Aristotle and Chrysippus On The Physiology of Human Action PDF

Anstotle and Chrysippus on the
Physiology of Human Action

Priscilla K. Sakezles
The early Stoics do not seem to have physiological theories about the
workings of the human body. This is not surprising in light of Chrysip-
pus' admission, reported by Galen, of his ignorance of anatomy.1 Yet a
physiological theory explaining the mechanics of how the body moves
in response to the soul's desires can be reconstructed from a handful of
neglected fragments. Interestingly, the revealed theory is nearly identi-
cal to Aristotle's explanation in the de Motu Animalium (MA) of 'how the
soul moves the body in voluntary motion' (700blO and 703b3). The crux
of the similarity involves the expansion and contraction of πνεύμα
(pneuma) in the heart. In this paper I reconstruct the Stoic theory, and
argue that it is most likely adopted directly from Aristotle.
I make this claim pace F.H. Sandbach, who in 1985 published a
monograph, Aristotle and the Stoics, in which he argues for two theses, a
stronger and a weaker: the former is that 'Aristotle was not a significant
influence on early, that is on third-century, Stoicism' (56), and the latter
is that 'it is a mistake to proceed on the a priori assumptions that the
Stoics must have known the opinions expressed in his school-works,
must have understood his importance sub specie aeternitatis, and must
therefore have been influenced by him' (57). Sandbach's strategy for
proving these two claims is essentially negative: there is no certain and
positive evidence to show that the Stoics did know Aristotle's works or
views, therefore we must not think that they did so. Apparent similari-
ties, he thinks, must be coincidental, and he prefers to think of the Stoics
1 On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato 1.6.13
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128 Priscilla K. Sakezles
as original rather than as responding, positively or negatively, to Aris-

totelian theories. He occasionally suggests Academic influence, but as
David Hahm points out in his excellent critique of this work, Sandbach's
negative methodology makes it difficult to advance any hypothesis of
influence on the Stoics.21 agree with Hahm's final estimation of Sand-
bach's work: given the lack of direct evidence for influence, scholars are
unwarranted in assuming that such influence existed — thus Sandbach's
weaker claim is true, and he has done a great service to ancient scholar-
ship by challenging us to be more careful in attributing Aristotelian
views to the Stoics. But the stronger claim is not proven true, because
lack of direct evidence does not prove the absence of influence. Rather, it
indicates that our claims of influence must rest on the strength of our
indirect evidence, viz. similarity of theory. In this paper I will present
what seems to me compelling evidence that the Stoics not only knew of,
but even adopted Aristotle's physiological description of human action.
My methodology will be to show that there is a very high degree of
similarity between the Aristotelian and Stoic theories; that as far as we
can tell from the extant remains no one else besides Aristotle had such a
theory which could have influenced the Stoics; and that given the
peculiarity of the theory, it is highly unlikely that the Stoics formulated
this theory independently of its inventor who lived in such close tempo-
ral and spatial proximity.3
2 'Aristotle and the Stoics: A Methodological Crux', 300-1

3 Consider the story of the fate of Aristotle's written work. When he died in 322 BCE
he left his library to his successor Theophrastus. When Theophrastus died in 288 he
left his and Aristotle's library to Neleus of Skepsis. When Neleus died he left them
to his non-philosophical relatives, who hid them in a cellar to avoid confiscation by
the book-buyers for the great libraries at Alexandria and Pergamum. But eventually
they were sold to Apellicon of Teos in the first century BCE, then exported to Rome
where Andronicus of Rhodes finally catalogued and published them around 30-20
BCE. Sandbach leans heavily on this story to argue that Aristotle's written work was
unavailable, and hence unknown, for most of the Hellenistic period. However, by the
time Theophrastus died and the books supposedly disappeared, Zeno of Citium —
the founder of the Stoa — had been living in Athens for some 24 years and running
the Stoa for 13. It is also quite likely that there were other copies of Aristotle's works
in circulation, or copies of notes by his students, and that his views were known by
word of mouth. Also, the Lyceum remained active at least through the time of Strato
(c.270 BCE), which was about ten years after Chrysippus' birth. So Zeno could have
had access to Aristotle's own library before Theophrastus died, and he and Clean-

Aristotle and Chrysippus on the Physiology of Human Action 129
In Part 11 will describe Aristotle's physiological theory of how the soul

moves the body. In Part I I I will reconstruct the Stoic theory, and then
the similarity of the two will be apparent. But before I can reasonably
conclude that the Stoics adopted Aristotle's theory I must show that
similar theories were not available to the Stoics from any other source.
To this end, Part III will briefly survey relevant medical and physiologi-
cal research from its beginnings in the generation before Aristotle to the
time of Chrysippus.
I Aristotle's Theory
In the first book of the de Anima (DA) Aristotle asserts repeatedly that
the soul is that which originates movement in the body.4 DA ΠΙ 9 first
asks specifically 'what it is in the soul which produces movement'
(432al8-19), and deMotu Animalium 6-11 gives Aristotle's fullest answer
to this difficult question. His physiological theory of bodily movement
can be extracted from a survey of these texts.
In de Anima III 9 Aristotle identifies the cause of bodily motion by a
process of elimination, first arguing that neither the nutritive soul nor
the perceptive soul can be sufficient for movement, because if they were,
plants and all animals would be capable of locomotion, which is false —
the so-called 'imperfect' animals (the ones that have only the sense of
touch) are stationary.5 In the course of ruling out nutritive and perceptive
soul as sufficient for locomotion Aristotle gives two arguments concern-
ing desire which are worth noting because they reveal that the first
necessary condition for movement is experiencing some form of desire
for an object.6. The first argument goes:
thes surely had contact with the still-active Lyceum before and after Theophrastus'
death. Athens was a small town, and the philosophers were sociable, if sometimes
hostile All things considered, it is highly unlikely that the early Stoics were
completely ignorant of Aristotle's philosophy.
4 406a30,408b5-7,409al6-17
5 E.g., testaceans; on imperfect animals see History of Animals VIII1, IV 11, V15.
6 Children and non-human animals experience either appetite (επιθυμία) or passion
(θυμός), whereas adult humans are also capable of wish (βούλησις), i.e., rational
desire; all three are species of ορεξις.

(1) 'Nothing which is not desiring or avoiding something moves

unless as the result of force (βία)' (432M6-17), i.e., desire and
avoidance are the causes of all non-forced locomotion.
(2) Therefore, locomotion 'is always for the sake of something
and involves imagination and desire' (432bl5-16).
I have as yet found no argument anywhere for the premise of this

argument, so it seems to be a fundamental assumption for Aristotle.
From this premise Aristotle concludes that locomotion 'is always for the
sake of something and involves imagination and desire.' Why does this
follow? Because desire and avoidance are necessarily intentional, i.e.,
object-directed, and this object is the 'that for the sake of which' of
locomotion (433al5). Moreover, the objects of desire and avoidance are
the pleasant and the painful. Aristotle has already argued that:
(1) Where there is sensation there is pleasure and pain;
(2) where there is pleasure and pain there is appetite (which is de-
sire for the pleasant); so that
(3) where there is sensation there is imagination and desire
(413b22-24 and 414bl-6).
Since appetite is a species of desire it is obvious why sensation implies

desire in this second argument, and also obvious why locomotion in-
volves desire in the previous argument. But how does imagination —
φαντασία — enter this discussion? Aristotle's analysis of this faculty is
notoriously obscure, but we can answer the present question by noting
that he identifies imagination as 'a movement taking place as a result of
actual perception' (429al-2)7 Imagination is not the same thing as per-
ception but it cannot occur without perception. So perception is a neces-
sary condition for imagination but it is not clear whether it is also a
sufficient condition. In DA III 10 Aristotle does claim that all animals
See Nussbaum's De Motu Animahum, Essay 5 (221-68), for an excellent analysis of

φαντασία, especially in action contexts. She argues that the φαντασία is not just an
objective picture-image of a perceived object, but rather is an interpretive awareness
of such an object which need not be like a mental picture. I agree with her on this
point, but for the sake of simplicity and following convention, I substitute 'imagi-
nation' and 'image' for her transliterated 'phantasia' in quoting her translation of the
MA.

have sensitive imagination.8 In chapter 11 he seems to think that even

'imperfect' animals have imagination, but only in an 'indeterminate'
way (433b31-4a5). So imagination may be directly implied by perception
in this second argument. This now may explain how imagination enters
into the previous argument about locomotion: desire and avoidance
have as their objects the pleasurable and the painful, where there is
pleasure and pain there is perception,9 and where there is perception
there is imagination.
On the other hand, even if this line of reasoning is implicit in the
locomotion argument Aristotle may not mean that imagination is di-
rectly implied by perception. In the second argument, the perception
syllogism, the conclusion should be 'where there is perception there is
appetite', but Aristotle cashes this out as 'imagination and desire'. So also
in the locomotion argument, 'desire and avoidance' seem meant to
directly imply 'imagination and desire'. So επιθυμία in particular, and
δρεξις in general, somehow directly involve imagination. A bit later
Aristotle claims that an animal is not capable of desire without imagina-
tion (433b28-9). The reason for this seems to be that the job of φαντασία
is to capture and present the/on« of the perceived or conceived object of
desire (MA 8, 702al7-19; 11, 703bl8-20). By either approach however,
perception, desire, and imagination are intimately bound together:
whatever has one will also have the others. Let us keep these points in
mind as we consider what causes animal and human motion.
Aristotle next considers the faculty of soul peculiar to humans. Nei-
ther intellect (νους) nor contemplative intellect (ό θεωρητικός) can be the
cause of locomotion, because they are not concerned with pursuit and
avoidance (432b26-9) as required by the premise of the first argument
above. Even practical intellect (ό πρακτικός), which does involve pursuit
and avoidance, is not a sufficient condition for locomotion, because it
may think of a pleasant or painful object without causing locomotion or
it may command movement but be overruled by επιθυμία (432b29-3a6).
Nor is desire a sufficient condition (in adult humans), because the
continent person's desires can be controlled by reason (433a6-8). From
these considerations Aristotle concludes in chapter 10 that desire and
8 43339-12,433b29-30; and chapter 11,434a5-7.

