Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DOCUMENT ID - SP 1075
REVISION - 2.0
DATE - - 15/07/02
HSE – SPECIFICATION
Setting Clear Requirements
Document Authorisation
Document Authority Document Custodian Document Author
‘dapo Oguntoyinbo Hamad Khalfeen Hamad Khalfeen
Ref. Ind: CSM Ref. Ind: CSM/11 Ref. Ind: CSM/11
Date: 15/07/02 Date: 15/07/02 Date: 15/07/02
The following is a brief summary of the four most recent revisions to this document. Details of all revisions prior
to these are held on file by the Document Custodian.
User Notes:
The requirements of this document are mandatory. Non-compliance shall only be authorised by CSM through
STEP-OUT approval.
A controlled copy of the current version of this document is on PDO's EDMS. Before making reference to this
document, it is the user's responsibility to ensure that any hard copy, or electronic copy, is current. For
assistance, contact the Document Custodian.
This document is the property of Petroleum Development Oman, LLC. Neither the whole nor any part of this
document may be disclosed to others or reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form by
any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic recording or otherwise) without prior written consent of the
owner.
Users are encouraged to participate in the ongoing improvement of this document by providing constructive
feedback.
Contents
1.0 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................5
1.1 PURPOSE...............................................................................................................5
1.1.1 Objectives....................................................................................................5
1.2 SCOPE..................................................................................................................5
1.3 DEFINITION...........................................................................................................6
1.4 DELIVERABLES........................................................................................................6
1.5 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES....................................................................................6
1.6 PERFORMANCE MONITORING......................................................................................6
1.7 REVIEW AND IMPROVEMENT.......................................................................................7
1.8 REPORTING FORMAT................................................................................................7
2. PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS........................................................................8
2.1 BASIS...................................................................................................................8
2.2 ROLE OF PRE-FIRE PLANNING IN SYSTEM DESIGN...........................................................9
2.3 FERM ENGINEERING AND DESIGN PRINCIPLES...............................................................9
2.4 APPLICATION OF FIRE AND EXPLOSION STRATEGIES DURING DESIGN.................................10
2.4.1 Modifications to Existing Facilities.................................................................10
2.4.2 Green Field Facilities....................................................................................10
3.0 DETECTION AND PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS..........................................13
3.1 GENERAL.............................................................................................................13
3.1.1 Fire Proofing of Supporting Structures..........................................................13
3.2 HYDROCARBON HANDLING FACILITIES........................................................................13
3.2.1 Wellheads...................................................................................................13
3.2.2 Oil/Gas Inlet Manifolds................................................................................13
3.2.3 Gathering, Production Stations & Storage Tanks...........................................13
3.2.4 Gas Processing Facilities..............................................................................21
3.2.5 Booster Stations..........................................................................................22
3.3 UTILITY FACILITIES................................................................................................23
3.3.1 Power Stations............................................................................................23
3.3.2 Control and Auxiliary Rooms........................................................................23
3.3.3 Electrical Substations and Switchgear Rooms................................................23
3.4 OFFICE BUILDINGS, RESIDENTIAL AND INDUSTRIAL AREAS..............................................23
3.4.1 General......................................................................................................23
3.4.2 Plans and Procedures..................................................................................24
3.4.3 Office Buildings...........................................................................................24
3.4.4 Residential Areas.........................................................................................25
3.4.5 Industrial Areas...........................................................................................25
3.5 AIRSTRIPS...........................................................................................................26
3.5.1 Aircraft rescue and fire fighting....................................................................26
3.5.2 Mobile Equipment.......................................................................................26
3.5.3 Air strip buildings........................................................................................26
4.0 DETECTION SPECIFICATIONS.......................................................................27
4.1 DETECTION SYSTEMS..............................................................................................27
4.2 GAS DETECTION....................................................................................................27
4.2.1 Flammable Gas Detection Philosophy...........................................................27
4.3 FIRE DETECTION...................................................................................................28
4.3.1 Optical Flame Detection...............................................................................28
4.3.2 Bimetallic Heat Detection.............................................................................28
4.3.3 Fusible Plug Heat Detection.........................................................................28
8.0 REFERENCES..................................................................................................51
1.0 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This Specification provides users with a standard specification for the level of fire and
explosion mitigation measures that are tailored to typical facilities in PDO.
This document incorporates the latest international standards, DEP’s and the EP 95-
0000 guidelines dealing with fire protection. In addition, this Specification
incorporates the findings and recommendations from three fire protection related
studies, namely:
The studies established the actual risk from fires and explosions in PDOs facilities and
have determined the appropriate level of control to mitigate the consequences in the
event of a fire/explosion using QRA and Cost Benefit Analysis.
This Specification should be used to assist engineers define the appropriate fire and
gas detection and protection equipment, where there is a wide range of size and
criticality of equipment (e.g. shipping pumps and cone roofed storage tanks) that
deviates from the typical. The Specification describes a simple methodology that is
appropriate to the level of business risk of the facility concerned.
Reference is made in this Specification to the FERM Facility Plan Guideline, GU 230
(Reference 6), which provides additional information in applying the standards.
1.1.1 Objectives
This Specification has the following objectives, to:
1.2 Scope
This Specification covers the requirements for fire and gas detection and protection in
PDO facilities. These requirements shall be applied when making plant modifications
and when designing new facilities.
The Specification covers both green field facilities and modifications to existing plant.
Due consideration to cost effectiveness shall be taken into account when applying
these standards to existing facilities, particularly over the remaining plant life. The
scope of the Specification also includes the preparation of a fire response document
pertaining to the facility being designed or modified and the incorporation of these in
the relevant operational documents. The approach is in line with EP 95-351, Fire
Control and Recovery.
1.3 Definition
This Specification draws upon a number of relevant international sources to define
the requirements for management of fire and explosion risks. Where a user is
referred to another standard, the latest edition of the relevant standard shall be
used. In the event of discrepancies between sources, the order of precedence shall
be:
A reference list of all the standards, specifications and codes used throughout this
document is provided in Appendix A.
This Specification also relies on the use of a large amount of acronyms and
abbreviations that may not be familiar to personnel who don’t have experience in fire
protection. A glossary of terms is provided in Section 7 of this Specification to aid in
the understanding of personnel unfamiliar with any terms used within.
1.4 Deliverables
1.4.1 Records
Records produced as a result of the use of this Specification will be incorporated into
design documentation and the FERM Facility Plan.
1.4.2 Reports
PDO Staff: Any non-compliance with this Specification shall be notified, investigated
and reported as per CP 122 HSE Management System Manual, Part 2, Chapter 6.
Asset Managers
Asset Managers are responsible for ensuring that they do accept new or upgraded
facilities that re not in compliance with this Specification.
Design Engineers
Design Engineers are responsible for the implementation of the requirements
provided in this Specification.
2. Performance Requirements
2.1 Basis
The risks due to fire and explosions of existing typical assets in PDO were assessed
using a ‘Risk Matrix’ (see Appendix B). This was used to rank the relative risk to the
various types of facilities and illustrates the rationale of the decisions taken at that
time. Based on this evaluation, four different strategy levels for addressing fire and
explosion incidents within PDO have been developed. These are defined as:
Using these four strategies, typical PDO facilities can be categorised and grouped
together with a common approach for defining fire and gas detection and protection.
