specific survey during detailed
engineering phase.
Ship Impact Attendant vessel Structural damage Design caters for potential energy 2/1
of attendant vessel impacts
Riser impact Riser currently shown as outside the 2/2 Consider pre-installing riser inside
platform structure the jacket structure
Passing vessel Structural failure  Platform is outside normal 2/1
shipping route
 No radar monitoring of
shipping traffic on manned
platform
Dropped objects Normal platform crane lift eg. Potential damage to hydrocarbon Crane, boat unloading area and 2/1 Confirm this is the case for the
chemical tote tanks equipemnt laydown area such that thereis no instrument gas skid
lifting over the main hydrocarbon
process area
Transport People arriving by boat Personal injury with potential  Life jacket is worn 2/2  Only trained personnel is allowed
fatality  Training available to embark/disembark the
 2-meter wave and 30-knot wind platform
limitations  Consider improvements to
 Water survival training landing space on the boat
 Consider medical certification as
a requirement for offshore visit
 Review of incident data on such
activities with a view to

Project: BZNA
Area or System:
Operation of New Facility (BZNA)
Security Platform equipment subject to
damage and loss due to theft from
the facility (particularly in
consideration of its close
proximity to the shore)
Other Uncertainty in BZNA gas
composition
Shutdown philosophy
Lifting equipment loss of power
Note that under SAFEGUARDS & ACTIONS consider in descending order of priority means of PREVENTION, CONTROL & MITIGATION
HAZID REPORT FORM
Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 9 of
Drawing Nos
Attendees:
BZNA-P-PFD-0001
See Attendance List
investigating any improvement
that could be made
Loss/damage to equipment. Consider the means of making the
platform facilities less
Potential threat to the vulnerable/accessible to theft.
integrity/safety of the installation. Consider also ensuring that any such
activity will not threatent the integrity
of the installation.
Possible under prediction of Review data and consider impact of
condensate production higher condensate production
ESD shutdown (including sub There is no means of remote shut
surface safety valve) of the down; consider the merits of remote
platforms is by the following shutdown in the context of
means: earthquake risk etc ?
Fusible plugs
Manual local push button initiation.
Process shutdown (without sub
surface valve) is also initiated by:
High & low pressure trips
High & low
Suspended load or dropped object Review arrangement for safe load
during lifting handling in the event of loss of power
(for shallow water facilities, the
power supply is from the attending
supply boat which may be more
liable to cable damage in use)
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: BZNA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 10 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:
BZNA-P-PFD-0001
Operation of New Facility (BZNA) See Attendance List
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: BZNA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 11 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:
BZZB-MD-200
Operation on the Existing Facilities (BZZB, BZZA, B2C, BC, B Process) See Attendance List

GUIDEWORD EVENT DESCRIPTION CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS No ACTION RECOMMENDED

HP/LP InterfacesBetween wellhead and the
manifold
Slugging @ BZZB Arrival of slugs through pipelines
@ Test and Production Separator
Loss of Release from BZZB Process area
containment
Release from BZZB riser which is  Major gas release from pipeline Frequent inspection of riser
currently empty
BZZB Gas line to BZZA/B2C
Catstrophic failures of manifold
system
 Process Shutdown on high
level
 Liquid carry-over into gas
export line
Small increase of release because of As per BZNA (fusible plugs)
the additional control valve and the
piping as well as the small increase
of gas that could be released due to
the increase gas through-put
(although less than original
capacity)
 Potential major damage to
platform
Uncontrolled release of gas
(no change to the existing condition
other than the increase of gas
through-put from 2 MM to 10 MM)
2 x 100% relief valve size for block
capacity
 Vessel design pressure exceeds
normal running pressure of
pipeline
 Compressor slug catcher and
inlet scrubber
PSLL pressure trip will initiate
shutdown but only for major
pipeline failure
2/1
1/2  Evaluate that B2C compressor
slug catcher is capable to handle
the liquid carry-over
 Provide all drawings of receiving
facilities to EPCI contractor
 Shutdown on BZZB should be
transmitted to host platform
1/2 Some additional leak detection such
as sonic detection
2/2  Review adequacy of riser splash
zone protection
 Inspection of riser prior to
recommisioning and establish an
on-going inspection program
1/2  Consider the impact of increasing
gas flow rate from 2 MM to 10
MM (potenial for initial large
volumeof liquid slugs)
 Start-up procedure should
include consideration of such
effect on existing facilities
 BZNA gas is low molecular
weight; impact on compressor
should be evaluated
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: BZNA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 12 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:
BZZB-MD-200
Operation on the Existing Facilities (BZZB, BZZA, B2C, BC, B Process) See Attendance List

BZZB Liquid line to BC/B BZNA producing mainly water

Process liquid. The main impact is a small
increase in water separation load at
Junction

Note that under SAFEGUARDS & ACTIONS consider in descending order of priority means of PREVENTION, CONTROL & MITIGATION
 HAZID REPORT FORM

Project: BZNA Date: 31/08/2021 Sheet No: 13 of

Drawing Nos
Area or System: Attendees:

Abandonment See Attendance List

GUIDEWORD EVENT DESCRIPTION CONSEQUENCES SAFEGUARDS No ACTION RECOMMENDED

Wellhead abandonment – All

production casing will plugged
and abandoned (P&A).
The casing will be cut about 10
feet below the mudline
Remove the jacket and return it to
fabrication yard for reuse or
refurbishment
Remove pipeline from seabed and
dispose

Note that under SAFEGUARDS & ACTIONS consider in descending order of priority means of PREVENTION, CONTROL & MITIGATION