9 Aristotle's premise is that perception implies pleasure and pain, but he could not
deny the reverse, that pleasure and pain imply perception.

practical intellect can produce locomotion. But imagination must count

as a sort of thought, since humans sometimes follow imagination rather
than knowledge and non-human animals have only imagination and no
intellect. But imagination and practical intellect both presuppose desire,
making desire the first necessary condition for action. Aristotle says:
Every desire too is for the sake of something; for the object of desire is
the starting-point (αρχή) for the practical intellect... The object of desire
produces movement, and, because of this, thought produces move-
ment, because the object of desire is its starting-point. (433al5-20)
Exactly how 'the object of desire produces movement' is explained in

more detail in de Motu Animalium, which will be addressed shortly. For
now what is important is Aristotle's conclusion that 'there is one thing
which produces movement, the faculty of desire (το όρεκτικόν)' (433a21).
But this is soon qualified: 'Hence that which produces movement will
be one in kind, the faculty of desire as such — and first of all the object
of desire (το όρεκτόν) (for this produces movement without being moved,
by being thought of or imagined)' (433blO-12). This suggests that the
desired object is more specifically the cause of motion.
Aristotle makes four further distinctions concerning desire qua cause
of locomotion:
There are three things, one that which produces movement, second that
whereby it does so, and third again that which is moved, and that which
produces movement is twofold, that which is unmoved and that which
produces movement and is moved. That which is unmoved is the
practical good, and that which produces movement and is moved is the
faculty of desire (for that which is moved is moved in so far as it desires,
and desire as actual is a form of movement), while that which is moved
is the animal; and the instrument by which desire produces movement
is then something bodily. Hence it must be investigated among the
functions common to body and soul. (433bl3-21)
These four parts involved in an instance of desire are:

(la) That which produces movement and is itself unmoved — this
is called 'the practical good,' which must be the desired object.
(Ib) That which produces movement and is itself moved — this is
the faculty of desire.
(2) "That whereby' or 'the instrument' by which desire produces
movement — Aristotle says here only that this is 'something

bodily', and is found in a sort of joint because 'everything is

moved by pushing and pulling' (433b21-26), but we shall see
in de Motu Animalium that this is specifically the πνεύμα in the
heart.
(3) That which is moved — this is the animal.

Note that there is implicit in these distinctions a certain dualism: the
emphasis here is on the psychological, desiderative, intentional aspect
of motion, but the bodily instrumental part which is also a necessary
condition for motion suggests a physiological, mechanistic aspect that is
explained in greater detail in the de Motu Animalium. So using de Anima
III 9-10 as an introduction, let us now examine MA 6-11.
MA 6 states the problem: 'How the soul moves the body, and what is
the αρχή of an animal's motion' (700blO-ll). This chapter largely restates
what we were told in DA ΙΠ 9 and 10: the producers of motion are
reduced to desire and thought (νους); desire and the faculty of desire
(these terms seem to be used interchangeably) produce morion and are
themselves moved ([lb] in my list); the object of desire and the object of
thought (το διανοητόν) are called 'first movers' and these impart morion
but are themselves unmoved ([la] in my list).
In MA 7 we find the psychological and mechanistic aspects of animal
motion explained back to back. The psychological aspect has so far been
explained in terms of desire and, in the case of adult humans, thought;
Aristotle now cashes this out more specifically in terms of the practical
syllogism. The practical syllogism is similar in form to the theoretical
syllogism, but there are two main differences. First, the latter is con-
cerned with 'unchanging objects' (701a9), with the objects of knowledge
in the strict sense (επιστήμη) which are necessary, eternal, etc., such as
mathematical truths. The former is concerned with what is contingent
and can be done. Second, the conclusion of the theoretical syllogism is a
'speculative proposition' (701alO), whereas the conclusion of the practi-
cal syllogism is an action (701al2-13). For instance, whenever I think that
every person should take walks, and that I am a person, I immediately
take a walk: the conclusion here is the actual walking. We do not always
consciously consider every step in such syllogisms, but rather skip the
obvious premises and go straight to the action. For instance, in this
example I do not consciously affirm that I am a person, but as soon as I
think that every person should take walks I start off walking. This partly
explains why action occurs so quickly: it is obvious that not every action
is preceded by extended syllogistic deliberation; in fact, the practical

syllogism may at least sometimes be only an explanatory device used to

account for an action after the fact10.
Many actions occur with no prior syllogistic reasoning, but follow
immediately upon a desire. Animals and children, since they lack reason,
cannot formulate practical syllogisms, so such a process does not account
for their movements. Aristotle explains:
For whenever a creature is actually using sense-perception or imagina-

tion or thought towards the thing for-the-sake-of-which, he does at once
what he desires. For the activity of the desire takes the place of ques-
tioning or thinking. "I have to drink," says appetite. "Here's drink,"
says sense-perception or imagination or thought. At once he drinks.
This, then, is the way that animals are impelled (όρμώσι) to move and
act: the proximate reason for movement is desire, and this comes to be
either through sense-perception or through imagination and thought.
With creatures that desire to act, it is sometimes from appetite or
spiritedness and sometimes from [desire or] wish that they make or act.
(701a29-bl)
This explains the psychological aspect of the movement of animals and

children, and together with the practical syllogism accounts for the
actions of adult humans.
Aristotle next launches straightaway, with no transition, into the
physiological, mechanistic aspect of motion. Animals, he tells us, are like
'automatic puppets' (701b2) in so far as they have bones and sinews that
are analogous to the pegs and cables in the puppets. The puppets 'are
set moving when a small motion occurs; the cables are released and the
pegs strike against one another' (701b2-3), and likewise the animal
moves when its sinews are released and slackened (701b7-10). The key
difference between animals and these puppets is that the former undergo
alteration (άλλοίωσις), and here is where Aristotle connects the psycho-
logical and physiological aspects of motion:
In the animal the same part has the capacity to become both larger and
smaller and to change its shape, as the parts expand because of heat
and contract again because of cold, and alter. Alteration is caused by
images (φαντασίαι) and sense-perceptions and ideas. For sense-percep-
10 See Nussbaum's De Motu Ammalium, Essay 4, on this view.

tions are at once a kind of alteration and imagination and thinking have
the power of the actual things. For it hams out that the form conceived
of the [warm or cold or] pleasant or fearful is like the actual thing itself.
That is why we shudder and are frightened just thinking of something.
All these are affections and alterations; and when bodily parts are
altered some become larger, some smaller.... Further, when, under the
influence of heat or cold or some other similar affection, an alteration
is produced in the region of the heart, even if it is only in an impercep-
tibly small part of it, it produces a considerable difference in the body,
causing blushing and pallor, as well as shuddering, trembling, and their
opposites. (701bl3-32)
This psychological/physiological link is explained a bit further in MA 8.

The ultimate cause of motion is the pleasant or painful object of pursuit
or avoidance, that 'practical good' which produces movement but is
itself unmoved. This object is represented to the animal through either
sense-perception or imagination or, in the case of humans, thought. The
image or thought is of necessity accompanied by a heating or chilling in
the body (MA 8, 701b34-35). 'Accompanied by' translates ακολουθεί,
which could mean that the physical alteration either 'goes along with' or
'follows after' the psychological phenomenon that corresponds to it.
Aristotle seems a bit ambivalent regarding the strength of the connection
between the thought/image and the heating/chilling: at 701b34 he says
the psychological phenomenon is necessarily (εξ ανάγκης) accompanied
by heating/chilling, but at 702al he weakens this to claim that the former
is nearly always (πάντα σχεδόν) accompanied by the latter. Nussbaum
argues in her commentary on de Motu Animalium that the sense percep-
tion or image or thought does not cause the physical alteration of heat-
ing/chilling (151). The relationship between the psychological event (the
image in the 'soul') and the physiological event (the heating/chilling of
πνεύμα in the heart) may well be that they are two complementary
descriptions of the same phenomenon, just as anger is both a boiling of
blood around the heart (qua material cause) and a desire to return pain
for pain (qua formal cause, DA 11,403a25-b3).n
11 Compare the Stoic view reported by Galen (de sanitate tuenda II 9 Vol. VI ρ.138Κ,
SVF 2.878) that 'the essence of anger was a kind of boiling of the cardiac heat' (quoted
from A.C. Lloyd, 240).