For a facility group, e.g. a gathering station, the applicable strategy has been
determined through consideration of the typical equipment contained within that
facility group.
Figure 2.1 shows the four basic strategies and the facility groups contained in each
strategy. The figure also highlights the risk drivers associated with a facility group.
It should be noted that because of the onshore location of PDO facilities, low
manning levels at most facilities and the generally unconfined layout, life safety is
generally not the dominant risk driver.
Although this is a very coarse delineation of required control and recovery systems, it
does provide a high level overview. The prime objective is to optimise the level of
risk contributed by each type of equipment to meet the FERM requirements.
Due to the variation between PDO gathering and production stations these have been
categorised into different types, (A, B, C etc.) and have been assigned different
strategies. The assigned Facility Group Categories are shown in Appendix C.
STRATEGY LIFE
SAFETY
ENVIR-
ONMENT BUSINESS ASSET REPUATION
SYSTEMS/EQPT
Production stations Type B & C
PLUS BACK-UP
The content and guidance in the preparation of such plans can be found in GU 230
FERM Facility Plan Guideline.
Life safety
Damage to the environment
Lost and deferred production
Loss of assets (facility)
Reputation
Fire and explosion risk reduction measures shall be prioritised in the following order:
The new strategy shall be supported by QRA studies in accordance with EP 95-0352,
Quantitative Risk Assessment.
A flowchart of the methodology for green field facilities is provided in Figure 2.4.2.
FIGURE 2.4.1
MODIFICATIONS
Assess impact on
Conceptual
design existing fire and
explosion strategy
Do the
yes modifications
change the
existing
strategy?
no
Up or down grade
the FERM strategy
Do the
mofications no
change the No Change
station
category?
Asses the impact of
revised strategy on
whole facility (use
QRA if appropriate) yes
Amend FERM
Facility Plan
FIGURE 2.4.2
QRA
Incorporate into
emergency
procedures
Obtain approval
from CSM for new
strategy level
3.1 General
This section identifies the requirements for the various types of fire and gas detection
and protection equipment for each of the major types of location and production
facilities.
Appendix D – Typical Alarms and Executive Actions, summarises the general levels of
detection and protection for generic equipment types that are required to meet the
fire and explosion strategies for typical facilities. These tables provide an overview
only and the engineer shall determine the applicability of the standard protection
levels proposed in this Specification when the facilities being designed deviate
significantly from other common PDO facilities.
Specific engineering & design details for the detection and protection systems are
given in Sections 4 and 5 of this Specification.
3.2.1 Wellheads
Generally, no fire or gas detection shall be provided for wellheads. However, heat
detection shall be provided on wellheads fitted with actuated ESD valves, SSVs,
SCSSVs and ESPs and upon fire detection, the valves shall close or pumps shutdown.
Fire and gas detection and protection systems for turbine hoods shall include:
Flammable gas detection on the combustion and ventilation air inlet if gas
ingestion is possible.
Gas detection on the ventilation outlet and/or oil mist vapour detection
(depending on type of fuel).
Heat detection.
Flame detection.
Fine water spray or CO2 extinguishing system.
It is possible for flammable gas concentrations up to the LEL (Lower Explosive Limit)
to exist in a non-hazardous area by definition of the limits of classified areas. An
example is a large flammable gas cloud in the vicinity of the combustion air intake
and/or ventilation air intake. If such a possibility exists, then three flammable gas
detectors shall be installed.
There is also the possibility for flammable gas to exist within the turbine hood from a
release from the fuel distribution piping. Gas from such a release should be detected
at the ventilation outlet. For this purpose three flammable gas detectors shall be
installed to monitor the ventilation outlet airflow.
Heat detectors of the bimetallic type shall be installed over bearings. They shall be
used in combination with flame detectors. A minimum of four flame detectors shall
be installed, and at least one heat detector. In large turbines, e.g. Frame 5
equivalent, additional detectors may be required and in such cases the turbine
manufacturers recommendations shall be followed.
If IR flame detectors are used, then to prevent false alarms due to IR detectors
responding to hot turbine shafts rotating at certain speeds, the design shall ensure
that the view of any rotating shaft by a detector is obscured by a casing shield.
Electric Drivers
Heat detection of the windings in accordance with DEP 33.66.05.31, Electric Motors -
Cage Induction and Synchronous Type, shall be provided as an integral part of the
electric motor design.
Basic process protection from primary safety features, such as tank level
measurement with level alarms, an independent high level alarm and trip and
automatic ESD inlet and outlet valves shall be installed in accordance with ERD 08-
11, Isolation of Process Equipment.
Basic process protection from primary safety features, such as tank level
measurement with level alarms and independent high level alarm and trip and
automatic ESD inlet and outlet valves shall be installed in accordance with ERD 08-
11, Isolation of Process Equipment. Further fire risk reducing measures consists of:
The relative risk reduction of each option has been plotted as a histogram in Figure
3.2.3 (a).
Each bar of the histogram shows the distribution of damage, which covers 3 damage
categories:
The ‘Y’ axis gives the risk index, which can be used to determine the differential risk
reduction factor introduced by the various mitigation methods.
It can be seen that as the various mitigation methods are introduced not only is there
a reduction in overall risk but that the damage distribution changes to give less
severe consequences.
80
Fire Damage
71 71%
70 Loss of 1 Tank
66 66%
Loss of 2 Tanks
60
Loss of 1 Loss of 2
RISK INDEX
50
Tank Tanks
40
36 36%
33 33%
30 29%
29
20
Fire Damage
Fire Damage
Fire Damage
10
0.05
0.04
0.08
0.09
0.22 0.2
0.5 0.5 0.78 0.71 0.6 0.32 0.6 0.35 0.68 0.28
Base Case +Heat Detection +Heat Det'n & Pump-out +Heat Det'n & Base +Heat Det'n & Base +Heat Det'n/Base Foam/
Foam Foam & CW Monit ors Portable Foam
& CW Monitors
The relevance of the active risk reducing options for any particular location, in terms
of the amount of capital that can be justified on break even cost-benefit grounds, can
be determined by entering the relevant values into Table 3.1. From this Table,
calculate the present value of the base case cost of damage for any particular
installation which equates to 100 on the risk histogram (Figure 3.2.1).
The methodology described below is suitable for screening the cost benefits of fire
protection to within 25% (50/50). In the event the economic justification is
marginal, other factors such as loss of reputation shall be considered. Alternatively a
detailed QRA and cost benefit analysis may be performed to arrive at the appropriate
level of protection.
TABLE 3.1
Note 1: The value may be updated from time to time and users shall check the latest
value with the Company's Corporate Economics and Production Planning Department
The risk differential values (in US$) (justified project cost of mitigation) may be found
by multiplying the percentage difference in risk, taken from the histogram, by the PV
base case cost of damage to give the amount which can be spent on that mitigation
system.
Shipping Pumps
The installation of shipping pumps shall include basic process protection from primary
safety features, such as dual seals with primary seal failure detection, vibration
monitoring and high temperature detection. Automatic suction and discharge ESD
isolation valves shall be installed in accordance with ERD-08-11, Isolation of Process
Equipment. The design shall include a defined route for crude oil spill run off such
that the ground surface slopes away from equipment that has the potential to cause
escalation. The direction of the slope shall also consider fire spread and damage to
protection systems and equipment.
The relative risk reduction of each option has been plotted in the following histogram
– Figure 3.2.3 (b).
80
Minor Major Plant
No Damage Fire Damage
Damage Damage
70
60
Fire Major
50 Damage Damage
RISK INDEX
40
33 33.1%
30
27 27.3%
23 23.4% 21.5%
21
20
Fire Damage
Fire
Minor Damage
Minor Damage
Fir e
Minor Damage
Damage
Damage
NoDamage
10
Minor Damage
NoDamage
Fire
Minor
Damage
Damage
7.2%
0.012
7
0.052
0.127
0.004
0.04
4.7%
0.083
0.004
0.096
0.097
0.003
4.3%
0.005
0.064
0.074
0.021
0.03
0.017
0.02
4.7
0.002
4.3 0.5 0.5 0.28 0.69 0.81 0.451 0.524 0.816 0.29 0.2 0.486 0.86 0.29 0.32 0.486 0.86
Base Case +Fire Detection +Fire Det'n & +Fire Det'n & +Fire Det'n & Day Manning+ Day Manning+ Day Manning+ Day Manning+
Vapour Det'n Sprinklers Vapour Det'n & Fire Det'n Fire Det'n & Fire Det'n & Fire Det'n &
Sprinklers Vapour Det'n Sprinklers Vapour Det'n &
Sprinklers
Each bar of the above histogram shows the distribution of damage that covers 4
damage categories and includes the no damage category:
Major plant damage causing the loss of 2 months total oil production
followed by 3 months at 50% production.
Fire damage to a pump causing the loss of 5 days total oil production
followed by 3 months at 83% production.
Minor damage to a pump causing the loss of 3 days production followed by 2
months of reduced production rates at 83%.
The ‘Y’ axis gives the risk index that can be used to determine the differential risk
reduction factor introduced by the various mitigation methods.
It can be seen that as the various mitigation methods are introduced not only is there
a significant reduction in overall risk but that the damage distribution changes to give
less severe consequences. The no damage category does exist for the base case
but is not shown for clarity since it represents a part of the damage distribution
common to all the above conditions. The sections of the bars above shown as no
damage are purely attributable to the introduction of mitigation. It can be seen that
vapour detection and manning give a significant benefit by increasing the no damage
allocation. This is because both can provide leak detection prior to ignition that
results in spill damage, which is considered insignificant in comparison to fire
damage.
The relevance of the active risk reducing options for any particular location, in terms
of the amount of capital which can be justified on break even cost benefit grounds,
can be determined by entering the relevant values in the Table 3.2. This can be used
to calculate the present value of the base case cost of damage per pump set for any
particular installation which equates to 100 on the previous risk histogram (Figure
3.2.3 (b)).
The methodology described below is suitable for screening the cost benefits of fire
protection to within 25% (50/50). In the event the economic justification is
marginal, other factors such as loss of reputation shall be considered. Alternatively a
detailed QRA and cost benefit analysis may be performed to arrive at the appropriate
level of protection.
TABLE 3.2
Note 1: The value may be updated from time to time and users shall check the latest
value with the Company's Corporate Economics and Production Planning Department.
The risk differential values (in US$) (justified project cost of mitigation) may be found
by multiplying the percentage difference in risk, taken from the histogram, by the PV
base case cost of damage to give the amount which can be spent on that mitigation
system.
Compression Facilities
Generally, no detection is required for gas separators and compressor surge vessels.
They shall however, be provided with relief and blowdown systems in accordance
with the applicable pressure vessel standards.
Centrifugal Compressors
Centrifugal compressors shall be equipped with heat detectors above each bearing
with a seal or gland. They are intended to detect both gas fires and lube oil fires.
Reciprocating Compressors
Fire and gas detection for reciprocating compressors shall be determined on a case
by case basis. As a minimum they shall be equipped with heat detectors above each
bearing with a seal or gland as per centrifugal compressors.
LNG/LPG Vessels
Fire and gas detection for LNG/LPG vessels shall be in accordance with DEP
80.47.10.30 Gen. Section 5.5.1, Pressurised Storage Vessels.
LPG vessels shall be provided with a sloping drain such that the slope is not directed
to protective systems or potential escalation areas.
Use of fixed cooling water spray systems is justified where an existing fire water
system is in place. Where blocking is a problem for water nozzles, provision of
passive fire protection may be considered.
Generators shall be provided with heat detection and UV flame detection over the
main areas.
Auxiliary diesel generators shall be provided with heat detection and an automatic
extinguishing system, typically a self-contained dry powder system, or a fine water
spray system. Installation of such systems generally require that the engine is
enclosed and not subject to any local air movement, which should be the case when
the engine has tripped and the mechanically driven cooling fan has stopped.
3.4.1 General
The overall strategy for buildings in which people are generally present is level 1 with
some level 2 exceptions as further specified below. The primary protection for
people is to provide fire/smoke detection, alarm and adequate escape routes. Smoke
detection and Manual Alarm Call (MAC) points connected to a general audible alarm
shall be installed in accordance with ERD 17-02 Building Services Construction
Specifications, Section (D), Fire Detection and Alarm Installation.
No Smoking signs
No smoking signs shall be clearly displayed in all areas where smoking is prohibited.
Visual alarms
The main visual alarm interface shall be the fire detection panel. This shall be located
at the main entrance to the building. The panel shall clearly highlight which detection
circuit has been activated and the area of the building affected.
Audible Alarm
In residential areas the audible alarm shall be in the form of a horn or bell.
Escape Routes
All escape routes and exit doorways shall be provided with emergency lighting where
required. They shall be marked with luminous or illuminated signs
Fire Wardens
Fire Wardens signs shall be clearly displayed in all critical areas
Fire Extinguishers
A suitable number of hand-held extinguishers shall be provided at strategic locations.
If a fire water system is installed then hose reels shall also be provided at strategic
locations.
Guidance in the preparation of such plans can be found in GU 230 FERM Facility Plan
Guideline.
Materials storage areas shall be provided with fire detection applicable to the type of
material being stored. In areas where the stored materials give off flammable
vapours, e.g. seismic tape stores, the electrical installation shall be suitable for zone
2.
Where the contents of a building are particularly valuable or critical, such as some
archives and data stores, a total flood system may be justified in order to minimise
the potential loss. Cost Benefit Analysis should be applied in order to provide the
justification. The type of extinguishant used for total flood systems shall provide
minimum environmental impact and health risk, and shall be approved by the
Custodian of this Specification (CSM).
Kitchens
In all kitchens serving a residential camp CO 2 or foam extinguishers and a fire blanket
shall be provided. Fire blankets shall be woven glass fibre tested to BS 476 Parts 4
and 7.
Heat detection shall be installed in the kitchen hood. Activation of the detector shall:
On line gas bottles for use in kitchens shall be located outside. If the bottles are
closer than 5 metres from combustible materials a block work separation wall shall be
constructed. Any enclosure for gas bottles shall be freely ventilated.