Aristotle claims that feelings of desire or avoidance are necessarily

accompanied by heating or chilling based on his observation that
πα&ηματα such as sexual desire and fear are accompanied by feelings of
heating or chilling in a certain body part or sometimes in the whole body
(702a3-5). This temperature change alters the 'inner regions' (702a8)
which are naturally constituted so as to change between solid and liquid,
and hard and soft. Aristotle does not yet specify what body part is
capable of this. But it is because of this process of alteration in which 'the
active and passive' naturally interact12 that 'at once the one acts and the
other is acted upon' (702al5). Aristotle further explains:
That is why it is pretty much at the same time that the creature thinks
it should move forward and moves, unless something else impedes it.
For the affections suitably prepare the organic parts, desire the affec-
tions, and imagination the desire; and imagination comes about either
through thought or through sense-perception. The rapidity and simul-
taneity result from the fact that the active and passive are naturally
relative to each other. (702al5-21)
This explains why the agent 'does at once what he desires' (701a30) when
his sense-perception or imagination or thought is directed towards the
desired object. I perceive or think of the object I desire, and this produces
an image of the object, which by some obscure but direct interaction with
desire and the affections alters an organic bodily part (thought and
imagination present the form of the desired object and it is this form
which triggers the affection, 703bl8-20). This, again obscurely but di-
rectly, results in my moving towards the object. The final movement is
seemingly simultaneous with the initial perception or thought because
'the active and passive are naturally relative to each other,' i.e., that is
just how the body works.
There is then a long argument, extending through chapter 9, which
concludes that the soul or at least the αρχή of the movement-imparting
soul is in the middle region of the body (702bl5-16). Happily, this is also
where the faculty of sense-perception is located.13 Aristotle says of the
12 On the active and passive see On Generation and Corruption 17-9. These terms refer
to contraries which are genetically the same but specifically different, e.g., solid and
liquid, or hot and cold. This distinction is meant to explain in general how change

mechanics involved in this region: 'So that when, because of sense-per-

ception, the area around the origin is altered and changes, the adjacent
parts change also, expanding and contracting, so that by these means
animal motion necessarily comes about' (702b21-5).
In chapter 10 we are finally told exactly what this middle region is:
the πνεύμα in the heart, πνεύμα is a hot and airy material stuff, usually
translated breath' or 'air'. The heart, in addition to being full of blood,
contains πνεύμα (703al4-16; PA III 4, 667a27-9). πνεύμα is the source of
the animal's power and strength (703a9-10). It is able to contract and
expand, and pull and push (703a22-23), and thus start off the mechanical
chain reaction in the joints that results ultimately in the animal's moving.
The πνεύμα is called 'the tool (το όργανον) of movement' (703a20), and is
clearly the bodily instrumental part referred to in DA ΠΙ10 ([2] in my list
above). Yet MA 10 opens: 'According to the account that gives the reason
for motion, desire is the middle, which imparts movement being moved.
But in living bodies there must be some body of this kind' (703a4-6). This
Ijody' is the πνεΰμα, and seems to satisfy the description 'imparts
movement and is itself moved,'14 which raises the question of the rela-
tionship between desire or the faculty of desire and the πνεύμα ([lb] and
[2] in my list). Is the faculty of desire in some sense a bodily part, namely,
the πνεΰμα? Or does Aristotle just mean that this faculty is located 'in'
the πνεΰμα (whatever 'in' means)? These questions raise the very large
problem of the relationship between soul and body in Aristotle's phi-
losophy, a problem too complicated to be addressed here.15
What is clear is that when this πνεΰμα is heated or chilled it expands
or contracts,16 and this pushes or pulls the connected body parts (sinews
13 Recall that the brain's function is merely to cool the body: Parts of Animals ΓΠ 4,
666all-13; On Sleep 2,455b34-456a6; On Youth and Old Age 3. It is not at all clear what
Aristotle means when he says the soul is 'in' a particular region or body part, but
he does say this: the soul 'is distinct from a spatial magnitude of this kind, though it
is in it' (703a2-3).
14 It is moved in so far as it expands and contracts, but Aristotle says it does so 'without
undergoing alteration' (703a25). I find this distinction obscure.
15 See Nussbaum's de Motu Animaltum, Essay 3 (143-64)
16 This expansion and contraction is mentioned in at least three places:
1) MA 9,702b23, where 'expanding' is έκτεινόμενα and 'contracting' is συναγόμενα.
Here Aristotle does not specify that the πνεΰμα expands and contracts, but says

and bones), and thus movement is relayed throughout the joints of the
body until we get up and walk towards or flee from the object of our desire
or avoidance. Aristotle said earlier in his comparison of moving creatures
with puppets that when the sinews and bones 'are released and slackened
the creature moves' (701b9-10). The expansion and contraction of πνεύμα
in the heart pushes and pulls, causing this releasing and slackening of
sinews and bones. Aristotle specifies in MA 11 that these heatings and
chillings are 'responsible for' or are the 'cause of (αίτίαι) bodily move-
ments (703bl4-15), but he gives no details explaining how the expansion
and contraction of warm air in the heart could push and pull the muscles,
bones, or limbs. He probably never worked out such details, but I will
speculate on the possibilities shortly. But despite its vagueness, what
makes this account so significant is that it is ihe first theory to give us a
stage-by-stage description of how psychological phenomena are trans-
lated into bodily action. Note that in this description movement origi-
nates in the πνεύμα in the heart and extends outward to the limbs; we will
see shortly that πνεύμα also works in the opposite direction relaying
sensations from sense organs inward to the heart.
This theory that I have sketched from MA 7-10 is said by Aristotle to
explain 'how animals move with voluntary motions' (703b3). But in MA
11 he briefly mentions 'involuntary' and 'non-voluntary' movements,
the former of which is also described as involving expansion or contrac-
tion. Note that involuntary and non-voluntary do not mean here what
they mean in Nicomachean Ethics III 1. Rather, in MA 11 'involuntary'
refers to 'such movements as those of the heart and the penis; for often
these are moved when something appears, but without the command of
thought' (703b5-8). And 'non-voluntary' describes 'movements such as
sleep and waking and respiration, and all the others of this kind; for
neither imagination nor desire is, strictly speaking, in control of any of
only that 'the parts adjacent to the origin' (i.e., the body's center: the heart) are
altered thusly
2) MA 10, 703a20-l, where 'expanding' is αύξάνεσθαι and 'contracting' is
συστέλλεσθαι. Here Aristotle says quite explicitly that the πνεΰμα itself expands
and contracts
3) PA ΙΠ 4,666bl4-18: "The heart again is abundantly supplied with sinews (νεύρων),
as might reasonably be expected. For the motions of the body commence from the
heart, and are brought about by traction (ελκειν) and relaxation (άνιέναι). The heart
therefore, which, as already said, is as it were a living creature inside its possessor,
requires some such subservient and strengthening parts.'

these' (703b8-ll). The non-voluntary are the automatic, unconscious,

mechanical motions in the body, and are of no concern here. The invol-
untary are not intentional and goal-directed as are the truly voluntary,
yet they do involve imagination and desire to some degree. Aristotle
seems to be thinking of cases such as the heart leaping in fear when one
is startled, or the penis becoming erect when a man sees something
arousing; such reactions are not sufficient to initiate locomotion,17 but
the person is obviously responding to a perception or image of some-
thing that evokes desire, repulsion, fear, etc. As Aristotle said that the
image of the pleasant or painful object is necessarily accompanied by
heating or chilling (MA 8, 701b34-5), such involuntary reactions would
involve at least a minimal heating or chilling, therefore a minimal
expansion or contraction, and therefore a minimal bodily movement (a
jumping when startled, an erection when aroused).
This account of movement in de Anima and de Motu Animalium explic-
itly mentions πνεύμα only in the heart, but Aristotle's biological works
suggest that πνεύμα plays a larger role, especially in reproduction and
sense perception.18 In de Generatione Animalium (GA) Π 3 we learn that
the male's semen contains πνεύμα, which is the vehicle by which the
'αρχή of the soul' is transmitted from father to offspring. Here πνεύμα is
said to be analogous to the element of the stars, i.e., the fifth element
ether. In discussing spontaneous generation in III 11 Aristotle argues that
since earth contains water, and water contains πνεύμα, and all πνεύμα
contains 'soul-heat', then 'in a way all things are full of soul' (762al9-22).
The first passage elevates the status of πνεύμα to something nearly divine,
while the second passage makes πνεύμα nearly ubiquitous (in the sublu-
nary region); interestingly, this anticipates the role of πνεύμα in Stoic
philosophy as a truly divine and ubiquitous substance. Aristotle later
comments on the wide usage of πνεύμα: 'So it is reasonable that nature
should perform most of her operations using breath [πνεύμα] as an
instrument, for as some instruments serve many uses in the arts, e.g., the
17 SeeD>UH9,432b26-3al.
18 See Peck's 'The Connate Pneuma' for an analysis of the role of πνεϋμα in reproduction
and sensation, and most recently Gad Freudenthal's Aristotle's Theory of Material
Substance, chapter 3, on the connection between πνεύμα and vital heat. Freudenthal's
fascinating work attempts to reconstruct a coherent and systematic theory of πνεύμα,
contrary to common belief that Aristotle had no such theory

hammer and anvil in the smith's art, so does breath in things formed by
nature' (GA V 8, 789b7-ll).
Regarding perception, there seems to be a continuous system of
πνεύμα running from the sense organs to the heart, by means of which
the movements of sensation travel to the heart (which is of course the
seat of the perceptive soul).19 Aristotle says in GA II 6 that 'smell and
hearing are passages full of innate πνεύμα, connecting with the outer air
and terminating at the small blood-vessels around the brain which
extend thither from the heart' (744al-5). In de Partibus Animalium (PA) Π
10 he says the eyes, and again the ears, have passages running from them
to the blood-vessels around the brain. Here he does not mention πνεύμα,
but says the ear is full of air. Since πνεύμα is a type of air,20 and we already
know from the GA that the passages from the ears contain πνεύμα, it is
likely implicit here that the passages from both the eyes and the ears
contain πνεύμα. (These 'passages' were later discovered to be nerves by
Herophilus and Erasistratus — discussed in section III below — who
continued to believe them to be filled with πνεύμα.) And although it is
not explicit in the texts, it seems that all the blood is charged with πνεύμα
when it is first manufactured in the heart21: in Aristotle's Theory of Material
Substance Freudenthal argues that it is the action of the vital heat in the
blood that creates tiny bubbles of πνεύμα by concoction (120-1). In fact,
only πνεύμα in the blood-vessels could account for a flow of perceptual
information from the sense organs into the heart, for at least two reasons.
First, Aristotle is explicit in PA III 4 that blood is manufactured by
concoction from nutriment in the heart and flows outward through the
veins, and no blood enters into the heart from outside it (666a6-8); and
second, he insists that blood is merely a form of nutriment in the body
and as such cannot itself enable us to perceive, although the presence of
blood is a necessary condition for perception.22 And as Freudenthal notes,
19 This continuity is explicitly argued for by Peck in Appendix B of his GA (especially