Laboratories
Fire protection in laboratories shall be designed in accordance with DEP 34.17.10.31.
On line gas bottles for use in laboratories shall be located outside. If the bottles are
closer than 5 metres from combustible materials a block work separation wall shall be
constructed. Any enclosure for gas bottles shall be freely ventilated.
Workshops
In workshops free of dust and vapours, smoke detection shall be provided. In
workshops areas where smoke detectors may become quickly contaminated due to
dust and vapours, heat detection shall be provided instead of smoke detection. The
location of such heat detectors is critical as a fire can become well established before
activating a heat detector.
3.5 Airstrips
For mobile fire fighting equipment reference should be made to DEP 80.47.10.32,
General and for fire fighting vehicles, DEP 80.47.10.33.
3.5.3 Air strip buildings
The general specifications as defined in Section 3.4.1 above shall be applied.
The power supply to the system shall be provided with a battery back up giving 8
hours duration, 7.75 hours at normal load and 0.25 hours at alarm load.
Point type gas detectors shall be used. The use of open path gas detectors may be
considered only when used in conjunction with point type detectors.
Flammable gas detection shall initiate alarms at alert and danger levels. Executive
actions shall only be initiated from danger level detection. The location and number
of detectors required is a function of the particular equipment design and layout,
however they shall be located over obvious potential leak points e.g. seals.
TABLE 4.2
The use of Ultra Violet detectors in areas where arc welding, flash photography and
NDT X-Ray testing shall be carefully considered. Detectors should be located in
elevated positions looking downwards. Consideration should be given to the
possibility of smoke accumulation preventing the detector from seeing a flame. UV
detectors shall provide an alarm signal to alert operators when the window is dirty.
Low-pressure initiator monitoring of air pressure in the system shall be used for fire
detection.
This type of heat detection is preferred for congested process plant areas unless the
equipment is subject to periodic removal.
Smoke Detection
Smoke detectors shall be of the optical type or ionisation type. Where smoke
detection is provided, at least one of each type shall be installed at each location.
The optimum locations for conventional smoke detectors will be a function of the
preferential air flow patterns.
Activation of a single smoke detector shall initiate alarms and executive actions.
Note: According to BS 5839 Part 1 false alarms from smoke detectors may be caused
by fumes, dusts or condensation. Some types of ionisation chamber type smoke
detectors are highly sensitive to high air speeds and may give false alarms.
Ionisation type detectors shall be provided with a warning that label highlights them
as a radioactive source.
This type of system is capable of detecting fire at the incipient stage up to 4 hours
before flame breaks out.
The extremely high sensitivity of these systems may tend to cause alarms
occasionally under transient conditions. They should only therefore be used to initiate
alarms, not executive actions.
Note: None of these devices are suitable for fume contaminated areas typically
including vehicle exhausts or cigarette smoke, and clearly have limited applicability in
inherently dirty or dusty environments.
Audible Alarms
Audible alarms shall be installed on the outside of the control building as a minimum.
Different alarm sounds shall be used for fire, combustible gas, toxic gas and all clear.
These shall be in accordance with DEP.32.30.20.11, General. Additional audible
alarms shall be located on top of noisy machinery e.g. gas turbines.
Visual alarms
The main visual alarm interface shall be the mimic. This shall either be a dedicated
display on the control system or a graphic mimic panel. The mimic layout shall be
based on the station fire and gas detector layout drawings. It shall clearly highlight
which detection circuit has been activated and the area of the plant affected. Design
of the mimic shall be in accordance with DEP.32.30.20.11, General.
When H2S detection is provided, visual beacons shall be installed in accordance with
ERD 08-04.
It is however acceptable to take the firewater supply from a process system (eg.
water injection system) provided that pressure and flow can be maintained under
emergency conditions.
Fire water systems are required for facilities where FERM strategies 3 and 4 have
been justified.
The fire water network shall be designed to supply the calculated water demand at
the required discharge points and pressure (reference shall be made to preplanning
documentation for required flow rates).
The pumps should discharge into a ring main with hydrants, fixed monitors and feeds
to fixed foam systems and sprinkler systems.
The fire water distribution piping shall be a ringmain, with adequate loops and block
valves to ensure that a single line break can be isolated safely with minimum loss of
fire protection. Single branch lines shall be avoided.
The piping material may be steel for above or below ground and GRE (in accordance
with ERD 38-12) where mechanical damage is unlikely. Steel pipe shall be cement
lined in accordance with DEP 30.48.30.31, General. When above ground, the pipe
shall be protected by physical barriers where necessary to reduce the possibility of
impact by vehicles.
All valves in the system shall be clearly identified with their function and normal
status. System pipework shall be routed such that wherever possible it is not exposed
to excessive radiation from a fire for which it may be required. In particular, the
following guidelines shall be applied:
Fire water pipework shall not pass through tank bund areas.
Fire water pipework shall not pass through areas where product spills can
accumulate underneath them.
Fire water pipework shall be at least 15m from process facilities.
System isolation valves shall be located such that radiation (based on FRED
calculations) from fires for which they are intended will be a maximum of 5 kW/m 2
under any anticipated design conditions. If the system is such that its user is likely to
remain in the area for extended periods (greater than 10 minutes), then screening
shall be provided to ensure that radiation levels do not exceed 1.5 kW/m 2.
The fire water tank internal lining shall be in accordance with ERD 48-01 to obviate
the generation of corrosion products which could affect the performance of
downstream systems.
A system would typically include a water storage tank (in accordance with NFPA 22)
for those areas without a suitable natural source of water. The tank may be filled
with formation water provided the quality is compatible with available foam
concentrates.
Since the majority of the tank(s) fill is likely to stand for considerable periods of time
consideration shall be given to batch dosing foam compatible corrosion inhibitor and
bactericide.
Where required due to the type of pumps being used, tanks shall be elevated to
provide positive suction when the operating pressure is low.
Generally two 100% fire water pumps, one electric and one diesel driven, shall be
installed to ensure a reliable supply under all circumstances. The electric driven pump
would normally be selected to start first, either from a confirmed fire signal as a
precursor to fire water demand or due to a fall in pressure in the ringmain. The diesel
driven pump would start automatically on low ring main pressure after a pre-set time
or on failure of the electric pump.
A jockey pump shall be installed to maintain pressure in the system (typically 3 barg).
Fire water pumps shall be started weekly and performance tested annually. The
annual performance tests shall incorporate flow tests for the ringmain itself. Flow and
pressure tests shall be performed on the fire water system to ensure that water
demand for the identified scenarios can be achieved.
Pumps shall be selected and installed in accordance with DEP 31.29.02.11, General,
DEP 31.29.02.30, General and NFPA 20.
5.1.4 Hydrants
Hydrants in process areas shall generally have 4 x 65mm instantaneous coupling
outlets in accordance with BS 336. Hydrants at offices, residential and industrial
areas shall generally have 2 x 65mm outlets.
Fire Hoses
All hoses for fire fighting purposes shall conform to the requirements of DEP
80.47.10.32, General, Section 3.2.
5.1.5 Monitors
Fixed, manually operated water monitors shall be provided for strategy 3 facilities for
specific cooling requirements, i.e. storage tanks and congested areas as justified by
risk analysis.
Fixed Monitors
Fixed monitors shall be chosen to provide the stream range required to cool the
equipment for which they are provided at the design operating pressure. The flow
rate shall not be less than 2000 lpm at the design operating pressure.
Access during a fire should be taken into account where locating fixed monitors. The
effects on firefighters from radiant heat during a storage tank fire also need to be
considered. Monitors shall be located such that radiation (based on FRED
calculations) from fires for which they are intended will be a maximum of 5 kW/m 2
under any anticipated design conditions. If the system is such that its user is likely to
remain in the area for extended periods (greater than 10 minutes), then screening
shall be provided to ensure that radiation levels do not exceed 1.5 kW/m 2.
DEP 80.47.10.32, General, gives information regarding the requirements for fixed
monitors, and DEP 80.47.10.30, General, provides information on water flow rates.
The design of portable water monitors shall be in accordance with DEP 80.47.10.32,
General.
Water application systems will not generally extinguish fires caused by hydrocarbon
flammable liquids with flash points below ambient temperature or flammable liquids
heated above their flash points. Foam systems are required for this application.
Water application systems consist of a valve in a take-off from the fire water
network, distribution pipework and discharge nozzles.
(i) Sprinkler nozzles - where each nozzle has a frangible bulb or fusible link
preventing water flow through the nozzle. At a preset temperature the bulb
or link breaks and releases water. Thus, only the nozzles subjected to heat
discharge water. Typical applications of sprinkler systems include offices and
hazardous material warehouses. They should not normally be used in
computer rooms or electrical equipment rooms.
(ii) Waterspray (deluge) nozzles - where all nozzles are open and, on opening of
the valve, will all discharge simultaneously. Deluge systems can be automatic
or manually operated according to specific hazard requirements.
Sprinkler system hydraulic calculations shall be carried out using approved software
rather than by manual calculations.
Sprinkler systems shall normally be of the wet pipe type. Where the protected area
contains critical equipment and water damage from sprinkler nozzle leakage would
have major consequences, consideration may be given to the installation of a pre
action system, typically consisting of dry pipe, requiring confirmation of fire from
another source before the valve is opened.
All system sprinkler valves and nozzles shall be approved by the Loss Prevention
Council (LPC), Underwriters Laboratories (UL) or Factory Mutual (FM).
Automatic deluge valves and nozzles shall be approved by Loss Prevention Council
(LPC), Underwriters Laboratories (UL) or Factory Mutual (FM).
Deluge system valves shall be located such that radiant heat levels from the incident
for which they are provided shall be located such that radiation (based on FRED
calculations) from fires for which they are intended will be a maximum of 5 kW/m 2
under any anticipated design conditions. If the system is such that its user is likely to
remain in the area for extended periods (greater than 10 minutes) then screening
shall be provided to ensure that radiation levels do not exceed 1.5 kW/m 2.
Automatic deluge valves shall be actuated by the relevant detection system but shall
also include a manual operation capability. The preferred method of operation of
automatic deluge valves is by fusible plug detectors. Water deluge valves in pipe
work shall be locked in the open position. Special consideration shall be given to the
locking of ball valves such that they cannot be closed with the lock in place. Ideally,
the valves should be purchased with a lock as part of the design.
Testing and inspection of deluge systems shall be in accordance with NFPA 25.
Regular maintenance of the system shall be performed, and in particular the deluge
nozzles shall be checked for blockage. Regular flushing of the nozzles shall be
performed.
5.3.1 General
Foam systems consist of 3 basic parts:
Foam makers can be further subdivided into aspirating types which use a venturi
nozzle system to draw air into the foam solution and non-aspirating devices which
rely on impinging jets of foam solution or turbulence as the foam solution leaves the
nozzle to generate bubbles of foam.
Reference shall be made to the following standards for relevant aspects of foam
system design and foam concentrate specification:
DEP 80.47.10.31 - Gen., June 1992, Section 2.4
DEP 80.47.10.10 - Gen., March 1991, Section 2.1
DEP 80.47.10.33 - Gen., Fire Fighting Vehicles and Fire Stations, June1993
NFPA 11 - Standard for Low Expansion Systems
NFPA 16 - Deluge Foam - Water Sprinkler and Foam Water Spray Systems,
1995
ISO 7203 - 1 Fire Extinguishing Media, Foam Concentrates, 1995
UL 162, Seventh Edition - Foam Equipment and Liquid Concentrates, 1994
For airport applications, reference shall be made to ICAO, CAP 168 - Licensing of
Aerodromes, 1990.
The foam concentrate for hydrocarbon flammable liquids (e.g. crude or condensate)
shall be either fluoroprotein, film-forming fluoroprotein or multipurpose (alcohol
resistant) fluoroprotein or synthetic based type and shall conform to the
The foam concentrate for water soluble flammable liquids (e.g. methanol) shall be a
multipurpose type and shall conform to the requirements of Underwriters
Laboratories UL 162 7th Edition test requirements or ISO 7203-1 Class IIA or higher.
The foam concentrate for airstrip use shall be AFFF (Aqueous Film Forming Foam),
FFFP (Film Forming Fluoroprotein) or a fluoroprotein type conforming to the
requirements for level B type foams of CAP 168 (multipurpose types of the same
generic type are permissible).
Foam concentrates whether in systems, drums or vehicles shall be stored such that
they are not exposed to direct sunlight.
For foam concentrate for use at facilities other than airstrips, manufacturers type
certification shall be available on site demonstrating full conformity with either UL
162 or ISO 7203-1, Class IIA or higher.
This shall also include information on the following physical properties with measured
tolerances:
Specific gravity @ 20C
pH @ 20C
Sediment
(ii) Every 10 years, the foam concentrate used at airstrips shall be subjected to a
fire test in accordance with CAP 168 to ensure continuing conformity with
level B type fire fighting performance.
Various types of proportioner are available as described in NFPA 11. This section
defines the type that shall be used for different applications at PDO facilities.
General
All foam proportioning systems shall be capable of providing acceptable concentrate
proportioning (3-3.6%) under all operating conditions of the equipment, including
blockage of some outlets.
FERM strategy 3 sites and strategy 4 sites shall have fully fixed systems. Semi-fixed
systems may be added at sites with a professional fire response nearby. In such a
case the fire responders shall be trained and regularly practice the use of such
equipment (see Proportioning Systems for Semi-Fixed Foam Systems below).
All proportioning stations shall be provided with a clear indication of the facilities to
which they relate and clear operating instructions including identification of valves.
Minimum and maximum operating pressures shall also be clearly identified.
All proportioning stations shall be located in safe locations (i.e. areas not having
hazardous area classification).
All proportioning stations shall be located such that radiation (based on FRED
calculations) from fires for which they are intended will be a maximum of 5 kW/m 2
under any anticipated design conditions. If the system is such that its user is likely to
remain in the area for extended periods (greater than 10 minutes), then screening
shall be provided to ensure that radiation levels do not exceed 1.5 kW/m 2.
Fixed proportioning systems shall be of the balanced pressure type (See NFPA 11).
The preferred type is one having a foam concentrate pump although diaphragm tank
(bag tank, bladder tank) types are acceptable where the quantity of foam
concentrate in them does not exceed 1500 litres.