p. 593); and Freudenthal argues similarly that πνεϋμα is coextensive with all the
blood in the body, 121.
20 G/lII2,736al
21 Peck argues thus in The Connate Pneuma' 115 and 119, and in his GA, Ixiv and
Appendix B. Von Staden endorses Peck's view in Herophilus, 266.
22 PA ΠΙ4,666al7-19 and Π 10, 656bl9-22

the blood vessels are the only available pathways through which the
movements of sensation could travel:
As long as the arteries were not functionally differentiated from the

veins nor the nerves discovered, the communication between the per-
ceiving centre ... and loci throughout the rest of the body where the
perceptions originate, had to be indistinctly ascribed to all the vessels:
there was no other "part" which, being continuous between the centre
and the periphery, was a possible candidate for this office. (132)
Thus, there must be a continuous system of πνεΰμα in place from the

sense organs all the way to the heart. So if we may assume that the veins
contain πνεΰμα, sense-perception is explained as follows.
Let us take the simpler case of seeing or hearing. Aristotle rejects the
effluence theories of the atomists and Empedocles, which claim that
objects give off particles which come into direct contact with the sense
organ. Rather, there must be an intermediate substance such as air or
water which transmits 'movements' from the object to the sense organ
(de Sensu 2,438b3-5). When Aristotle defines perception as taking in the
object's form without its matter, these 'movements' may be the physi-
ological counterpart of this 'form'.23 So these movements travel from the
object to the sense organ via some intermediate substance, then they
travel through the πνεΰμα in the sense organ's 'channels', then through
the πνεΰμα in the blood through the blood-vessels, first going around the
brain then to the heart where they register as perceptions in or by the
'common sense'.24 This much of the physiological process of perception
23 In Aristotle· The Desire to Understand, Jonathan Lear suggests that when Aristotle
says the sense organ receives the form of the perceived thing without its matter (DA
424al7 and 425B23), he means not that the organ is literally made like the object in
quality (e.g., redness), but rather receives a coded message, e.g., a vibration, which
somehow represents its object (116). Sorabji argues that the sense organ does literally
take on the quality of the perceived object ('Body and Soul in Aristotle/ 72n22;
74n28). Guthrie also follows this literal interpretation ('The organs of sight and touch
do become informed in this material way; the flesh becomes warm and the eye (or
the sensitive part of it) coloured/ 302), although this physical alteration is only a
necessary pre-condition of sensation, while sensation itself is a purely psychical
event (A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 6,303).
24 The 'common sense' itself, as instantiated, seems to be composed of πνεΰμα. On this
see Ross' introduction to De Sensu and De Memona, 14-20.

can be attributed to Aristotle with some confidence, I think, although it

is inferred from the texts and never explicitly explained by him. What
remains very obscure and rather mysterious is exactly how the move-
ments of sensation 'travel' by means of the πνεύμα. Would the πνεύμα
bubbles flow outward from the heart along with the blood? If so, the
movements of sensation would have to struggle upstream, so to speak,
to get to the heart. Or perhaps the πνεύμα bubbles rest in place in the
veins as the blood flows past them, and maybe they vibrate or hit each
other domino-style as sensations pass through them. Even more difficult
is the question of how the expansion and contraction of πνεύμα in the
heart can move the whole body. As I noted above, it is clear in the MA
that this expansion and contraction is directly responsible for the push-
ing and pulling of sinews and bones; but Freudenthal argues that it must
again be the πνεύμα running through the veins which transmits what-
ever motions result in bodily locomotion, his main reason being that the
sinews do not extend through the entire body as the veins do (135).
Personally, I find it easier to imagine warm air in the heart pushing and
pulling the sinews and bones, which then moves the limbs, than warm
air in the veins moving the limbs those veins run through. But either way,
we are speculating concerning details about which Aristotle was silent.
He saw that there must be some sort of relay system between the periph-
ery and center to explain the mechanics of perception and movement;
when Herophilus and Erasistrarus discovered the nerves, they distin-
guished between sensory and motor nerves (both filled with πνεύμα) to
accomplish these two tasks.
To briefly recapitulate, considering together the two theories I have
sketched, the explanation of bodily motion from DA and MA and the
explanation of sense perception, we see that the πνεύμα functions in two
directions. First, sense perception is explained by movements traveling
from the sense organs inward to the heart carried on or by the πνεύμα
which is continuous from the sense organs, channels, and blood vessels
to the heart. Second, bodily motion, which is the animal's response to the
perceptions it receives, is explained by the heating and chilling and
subsequent expansion and contraction of πνεύμα in the heart being
relayed outward to the limbs, via the pushing and pulling of sinews and
bones. We shall next see that the Stoics also speak of expansions and
contractions of πνεύμα in the heart.

II Chrysippus' Theory.25
The Stoics are materialists, so that soul and body are both corporeal. The
world is composed of matter which is passive, and god which is active
and shapes the matter.26 More specifically, the world is composed of
earth, water, air, and fire; earth and water are passive, while air and fire
are active. Fire and air together compose πνεύμα, and the hot fire's
expansion seems to conflict with the cold air's contraction in such a way
as to produce a kind of motion. The details here are quite obscure, but
πνεύμα can be qualitatively altered to take various forms, where the
'tension' (τόνος) of a body's πνεύμα determines what sort of body it is.
The active πνεύμα 'sustains' or 'holds together' (συνέχειν) the passive
matter, giving form and quality to bodies. Inanimate bodies such as
sticks and stones contain πνεΰμα in the simplest form, called 'tenor'
(έξις). Plants contain πνεΰμα in the form of 'physique' (φύσις). Animals,
including people, contain πνεΰμα in the form of soul (ψυχή), and humans
also contain it in the form of rational soul. The more complex bodies
include the less complex forms of πνεΰμα as well: e.g., our bones are like
stones, and our nails and hair are like plants.27 The unity of these different
types of matter within a single animal or human body is explained by
the Stoics in terms of mixture: 'An animal is a composite of body and
soul ... [which are] blended through and through.'28 Our soul, then, is
πνεΰμα (itself material: fire and air) in a certain form, which is mixed
throughout the body.
25 In what follows I am speaking of the views of Chrysippus. Often our sources treat
Chrysippus' theories as representative of the whole school; where we know that
Chrysippus' theories differ from Zeno's and/or Cleanthes', I will refer only to the
former. See Hahm's The Origins of Stoic Cosmology for a detailed analysis of the
development of Stoic cosmology from Zeno to Chrysippus; chapter 5, 'Cos-
mobiology', is especially pertinent to my topic, although Hahm does not recognize
the physiological theory I attribute to Chrysippus.
26 Diogenes Laertius VII134
27 Philo, Allegories of the Laws 2.22-3 (SVF 2.458, part; Long and Sedley 47P); Inwood
finds Philo's explanation of how lower forms of this hierarchy are included in higher
levels to be 'fanciful' and untrustworthy (25). (In all following notes I will refer to
Long and Sedley's The Hellenistic Philosophers as LS; SVF refers to von Amim's
Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta.)
28 Hierocles, Elements of Ethics 4.38 (LS 53B[5])

The Stoics describe the soul-πνεΰμα not only as mixed with the body,
but also as extending throughout the body with parts like the tentacles
of an octopus, with the rational soul-πνεΰμα or commanding-faculty (το
ήγεμονικόν) localized in the heart.29 Aetius reports:
The Stoics say that the commanding-faculty is the soul's highest part,
which produces impressions, assents, perceptions and impulses. ...
From the commanding-faculty there are seven parts of the soul which
grow out and stretch out into the body like the tentacles of an octopus
Five of these are the senses, sight, smell, hearing, taste and touch. Sight
is πνεύμα which extends from the commanding-faculty to the eyes,
hearing is πνεΰμα which extends from the commanding-faculty to the
ears.... Of the remainder, one is called seed, and this is πνεΰμα extend-
ing from the commanding-faculty to the genitals. The other,... which
they also call utterance, is πνεΰμα extending from the commanding-fac-
ulty to the pharynx, tongue and appropriate organs.30
Chrysippus used the spider analogy to make the same point:
In the same way as a spider in the center of the web holds in its feet all
the beginnings of the threads, in order to feel by close contact if an insect
strikes the web, and where, so does the ruling part of the soul, situated
in the middle of the heart, check on the beginnings of the senses, in
order to perceive their messages from close proximity.31
As materialists it is easier for the Stoics to explain soul-body interaction,

and another fragment reports that:
by stretching out (τεινομένη έξω32) and relaxing (μετ' αφέσεως), the soul
makes an impression on all the body's parts, since it is blended with
them all, and in making an impression it receives an impression in
29 Galen, On the Formation of the Foetus 4.698, 2-9 (SVF 2.761, part; LS 53D); On the
Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (PHP) 5.2.49,5.3.1 (SVF 2.841, part; LS 53U)
30 Aetius 4.21.1-4 (SVF 2.836, part; LS 53H)
31 Chalcidius, Commentary on the Timaeus, 220 (SVF 2.879); Sambursky's translation,
Physics of the Stoics, 24
32 This is the same terminology used by Aristotle for expansion — εκτεινόμενα — in
MA 702b23.

response. For the body, just like the soul, reacts to pressure; and the
outcome is a state of their joint pressure upon, and resistance to, each
other. From the outermost parts inclining within, it travels ... to the
commanding faculty, with the result that there is an awareness both of
all the body's parts and of the soul's. This is equivalent to the animal's
perceiving itself.33
This 'stretching out' and 'relaxing' and 'joint pressure' here explains the
commanding faculty's awareness of and communication with its own
body.
For the Stoics, any action must be preceded by impression, assent, and
impulse.34 Receiving an impression from a desired object is the first
necessary condition for action. Chrysippus defines impression as 'an
imprinting in the soul, i.e., an alteration/ and it occurs specifically in the
soul-πνεΰμα of the commanding-faculty in the heart.35 Our sense organs
are constantly stimulated by external objects, and since the soul and body
are blended, an affection travels from, say, our eyes, through our soul-
πνεΰμα to our commanding-faculty in the heart, where it enters our
conscious awareness. This is very similar to Aristotle's description of
perception, except that the soul-πνεΰμα is said to be blended with the
body instead of being confined to passages and blood-vessels.
Assent is the second necessary condition for action, and also the
necessary condition for impulse: 'Without assent there is neither action
nor impulsion.'36 The mind assents to a proposition recommending an
action related to the impression being experienced; e.g., (to use Inwood's
example, 60) when faced with a piece of cake the sweet-toothed man
assents to the proposition 'it is fitting for me to eat this cake'. The relation
between assent and impulse is controversial and does not concern me
33 Hierocles, Elements of Ethics 4.38-53 (LS 53B[6]-[9])