For pumped balanced pressure proportioning systems, the pump can be water,
electric or diesel driven. In all cases the pump shall be of the positive displacement
type (i.e. not centrifugal).
All proportioning stations shall be provided with isolation valves and pressure gauges
at their inlet and outlet. In the case of pumped balanced pressure proportioning
systems, pressure gauges will also be provided in the foam concentrate line
downstream of the foam pump prior to the proportioner. Gauges shall be provided to
demonstrate that foam concentrate pressure and water pressure are balanced at the
point of concentrate injection.
The flow range of the proportioner and operating pressure range shall be clearly
marked on the proportioner.
Pumped balanced pressure proportioning systems shall be provided with the facility
to test the foam concentrate and circulate foam concentrate back to the concentrate
tank without discharging concentrate into the foam solution discharge line. Valves in
the system specifically provided to allow this function shall be provided with a lock so
that they can be locked during normal status.
Pumped balanced pressure proportioners shall have manual over ride capability to be
used in the event of failure of the automatic balancing system.
All foam concentrate tanks shall be provided with a sight glass with isolation valves.
In the case of diaphragm tanks the isolation valves will be provided with locks.
In areas where specialist fire vehicles are available (strategy 4 in FERM), a pumping
in connection shall be provided downstream of the proportioning skid to allow back
up of a fixed proportioning system by use of the proportioning system on the vehicle.
In the case that hand held equipment outlets are served by the proportioning station
as well as fixed systems, the outlets shall be such that pressure is limited to a
maximum of 7 barg.
The foam system shall conform to the requirements of DEP 80.47.10.33, General.
The flow rate capability of the proportioning system shall take due account of other
items, such as foam monitors or hand lines, which may be fed from it.
The proportioning system shall have the manual over ride, drain and return to tank
facilities as described for the pumped proportioning systems for fixed systems in the
previous section.
Note: The above comments should not be regarded as a detailed specification for
foam systems for fire trucks. They cover only the necessary requirements to serve
semi-fixed systems at PDO facilities.
Proportioners for One Shot Foam Systems for Floating Roof Tank Rimseal Fires
Proportioners for one-shot foam systems for floating roof tank rimseal fires are
considered to be an integral part of a package unit (see previous section).
Base injection (sub-surface) systems are used to protect cone roof (fixed roof)
atmospheric storage tanks that do not have an internal floating cover. They are
designed to inject foam at the base of a tank above any water and allow the foam to
float to the fuel surface. Base injection foam systems are not suitable for water-
soluble fuels such as methanol.
a viscosity less than 440 centistokes at the minimum storage temperature. Above
this, top entry for the foam should be used.
Each tank nozzle associated with a base injection system shall be provided with a
normally locked open shut off valve and a non-return valve.
Bursting discs shall be provided upstream of the non return valve in the foam
discharge line to act as a positive seal preventing product entering the foam line
under normal operations. The bursting discs shall be of the differential pressure type,
rated and located such that where there is more than one disc in a system, the
bursting of one disc will not relieve pressure throughout the system and prevent the
bursting of all other discs.
Valved test connections shall be provided in a base injection system on each system
outlet. These shall be of the same diameter as the system foam outlets in order to be
representative of the actual system. The valve of the test connection outlet shall be
normally locked closed. Normally locked open valves shall be provided as necessary
in the foam discharge outlets. These valves shall be closed during testing to prevent
bursting discs being subjected to high pressure.
Foam generators for the base injection system shall be of the type that can generate
foam of the required expansion and drainage time properties (see NFPA 11) against
backpressure caused by product head and downstream frictional losses. The
preferred type is one that can operate against at least 40% backpressure. The
generators shall be provided with pressure gauges showing upstream and
downstream pressures so that operating conditions can be checked during testing.
The generators shall incorporate a non-return valve in the air inlet to prevent
backflow of product through the inlet after system shutdown.
In semi-fixed systems, the foam solution inlets shall be clearly marked with their
purpose, the tank numbers to which they relate, the minimum operating pressure
and flow rate.
Each foam generator shall be clearly labelled with its minimum operating pressure
and the flow rate at this pressure.
The foam outlet inside the tank shall be such that it does not become easily clogged
by sediment. In crude tanks this means that the end of the outlet pipe should be cut
at an angle so that any sediment in the crude does not accumulate in the pipe.
All foam systems shall be discharge tested on an annual basis. The tests shall
include proportioning accuracy (see Testing of Proportioning Equipment), foam
expansion and drainage time. Results shall be compared with system specification
and manufacturers' data.
Top Pourer Systems - Cone Roof Tanks and Internal Floating Roof Tanks
Top pourer systems are foam systems that consist of one or more foam
generator/pourer assemblies positioned around the tank just below the roof to shell
seam. On system actuation foam is fed through the generator to the inside of the
tank shell to flow onto the fuel surface. They can be regarded as an alternative to
base injection systems for cone roof tanks but are not the preferred option because
there is a high probability that the equipment will be damaged prior to system
actuation.
They are, however, the system of choice for internal floating roof tanks and may be
considered for cone roof tanks where base injection or semi-subsurface (see Base
Injection Systems) are not considered practical.
Top pourer foam systems shall be designed in accordance with NFPA 11 in terms of
application rate, running times, foam discharge velocities and number of foam
application points.
Top pourer foam systems for internal floating roof tanks shall be designed to cover
the complete fuel surface at application rates for standard cone roof tanks unless it
can be shown that the internal floating roof will maintain its integrity in a fire
incident.
Each foam pourer assembly will comprise a foam generator, a vapour seal (to
prevent vapours from the tank migrating through the foam system pipework) and a
pourer assembly inside the tank to direct foam against the inside wall of the tank.
The foam pourer assembly shall be designed such that a full flow foam discharge test
can be carried out without breaking the vapour seal and without discharging foam
into the tank.
A separate foam solution riser shall feed every foam pourer assembly. Every foam
pourer assembly shall be clearly marked with operating pressure and flow rate.
Foam solution system pipework shall incorporate valves such that individual risers to
foam pourer assemblies can be isolated in the event of damage to an assembly. The
valves shall be located such that radiant heat levels as predicted by FRED, do not
exceed 5 kW/m2 under credible fire scenarios (nb. full surface fires in internal floating
roof tanks are not generally considered credible scenarios - fires burn at the vents
only).
The foam solution pipework shall be provided with pressure gauges at convenient
locations to check operating pressures. The minimum operating pressure required
shall be clearly identified at the pressure gauge.
The system shall be fully fixed for FERM strategy 3 & 4 facilities. They can be
supplemented by semi-fixed. In the case of semi-fixed systems the inlets shall be
positioned such that the radiation level limits given for proportioning systems for
fixed foam systems are met.
In semi-fixed systems, the foam solution inlets shall be clearly marked with their
purpose, the tank number to which they relate, the minimum operating pressure and
flow rate.
All foam systems shall be discharge tested on an annual basis. The tests shall include
proportioning accuracy, foam expansion and drainage time. Results shall be
compared with system specification and manufacturers' data.
Extended Discharge Foam Systems for Protection of Rimseal Areas on Floating Roof
Tanks
Reference should be made to DEP 80.47.10.31, General, Paragraph 2.4.1.3.
In this case, the term extended discharge refers to a system having a discharge time
in accordance with a recognised standard such as NFPA 11 (i.e. it is not a one shot
system providing a short duration application of foam as provided in the following
section).
The extended discharge system shall be considered as the primary protection system
even when a one shot system is also in place. Thus a one shot system is not
considered to be an alternative to the extended discharge system.
The system shall comply with the requirements of NFPA 11 in terms of foam solution
application rate, run time and number of foam application points.
The system shall be designed such that it can be actuated manually, either locally or
remotely, within 10 minutes of a confirmed fire. If this cannot be achieved, a one-
shot foam system shall also be provided as detailed in the following section.
For new facilities, the system application devices shall be of the top pourer type
because it allows easy inspection and testing. The system consists of a number of
foam generators and pourers mounted around the top of the tank fed with foam
solution from the proportioning unit. Each pourer assembly shall be provided with a
foam generator (i.e. a single foam generator feeding several pourers shall not be
permitted).
The primary systems shall be fully fixed but may be supplemented by semi-fixed
systems when there is ready access to a professional fire brigade. When semi-fixed
systems are installed, the system inlets shall be outside the bund and clearly marked
with their purpose, the tank to which they relate and minimum operating pressure
and flow rate.
All foam generators shall be clearly marked with their minimum operating pressure
and the flow rate at that pressure.
A foam dam shall be installed on the tank to contain the foam over the seal area.
This dam shall be designed and provided with drain holes in accordance with NFPA
11. The fitting of the foam dam to the roof shall be such that leakage of foam or
foam solution cannot occur except at the designated drainage points (i.e. there will
be a dam tank roof seal or continuous weld except at drainage points).
Hydrant outlets fed with foam solution shall be provided at the top of the tank at
wind girder level to allow use of foam hand lines to supplement the fixed system.
The maximum distance between foam solution hydrants shall be 60m around the
walkway.
A pressure gauge shall be provided on the foam system pipework along with clear
identification of the minimum operating pressure at this point.
A cabinet including 2 x 20m x 65mm hoses and a 450 lpm foam nozzle shall be
provided at each hydrant outlet on the walkway.
Drain facilities shall be provided in the system to allow the complete system to be
drained after operation.
Foam pourers shall be designed and mounted on the tank shell so that foam is
directed to flow down the inside wall of the tank without disruption from the tank
structure or fittings.
All foam systems shall be discharge tested on an annual basis. The tests shall
include proportioning accuracy (see 4.6.3.6), foam expansion and drainage time.
Results shall be compared with system specification and manufacturers' data.
One shot systems shall be a totally integrated package comprising linear heat
detection, alarm/control facilities, foam concentrate storage, water storage (or
premix storage - see below), foam solution discharge pipework and discharge
nozzles.
The detector system shall comprise a continuous heat detector mounted around the
entire circumference of the tank at a distance of 50mm maximum from the top of the
seal assembly. Each foam solution module shall have its own dedicated detector in
the segment it protects.
The heat detector shall be either of the fusible plastic tube type (see DEP
32.30.20.11 - General, November 1995, Paragraph 3.9.4.2) or digital electrical cable
All electrical components shall be suitable for the classification of the area in which
they operate, recognising that the roof area should be regarded as Zone 1.
Foam solution application rate shall be 20 lpm/m 2 around the seal area and shall be
discharged for a minimum period of 30 seconds.
Foam application nozzles shall be positioned such that the areas of the rimseal
affected are blanketed with foam within a period of 15 seconds from the system
actuation.
Aspirated foam nozzles are preferred in order to provide a more effective blanket
than non-aspirating nozzles.
The circumference of the tank shall be split into segments of approximately 40m.
The foam application nozzles in each segment shall be fed with foam solution from a
dedicated supply module. The discharge pipework and detector for neighbouring
modules shall overlap by at least one nozzle spacing distance.
Foam solution discharge pipework shall be stainless steel or other material that
reduces maintenance requirements on the tank roof.
The foam solution shall be supplied from modules which contain either premix (i.e.
foam concentrate and water already mixed) in a pressure vessel or a separate foam
concentrate and water storage.
A sunshade to prevent direct exposure to sunlight shall protect each storage module.
In cases where the foam concentrate and water are stored in separate vessels, the
proportioner shall be of a type that can still function correctly with 3 nozzles blocked.
All foam systems shall be discharge tested on an annual basis. The tests shall include
proportioning accuracy, foam expansion and drainage time. Results shall be
compared with system specification and manufacturers' data. In addition, rimseals on
the system shall be fully discharged and replenished on an annual basis.
Foam deluge systems shall be designed in accordance with NFPA 16 using an area
foam solution application rate of 6.5 lpm/m 2 and a minimum of 10 minutes
application time, followed by water for a total time of 60 minutes at an application
rate of 6.5 litres/m2/min. With an increased application rate the operating time may
be reduced proportionally, but not less than 7 minutes.
Foam deluge systems shall be fed with foam solution from a fixed proportioning
system.
The foam deluge system nozzle shall be such that following foam application,
continuing water application for a period of 20 minutes will provide a cooling spray
capability without significant damage to the foam blanket.
Foam nozzles for use on small spill fires (e.g. minor bund incidents) at FERM strategy
3 facilities shall have approximately 200-250 lpm throughput at 7 barg inlet pressure.
Their throughput shall be matched to that of the proportioners used with them (see
Proportioners for Hand Held Foam Nozzles).
Foam nozzles for use at FERM strategy 4 facilities shall have a throughput up to 1000
lpm at 7 barg inlet pressure.
Hand held foam application equipment shall be provided in fire cabinets at strategic
locations adjacent to hydrants at FERM strategy 3 and 4 facilities. The number and
location of fire cabinets shall be determined from hazard identification and pre-fire
planning studies for minor incidents taking into account manning levels.
Each fire cabinet shall contain 1 x foam nozzle (200-250 lpm), 1 x water nozzle (450
lpm at 7 barg jet/spray type) 2 x 20m x 65mm hose lengths and 6 x 20 litre drums of
foam concentrate.
FERM strategy 3 and 4 facilities shall be provided with portable foam monitors for use
by the fire fighters for larger spill incidents and supplementing fixed systems.
The number of units shall be based on the requirements of any tanks that are not
protected by a fixed or semi-fixed system. In the event that all tanks are provided
with a system, a single unit shall be provided.
Each foam monitor shall have a throughput of at least 2500 lpm at 7 barg inlet
pressure. Monitors shall be provided with a self-inducing proportioning capability but
in general shall actually be operated from a specialist vehicle proportioning system.
5.6.1 General
Portable extinguishers shall be suitable for the type of fuel involved in accordance
with BS EN 2. There are four classes of fire, namely Class A involving solid materials,
Class B involving liquids, Class C involving gases and Class D involving metals.
Additionally, the extinguisher body, filling nozzle and cap shall be made from material
having rigidity, durability and resistance to electrochemical corrosive effects of the
extinguishing media. Non metallic materials are not acceptable for these parts or the
moveable nozzle.