34 Brad Inwood's Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, chapters one through three,
compare the Aristotelian and Stoic theories of action, and I am largely following his
account Inwood's book was published the same year as Sandbach's monograph; I
think the parallels Inwood finds between Aristotle and the Stoics can be strength-
ened farther against Sandbach by my present argument.
35 Diogenes Laerdus VII50 (SVF 2.55; LS 39A[3])
36 Plutarch, On Stoic Self-contradictions 1057A (SVF 3.177, part; LS 53S). Also Seneca,
On Anger 2.4 (LS 65X[2]): 'Impulse never exists without the mind's assent.'

here.37 Most likely, either assent temporally precedes impulse, or they

are two aspects of one phenomenon. Either way, the third necessary
condition for and efficient cause of action is experiencing an 'impulse'
(ορμή) towards the desired object or a 'repulsion' (αφορμή) away from
an unwanted object.38 Impulse and repulsion, like Aristotle's desire and
aversion, are both psychological and physiological phenomena. Under
its psychological description, impulse in humans is defined as 'a move-
ment of thought towards something in the sphere of action,'39 and while
assent is given to a proposition, impulse is some sort of movement
towards the predicate of that very proposition.40 While this makes the
object of impulse a linguistic entity (a λεκτόν), this entity represents the
real desired object, e.g., the cake, and the Stoics speak of impulse as the
direct cause of the action of reaching for the cake.
The Stoics insist that all human impulse is rational because the soul
has no irrational parts. However, some impulses are 'excessive' and
'disobedient to reason/ and such impulses are called 'passions' (πάθη).41
A passion is not an 'emotion' in our sense, but rather refers specifically
to an excessive impulse; the Stoics countenance many emotions as appro-
priate impulses, as long as they are not excessive. They divide all
reasonable impulses (or 'good feelings', εύπάθειαι) into joy, watchful-
ness, and wishing.42 Joy includes delight, sociability, cheerfulness;
watchfulness includes respect, cleanliness; and wishing includes kind-
ness, generosity, warmth, affection.43 There are four species of passion:
appetite (επιθυμία), fear (φόβος), pleasure (ηδονή), and distress (or 'pain'
— λύπη). Stobaeus differentiates them:
37 See Inwood 42-66, and Annas 97-8.

38 See Inwood, chapter 5, for an excellent analysis of Stoic impulse.
39 Stobaeus 2.86,17-87,6 (SVF 3 169, part; LS 53Q)
40 Stobaeus 2.88,2-6 (SVF 3.171; LS 331)
41 Stobaeus 2.88,8 (SVF 3 378, part; LS 65A[1])
42 Nussbaum provides a nice description of these, The Therapy of Desire, 399.
43 Diogenes Laertius VII116 (SVF 3.431; LS 65F)

Appetite and fear come first, the former in relation to what appears
good, and the latter in relation to what appears bad. Pleasure and
distress result from these: pleasure, whenever we get the objects of our
appetite or avoid the objects of our fear; distress, whenever we fail to
get the objects of our appetite or experience to objects of our fear.44
Appetite and fear are future-looking, while pleasure and distress are
responses to the present situation. Inwood translates this text a bit
differently, calling appetite ('desire') and fear the 'primary' passions,
and pleasure and distress ('pain') the 'subordinate' (146). All vices are
subsumed under one of these four passions (e.g., appetite includes anger,
intense sexual desire, cravings and yearnings, love of pleasure and riches
and honours).45 Since all human impulses are rational, passions are also:
Passion is no different from reason, and there is no dissension and

conflict between the two, but a turning of the single reason in both
directions, which we do not notice owing to the sharpness and speed
of the change. ... Appetite and anger and fear and all such things are
corrupt opinions and judgments, which do not arise about just one part
of the soul but are the whole commanding-faculty's inclinations, yield-
ings, assents and impulses.46
This monistic psychology, allowing disobedience to reason but not

irrational parts, is obviously problematic and has been much discussed.
I will not pursue this psychological dimension of impulse, as I am
presently concerned with the physiological dimension.
The physiological description of impulse must be reconstructed from
fragments whose significance, I believe, has lain unrecognized. Galen,
in On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (PHP), criticizes Chrysippus'
denial of irrational parts of the soul. In the course of his criticism he
reports Chrysippus' definitions of distress and pleasure, the two subor-
dinate passions. Galen says that Chrysippus first defines distress as 'a
fresh belief that evil is present' and pleasure as 'a fresh belief that good
44 2.88-89; SVF 3.378, part; LS 65A(4)

45 Stobaeus 2.90,19-91,9 (SVF 3.394, part; LS 65E)
46 Plutarch, On Moral Virtue 446F-447A (SVF 3.459, part; LS 65G)

is present' (4.2.1).47 Galen complains that Chrysippus then contradicts

himself in offering this second definition:
A) In defining distress, he [Chrysippus] says that it is "a shrinking at
what is thought to be something to avoid/' and he says pleasure is "a
swelling up at what is thought to be something to pursue."48
Galen adds that Chrysippus sometimes mentions 'expansions'

(διαχύσεις) and 'contractions' (συστολαί49) in addition to shrinkings
(μειώσεις) and swellings (επάρσεις).50 Galen's complaint is that the first
definition is in terms of the rational part of the soul and the second is in
terms of an irrational part, but Chrysippus denies the existence of an
irrational part. I am here unconcerned with the details of Galen's criti-
cism. What is relevant is that Galen has just revealed the psychological
and physiological descriptions of two of the four species of passion. He
sees these two descriptions as indicating the existence of conflicting
rational and irrational parts of soul, but I believe they are in fact comple-
mentary, in the same way Aristotle's psychological and physiological
accounts of desire are complementary: they are two descriptions of a
single phenomenon.51 The second definition Galen reports reveals the
physiological guise of impulse: it is an expansion or contraction.
A bit later Galen reports Chrysippus' view that passions not only are
judgments but also are identified with expansions, contractions, etc.:
47 Where 'fresh' probably means either recent or intense; see Inwood, 147, on the
controversy between these interpretations.
48 On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato 4.2.5 (SVF 3.463, part; LS 65D[4])
49 This is close to Aristotle's 'contraction' — συστέλλεσθαι — in MA 703a21.
50 On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato 4.2.6 (LS 65D[5]). These terms recur at 4.3.2
(LS65K[1]).
51 Recall Aristotle's two definitions of 'anger' qua formal and material causes, given
above. Michael Frede makes a similar observation: for the Stoics (as for Aristotle, he
notes) there are three components or aspects of any passion (he uses 'affection'): '(i)
the affection, (ii) the physiological state which corresponds to it, and (ω) a charac-
teristic feeling which we have when we are aware of this physiological state ...
Obviously all three things are so closely related to each other that we tend to conflate
them' ("The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul', 102).

B) On this point [i.e., his holding the passions to be judgments], he

[Chrysippus] is in conflict with Zeno and himself and many other
Stoics, who do not take the soul's judgments themselves to be its
passions, but identify these with the results of the judgments — the
irrational contractions (συστολάς), cowerings, tearings, swellings
(επάρσεις) and expansions (διαχύσεις).52
This text is rather vague, but it at least suggests that all passions are
correlated with physical alterations such as expansions and contractions.
Other sources confirm that the two subordinate passions were de-
scribed in terms of expansion and contraction. Two centuries before
Galen, Andronicus reported these definitions of the four passions:
C) Distress is an irrational contraction (συστολή), or a fresh opinion that

something bad is present, at which people think it right to be contracted.
Fear is an irrational shrinking (εκκλισις), or avoidance of an expected
danger. Appetite is an irrational stretching (desire, ορεξις), or pursuit
of an expected good. Pleasure is an irrational swelling (επαρσις), or a
fresh opinion that something good is present, at which people think it
right to be swollen.53
This text clearly shows pleasure and distress to be expansions and

contractions, but is not very good evidence for either appetite or fear.
First, 'stretching' translates ορεξις, which is arguably not meant as a
physical stretching, δρεξις comes from όρέγω, the root meaning of which
is to stretch out or reach out, so it is possible that the Stoics here conceive
of appetite as an irrationally-motivated stretching out of soul-πνεΰμα.
However, by their time δρεξις is so commonly used to refer to a psycho-
logical 'reaching for', i.e., a desire, that I cannot argue that δρεξις here
means anything more than that. Second, 'shrinking' translates εκκλισις,
by which Long and Sedley mean 'aversion' or a literal 'turning away
from' rather than 'contraction'.54 έκκλίνω means to T?end out of the
regular line', 'dislocate', 'turn away', 'avoid', and εκκλισις correspond-
ingly means 'turning out of one's course', dislocation', 'avoidance',
52 PHP 4.3.2; LS 65K(1)

53 Andronicus, On Passions 1 (SVF 3.391, part; LS 65B)
54 See their commentary on 65B, vol. 1,421.

which pairs well with the root meaning of ορεξις as turning or reaching
towards something. The Stoic word choice thus suggests that pleasure
and distress are small scale expansions and contractions within the body
(specifically of the soul-πνεΰμα), while appetite and fear are large scale
movements of the mind and the whole body towards or away from
something.
Stobaeus also associates the passions with expansions and contrac-
tions:
D) In the case of all the soul's passions, when they [the Stoics] call them
Opinions', Opinion' is used instead of 'weak supposition', and 'fresh'
instead of 'the stimulus of an irrational contraction (συστολής) or
swelling (έπάρσεως)'.55
However, only pleasure and distress are called 'fresh' opinions, so this
text reconfirms that the subordinate passions are expansions and con-
tractions, although it is silent concerning the primary passions of pleas-
ure and distress (despite its misleading subject 'all the soul's passions').
In Tusculan Disputations Cicero provides the Stoic definition of dis-
tress — aegritudo — as:
E) a newly formed belief of present evil, the subject of which thinks it

right to feel depression and shrinking of soul (demitti contrahique an-
imo).56
And again:
F) the first definition of distress is that it is a shrinking together

(contractio) of the soul in conflict with reason' (ibid.).
In his Loeb translation of Cicero's Tusculan Disputations, King notes (342)

that contractio answers to the Greek συστολή, and he says 'joy is expan-
sion, grief contraction/ understanding elatio as expansion.57 Seneca notes
that:
55 Stobaeus 2.88,22-89,3 (SVF 3.378, part; LS 65C)

56 4.14, J Ε King's translation from Loeb edition
57 As does Inwood, 174.