6.1 General
The table in Appendix D gives typical alarm and executive action requirements for the
different types of detection and facilities. This table provides only an overview and
the engineer shall fully review the requirements of this specification to define
specifics for any piece of equipment.
Given the ingestion of gas into the combustion or ventilation air intakes, the
turbine shall be tripped and the hood ventilation system shall be shutdown.
Given a sufficiently large release of flammable gas under the hood, the
turbine shall be tripped together with a remote fuel gas ESDV, but the hood
ventilation system shall be allowed to run to minimise the possibility of gas
concentration build up and result in a possible explosion or flash fire.
Given a confirmed flame detected under the hood, the turbine and ventilation
system fans will be tripped together with closure of fire damper(s).
FIGURE 6.2
Trip Turbine
Disable Trip from Heat Switches (if total flood system installed)
EFFECT
CAUSE
Gas Detection Flammable >=1 at ALERT X
(per compartment Flammable any 1 at DANGER X
under-hood)
Flammable >= 2 at DANGER X X X X X
Gas Detection Flammable >=1 at ALERT X
(at Air Intakes if Flammable any 1 at DANGER X
HL gas possible)
Flammable >= 2 at DANGER X X X X X
Fire Detection >= 1 Heat activated X X X X X X X X
Any 1 UV/IR activated X
>= 2 UV/IR activated X X X X X X X X
Loss of Hood Ventilation Air Flow* X X
Loss of Hood Ventilation Air Flow>= 20 secs* X X X X
Notes:
1. Alert and danger are defined in section 4.2
2. HL refers to high level
7.0 Abbreviations
8.0 References
1. Report No. HSE/97/07 (1997) Fire and Explosion Risk Management (FERM) Summary
Report. Petroleum Development Oman
2. Report No. EWE-28107.1 (1996) Halon Phase-out Studies, Quantified Risk Assessment &
Cost-benefit Analysis. Electrowatt Engineering
3. Report No. EWE-63273.1/1 (1997) Quantified Risk Assessment for Shipping Pumps and
Cone roofed Tanks. Electrowatt Engineering
· NFPA 22 National Fire Codes: Standard for Water Tanks for 5.1.2
Private Fire Protection. Vol.1. National Fire
Protection Association
· NFPA 750 National Fire Codes: Standard on water mist fire 5.4
suppression systems. National Fire Protection
Association
· NFPA 2001 National Fire Codes: Standard on Clean Agent Fire 5.5
Extinguishing Systems. National Fire Protection
Association
· ICAO-9137 Part 1 Airport Services Manual, Rescue and Fire Fighting. 3.5.1
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Authority)
· ICAO-9137 Part 7 Airport Services Manual, Airport Emergency 3.5.1
Planning. ICAO (International Civil Aviation
Authority)
· ISO 7203-1 Fire Extinguishing Media, Foam Concentrates 5.3.1
5.3.2
· UL 162 Foam Equipment and Liquid Concentrates, 7th 5.3.1
edition 5.3.2
This matrix gives an overview of the risk level of typical equipment to provide an indication of
the level of protection that may be justified in the form of a fire and explosion strategy.
The individual equipment risks are positioned to denote the worst case frequency and
consequences. Some equipment appears twice, e.g. a floating roof tank fire has occurred in
SIEP with minor (rating 2) consequences but elsewhere in the industry with very serious
(rating 5) consequences.
Probability of Occurrence
Consequence A B C D E
happens several
occurred in E&P
not heard of but
year at location
several times a
times a year in
could occur in
Environment
E&P industry
incident has
incident has
Reputation
Production
occurred in
Ratings
happens
Assets
People
industry
incident
incident
SIEP
SIEP
0 No injury No Damaage No Effect No Impact No Effect
1 Slight injury Slight Damage Slight Effect Slight Impact Slight Effect 9 1
Incident: Strategy:
1. Small Incidents 6. Cone Roof Tanks Strategy 1 Strategy 3
2. Pump Seals 7. Floating Roof Tanks
3. Compressors 8. Aircraft Strategy 1/2 Strategy 4
4. Turbine Enclosures 9. Camps
5. Pressure Vessels Strategy 2 Strategy 3/4
Production Stations
Category B: Typical facilities include those on Category A stations but also have larger
cone roof tanks and pressure vessels.
Category C: Typical facilities include those on Category B stations but also have floating
roof tanks.
Specific hazard fire protection is to be provided at Category C production stations with a fire
water network (strategy level 3).
CATEGORY AREA
B Lekhwair
C Yibal
C Fahud
C Qarn Alam
B Rima PS
A Sayyala PS
B Nimr PS
B Marmul
A Anzauz
A Suwaihat
A Zauliyah
A Ghubar
Gathering Stations
First aid fire protection is only to be provided at Category A stations (strategy level 1).
Category B: Typical facilities include those on Category A stations but also compressors
and turbine enclosures.
Specific hazard fire protection is to be provided at Category B stations without a fire water
network (strategy level 2).
Area sirens/bells X X X X X X
ESD associated equipment X X X X X X
Blowdown associated X X X X X X
equipment (Note 4)
Station ESD X X X X
Note 1 Note 1
Initiate AFP (Note 3) X X X X X X
Alarm to SCADA X X X X X X
Alarm to fire brigade X
Flame GFS panel alarm X X X X X X
Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2
Mimic panel alarm X X X X X X
Area sirens/bells X X X X X X
ESD associated equipment X X X X X X
Blowdown associated X X X X X X
equipment (Note 4)
Station ESD X X X X
Note 1 Note 1
Manual call Point GFS panel alarm X Note 2 X Note 2 X Note 2 X Note 2 X Note 2 X Note 2
Mimic panel alarm X X X X X X
Area sirens/bells X X X X X X
Station ESD X X X X
Note 1 Note 1
AFP activated GFS panel alarm X X X X X X
Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2 Note 2
Mimic panel alarm X X X X X X
Alarm to SCADA X X X X X X
Notes
1. Station ESD not required if station is permanently manned.
2. Alarm required on GFS panel if no mimic provided, typically for control/auxiliary buildings.
3. Initiate AFP on relevant equipment where installed.
4. Where blowdown facility is provided.
The Specification provides a methodology for determining the levels of fire and
explosion protection for what are seen as critical items of equipment, ie. cone roofed
tanks and shipping pumps.
This approach is based on a detailed QRA (Reference 3) which was performed, and
enables the user to apply a cost benefit analysis in order to justify the protection level
specified.
The risk reduction by installing heat detection and base foam injection is provided on
the risk histogram (Figure 3.2.3), and works out as 64% (ie, 100-36). Therefore,
0.64 x 450085 = US$288054 can be spent installing heat detection and base foam.
If the cost of installing the fire protection is less that US$288054, then installation is
justified.
Shipping Pumps
Suppose we are installing 3 additional centrifugal shipping pumps at Yibal A and wish
to establish the levels of fire protection that can be justified. Assuming that the 3
pumps have a combined capacity of 23000 BPD, and using the pro-forma on page 18
of this Specification:
The risk reduction by installing fire detection is provided on the risk histogram (figure
3.2.3) and works out as 67% (ie. 100-33). Therefore, 0.67 x 55908 = US$37459 can
be spent installing fire detection. If the cost of installing the fire protection is less
than US$ 37459, then installation is justified.