G) joy is an 'elation of spirit' (animi elatio)!*
This identifies a reasonable impulse, as opposed to a passion, with what

sounds like a physical expansion in the soul.
Diogenes Laertius seems to suggest that all three types of reasonable
impulse are defined in the same physiological terms:
H) They [the Stoics] say that there are three good feelings: joy (χαράν),
watchfulness (εϋλάβειαν), wishing (βούλησιν). Joy, they say, is the
opposite of pleasure, consisting in well-reasoned swelling (επαρσιν);
and watchfulness is the opposite of fear, consisting in well-reasoned
shrinking (έκκλισιν). For the wise man will not be afraid at all, but he
will be watchful. They say that wishing is the opposite of appetite,
consisting in well-reasoned stretching (desire, δρεξιν).59
Joy is the correct (i.e., rational) version of pleasure, watchfulness is the

correct version of fear, and wishing of appetite; interestingly, there is no
correct version of distress (and thus the sage would feel no form of pain,
and be perfectly undisturbed and happy). This text uses the same three
Greek terms — έπαρσιν, εκκλισιν, and δρεξιν — used in text C to describe
fear, appetite, and pleasure. Given the meanings of these terms discussed
above, this text, like C, would support επαρσιν, and so joy, being meant
as a small scale expansion within the body, and εκκλισιν and δρεξιν, and
so watchfulness and wishing, being meant as a large scale movement of
the mind and whole body away from or towards something.
The eight texts (A-H) together provide the following evidence con-
cerning the various types of impulses and expansions and contractions:
1. Distress is a μειώσις in Α; συστολή in A, C, and D; contractio in
EandF.
2. Pleasure is an επαρσις in A, C, and D; διαχύσις in A.
3. Passions in general are συστολάς, επάρσεις, and διαχύσεις in Β.
4. Fear is an έ'κκλισις in C.
5. Appetite is an δρεξις in C.
58 Eptstulae Morales 59.2, R M. Gummere's Loeb translation

59 Diogenes Laertius VII116 (SVF 3.431; LS 65F[l-3])

152 PrisciUa K. Sakezles
6. Joy is an elatio in G; επαρσις in H.
7. Watchfulness is an εκκλισις in H.
8. Wishing is an ορεξις in H.
This (1 and 2) shows that there is very strong evidence that the subordi-
nate passions of pleasure and distress were considered to be literal
physical expansions and contractions. Text Β provides some evidence (3)
for thinking that all passions are expansions or contractions: the three
Greek terms used in Β are the same ones used to describe distress and
pleasure in A, C, and D, and one term used for expansion — επαρσις —
is the same term used in H to describe the reasonable impulse of joy. The
primary passions of fear and appetite (4 and 5) and the corresponding
reasonable impulses of watchfulness and wishing (7 and 8) are described
in Greek as movements towards or away from something, and so are
best understood as a sort of large scale psychological and whole-body
motion, and not a covert internal expansion or contraction of soul-
πνεΰμα. I believe the evidence (6) is good for taking the reasonable
impulse of joy to be an expansion because two different sources (G and
H) identify it as such, and the well-reasoned επαρσις of H recurs as the
irrational επαρσις of A, B, C, and D.
The so-called 'preliminary passions' (propatheiai),60 those involuntary
and unthinking responses to stimuli, are also identified with expansions
and contractions. Aulus Gellius quotes Epictetus' view (which he claims
to be consistent with Zeno and Chrysippus) of a sage's reaction to being
startled: 'even a sage's soul [will] be moved for a short while and be
contracted and grow pale (paulisper moveri et contrahi et pallescere), not
because he has formed an opinion of anything evil but because of certain
rapid and unreflective movements which forestall the proper function
of the intellect and reason.'61 Cicero reports the same view: the wise man
will not experience the passion of distress (and as noted above, there is
no correct version of λύπη), but 'all the same the sting and certain minor
symptoms of shrinking (contractiunculae) of soul will be left' (TD 3.83).
These preliminary passions are analogous to the involuntary move-
60 On which see Inwood, 175-81.

61 Attic Nights 19.1.17, translation following Inwood, 177

merits of Aristotle's de Motu Animalium 11, which as I noted above,

involve at least minimal expansions or contractions.
One may be tempted to dismiss the Stoic references to expansion and
contraction as merely a metaphorical way of referring to the pheno-
menological 'feel' of impulses, as when I say I am 'elated'. For instance,
in The Therapy of Desire Nussbaum notes 'joy of the intense sort is
experienced as a giddy inflation, a dangerous uplift that is never without
the vertiginous sense that at any moment we may be dashed to the
ground' (393). And A.C. Lloyd claims that the expansion/contraction
terminology refers to the affective side of the passions (he uses 'emo-
tions'): "The names of the "feelings" — e.g., systole ("contraction") and
diachysis ("diffusion") — were in fact current names of the emotions for
ordinary Greek speakers who did not think (or declined to think) of them
as literal contractions and expansions' (238). However, Lloyd provides
absolutely no evidence for this claim about the ordinary Greek usage of
these terms, and Liddell-Scott's Greek-English Lexicon entries do not
support his claim. And there are two reasons against dismissing the Stoic
terminology as mere metaphor. First, these references are fairly frequent
and consistent: as I showed above, numerous sources verify that the
subordinate passions of pleasure and distress and the reasonable im-
pulse of joy are described as expansions and contractions. Second, Stoic
physics and physiology are consistent with these passions and the
impulse being literal expansions and contractions: as I noted at the
beginning of this section, πνεύμα is composed of fire and air. The hotness
of fire and the coldness of air cause them to expand and contract,
resulting in some sort of motion in the πνεύμα which seems meant to
explain its 'tension', which in turn explains the form taken by the body
that πνεύμα 'sustains'. Since impulse is an activity of the commanding-
faculty, which is a physical mass of πνεύμα in the heart, it seems quite
consistent with their materialism to claim that an impulse is a literal
expansion or contraction of this mass. Furthermore, there need not be a
conflict between impulses being a literal expansion/contraction of
πνεύμα and their being felt as an expansion/contraction in one's heart or
stomach or whole body; in fact, the former physiological condition
would cause and account for the latter psychic condition or pheno-
menological 'feel'. Considering all this, it seems unreasonably dismis-
sive and skeptical to insist that the Stoics were merely speaking
metaphorically. I suggest we take them literally.
Since impulse and passion are activities of the commanding-faculty,
which is a certain form of πνεύμα centralized in the heart, it must be this
πνεύμα in the heart which expands and contracts. Impulse is for the Stoics

the efficient cause of action and Inwood argues that it is both the
necessary and sufficient condition for action (52), so it seems quite
probable that they explained bodily movement in terms of this expan-
sion and contraction of soul-πνεϋμα in the heart. In fact one text from
Seneca suggests that it is the movement of πνεύμα in the mind (heart)
which causes the limbs to move when one walks: 'Cleanthes and his
pupil Chrysippus did not agree on what walking is. Cleanthes said it
was breath (spiritum = πνεϋμα) extending from the commanding-faculty
(principali = το ήγεμονικόν) to the feet, Chrysippus that it was the com-
manding-faculty itself.'62 Inwood says of this disagreement between the
two Stoics:
Cleanthes thought that the movement of the mind's pneuma (and this
must be the impulse) sent out a separate jet of pneuma to the limbs as a
motor stimulus. This, he said, should be called "walking". The action,
properly speaking, is not the movement of the limbs but the pneuma
which made them move. Chrysippus thought that the relation of mind
to body was more intimate, and that the pneuma of the mind could act
directly on the limbs and that this should properly be called "action".
... Both held that the mind was pneuma in the heart and that actions
were causations of bodily movements by movements in that pneuma.
They disagreed about the detailed pneumatic mechanics of seeing the
limbs in motion and about which portion of this psycho-physical chain
of events should be designated as the action itself. But these points are
less significant than their shared belief in a cause of action, a motion of
the material mind called impulse. (50-1)63
I agree completely with Inwood's analysis. My purpose in this paper is

twofold. First, it is to supply the so far unrecognized link between
impulse and bodily motion: the former is an expansion or contraction of
πνεύμα in the heart which then moves the πνεύμα extending through the
body like octopus tentacles, resulting in the movement of the limbs.
Second, it is to argue that this theory was borrowed from Aristotle: Stoic
impulse, like Aristotle's desire, has the function of translating what we
want into what our bodies do. We saw above that communication be-
62 Letters 113.23 (SVF 2.836, part; LS 53L)
63 In State Philosophy Rist says essentially the same thing, 33-4.

tween body and commanding-faculty is described in terms of the soul-

πνεΰμα stretching out and relaxing, and also in terms of the mutual
pressure upon each other of soul and body. Perception occurs when an
object makes some sort of imprint on our sense organs which travels
through the soul-πνεΰμα to the commanding faculty in the heart. Thus
the Stoics like Aristotle would use the πνεΰμα to function in two direc-
tions: perception involves information traveling via the πνεΰμα inwards
to the heart, and bodily motion involves expansions and contractions of
πνεύμα in the heart being relayed outwards to the limbs.
This is my reconstruction of the Stoic account of the physiological
dimension of human action, and it is literally a reconstruction (the only
one as far as I know64) of the few relevant fragments we have. But I think
it is right, and it reveals a physiological picture of perception and action
nearly identical to Aristotle's. The differences are necessary to adapt
Aristotle's theory to the Stoics' brand of materialism.65
As similar as these two theories are, I think it would be perverse for
Sandbach to insist that the Stoics developed their theory independently,
and that the similarity is sheer coincidence. But there is one thing left to
do before one can reasonably conclude that the Stoics adopted Aristotle's
theory, and that is to show that there was not anyone else they could have
gotten it from. We know of no other philosopher who had a similar
theory, and the only other likely source is the doctors, anatomists and
physiologists of this period.
To see the scientific context in which Aristotle and the Stoics were
working, I will briefly survey the relevant theories current at that time.66
64 There are occasional references to the passions as expansions or contractions, but

no one has recognized the Aristotelian-type theory I reconstruct here. See, e.g.,
Frede, 102; A C Lloyd, 234, 236, 238; and especially Inwood 146-55 and 165: 'all
impulses are motions in the pneuma of the hegemomkon; this psychological material-
ism was taken very seriously by the Stoics, although we find it relatively unenlight-
ening to be told that such and such a psychological event is identifiable with a certain
set of movements in the stuff of the mind.'
65 The differences are of course vast, but I have no space to address them here. I only
mention the two most obvious: 1) the Stoic's 'mind' is material, Aristotle's is not;
and 2) the Stoic's πνεΰμα is mixed with the body, while Aristotle's is contained in
channels and veins.
66 In chapter 1 of Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, Julia Annas discusses medical theories
from Aristotle through the Hellenistic period. While her treatment of this topic is,

I would like to say that the Aristotelian and Stoic physiological theory I
have described is perfectly unique — that would certainly strengthen
my claim that the Stoics adopted Aristotle's theory. Unfortunately,
things are not that simple.
Ill Other Physiologists
There were two anatomists before Aristotle's time that he knew of and
referred to. First is Alcmaeon of Croton, whose floruit was probably
about 450 BCE. Very little is known about Alcmaeon, but he was famous
for first dissecting the eye67 and he was the first to mention passages
(πόροι) from the eyes, ears, nose, and maybe tongue, to the brain. He is
said to have thought that all of the senses were connected in some way
with the brain,68 but there is no evidence to suggest that he thought of
the brain as the seat of consciousness or intellect.69 He is relevant to our
present topic because he shows that Aristotle did not discover the pas-
sages from the sense organs in the head, but rather this would have been
fairly common knowledge at the time. And Alcmaeon's attributing some
special role to the brain anticipates what is soon to become a very
controversial question.
Diogenes of Apollonia was a younger contemporary of Alcmaeon
(fl. c. 440-430). Aristotle, in his History of Animals III 2, describes and
criticizes Diogenes' system of blood-vessels. Diogenes also spoke of
passages connecting the ears and nose to the brain, but he seems to
have thought that the eyes and tongue were connected to the heart.
He does not address the question of there being one special place where
thought or perception is centered, but heart and brain are both impor-
tant to him.
as she admits (20nll), cursory and selective, it is a good starting point for anyone
interested in Hellenistic medicine as it influenced philosophy, and it contains the
references and bibliography one would need to pursue more detailed research.
67 Chalcidius, Commentary on the Timaeus, 279
68 Theophrastus, On the Senses 26 (in Stratton)
69 On this see Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition, 251-2.

He was perhaps a follower of Anaximenes,70 and air played a signifi-

cant role in his physiology.71 For instance, he thought that when we hear
or smell something, the outside air enters our body and mixes with air
in the brain to produce perception. He also associated air with thought,
movement, and life in general.72 He seems to have thought that the veins
contained air as well as blood, and it was this air that made thought and
perception possible: Theophrastus reports that 'the internal air is the real
agent of perception, as it is a tiny fragment of divinity' (On the Senses 42)
and 'thinking is due to pure dry air' (ibid., 44). However, Theophrastus
adds that it is the mingling of air with our blood that causes thought and
perception (ibid., 47). Diogenes is noteworthy because he attributed to
air the sorts of functions which Aristotle soon afterwards attributed to
πνεύμα. In Physics of the Stoics (10,26-7) Sambursky sees Diogenes' view
of air as influencing the Stoics' view of πνεΰμα. I believe this is right, and
Diogenes is one of many (including Aristotle) that influenced Stoic
philosophy. Nevertheless, Diogenes does not have the specifically Aris-
totelian theory (of desires being expansions/contractions in the heart
which cause bodily motion) which I find in Chrysippus.
Plato should be mentioned, not because he was a physiologist of
course, but because he dabbled in physiological issues in the Timaeus.
What is relevant to our subject is Plato's locating the three parts of the
soul in three parts of the body (69c-72d). The rational soul is in the head,
perhaps specifically in the brain, and the neck serves to block off the
rational soul and protect it from being polluted by the lower parts. The
spirited soul is in the chest area, perhaps in the heart; and the appetitive
soul is in the region between midriff and navel, and is associated with
the liver.73 Plato speaks of 'narrow channels' (στενωπα, 70b) through
which the rational soul sends commands to the rest of the body, and these
are quite possibly the veins. He also seems to consider the veins (φλέβας)
to be carriers of perceptual information from the sense organs to the parts
70 Diogenes Laertius IX 57
71 Theophrastus, On the Senses 39^18
72 Aristotle, de Anima 12,405a21-5
73 Galen takes himself to be defending Plato's view in locating the three parts of the
soul in brain, heart, and liver in On the Doctnnes of Hippocrates and Plato.

of the soul (64a-68d), because he later describes two main veins extend-
ing from the left and right sides of the head to the opposite sides of the
body whose functions are first, to fasten the head to the body, and
second, to ensure that 'sensations from both sides might be distributed
over the whole body' (77e, Jowett translation). In his general account of
perception Plato says the mobile particles within us (the fiery and airy
ones, as opposed to the sluggish watery and earthy ones) receive an
impression and then pass this motion on to neighboring particles until
the motion reaches the mind (το φρόνιμον) and announces the perceived
quality (64b). It is not explicitly stated, but surely το φρόνιμον is in the
head with the rational soul. This suggests that perceptual information
travels from the sense organs to the brain.
However, when Plato goes on to discuss particular sense organs this
account is complicated. Taste occurs when particles of food enter the
small veins in the tongue and interact with the 'moist delicate flesh' of
these veins and/or the tongue (65c-d). Apparently sensation occurs in
the tongue itself, but Plato notes that these veins in the tongue extend all
the way to the heart (65d). Smell occurs when particles enter the veins
in the nose, and Plato says smells are distinguished only into the painful
and the pleasant: the painful sort 'irritate and disturb the whole cavity
which is situated between the head and navel' and the pleasant particles
have a soothing effect on the same region (66d-67a). So in this case
sensation is not limited to the sense organ, but seems to occur in the
central portion of the body where the spirited and appetitive souls
reside. Plato describes hearing thus: 'sound is a blow which passes
through the ears, and is transmitted by means of the air, the brain, and
the blood, to the soul, and hearing is the vibration of this blow which
begins in the head and ends in the region of the liver' (67b). This sounds
as if the whole soul, from brain to liver, is involved in hearing. Vision is
explained in terms of fiery particles entering the passages (τάς διεξόδους,
67e8) in the eye, and color perception seems to occur in the eye itself as
the fiery particles 'force their way through and melt' the passages and
otherwise interact with the fiery and watery nature of the eyeball. The
fifth sense of touch is not discussed. This is a convoluted theory of
perception, and Plato seems unconcerned with making it any more
consistent. What it reveals to us, however, is that Plato was at least
familiar with contemporary physiological theory and was imposing his
own tripartite conception of the soul on that theory.
The first really interesting and significant text for our purposes is the
Hippocratic work "The Sacred Disease'. Unfortunately this text is impos-
sible to date accurately. Hippocrates himself was a contemporary of

Socrates, but the Hippocratic corpus we have is believed to be composed

of texts by various authors written at various times, all attributed to
Hippocrates. But the author of 'The Sacred Disease', if not Hippocrates
himself, was probably a younger contemporary of Socrates, so Aristotle
could have been familiar with the theories of this text.74
The 'sacred disease' is epilepsy, and the Hippocratic author refutes
the claim that it is caused by the gods by explaining how it is really
caused by a certain dysfunctional state of the brain. Along the way he
states his view that the brain is the center of consciousness, and this text
is the first explicit formulation of such a belief. But air still has a vital role
to play, as it did in Diogenes of Apollonia. The author says that when
we breathe air in through our nose and mouth the air first goes through
our brain, then part of it goes to our stomach to cool it off, and the other
part goes to our lungs and blood-vessels to be dispersed to the rest of the
body. Of this latter type of air he says 'It induces intelligence and is
necessary for the movement of the limbs' (#10), but there is no explana-
tion given of how this works.
He later says of the brain itself:
So long as it is healthy, it is the interpreter of what is derived from the

air. Consciousness is caused by air. The eyes, ears, tongue, hands and
feet perform actions which are planned by the brain, for there is a
measure of conscious thought throughout the body proportionate to
the amount of air which it receives. The brain is also the organ of
comprehension, for when a man draws in a breath it reaches the brain
first, and thence is dispersed into the rest of the body, having left behind
in the brain its vigor and whatever pertains to consciousness and
intelligence. (#19)
This is sounding more like Aristotle, with air apparently functioning

something like his πνεύμα does, although as in Diogenes this is just the
ordinary external air we breathe in from the environment. The author of
"The Sacred Disease' gives us no details to explain how air and brain do
what they do, but it sounds as if the air must somehow carry into the
brain all perceptual information. It is very unclear how this could work
74 On the dating of this work see W.H.S. Jones's introduction, Hippocrates Vol. II, Loeb
edition, 134.

since this air enters through our nose and mouth, not our sense organs,
and the author does not try to make it work. Of course he is interested
in finding the cause of disease so as to cure it, so theories of perception,
thought, and bodily movement are very peripheral to his goal.
This Hippocratic author specifically attacks those who believe we
think and feel with our heart. Likewise, when Aristotle, in de Partibus
Animalium II10, is defending his view that the heart is the central organ
of perception he specifically attacks those who say it is the brain. Since
the date of 'The Sacred Disease' is unknown, we cannot say who knew
whom; but by the time that text was written, and certainly by Aristotle's
time, the battle lines between brain and heart were drawn.75
In the generation after Aristotle's death we know a little bit about two
physiologists, Diocles of Carystus and Praxagoras of Cos. There is a
striking difference between pre- and post-Aristotelian physiology, and
that is the role of πνεύμα. Once Aristotle introduced πνεύμα to explain
perception and bodily motion, all subsequent physiology presupposed
its existence. The argument then was only about what channels it flowed
through, and disagreement over the central organ — brain or heart —
also continued.
Diocles and Praxagoras agreed that πνεύμα issues forth from the heart
and spreads to the rest of the body through the blood-vessels,76 but
Praxagoras distinguished arteries from veins and said that πνεύμα runs
through the arteries while the veins contain blood (fr. 9 and 85). One
fragment says that the arteries are channels 'through which voluntary
motion (ή κατάπροαιρεσιν κίνησις) is imparted to the body' (fr.75). There
is nothing else in Praxagoras to explain what this means or how motion
is thus imparted, but since the arteries are full of πνεύμα it obviously
makes πνεύμα responsible for transmitting bodily movement. This
claim, coupled with Praxagoras' belief that the πνεΰμα originates in the
heart, which is the central organ, suggests that this fragment presup-
poses Aristotle's description of bodily motion in de Motu Animalium. It
75 In fact there are two Hippocratic works which suggest that the heart is the center of
thought: The short fragment On the Diseases of Maidens (Sigerist, A History of Medicine
Vol. II, 287); and On the Heart #10:'... man's intelligence, the principle which rules
over the rest of the soul, is situated in the left chamber [of the heart]' (Hippocratic
Writings, ed. Lloyd, 351).
76 Diocles fr. 59, Praxagoras fr. 70 and 74 (in Stekerl)

is likely that Praxagoras accepts Aristotle's philosophical theory explain-

ing movement, but modifies it in the light of this own distinction between
arteries and veins. It is noteworthy that Praxagoras defends the heart as
the center when the Hippocratic school claimed it was the brain.
Finally we have Herophilus and Erasistratus, two Alexandrian phy-
sicians famous for not only human dissection, but also human vivisec-
tion. They were active during the time of Cleanthes and Chrysippus, the
second and third heads of the Stoa. They discovered the nerves, and
distinguished the sensory nerves responsible for perception from the
motor nerves responsible for movement. They proved by dissection that
the nerves originated in the brain, and thus claimed the brain to be the
central organ and source of thought and perception. This was thereafter
the accepted scientific view, which makes it significant that Chrysippus
rejected the best scientific evidence of his time and instead embraced the
outdated Aristotelian and Praxagorean view that the heart is the central
organ.77
Erasistratus, like Praxagoras, believed the arteries were full of πνεΰμα
while the veins contained blood, but added that the nerves too were filled
with πνεΰμα. In fact, he described the nerves as 'that through which
voluntary motions are brought about,'78 almost exactly the same words
Praxagoras had used of the πνεΰμα-filled arteries. Thus πνεΰμα retained
its Aristotelian functions of enabling the body to move and perceive. But
again, as with Diogenes, this πνεΰμα originates as air breathed in from
the environment, and is mysteriously changed from air to πνεΰμα within
the body. Aristotle on the contrary believed the πνεΰμα to be innate, a
special type of substance analogous to the ether composing the stars, and
which transmits the form of the human soul from parent to offspring.
Now with this very brief survey of ancient physiology in mind we
must ask, could any of this be the source of Chrysippus' theory of how
our wants are translated into bodily movement? I think the answer is no.
There is an obvious continuity among the theories I have just de-
scribed. First, all are concerned to various degrees with how perceptual
information travels through the body. But this was an ancient question,
77 Of course, he had philosophical reasons for keeping the mind in the heart. On this
see Annas' Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, 25 and 68-70.
78 Galen, On Melancholy 5

and Empedocles was perhaps the first to venture an answer with his
doctrine of effluences and channels or pores through which these parti-
cles travel. He even said that we think with the blood around our heart
(fr. 105), which may suggest that the heart was the central organ for him,
although I doubt Empedocles thought in such terms. Aristotle and the
Hippocratic author were the first to explicitly centralize thought and
perception in one organ, and it is only after Aristotle that we see physi-
ologists and philosophers taking sides. Praxagoras and Chrysippus
agreed with Aristotle that the heart was central, while Herophilus and
Erasistratus proved the Hippocratic author right.
Second, many of these doctors and physiologists were interested in
the mechanics of how the body moves. The two above-mentioned frag-
ments of Praxagoras and Erasistratus associating πνεύμα with voluntary
motion are tantalizing evidence of what may have been fully developed
theories of movement. There is undoubtedly a fascinating story to tell
about the corresponding development of philosophical and physiologi-
cal theories of perception and voluntary movement.79 Nevertheless,
however we explain the relationship between philosophers and physi-
ologists, the fact remains that there is in the medical fragments nothing
like Aristotle's theory of desires causing the expansion and contraction
of πνεύμα in the heart which in turn moves the body, and this is what we
find in Stoic fragments which is peculiarly Aristotelian. My survey of the
physiologists here is of necessity cursory, but the most detailed reading
of them will not turn up any evidence of the expansion-contraction
theory I find common to Aristotle and Chrysippus. It is of course logically
possible that the Stoics decided to make impulses expansions and con-
tractions of πνεύμα in the heart independently of Aristotle, but that just
does not seem likely considering the spatial and temporal proximity of
the inventor of this peculiar theory. It is also possible that Diogenes or
Praxagoras or even some unknown natural philosopher developed this
theory, and the Stoics borrowed from that source rather than Aristotle;
it is even possible that there is some unknown source from which both
Aristotle and the Stoics borrowed, thus accounting for the similarities in
their views; but a text supporting these possibilities has yet to be un-
earthed, and scholars must base their interpretations and hypotheses on
79 See, for instance, Solmsen's 'Greek Philosophy and the Discovery of the Nerves'.

the evidence we do have. All things considered then, it is most likely that
Chrysippus did adopt Aristotle's description of the physiology of ac-
tion.80
University of Akron
Department of Philosophy
302 Olin Hall
Akron OH 44325-1903
U.S.A.
psakezles@uakron.edu
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Aristotle and Chrysippus On The Physiology of Human Action PDF

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Anstotle and Chrysippus on the

Physiology of Human Action

1 On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato 1.6.13

APEIRON a journal for ancient philosophy and science

as original rather than as responding, positively or negatively, to Aris-

2 'Aristotle and the Stoics: A Methodological Crux', 300-1

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In Part 11 will describe Aristotle's physiological theory of how the soul

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(1) 'Nothing which is not desiring or avoiding something moves

I have as yet found no argument anywhere for the premise of this

Since appetite is a species of desire it is obvious why sensation implies

See Nussbaum's De Motu Animahum, Essay 5 (221-68), for an excellent analysis of

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have sensitive imagination.8 In chapter 11 he seems to think that even

8 43339-12,433b29-30; and chapter 11,434a5-7.

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practical intellect can produce locomotion. But imagination must count

Exactly how 'the object of desire produces movement' is explained in

These four parts involved in an instance of desire are:

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bodily', and is found in a sort of joint because 'everything is

(3) That which is moved — this is the animal.

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syllogism may at least sometimes be only an explanatory device used to

For whenever a creature is actually using sense-perception or imagina-

This explains the psychological aspect of the movement of animals and

10 See Nussbaum's De Motu Ammalium, Essay 4, on this view.

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This psychological/physiological link is explained a bit further in MA 8.

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Aristotle claims that feelings of desire or avoidance are necessarily

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mechanics involved in this region: 'So that when, because of sense-per-

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these' (703b8-ll). The non-voluntary are the automatic, unconscious,

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19 This continuity is explicitly argued for by Peck in Appendix B of his GA (especially

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As long as the arteries were not functionally differentiated from the

Thus, there must be a continuous system of πνεΰμα in place from the

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can be attributed to Aristotle with some confidence, I think, although it

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Chrysippus used the spider analogy to make the same point:

As materialists it is easier for the Stoics to explain soul-body interaction,

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33 Hierocles, Elements of Ethics 4.38-53 (LS 53B[6]-[9])

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here.37 Most likely, either assent temporally precedes impulse, or they

37 See Inwood 42-66, and Annas 97-8.

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Passion is no different from reason, and there is no dissension and

This monistic psychology, allowing disobedience to reason but not

44 2.88-89; SVF 3.378, part; LS 65A(4)

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is present' (4.2.1).47 Galen complains that Chrysippus then contradicts

Galen adds that Chrysippus sometimes mentions 'expansions'

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B) On this point [i.e., his holding the passions to be judgments], he

C) Distress is an irrational contraction (συστολή), or a fresh opinion that